Agrégateur de flux

Zord

La tension est actuellement forte entre le Mali et l’Algérie. Mercredi 20 décembre 2023 l’ambassadeur algérien à Bamako a été convoqué par la junte militaire au pouvoir. En retour, dès le lendemain jeudi 21 décembre, l’ambassadeur du Mali à Alger le fut au ministère algérien des Affaires étrangères.

Bamako reproche à Alger ses liens avec les « séparatistes » touareg ainsi que l’accueil fait  le mardi 19 décembre  par le président Abdelmaajid Tebboune à une délégation politico-religieuse malienne dirigée  par l’imam Mahmoud Dicko. Or, cet influent chef religieux d’ethnie peul est un opposant à la junte. Cela a pu faire penser à cette dernière qu’Alger tentait d’ouvrir un nouveau front au Mali afin de  donner de l’air à ses alliés touareg actuellement en difficulté militaire… Et pour ne rien arranger,  les 22 et 23 décembre derniers, le ministre malien des Affaires étrangères, M. Abdoulaye Diop a effectué une visite au Maroc, pays avec lequel l’Algérie a unilatéralement rompu ses relations diplomatiques au mois d’août 2021…

Derrière ces évènements récents, c’est en réalité un contentieux ancien et profond qui oppose Alger à Bamako. Et comme les deux pays partagent une frontière de 1400 kilomètres de long, et comme leurs populations touareg sont imbriquées, les évènements  y agissent en vases communicants.

Le problème est bien connu :

1) L’Algérie qui considère le nord du Mali comme le prolongement méridional de ses immensités sahariennes, et pour tout dire comme son « protectorat », s’est toujours impliquée dans les règlements des guerres touareg du Mali. Comme elle craint la contagion chez ses propres touareg, elle ne veut en effet en aucun cas que ces derniers se trouvent impliqués dans la poudrière malienne. Alger est ainsi le principal médiateur dans la question malienne depuis la signature en 2015 de l’Accord d’Alger entre Bamako et les  groupes armés touareg. Tout au contraire, la junte malienne considère que cet accord fait la part belle à ceux qu’elle qualifie, à juste titre d’ailleurs, de « séparatistes ». Pour l’historique de la question on se reportera à mon livre Histoire du Sahel des origines à nos jours.

2) L’Algérie a constamment entretenu des relations avec les mouvements touareg. Il est de notoriété que le chef historique des dernières insurrections, Iyad Ag Ghali, est lié à Alger. Sa famille réside en Algérie, et lui-même y a sa base arrière.

3) Alger se satisfaisait de voir le nord du Mali échapper au pouvoir de Bamako sans toutefois accéder à une véritable indépendance qui aurait pu donner des idées à ses Touareg. Tout au contraire, les militaires maliens ont un objectif  prioritaire qui est la reconquête du nord du pays. Une utopie jusqu’à ces dernières semaines. Or, l’intervention massive  du groupe Wagner a permis aux FAMA (Forces armées maliennes) de prendre Kidal, la « capitale » des Touareg vidée de sa population partie vers le désert et les frontières de l’Algérie. Dans l’attente d’une revanche… 
Les intérêts de l’Algérie se trouvent donc opposés et confrontés à ceux de son allié historique, la Russie, pays qui lui fournit la quasi-totalité de son armement… Aussi, Alger tente actuellement un rapprochement avec Paris… Une affaire à suivre, mais de loin, maintenant que les protagonistes ont demandé le départ des forces françaises…

A strong and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is a prerequisite for developing defence capabilities and securing European strategic autonomy. EDA has established a structured dialogue and enhanced engagement with industry, which aims to EDTIB and focuses on European entities. This month, the Agency hosted a dedicated workshop for the defence industry, welcoming over 150 experts in-house and online, to update on the state of play and related way ahead of EDA’s activities of particular interest to the defence industry.

