Agrégateur de flux

 

In 2017, the Russia-based Institute for Prospective Military Studies dedicated its annual award to a military engineer for designing a “non-lethal acoustic weapon suitable for use in urban combat.” This engineer was also a high-ranking member of Russia’s main intelligence directorate, the GRU, specifically its clandestine sabotage and assassination unit 29155. Following this accolade, President Putin promoted this individual as his representative in a Far Eastern province, a rare honor generally reserved for agents after they achieve a major “success” in kinetic covert operations. Putin originally founded the Institute for Prospective Military Studies in 2013 to develop “weapons based on new physical properties including ray weapons and wave weapons.” Within a couple of years, American diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials started falling ill under mysterious circumstances at home and abroad.

Most people know this phenomenon as Havana Syndrome, scientifically termed anomalous health incidents (AHIs). The issue first entered the spotlight in 2016 when CIA personnel stationed in America’s embassy in Havana started reporting intense headaches, ringing in the ears, and fatigue. Since then, over 1,000 incidents have emerged on every continent. In addition to the aforementioned symptoms, victims have suffered dizziness, vertigo, nausea, and cognitive difficulties, with some experiencing rare cancers, heart conditions, and, unfortunately, death.

Conclusive evidence has never emerged, and possible explanations have ranged from work-related duress to mass psychogenic illness (Epidemic hysteria) or even the sounds made by crickets. At a recent congressional hearing on AHIs, however, one of the witnesses noted their study indicated at least 68 of the incidents cannot be explained by pre-existing conditions or psychosomatic symptoms. They affirmed that the aggregate scientific, intelligence, and medical evidence substantiates claims that these AHIs are the result of a foreign adversary. More specifically, the reported symptoms are consistent with “wave weapons.” As the witnesses see it, Russia is this foreign adversary.

Russia has a long-running R&D program on acoustic and electromagnetic directed-energy emission devices used for lethal and non-lethal purposes. During the Moscow Signal incident of the Cold War, around 350 American embassy employees in Moscow experienced symptoms similar to those today between 1953 and 1976. While most information regarding AHIs remains strictly confidential, declassified documents show that  Soviet intelligence aimed microwave radiation at the U.S. embassy, detected through frequency bands.

The recent congressional testimonies by individuals with top-secret security clearances suggest a similar pattern of events today. They charge that high-powered microwave systems are bathing the living quarters of American officials to gradually induce auditory and sensory-motor impairments. Such methods are covert and leave little trace. The last two years have shown that Russia possesses the means and, more importantly, the motives to pursue such acts. Additionally, there is more evidence than just the Institute for Prospective Military Studies.

One witness mentioned a medical research facility in Saint Petersburg with recorded links to unit 29155. This facility also happens to research the consequences of ultra and infrasound frequencies on the brain. Given its sustained communication with military scientists, unit 29155 is the plausible executor if Russia is behind Havana Syndrome. The unit is known for offensive terror actions, including the Salisbury Poisonings and a series of explosions at NATO ammunition facilities throughout the 2010s. Most crucially, an AHI investigation established that members of unit 29155 were in proximity of confirmed AHI incidents on at least four occasions. Further revelations will likely follow.

While evidence points to Russia, the U.S. government’s response has left conflicting or puzzling messages to the public. According to a March 2023 report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, most intelligence agencies deem it “very unlikely” that a foreign adversary is behind AHIs. However, interviews with agency officials reveal low confidence or outright disagreement with that assessment. One of the recent congressional witnesses, who has a top-secret security clearance, said that the classified material he personally reviewed “directly contradicts” the public statements from the Executive Branch on the origins and extent of AHIs. He also said numerous agencies have withheld information from sister agencies and intentionally neglected critical evidence that would implicate a foreign adversary.

These discrepancies hint at a possible cover-up within the U.S. government, although there are legitimate reasons for deliberately withholding such information. Perhaps the government refuses to release the truth to prevent the weapon’s proliferation. While the witnesses did not divulge specific details due to classification, they did mention that the weapon is small enough to fit in a backpack. However, the revelation that certain agencies are refusing to share pertinent information with sister agencies invariably fuels conspiracy theories regarding the nefarious deep state.

