Agrégateur de flux

Les Bourses mondiales ont fortement reculé le 5 août, prises de panique sur l'évolution de l'économie américaine, les investisseurs se montrant très méfiants en plein été, une période traditionnellement propice à la prudence.

ENTRETIEN - Ministre démissionnaire de l’Égalité femmes-hommes, l’ancienne patronne des députés macronistes appelle à la nomination « d’un nouveau premier ministre qui donne une nouvelle impulsion », en évoquant Xavier Bertrand, Michel Barnier et Gérard Larcher.

 La localité d’Eringeti dans le territoire de Beni (Nord-Kivu) a enregistré depuis trois mois une baisse de l’insécurité. La jeunesse locale salue cet état des faits.

Selon son président, Fabrice Muhangi, cette accalmie est le fruit d’une collaboration entre les jeunes et l’armée. Il encourage la jeunesse à poursuivre cette collaboration avec les FARDC, jusqu’à l’éradication totale de l’insécurité dans la région:

La « candidate » du Nouveau Front populaire pour Matignon cherche à occuper le terrain malgré une actualité politique largement éclipsée par les Jeux olympiques.

 La Ligue de la zone Afrique pour la défense des droits des enfants et élèves (LIZADEEL), condamne le meurtre de son point focal de Demba. Il a été retrouvé mort sur la route et son corps en décomposition alors qu’il se rendait à Kananga. 

Le coordonnateur provincial de la LIZADEEL,  Jean-Malhis Lungala, qui annonce que le premier suspect est aux arrêts, souhaite que lumière soit faite sur le décès de ce défenseur des droits de l’homme, abattu lâchement.

Verbraucherorganisationen werfen dem Programm für künstliche Intelligenz (KI) von X vor, gegen die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) zu verstoßen. Am Montag (5. August) hatten sie bei der irischen Datenschutzkommission (DPC) Beschwerde eingereicht.

Israels fährt eine Politik der strategischen Zweideutigkeit in Bezug auf sein Atomwaffenarsenal. Das mache es „schwierig zu wissen“, wie nahe dran die derzeitige Krise im Nahen Osten an einem Atomkrieg ist, eine Gruppe von Atomwaffengegnern.

While the RMS Titanic is, by far, the most storied ocean liner in history, the most storied ocean liner in United States history is, likely, the aptly named SS United States.

Built in the postwar period between 1950 and 1951, the United States Lines SS United States is the largest ocean liner ever built domestically. The SS United States is also the fastest ocean liner to ever cross the Atlantic Ocean. In fact, the SS United States still holds the Blue Riband (an unofficial accolade awarded to the ocean liner with the fastest Atlantic Crossing), which she has held since her maiden voyage in 1952.

Designing the United States

William Francis Gibbs was credited with designing the SS United States. Curiously, Gibbs began his career as an attorney but gained notoriety as a project manager in the restoration of a German ocean liner. Eventually, Gibbs and his brother would become prominent warship designers during World War II, with credits to their names including the Liberty-class and Fletcher-class. Gibbs was especially known for efficient hull designs and propulsion – which would come into play as he designed the SS United States.

The SS United States cost $79 million to construct – most of which the United States government underwrote. The vessel was built to the demanding specifications of the US Navy, which called for the vessel to be strictly compartmentalized, and to feature separate engine rooms. The reason for the stringent safety standards: the Navy wanted to be able to convert the SS United States into a warship, with minimal transition time, in the event she was needed for wartime service.

Gibbs built the SS United States to the Navy’s standards – and also to his own standards. The propulsion system, as was Gibbs’s calling card, was efficient. The vessel featured eight M-Type boilers capable of generating 310,000 pounds of steam per hour. The boilers were split into two separate engine rooms, as per the Navy’s requirements. Four were located forward, and four others were located after. Steam from the boilers turned four Westinghouse double-redaction geared turbines. Each turbine was capable of producing 60,000 horsepower, for a combined 240,000 horsepower. The turbines led to four shafts,  which in turn led to four propellers. The two outermost propellers had four blades while the innermost two had five blades. The unorthodox blade configuration helped to reduce cavitation and vibration and allowed the SS United States to achieve her record-breaking speeds.