Welcoming industry representatives from large, mid-cap, SMEs and industrial associations, EDA’s Director for Industry Synergies and Enablers (ISE) underlined that the establishment of defence initiatives at EU level have created favorable conditions for strengthening the EDTIB. He emphasised that the Agency is committed to fostering an environment that supports the EDTIB, acknowledging its crucial contribution to Europe's overall security and defence.

The participants were updated by EDA experts during the workshop on the five pillars of EDA’s industry engagement approach, notably: Capability Development, Research, Technology and Innovation, Key Strategic Activities and wider EU policies as well as overall support to Industry. The update focused on activities of interest to the industry, including opportunities for potential engagement. Representatives of the European Commission also attended the meeting and provided an update on their current initiatives relevant to defence industry.

Access to finance, 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities & tools for industry

Industry representatives were informed on the Member States joint statement on access to financing that was prepared by EDA through a collaborative dialogue involving participating Member States and the industry. The statement, that was endorsed by 27 EU Ministers of Defence last November, emphasizes on the importance of accessing finance on capital markets, and encompassing both regulatory proposals at EU-level related to ESG reporting and ongoing developments with national financial actors.

The 27 EU Ministers of Defence approved also the 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities (CDP). The 22 agreed priorities provide a valuable overview of the capability development landscape for the defence industry. The workshop allowed industry representatives to address relevant questions on the CDP, primarily what are the next steps regarding the implementation and how industry could be involved in this process.  

Clarifications also provided to the participants on how to access to the EDA prioritization platform which contains the Capability Development Priorities (CDP), Strategic Context Cases (SCC), Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA including the TBB roadmaps) and Key Strategic Activities (KSA) and on the further development of the B2B platform.

EDA also informed the participants about the publication of the Industry Engagement Roadmap 2024 which offers an overview of the EDA activities of interest to the industry, that are planned to take place in 2024 in all 5 pillars of EDA Industry Engagement.

Participants stressed that this workshop could take place one more time per year as the update provided is considered very useful.

A JAS39 Gripen 1995. október 30-án, a kecskeméti repülőbázison mutatkozott be a szakmának és a sajtónak, majd az 1997-es és 1998-as NATO Express nemzetközi repülőnapon, ugyancsak Kecskeméten, már a nagyközönség is megnézhette a svédek új típusát. Nagyjából ezzel párhuzamosan a cég elkezdte a sajtóanyagok, fotók rendszeres küldését. Mivel az internet szolgáltatástól ekkor még egy-két év választott el minket, a papíralapú képek és a fotó-CD-k postai úton érkeztek. Azt nem tudom, hogy egy, a piacra éppen bevezetés alatt álló harcászati repülőgép fotóit milyen megfontolásból küldték akkori munkahelyem, egy alapvetően munkarepüléssel foglalkozó kisgépes cég címére, hiszen e két ágazat feladat- és eszközrendszere annyira áll közel egymáshoz, mint a bábszínház az operához, de a fotók rendszeresen jöttek. Nagyjából azóta lapultak egy dobozban, amelyet a közelmúltban nyitottam fel és úgy döntöttem, hogy az évszaknak megfelelő képekből felteszek néhány darabot ide.

[...] Bővebben!

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

•  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

• ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

•  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

•  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

• ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

•  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

•  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

• ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

•  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

The Kremlin is reinforcing the electronic warfare capabilities of its ground-to-air defence apparatus, the "Moscow Belt" to protect Moscow from

Omar bin Sultan Al Olama has his work cut out for him. According to our information, the UAE minister of

Dekabristen, a Berlin-registered humanitarian and civil society association, is raising funds to buy drones for Ukraine, as do the Ukrainian

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The Van Aucker Group (TVAG) has been working Capitol Hill on behalf of the embassy of Turkey, a lobby disclosure

Whether looking for the perfect end-of-year gift for an intelligence fan, a security buff, a military enthusiast or a keen

Ghebi production studio, the long-serving US partner of Rossiya Segodnya, parent company to the Russia news network RT (IO, 26/01/22),

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

• TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
• Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
• The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

• TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
• Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
• The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

• TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
• Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
• The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.