Agrégateur de flux

Long-running mechanical, faulty metallic alloys in the Prop-Rotor Gear Box and lack of synergy between the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have compounded the V-22 Osprey’s troubles. Faulty parts, inconsistent communication of safety and hazard risks from the Joint Program Office, and poor coordination between the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force, […]

Les « chevaliers de la vocation » ont été mis à la porte du Théâtre national. La remise des prix s'est donc tenue en plein air, sur la place de la République de Belgrade, transformée en tribune de soutien aux étudiants et aux figures de la contestation civique en Serbie.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Culture et éducation

BBC Sport Africa sélectionne six joueurs à suivre lors de la Coupe d'Afrique des nations 2025, qui se déroulera au Maroc du 21 décembre au 18 janvier.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Européens, Ukrainiens et Américains se retrouvent, dimanche 14 et lundi 15 décembre à Berlin, sans participation russe pour des nouvelles négociations sur l’Ukraine. Pour les alliés européens de Kiev, à commencer par le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz, le but est de travailler sur les propositions américaines - au départ peu favorables à Kiev - pour trouver un compromis plus équilibré. L’émissaire américain Steve Witkoff est également de la partie.

C'est dans la division et la crainte quasi permanente d'une possible implosion que la Bosnie-Herzégovine commémore le trentième anniversaire des accords qui ont mis fin à la sanglante guerre de 1992-1995.

Le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a déclaré jeudi que les États-Unis continuaient de demander d'importantes concessions de la part de son pays dans les négociations pour mettre fin à la guerre avec la Russie, dont le retrait de ses troupes du Donbass. Or, c'est dans la région de Donetsk, où se déroulent l'essentiel des combats, que la défense ukrainienne repose sur la ceinture fortifiée. Un dispositif militaire sans équivalent.

 Thanks to Duke 7 for the link.

Footage shows a Royal Thai Army mechanized force massing along the Thai-Cambodian border ahead of a planned offensive.

The formation includes M113 ACAV armored personnel carriers and FV101 Scorpion light tanks. pic.twitter.com/FpH2WBjeXY

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) December 12, 2025 Does anyone know what kicked off the fighting here? I thought it was just border clashes but it looks like the Thai Army is going full tilt boogie now.
Between this, the RSF and Burko whatever in Africa running wild, to even ISIS attacking our guys in Syria and of course Ukraine/Russia plus China continuing to push things against Taiwan that we could easily be in a multi-front war in the next few years.
Have to wonder how that'll workout.
I know the US will, or at least want to , prioritize Taiwan.  The Europeans have made noise (well actually just the UK and sometimes France) about supporting us there but I seriously doubt it.
Ukraine doesn't seem to want an end to the fighting so that will rage and no one seems to give a damn about the persecution of Christians in Africa by the Muslim horde and everyone (with sense) wants to wash their hands of the Syria mess.
I think it'll break down like the latest security assessment called for.  Until they cross the line Ukraine will prioritized at the expense of all else.  SOCOM will have a playground in Africa and Syria (but they will need MASSIVE conventional support).  The Navy will continue to play the flex role of supporting SOCOM more and more in Africa and Syria, along with the USAF.  The 82nd and 101st will probably be tasked with helping SOCOM too.
Drawdown of Army forces in Europe will be delayed (cause everyone in power was once a Russia expert and that's the fight they WANT) with the USAF getting stretched to support a mission there.
China will see their chance and make a move on Taiwan before the next presidential election and that will change the world.  WE MIGHT hold onto it by our fingernails but we'll see the destruction of many ships, a few MLRs and a multitude of aircraft.
I think things are lining up for shit to get nasty in the next few years.  Oh and notice that while the Thailand/Cambodia thing rages it wasn't even listed?  That leaves out another flair up between Pakistan/India, China/India, Pakistan/Iran and of course Israel and damn near the entire Middle East.

As some Somali migrants fear what might happen next, the BBC speaks to one deportee in Mogadishu.

