Agrégateur de flux

The corner-stone of the UN headquarters building was laid on UN Day at a special open-air General Assembly meeting held on 24 October 1949. Credit: UN Photo

By Kul Chandra Gautam
KATHMANDU, Nepal, Oct 13 2025 (IPS)

The United Nations turned 80 this year. What should have been a moment of pride and celebration at the high-level session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025 turned instead into an occasion of bitter irony.

At the UN Headquarters in New York—fittingly located in the host country that once helped found and champion the organization—the loudest fireworks came not from commemoration but condemnation.

The President of the United States, boasting that he had “ended seven wars in seven months while the UN did nothing,” derided the very purpose of the institution. He dismissed climate change as a hoax, renounced the Sustainable Development Goals, and mocked multilateralism as an obsolete bureaucracy.

Kul Chandra Gautam

That outburst was shocking, but not surprising. The UN has long been an easy target for populist politicians. Yet even as it endures ridicule and neglect, the truth remains: if the UN did not exist, the world would have to create it again.

An Imperfect but Indispensable Institution

The UN’s failures are glaring and often heartbreaking. As the wars in Ukraine and Gaza rage on—each aided and abetted by two Permanent Members of its Security Council—the organization looks helpless, capable only of issuing pleas and providing meager humanitarian aid.

Its impotence is evident again in Haiti’s gang warfare, Myanmar’s and Sudan’s military atrocities, Afghanistan’s gender apartheid, and North Korea’s saber-rattling, just to name a few.

It is easy to blame “the UN,” but the real culprits are its Member States—especially the five veto-wielding powers of the Security Council, who too often place narrow national interests above global security. Many others strangle the UN with grand resolutions and lofty mandates but fail to fund them.

Hiding behind sovereignty, many governments oppress their citizens, foster corruption, and neglect their global commitments. Meanwhile, the richest nations, capable of lifting millions from poverty, pour trillions of dollars into their militaries.

Still, despite its flaws and frustrations, humanity cannot afford to abandon the United Nations. The challenges of our time— poverty, climate change, pandemics, terrorism, cybercrime, and mass displacement—are “problems without passports.” No nation, however powerful, can solve them alone. Only collective action through a multilateral system can address the interconnected crises that define the 21st century.

For smaller or poorer nations, the UN is an amplifier of voice and leverage. Acting together, they can negotiate more fairly with the powerful. For big and powerful nations, the UN provides legitimacy and a framework for cooperation that unilateral action can never achieve.

The UN, for all its imperfections, remains a mirror of our world: it reflects both our aspirations and our divisions. Its hypocrisy is our hypocrisy; its failures are our failures. Resolutions without resolve and promises without action are the true reasons for its ineffectiveness.

Yet amid the cynicism, it is worth recalling that the UN and its agencies have earned 14 Nobel Peace Prizes—more than any other institution in history. That is no small testament to its contributions to peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, human rights, and development.

But it cannot rest on past laurels. If the UN is to remain relevant, it must transform itself to meet the demands of a rapidly changing world.

Time for Tough Love and Real Reform

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has launched the UN@80 Initiative to sharpen the system’s impact and reaffirm its purpose. A recent system-wide Mandate Implementation Review uncovered a staggering reality: over 30% of mandates created since 1990 are still active, and 86% have no sunset clause. Many require the Secretariat and specialized agencies to carry them out “within existing resources”—an impossible task.

Hundreds of overlapping resolutions and reports clog the UN’s machinery, sustained by bureaucratic inertia and Member States’ appetite for endless paperwork. Too many meetings produce too little action.

Technology now offers a way out. Artificial intelligence can consolidate and streamline reporting, freeing up resources for real work. Likewise, the frequency of governing board meetings—three times a year for agencies like UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women, and WFP—could be reduced without sacrificing accountability.

Facing financial crisis, political hostility from major donors, and a proliferation of unfunded mandates, the UN has no choice but to rationalize its structure. Some agencies will have to merge or move their operations from costly headquarters in New York and Europe to lower-cost locations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

UNICEF has already taken the lead with its “Future Focus Initiative,” with plans to cut headquarters budgets by 25% and relocate 70% of its staff to more affordable hubs such as Bangkok, Nairobi, or Istanbul. Such moves can reduce expenses, bring the organization closer to the field, and align it better with the realities of today’s world.

