Agrégateur de flux

The complexity of the Brazilian electricity system has evolved from a model based on hydroelectricity supplemented by thermoelectricity to a combination of diverse sources, without planning and with little control, whose excess intermittent generation threatens to cause blackouts. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

By Mario Osava
RIO DE JANEIRO, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

Wind and solar power sources, essential for the energy transition to mitigate the climate crisis, have become a risk of power outages in Brazil.

It is a remedy that, in excess, becomes poison. The rapid and unplanned growth of these alternatives has created operational difficulties for the Brazilian electricity system, which is nationally interconnected.“Brazil has one of the most complex electricity systems in the world. No other country has such a diversity of sources”–Luiz Barata.

A blackout on August 15, 2023, which affected 27% of the supply throughout most of the country, was a major wake-up call about insecurity. It began with the transmission of wind and solar power plants in the state of Ceará, in northeastern Brazil.

It almost happened again in April and August of this year due to excess generation, according to the  National System Operator (ONS), a private organization that represents consumers and all sectors involved, which coordinates and controls supply nationwide.

A functional electrical system requires surpluses; energy must be available at all outlets for eventual consumption. But “too much excess causes problems,” said Luiz Barata, former director general of the ONS and current president of the non-governmental National Front of Energy Consumers.

The proliferation of solar and wind power plants in Brazil has created imbalances between supply and consumption that caused operational difficulties in effective distribution, such as power outages in 25 of Brazil’s 26 states on August 15, 2023. Credit: Fotos Públicas

Renewables in question

The intermittent nature of wind and solar power, which have grown the most in the last decade, exacerbates the risks due to their uncontrollable origin. This type of energy depends on nature, on when there is wind and sun.

The plot thickens with distributed generation, also known as decentralized generation, which turns consumers into producers of their own electricity in 3.8 million residential micro-plants or groups of individuals or small businesses.

This dispersed generation already exceeds 43 gigawatts of power, according to data from the National Electric Energy Agency (Aneel), the sector’s regulatory body.

This amounts to 18% of the country’s total generating capacity, with solar photovoltaic power dominating the segment with a 95% share.

“In addition to being uncontrollable, because it depends on the sun, distributed generation cannot be interrupted, as it is beyond the control of the ONS,” warned Barata, an electrical engineer.

What the ONS does is curtail the contribution of some generating sources when excess supply threatens the system. In general, the interruption affects wind and solar generation, which are further away from the area of highest consumption.

The Northeast, favored by strong and regular winds and solar radiation, concentrates most of these sources, while the highest electricity consumption occurs in the Southeast, Brazil’s most populous and industrialized region.

Wind farms occupy hills and mountains throughout the Northeast region of Brazil, which has become a supplier of electricity for the entire country. The intermittency of this source, with generation concentrated at night, contributed to the risk of blackouts in the country. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Uncertain future

The trend is for operational problems in the electricity system to worsen because distributed generation continues to expand, due to the legal incentives it enjoys, and without planning, as it is the result of individual decisions.

From January to August 2025, the ONS discarded 17.2% of the country’s potential wind and solar generation, which corresponds to 7% of the country’s monthly consumption. This tripled the cuts compared to the same period in 2024, according to an analysis by Volt Robotics, an energy consulting firm.

In August, the rejection reached 57% of new renewable generation due to excess supply.

“Brazil has one of the most complex electricity systems in the world. No other country has the diversity of sources that we have,” Barata told IPS by telephone from Brasilia.

Of a total of 236 gigawatts of installed capacity at the end of 2024, hydroelectricity continues to account for a majority, with 46.5% of the total, according to the state-owned Energy Research Company. But it is no longer as dominant as it was in 2000, when it accounted for 89%.

Solar energy, with 20.5%, wind energy with 12.5% and thermal energy, which consumes fossil fuels and biomass, with 18.6%, already exceeded hydroelectricity in 2024, with a trend towards further growth.

Necessary reform

There has been a change in the electricity matrix, which has shifted from hydrothermal, basically hydroelectric and supplemented by thermal power plants, to a growing incorporation of new renewable sources, given the lower cost of their implementation and distributed generation, Barata pointed out.

However, legislation and regulations have not kept pace with this transformation, said the expert, who believes the sector needs a comprehensive structural reform in order to reduce risks and restore better operating and planning conditions.

“It is a complex system that cannot be solved with simple measures,” he said.

Joilson Costa, coordinator of the non-governmental Front for a New Energy Policy for Brazil and also an electrical engineer, considers it “incorrect” to attribute systemic risks solely to excess wind and solar generation.