Breaking Records for SS United States 

The top speed of the SS United States is still disputed, after being withheld as sensitive military information. Different sources have published different top speeds, ranging from between thirty-five knots and forty-three knots. The true speed is believed to be about thirty-eight knots per hour.

The vessel’s speed was put to good use on her maiden voyage, in 1952, when the SS United States crossed the Atlantic Ocean, from New York, New York to Cornwall, United Kingdom in just here days, ten hours, and forty minutes. The run was fast enough to earn the Blue Riband, which has not been relinquished in the seventy years since. On her return voyage, the SS United States set a record for the fastest westbound voyage, with a run of three days, twelve hours, and twelve minutes.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

A look at Lesotho, where more people take their own lives than anywhere else in the world.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Marine Corps’ VMFA-311 “Tomcats” squadron has achieved initial operational capability with the F-35C Lightning II, marking a significant milestone in readiness for carrier-based operations.

-This achievement means the squadron is fully equipped and trained to deploy in combat if needed. The F-35C’s advanced capabilities make it a critical asset for air superiority, close air support, and intelligence missions.

-The Marine Corps has a total order of 420 F-35s, including 67 F-35Cs, emphasizing the importance of these aircraft in future operations.

The F-35C Is Now All About the Tomcats 

The U.S. Marine Corps tactical aviation community achieved an important milestone this week after its second fighter jet squadron achieved initial operational capability with the F-35C Lightning II stealth fighter jet.

Designed for aircraft carrier operations, the newest F-35C squadron is now combat-ready in the event of a contingency.

The “Tomcats” Are Ready

Last week, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 311 “Tomcats” declared initial operational capability and is ready to fly the F-35C to war if necessary.

“I am incredibly proud of the Marines and Sailors in this squadron as they hit this critical milestone that ensures greater lethality and operational readiness for the Wing, the Marine Corps, and the joint force,” U.S. Marine Corps major general James Wellons, the commanding general of 3rd MAW, said in a press release.

Achieving initial operational capability is a big milestone and signifies that the unit has the aircraft, the right equipment, and the necessary trained pilots and maintainers.

“Initial operational capability is a milestone and achievement in readiness. It’s all on the backs of the Marines out there. What they do in their day-to-day actions is what made this possible,” Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fisher, the commanding officer of VMFA-311, stated.

Previously, the squadron flew the AV-88 Harrier and F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets.

“Nothing changes for us, our pursuit of excellence and how we carry ourselves, initial operational capability is a byproduct of daily competency and being good at our job,” Fisher added. “It is a great accomplishment, but when we wake up the next day, we are going to keep doing the same thing. Now full operational capability is the goal.”

F-35C activity is picking up. Only a few days ago, the Navy announced the forward deployment of an F-35C squadron in Japan to be close to China, Russia, and North Korea. And now, the Marine Corps announced the second operational F-35C squadron.

“The Tomcats have a storied history that includes legends such as Ted Williams and John Glenn, and participation in every major conflict since World War II. Today’s Marines add another chapter to that legacy with the introduction of the F-35C and fifth-generation capabilities to VMFA-311,” Wellons added.

The Marine Corps has ordered a total of 420 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. Broken down, the order is for about 353 F-35B aircraft, which rely on a Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) mechanism to take off and land, and sixty-seven F-35Cs. The Marine Corps is the biggest customer of the F-35B (the United Kingdom has ordered 138 F-35Bs, Japan forty-two F-35Bs, Italy thirty F-35Bs, and Singapore twelve F-35Bs). It is also one of the only two customers for the F-35C, with the U.S. Navy being the other and biggest one with an order for 273 F-35Cs.