At the same time, the UN must take advantage of the tremendous growth in professional capacity within developing countries. Many of these nations now produce highly qualified experts who can serve effectively—and at lower cost—than expatriates from the Global North.

UNICEF pioneered this decades ago by hiring national professionals in its field offices. Expanding this practice system-wide would not only save money but also strengthen local ownership and credibility.

These are sensible, short-term measures. But they only scratch the surface. The real test of leadership lies in tackling the deep structural reforms that have eluded the UN for decades.

The Hard Reforms: Power, Accountability, and Money

1. Democratizing the UN

The UN’s mission is to promote peace, democracy, development and human rights—but its own structure remains profoundly undemocratic. The Security Council’s five permanent members hold veto power that can paralyze action even in the face of genocide or aggression.

That provision might have made sense in 1945, but it is indefensible in 2025. Yet changing it requires the consent of those same five powers. Only enlightened leadership in those countries and sustained public pressure globally can bring about reform.

Democratization must also extend to how the UN’s top leaders are chosen. The Secretary-General and heads of major agencies are still selected through opaque bargains among powerful nations. These posts are often “reserved” for certain nationalities rather than awarded on merit. The UN must move toward a transparent, merit-based system if it hopes to regain credibility.

2. Reviving the “Responsibility to Protect”

Too many regimes hide behind the shield of sovereignty to oppress their own people. The world leaders agreed at the UN Millennium Summit in 2005 that when a government fails to protect its citizens—or worse, becomes their tormentor—the international community has a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The 2024 Pact for the Future reaffirmed that principle.

But R2P has rarely been applied because powerful nations invoke it selectively—protecting their allies and condemning their rivals. True leadership would mean upholding R2P universally, without double standards.

3. Rebalancing Priorities: Disarmament and Development

The UN was founded to prevent war. Yet worldwide military spending now exceeds $2.7 trillion a year—nearly $7.5 billion every day. NATO countries are expanding their defense budgets even as social spending shrinks and commitments to the poor are cut.

This is moral madness. Humanity needs fewer weapons and more investment in sustainable development. Redirecting even a fraction of global military spending toward the Sustainable Development Goals would do more to secure peace than all the bombs in the world.

4. Fixing the UN’s Finances

Money and power often speak louder than moral authority at the UN. The United States contributes about a quarter of the UN’s regular budget—and uses that leverage to exert disproportionate influence. Other large donors do the same.

In 1985, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme proposed a simple remedy: no single country should pay—or be allowed to pay—more than 10% of the UN’s budget. That would reduce dependence on any one donor while requiring modest increases from others. Ironically, Washington opposed it, fearing it might lose influence.

Reviving that proposal today could help depoliticize UN financing and make it more sustainable. The UN should also expand partnerships with private philanthropy, foundations, and innovative sources such as taxes on global financial transactions or the use of the global commons. Such mechanisms could liberate the organization from the recurring hostage drama of budget threats and withheld dues.

A Hopeful Horizon

History rarely moves in straight lines. Progress often comes two steps forward and one step back. Today, the post-World War II international order is fraying, and populist nationalism is resurgent. But in the long arc of human history, the movement toward global cooperation is irreversible.

We are slowly—but surely—evolving from primitive tribalism to modern nationalism and onward toward shared global solidarity. Multilateralism may be under siege, but it will rise again, reimagined and renewed, because our interdependence leaves no alternative.

I take hope from the energy and courage of Generation Z across the world—from Nepal and Bangladesh to Kenya, Indonesia, Morocco, and beyond. Young people are challenging corruption, inequality, and authoritarianism, and they see themselves increasingly as global citizens, connected through technology and united by shared aspirations rather than divided by borders or dogma.

If we can offer these young citizens opportunity and justice instead of inequality and despair, we will see the dawn of a more cooperative, humane, and equitable world. That, in turn, will breathe new life into the United Nations—still imperfect, still indispensable, and still humanity’s best hope for promoting peace and prosperity.

Kul Chandra Gautam, a former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF and Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, is the author of ‘Global Citizen from Gulmi: My Journey from the Hills of Nepal to the Halls of United Nations’.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Written by Vasilis Margaras.