“Excess supply is only part of the problem, not the only one. Another cause is the deficiency of the transmission system, which makes it impossible to transport the energy generated in the Northeast to other regions at certain times. This then necessitates a cut in generation,” he argued.

Nor can it be said that distributed generation is outside the scope of planning. The Energy Research Company, part of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, does consider this modality in its plans because “its studies and simulations allow it to make estimates,” even though it cannot control the expansion of microplants, Costa noted.

Electricity distribution companies also monitor the evolution of distributed generation in their networks and can update their data monthly, he told IPS by telephone from São Luis, capital of the northeastern state of Maranhão.

Distributed generation, which is small-scale and generally consists of photovoltaic panels on residential or commercial roofs, already accounts for 43 gigawatts of installed capacity in Brazil. There are 3.8 million plants benefiting seven million consumer units, without the necessary control over the operation of the national electricity system. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Daily asynchrony

The major risk factor, however, is the lack of synchrony between the generation and consumption of new sources of electricity in their daily cycles.

Solar generation occurs during the day, peaking around noon, when consumption is low. It declines just as consumption increases at the end of the day and beginning of the night, when lights and household appliances are turned on, especially electric showers, which are widely used in Brazil.

Wind farms, concentrated in the Northeast, generate electricity mainly late at night, when consumption drops again.

Pericles Pinheiro, director of New Business at CHP, a gas generation equipment and solutions company in Rio de Janeiro, identifies a trend toward crisis in the Brazilian electricity system in his ongoing analysis of the sector. “Every summer, new emotions,” he jokes.

In previous years, he identified a risk in the proliferation of diesel generators that many companies used to avoid the higher cost of electricity during peak consumption hours in the early evening.

But they abandoned this resource because they migrated to the free market, which has expanded in Brazil in recent years, lowering energy costs for large consumers by allowing them to choose their supplier.

Diesel generators, which helped reduce the upward curve of consumption during peak hours, disappeared or declined, exacerbating daily fluctuations in demand, in cycles opposite to those of wind and solar sources, Pinheiro told IPS.

Distributed generation reduces demand on the grid and the share of electricity managed by the system operator, in a trend that exacerbates insecurity, he added.

The ONS estimates that by 2029 it will control less than half of the country’s installed generation capacity, increasing the operational uncertainty of the national interconnected system.

The proliferation of digital data centers in Brazil, which the government is trying to promote, is seen as a way to balance electricity consumption and supply in the country.

But these huge energy sinks would consume the excess during the day but increase demand at night, as they operate 24 hours a day, warned Pinheiro, who identifies another risk in electric vehicles whose batteries consume the electricity of several homes when recharging.

Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, kept a secret diary of the talks.

Published in 2021, it revealed in painful detail why Britain lost so badly at the negotiating table. Jonathan Powell, former Downing Street chief of staff, summed it up. Britain was left with:

“a flawed withdrawal agreement and a deeply disadvantageous future relationship, both of which will cause us major problems for decades to come.”

Barnier’s account highlights five key reasons.

1. Prepared vs unprepared: Barnier mastered every detail. Britain’s first Brexit Secretary, David Davis, turned up empty-handed. Barnier was shocked by his “nonchalant” approach.

2. EU unity: The EU27 stood together. Britain tried to bypass Barnier by approaching individual states, but was repeatedly sent back to him.

3. Clarity vs chaos: The EU knew what it wanted. Britain was consumed by internal arguments. Barnier wrote that Theresa May spent more time negotiating with her own ministers than with Brussels.

4. Johnson’s failed “mad man” strategy: Attempts to provoke or threaten the EU backfired. In 2020 David Frost cancelled talks, then humiliatingly returned a week later.

5. The deadline trap: Theresa May triggered Article 50 without a plan. Boris Johnson agreed to a border in the Irish Sea despite knowing what it meant. At one point Barnier had to explain to MPs that “the health of cows cannot be checked by drone.”

Barnier’s diary makes one thing clear. Britain was out-negotiated at every turn. And the consequences are still with us. Britain and Britons were far better off when we were in the EU.

• We had full access to the world’s largest single market.
• We had a seat at the table shaping the rules.
• We enjoyed freedoms and protections now lost, from cheaper food and travel to stronger rights at work.

Some Leave voters now say they did not get the Brexit they wanted. But nobody voted for a version of Brexit. That was not on the ballot paper. People who voted Leave could not know what they would get.

Now many of them, along with most of the country, regret the reality we ended up with.

As Jonathan Powell concluded, there should have been an inquiry into why Britain, once so proud of its diplomacy, was so utterly defeated.

Barnier’s diary may be the closest we will get.