A fifth-generation, multirole fighter jet, the F-35 Lightning II can conduct six mission sets: Air Superiority, Close Air Support, Strategic Attack, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and Destruction Enemy Air Defense (DEAD). The aircraft comes in three versions: the F-35A, the conventional take-off and landing version; the F-35B, which is a STOVL aircraft; and the F-35C, which is designed for carrier operations.

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Un an après la destitution et l'emprisonnement du maire élu d'Himara, Fredi Beleri, des élections anticipées étaient organisées dans cette ville de la côte albanaise où vit une importante minorité grecque. Sans surprise, c'est le candidat socialiste qui l'a emporté, alors que de grands projets immobiliers prolifèrent à Himara.

- Le fil de l'Info / Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Politique, Relations régionales

En Allemagne, sur le marché de la voiture électrique, les ventes ont une nouvelle fois chuté de 37% le mois passé, selon une enquête mensuelle de l’Institut économique allemand publiée le lundi 5 août. C’est la plus forte baisse depuis décembre. De son côté, le constructeur allemand Infineon, qui produit, entre autres, des semi-conducteurs pour ces voitures électriques, a annoncé des coupes dans ses effectifs.

How a grassroots uprising toppled Sheikh Hasina.

As the rise of multipolarity is testing the resilience of the liberal international order, states are rushing to decouple economically from their political competitors. This makes Central Asia a focal point for geopolitical competition, with global and regional powers vying for influence.

Central Asia is a critical region due to its abundant natural resources and geographic position. Rich in oil, gas, and rare minerals, the region also serves as a crucial transit corridor linking the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. These facts elevate Central Asia’s importance for Russian, Iranian, and Chinese strategic calculations.

Due to increased international isolation after its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is now increasingly relying on Central Asia as a sanction evasion hub and an export and transport route for energy exports. China, whose regional interest was focused on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is now also aiming to secure cheap energy and raw materials and hedge against Europe’s potential economic decoupling. Tehran aims to leverage its cultural ties to develop strategic transport corridors that bypass its rivals, enhancing its influence and mitigating economic isolation.

The three states’ competing visions for a regional order in Central Asia are giving rise to diverging interests in the security, energy, and trade spheres, which the West could leverage to deepen its engagement with the region.

1) Security

Russia, China, and Iran share a common interest in countering U.S. influence in Central Asia. After 9/11, the United States established military bases, like the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in Uzbekistan, to support operations in Afghanistan. After the closure of these bases, U.S. strategy shifted towards security cooperation programs focusing on training and joint exercises. The United States continues to engage in Central Asia to balance Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence while promoting the stability and independence of Central Asian states, which the three powers view as a direct challenge to their regional dominance and strategic interests. Counterterrorism is also a shared preoccupation for Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia. Concerns about ISIS and Al-Qaeda have led to security cooperation and intelligence-sharing through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Iran was admitted as a full member in 2023.

In spite of these shared interests, Russia, China, and Iran have conflicting aims in Central Asia, in particular regarding security dominance. Russia has the most significant military presence, with major bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and it leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). To counterbalance Russia’s dominance without challenging it directly, China has expanded its security engagement through the SCO and established a rapid-response military outpost in Tajikistan. At the same time, Iran seeks to make up for its lack of military presence in the region through security and economic partnerships.

Another pain point is their differing approaches to Islamist groups. While all three states oppose extremism, they disagree on which groups should be classed as such. Iran has historically supported Islamist movements in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Russia and China, on the other hand, see Islamic movements as regional and domestic security threats. Russia sees IMU as a significant security threat due to its connections with Chechnya militants. Similarly, Russia views Hizb ut-Tahrir as destabilizing due to its radical ideology and purported desire to establish a caliphate. China shares similar concerns regarding IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir as a direct threat to regional stability and its interests in Xinjiang.

