Agrégateur de flux

Pressemitteilung der Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e. V. in Kooperation mit dem Österreichischen Institut für Wirt­schaftsforschung (WIFO), Kiel ...

By CIVICUS
Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the presidential election in the Republic of the Congo with Ivan Kibangou Ngoy, executive director of Global Participe, a civil society action-research organisation focused on democratic governance based in Pointe-Noire.

Ivan Kibangou Ngoy

On 15 March, President Denis Sassou Nguesso, aged 82, won the election with around 95 per cent of the vote, extending his 42-year rule. The result came as no surprise: two major opposition parties boycotted the poll, key opposition figures were jailed or in exile and independent observers were denied accreditation. On polling day, borders were closed and the internet cut off. The non-competitive election produced the result it was designed to.

How can the 94.8 per cent result be explained?

The outcome of this election was predictable from the outset, and for one fundamental reason: the legal framework gives free rein to electoral fraud. The electoral law lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent manipulation. The ruling party has systematically rigged the electoral process, excluding its opponents and independent civil society from any meaningful participation.

Accreditation for observers was refused to independent civil society organisations (CSOs), evidence of a total lack of transparency. Without independent observers, there’s no external oversight of the conduct of the vote or the counting of votes.

The result was not the outcome of electoral competition; it was the logical result of a system designed to guarantee precisely this outcome. When the legal framework allows for fraud, the opposition cannot campaign, observers are excluded and the government controls all administrative mechanisms, including the electoral administration, the result becomes inevitable. This is not an anomaly but the product of a system designed to produce it and to give it the appearance of democratic legitimacy. So the result was already decided even before polling stations opened.

How was competition restricted?

Opposition parties and independent CSOs were not allowed to organise public meetings or campaign openly among voters. They were denied access to public media, preventing them communicating with people.

The country still operates under a prior authorisation regime: the government must approve all public political activity. This system creates a fundamental imbalance: the ruling party can organise its rallies freely, while the opposition is blocked at every turn. There is an urgent need to move to a simple notification system, in which CSOs and parties would inform the authorities of their activities without needing their consent. Without this change, the opposition has no legal mechanism to participate fairly in an election.

The imprisonment and exile of major opposition figures send a clear message: challenging Sassou Nguesso’s regime is criminalised. Two of the country’s best-known opposition figures have been in prison for nearly a decade. When opponents cannot stand for election, campaign or move about freely, the result is predetermined both by fraud and the physical elimination of alternatives. The election is merely an administrative charade designed to legitimise the retention of power. It’s not a genuine choice but a demonstration of state power over a population reduced to silence.

Why is the internet cut off during elections?

Since the advent of social media, every election has been accompanied by an internet blackout, a deliberate measure the authorities take to control the information circulating during the vote. Internet shutdowns directly reinforce the system of electoral fraud by preventing the spread of information on fraud, irregularities or violations of voters’ rights. Without the internet, people cannot share photos or videos from polling stations, observers cannot report anomalies in real time and citizen movements cannot coordinate monitoring efforts.

The internet blackout effectively transforms the country into an information-controlled zone where only government messages can circulate. This reveals that the regime understands the power of social media as a tool for accountability and mobilisation. It’s an implicit acknowledgement that, without control over information, the regime could not maintain its official narrative. This systematic practice ultimately reveals the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy.

How has civil society mobilised despite restrictions?

Despite systematic restrictions, civil society organised itself by holding press conferences and workshops in private spaces, where the authorities could not intervene directly. These meetings enabled civil society to coordinate strategies and strengthen cohesion between organisations, even with a limited number of participants. Press conferences enabled direct engagement with the media despite restrictions on access to public media. Civil society also used social media to document rights violations, mobilise people and maintain a public conversation on electoral issues.

However, these strategies reveal the limits of resistance in a heavily controlled environment. Meetings in private spaces reach only a limited audience and social media can be shut down at any moment, as happened on election day. We must continue mapping independent CSOs to identify and connect all those working outside the regime’s control. We must also train CSO leaders in techniques for raising awareness and mobilising people.

People must understand the nature of the regime governing Congo-Brazzaville. The current regime is embodied by the Congolese Labour Party, a former Soviet-style party-state ousted from power at the ballot box in 1992, in the only truly free and transparent election the country has ever held. The party returned to power by force of arms after overthrowing the democratically elected government. Understanding this history is crucial: it proves that democratic change is possible. When people understand the mechanisms of power seizure and refuse to accept them, the regime loses its legitimacy even if it retains formal control of the state.

What’s the future for democracy in Congo after 42 years of rule?

Four decades under the same regime amount to the systematic denial of democratic change, of citizens’ fundamental right to choose a different government through the ballot box. Sassou Nguesso’s fifth term consolidates an institutional framework designed to ensure no one else ever comes to power through democratic means.

