Ünnepi hetünk szombat reggeli Hangolójában azokkal beszélgettünk, akik a rádió hangjait láthatóvá teszik: azokat a kollégákat hívtuk meg, akik az online tér sokszor zegzugos útjainak kalandorai és ismerői. Székely Balázs 2011-2013 között, Orbán Zsolt 2013-tól 2016-ig, Fülöp Noémi 2016-ban volt, Sebők Tímea pedig 2020-tól kezdve jelenleg is a Kolozsvári Rádió online felületeinek kezelője. „Volt azért […]
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A gyerekek és fiatalok ingyen látogathatják a közintézményként működő múzeumokat és tárlatokat a szenátus által elfogadott törvénytervezet értelmében. A múzeumok kulturális és oktatási intézménynek minősülnek, amelyek remek tanulási lehetőséget biztosíthatnak a diákoknak mondja Gigel Stirbu szenátor, a tervezet kidolgozója. Azért volna fontos, hogy a fiatalok ezeket látogassák, mert így jobban megismernék és értékelnék saját és […]
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Hamas has a history of executing Palestinians who the terrorists claim are collaborating with Israel. Back in 2014, for example, the Times of Israel reported that Hamas killed over 30 suspected collaborators with Israel. And that was over just a few days. Of course, there is no way to tell whether Hamas actually executes collaborators, or is killing off opposition to its rule in Gaza.
According to Hamas, collaborating with Israel is not limited to spying for the Jewish state and relaying information that helps to target Hamas terrorists.Hamas is stealing aid and trying to sell it back to Gazans at exorbitant prices. https://t.co/AXQ363orF7
— Haviv Rettig Gur (@havivrettiggur) January 17, 2024If Hamas was trying to dissuade Gazans from participating in Israel's plan, it may have been unnecessary. The clans are reported to have rejected what they considered Israeli interfernce in internal matters. More to the point, if Hamas felt the need to kill tribal leaders in order to maintain control, that constitutes a major change in tactics indicating that Hamas is afraid of losing control.
On March 10, Khaled Abu Toameh reported that Hamas was competing with the PA to get the support of the clans:
The P.A. and Hamas understand that the backing of the clans is crucial for maintaining their control over the Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That’s why P.A. and Hamas leaders have always treated the large families and their leaders with utmost respect. In some instances, clan leaders were elevated to the unofficial position of supreme judges and arbitrators, replacing the official judiciary and law enforcement of both organizations.This is all the more reason to see the Hamas execution of a clan leader as an admission of a potential threat to Hamas control in Gaza. The fact that Hamas killed the leader supports Toameh's report that some of the clans sided with the PA and were enforcing law and order in some of the towns and refugee camps, preventing looting and anarchy. And one clan was in fact reported to be escorting some of the trucks carrying humanitarian aid that entered through Egypt and Israel.
This is not the first time Hamas has sparked revenge over their killing of an Arab. This past November, a Bedouin family accused Hamas of torturing, humiliating and executing Osama Abu Asa during the October 7 massacre. They offered a reward of $1 million for help in identifying who killed him. An uncle made clear, "as with the bedouins, we have a blood feud with the terrorists. This account will be closed, no matter how long it takes.”
But this time, the backlash is against all of Hamas: Major Gaza clan says it considers all Hamas members legitimate targets after leader assassinated:
The Doghmosh Family — a major clan in Gaza — has issued a statement declaring that all Hamas members are legitimate targets after its leader was assassinated by members of the terror group along with ten other relatives allegedly for stealing humanitarian aid and being in contact with Israel.How serious is this threat to Hamas?
On November 9, 2005, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the three suicide bombers who killed 60 people at hotels in Amman Jordan. He was rebuked by members of his own tribe.
“We, the sons of the Bani Hassan tribe in all its branches in the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, support and express solidarity with our cousins, the al-Khalayleh clan, and their decision to sever relations with the terrorist Ahmad Fadheel Nazzal al-Khalayleh, who calls himself Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” said the letter published in four leading newspapers.This signaled the beginning of al-Zarqawi's downfall. He was killed in a US airstrike the following year.