This divergence complicates trilateral cooperation in addressing security threats, as each country prioritizes its strategic alliances and ideological stances. At the same time, Central Asian states are weary of overreliance on Russia for border and regional security, seeking to diversify their security partners to hedge against Russian domination. While the regional sentiment is not currently favorable to increased military cooperation with the West, policymakers should monitor the evolution of these different regional security doctrines to detect a more favorable timing for security re-engagement with Central Asian Republics.

2) Energy

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent loss of the European gas market has led to the temporary convergence of Russia and China’s energy interests in Central Asia. This has left Central Asian states with narrowing space for maneuver. While Central Asian countries are eager to reduce their dependence on China and Russia, the West’s ability to step up is severely hindered in the short term by the lack of viable alternative export routes.

The reversal of the flow of gas in the Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline system in October 2023 marked the first time in which Russian gas was imported to the ex-Soviet Republics and, thus, to China via Uzbekistan. While the far-reaching partnership that Russia envisioned with its proposal for a “Trilateral Gas Union” with Astana and Tashkent did not materialize, Gazprom committed to supply 2.8 billion cubic meters of gas yearly to Uzbekistan. 

With this deal, Tashkent hopes to alleviate its chronic winter energy shortage, which led to the almost complete stoppage of energy exports. Kazakhstan has also reportedly sought to take advantage of its newfound role as a transport corridor for Russian energy exports to China. Astana’s decision was partly spurred by Western energy companies’ reticence to commence new projects and their reported intention to divest from the region due to sanctions risks.

Russian gas has become a key source of cheap energy for China, with recent exports surpassing Turkmenistan. China is leveraging its position in this buyer’s market by demanding better prices from Moscow for a new gas pipeline through eastern Siberia. Beijing and Moscow’s energy relationship remains opportunistic rather than strategic. China and Russia aim to prevent Central Asia from accessing other export markets and limit Iran’s role in the energy market.

Russia’s new role as an energy exporter in Eurasia has altered the status quo in the region, creating urgent dilemmas for the ex-Soviet Republics. Turkmenistan has the most to lose from Russia’s eastward pivot and has frantically looked for new export markets. The outpour of cheaper Russian gas into the Eurasian energy market threatens around 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s state revenues. This has spurred renewed interest in completing the decades-old Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, with new proposals to ship Turkmen gas to Europe via Pakistan. The completion of the TAPI pipeline, however, remains highly uncertain due to its planned passage through Afghanistan.

With the TAPI pipeline nowhere near completion, the other favored route to Europe, a Trans-Caspian pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor via Azerbaijan, is once again on the table. The project was revived in May 2024 with promises of gas delivery to Europe by 2030. While the Trans-Caspian pipeline remains a lynchpin in Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, it may be too little too late to prevent China from securing its dominance in the Turkmen gas market.

The fundamental divergence of interest in Central Asian energy markets between Russia and China on the one hand and Iran on the other should be carefully leveraged by Western nations. The West should focus on becoming an indispensable partner to Central Asia by offering successful energy transition roadmaps and economic diversification. This engagement needs to be sustained long-term, addressing both diplomatic and economic aspects, and coupled with commitments to meet short-term needs to compete with Russia and China effectively. 

However, to incentivize Central Asian nations to reduce their immediate dependency on the Chinese market, Western nations may consider allowing Central Asian states to transit gas and oil through Iran to India. Iran’s limited economic and political influence in Central Asia, along with its recent setbacks in the energy market, makes it less of a regional threat to Western interests. In contrast, India’s energy demand can compete with Chinese imports. This strategy could create more breathing space for regional countries and buy Europe time to build the Trans-Caspian pipeline.