This framework operates through the systematic contradiction between constitutional promises and practice. The constitution proclaims a multi-party system, but a law recognises only those parties that pledge allegiance to the ruling power. The constitution creates the post of leader of the opposition, but this leader is the head of a party affiliated with the ruling power. The constitution establishes an advisory council of associations, but this institution is attached to the office of the head of state to muzzle civil society. The country is run like a barracks.

We must expose and discredit this regime internationally, by publicly denouncing its supporters, notably the French government and oil multinationals. Independent civil society must step up awareness-raising campaigns, both in person and online. The international community must exert sustained pressure, including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and support for organisations in exile. Without this combination of internal action and international pressure, democratic change will remain impossible. But it is possible. It happened in 1992, and it can happen again.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Nacho Sánchez Amor

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

La RD Congo se qualifie pour sa première Coupe du monde depuis 1974 grâce au but d'Axel Tuanzebe, qui a permis aux Léopards de s'imposer 1-0 face à la Jamaïque lors du match de barrage.

Sommaire

Dossier : La visite du pape en Algérie
- La visite du pape, une « divine surprise » pour le régime algérien
- La christianisation des Berbères
- Papes et grandes figures chrétiennes berbères
- Pourquoi les Coptes et les Maronites ont-ils maintenu leur religion et non les chrétiens du Maghreb ?
- Y eut-il des survivances du christianisme après la conquête arabo-musulmane ?
Hydrocarbures : L’Afrique pourrait-elle remplacer le Moyen-Orient ?
- Le pétrole africain
- Le gaz africain
- Le cas de l’Algérie

Editorial de Bernard Lugan
Du 13 au 15 avril, le pape se rendra en Algérie, un pays dans lequel le catholicisme a été éliminé en 1962 par l’épuration ethnique des Européens, et où l’éradication du christianisme est depuis cette date une constante politique. Un pays dans lequel l’Eglise catholique qui a choisi la « discrétion » se cantonne à un rôle de « témoignage » timide et respectueux des autorités. Comme l’église catholique ne représente plus un danger pour l’unité islamique de l’Algérie, elle est donc choyée par le régime. Ce dernier s’en sert comme d’une vitrine, mettant en avant sa docile soumission à l’islamité du pays afin de contrer le prosélytisme actif et courageux des divers courants protestants et évangélistes, notamment chez les Berbères.En Algérie, la visite du pape va d’abord être l’occasion pour un régime aux abois de redorer son image internationale. Le récit officiel est d’ailleurs clair : « l’Algérie est la gardienne légitime de l’héritage culturel et spirituel de Saint Augustin »… Une telle hypocrisie sera naturellement relayée en France par les affidés et les stipendiés d’Alger.L’on nous dit que le voyage du pape permettra de redonner vie au « dialogue islamo-chrétien ». Mais de quel dialogue parle-t-on dans un pays où, selon le rapport de l’ONG International Christian Concern : « Le gouvernement considère le christianisme comme un danger pour l’identité islamique algérienne et tente par tous les moyens de réglementer l’Église pour la réduire à néant ». Un pays dans lequel les autorités associent le christianisme à une forme de « trahison identitaire » et d’allégeance à l’Occident. Un pays où, en 2010, le ministre des Affaires religieuses M. Bouabdellah Ghlamallah, déclarait que : « Personne ne veut qu’il y ait des minorités religieuses en Algérie, car cela risquerait d’être un prétexte pour des ingérences étrangères sous couvert de protection des minorités ». Un pays dans lequel l’apostasie qui est passible de deux à cinq ans de détention et d'une amende de 500 000 à 1 million de dinars, a pour résultat la mort sociale des « traitres ».
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La République démocratique du Congo a vécu une nuit historique marquée par une explosion de joie populaire après la qualification des Léopards pour la Coupe du monde 2026. À Kinshasa, la pluie battante et l’heure tardive n’ont pas suffi à freiner l’enthousiasme des supporters, descendus massivement dans les rues pour célébrer un exploit attendu depuis plus d’un demi-siècle.

Kinshasa : une fête sous la pluie

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Introduction Some history

The concept of a regulatory sandbox already existed before the AI Act. According to Arto Lanamäki et al., it first emerged in 2016 with the United Kingdom’s financial technology (fintech) regulation. Studies suggest that regulatory sandboxes have reduced legal uncertainty and raised fintech venture investment. A 2022 EPRS publication also lists other sectors where regulatory sandboxes have emerged as test beds, including transport, energy, telecommunications and health. It adds that the UK and Norway have already established regulatory sandboxes for AI products. It also notes that the European Parliament has called for introducing regulatory sandboxes in several resolutions since 2019.