• Join the discussions about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky

The post Brexit: How Britain was out-negotiated appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

L’équipe de France a décroché une deuxième médaille aux championnats du monde de cyclisme, ce mercredi 24 septembre, à l’occasion du contre-la-montre par équipes en relais mixte, au Rwanda. Thomas Voeckler, sélectionneur de l'équipe de France de cyclisme, est notre invité sur France 24.

Promoting sign language and Deaf culture is not only a constitutional mandate, but also an international legal requirement.

By Timothy Egwelu
KAMPALA, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

Every Last week of September the Deaf community in Uganda and the rest of the world celebrates sign languages and the rich identity of Deaf people and Deaf culture. The day is also an opportunity to advocate for the enforcement of sign language laws and policies.

In Uganda, despite the legal recognition of sign language in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda as amended, the Persons with Disabilities Act of 2020, and the ratification of the African Disability Protocol, the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability and other international laws, significant implementation gaps remain the major issue in the promotion of sign language.

For instance, the Public Service Ministry announced in the approved staffing structure shared to local governments last year that sign language interpreters must be posted in general and referral hospital service structures.

Acknowledging and fostering sign language enhances society's comprehension of the Deaf community's needs and rights, supporting the pursuit of equal opportunities and inclusion

However, more than a year later, no tangible updates have occurred. Ministry of Health’s lack of compliance may be potentially due to the non availability of funds allocated in their budgets – and yet the same structures were already approved by the Ministry of finance.

Previously, no hospitals employed interpreters, making it increasingly critical that this mandate is fulfilled.

Under Section 7(1) of the Persons with Disability Act, 2020 there is a clear stipulation against discrimination in the provision of health services on the basis of one’s disability, highlighting the urgency for compliance and action to support individuals who rely on these sign language interpreting services.

As another example, the Uganda Communication Commission as mandated under section 31 and schedule 4 of the Uganda Communications Commission Act of 2013 also issued a suspension of broadcasting licence for broadcasters that don’t meet the requirements of the law under section 12(4) of the Persons with Disability Act of 2020 which stipulate that “An owner or a person in charge of a television station shall, provide or cause to be provided sign language insets in all newscasts.”.

However, many broadcasters have been in breach without interpreters at newscasts and no licence has been suspended as a punishment. What is the point of inclusive policies if they are not enforced?

In addition, the absence of sign language-trained teachers and adequate funding for assistive technology such as computers and screens for visualisation in electronic classrooms, means the average Deaf student continues to be excluded from important educational and career opportunities.

Is it any wonder that they annually have consistent poor performance in national exams countrywide? A major shortcoming of the state is the lack of a Policy to Streamline early childhood education for Deaf children.

Of course, promoting sign language and Deaf culture is not only a constitutional mandate, but also an international legal requirement. There is urgent need for Uganda sign language policy to operationalize its promotion and usage.

The Agenda 2030 of the Sustainable Development Goals hinges on leaving no one behind. This is a salient feature of promoting sign language rights and zero discrimination towards the Deaf community.

Sign language interpretation available is an issue of the Deaf community’s human rights. Indeed, sign language acts as an essential instrument for advocating for Deaf rights. Acknowledging and fostering sign language enhances society’s comprehension of the Deaf community’s needs and rights, supporting the pursuit of equal opportunities and inclusion.

In South Africa is an example of a country that is making more strides, and Uganda should follow suit. The long-awaited recognition of sign language as the 12th official language is gaining momentum following parliamentary approval to amend the constitution.

This landmark decision marks the culmination of over thirty years of advocacy aimed at empowering the deaf community throughout the nation. By granting official status to sign language, South Africa acknowledges its role as a vital medium for communication and administration in public affairs, thereby enhancing accessibility for the country’s deaf citizens.

The inclusion of South African Sign Language (SASL) in policy discussions is indicative of a broader commitment to inclusivity and accessibility there.

This policy shift not only elevates SASL to a status comparable to other official languages but also lays the groundwork for its integration in educational, legal, and governmental frameworks.

With dedicated initiatives aimed at teacher training, public awareness campaigns, and resources development, South Africa demonstrates a proactive approach in fostering a deeper understanding and appreciation of sign language.

This commitment not only serves the deaf community but enriches South African society as a whole, emphasizing the importance of linguistic diversity and human rights.

In contrast, in Uganda, systematic corruption has critically redirected essential resources away from initiatives aimed at enhancing the livelihoods of Deaf individuals, particularly within key sectors like the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development.

This ministry’s budget for the Special Island Grant and Youth Livelihood Program experienced staggering cuts of 80% and 79%, respectively, in the previous financial year.