We can only hope that the blood feud Hamas has brought upon itself, from Arabs who have outright threatened to kill Hamas members, will have similar results.
A nyolcvanas évek második felében, a Tomcat üzemeltetés csúcspontján, az amerikai haditengerészet 22 elsővonalbeli (repülőgép-hordozós) százada repülte az F-14-est, megosztva a csendes-óceáni és az atlanti-óceáni flotta hordozói között. A nyugati parton 10 Tomcat század osztozott a kaliforniai Miramar tengerészeti légibázis hangárjain és állóhelyein, a keleti parton 12 század repült a virginiai Oceana légibázisról. Mindkét bázison további egy-egy átképző század működött az új Tomcat pilóták kiképzésére vagy a hosszabb kihagyást követő frissítő képzésre. További két tartalékos századnál is repültek F-14-esek, és a tesztszázadoknak is jutott a Tomcatből. Kaliforniában két helyszínen üzemeltek a Grumman Kandúrjai: egy gépet NASA tesztekre használtak az Edwards légierő bázison, három-hárommal pedig Point Muguból végeztek repülési illetve fegyverzeti teszteket. A keleti partra három teszt Tomcat jutott, a marylandi Patuxent Riverbe, a Navy tesztpilóta iskolájához. Hihetetlenül intenzív időszak volt: egy tengeri bevetésről visszatérő Tomcat század egy-két hét pihenő után megkezdte a felkészülést a következőre, az új századtagok beillesztésével, légiharc-gyakorlatokkal, éles gépágyús és rakétalövészettel, országon belüli áttelepülésekkel, a légierővel közös gyakorlatokkal és rövidebb, néhány napos-hetes repülőgép-hordozós gyakorlással, kvalifikációkkal kitöltve a két tengeri út közötti hónapokat.
Mindez a kilencvenes évek közepén radikális átalakuláson ment át: a gépeket alkalmassá tették a földi célpontok elleni feladatokra, a Top Gunból is ismert Miramar a tengerészgyalogsághoz került és a leépítés után megmaradt F-14-eseket az Oceana bázison vonták össze. A gépek számát századonként 12-ről átmenetileg 14-re növelték, később 10-re csökkentették. Amikor 2005-ben eljutottunk egy repülőgép-hordozóra, már csak három század repülte az F-14-est. Ezek egyike a VF-32 Swordsmen volt, amely 2004 novembere és 2005 áprilisa között a USS Harry S. Truman fedélzetén teljesítette utolsó hordozós bevetését az F-14-essel. A hajó a Perzsa-öbölből, az Iraqi Freedom (Iraki Szabadság) műveletből tartott hazafelé és egy kevés időt a Földközi-tengeren töltött. Ott kaptunk ízelítőt a VF-32-esek Gypsy hívójelű F-14-eseinek hordozófedélzeti üzemeléséből.
Seit April 2023 herrscht Krieg in Sudan. Er ist Ausdruck grundsätzlicher Veränderungen in den politischen Machtverhältnissen. Der vorher dominierende Sicherheitssektor ist tief gespalten und die ehemals schwach vernetzte Zivilgesellschaft hoch mobilisiert. Einerseits ermöglichte die Konkurrenz innerhalb des Sicherheitssektors, eine zivil-militärische Übergangsregierung zu bilden. Andererseits erhöhte der weitere Aufstieg der Rapid Support Forces zur Macht das Risiko eines bewaffneten Konflikts, erst recht nach dem Putsch 2021. Seit Bashirs Fall 2019 haben die Sicherheitskräfte zweimal vergeblich versucht, eine alleinige Militärherrschaft zu errichten. Gleichwohl scheiterte auch die zivil-militärische Übergangsregierung, weil das Militär nach wie vor über erhebliche Machtressourcen verfügte. Sudans politische Elite trug zu diesem Ausgang bei, indem sie sich zu wenig um den Aufbau rechtsstaatlicher Institutionen und zu viel um die eigene Sichtbarkeit kümmerte. Internationale Akteure, die Sudans Übergangsprozess stärken wollten, hätten die Sicherheitskräfte entschiedener zurückdrängen können, statt sie reflexhaft einzubinden. Viele internationale und sudanesische Bemühungen krankten daran, dass sie entweder nur auf Einbindung oder nur auf Ausschluss der Sicherheitskräfte abstellten. Ein neuer Elitendeal allein mit Sudans Gewaltunternehmern wird keinen Frieden bringen, solange keine zivilen Kräfte am Tisch sitzen. Sudans beste Chance liegt vielmehr im Sozialkapital des freiwilligen Engagements seiner Bürger:innen für humanitäre Versorgung, Demokratie und lokale Versöhnung.
