Agrégateur de flux

Le 31 mai est la journée mondiale sans tabac, au cours de laquelle les organisations de santé cherchent à prendre de nouvelles mesures contre le tabagisme.

Today’s 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings is an opportunity to remember a great military victory against the Nazis but also - on the day European elections start - an important reminder to voters of the values that were fought for, which become the basis of the EU.

 

Avec l’arrimage de l’Égypte, de l’Éthiopie, de l’Arabie saoudite, des Émirats arabes unis et de l’Iran au sein des BRICS début 2024, le groupe incarne aujourd’hui un ensemble d’États influents sur la scène internationale, représentant 46 % de la population mondiale et 29 % du PIB global.  Alors que 2024 est synonyme d’année électorale importante pour plusieurs membres des BRICS, de nouveaux élargissements pourraient intervenir dans les prochaines années. Va-t-on vers un ordre international alternatif ? Quels sont les avantages stratégiques des BRICS+ ? Peuvent-ils incarner la voix du Sud global ? Entretien avec Jean-Joseph Boillot, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, spécialiste de l’économie indienne et du monde émergent.

Nouveau mandat pour Vladimir Poutine en Russie, revers historique pour le Congrès national africain (ANC) aux élections sud-africaines, victoire étriquée pour Narendra Modi en Inde, nouveaux scrutins à venir en Iran à la suite de la mort d’Ebrahim Raïssi et en Éthiopie… 2024 constitue une année électorale charnière pour de nombreux pays des BRICS+. Doit-on s’attendre à d’éventuelles répercussions de ces élections sur l’agenda international des États des BRICS+ ?

Ce serait fort possible car les BRICS+ forment un ensemble assez hétérogène. Il suffit, comme on l’a vu en Argentine, que Javier Milei, libéral proaméricain, soit élu pour sortir de ce groupe. Mais ce qui est intéressant, c’est de voir que, y compris avec les élections indiennes dont les résultats reconduisent Narendra Modi avec une petite majorité, la plupart des pays dit du « Sud Global » sont fondamentalement unis avec un fort consensus interne pour enfin s’affranchir de l’ordre international occidental dit de Bretton Woods. Il peut donc y avoir des alternances sans que cela remette en cause ce consensus très fort à une ou deux exceptions près. Et si certains voudraient que les BRICS+ soient un club anti-occidental confrontationnel, dans la réalité on voit bien qu’avec l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et l’Égypte qui ont intégré le groupe récemment, le consensus évoqué concerne davantage sur des positions de multi-alignement, un peu comme l’Inde qui s’est plutôt rapprochée des États-Unis ces derniers temps sans rompre ses relations avec la Russie par exemple. Pour l’instant en tout cas, les élections dans le monde en développement ne semblent pas remettre en cause ce consensus majoritaire au Sud, et je ne parle pas des fausses élections comme en Russie avec l’élection de Poutine.

Depuis l’élargissement des BRICS+ début 2024, quelle analyse peut-on délivrer sur l’expansion économique du groupe ? Quels sont ses forces et avantages stratégiques ?

On s’aperçoit que le mythe d’un groupement BRICS+ plus puissant que les économies occidentales et capable de renverser la table ne se vérifie pas, sans non plus que les BRICS+ soient un phénomène marginal pour l’évolution de l’économie mondiale. Ce que l’on observe, c’est que les BRICS+ sont plus un regroupement assez souple, issu d’une volonté politique des pays du Sud d’être pris au sérieux dans les enceintes internationales – dominées encore aujourd’hui très largement par le monde occidental – plutôt qu’un ordre mondial alternatif, sauf sans doute dans la tête de Moscou. En témoigne justement la présidence des BRICS assurée cette année par la Russie parce que le Brésil à la présidence du G20 et ne pouvait assurer les deux. Quand on regarde la façon dont la Russie anime les sessions préparatoires du sommet de Kazan qui aura lieu en octobre, on remarque que l’agenda est relativement vide. Il n’y a quasiment pas de réunions, ni de décisions prises. Sur le plan monétaire par exemple, il y avait cette idée de monnaie commune, mais qui n’a pas avancée.

Cela rassure d’une certaine façon sur le fait que, au lieu d’aller vers un monde confrontationnel entre deux blocs, l’on se dirige plutôt vers une confrontation Sud-Nord mais à l’intérieur de l’architecture internationale existante et notamment autour d’institutions qu’il s’agit de réformer comme le Fond monétaire international (FMI) ou la Banque mondiale largement dominés par les pays occidentaux encore à la différence des Nations unies où se retrouvent beaucoup plus les pays du Sud.

Il faut cependant noter que l’entrée de l’Arabie saoudite, de l’Iran ou des Émirats arabes unis tend à renforcer une certaine « cartellisation du monde » sous le parapluie des BRICS dans les domaines clés des matières premières, alimentaires, énergétiques et des métaux. Certains pays du Sud possèdent désormais un levier politique fort sur les matières premières critiques qu’ils revendiquent. Cela pose problème parce que la majorité des pays dits du Sud ne sont en réalité pas producteurs de ces matières premières. Ils risquent donc d’y avoir à l’intérieur du club des BRICS+, non pas un affrontement pour l’instant, mais une difficulté à trouver un point d’équilibre entre l’intérêt des pays producteurs et l’intérêt des pays consommateurs. À titre d’exemple, l’Afrique, un des géants de demain dans les matières premières, est courtisée par la Chine mais aussi par la Russie et les pays du Golfe. Tout le jeu pour ce continent va être d’éviter de tomber dans la dépendance vis-à-vis de ce cartel.