Such drastic reductions reflect a troubling indifference towards minorities and , as the current regime, characterized by radicalization and self-enrichment, perpetuates a culture where the needs of Deaf persons and other marginalized groups are deemed non-essential.

Political figures, including leaders like Speaker Anita Annet, often downplay the importance of including sign language in public services, viewing it as a minimal concern amidst their pursuit of wealth and power. This disregard for minority rights breeds an environment where advocacy is stifled, and the rule of law is undermined.

To address this injustice, it is crucial to advocate for a Uganda sign language policy that focuses on sign language education and iIt’s accessibility in public sectors.

Efforts should include creating advocacy coalitions that highlight the economic and social benefits of integrating Deaf individuals into the Public service, thereby demonstrating their value to society.

Engaging in public campaigns to raise awareness and support for sign language programs can also shift perceptions among policymakers, reminding them that inclusivity fosters a stronger democracy. Furthermore, pressure needs to be applied on governmental bodies to prioritize budget allocations that support Deaf communities, ensuring the development of robust programs tailored to their needs.

Through the various ministries, the government must as a matter of urgency lead in promoting, respecting, implementing the sign language rights of deaf people and provide adequate and timely funding to meet the public need of sign language in major sectors such as health, education and Justice.

Timothy Egwelu is a lawyer and disability policy and an inclusion consultant.

Ethiopian runner Shewarge Alene dies aged 30, the organiser of the Stockholm marathon confirms.

Event Video 
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IPI, in partnership with The Elders, cohosted a policy forum on “The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism” on September 25th.

The multilateral system is facing its greatest crisis since World War II, creaking under the strain of disordered global power dynamics. The UN has long struggled with a host of threats to multilateral cooperation, including growing disregard for the rule of law, nuclear proliferation, the rise of nationalist policymaking, and backtracking on global climate action and efforts to promote gender equality. Now, in the face of unprecedented funding cuts, the UN is being forced to reduce costs while seeking to retain relevance and improve efficiency across its three pillars. Bold thinking and action are urgently needed for a fairer, more effective, and more responsive UN to emerge from this crisis.

At the event, The Elders introduced their new policy paper, speaking to the failures of the existing multilateral system and calling for bold reform. The paper advocates for renewing the international peace and security architecture, overhauling the international financial architecture, accelerating investment in global public goods, and selecting a woman as the next UN secretary-general. The Elders shared nine “calls to action” to drive forward the process of reform.

Read The Elders’ report>>

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Juan Manuel Santos, Chair of The Elders; former President of Colombia; and Nobel Peace Laureate

Speakers:
H.E. Mary Robinson, Member of The Elders; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and first woman President of Ireland
H.E. Helen Clark, Member of The Elders; former Prime Minister of New Zealand; and former Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Nudhara Yusuf, Co-Chair of the Coalition for the UN We Need

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

The post The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism appeared first on International Peace Institute.

VIENNA, 25 September 2025 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Ambassador Jan Braathu concluded his first official visit to Greece yesterday.

During his visit, Representative Braathu discussed current challenges to media freedom and the safety of journalists with Minister of Justice Georgios Floridis, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Pavlos Marinakis, as well as Secretary General for Communication and Information Dimitris Kirmikiroglu. Braathu also held consultations with investigative journalists, representatives of journalists’ unions, academia and members of Greece’s Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

“Greece has made significant strides since 2022 in enhancing journalist safety through a range of policy initiatives, training and capacity-building programmes,” Representative Braathu underlined. “I was informed of an ambitious and multi-faceted approach by the Government and I urge continued efforts together with representatives of journalists and media. I look forward to the implementation of the government Action Plan for media freedom and safety of journalists and stand ready to provide support and assistance to this end,” Braathu said.

One of the topics addressed was the ongoing work by the government task force, including representatives of journalists’ unions, on draft legislation to counter Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

“It is important not only to transpose the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive, which addresses cross-border cases, but also to adopt legislation countering domestic SLAPPs,” the Representative noted. He added that this development would represent a highly positive step and place Greece among the very few OSCE participating States that have a progressive legal framework aimed at countering all cases of SLAPPs.

Representative Braathu welcomed the legislative measures undertaken by Greece to strengthen the safety and legal protection of journalists and media professionals, including the decriminalization of defamation and the adoption of a collective labor agreement for public sector media and expressed the hope that the private sector media would follow this example as well. It was agreed to explore further co-operation with the International Training Center for the Safety of Journalists and Media Professionals in Thessaloniki. He also stated support for ongoing discussions on the creation of a self-regulatory Media Council in Greece.

