Agrégateur de flux

Le charbon russe continue d’arriver en Pologne, bien que ce pays ait été l’un des premiers à appeler au boycott des ressources naturelles russes, selon des enregistrements publiés par le sénateur Krzysztof Brejza.

Sehova sem költözik a Bánffy-palotából a Művészeti Múzeum – mondja Vákár István, a Kolozs Megyei Tanács alelnöke. A kijelentés azután történt, hogy szeptember közepén Lucian Nastasă-Kovács a múzeum igazgatója bejelentette: felszólítást kapott arra, hogy át kell adnia a Művészeti Múzeumnak otth...

Germany on Thursday (28 September) signed a deal to acquire the Israeli-made Arrow 3 hypersonic missile system that will become a key part of Europe's defence against air attack.

Major changes to the Australian Army's capability and structure including the transfer of key combat units from South Australia to the country's north were announced by...

Austria has made a renewed push to support EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, naming possible policy areas for advancing 'gradual integration', according to a non-paper prepared for next week's informal EU summit in Granada, seen by Euractiv.

 

Plusieurs maisons sont inondées dans la cellule Kisathiro de la commune de Mangina, à une trentaine de kilomètres de la ville de Beni (Nord-Kivu). Selon Akilimali Paluku, chef de cette cellule, ces inondations sont dues à la crue de la rivière Makeke qui déborde en saison pluvieuse.

Certains habitants ont été contraints de quitter leurs habitations pour trouver refuge dans des milieux plus habitables.

Le gouvernement tchèque a approuvé l’achat de 24 avions de combat F-35, s’ajoutant ainsi à un groupe croissant de pays européens qui attendent la livraison de cet avion de pointe.

L’Association des femmes pour la promotion et le développement endogène () a remis symboliquement mardi 26 septembre une morgue et deux blocs de maternité à la zone de santé de la Ruzizi, dans la cité de Sange dans le territoire d’Uvira (Sud-Kivu).

A kolozsvári Polgármesteri Hivatal növelné az ingyenes fogászati ellátásra jogosultságot nyújtó jövedelemküszöböt. A városháza közvitára bocsátotta azt a tervezetet, amelynek értelmében a legtöbb 1500 lejes nyugdíjban részesülők jogosultak az ingyenes fogászati kezelésre. Jelenleg a program kedvezmé...

 

De nombreuses habitations de la ville d’Uvira (Sud-Kivu) sont inondées par les eaux de pluie, depuis la soirée de mercredi 27 septembre. Les quartiers les plus touchés sont Kalimabenge et Kasenga/Muramvya. Plusieurs ménages ont perdu leurs biens emportés par les eaux. 

 

As the European Union finalises its hydrogen and gas rulebook, key issues remain on how to remunerate network operators for building and maintaining Europe’s future hydrogen grid.

L'armée ukrainienne est engagée dans une course contre-la-montre dans sa contre-offensive à l'approche de l’automne. Régulièrement, des voix s’élèvent pour demander plus de moyens pour les militaires. C’est le cas à Odessa, où depuis un mois, des dizaines de personnes manifestent devant la mairie.

L’ancienne ministre rwandaise prendra le 1er octobre la tête du bureau Afrique de l’Organisation internationale, où elle remplace la Nigériane Cynthia Samuel-Olonjuwon.

Depuis le début de l’année, plus de 130 000 migrants sont arrivés en Italie par la mer, contre 70 000 pour la même période en 2022 - Crédits : ChiccoDodiFC / iStock

Mercredi 27 septembre, l’Allemagne a décidé de renforcer les contrôles mobiles à ses frontières avec la Pologne et la République tchèque “où les flux de migrants sont en forte hausse”, explique Courrier International. La mise en place de contrôles renforcés “vise notamment à lutter plus sévèrement contre les passeurs”, détaille Der Spiegel.

À LIRE AUSSIImmigration illégale : l’Allemagne renforce le contrôle de ses frontières avec la Pologne et la République tchèque Changement d’approche allemande

Longtemps, l’Allemagne a accepté d’ ”accueillir les migrants et les réfugiés arrivant en Italie”, rappelle BFTMV. La décision annoncée mercredi “marque un changement par rapport à l’époque d’Angela Merkel”, note le New York Times. En témoignent les déclarations du ministre des Finances Christian Lindner à la Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Ce dernier estime que son pays “ne peut plus accepter que, depuis la politique d’accueil des réfugiés du gouvernement Merkel, le contrôle de l’accès à [leur] société ait été perdu”.