Alors que la Thaïlande a déposé il y a peu sa candidature pour rejoindre les BRICS+ et que de nombreux pays comme le Mexique, l’Algérie ou la Turquie pourraient rejoindre le groupe, quels sont les horizons possibles pour les BRICS+ ? Peuvent-ils incarner de façon homogène la voix dite du « Sud global » ?

Il semble peu probable que l’on s’achemine non seulement vers une organisation structurée des BRICS+, mais aussi vers une capacité du club à être « LE » porte-parole des pays du Sud. La raison en est qu’une majorité de pays sont plutôt sur des positions de multialignement, de double jeu entre les pays occidentaux et les puissances émergentes ou réémergentes du Sud au sens large de Russie comprise. L’immense majorité du monde en développement ne souhaite pas tomber dans une dépendance qui serait russo-chinoise par exemple. Ceux qui ont donné pendant la guerre froide, comme l’Angola, s’en mordent aujourd’hui les doigts. L’élargissement des BRICS qui va se poursuivre – mais très probablement à vitesse modérée – dilue relativement le pouvoir dans l’organisation et empêche un groupe de prendre l’ascendant. Ceci explique qu’on aille si lentement sur la question d’une alternative monétaire au dollar, ou bien encore dans les décaissements effectifs de la banque des BRICS pourtant dirigée désormais par une brésilienne.

On irait ainsi plutôt vers ce qui pourrait être qualifié de forum de rencontre et notamment un forum pré-G20 – puisque l’habitude a été prise par les BRICS de se réunir avant chaque G20 – ou autre sommet international important, avec l’objectif d’harmoniser les positions du Sud et de peser collectivement sur les décisions comme le faisaient d’ailleurs les pays du G7. Il est donc plutôt positif d’avoir un élargissement des BRICS à des pays qui représentent des visions et des intérêts un peu différents des cinq pays fondateurs, comme l’Algérie, l’Indonésie, le Viêtnam ou la Thaïlande qui semble sérieuse dans sa candidature. Il sera aussi intéressant d’observer si l’élection de la nouvelle présidente du Mexique infléchit la réflexion du pays dans son souhait de rejoindre le club alors que les États-Unis y sont totalement opposés.

Dans les quatre scénarii possibles décrits par le chercheur français Julien Vercueil, il semble que l’on se dirige vers un scénario de poursuite de l’expansion des BRICS plutôt que vers son éclatement et son déclin, comme certains le pensaient. Mais dans ce scénario d’expansion, plutôt que d’aller vers un découpage de l’économie mondiale entre le Sud et le Nord, on se tournerait vers une contestation croissante conduisant progressivement à des réformes de l’ordre économique mondial. Cela semble être le scénario le plus probable compte tenu de la façon dont le premier élargissement s’est fait. Le second élargissement ne se fera peut-être pas en 2024 parce que l’Inde et le Brésil n’y sont pas très favorables. Les pays qui ont fait acte de candidature vont donc certainement devoir attendre 2025. Mais qu’est-ce qu’une année quand on parle de réformer l’architecture du monde…

Az uniós intézmények részt vesznek a június 6-9-i európai választások védelmében az európai demokráciát célzó dezinformáció és információ-manipuláció ellen.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2024 - EP

Summary: Northrop Grumman's X-29, developed during the Cold War to compete against Soviet fighters, is one of aviation history's most unique experimental aircraft.

-Introduced in the 1980s, it featured forward-swept wings, providing exceptional maneuverability and supersonic performance.

-The aircraft required advanced composite materials and a computerized fly-by-wire system for stability.

-Although only two prototypes were built and the program was eventually discontinued, the X-29's innovative design and capabilities left a lasting impact.

-Russia later attempted a similar design with the Sukhoi Su-47, which faced significant issues and was also shelved after producing just one prototype.

The X-29: Northrop Grumman's Revolutionary Jet with Backward Wings

Manufacturer Northrop Grumman may be best known for developing the F-14 fighter popularized by the blockbuster film Top Gun, however, the company is behind one of the most obscure experimental airframes in aviation history. In fact, the X-29 never even made it past its testing phase. This airframe was developed more than four decades ago, yet it remains a fan favorite for aviation experts. 

An overview of the X-29’s history

When the Cold War was heating up back in the 1970s, the U.S. military began seeking a dynamic fighter platform to better compete against the Soviet’s own aerial fleet.

The X-29 was submitted to fulfill this need, going up against the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. When this prototype was introduced, it became the first airframe of its kind to feature forward-swept wings that made it appear as though they were installed backward.

Incorporating this unique feature was new. However, the concept driving it dated back further. Both the U.S. and Nazi Germany experimented with forward-swept wings during the Second World War. Like design issued that would persist to plague the X-29, these earlier conceptions were also flawed.

The X-29 notably achieved the ability to fly supersonically with this unique wing design.

As detailed by NASA – “The complex geometries of the wings and canards combined to provide exceptional maneuverability, supersonic performance, and a light structure. Air moving over the forward-swept wings tended to flow inward toward the root of the wing instead of outward toward the wing tip as occurs on an aft-swept wing. This reverse airflow kept the wing tips and their ailerons from stalling at high angles of attack (direction of the fuselage relative to the airflow).” 

NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency collaborated to make sure the wing design functioned on the X-29. Advanced composite materials enabled the wing structures to be lightweight and rigid. While the X-29 was very agile even flying at fast speeds, it required a computerized fly-by-wire control system for stability.

More specs and capabilities:

The X-29 measured roughly 48 feet long and its unique wingspan stretched to just over 27 feet.

The fighter was powered by the General Electric F404-GE-400 engine, which produced 16,000 pounds of thrust.

Additional details surrounding the X-29’s specs were outlined by NASA:

“The aircraft had a maximum operating altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 and a flight endurance time of approximately one hour. The only significant difference between the two aircraft was an emergency spin chute deployment system mounted at the base of the rudder on aircraft No. 2. External wing structure is primarily composite materials incorporated into precise patterns to develop strength and avoid structural divergence. The wing substructure and the basic airframe itself are aluminum and titanium. Wing trailing edge actuators controlling camber are mounted externally in streamlined fairings because of the thinness of the supercritical airfoil.”

In the mid-1980s, the X-29 took its first flight from Edwards Air Force Base. Northrop Grumman’s Chief Test Pilot Chuck Sewell flew the airframe.

A second X-29 prototype flew two years later. In total, both aircraft were in the air 242 times between 1984 and 1991. The first X-29 to fly was relegated to display duties at the Research and Development Gallery of the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.

The Second airframe found its way back to the Armstrong Flight Research Center on Edwards Air Force Base.

What about Russia's "copycat" X-29 fighter?

Roughly five years after the X-29s flew on their final missions, Russia debuted its own version of a fighter jet with forward-swept wings. This copy-cat airframe was designated the Sukhoi Su-47.

Like its American counterpart, the Soviet fighter has many issues. Without munitions, the Su-47 weighed a whopping 18 tons. This added pressure on its wings, which were already over-worked when flying high-speed movements. Two D-30F-11 turbojet engines powered the Soviet fighter, enabling the aircraft to fly at speeds of Mach 1.65, comparably slower than the U.S. X-29. 

 Ultimately, the experimental plane was nixed, and only one was ever built. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.'s first jet bomber, was introduced in 1951, marking a significant transition in military aviation.

-Designed for high-altitude, long-range missions to deliver nuclear weapons, it featured advanced technologies like swept wings and powerful jet engines.

-Despite early issues with stability and maintenance, the B-47 became a pivotal aircraft in the Cold War, with over 2,000 units produced.

-Its role extended beyond its initial design, including electronic intelligence missions.

-The B-47 set the stage for subsequent jet bombers and represented a critical leap in U.S. strategic bombing capabilities.

The Forgotten Pioneer: The B-47 Stratojet’s Impact on Cold War Strategy

A slew of U.S. bomber aircraft have transcended the military community to become iconic weapons of war in the eyes of the general public.

The stable of World War II bombers, for example, like the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and B-29 Superfortress, which are typically associated with the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Then you’ve got the B-52 Stratofortress, a massive eight-engine brute that has been in service for seven decades without any plans for retirement.

But there were also machines that debuted in the small window between the iconic classes of U.S. bombers; after World War II but before the B-52 became a mainstay of U.S. aerial power. And generally, understandably, those bombers have been forgotten as relics of a transitional period in military technology.

But one such example is particularly important: the B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.’s first jet bomber. 

Research and Development of the Early Jet Bomber

The B-47 Stratojet was introduced in 1951 as a long-range, high-altitude, jet-powered strategic bomber. The B-47 was designed to avoid enemy interceptor aircraft and deliver nuclear weapons deep within the Soviet Union’s territory. 

In 1943, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) made an informal request for the design of a jet-powered reconnaissance bomber. Jet technology was sparkling new in 1943 and had not yet been applied to a bomber platform – but the merits of such an application were obvious. Several aerospace companies responded to the USAAF’s request, and began conducting research into jet bomber technology.

By 1944, the USAAF had formalized its request, asking for proposals for a jet bomber with impressive specifications: 550 mile per hour top speed; 450 mile per hour cruising speed; 3,500 mile range, and; 45,000 foot service ceiling. North American Aviation, Convair, Boeing, and the Glenn Martin Company each submitted proposals – and all four companies were awarded study contracts. NAA and Convair were asked to focus on four-engine designs – which would become the B-45 and XB-46 respectively. Boeing and Martin were asked to focus on six-engine designs – which would become the B-47 and XB-48 respectively.

Design Influence from German Aeronautics

In 1945, the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Board inspected a secret German aeronautics lab. Embedded with the inspection team was George S. Schairer, the chief of Boeing’s technical staff. During the inspection, the team found German airplane models incorporated something novel, something rumored but unconfirmed: swept wings. Extensive wind tunnel data confirmed that the swept wing design was quite effective. Urgently, Schairer wired back to Boeing.

“Stop the bomber design,” Schairer wrote. The new bomber, under development back home with Boeing, featured straight wings. But Schairer was now a convert; he wanted the new bomber to have swept wings.

Back home, Boeing redesigned its jet bomber to include wings and tail that swept back at 35 degrees. Further revisions were to follow, especially with respect to engine placement and landing gear placement. 

By April 1946, Boeing was satisfied with all of its tweaks. The USAAF ordered two prototypes, which were designated as the XB-47. The XB-47s rolled off the assembly line, ready for flight testing, just a few days before the USAAF separated from the U.S. Army to become a distinct service, the U.S. Air Force. The newly formed USAF set to work, exhaustively testing the new XB-47.