Whatever the reason may be, the irresolute response by the American executive branch feels like a whitewashing for the victims and their families. Whether Russia or another adversary is responsible, they are targeting America’s best and the brightest. Most of the victims hope to return to work one day, but many will never fully recover. The lack of clarity surrounding this issue is why the recent congressional hearing was held–to shed light on AHIs and spur elected representatives to take action. Government-provided healthcare is the most evident policy option, and it is Congress’s job to ensure available funding.

As to whether a specific perpetrator will ever be identified, only time will tell.

 

 

 

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© European Union 2024- Source EP – Alain ROLLAND

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Very pleased to have you back with us, Nick. You have studied the European far right parties over decades now and you shared your findings several times in our programme, most recently on how these parties respond to the climate crisis. With the European elections less than one month away, let me ask you what you think of all the media speculation about the rise in support for Radical Right Parties.

Before turning to next month, the first thing I would flag up is that the Radical Right already did very well in the 2019 European elections. A leading scholar in the field, Cas Mudde, estimated back then that ‘Right-wing Euroskeptics took between a quarter and a third of the seats in the European Parliament, with populist radical-right parties making the biggest gains’.

That said there is little doubt that the number of Radical Right MEPs looks set to increase further at the elections next month, although not uniformly across the member states.

In a Policy Brief conducted for the European Council on Foreign Relations in January, Kevin Cunnigham and his co-authors predicted that ‘anti-European populists’ are likely to come first in nine member states and that the two transnational groups where Radical Right parties currently sit are likely to win a quarter of the European Parliament’s 720 seats.

 

Is that confirmed in the current opinion polls?

If we look at the three largest Western European states, France, Italy and Germany (all three founding members!), the Radical Right, as represented by the Rassemblement National, the Fratelli D’Italia and the Alternative für Deutschland, could obtain up to 75 seats.

This would represent over 10% of the seats in the Strasbourg Parliament. And that’s before you add the 12 seats predicted for the rival radical right parties in Italy and France, Matteo Salvini’s Lega (with a prediction of 7 seats) and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête (possibly 5 seats). On the face of it, this is a very significant rump of like-minded Radical Right MEPs emanating from the three big founding member states!

 

Why do you say “on the face of it”?

Because historically, the Radical Right has struggled to work together in the European Parliament, and this has limited its overall influence and impact. Back in 2007 Michael Minkenberg and Pascal Perrineau stated that ‘there is nothing more difficult to establish than an international group of nationalists.’

Since then, we have witnessed more cooperation among radical right parties, but even today, despite the strategic and financial advantages of transnational group cooperation, the Radical Right remains fractured across two groups: the ‘soft eurosceptic’ European Conservative and Reformists group (ECR), and the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic Identity and Democracy group (ID). To illustrate the point, if we go back to our discussion about France, Italy and Germany, currently the Fratelli d’Italia are in the ECR group and the Rassemblement National are in the ID group.

And even within the groups there are tensions between certain parties; for instance, most recently within the ID group between the RN and the AfD over the latter’s controversial meeting on ‘remigration’.

In other words, as Cas Mudde extrapolates, ‘a far-right “super group” remains an unlikely scenario – at least for the next legislature.’

 

So, what will be the significance of their potential increase over the next 5 years?

The significance in the broader sense is that it appears to confirm the ongoing mainstreaming of the Radical Right, which is much debated by political scientists.

What this means in terms of its impact on EU policy is that flagship policies such as the European Green deal may be up for further discussion and potentially watered down. There will also be moves to prioritize a stricter immigration policy, with pressure on the Schengen Agreement and the principle of open internal borders.

In short, the next President of the European Commission, whoever that is, will face significant challenges emanating from the Radical Right in terms of the future trajectory of the European Union.

 

Many thanks, Nick Startin, for sharing your observations and expectations with us. 
I recall you are Associate Professor of international relations at John Cabot University, in Rome.

The post The Radical Right and the European Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Photo de Luka E sur Unsplash

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Ana Bojinović Fenko, you are professor of international relations at the University of Ljubljana. Tell us what you were doing when Slovenia joined the European Union on the 1st of May 2004?