Le choix de Berlin est dicté par la situation en Italie. Le nombre d’exilés arrivants sur des bateaux en provenance d’Afrique du Nord y a fortement augmenté, conduisant à une situation inédite : “plus de 130 000 migrants enregistrés jusqu’à présent cette année, contre 70 000 pour la même période en 2022″, rapporte Le Parisien. De plus, le gouvernement allemand reproche à Rome de ne pas appliquer les procédures européennes et l’appelle à “mieux protéger les frontières” extérieures de l’UE [France info].

Selon Politico, cette décision radicale relève également de la politique intérieure. Profitant de la crise migratoire, “le parti d’extrême droite AfD a bondi dans les sondages” alors que “des élections se profilent dans plusieurs régions allemandes comme […]  en Hesse, d’où est originaire la ministre allemande de l’Intérieur Nancy Faeser”.

L’espace Schengen en crise

D’autres Etats membres intensifient les contrôles à leurs frontières. “Un quart des pays de l’espace Schengen [a] mis en place des contrôles aux frontières affectant la moitié de la population de l’espace Schengen”, détaille Euractiv.

À LIRE AUSSILe fonctionnement de l’espace Schengen

Après la décision de Berlin, la Pologne a “renvoyé l’ascenseur” en instaurant également des contrôles à ses frontières allemande et slovaque, relève Euractiv. En voyant les images des migrants arrivés à Lampedusa, l’Autriche n’a quant à elle “pas tardé à déclarer qu’elle commencerait à effectuer des contrôles à sa propre frontière avec l’Italie” [Euractiv].

En France également, les contrôles se sont multipliés et ont “abouti à de nombreuses interpellations : 32 000 depuis le début de l’année, 1 400 pour la seule semaine écoulée”, détaille France 3. Le 21 septembre dernier, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne s’est d’ailleurs opposée à la stratégie française, se prononçant “contre le refus systématique d’entrer sur son territoire”, poursuit le média.

Au menu des discussions des Vingt-Sept

Dans ce contexte, “les ministres de l’Intérieur des 27 pays de l’UE se réunissent aujourd’hui à Bruxelles pour trouver un compromis sur l’une des lois les plus controversées du paquet migratoire de l’UE”, rapporte Politico.

“Le gouvernement allemand ne s’opposera plus aux éléments controversés du pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile, malgré l’opposition farouche des Verts au pouvoir, qui affirment que cette décision menacerait l’‘État constitutionnel’ de l’Europe”, résume Euractiv. Les tensions allemandes mises de côté sur le sujet, il y a “de fortes chances qu’un accord soit conclu aujourd’hui”, estime Politico.

Rome et Paris sont également très attentifs à l’issue des discussions sur le pacte. Mardi dernier, le président Emmanuel Macron et la Première ministre italienne Gorgia Meloni avaient souligné ensemble “la nécessité de trouver une solution européenne à la question migratoire”, indique l’Elysée [BFMTV]. “Nous ne pouvons pas laisser les Italiens seuls”, avait pour sa part affirmé le chef d’Etat français quelques jours plus tôt [France 24].

À LIRE AUSSIQu’est-ce que le Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile ? Les autres sujets du jour Economie

• Allemagne : Le PIB devrait se contracter de 0,6% cette année, selon des instituts économiques [Challenges]
• Espagne : forte accélération de l’inflation à 3,5% en septembre [Le Figaro]
• L’Italie, surveillée par les marchés, abaisse ses prévisions de croissance et de déficit [Les Echos]
• Prix des carburants : les aides à la pompe en Allemagne et en Espagne [France Info]

Elections

• A quelques jours des élections législatives, la Slovaquie visée par des campagnes de désinformation [Libération]
• En Espagne, après l’échec de la droite à former une majorité, la balle revient dans le camp du premier ministre Pedro Sanchez [Le Monde]

Migration

• Italie: le gouvernement adopte un décret répressif contre les jeunes migrants [RFI]

Ukraine

• Cinq pays d’Europe centrale veulent maintenir les voies de communication avec la Russie [Euractiv]
• Ukraine : le ministre français des Armées à Kiev pour ancrer l’aide française dans la durée [Les Echos]

L’article Immigration : à l’image de l’Allemagne, les Etats membres renforcent leurs contrôles aux frontières intérieures de l’UE est apparu en premier sur Touteleurope.eu.