A New Jet Bomber in the New Air Force

Because the new jet bomber incorporated so many cutting-edge technologies, the platform was heavily tested. Test pilot Robert Robbins, who helped debut the XB-47, was initially skeptical about the new bomber. “Oh God, please help me through the next two hours,” Robbins prayed before the XB-47’s first flight. Robbins' fears were alleviated, however; the XB-47 could fly. 

There were some problems, however. The prototype had a tendency to “Dutch roll,” or weave side to side in an uncontrolled yawing motion. A “yaw damper” control system was installed to prevent such yawing. The bomber also had a habit of pitching up at maximum speed – a dangerous flight characteristic caused stalling due to upward pitching of the outboard section of the wing. To remedy the upward pitching, Boeing installed “vortex generators” to prevent the airflow separation that led to upward pitching and stalling. And tragically, during an early test flight, pilot Scott Osler was killed when the XB-47’s canopy ripped off at high speed. The co-pilot managed to land the bomber safely – and Boeing redesigned the canopy. 

Stratojet in Service

The exhaustive tweaking and testing paid off in dividends – although the finished B-47 Stratojet still had problems. 

The finished B-47 Stratojet was regarded as the fastest bomber in the world. USAF Col. Walter Boyne described the new bomber as a “sleek, beautiful outcome that was highly advanced.” The B-47 was said to fly with a light touch, more like a fighter jet than a bomber. The B-47 was so aerodynamically clean that high-speed landing gear (180 knots) was required; the landing was assisted, however, with a ribbon-like drag chute that would slow the bomber down. And because of the hazards associated with such high-speed landings, the B-47 was the first mass-produced aircraft to be equipped with an anti-skid braking system (ABS). 

Still, the B-47 was criticized for its high landing speed – which, when paired with the bomber’s sluggish takeoff performance made for a dangerous combination. The B-47 was also very particular about its landing attitude. If landed at the wrong attitude, the bomber would porpoise – and sometimes skid onto one wing before cartwheeling. Another serious problem: the wings flexed in flight, which had a tendency to affect flight control. Also, the B-47 was a “maintenance hog.” 

Despite the drawbacks, over 2,000 B-47s were produced. The standard variant served proudly until 1969, while the electronic-intelligence variant, the EB-47, served until 1977. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 published articles posted online and around the world. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.

Image Credit: Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

 

The role of the UN in American foreign policy has become more of an afterthought than a priority these days. As the world descends into great power competition, the idea of multilateral institutions as a panacea for global challenges seems like a relic of a bygone era of optimism. With frightening levels of polarization in the U.S. and elections in November, the last thing voters are pondering is how the next president will engage the UN. This disregard is neither new nor surprising and certainly not the fault of individual voters. For years, U.S. attitudes toward the UN have oscillated between disengagement and retrenchment depending on the administration. Amidst this cyclical vacillation, the U.S. has diminished its organizational leverage while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its influence.

Unlike the U.S., the PRC leverages its UN membership as a force multiplier to advance its interests and reshape global norms and the international order. Through economic coercion, strategic placement of its officials in key positions, and pressure on foreign officials, Beijing has undermined the UN’s institutional integrity to accommodate its domestic and international agenda. It has also successfully silenced critics of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) human rights violations and malign activities.

Under President Xi Jinping’s hallmark “wolf warrior diplomacy,” Beijing has recognized that it cannot accomplish its maximalist objectives within the confines of the current international order. Consequently, PRC officials within the UN system have silently pushed for resolutions and norms that reflect its global vision. Foremost, the PRC prioritizes non-interference and state sovereignty over democracy and human rights. Moreover, the CCP’s conceptualization of human rights promotes the right to economic development at the expense of political and civil rights. Other authoritarian regimes support the PRC’s vision for the international system, as it would enable them to operate without criticism, accountability, or consequences.

Perhaps most egregious is the PRC’s abuse of UN committee positions. Despite its well-documented repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, which Beijing has whitewashed as “vocational education,” China retains its position on the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The PRC has routinely used this position to silence and shield itself from criticism.

In 2019, 22 Western countries sent a letter to the UNHRC that urged the CCP to close its Xinjiang re-education camps. The PRC responded by rallying 50 countries–nearly all with poor human rights records and economic dependence on China–to sign a joint letter that praised its “remarkable achievements in Xinjiang.” The UNHRC rejected a similar Western bid to hold a debate on PRC crimes against humanity against Uyghurs in October 2022. However, efforts to suppress debate extend beyond the situation in Xinjiang, with Beijing marshaling 53 countries to defend its imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law. Uncoincidentally, 43 were recipients of PRC investments through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China also weaponizes its role on the NGO Committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This committee grants applicant organizations consultative status, a mechanism necessary to participate in the UN’s activities, events, and negotiations. Unfortunately, Beijing has conditioned its vote of approval on whether the organization recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China.

The subversion of institutional integrity is not limited to committees, most recently exhibited during the World Health Organization’s (WHO) response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Alongside blatant failures to adhere to International Health Regulations, the CCP launched a pressure campaign on the WHO to downplay the virus’s severity. This was coupled with obfuscation efforts and a general lack of transparency that left the world woefully unprepared for what was to come. The PRC has also long pressured countries to reject Taiwan’s membership in the WHO despite the island’s medical expertise.