As the demands on German foreign and security policy increase in a Europe characterised by multiple crises, so do the demands on the German armed forces. In order for the Bundeswehr to become more assertive and effective as a deterrent, despite limiting factors such as personnel and materiel shortages, it must be able to employ new technologies more quickly and extensively. The faster and more effectively these technologies are harnessed, the more advantages they will bring on the battlefield. The current political will for change, the pressure to adapt due to the evolved security situation and the increase in financial resources are creating an unprecedented momentum.
The following is the conclusion of the second interview with Dr. Harold Rhode.
The idea of a two-state solution being pushed by the US State Department does not attract the Palestinian Arabs. They are not interested in the benefits Arabs have in Israel as opposed to in the surrounding states.
So why did the Palestinian Arabs sign the Oslo Accords?
Signatures on documents do not mean much in Arab culture. Two weeks after the signing of the Oslo Agreement, Arafat spoke at a mosque in South Africa. He told his listeners he did not sign a peace agreement with Israel. It was a truce. He compared the Oslo Accords to the ten-year truce their prophet Muhammad signed at Hudaybiya (near Mecca) with his enemies, the Qureysh.
Two years later, when Muhammad realized he was stronger than his enemies, he attacked and conquered Mecca -- so much for the 10-year truce with his enemy. Similarly, on October 7, 2023, Hamas and Iran saw Israel as divided and weak. But they miscalculated because this wasn’t Hudaybiya. They did not understand Israel’s internal fortitude.
But all is not lost when it comes to Israel-Arab relations.
Muslims can sign agreements with their opponents which –- unlike the Hudaybiya truce –- can be periodically renewed when they believe it is in their interests. Netanyahu knew that once they needed what Israel had to offer -- such as hi-tech, security, and investments -- the Arabs would be the ones reaching out for an agreement.
This is the reason why the Abraham Accords were signed.
Moreover, Muslims respect power. When President Trump killed Qasem Soleimani, Iran became relatively quiet, except for some small probing attacks. We saw this also in Iran's reaction to President Ronald Reagan before he came into office. Forty-five minutes before Reagan took the oath of office, Iran put the US hostages on a plane to freedom. Iran saw Reagan as a cowboy who would destroy them.
You can make things happen once you understand the Muslim respect for power.
In comparison, a compromise is a blot on your honor. In the Muslim world, compromise is a sign of weakness, encouraging others to strike back at you even harder. You cannot give in. The Americans have not yet learned the Muslim concept of compromise.
Concepts are not the same as words. Anybody can look up a word in a dictionary and translate it the way you like. We assume a concept means the same thing in every language. But cultures don't communicate -- they clash.
I once asked an Arab friend how he would translate the word "compromise." He thought about it for a week and came back to me. He said the closest he could get to it in Arabic was a word with the root N-Z-L. We both laughed because in Hebrew that root means "a runny nose." In Arabic, it means to get off your camel -- the common idea being to go down, that you humiliate yourself. That is what the Western concept of compromise means in Arabic.
Compromise means humiliation.
That is why there can be no two-state solution. At best, it would be a temporary solution, but it will be like Gaza: they will take what you give them and then use it against you. An agreement might be renewed over and over, but it is not designed to last and there is always the possibility it will fall apart. There may be others who will be better allies, especially if they are also Arabs and in the same clan. It is not a nice way to live, but then again, there is no such thing as peace.
That doesn't mean we cannot have long periods of quiet.