 

Huge SHOCK to LONDON: RUSSIA Captured Fighters of the UK’s Elite Special Air Service (SAS) in SUMY

It’s worth noting the unique operation of the Russian spetsnaz behind enemy lines in the Sumy region. In particular, near the village of ‘Sadki’, Russian spetsnaz wiped out a group… pic.twitter.com/JLiJGszwIy

— SlavicFreeSpirit (@SlavFreeSpirit) December 13, 2025 I watch the war in Ukraine and you know who would be perfect there and are the only Special Ops Outfit that does the work? US Army Special Forces. They're force multipliers capable of organizing and leading (wink wink) allied or factional forces against outside threats or internal threats to nations friendly to us.
Having said all that I'm glad (hoping) they're not there.
What has me spinning is why would the UK waste their force in the type of warfare happening right now.  I always viewed the SAS as a type of raid force, operating like a downsized US Army Ranger type outfit.
Conventional warfare is NOT where they shine.  So why put them in this type of fight?

 

The Netherlands has awarded a contract to Rheinmetall for the provision of Skyranger 30 Short Range Air Defence Systems mounted on FFG's ACSV and in stationary configuration. Deliveries start in 2028 and are to be completed by the end of 2029. The contract is valued in the three-digit million euro range.

 

U.S. Marines with 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, unload amphibious combat vehicles from a U.S. Navy landing craft, air cushion with Assault Craft Unit 5 onto Red Beach during Exercise Steel Knight 25 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Dec. 6, 2025. Steel Knight is an annual exercise that strengthens the Navy-Marine Corps team's ability to respond forward, integrate across domains, and sustain Marine Air-Ground Task Force readiness. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Keegan Jones)

 

 

Putin: "Look at what the West is doing with their own people."

"They're destroying the institution of family, their culture's historical identity, and various perversions with regard to children."

"Pedophilia is accepted as the new norm." pic.twitter.com/1fYIcKkF20

— Red Pill Dispenser (@redpilldispensr) December 13, 2025 Then there is this...
  Vladimir Putin said this week that he doesn’t fear the United Kingdom as they can’t even stop rubber boats invading their country or foreign men raping their women & children. Plus he said the British people hate their leader. 
Add this to the pile from our own allies that want us to foot the whole bill for Ukraine...

Funny because it’s true… pic.twitter.com/E068iLROOB

— Anna (@provemewrong411) December 13, 2025 What does this all add up to?
We are entering a very weird time in Ukraine.  The American people are tired of the fight, most especially the right.
Our own military has warned that the donations of gear to Ukraine is sapping our ability for fights elsewhere.
Europe has refused to stand up and take responsibility for the fight even though they claim it to be damn near a struggle for survival.
So all in all you have a populace in the West that is primed to vulnerability from propaganda or an "alternative" point of view.
Someone somewhere will make this a fight between bullets and bread in the US with regard to the budget and in Europe it will be between saving themselves or Ukraine with regard to unfettered immigration and the national leadership there failing to respond.
Ukraine's thread is getting thinner.  They better respond to Trump's demand for a peace treaty or they'll be left hanging by all sides soon.

Des centaines de jeunes se sont rassemblés ce samedi à Cotonou au Bénin pour dénoncer la tentative de coup d'État de dimanche dernier. Dans le même temps, côté politique, l'enquête avance, alors que les présumés responsables sont toujours recherchés.

Six Casques bleus originaires du Bangladesh ont été tués samedi dans une attaque de drones dans une ville du sud du Soudan assiégée par les paramilitaires, a indiqué la force de maintien de la paix de l'ONU dans la région.