Additionally, the CCP makes concerted efforts to install its nationals in leadership positions within the UN’s specialized agencies. In 2019, when no other country held more than two leadership positions, China had four, with another candidate under nomination. For eight years, Houlin Zhao oversaw the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which regulates and standardizes telecommunications and information technology. During his time, Zhao leveraged his influence to benefit domestic companies like Huawei and promoted PRC internet norms of surveillance and censorship. CCP officials have also held leadership positions in INTERPOL, the UN Industrial Development Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Like Zhao at the ITU, the agency heads brazenly pursued PRC interests in violation of the agency’s neutrality mandates.

President Xi’s inauguration of the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF) provides another compelling example of Beijing’s self-interested pursuits. Launched in 2015, the much-vaunted fund is run by a steering committee of mostly CCP officials. Unsurprisingly, over one-third of its approved projects have fallen under China’s flagship BRI. While CCP malpractices at the UN do not end here, the picture is clear.

Fortunately, the U.S. is the UN’s largest contributor and possesses the alliances necessary to counter the PRC’s expanding influence. Washington should utilize its power of the purse to drive structural reforms that improve transparency and accountability. For example, it is clear that the UNHRC is broken, and the U.S. should advocate for prerequisites that prevent the world’s worst human rights abusers from holding panel positions. Moreover, U.S. and European diplomats should collaborate to create coalitions that coordinate leadership roles and voting strategies.

However, nothing is possible without sustained U.S. engagement across administrations. This is not to say that the UN will become the supranational authority some envisioned in the aftermath of World War II. Many Americans will remain skeptical of the UN. Nonetheless, even UN skeptics would agree that countering China is America’s top foreign policy priority. Doing so requires a comprehensive diplomatic approach that ensures Washington defends its interests and those of the free world in every possible arena.

In this first discussion, supported by ACE, we delved into the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWR).

Reforms of the telecom sector are expected to be at the top of the policy agenda for the next EU mandate and a battle is already heating up over the need to deregulate it.

The divers helping restore Zanzibar's coral reefs damaged by climate change, fishing and tourism.

Summary: The Lockheed S-3 Viking, retired by the U.S. Navy in 2016 after over four decades of service, was a versatile, carrier-based aircraft renowned for its anti-submarine capabilities.

-Initially developed to replace the Grumman S-2 Tracker, the S-3 featured a four-person crew and advanced sensor integration.

-Although it was later repurposed for surface detection, ground attack, and in-flight refueling, its retirement has left some defense planners nostalgic for its submarine detection abilities, especially amid rising naval tensions with China.

-Despite interest in reviving the S-3, modern replacements like the V-22 Osprey have taken over its roles.

Why the S-3 Viking's Retirement May Have Been Premature

A few years ago, NASA retired the Lockheed S-3 Viking, which had been in service with the U.S. Navy until 2016 – over four decades after the jet’s introduction in 1974.

The S-3, nicknamed “War Hoover” for the vacuum cleaner-like sound it made, was originally developed as a submarine killer – and was distinct for its four-person crew.

Building the S-3 Viking

To replace the aging, prop-driven Grumman S-2 Tracker, the Navy developed the VSX program to procure an anti-submarine successor.

The winning design, the S-3, was a carrier-based, all-weather aircraft capable of subsonic, long-range flight. The S-3 was very much a conventional-looking plane, with a slightly swept leading edge and two GE TF-34 turbofan engines mounted under the wings. Whereas most military jets required ground service equipment to assist with the engine start, the S-3 housed an auxiliary power unit (APU) and could perform unassisted starts.  

Four-Man Crew

Unlike most carrier-capable jet aircraft measuring around 50 feet long, the S-3 carried a four-person crew – rather than a two-person, or one-person crew. Upfront sitting side-by-side was the pilot and the copilot/tactical coordinator (COTAC).

In the back, also side-by-side, were the tactical coordinator (TACCO) and the sensor operator (SENSO). The SENSO was enlisted, whereas the other three crew members were commissioned officers. The four-person configuration came with an odd ejection protocol: if the pilot or COTAC initiated ejection, all four crew members would be ejected, with the backseaters firing 0.5 seconds before the frontseaters to allow for separation.

If TACCO or SENSO, sitting in the back initiated ejection, the pilots up front would not be ejected – no, they had to initiate their own ejection. 

Sensors and Displays Allowed Teamwork

The S-3 was renowned for its sensory integration; the S-3 was the first anti-submarine aircraft to integrate all of its sensor systems into a single General Purpose Digital Computer (GPDC). The integration allowed crew members, who were each seated in front of a Multi-Purpose Display (MPD) screen, to consult and collaborate with each other by analyzing the same data at their own station simultaneously. Alternatively, each crew member could assess separate data.

The end result: the S-3 was a powerful detective, with sensory capabilities considered equivalent to the P-3 Orion, a 116-foot plane with a crew of 12. 

Despite the S-3’s adeptness at sleuthing out enemy submarines, by the 1990s, with the Soviet Union folded, there just weren’t many enemy submarines left to sleuth.

Accordingly, the S-3’s mission profile was modified, from anti-submarine operations to sea surface detection, ground-attack, and in-flight refueling operations. For the S-3’s updated, less sophisticated function, the backseat crew was removed, leaving just a pilot and COTAC to operate the S-3 for most missions. The S-3 served reliably until 2016 when it was retired.

Still, some interest in the S-3 has remained, including rumors of a “comeback.” South Korea’s Navy, for example, expressed interest in purchasing the S-3. Even the U.S. Navy has spitballed the idea of bringing a few S-3s back from storage to perform anti-submarine duties.