I was already at the University of Ljubljana, 23 years old and just graduated in Political Science with a major in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Only fourteen days before the 1st of May 2004 I defended my Bachelor Thesis with the title: “Western Balkans as an opportunity for Slovenia as a member of the EU”. I was quite enthusiastic to be finishing my studies in this field, which was much focused on the EU accession process of Slovenia at this time when it was successfully finalised and when the accession Treaty came into force.

 

So what were your expectations for the future at that moment in your life?

My expectations as a future Master student were mostly focused on how to seize the new opportunities offered by the EU market and other EU integration instruments. I remember I applied for a master’s in European integration in Nice, in a programme ran by the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and I almost moved to France!

But finally, despite being accepted to the programme, I decided to stay in Ljubljana, where I was offered an employment in scientific research. In October 2004 I started a job as a Junior Researcher, which led directly from the Master to PhD studies in International Relations.

And I could feel the expected opportunities brought by EU membership very quickly, as the Centre of International Relations where I was employed got engaged in concrete international projects, especially those funded by the European Union. We were mostly analysing economic and political effects of EU enlargement for the EU but also for small states such as Slovenia. One specific feature, for example, was the effect of transition periods that were negotiated by some of the new Member States – for Slovenia this was a period imposed by Austria and Germany for opening their job market. In these research projects, the most important feature for Slovenian foreign policy was focusing on the future EU enlargement towards the Western Balkan countries.

 

So you were seizing the opportunities right from the beginning.
How do you look back today at these two decades?

Both personally and professionally I am very satisfied with Slovenian membership. It should be noted though that Slovenia as a society, economy and state did not only profit from EU membership. There were also hard times, for instance the specific period of the economic and financial crisis, when the state was on the very verge of bailout, but then the government managed to avoid international intervention into domestic finance.

Still, I consider the EU political community brings much more positive effects to Slovenia compared to if the state had not become an EU member. In my assessment, the ultimate positive effect for Slovenia – a former communist state – is the internalisation of European values into Slovenian society. This effect was very visible in 2020–2022 period, a moment when the government started several political manoeuvres of de-democratisation, disrespect of human rights and rule of law. Not only political opposition and organized civil society but also the Slovenian people in general opposed en masse such a move away from EU values and in the election managed to change the leading party and the government.

 

So there’s definitely more than economic benefits to EU membership.

Yes, I think so. All of the challenges Slovenia is facing – economic, political, security, social or cultural effects of globalisation – would of course have been present regardless of its EU membership. But for a small state of only 2 million people in the centre of Europe, at the crossroads of four different cultures, I assess that these challenges are met much more effectively in a multilateral setting within the European institutions.

As the biggest opportunity for Slovenia, I see the possibility for our country to contribute to EU policies that respond to specific interests and expertise of Slovenian companies, civil society and state: a fair green transition on a global scale, safeguarding international peace and security, protection of human rights and application of humanitarian law in armed conflicts, and more particularly the integration of Western Balkan countries into the European Union.

 

The last issue may be one of the most pressing ones today. Thank you very much, Ana Bojinović Fenko, for your personal testimony. I recall you are professor of international relations at the University of Ljubljana. All the best for the next twenty years!

The post 20 years of Slovenia in the EU – Ana Bojinović Fenko appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A második világháborút követő években az amerikai légierő, a haditengerészet és a tengerészgyalogság legtöbb gépe még dugattyús motorral repült. A pilótaképzésben a T-34 Mentor jelentette az alapfokot, de arról túl nagy ugrás lett volna a vadászgépekre ülni. Ezért a North American Aviation létrehozott és négy különböző változatban, közel 2000 darabos példányszámban legyártott egy közbenső típust, a T-28 Trojant.