 

A New Epidemic of Coups

The recent events in Niger and Gabon show that military coups are again a common trend in African politics. Although the armed forces never ceased playing a role in politics, military coups had become less frequent since the early 1990s. The number of successful coups had continuously declined after 1990 and came to an all-time low of six military coups in the period from 2010 to 2019. Less than four years into this decade, at least eight putsches have succeeded. Burkina Faso and Mali both saw two military takeovers, Guinea one in 2021, and Niger and Gabon one each in July and August 2023, respectively. The developments in Sudan in 2021 constitute an additional case. In Chad, the unconstitutional takeover by Mohamed Déby Jr after the death of his father in 2021 might even bring the count to nine. However, the succession from father to son did confirm the military as the actual power centre of the country. We do not know whether the trend will continue. If no decisive action is taken however, it will be more likely to do so.

Coups Don’t Come out of the Blue

While coup causes are always country-specific, three conditions have been key drivers: acute crises, politicized armed forces and an increasingly self-reinforcing dynamic.

First, all countries were facing crises before the coups and had entrenched socio-economic challenges. Discontent grows when politicians do not deliver public goods, and they lack legitimacy because of corruption. The recent political crises have taken different shapes: Power struggles, such as those between civilian presidents clinging to power despite term limits, have been important sources of crises in Guinea and Gabon. In Mali and Burkina Faso, jihadist insurgencies have spread in West Africa in recent years and intensified instability and dissatisfaction.

Second, a military coup is much more likely in places where the armed forces have previously intervened in politics, which is true for around 40 per cent of all sub-Saharan countries, with West Africa as its epicentre. The specific interests of those within the ranks of the military are often the triggers for coups. The coup in Mali in 2012 was motivated by dissatisfaction with the government’s support in fighting against the rebels, who inflicted heavy casualties. In the recent case of Niger, coup leader Omar Tchiani faced the threat of being ousted as the leader of the presidential guard. Rumours persist that the defence ministry embezzled large amounts of the military budget.

Third, coups breed coups. Successful military takeovers in other countries may inspire further coups and create a self-reinforcing dynamic. A further motivating factor for takeover attempts is that would-be plotters of coups might hope for Russian support, as with the junta in Mali.

Consequences: Rarely Better Governance and Delicate Geopolitical Implications

Given the dissatisfaction with civilian leaders, the military juntas initially enjoy considerable popularity. However, as a rule, military involvement does not improve governance. A military government is not only an indicator of instability but may also lead to further trouble: If the root causes of a coup persist, countries may face additional attempts, as recent events in Burkina Faso and Mali have exemplified. Moreover, military officers – who initially claim to be the “salvation” of the country – often develop a taste for ruling once they are in power. This is frequently accompanied by self-enrichment and serious human rights violations. Yet, there are exceptions. In Mali in 1991 and in Niger in 2010, armed forces ousted authoritarian leaders and went on to become “democratising soldiers”. Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings – after implementing economic experiments that initial failed – led the country to relative prosperity and democracy. Gabon, where an oil-fuelled authoritarian regime was overthrown, has the chance of becoming such a success story.

The recent wave of coups is connected to geopolitical changes, especially Russia’s return to the region and the decline of Western – specifically French – influence. Russia takes advantage of these coups and the offer is straightforward: It provides security support for the regime, often through the infamous Wagner mercenaries, and generates revenues from resource extraction in return. Support for Russia at the international level follows suit. None of the coup countries condemned Russia’s imperialistic aggression against Ukraine. The support from Russia and other countries for military juntas and other authoritarian regimes may accelerate a “new scramble for Africa”. African governments can attract foreign support either from non-Western countries or entice Western countries to turn a blind eye to authoritarian or corrupt governance to keep them in their “camp”.