For a moment, it appeared as though Lockheed was going to refurbish the S-3, rename it the C-3, and use it to replace the C-2 Greyhound for carrier onboard delivery (COD). Instead, the V-22 Osprey was chosen as the C-2’s replacement.

But the lingering interest in the S-3 serves as a testament to the jet’s functionality and reliability.

And now, in light of China’s naval build-up and aggressive behavior, some war planners are longing for the S-3’s vaunted submarine detection abilities, and wondering if the Viking’s retirement was premature. 

About the Author

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 articles published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

US President Joe Biden gave a heartfelt speech at Thursday’s (6 June) commemorations of the Normandy landings, bringing the “dark forces” of 80 years ago to those threatening Ukraine and the West today on an equal footing.

Often-overlooked developments in Armenia show how Western policymakers are failing to recognise and counteract the growing sophistication of Russia’s propaganda machine, writes David Grigorian.

The ECB made its first interest rate cut since 2019 Thursday, reducing borrowing costs from record highs, but gave few clues about its next move while warning of continuing inflation pressures.

If Biden can avoid the temptation to be a warrior defending allies abroad, he might have a better chance at winning his battles at home.

Does the United States need the ability to fight more than one major war at a time? 

The Senate Armed Services Committee has been asking this question of late, and it is right to do so.

Today, according to official Pentagon planning doctrine, the United States could not. One need not believe literally in a “new axis of evil” that includes Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China to worry that if America and its allies wound up in a fight against one of these four states, another one might consider opportunistic aggression. This could be particularly concerning if the potential adversary believed it could win fast, creating a fait accompli that the United States would be challenged to reverse even after concluding war in another theater. 

For many decades, seeking to ensure deterrence and prevent opportunistic aggression by a second foe if engaged already against a first, the United States aspired to some variant of a two-war capability. During the Cold War, the United States generally aimed to be able to fight a major war alongside NATO allies against the Soviet bloc in Europe and at least one other simultaneous conflict (like the Korean or Vietnam war) elsewhere. Accordingly, the U.S. military during the Cold War was generally 60 to 100 percent larger than it is today.

Once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the United States cut back its armed forces but kept a two-war planning goal. However, those two wars were imagined to be against much less capable foes:  the likes of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or perhaps Syria. In fact, the United States wound up fighting two overlapping wars for many years in Iraq and Afghanistan—though they differed from the typical scenarios envisioned in these force-sizing paradigms since they were long and moderate in scale rather than short and big (like Operation Desert Storm in 1991). Because of their duration, the United States had to stagger its peak efforts in those wars, emphasizing Iraq under President George W. Bush and Afghanistan in the first term of President Obama. 

Starting around 2015, things changed again. Pentagon planners, starting with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, created a “4+1” threat framework with Russia and China joining Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism on the Pentagon’s list of top concerns. Then, under Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary Mark Esper during the Trump years, the Pentagon prioritized Russia and China; the Biden administration under Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has kept a very similar National Defense Strategy.

According to official doctrine [media.defense.gov], today’s U.S. military should have the capacity to do the following all at once:

-Together with allies, fight and defeat China or Russia (but not both at the same time), presumably in conflicts centered on the western Pacific region and eastern European region, respectively,

-Defend the American homeland while also maintaining a nuclear deterrent,

-Deter North Korea and Iran (without specifying exactly how), and

-Maintain momentum against transnational violent extremist organizations as part of the so-called “war on terror.”

But this is still just a one-war framework. Is that enough military for today’s world? 

Before jumping to the conclusion that we need a big defense buildup, a few other considerations are in order. Leave aside the fact that, at nearly $900 billion, America’s national defense budget already exceeds the Cold War peak and is roughly triple China’s and six times Russia’s—at a time when the U.S. structural federal deficit of more than $1 trillion a year makes a big defense buildup challenging to imagine. More to the point, the four nemeses mentioned above, while certainly in cahoots with each other already on some issues, are not likely to fight literally for each other. For any of them, going to war deliberately against the United States would be a decision of huge consequence not likely to be reached just because America seemed temporarily preoccupied elsewhere. In addition, the Army today cannot even recruit to fill out the currently desired troop strength and most of the other services have been struggling to make personnel targets as well.

Most of all, for both the Trump and Biden administrations, the quality of the armed forces has been rightly seen as a higher priority than their size. Defense planners have wanted to focus on improving military lethality, survivability, sustainability, resilience, and adaptability in an era of rapid technological change. 

The United States does need to buttress its deterrence of simultaneous, opportunistic aggression. But the right standard for doing so is probably to ensure that the country has sufficient key capabilities for each of the four key potential foes that—with allies—it could prevent a quick, successful aggression by any of them even while concentrating most of its forces on a single big war.  As recently argued compellingly by Thomas Mahnken as well, another key benefit of a multi-war planning framework is that it would, in effect, create a strategic reserve of munitions. By producing and pre-stationing ordnance for several wars at once in key overseas theaters on a larger scale than today, the United States would, in effect, create a hedge against a single war going longer or taking more weaponry than initially expected. This policy would also buy time to start manufacturing more weapons to restore a rock-solid multi-theater capability if and when a war broke out in one place. Fortunately, these are attainable and affordable goals that the National Defense Strategy already pays lip service to. We need to ensure that we have the capabilities, not just the right words.