Definition

AI regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI Act) published by the European Commission in April 2021. The final version of the AI Act, adopted in 2024, defines an AI regulatory sandbox as ‘a controlled framework set up by a competent authority which offers providers or prospective providers of AI systems the possibility to develop, train, validate and test, where appropriate in real-world conditions, an innovative AI system, pursuant to a sandbox plan for a limited time under regulatory supervision’.

Benefits and risks

Regulatory sandboxes offer three main benefits: they can help regulators develop better policies, innovators to develop compliant AI products, and consumers by bringing safer products on to the market. In a 2020 report, the OECD found they may facilitate dialogue between authorities and new players entering the market. Another report from the World Bank confirms these benefits based on its study of the fintech sector. However, the World Bank report also warns of implementation risks, where additional administrative burdens and lack of resources could outweigh the benefits.

AI Act regulatory sandboxes Obligations on Member States

EU Member States are required to ensure their national competent authorities establish, or participate in, at least one AI regulatory sandbox, which should be operational by 2 August 2026. The AI regulatory sandboxes aim to improve legal certainty to achieve regulatory compliance, support sharing of best practices through fostering cooperation, innovation and competitiveness, contribute to evidence-based regulatory learning and speed up access to the single market. They are accessible on a voluntary basis and include specific measures targeted at SMEs and start-ups.

Implementation and coordination

The AI Act established a hybrid enforcement system whereby the Commission and the European AI board assist Member States in setting up their AI regulatory sandboxes. National competent authorities are also obliged to coordinate with and report to EU‑level entities, produce guidance, supervision and support within the sandboxes, and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Meanwhile, the Commission is required to adopt secondary legislation that specifies how the AI Act is to be implemented and gives details of terms and conditions and how to access sandboxes. The European Data Protection Supervisor may also establish an AI regulatory sandbox for EU institutions.

Challenges Design

Claudio Novelli et al. describe three phases of regulatory sandboxes: pre-testing, testing and post-testing. Designing a sandbox involves defining the variables of each phase, such as the eligibility criteria (pre-testing), the level of realism and replication of oversight (testing), and the exit pathway and streamlined conformity assessments (post-testing). They believe the right balance must be struck between each variable to attract innovators and ensure compliance. For instance, eligibility criteria should permit different situations and lead to a tailored track when using the sandbox, since AI systems in early-stage development do not need the same support as those in late-stage development.

Fragmentation

The rules for AI systems are enforced at Member State level through national authorities. While Member States must ensure that authorities have enough resources to set up and run their sandboxes, fragmented enforcement could result in some authorities receiving more resources than others, leading to uneven capacities. AI providers might therefore intentionally choose less stringent sandboxes, risking inconsistencies in the act’s enforcement.

Time

Challenges related to the design and fragmented implementation are compounded by additional time constraints. The AI Act provisions related to regulatory sandboxes will take effect from 2 August 2026. Since the Commission has not yet adopted any implementing acts providing guidance, Member States have to act independently to design their sandboxes, recruit and train staff, and build capacity.

State of play and next steps National implementation

In August 2025, Deirdre Ahern noted that out of the 27 Member States, only one – Spain – has an AI regulatory sandbox which is up and running. Five are actively implementing their sandboxes, four have declared their intention to do so and 16 have not yet communicated their plans. Spain seems to be the most advanced Member State currently, as its sandbox opened in 2025 and began hosting 12 high-risk AI systems. This initial experience enabled the Spanish authority, AESIA, to publish guidelines in December 2025 to support the implementation and compliance of systems with the AI Act. The act further obliges the Commission to develop a single, dedicated interface containing all relevant information on AI regulatory sandboxes to allow stakeholders to interact with them.

Secondary legislation and omnibus

Under the AI Act, the Commission must adopt implementing acts specifying how to establish, develop, implement, operate and supervise the sandboxes. In December 2025, the Commission published a draft version and requested feedback by January 2026. In the recitals of the draft, the Commission insists on the need to ensure consistent implementation of the rules. In addition to the implementing acts, a new regulation known as the digital omnibus on AI has been proposed by the Commission to amend the AI Act. The proposal suggests granting the Commission the right to create an EU‑level AI regulatory sandbox for AI systems under its supervision and strengthen coordination between national sandboxes. As of March 2025, the relevant European Parliament committees are engaged in examining the proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘AI regulatory sandboxes: State of play and implementation challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Credit: UN Photo/Pasqual Gorri

By UN Development Programme
AMMAN / NEW YORK , Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

New estimates by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggest the military escalation in the Middle East, now into its fifth week, may cost economies in the region from 3.7 to 6.0 percent of their collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

This represents a staggering loss of US$120-194 billion and exceeds the cumulative regional GDP growth achieved in 2025. Coupled with an estimated rise in unemployment of up to 4 percentage points or 3.6 million jobs lost—more than the total jobs created in the region in 2025, these reversals will push up to 4 million people into poverty.