3) Trade

The current commercial landscape in Central Asia provides an ever more favorable, though time-sensitive, prospect for strategic Western engagement. Recent geopolitical conflicts have not fundamentally transformed Iran, China, and Russia’s commercial interest in Central Asia. They have, however, increased its strategic importance for two reasons. Firstly, Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular, have been a critical link in Russia’s sanctions evasion strategy. Secondly, Russia, Iran, and China aim to capitalize on Central Asia’s recent economic growth. If China and Russia have more to gain from cooperating to exclude Iran from the energy market, Iran and China stand to gain from trade cooperation through BRI at the expense of Russia.

Due to Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, China’s trading position in the region has strengthened considerably at the expense of Russia, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, China’s BRI mainly focused on expanding the “Middle Corridor,” connecting Chinese manufacturers with European consumers through Central Asia and Iran while bypassing Russia. The operability of the Middle Corridor could provide a win-win scenario for Europe and China by providing alternative trade routes that can insulate both parties from overreliance on maritime supply chains, which are susceptible to geopolitical shocks and blockades through the Taiwan Strait and the Suez Canal, respectively.

Recent signs, however, point to a temporary lull in China’s commercial projects in the region, driven most likely by adverse domestic economic conditions. In spite of the recent signing of an agreement for the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, China’s foreign direct investment has reportedly slowed down significantly in 2024. This gives Western nations a chance to strengthen their partnership with Central Asian states. Western focus should be on providing the kind of investment that can foster the bottom-up regional growth and cooperation that underpins the B5+1 forum, for example, by building domestic and regional connections outside of the narrow east-west path that China’s BRI follows. 

Once again, these policies will take time to bear fruits, and Western nations will need a short-term tactic to counter Chinese commercial dominance in the region. One option could be to allow India to trade with Central Asian Republics through the Iranian port of Chabahar, for which it had initially obtained a sanctions exemption in 2018. This would play into Iran’s desire to compete with China through the establishment of a north-south corridor, fuelled by the disappointing economic benefits of Iran’s cooperation with Beijing.

Keeping a Finger on the Pulse

The primary driver for cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia is their shared perception of mutual threats. The U.S. presence in the region, with its history of military bases and security cooperation, is seen as challenging its regional dominance. Similarly, the threat of terrorism and extremism, particularly from groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, compels these nations to collaborate on counterterrorism efforts and intelligence sharing.

However, with the United States' relative disengagement from Central Asia and growing competition for its resources, the underlying conflicts of interest among these countries become more apparent. Russia, China, and Iran each aim to secure their energy needs and economic interests, leading to rivalries often masked by their cooperative façade against common threats.

Therefore, while mutual antagonism towards the United States and a desire to reshape the international order currently unites Russia, China, and Iran on a global level in Central Asia, their collaboration is more a strategic convenience than a deep-seated alliance. Beyond the surface, there are more conflicts than commonalities, underscoring the fragile nature of their cooperation in the region.

However, unless Western nations commit to a long-term plan for strategic engagement with Central Asia, it is unlikely that these simmering tensions will drive a wedge in their de facto alignment. To do so, Western countries should enact policies that encourage energy and trade competition among Russia, China, and Iran, as well as with other regional actors such as India and Turkey. This would give space to the Central Asian Republic to hedge by turning the regional dynamic into an economic and diplomatic “sellers’ market.”

Arman Mahmoudian is an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security. He is also a research assistant at the USF Global and National Security Institute, focusing on Russia and the Middle East. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @MahmoudianArman.

Valentina Pegolo is a Junior Consultant at Plenitude Consulting and holds a Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, a Master of Philosophy in International Relations, and a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from the University of Oxford. Her research interests include Iranian foreign policy, political ideology, Eurasian geopolitics, global economic and technological interconnectedness, interstate and transnational political violence, and its relationship to financial crime.

Image: plavi011 / Shutterstock.com. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. is ramping up its military presence in the Middle East, including deploying more fighter jets and warships, in response to escalating threats from Iran and its proxies. The Navy is exploring the use of laser weapons, such as the HELIOS, to counter the growing threat of drone and missile attacks.

-Although progress has been made with laser systems like the LWSD and AN/SEQ-3, these technologies are still in the testing phase.