Towns and cities are home to nearly three quarters of the EU’s population. Many EU cities and urban areas constitute vibrant spaces of economic growth and innovation. However, they also face multiple challenges, such as building inclusive societies, tackling inequalities, addressing climate change and environmental degradation, and dealing with housing issues and demographic challenges. Cities are at the forefront of implementing EU legislation in several policy areas, including cohesion, and have been demanding a stronger role in shaping these policies and greater access to EU financial resources.

Cohesion policy has a strong urban dimension. Its support for sustainable urban development was reinforced in the current 2021-2027 programming period to help cities take an active role in designing and implementing policy responses to their own challenges. Cohesion funds invest more than €100 billion in towns and cities. For their part, cities are directly responsible for designing and implementing investments worth over €24 billion under the cohesion policy programmes.

The emergence of the Urban Agenda for the EU in 2016 and the beginning of participatory partnerships raised new expectations about the role of urban authorities in the EU decision-making process. The Pact of Amsterdam provided for urban partnerships focusing on key urban themes such as air quality, urban poverty and housing. However, progress in empowering cities within cohesion policy has been limited. Stakeholders evaluating the progress of the Urban Agenda for the EU highlight issues such as limited EU resources channelled to tackling urban issues, obstacles in achieving direct EU funding, a lack of effective long-term urban governance mechanisms in EU policymaking, and limited input of urban areas into EU policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new urban policy agenda for the EU: Addressing cities’ current challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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A surge in autocratic governance has become increasingly threatening to global politics, having gathered momentum over the past two decades. This autocratic wave continues to evolve, becoming ever more complex and diverse as it unfolds. Hence, the shifting dynamics driving this wave need to be fully understood and disaggregated if the European Union (EU) is to design effective responses. Democratic strategy needs not only to hold at bay severe repression, but also to engage with the ideas and narratives that underpin autocracy’s apparent appeal. Accordingly, this paper draws on historical and contemporary writings that present various arguments against democracy. After unpacking the different components of this autocratic wave, EU responses over recent years are assessed, looking at how these relate to pro-authoritarian narratives. It finds that the EU has improved many elements of its policies during this time but still needs to tailor its strategies to the ideational aspects of anti-democratic trends.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Les Kosovars étaient appelés à voter ce dimanche pour des élections municipales. Les yeux étaient tournés vers Pristina et Mitrovica Sud, baromètres du pays, ainsi que sur les communes à majorité serbe. La Lista Srspka est plébiscitée dans ces dernières, tandis qu'un second tour serré s'annonce à Pristina.

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Gérald Darmanin reconduit à la Justice, Laurent Nuñez nommé à l'Intérieur, Jean-Pierre Farandou au Travail... L'Élysée a dévoilé dimanche le nouveau gouvernement du Premier ministre Sébastien Lecornu, présenté comme plus technique et moins politique avec l'arrivée de personnalités issues de la société civile, mais dont la survie est liée à une absence de censure des oppositions. Voici le fil du 12 octobre 2025.

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By Thomas Conzelmann and Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht University, The Netherlands)

Trade and foreign investment have become politicized in the current international system. The unilateral imposition of tariffs across the global economy by the second Trump administration is a good illustration: tariffs are not used to address unfair trade practices but as an instrument to exert political leverage and restructure international relationships. As a large, integrated and open market, the EU is clearly vulnerable to such actions. EU decision-makers have also increasingly become concerned about the takeover of European critical infrastructure and technology champions by third countries. Chinese investments in European ports are a key example. Both developments have led observers to speak of a “geo-economic world” in which the EU must defend its interests and its “economic security” (European Commission, 2024; Herranz-Surrallés et al., 2024).

How can the EU live up to the challenges of this geo-economic world? One response is the adoption of new EU policy instruments such as the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) and the EU Investment Screening Framework (ISF). The ACI, also referred to as Europe’s ‘trade bazooka’ allows the EU to adopt punitive measures against countries attempting economic coercion. Commission President von der Leyen and French President Macron explicitly mentioned it as one of the European cards in reaction to Trump’s “Liberation Day”. To address vulnerabilities from foreign direct investment (FDI), the ISF establishes common standards and a procedure for the coordination of member state’s screening of FDI that may carry risks for public order and security. The instrument is currently under review (Doppen et al., 2024).