The assessment — “Military Escalation in the Middle East: Economic and Social Implications for the Arab States region” — exposes the concerning reality of structural vulnerabilities characteristic to the region, which enable a short lived military escalation to generate profound and widespread socio economic impacts that may persist over a long-term.

“This crisis rings alarm bells for countries of the region to fundamentally reevaluate their strategic choices of fiscal, sectoral, and social policies, representing an important turning point in the development trajectory of the region,” said Abdallah AlDardari, UN Assistant Secretary General and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab State in UNDP.

“Our findings underline the pressing need to strengthen regional collaboration to diversify economies—beyond reliance on growth driven by hydrocarbons, and to expand production bases, secure trade and logistics systems, and broaden economic partnerships, to reduce exposure to shocks and conflicts.”

The assessment employs Computable General Equilibrium modelling to capture the magnitude of disruptions caused by a four-week conflict, and models its effects through key transmission channels, including increased trade costs, temporary productivity losses, and localized capital destruction.

It conducted five simulation scenarios, representing escalating levels of conflict scenarios, ranging from a “moderate disruption,” where trade costs increase by tenfold, to an “extreme disruption and energy shock,” where trade costs increase a hundred-fold, intensified by a stop of hydrocarbon production.

The findings highlight that impacts are not uniform, varying significantly across the region due to structural characteristics of its main subregions. Estimates suggest that the largest macroeconomic losses are concentrated in Gulf Cooperation Council and the Levant subregions, where strong exposure to trade disruptions and energy market volatility drives significant declines in output, investment, and trade.

Both subregions stand to lose 5.2-8.5 percent and 5.2-8.7 percent of their GDP, respectively. Increases in poverty rates are concentrated in the Levant and Least Developed Arab Countries, where baseline vulnerability is highest and shocks translate more strongly into welfare losses. In North Africa, impacts remain moderate but still significant in absolute terms.

In the Levant, the crisis is expected to increase poverty by 5 percent, pushing an additional 2.85-3.30 million people into poverty—accounting for over 75 percent of the rise in poverty across the region. Across the region, human development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) is expected to decline by approximately 0.2 to 0.4 percent, corresponding to a setback of roughly half a year to nearly one year of human development progress.

Footnote

• The Assessment will be available online—through the following link.
• This Assessment if part is part of a series of rapid assessments that UNDP is producing on the impacts of the Middle East military escalation on Iran, the Arab States in the region, Africa, the Asia Pacific region and on the global development outlook.
• Results presented in this brief should be interpreted as illustrative estimates of potential outcomes under different shock intensities, rather than realized impacts.
• Impact estimates are presented for four Arab States subregional groupings, including:
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
• The Levant, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and Syria
• North Africa, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya Morocco and Tunisia
• Least Developed Arab countries (LDCs), including Sudan and Yemen—insufficient data did not allow for simulating impacts on Djibouti and Somalia.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Prévue pour le 11 octobre, la primaire de la gauche patine. Alors que ses organisateurs espéraient élargir son périmètre en parvenant à convaincre Raphaël Glucksmann, notamment, d’y participer, sa tenue paraît désormais compromise en raison des hésitations du Parti socialiste. Marine Tondelier compte publier jeudi un "manifeste pour la primaire" pour tenter de la sauver.

La République démocratique du Congo tient enfin son billet pour la Coupe du monde 2026. Au terme d’un match longtemps indécis face à la Jamaïque, les Léopards ont arraché une victoire précieuse en prolongation, déclenchant une explosion de joie à travers le pays, notamment dans la fan zone de la Place Royale dans la capitale congolaise. 

Depuis l'effondrement mortel de l'auvent de la gare de Novi Sad, le 1er novembre 2024, la Serbie se soulève contre la corruption meurtrière du régime du président Vučić et pour le respect de l'État de droit. Cette exigence de justice menée par les étudiants a gagné tout le pays. Suivez les dernières informations en temps réel et en accès libre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Gratuit, Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Politique, Société

Depuis l'effondrement mortel de l'auvent de la gare de Novi Sad, le 1er novembre 2024, la Serbie se soulève contre la corruption meurtrière du régime du président Vučić et pour le respect de l'État de droit. Cette exigence de justice menée par les étudiants a gagné tout le pays. Suivez les dernières informations en temps réel et en accès libre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Gratuit, Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Politique, Société

Entre 1954 et 1962, l’armée française a déplacé et parqué dans des camps plus de 2 millions de paysans algériens. Plus de 200 000 d’entre eux, dont deux tiers d’enfants, y seraient morts de froid et de faim. La journaliste Lorraine Rossignol ravive, dans un livre, un récit longtemps tu.

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