-Incorporating lasers could significantly enhance the Navy’s defense capabilities against UAV swarms.

Inside the Navy's Plan to Combat Drone Swarms with Laser Technology

The shadow war between Israel and Iran appears to be stepping into the light, and the U.S. is preparing for conflict to grow in the Red Sea. 

Last week, American officials announced that additional fighter jets and Navy warships would be deployed to the Middle East in an effort to thwart escalating threats from Tehran and its regional proxy groups. Since Hamas launched its October 7 massacre against Israel, the U.S. Navy and its allies have shot down scores of attack drones and missiles fired by Iran’s affiliates. In April, Iran directly launched a massive barrage of projectiles toward the Jewish state. While the Israel Defense Forces, the U.S., and other allies intercepted the vast majority of the more than 300 missiles and drones Iran launched, the incident caused officials and analysts to wonder whether a laser system might bolster the U.S. Navy’s efficacy against such barrages.

Earlier this year, Rear Adm. Fred Pyle discussed the service’s progress on developing a laser weapon. High-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwaves (HPMs) in theory could counter unmanned aerial vehicles  and rockets better than existing countermeasures. However, despite years of research on the concept, the Navy has not fielded any laser weapon. “We continue to invest in directed energy capabilities,” Pyle said. “It requires space, weight, power and cooling, which can be a challenge on our current surface combatants.”

Pyle noted that the means the Navy uses in the Middle East right now to defend Israel and commercial shipping are “performing extremely well. But we’re very focused on delivering directed energy capability and we’re building it into the future [budget requests] in mind with our frigate and the DDG(X) [the next-generation destroyer].”

Laser progress over the years

One decade ago, the Navy installed the AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System on the USS Ponce amphibious transport dock. This unique system strikes at the speed of light, roughly 50,000 times the speed of an incoming ICBM. In 2021, the service’s USS Portland test-fired the 150-kilowatt Solid State Laser Technology Maturation Laser Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) in the Gulf of Aden. This LWSD packed five times the power of its AN/SEQ-3 predecessor. Most recently, the Navy installed its HELIOS high-energy laser on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Capable of blasting more than 60 kilowatts of directed energy toward targets, this weapon is perhaps the most promising.  

Although the incorporation of laser technology on every warship would be significant for the Navy as the threat of swarm UAV attacks rises, the service has been unable to fully field any directed-energy tool so far. 

Navy warships carry a finite supply of munitions, so a vast enough volley of enemy UAVs is a real threat. The Standard Missile-2 is a formidable asset, but the introduction of laser weapons would certainly elevate the Navy’s ability to thwart enemy bombardments.

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

L'Ukraine rejette les accusations de soutien au terrorisme international lancées par le Mali. Dimanche soir, Bamako annonçait « la rupture avec effet immédiat de ses relations diplomatiques » avec Kiev, accusant son gouvernement d'être directement responsable de l'attaque menée par les groupes rebelles du CSP et des djihadistes du JNIM contre l'armée malienne à Tinzaouatène, dans le nord du pays.

Summary and Key Points: Ukraine has received its first batch of F-16 fighter jets, a significant development in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed confidence in the jets' potential impact.

-However, questions remain about their effectiveness given the limited number delivered and the strength of Russian air defenses.

-Additionally, concerns about potential Russian escalation in response to the F-16s have been raised, though a major escalation seems unlikely. The effectiveness of these jets and the broader impact on the war will be closely watched.

F-16s Arrive in Ukraine: What’s Next for the Conflict?

After months of lobbying and waiting and wanting, Ukraine has received its first batch of donated F-16 fighter jets. Ukraine, which pressed the United States and its allies zealously for the single-engine, fourth-generation fighters, hopes the new jets will change the momentum in the Russo-Ukrainian War in favor of the Ukrainian resistance. 

“F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it. I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said. “These jets are in our sky and today you see them. It’s good that they are here and that we can put them to use.”