Addressing Root Causes and Lowering Expectations

It is necessary to adopt a firm stance against military coups and strengthen international and regional anti-coup norms in order to stop the contagion. Professionalizing the armed forces can help. First, the military needs to remain under stable civilian control and refrain from politics. Second, professional armed forces are capable of tackling and – preferably – deterring security challenges, such as the jihadist insurgencies that have indirectly led to the coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Direct military support remains necessary if one does not want security to further deteriorate. However, any long-term strategy requires addressing the socio-economic and political root causes of the coups and other manifestations of instability. The long-term answer is socio-economic and political transformation.

We have no magic bullets to fix the related structural problems quickly. Practitioners and the public expect too much too fast and give up quickly if improvements do not materialise rapidly. However, things can be done. African political leaders must work for the common good and be held accountable to their populations. External actors such as Germany, the European Union (EU) and the United States should evaluate and rethink their policies. Although general concepts such as “security and development” do make sense, instruments such as traditional development cooperation as well as training programmes for African militaries have produced mostly disappointing results.

The European training missions for African militaries share some of the pitfalls of civilian development aid. Programmes are usually designed by Western experts rather than developed according to the needs of local partners. Western instructors apparently refused to train Malian forces in offensive tactics out of fear they would exact vengeance on insurgents and their constituencies. As a result, ownership is lacking and participants view the programmes as sources of income, not as opportunities to improve their professional skills. Relatedly, corruption in the military often undermines efforts to improve their performance.

A revision of the programmes first requires in-depth analysis. We must acknowledge tensions between goals: The coups call for working on the integrity of partners. Security problems – one of the root causes of the coups – require strengthening military capabilities. Western partners need to decide to what extent the latter is conditional on the former. The key is to incentivise ownership by better tailoring programmes to the ideas and needs of African partners. This will also make programmes less prone to abuse. But again, expectations must be realistic. The causes of coups and deficiencies of armed forces cannot be changed overnight and from the outside. African challenges require African solutions.

A Geopolitical Dilemma for Western Actors?

The West faces a mild dilemma, at the very least. Letting things take their course might push the region towards greater turmoil. Russian assistance and military rule are unlikely to remedy either the jihadist surge or other causes of coups. The retreat of Western forces is likely to accelerate the spillover of the jihadist wave and coups to the continent’s western coast. At the same time, Western engagement – military or otherwise – will play into an anti-Western narrative of “neocolonialism” and also be fuelled by Russian disinformation and deeply entrenched anti-French resentment. EU countries must develop a joint position that considers the mistakes of the past. Supporting responsible governance is the solution in the long run, not short-sighted geopolitical goals such as maintaining zones of influence, regardless of the character of the regimes. In the present situation, the best option is still to support African regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS in their anti-coup policies. Instead of falling into the trap of engaging in a scramble for Africa with China, Russia and others, Germany, the EU and the West need to revise their Africa policy in terms of long-term goals, coherence and – in particular – instruments.

Matthias Basedau is the director of the GIGA Institute for African Affairs. His research interests are causes of peace and conflict as well as democratization and civil–military relations. 

Responsibility for content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

 

A New Epidemic of Coups

The recent events in Niger and Gabon show that military coups are again a common trend in African politics. Although the armed forces never ceased playing a role in politics, military coups had become less frequent since the early 1990s. The number of successful coups had continuously declined after 1990 and came to an all-time low of six military coups in the period from 2010 to 2019. Less than four years into this decade, at least eight putsches have succeeded. Burkina Faso and Mali both saw two military takeovers, Guinea one in 2021, and Niger and Gabon one each in July and August 2023, respectively. The developments in Sudan in 2021 constitute an additional case. In Chad, the unconstitutional takeover by Mohamed Déby Jr after the death of his father in 2021 might even bring the count to nine. However, the succession from father to son did confirm the military as the actual power centre of the country. We do not know whether the trend will continue. If no decisive action is taken however, it will be more likely to do so.

Coups Don’t Come out of the Blue

While coup causes are always country-specific, three conditions have been key drivers: acute crises, politicized armed forces and an increasingly self-reinforcing dynamic.