The Representative raised the topic of the 2022 surveillance case, “Predatorgate”, as well as the murder of veteran crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in 2021, encouraging authorities to continue investigations and reiterating the importance of preventing impunity for crimes against journalists. Braathu underlined the importance of adhering to the 2018 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on the Safety of Journalists.

In various meetings, Braathu stressed the importance of editorial independence, promoting transparency in media ownership, and safeguarding media pluralism. Regarding the allocation of state advertising and support, he underlined that allocation should be based on objective and transparent criteria.

In line with his mandate, Representative Braathu reaffirmed his readiness to support Greek authorities at all levels in advancing reforms that promote media freedom and safety of journalists.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

Polen, Dänemark, Finnland – in immer mehr Ländern werden mysteriöse Drohnenüberflüge registriert. Die Schweiz ist schlecht gerüstet.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz

The OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of experts undertaken by Professor Hervé Ascensio, Professor Veronika Bílková and Professor Mark Klamberg presented their findings to the OSCE Permanent Council on 25 September 2025, collected in the report entitled ‘Report on Possible Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation’.

The three experts were selected after 41 OSCE participating States, following consultation with Ukraine, invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism on 24 July 2025 to “build upon previous findings, and: [t]o establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of relevant OSCE commitments; violations and abuses of human rights; and violations of IHL, including possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, related to the treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation; [t]o collect, consolidate, and analyze this information including to determine if there is a pattern of widespread and systematic torture, ill-treatment and execution of Ukrainian POWs and soldiers hors de combat and/or at detention facilities by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories and in Russia; and [t]o offer recommendations on relevant accountability mechanisms”.

The Mechanism, established by all OSCE participating States in 1991, allows for one or more participating States to request ODIHR to “inquire of another participating State whether it would agree to invite a mission of experts to address a particular, clearly defined question on its territory relating to the human dimension”.

The Permanent Council is one of the OSCE’s main decision-making bodies, and convenes each week in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions on future activities.

The observations of the mission of experts are available here.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Women stand in a damaged displacement settlement in Khan Younis, Gaza. Credit: UNFPA/Media Clinic

By the Peace Research Institute Oslo
OSLO, Norway, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

The battlefield is no longer distant; for millions of women, it’s next door. An estimated 676 million women – nearly 17 percent of the global female population – lived within 50 kilometres of a deadly conflict last year, according to a new report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). That is the highest figure recorded since the end of the Cold War.

https://www.prio.org/about

Women at risk

2024 marked a historic peak in women’s exposure to armed conflict. The number of women living in conflict zones has more than doubled compared to 1990, reflecting both the rising scale of global violence and the increasing reach of conflicts into densely populated areas.

The study found that last year, around 245 million women lived in areas where conflict caused more than 25 battle-related deaths, while 113 million women were located in zones with over 100 deaths.

Bangladesh recorded the highest absolute number of women exposed, with nearly 75 million living within 50 kilometres of conflict. The violence was primarily linked to nationwide protests in July and August, which culminated in the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

In Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, all women were affected, meaning entire female populations were directly exposed to deadly violence.

Living near conflict zones has severe consequences for women’s lives. Armed conflict undermines inclusion, justice and security, and is consistently associated with higher maternal mortality, greater risks of gender-based violence, reduced access to education for girls, and widening gender gaps in employment.

These impacts threaten women’s immediate safety, but also their long-term wellbeing and economic prospects, weakening the foundations needed for recovery.

‘Conflict doesn’t just happen on the battlefield – it reaches into women’s homes, schools and workplaces, disrupting the very foundations of their lives,’ said PRIO Research Director Siri Aas Rustad, who is the author of the report. ‘While some may find new roles in crisis, these opportunities are fragile. The hard truth is that war widens gender inequalities and leaves women at greater risk.’

Regional variation

The report highlights striking regional and national differences. In Lebanon in 2024, 100 percent of the female population lived within 50 kilometres of a conflict event where the death toll exceeded 100 – this means that all women in Lebanon are exposed to high-intensity conflict.

In the Palestinian territories, nearly 80 percent of women reside near areas with more than 100 fatalities, with the other 20 percent living in conflict areas with between 1 and 99 killed. Over one third of women live close to zones with more than 1,000 deaths. Syria shows a similarly severe pattern, with most women exposed to medium- and high-intensity conflict.

In Nigeria, the report reveals that women in Borno State face particularly high-intensity violence linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State, while women in the South-South region are increasingly affected by separatist violence.

Long-term toll

The developmental costs of the impact on women are profound. Countries with a high proportion of women living near conflict consistently score lower on the United Nations Human Development Index, underlining the long-term effects of violence on education, health and livelihoods.