Existing research has studied the evolving discourse around the “economic security” of the EU and the potential effectiveness of new economic security instruments. However, little is known about the institutional consequences of this new development. What does it mean for the EU if the boundaries are blurred between its trade policy, with its strong role for the Commission, and its security policies, with the predominance of the Council? What is the role of the European Parliament? Is a new institutional balance emerging in this field and how can we explain it? These questions are the focus of our recently published research in the Journal of Common Market Studies. We address them by looking at the ACI and the ISF as two prominent new economic security instruments of the EU.

Is a new institutional balance emerging in the EU?

The EU’s institutional balance is an elusive concept. We use it as a descriptive term for the actual balance of powers between the EU institutions. Specifically, we discuss four analytical dimensions, which are the right of initiative, coordination procedures, decision-making, and implementation arrangements laid down in the ACI and the ISF. To assess whether a “new” balance is emerging through these new instruments, we use trade defense instruments under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as benchmarks.

Our research shows that in both the ACI and the ISF the roles of Commission and Council overlap along all four analytical dimensions. In both instruments, the right of initiative is shared between the Commission and the member states, and both instruments foresee a close procedural cooperation between both sides. A good example of this is the ISF procedures, in which national authorizing bodies notify ongoing FDI screening cases to the Commission and must take comments by the Commission or other member states into account. When it comes to decision-making, both instruments rely on comitology, albeit with important inroads into Commission competences. In the ACI, a unique format has been agreed, in which the Council, through QMV, has to approve implementing decisions by the Commission. This extraordinary step was the outcome of intensive institutional haggling, and was accompanied by a declaration in which the Commission, the Council, and the EP underline their intention not to set a precedent with these arrangements. Finally, both procedures foresee a joint implementation of decision between the Commission and the member states. The role of the EP, which is a co-legislator in the area of trade, remains limited. Although it played an active role in the adoption of the new instruments, it did not seek to enhance its own role beyond that of being informed.

It is difficult to classify the emerging institutional arrangements in the ACI and ISF as clearly “intergovernmental” or “supranational”. Elements of centralization co-exist with pockets of national control and coordination requirements between the different levels. What we see is a hybrid between the procedures in trade defence and in sanctions respectively, leading to a new institutional balance in a field that will only grow in importance over the coming years.

Explaining the changing institutional balance

We show how these findings are the outcome of different factors. In both the ACI and the ISF, the Commission, the EP, and the member states defended their ‘institutional self-interests’. However, these logics intersected with two other developments. First, the member states in the Council were far from sharing a common position. In both cases, one group of member states pushed for joint gains through supranational coordination and credible deterrent instruments, while others prioritized sovereignty concerns. Second, the actors were clearly aware of the institutional experimentation process they had entered. Questions arose about the compatibility of the new instruments with international legal requirements and the consistency of the EU legal order. The “no precedent” declaration mentioned above that was issued together with the ACI is the clearest example of this.

Who are the winners?

Whether the new institutional balance is a victory for the Commission or for the Council depends on how we look at it. Using the CFSP as a benchmark, some observers see the ACI and the ISF as leading to a consolidation of power in Brussels. In their view, both allow the Commission, and to some extent the EP, to enter the security field, an area of Council competence (Freudlsperger et al., 2024; Vlasiuk Nibe et al., 2024). The new instruments are thus seen as a first step from which the Union can “fail forward” and establish more stringent regulation later (Jones et al. 2021). When taking the usual decision-making process under the CCP as benchmark, both the ACI and the ISF imply decreased powers of the Commission. The member states have made inroads into Commission implementing powers (ACI) and have preserved important national prerogatives (ISF). Our research shows that both these perspectives are one-sided. In reality, the ACI and the ISF are characterized by a complex form of collaboration which cannot be easily pigeonholed either as intergovernmental or supranational. With further economic security instruments currently under consideration (outbound investment, review of the dual-use goods regulation), more debates about the right institutional balance in this area will emerge in the coming years.

Thomas Conzelmann is Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Maastricht University. His research focuses on the politics of leverage in global affairs and the EU’s policies in a geoeconomic world. https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/t-conzelmann

 

 

Sophie Vanhoonacker is Professor in Administrative Governance at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Maastricht University. Her research focuses on the institutional aspects of EU External Relations and administrative governance in the area of foreign and security policy. https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/smrl-vanhoonacker

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