First, all countries were facing crises before the coups and had entrenched socio-economic challenges. Discontent grows when politicians do not deliver public goods, and they lack legitimacy because of corruption. The recent political crises have taken different shapes: Power struggles, such as those between civilian presidents clinging to power despite term limits, have been important sources of crises in Guinea and Gabon. In Mali and Burkina Faso, jihadist insurgencies have spread in West Africa in recent years and intensified instability and dissatisfaction.

Second, a military coup is much more likely in places where the armed forces have previously intervened in politics, which is true for around 40 per cent of all sub-Saharan countries, with West Africa as its epicentre. The specific interests of those within the ranks of the military are often the triggers for coups. The coup in Mali in 2012 was motivated by dissatisfaction with the government’s support in fighting against the rebels, who inflicted heavy casualties. In the recent case of Niger, coup leader Omar Tchiani faced the threat of being ousted as the leader of the presidential guard. Rumours persist that the defence ministry embezzled large amounts of the military budget.

Third, coups breed coups. Successful military takeovers in other countries may inspire further coups and create a self-reinforcing dynamic. A further motivating factor for takeover attempts is that would-be plotters of coups might hope for Russian support, as with the junta in Mali.

Consequences: Rarely Better Governance and Delicate Geopolitical Implications

Given the dissatisfaction with civilian leaders, the military juntas initially enjoy considerable popularity. However, as a rule, military involvement does not improve governance. A military government is not only an indicator of instability but may also lead to further trouble: If the root causes of a coup persist, countries may face additional attempts, as recent events in Burkina Faso and Mali have exemplified. Moreover, military officers – who initially claim to be the “salvation” of the country – often develop a taste for ruling once they are in power. This is frequently accompanied by self-enrichment and serious human rights violations. Yet, there are exceptions. In Mali in 1991 and in Niger in 2010, armed forces ousted authoritarian leaders and went on to become “democratising soldiers”. Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings – after implementing economic experiments that initial failed – led the country to relative prosperity and democracy. Gabon, where an oil-fuelled authoritarian regime was overthrown, has the chance of becoming such a success story.

The recent wave of coups is connected to geopolitical changes, especially Russia’s return to the region and the decline of Western – specifically French – influence. Russia takes advantage of these coups and the offer is straightforward: It provides security support for the regime, often through the infamous Wagner mercenaries, and generates revenues from resource extraction in return. Support for Russia at the international level follows suit. None of the coup countries condemned Russia’s imperialistic aggression against Ukraine. The support from Russia and other countries for military juntas and other authoritarian regimes may accelerate a “new scramble for Africa”. African governments can attract foreign support either from non-Western countries or entice Western countries to turn a blind eye to authoritarian or corrupt governance to keep them in their “camp”.

Addressing Root Causes and Lowering Expectations

It is necessary to adopt a firm stance against military coups and strengthen international and regional anti-coup norms in order to stop the contagion. Professionalizing the armed forces can help. First, the military needs to remain under stable civilian control and refrain from politics. Second, professional armed forces are capable of tackling and – preferably – deterring security challenges, such as the jihadist insurgencies that have indirectly led to the coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Direct military support remains necessary if one does not want security to further deteriorate. However, any long-term strategy requires addressing the socio-economic and political root causes of the coups and other manifestations of instability. The long-term answer is socio-economic and political transformation.

We have no magic bullets to fix the related structural problems quickly. Practitioners and the public expect too much too fast and give up quickly if improvements do not materialise rapidly. However, things can be done. African political leaders must work for the common good and be held accountable to their populations. External actors such as Germany, the European Union (EU) and the United States should evaluate and rethink their policies. Although general concepts such as “security and development” do make sense, instruments such as traditional development cooperation as well as training programmes for African militaries have produced mostly disappointing results.

The European training missions for African militaries share some of the pitfalls of civilian development aid. Programmes are usually designed by Western experts rather than developed according to the needs of local partners. Western instructors apparently refused to train Malian forces in offensive tactics out of fear they would exact vengeance on insurgents and their constituencies. As a result, ownership is lacking and participants view the programmes as sources of income, not as opportunities to improve their professional skills. Relatedly, corruption in the military often undermines efforts to improve their performance.