Protracted conflicts, often overshadowed by more visible wars, steadily erode social and economic structures. At the same time, cuts in international aid threaten to further weaken infrastructure and deepen vulnerabilities

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a world-leading institute for the study of peace and conflict. Through cutting-edge research, PRIO examines the drivers of violence and the conditions that enable peaceful relations between states, groups and individuals.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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On 24 and 25 September 2025, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, with support from the OSCE Secretariat’s Action Against Terrorism Unit, held a training course on media and information literacy in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (P/CVERLT) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan

The training supported the Centre’s P/CVERLT efforts by addressing the challenges stemming from the digital ‘information disorder’, in the context of P/CVERLT. Over the two days, participants discussed and were introduced to tools that can help increase media literacy and thinking skills, incl. regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI), and build resilience to violent extremist and other harmful content. The training also focused on ways to address violent extremist and other illegal content online, while upholding fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression. The training course brough together over twenty participants, including students from universities in Ashgabat as well as representatives of the Youth Union, the National Red Crescent Society of Turkmenistan and a number of local public organizations and media.

Through presentations from international and local experts as well as a number of hands-on exercises in working groups, the training fostered multi-stakeholder co-operation while providing participants with the tools and practical skills to address the misuse of online platforms for VERLT.

“In the context of global information flows and emerging new technologies, the rapidly changing information environment create a source of serious security threats,” said William Leaf, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“Being active users of internet resources, teenagers and youth, may become an easy target for manipulation and aggressive influence by extremist groups,” added Leaf.

“The aim of this project is to increase youth resilience to violent extremism by enhancing their knowledge about media and information security,” he stressed.

The event follows the OSCE-organized training course on media literacy for representatives of Turkmenistan’s national media and state institutions, which took place on 16 and 17 September in Ashgabat and focused on current trends in the modern media environment. It builds on a curriculum developed under “INFORMED: Information and Media Literacy in Preventing Violent Extremism. Human Rights and Gender-Sensitive Approaches to Addressing the Digital Information Disorder".

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership[1]

On 9–10 November 2025, the 4th European Union (EU)–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit is taking place in Santa Marta, Colombia, bringing together European, Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Goverment to  strengthen bi-regional relations. This mechanism constitutes the main forum for dialogue and cooperation between Europe and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is the continuation of the EU–LAC summits held since 1999.

Today, EU–LAC relations unfold within the context of a structural crisis of the international system, marked by the decline of the liberal international order, the fragmentation of global trade, and growing strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China in key sectors such as technology, energy and supply chains. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 Brexit referendum, illiberal and protectionist trends have intensified, while Donald Trump’s second term has deepened these dynamics through unilateral tariffs on countries and strategic sectors. The EU has responded with an “open strategic autonomy” agenda, combining the green and digital transitions with industrial policies and economic security, while LAC seeks to diversify its ties and advance green and digital reindustrialisation processes, despite structural fragilities and a recent decline in foreign direct investment[2]. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to revitalise a bi-regional relationship that, despite a long-standing record of cooperation and political dialogue, has gone through extended periods of stagnation and mutual loss of relevance compared with other actors such as China and Russia[3].

To foster debate ahead of this high-level meeting, on 23 May 2025, the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) hosted a roundtable entitled Beyond the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Shaping the Future of EU–Latin America Relations. The event aimed to encourage dialogue between researchers and policymakers, bringing together academics who participated in the European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) conference, along with EU officials and LAC diplomats.

Organised by Arantza Gomez Arana (Northumbria University, UK), Bruno Theodoro Luciano (ULB and UNU-CRIS, Belgium) and Damián Rodríguez (University of the Republic, Uruguay), and with the support of the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the event opened with a keynote by Professor José Antonio Sanahuja (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), who analysed the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic context surrounding the 2025 EU-CELAC Summit. He stressed that, after a period of “polycrisis” within the EU and accelerated change in the international system, Donald Trump’s re-election has brought a dynamic of contestation to the liberal order, affecting both transatlantic alliances and the development strategies of both regions. In this context, the EU faces the challenge of redefining its integration model and external projection, while simultaneously advancing the green and digital transitions, reinforcing strategic autonomy, and strengthening the resilience of its value chains. However, this process takes place amid internal tensions and macroeconomic constraints, as well as a global environment marked by intensifying US-China rivalry and the risk of economic fragmentation and trade wars.