« Le Monde diplomatique » inaugure sur son site Internet un instrument d'un type particulier : un poste d'observation et d'analyse des résolutions votées au Conseil de sécurité et à l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies, de 1946 à nos jours. En quelques clics, chacun peut désormais comparer les (…) / Diplomatie, Relations internationales

At first glance, the comparison seems almost absurd. Mongolia, a vast country with enormous mineral wealth, stretching between two geopolitical giants, versus Belize, a small Central American state with limited territory, modest population and no strategic depth. By classical logic, Mongolia should be the stronger actor in economic sovereignty. Yet recent analytical measurements reveal a far more counterintuitive reality: Belize today demonstrates a higher level of practical economic sovereignty than Mongolia.   As an expert of the International Burke Institute and an active participant in projects aimed at strengthening national sovereignty, I encounter such paradoxes with increasing frequency. They reveal one of the central truths of the modern world: economic sovereignty is no longer a function of size, territory, or raw resources. It is a function of control, diversification, resilience and institutional discipline.   Mongolia is rich in coal, copper, gold and rare earth elements. Its underground wealth is undeniable. Yet much of its economic model remains structurally dependent on a narrow export base and on external demand, primarily from a single dominant market. This creates a classic dependency trap. When prices fluctuate or geopolitical pressure intensifies, Mongolia’s fiscal stability, currency strength and social balance become immediately vulnerable to external forces it does not control.   Belize, by contrast, lacks large-scale mineral reserves and does not command major industrial capacity. But over the past two decades it has built something far more decisive for modern sovereignty: a diversified economic structure that reduces exposure to single-source dependency. Tourism, financial services, agriculture, logistics and digital services form a balanced ecosystem. None of these sectors dominates absolutely, yet together they form a resilient economic architecture.   Economic sovereignty is not measured by how much a country exports, but by how freely it can decide under pressure. A state that earns billions from raw materials but cannot influence pricing, transportation routes or investment conditions is not fully sovereign in economic terms. It is economically active, but strategically constrained. This is where Mongolia’s vulnerability becomes evident. Its resources generate revenue, but not full control.   Belize’s advantage lies not in volume, but in flexibility. Its economy is small, but adaptive. External shocks do not collapse the entire system at once. Currency policy, fiscal regulation and sectoral balance provide room for maneuver. In moments of global turbulence, this flexibility becomes a strategic asset far more valuable than sheer scale.   At the International Burke Institute, where we are finalizing the comprehensive Sovereignty Index to be presented this December for all UN member states, economic sovereignty is assessed not by GDP alone, but by a deeper set of indicators. These include dependency ratios, trade concentration, fiscal autonomy, financial system resilience and the state’s capacity to absorb shocks without losing strategic autonomy. It is within this multidimensional framework that Belize unexpectedly outperforms Mongolia.   As someone directly engaged in both the analytical and practical dimensions of this work, I see a pattern repeating across regions. States that rely heavily on a narrow economic corridor — one commodity, one route, one partner — accumulate invisible vulnerabilities. Their economies may look strong in growth charts, but their sovereignty erodes silently through structural exposure. When disruption comes, decision-making becomes reactive rather than sovereign.   Belize followed a different logic. Instead of maximizing output from a single dominant resource, it invested in balancing multiple smaller sectors. This did not produce spectacular growth headlines. But it produced something far more durable: economic independence in critical moments. Sovereignty is not tested in times of prosperity. It is tested when options disappear.   Mongolia now faces the classic dilemma of many resource-rich states: how to convert natural wealth into strategic autonomy rather than long-term dependence. The answer lies not in extracting more, but in restructuring more. Without diversification, even the richest subsoil becomes a fragile foundation for sovereignty.   The Belize–Mongolia contrast illustrates a broader truth about the modern global system. Size no longer guarantees strength. Wealth no longer guarantees independence. What matters is the architecture of control. Who sets the terms of trade? Who controls capital flows? Who absorbs the first удар during a crisis?   In December, when the full Sovereignty Index is released, many governments will confront similar surprises. Some large states will discover hidden fragility. Some small ones will discover unexpected strength. And many will face an uncomfortable realization: economic sovereignty today is built not by scale, but by structure.   Belize did not become stronger than Mongolia by growing bigger. It became stronger by becoming smarter in how it organizes dependency and control. And in the modern world, that difference defines who truly holds economic sovereignty — and who merely appears to.