A revision of the programmes first requires in-depth analysis. We must acknowledge tensions between goals: The coups call for working on the integrity of partners. Security problems – one of the root causes of the coups – require strengthening military capabilities. Western partners need to decide to what extent the latter is conditional on the former. The key is to incentivise ownership by better tailoring programmes to the ideas and needs of African partners. This will also make programmes less prone to abuse. But again, expectations must be realistic. The causes of coups and deficiencies of armed forces cannot be changed overnight and from the outside. African challenges require African solutions.

A Geopolitical Dilemma for Western Actors?

The West faces a mild dilemma, at the very least. Letting things take their course might push the region towards greater turmoil. Russian assistance and military rule are unlikely to remedy either the jihadist surge or other causes of coups. The retreat of Western forces is likely to accelerate the spillover of the jihadist wave and coups to the continent’s western coast. At the same time, Western engagement – military or otherwise – will play into an anti-Western narrative of “neocolonialism” and also be fuelled by Russian disinformation and deeply entrenched anti-French resentment. EU countries must develop a joint position that considers the mistakes of the past. Supporting responsible governance is the solution in the long run, not short-sighted geopolitical goals such as maintaining zones of influence, regardless of the character of the regimes. In the present situation, the best option is still to support African regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS in their anti-coup policies. Instead of falling into the trap of engaging in a scramble for Africa with China, Russia and others, Germany, the EU and the West need to revise their Africa policy in terms of long-term goals, coherence and – in particular – instruments.

Matthias Basedau is the director of the GIGA Institute for African Affairs. His research interests are causes of peace and conflict as well as democratization and civil–military relations. 

Responsibility for content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

 

Africa has the world’s youngest and fastest-growing population. This is particularly evident in Nigeria, where nearly two-thirds of our 220 million people are under the age of 25. Nigeria’s future, both as a nation and a key player on the African continent, indisputably hinges on its youth. But high unemployment and underemployment rates hinder their progress. Empowering them is crucial for their active political and economic participation. To that end, Nigeria and Germany are intensifying their joint commitment in three essential areas: skills development, supporting young entrepreneurs and promoting political engagement.

What is the problem?

Nigeria’s burgeoning youth population stands at a crossroads. They signify both a beacon of hope and a source of concern. We see a demographic dividend waiting to be unlocked, and with it a generation that can actively drive economic growth as well as social progress in our country. This youth cohort is a reservoir of untapped energy, creativity and innovation. Recent elections have also shown what a significant voting bloc they form. Half of the 93.5 million eligible voters were below the age of 35.

At the same time, the World Bank reported an unemployment rate of 13.4 per cent in 2022. The National Bureau of Statistics even gave a much higher estimate – 53.4 per cent – for that same year. These are not just statistics. High youth unemployment is a harbinger of social disenchantment, unrest and the underutilisation of human capital, all of which can have severe consequences for the nation’s stability and prosperity. The second problem is underemployment, a situation in which workers only hold seasonal or short-term positions that do not allow for financial stability and predictability.

This leads to the disillusionment of individuals in our population, but it also has broader societal implications: High youth unemployment can contribute to rising crime rates, political instability and a host of other challenges that can impede the nation’s progress.

What we can do about it together

It is imperative that we empower Nigeria’s youth and strategically invest in their skills and labour market access. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) concrete initiatives such as vocational training and job placement services can kick-start positive change in labour markets. Germany has a wealth of experience and expertise in these areas that it could bring to the table when looking for ways to increase cooperation with Nigeria. Some key areas where we could cooperate and share best practices are:

1. Skills Development: Germany and Nigeria should continue to establish vocational training centres and opportunities to equip young Nigerians with essential skills. It is crucial to customize these programmes based on the current needs of and trends in local and regional industries. Germany’s successful vocational training system can serve as a valuable best practice when designing solutions that are suitable for Nigeria. Additionally, by focussing on STEM education, we can invest in accessible digital learning platforms and other technological infrastructure to align education programmes with industry requirements.

2. Supporting Young Entrepreneurs: To harness the entrepreneurial spirit of the Nigerian youth, both countries should support their aspirations of starting their own companies by providing much needed funding opportunities. Support for young entrepreneurs should cover seed funding, while accompanying network programmes could offer mentorship and access to global markets, fostering a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem. A particular focus should be placed on promoting green and sustainable business practices, supporting the transition to clean energy, biodiversity and conservation efforts, and sustainable agriculture.