Sanahuja argued that the bi-regional relationship must be reframed around mutual interests and tangible results, moving away from the traditional asymmetric logic. Through initiatives such as the Global Gateway initiative and the conclusion and implementation of trade agreements -including the EU–Mercosur, EU–Mexico[4] and EU–Chile agreements- the EU seeks to diversify partnerships and secure critical inputs, while LAC requires access to finance, technology transfer and industrialisation. He warned that the success of this agenda will depend on the ability to coordinate positions in multilateral forums, avoid having CELAC’s internal divisions undermine the relationship, and seize the current window of opportunity to build shared strategic autonomy. In his view, the Santa Marta Summit should not be framed as “against” Trump, but rather as an opportunity to avoid falling into his polarising game and to project an open space based on rules and mutual benefits for both regions.

The second part of the event brought together high-level academic and diplomatic voices. Participants included Anyurivet Daza Cuervo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of Colombia; Detlef Nolte, Professor at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA); María García, Professor at the University of Bath (UK); Renata Zilli, Researcher at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE); and Eduardo Pereira e Ferreira, Minister-Counsellor at the Mission of Brazil to the EU. Each contributed with complementary perspectives on the challenges and opportunities in the bi-regional relationship, from diplomacy and trade to global governance and sustainable development strategies.

The roundtable concluded with an exchange between speakers and participants (academics and students from different nationalities), allowing for a deeper exploration of areas of convergence and the pending challenges to strengthening EU-LAC relations. Participants agreed on the importance of promoting sustained dialogue, encouraging bi-regional research, and exploring synergies between academia and policymaking. The organising team expressed its interest in continuing work on this agenda and in assembling panels for future conferences and international events. Those interested in engaging with these topics or collaborating are warmly invited to get in touch with the organisers, as we aim to expand the network of experts and stakeholders committed to the future of EU-LAC relations.

 

[1]García, M.J. and Gomez Arana, A., 2022. Latin America-European Union relations in the twenty-first century.

[2] Sebastião D. and Luciano B.T.(2023). ‘Moving from EU-centrisms: Lessons from the polycrisis for EU studies and Global South regionalism’ inJournal of Contemporary European Research,19(2): 226-245.https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v19i2.1297

[3]Sanahuja, J.A. and Rodríguez, J.D., 2022. Twenty years of EU–MERCOSUR negotiations: Inter-regionalism and the crisis of globalisation. In Latin America–European Union relations in the twenty-first century (pp. 117-153). Manchester University Press.

[4] Proposed for adoption by the European Commission on the 3rd of September https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1644

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An article, published on 8 September 2025 in the Kyiv Independent, brandished the headline: ‘Russia’s gains speed up in Ukraine ahead of high-stakes autumn’. Relying on open-source data, the analysis showed how the average pace of Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2025 far outweigh those in 2024. Indicatively, Russia captured 363 km2 of Ukrainian territory in August 2024 as opposed to 464 km2 last month, in August 2025.

Figure 1 – The infographic summarising Russia’s monthly advances, as shared in the Kyiv Independent article published on 8 September 2025.

To make matters worse, according to some intel from the battlefield, the Russian armed forces are moving 150,000 troops, backed by columns of armour, to the frontline in Pokrovsk. These valuable reinforcements will inevitably lead to the deterioration of the situation at the front, with dispatches from the besieged stronghold of Pokrovsk suggesting the Ukrainian forces ‘are almost encircled’. The collapse of Pokrovsk, a strategic logistics and economic hub, would put pressures both on the Ukrainian military and the embattled Ukrainian economy.

Non-experts on the Eastern Mediterranean would be bemused to hear that this region, which only neighbours the Black Sea, maintains decisive influence on the course of events in the Ukrainian battlefield. Yet the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained a critical, even if overlooked, role in influencing the fate of military operations on the Ukrainian theatre. How could this be? I hear you asking.

The main connecting link lies in the trade of energy. Recent evidence shows the significant extent to which the European Union has subsidised the Russian wartime economy, and, therefore by proxy, the Russian armed forces. These statistics show that EU member states alone have funnelled more than €210 billion into Russia through the purchase of fossil fuels between 24 February 2022 and 24 July 2025.

By comparison, the EU plus the UK and EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) contributed €167 billion to Ukraine in the form of military and financial assistance in a similar period, from 24 January 2022 to 30 June 2025.

These valuable revenue flows have enabled Russia to sustain its push on the battlefield. They have enabled the Kremlin to purchase valuable defence components on the global market, replace lost equipment, accelerate the development of weapon innovations, and source domestic and foreign hired guns. The latter has meant that, while Russia has been losing personnel at exorbitant rates, the Russian military has been able to replenish those loses and keep pushing in the battlefield. Best attesting to this is the fact that the Kremlin has avoided the need for a second partial, let alone a full, mobilisation, which would threaten regime stability.