Some of the key additional capabilities that might be needed to support such a strategy include a couple of squadrons of dedicated “fifth generation” fighter aircraft for Korea (to attack North Korean missile launchers early in any war, limiting damage to Seoul); unmanned submarines stationed in the western Pacific with anti-ship sensors and missiles to help Taiwan resist a Chinese invasion attempt; vertical-lift aircraft on Okinawa with ordnance usable for the same purpose; dedicated missile defense systems for the Middle East of the type that helped stymie Iran’s recent missile and drone barrage against Israel; and a brigade of U.S. ground troops backed up by fighters and attack helicopters in the Baltic states as a permanent deterrent against Russian aggression there.  Again, augmentations of some sensor networks and munitions stockpiles also make sense.

The price tag for this sort of modest force expansion would hardly be trivial but would not exceed tens of billions of dollars a year. It could be partially funded by selective cuts in the defense budget elsewhere.  As we gear up for a presidential election this fall and a new defense review next year, these issues of possible simultaneous war—but simultaneous deterrence—should be front and center in the American strategic debate.

About the Author: Michael E. O'Hanlon 

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He directs the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy and Technology, as well as the Defense Industrial Base working group, and is the inaugural holder of the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy. He co-directs the Africa Security Initiative as well. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and George Washington universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the U.S. Department of Defense. O’Hanlon was a member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-12. O’Hanlon’s latest book, “Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars Since 1861” (Brookings and Rowman & Littlefield, 2023) was published in January 2023.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

On Monday 10 June, the day after the EU elections, the Parliament's political groups will rush into recomposing themselves to divide money and top jobs. The tricky part? They must follow the almighty d’Hondt law which is set to award the far-right a chunk of the Parliament's influence pie.  

Summary: The resurgence of tank warfare in Ukraine has spotlighted the importance of anti-tank weapons, including the Swedish AT4.

-This shoulder-fired, disposable anti-tank missile system, initially adopted by the Swedish Army and later by the U.S., is effective against lighter armored vehicles and buildings.

-While less versatile than its peers like the Javelin and NLAW, the AT4 has played a crucial role in Ukraine, reportedly taking out Russian T-90 tanks.

-Its ease of use and widespread availability have made it a valuable asset in the conflict, despite its limitations in urban settings due to a significant back-blast.

Swedish AT4: The Unsung Hero of Ukraine's Anti-Tank Arsenal

The revival of tank warfare in Ukraine has coincided with a resurgence of interest in anti-tank weapons.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Western nations have provided Ukrainian forces with sophisticated anti-tank missile systems to aid the country’s defensive efforts.

While news surrounding the role the American-made FGM-148 Javelin and Swedish-made Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon have played in the Eastern European conflict has circulated widely over the last year, one anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is also seeing good use in Ukraine.

The AT4 Swedish shoulder-fired weapon has proven to be a major pain to Moscow’s armored vehicles. 

Introducing the AT4: History and Specs

The Swedish Army adopted the predecessor to its indigenous AT4 in the late 1960s.

Within a decade, the weapon’s manufacturer began researching a more advanced variant that would be singularly capable of penetrating heavily armored main battle tanks in frontal engagements. With this design priority in mind, the AT4 was created. The ATGM was conceptualized to be a weapon that could engage lighter armored Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from any direction and heavily armored MBTs from the sides or rear. In addition to tanks, the AT4’s manufacturer wanted the weapon to be an effective tool against buildings and fortifications.  

Prior to the AT4’s introduction to the Swedish army, the AT4 was observed by the U.S. Army after Congress mandated an ATGM competition to replace the M72 LAW. Out of the competition’s six participants, the AT4 was recognized as the winner. The Swedish-made ATGM is a disposable, single-shot unguided launcher that fires an 84mm round. The AT4 is light, portable, and can be easily slung on a soldier’s shoulder. 

As outlined in a previous work, “The AT4 is a little over 3 feet (roughly 1 meter) in length and weighs around 15 pounds (6.80 kilograms). The round has a muzzle velocity of 820 feet (250 meters) per second and can penetrate 16 inches (40.64 centimeters) of armor at a maximum effective range of roughly 1,000 feet (305 meters). The projectiles can be high-explosive anti-tank, dual-purpose delayed penetration, high-penetration, and anti-structure for urban combat.”

The AT4 Hosts Many Similarities to the Carl Gustaf

The AT4’s manufacturer, Saab Bofors, implemented many of the same design features that the Cal Gustaf hosts. As a true supergun, the Gustaf can effectively target bunkers, thinly-armored personnel carriers, and even main battle tanks. Like the AT4, the Gustaf is man-portable and shoulder-fired.

However, unlike the Gustaf, the ATF is not reusable. Both weapons are of the same caliber and weight, but the AT4 is intended for two-person operation, unlike the Gustaf. 

Despite its Downsides, the AT4 Has Been Used Prominently in Ukraine

Perhaps the AT4’s best quality is that it can be easily used.

The weapon’s simplicity and durability have led to its export across the globe and 20 countries today readily deploy this ATGM. The U.S. military alone has procured more than 600,000 AT4 ATGMs over the years. While the Swedish-made weapon is user-friendly, it also comes with some cons. 

One major flaw that the AT4 possesses is that it develops a large back-blast behind the weapon, which could injure the weapon’s operator and nearby friendly forces, according to Army Technology.