Now that the F-16s are finally in Ukraine, months of speculation end. Whether the F-16s are effective will be determined, and whether the Russians escalate in response will be seen.

Will the Russians Escalate?

One reason the U.S. and NATO allies had reservations about sending the F-16 to Ukraine was the fear of a reactive Russian escalation. But escalation as a direct response to F-16s arriving in Ukraine seems unlikely. 

For one, the West has been supplying the Ukrainian resistance for years. In principle, very little is different about the F-16. Second, Russia’s options for escalation are limited. It could perhaps carry out strikes in Poland to intercept weapons shipments, or deploy a tactical nuke. But those are serious moves. A proportional escalation, something befitting the shipment of fourth-generation fighter jets, might be difficult to devise. Russia has proven wisely hesitant to directly confront NATO. The wisdom of doing so now has not changed. 

Similarly, Russia so far has not been willing to deploy a tactical nuke. It seems unlikely that a shipment of F-16s would be the tipping point that pushes Putin to be the first world leader since 1945 to use a nuclear weapon in combat.

Still, the risk of Russian escalation is higher after the F-16 shipment, which brings up the question of whether, from the U.S. and NATO perspective, it is worthwhile.

Will the F-16s Be Effective?

The F-16’s impact on the battlefield will likely be more modest than Zelensky led his people to believe.

According to Ukrainian officials, Ukraine will need 130 F-16s to neutralize Russian air power. The exact number of F-16s just delivered to Ukraine was not disclosed, but we can assume the number is nowhere near 130. That means the F-16s will not be able to neutralize Russian air power and will be vulnerable to Russia’s advanced air defense systems. And because the F-16s are so precious to the Ukrainians, we can expect the new jets to be used conservatively, meaning they will not likely make a significant impact on the outcome of this intractable conflict.

About the Author: Harrison Kass, Defense Expert 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.   

Summary and Key Points: The F/A-18, a fourth-generation fighter jet, is an enduring symbol of advanced aviation technology. Originally developed from the YF-17, which failed to win the Air Force's Lightweight Fighter (LWF) competition, the F/A-18 found new life when the Navy adopted and adapted it into a versatile aircraft.

-Known for its agility, thrust-to-weight ratio, and ability to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, the F/A-18 has evolved from the Hornet to the Super Hornet, serving as a critical asset for the U.S. Navy for over four decades.

F/A-18: The Fighter Jet That Almost Wasn't but Became a Legend

The fourth generation of fighter aircraft has been the most enduring and widely used. Fourth-generation aircraft first emerged in the 1970s and are still relevant today, even if they no longer represent the best of fighter jet technology. 

One of the generation’s most iconic and prominent aircraft is the F/A-18, which recently starred alongside Tom Cruise in Top Gun: Maverick. But the F/A-18 almost never was. The airframe was developed from a bid that failed to impress the U.S. Air Force. Fortunately, the Navy saw great potential in a jet the Air Force had discarded.

The LWF Program

Before the F/A-18, there was the YF-17 – a prototype lightweight fighter built specifically to win the Air Force’s Lightweight Fighter (LWF) bid. 

The LWF, as its name implies, was an effort to field a smaller, lighter, cheaper fighter in response to the belief that aircraft like the F-15 were too large and expensive for certain mission profiles. Two prototypes were considered: the single-engine YF-16, and the two-engine YF-17. The YF-16 won and became the venerable F-16 Fighting Falcon, so the program did work out, supplying the Air Force with an exemplary lightweight fighter that has been in service for almost 50 years. But the Air Force also passed on an exemplary lightweight fighter – a jet that caught the attention of the Navy, which had also been present to observe LWF testing.

The VFAX Program

The Navy also needed a small, cheap fighter, specifically to complement the large and expensive F-111, and to replace the aging F-4. The YF-17, the losing bidder from the Air Force’s LWF program, fit the bill. 