The Eastern Mediterranean has played a crucial role in these energy flows’ continuity. While additional jurisdictions, like China and India, have become important intermediaries in the sale of Russian fossil fuels amidst western sanctions, the Eastern Mediterranean state of Türkiye has best leveraged the region’s proximity to the European market.

Benefiting from reduced logistics costs due to the short distance, Türkiye emerged as the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil products in 2023. With increases in domestic consumption being unable to account for such surges in fuel imports, the safe conclusion is that Türkiye has been a ‘strategic pitstop’ enabling the circumvention of western sanctions. Concurrently, the TurkStream pipeline remains the sole active pipeline feeding Russian natural gas into Europe.

This explains why the US President, Donald Trump, has proposed placing American secondary sanctions on Russian oil if Europe initiates. While some have called this a stalling tactic, a unilateral US sanction would likely do more to harm the American economy while Europe continues to buy vast volumes of Russian fossil fuels.

The fact that this proposal come from the US also reveals the precarious position Europe has placed itself in. While European leaders have been quick to pronounce that they are ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ for Ukraine, in reality they have failed to heed to a US warning that emerged as early as 2014.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, (most) NATO member states (re)securitised Russia as a national security threat. This prompted the US to publicly encourage Europe to close its most significant security vulnerability: the continent’s dependence on Russian energy. One of the core propositions that accompanied the US position on European energy security has been to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean as a most suitable alternative supplier. This position became codified in 2019 in the ‘Menendez-Rubo Act’, co-sponsored by then Senator and current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Beyond the region’s proximity to the European market, two EU member states – Cyprus and Greece –, amongst others in the region, maintain sizable hydrocarbon reserves. This reaffirms the Eastern Mediterranean’s suitability.

Yet, at the face of military threats by no other than Türkiye, the EU has been unable to offer the protective umbrella to Cyprus and Greece necessary to salvage European energy security.

As a result, the EU has failed to arrest its energy imports from Russia even after nearly four years since Russia begun its invasion. The REPowerEU policy – EU’s response to this conundrum – only emerged three months after the full-scale invasion commenced and does not envisage the full phasing out of Russian energy until at least 2027. By that time, if the war drags on, Russia will have been waging an effectively EU-subsidised war on Ukraine for five years.

In the absence of decisive action to leverage the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves, the EU will continue to situate itself between rock and a hard place. Instantly stopping Russian energy imports would cripple the embattled European economies. Before Germany bypassed its own sanctions by indirectly importing Russian gas mainly through France, key German executives spoke of the ‘permanent damage’ to Germany’s economy from the energy crisis. Continuing to buy Russian fuel will of course lead to more Ukrainian deaths in the battlefield and beyond.

Yet, despite the challenges and the collective EU’s inaction, some, but nonetheless important, progress has been made in the Eastern Mediterranean, which further reaffirms the region’s potential. The Greek Alexandroupolis LNG terminal’s construction has enabled non-Russian gas to flow into Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, including Ukraine.

The logistics of the endeavour further reiterate the prospect for energy to play a necessary role in bringing about lasting stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Egypt is the world’s seventh largest natural gas producer, domestic demand means that it heavily relies on Israeli imports to conduct its exporting business. Amidst interminable turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is an encouraging sign for the region. Importantly, it builds on the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s establishment in 2021, which includes both Israel and the Palestinian Authority along with six other regional states. The Gaza Marine hydrocarbon reserves, which remain intact, mean that they can be used to reconstruct Gaza and develop the West Bank once hostilities end.

Undoubtedly, the continued use of fossil fuels leads to environmental concerns. Paradoxically, exploiting these natural gas reserves can lead to an end to highly polluting instances of warfare. It could have also prevented warfare in the past. Beyond rescuing European energy security and the war in Ukraine, unleashing the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy potential will reaffirm its potential as a global strategic conduit.

A memorandum signed at the G20 in New Delhi in 2023 between the US, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy, and India resolves to establish the ‘India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’ (IMEC). The Eastern Mediterranean is a critical and necessary conduit in this strategic initiative to counter China’s economic, cultural, and political influence through the parallel Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Similarly, energy constitutes an important, albeit merely one, IMEC dimension.

Figure 2 – A visualisation of the strategic projects associated with ‘IMEC’, which includes energy infrastructure passing through the Eastern Mediterranean

If the EU is seriously interested in doing whatever it takes, then ensuring the development of the Eastern Mediterranean plan occurs unimpeded is the best next step. For academics, the highly consequential linkages between the Eastern Mediterranean, European energy security, and Ukrainian military security expose the increasing interconnectedness between security sectors and regions in a globalised world where international competition is on the rise.

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