3. Promoting Political Participation and Youth Governance: Young voters in Nigeria already constitute a significant voting bloc, and their political influence will only grow in the future. Nigeria and Germany have the opportunity to collaborate on promoting youth participation in politics. Berlin can broaden exchange programmes between youth leaders and youth parliaments, emphasizing democratic values and practices. It is crucial to prioritize models that emphasize youth representation and engagement in politics.

 

Obiageli “Oby” Ezekwesili is an economic and public policy expert, advisor, advocate and activist. She is a former vice president for the World Bank’s Africa region (2007–2012) and previously served as the Federal Minister of Solid Minerals (2005–2006) and Federal Minister of Education (2006–2007).

Responsibility for content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

 

Africa has the world’s youngest and fastest-growing population. This is particularly evident in Nigeria, where nearly two-thirds of our 220 million people are under the age of 25. Nigeria’s future, both as a nation and a key player on the African continent, indisputably hinges on its youth. But high unemployment and underemployment rates hinder their progress. Empowering them is crucial for their active political and economic participation. To that end, Nigeria and Germany are intensifying their joint commitment in three essential areas: skills development, supporting young entrepreneurs and promoting political engagement.

What is the problem?

Nigeria’s burgeoning youth population stands at a crossroads. They signify both a beacon of hope and a source of concern. We see a demographic dividend waiting to be unlocked, and with it a generation that can actively drive economic growth as well as social progress in our country. This youth cohort is a reservoir of untapped energy, creativity and innovation. Recent elections have also shown what a significant voting bloc they form. Half of the 93.5 million eligible voters were below the age of 35.

At the same time, the World Bank reported an unemployment rate of 13.4 per cent in 2022. The National Bureau of Statistics even gave a much higher estimate – 53.4 per cent – for that same year. These are not just statistics. High youth unemployment is a harbinger of social disenchantment, unrest and the underutilisation of human capital, all of which can have severe consequences for the nation’s stability and prosperity. The second problem is underemployment, a situation in which workers only hold seasonal or short-term positions that do not allow for financial stability and predictability.

This leads to the disillusionment of individuals in our population, but it also has broader societal implications: High youth unemployment can contribute to rising crime rates, political instability and a host of other challenges that can impede the nation’s progress.

What we can do about it together

It is imperative that we empower Nigeria’s youth and strategically invest in their skills and labour market access. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) concrete initiatives such as vocational training and job placement services can kick-start positive change in labour markets. Germany has a wealth of experience and expertise in these areas that it could bring to the table when looking for ways to increase cooperation with Nigeria. Some key areas where we could cooperate and share best practices are:

1. Skills Development: Germany and Nigeria should continue to establish vocational training centres and opportunities to equip young Nigerians with essential skills. It is crucial to customize these programmes based on the current needs of and trends in local and regional industries. Germany’s successful vocational training system can serve as a valuable best practice when designing solutions that are suitable for Nigeria. Additionally, by focussing on STEM education, we can invest in accessible digital learning platforms and other technological infrastructure to align education programmes with industry requirements.

2. Supporting Young Entrepreneurs: To harness the entrepreneurial spirit of the Nigerian youth, both countries should support their aspirations of starting their own companies by providing much needed funding opportunities. Support for young entrepreneurs should cover seed funding, while accompanying network programmes could offer mentorship and access to global markets, fostering a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem. A particular focus should be placed on promoting green and sustainable business practices, supporting the transition to clean energy, biodiversity and conservation efforts, and sustainable agriculture.

3. Promoting Political Participation and Youth Governance: Young voters in Nigeria already constitute a significant voting bloc, and their political influence will only grow in the future. Nigeria and Germany have the opportunity to collaborate on promoting youth participation in politics. Berlin can broaden exchange programmes between youth leaders and youth parliaments, emphasizing democratic values and practices. It is crucial to prioritize models that emphasize youth representation and engagement in politics.

 

Obiageli “Oby” Ezekwesili is an economic and public policy expert, advisor, advocate and activist. She is a former vice president for the World Bank’s Africa region (2007–2012) and previously served as the Federal Minister of Solid Minerals (2005–2006) and Federal Minister of Education (2006–2007).

Responsibility for content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

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