The YF-17 was understood to be capable of meeting all of the Navy’s requirements, including air superiority performance, fleet air defense, escort attack, air to ground attack, long loitering time, long range, and an appropriate approach speed for carrier landings. The YF-17 hit all the right specifications, was redesigned to more perfectly match the Navy’s needs, and was redesignated as the F/A-18.    

Introducing the F/A-18

The F/A-18 was ahead of its time, which is why the airframe is still relevant today, 45 years after taking its first flight. Well, the airframe was updated along the way, and the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet has since become the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, with the original Hornet being retired in 2019. But the Super Hornet shares much in common with the original airframe.

With two engines and a midwing design, the F/A-18 is capable of conducting a variety of mission sets. With a solid thrust-to-weight ratio and a digital fly-by-wire system, plus leading edge extensions, the F/A-18 is highly maneuverable. The trapezoidal wings are swept back 20 degrees and the vertical stabilizers are canted, enabling a high angle of attack in flight.

The F/A-18 has proven its worth in air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, and it has been the workhorse of the U.S. Navy for decades.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

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Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Virginia-class submarine program is facing significant delays, with the USS Massachusetts (SSN-798) now expected to be delivered in early 2025 instead of late 2024.

-This marks yet another setback for the program, which is already running three years behind schedule. Huntington Ingalls Industries reported a minor disruption during testing, causing the delay.

-The USS Arkansas (SSN-800), the next submarine in line, is also behind schedule but is reportedly making progress. These delays highlight ongoing challenges in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, with only three of the ten Block IV Virginia-class submarines currently deployed.

Problems Continue With the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class Submarines

In February, Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipping launched the future Virginia-class nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Massachusetts (SSN-798). The boat was transferred from a construction facility to a floating dry dock, the company announced. Once there, it began the final outfitting, testing, and crew certification in advance of the ship being handed over to the U.S. Navy.

SSN-798 is the 25th submarine of the Virginia class and the 12th that will be delivered by NNS, but that delivery is running late. Part of the issue is that NNS operates one of just two shipyards capable of designing and then building nuclear-powered submarines for the Navy.

"During the quarter, SSN-798 construction team experienced a minor disruption to Massachusetts’ test program due to some equipment replacement identified during testing,”HII president and CEO Chris Kastner told investors on an August 1 quarterly call with investment analysts. “The disruption has been resolved, and the team is back into the test program making steady progress. It does, however, shift delivery from late 2024 to early 2025. We are reaffirming our shipbuilding margin outlook for the year.

"We're marching towards delivery on 798," Kastner added. "We did have that minor move on the milestone, but they're making progress on the test program now. And it's a good team on it. It's a good crew. It's a good leadership. So I fully expect 798 will resolve at the beginning of next year."

Not Just a Mass Problem for Virginia-Class

Kastner also said that the future Virginia-class submarine USS Arkansas (SSN-800) – the next of the boats in line – was running late but was "making progress."

The future USS Massachusetts and USS Arkansas are two of 10 Block IV Virginia-class submarines. The program as a whole is now running about three years behind schedule. Just three boats of the block have been deployed.

The Bay State Boat

When SSN-798 enters service, she will be the eighth vessel named for the Bay State, and the first since the South Dakota-class fast battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59) was retired in 1947.

The first ship named for the New England state was a "Revenue-Marine" cutter that was in service for just one year. It was followed by a sloop that served with the U.S. Navy for about a decade until 1804.

Notably, two warships named USS Massachusetts were never completed. Those included the Kalamazoo-class monitor and a battleship of the first South Dakota class, which was canceled following the Washington Naval Treaty in 1923. Two battleships did bear the name, including BB-2, an Indiana-class battleship that saw action in the Spanish-American War, and the aforementioned BB-59.

The Navy will have to accept that later is better than never. Unlike those two battle wagons that never sailed, it does look like SSN-798 will finally enter service next year.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.