A T-28-as vagy, ahogy a pilóták nevezték, „a 28-as” (The 28) tervezése mögötti koncepció az volt, hogy közbenső típusként segítse a leendő pilóták átmenetét az alapfokú légcsavaros kiképzőgépek és a nagy teljesítményű, szintén légcsavaros vadászok között. Az első változat a hét hengeres, 800 lóerős Wright R-1300-as csillagmotorral és kétágú légcsavarral felszerelt T-28A volt. Ezt az amerikai légierő használta, de viszonylag rövid ideig, mert a hatvanas évek elején megvált a típustól. Nem úgy a haditengerészet, amely a szárazföldi üzemeltetésre készült B változatot és a hajófedélzeti leszállásra is alkalmas C modellt 1984-ig használta. Ezek már egy 1425 lóerős, kilenchengeres, kétfokozatú feltöltővel ellátott Wright R-1820-as csillagmotorral, és háromágú légcsavarral készültek, továbbá felszerelték őket a gép hasa alatti törzsféklappal is. A hajófedélzeti üzem és az abból adódó sérülés elkerülése miatt a T-28C rövidebb légcsavarlapátokkal készült, megerősített futóműveket és fékezőhorgot kapott, továbbá a szárnyak alatt egy-egy függesztési ponttal is rendelkezett. A fegyverkezelő panelt a műszerfal alatt, a pilóta lábai között helyezték el. A kisebb átmérőjű légcsavar és a nagyobb tömeg miatt a C lassabb volt és nem emelkedett olyan gyorsan, mint a B. A némileg páncélozott, öntömítő üzemanyagtartályokkal és szárnyanként három-három függesztési ponttal készült negyedik változatot T-28D típusjelzéssel és Nomad elnevezéssel az A változatú gépekből alakították át. A bombákkal, géppuskakonténerekkel és nem irányított rakétákkal felfegyverezhető könnyű támadó gépet elsősorban felkelők elleni műveletekre szánták. A négy változatot más-más típusjelzéssel, és módosításokkal összesen 27 ország légiereje vagy haditengerészete rendszeresítette. A legnagyobb üzemeltető, a US Navy T-28-as pilótáinak feladataiba, az egykori haditengerészeti helikoptervezető, korábbi interjúalanyom, Marc Liebman visszaemlékezése és a Navy korabeli kiadványai nyújtanak betekintést.

[...] Bővebben!

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Le Courrier des Balkans est partenaire de l'édition 2024 du Festival Étonnants voyageurs, et organise trois rencontres :
« Ostalgie »
Rencontre avec : Géorgui GOSPODINOV, Velibor ČOLIĆ, Sladjana Nina PERKOVIČ, Mila TURAJLIC
Animé par Jean-Arnault DERENS
Samedi 18 mai 15h45, La Grande Passerelle - Salle 3
Précédé du film : « L'envers d'une histoire »
de Mila TURAJLIC (Survivance/2017/104')
Samedi 14h, La Grande Passerelle - Salle 3
De quoi les Balkans sont-ils le nom ?
Avec : (…)

- Agenda / Agenda - Diaporama, France - Régions

The Soviet T-64 tank, developed and produced by the Soviet Union at one of the largest armour manufacturing facilities in the Soviet Union, in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Now most T-64s are used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

The renewed assault by Russian forces on the Kharkiv region of Ukraine came as a surprise to many as it was thought that the resource depletion of both Ukraine’s and Russia’s forces had dwindled the ability to take large offenses after years of fighting. The motivation for such a large assault likely came about due to many decisions that should probably not have been committed to by Ukraine allies. Weakness in the coalition supporting not only Ukraine, but US and Western allies abroad will play into actions in Eastern Europe, even if taking place completely outside of the region.

In is likely the case that Russian military resources are depleted, but the attack was committed to due to circumstances. The motivation for such a move would reflect one seen during the Second World War. In the Battle of the Bulge, German forces used many of their reserves towards the end of the war to re-conquer parts of Belgium towards the shipping port of Antwerp with Germany’s remaining military strength. Taking one of the largest ports in Western Europe would have stunted the Allies advance on Germany, even if the end victory would still have been likely in the Allies’ favour. Kharkiv is important to Ukraine and the region for many reasons, and was always a logistical prize for Russia.