Therefore, the AT4 is not as versatile as other portable ATGMs, since it cannot be used in restricted areas frequently present in urban warfare settings. Due to this flaw, in addition to the AT4’s inability to take out main battle tanks easily, the Swedish-made weapon lags behind its Javelin and NLAW near-peer ATGMs. Despite this fact, the weapon has been used effectively in Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian officials, its soldiers were reportedly able to use the AT4 to take out some of Moscow’s top-of-the-line T-90 tanks.

In January of last year, Ukrainian-American journalist Viktor Kovalenko shared a clip of an alleged AT4 attack on social media.

In the footage, plumes of grey smoke can be seen billowing from a damaged T-90 tank.

While the Javelin and NLAW systems will continue to take center stage in Ukraine’s ATGM use, the AT4 should not be dismissed. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, named after Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, have been pivotal to the U.S. Navy's power projection since the mid-1970s.

-Despite plans to replace them with the Gerald R. Ford-class, delays and production issues have extended the Nimitz-class service life beyond past stated end dates, with the Navy spending $200 million on extensions.

-These carriers are vital for maintaining U.S. military presence in key regions like the Red Sea and South China Sea.

-Known for their robust capabilities, including advanced armament and large air wings, Nimitz-class carriers will continue to operate into the 2050s, supporting critical naval operations worldwide.

The Legacy and Future of Nimitz-Class Carriers Amid Ford-Class Delays

The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers have remained the backbone of the U.S. Navy since their introduction in the mid-1970’s. Named to honor World War II Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, these nuclear-powered carriers represented the largest warships to ever be built for the service until the introduction of the USS Gerald R. Ford in 2017.

From the Cold War to the War on Terror, the Nimitz class has a proven track record of power projection. More recently, the service has revealed that this carrier class will remain commissioned for longer than initially planned. The Navy’s fiscal 2023 budget called to prolong the service life of the lead ship of the class beyond 2025.

The Nimitz-class’ planned Ford successors are experiencing delays and other production issues, forcing the Navy to maintain these carriers past their service lives.

According to a 2023 report to Congress, the Navy plans to spend $200 million on extension work to preserve the Nimitz ships’ life spans.

As stated by Director of Air Warfare Division N98 Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly, “Carriers are the linchpin of everything we do in naval aviation. Our requirements are designed and aligned within our air wings to provide the capability out to the [combatant commands] for our ability to conduct the mission. Our ability to get the carriers out on time, whether it is new procurement or maintenance, is essential.”

The Navy must keep a sufficient number of carriers out at sea to project military might abroad. As tensions in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and South China Sea continue to spike, the presence of U.S. carriers is even more vital. Until the Ford ships all enter service, their Nimitz predecessors will remain deployable.

The history of the Nimitz-class

The Navy first ordered the Nimitz-class carriers as replacement vessels for the older Kitty Hawk and Enterprise-classes. Powered by two A4W pressurized water reactors instead of the typical gas turbines or diesel-electric systems used previously on ships, the Nimitz are more sophisticated than their predecessors. Specifically, this class can carry 90% more aviation fuel and to% more ordnance than the earlier Forrestal carriers. The U.S. Navy prioritized developing a carrier class capable of withstanding more than three times the damage inflicted on the Essex ships during the Second World War. To fulfill this need, the Nimitz hangers are divided and more protected to restrict the spread of fire.

Armament-wise, the Nimitz carriers are well-equipped. Each ship in this class carries two or three RIM-7 Sea Sparrow or RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile Mk29 missile launchers for use against aircraft and anti-ship missiles, in addition to Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). The Phalanx is used to defend against incoming missiles, aircrafts and small boats. The weapon consists of a radar-guided Vulcan cannon. It is deployed on every class of surface combat ship except the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock and Zumwalt-class destroyer.

While these weapons are formidable, the true strength of an aircraft carrier is its air wing. During the Cold War, the Nimitz carriers typically carry 85-90 aircraft, including E-2 Hawkeyes, S-3A Viking antisubmarine planes and A-6 Intruder attack bombers.

Today, the Nimitz carriers host the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft and F-35C Lightning fighters.

The ten Nimitz-class carriers were constructed at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, between 1968 and 2006. Nimitz was commissioned in 1975, followed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John C. Stennis, Harry S. Truman, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush in subsequent years.

Operational history:

The Nimitz first saw combat during Operation Eagle Claw over the Indian Ocean, when hostages were taken in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. During the Gulf War and Operation Southern Watch in the 1990’s, USS Theodore Roosevelt played a critical role in combat operations. Roosevelt and sister-ship Carl Vinson were among the first U.S. warships to operate in Operation Enduring Freedom following the September 11th attacks. Since then, essentially every Nimitz ship has supported air operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While the Nimitz-class certainly retains an honorable service history, certain limitations require a next-generation carrier-class that can better adapt to technological advances. The Gerald R. Ford-class was ordered in 2008 and is expected to replace its Nimitz predecessors.

However, delays are pushing back the projected timeline of the Ford ships’ entry to service, rendering the need to maintain the Nimitz ships. Recent reports suggest that the Nimitz-class ships will sail through the 2050s and perhaps later to prevent a gap in capability from forming.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock. 

À trois jours des élections européennes, France 24 revient sur les principaux enseignements et faits marquants de la campagne. Entre la poussée annoncée des extrêmes droites, les difficultés de Valérie Hayer, la surprise Raphaël Glucksmann et les thèmes omniprésents ou absents des débats, voici ce qu'il faut retenir.