Kharkiv is Ukraine’s second largest city and has historically been a central main city close to the front lines of many of the wars between the Soviet Union and Germany. During the Cold War period, Kharkiv was the base for many of the Soviet Union’s manufacturing and military industrial capabilities, producing many of the tanks currently being used on the battlefield by both Russia and Ukraine. Kharkiv is one of the main populations centres that would need to be encountered when approaching Moscow from the West, and during the Soviet era, was a strategic bulwark against foreign invasions from abroad.

One of the factors that may have encouraged a recent attack on Kharkiv and Sumy is the agreement to supply Ukraine with more advanced weapons from the US and other allies. While ATACMS had been supplied in silence towards Ukraine before any agreement was made in the US, it has been shown that assaulting a fortified Russian position has cost Ukraine many Western supplied Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks. If Russia can quickly take added territory and create barriers, they already know they will be met with some level of success in maintaining the territory, even against NATO weapons.

The use of drones, ATACAMS and long range missiles have targeted many oil and gas production facilities inside of Russia, with ATACAMS being used successfully along with anti-air assets to harass Russian forces and air capabilities. While attacks on Russian oil and gas may be an escalation that the Western allies did not want, Ukraine knows that it needs to affect Russian oil profits as there are still mechanisms where European countries and other allies are benefitting from Russian oil and gas. Despite sanctions, there is little movement in fully quelling the income Russia earns from these profits to fund their war effort. While assaults on Russian infrastructure are not the best tactic for the West or even Ukraine, the lack of de-escalatory policies limiting European use of Russian oil and gas have not been sufficient. As long as North American energy is being hamstrung to Europe and Asia, Ukraine is left on their own to implement an escalatory policy that will complicate the war and put more civilians at risk.

The lesson the US has taught its allies recently is that support may be fleeting, as limiting weapons to one ally sends a message to others. While Ukraine has received a great deal of support, putting the idea in the ether that domestic chaos may alter support for allies teaches all allies of the US to not depend on future support, even in the most dire of circumstances. Countries who are allies will always be independent and work for the betterment of their own citizens, and do not wish to take direction from abroad, only advice. The break in relations and treatment of allies as client states, as opposed to equals, is a victory for their adversaries in every sense of the word. The incentive for US adversaries to use domestic issues in the US and in the West to change foreign defence policy enables local chaos for strategic gain. Such policies create an economy and networks from abroad to alter and pressure local politicians to make decisions to weaken the West’s alliance in every region globally. The end result of making decisions in such an environment is to create weak policy, policies that give an opening to assaults like the one we see currently in the Kharkiv Oblast and surrounding regions. It is often the case that armies defeat themselves before the enemy defeats them. If weak policies dominate the alliance, there is no other outcome but more conflict and more loss of innocent lives.

Event Video 
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The Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, in partnership with IPI, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mozambique to the UN, the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), hosted a policy forum on May 20th on “25 Years of POC and the UN Security Council: Challenges and Opportunities.”

This year marks 25 years since the Security Council first recognized the protection of civilians (POC) as a matter of international peace and security. Since then, POC has become widely institutionalized within the council’s work, as well as the UN more broadly, elevated as a core issue on the council’s agenda, and designated as a priority among mandated peacekeeping tasks.

At the same time, POC continues to face significant challenges resulting from flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws (IHL/IHRL), including by some UN member states. These violations not only have devastating consequences for civilians in conflict settings but are also a symptom of an erosion of the normative frameworks that underpin the international system. This erosion calls into question the role of the UN Security Council in protecting and upholding such norms, especially as in some cases council members have been directly or indirectly involved in violations.

The purpose of this event was to take stock of the council’s engagement with POC over the past 25 years and assess opportunities for it to further strengthen POC norms amid contemporary political and security challenges. This conversation took place as the international community prepares to mark the 75th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, presenting an opportune moment for wider reflection on the fundamental principles of IHL/IHRL that underpin the POC agenda.

Speakers:
Naz K. Modirzadeh, Professor of Practice, Founding Director, Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, Harvard Law School
Laetitia Courtois, Permanent Observer and Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Hichem Khadhraoui, Executive Director, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)
Edem Wosornu, Director, Operations and Advocacy Division (OAD), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Moderator:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
H.E. Pascale Christine Baeriswyl, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN