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Pakistan’s senior air force official announced plans to purchase Chinese stealth fighters last week, potentially making Pakistan the first foreign partner to purchase 5th generation fighters from China.

During an induction ceremony for a variety of new military equipment held on January 2, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu announced the forces’ intentions to purchase Chinese FC-31 Gyrfalcon fighters, according to reporting by Defense News. This reporting was seemingly confirmed by a post on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Facebook page shortly thereafter.

The FC-31 is China’s second indigenous stealth fighter, which is currently in development for service aboard Chinese aircraft carriers, but has had an eye toward the export market since its inception.

The United States has long maintained a complex and often strained relationship with Pakistan – a country that was seen as a strategic partner at times throughout both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, but that has also been accused of harboring and supporting terrorist regimes. Today, Pakistan’s primary fighter is the American-sourced F-16 Fighting Falcon, with the country having about 85 operational platforms.

Pakistan’s hostile relationship with neighboring India, which has also been the source of tensions with the United States, has served to deepen military cooperation with China. Pakistan’s relationship with China is often described as “all-weather,” with deep strategic ties extending throughout economic, diplomatic, and military sectors.

THE FC-31/J-35 IS CHINA’S SECOND STEALTH FIGHTER DESIGN

The acquisition of FC-31 fighters would make Pakistan the first third-party country ever to purchase stealth aircraft designed outside the United States. Stealth, or low observable, aircraft designs are meant to delay or prevent detection by adversary systems, allowing them to operate inside contested airspace with greater survivability. The US has long maintained a monopoly on stealth aviation, as the only nation on the planet operating stealth aircraft from 1983 until 2017, when China’s first stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, entered operational service.

Today, it’s estimated that China has somewhere north of 250 J-20s built, giving it the distinction of operating the world’s second-largest fleet of stealth aircraft. The Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon is the nation’s second stealth effort, developed independently of Chengdu’s J-20 program.

The fighter was meant to be a lower-cost 5th-generation entry with an emphasis placed on the export market, but analysts were quick to point out that the smaller and lighter design may eventually see service aboard China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers as a replacement for the country’s long-troubled fleet of 4th-generation J-15s. In October 2021, those suspicions were confirmed when a modified carrier-capable iteration of the FC-31, dubbed the J-35, took flight for the first time. According to reports, the Chinese air force has also expressed interest in the platform as a lower-cost addition to its J-20 fleet.

To date, there has been no official word as to when this J-35 could see operational service, though some estimates suggest it could be as soon as 2026.

HOW DOES THE FC-31 COMPARE TO OTHER STEALTH FIGHTERS?

While China’s larger twin-engine J-20 is meant to fill an air-superiority role akin to the F-22 Raptor, the FC-31, and its Naval J-35 variant, are smaller twin-engine aircraft designed to compete with multi-role fighters like the F-35. In keeping with China’s longstanding approach to aviation design, both the J-20 and FC-31 borrow heavily from foreign fighter designs, with the J-20 often described as an amalgam of the long-defunct Soviet MiG 1.44 stealth fighter program infused with Lockheed Martin-derived low-observable design techniques.

While Russian officials have accused Chengdu of stealing elements of the MiG 1.44’s design, evidence to that effect has largely been circumstantial to date. China’s efforts to steal American stealth fighter designs, however, have been thoroughly confirmed, with a Chinese National named Su Bin ultimately charged with the cyber theft of secrets related to the design of many American military aircraft – including the F-22 and F-35 – in 2014.

In Su Bin’s e-mails to his Chinese government contacts, which were later entered as evidence in his trial, he openly gloated about how the stolen documents would “allow us [China] to catch up rapidly with U.S. levels … [and] stand easily on the giant’s shoulders.”

Su was ultimately sentenced to 46 months in Federal Prison for the theft in July 2016.

That is to say that the FC-31’s aesthetic similarities to America’s F-35 aren’t necessarily a coincidence. Because of the lack of transparency within Chinese state media, details about the FC-31’s actual capability set remain nebulous at best.

Current FC-31s in testing are reportedly powered by two Russian-sourced RD-93 afterburning turbofan engines that are each capable of producing about 18,300 pounds of thrust, though China has expressed plans to use domestically-sourced equivalent WS-13s that may increase power output to a combined 39,200 pounds of thrust with afterburners lit.

With an estimated maximum takeoff weight of 56,000 pounds, that could place the FC-31 on similar performance footing as the slightly larger and more powerful single-engine F-35. The American jet is powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofan engine that can pump out around 43,000 pounds of thrust under afterburner in a platform with a maximum takeoff weight of some 65,000 pounds. However, it’s important to note that the F135 is not just a more powerful engine, it’s also more advanced when it comes to reducing both radar and infrared (heat) signatures.

Broadly speaking, the FC-31, like its J-20 sibling, is not expected to be able to match America’s F-35 or F-22 in terms of preventing detection, thanks in large part to America’s multi-decade head start on the technologies involved in fielding truly stealth platforms, but that doesn’t mean the FC-31 wouldn’t represent a significant leap in low-observability over fourth-generation airframes like China’s J-15 or Pakistan’s F-16s.

In other words, the FC-31 may not be able to match the F-35 pound for pound, but could likely outperform many of the older 4th generation aircraft it might run across in a 21st century conflict.

That is, of course, if the aircraft ultimately lives up to China’s claims.

About the Author

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

When will Russia finally collapse? - Policymakers and analysts are getting impatient.

Predictions of Russia’s collapse appear to be wrong.

Instead of getting weaker, Vladimir Putin’s realm seems to be getting stronger.

One critic of the collapse argument puts it this way: “[T]wo years on, Russia looks in alarmingly robust condition.”

If that’s true, it obviously makes sense to negotiate with the Kremlin now, before it gets even more powerful and more stable. That may be a bitter pill to swallow, for Ukraine and its supporters of course, but what’s the alternative?

When Will Russia Collapse?

The alternative is obvious. In fact, Russia is not getting structurally stronger and more stable, and almost all theories of system breakdown lead us to expect something deeply destabilizing to happen in Russia. When? There’s the rub. It could be tomorrow; it could be five years from now. Either way, collapse is coming, though perhaps not “two years on.”

The case for Russia’s getting stronger rests on peculiar interpretations of the existing evidence regarding the Putin regime, the war, the economy, and the Russian population.

Putin may be exuding confidence—though why should we expect anything less from him or any leader?—but appearances can be deceiving, especially as Putin’s public persona is as often inclined to cluelessness as to self-confidence. He’s arrested his liberal and right-wing critics and built up the security apparatus, and his propaganda machine remains as active as ever. Are these signs of strength?

Yes, for obvious reasons, and no, because all these measures wouldn’t be necessary if he didn’t feel threatened. By whom? By important political and economic elites, who are unhappy with the war and its effects on the Russian economy and armed forces. The Prigozhin coup attempt is a case in point. Its very occurrence testified to dissatisfaction within the army. More importantly, the attempt could not possibly have been made without the knowledge—and blessing?—of the security services.

So, yes, Putin survived the coup. But its very happening means that his position was and is precarious.

Putin's Weakness Is Russia's Weakness

That’s important because Putin’s weakness means his regime’s weakness, since he’s its essential core. All authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, and dictatorial systems are hyper-centralized by definition. That can be their strength, if the supreme leader is a Platonic philosopher king, but more often than not it’s a fatal weakness. Supreme leaders are resistant to change and reform.

Their centrality encourages buck-passing, attempts at local power-building, and sycophancy. Most important perhaps, they are prone to strategic mistakes, especially as they age and lose their ability to project invincibility, infallibility, and charisma.

Putin’s most significant error was to pressure Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to back out of an Association agreement with the European Union in late 2013, thereby sparking the Revolution of Dignity that led to Yanukovych’s flight and then the launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Jamestown Foundation's Janusz Bugajski makes the case for viewing the war as disastrous for Russia: “Russian leaders are trying to convince Western leaders that Ukraine is losing the war in order to terminate military assistance for Kyiv. In reality, the war is disastrous for Russia. Although the Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia for the winter, after defeating Russian forces in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the Russian army is being decimated, and its navy has been pushed back from the western part of the Black Sea. During two years of combat, Russia has lost at least 315,000 killed or severely wounded, from a ground force of some 360,000 that invaded Ukraine. It has also sustained huge losses in equipment, including 2,200 out of some 3,500 tanks and a third of its armored vehicles.” These are not just incidental problems. Together, they bespeak a fundamental, structural decimation of Russia’s armed forces.

The situation with the economy is just as alarming. The opposition Russian economist Vladimir Milov has shown that the state has invested enormously in four sectors (ammunition, railroads, military security, and machine building) directly connected to the war, while reducing or only minimally increasing investments in consumer goods sectors. Putin’s claims that GDP is growing and inflation is low, therefore, conceal the reality that average citizens are being sacrificed on the altar of militarism. As Milov points out, “Russians have become significantly poorer in the last five and especially in the last two years.”

The Empirical Case for a Strong Russia Is Weak

Yale University’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues have convincingly shown that sanctions have worked and that “[R]ussia is no longer remotely an economic power and has suppressed the minimum reporting of transparent national income statistics that is required to retain IMF membership. With industrial might below that of Chile, Putin’s Russia survives merely by seizing assets. The increasingly state-dominated economy is cannibalizing its own companies to maintain Putin’s war machine.”

Finally, we come to the Russian population. Yes, they’re inactive, and yes, that makes them morally complicit in Putin’s crimes. But a significant minority, perhaps as many as one fifth, oppose the war and Putin’s fascist regime. They are largely urban, educated professionals resident in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At present, they’re cowed. But as soon as an opening appears, as it inevitably will, they will make themselves heard—as do all urban, educated professionals the world over.

The empirical case for a strong Russia is thus weak. Meanwhile, the theoretical case for collapse is strong, because Russia is exceedingly vulnerable to the structural forces that generally lead to systemic collapse. It’s important to remember that structures are like tectonic plates. We can predict that earthquakes will inevitably happen where two plates meet, but we cannot say exactly when. And we can say which regions—or states—are in greater or lesser degrees of trouble and increasingly face the prospect of collapse.

What are the structural forces besetting Russia?

The above analysis identified them. The brittle regime is one. The parlous condition of the military is another. The sinking economy is a third. The protest potential of Russia’s educated, urban elites is a fourth. We know from history that such states are prone to break down or, at the least, to experience massive popular protests and regime change. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites in 1989-1991 immediately come to mind.

But so, too, do scores of countries worldwide—such as Argentina, Nicaragua, Egypt, Syria, Zimbabwe, and Libya. Some states, such as the Ayatollahs’ Iran, weather the storms of repeated upheaval and survive. Others, such as the Shah’s Iran, do not. Besides invoking platitudes such as “it all depends on state strength or elite cleverness,” we cannot know what the exact outcome will be.

But we do know that, in most cases, the “contradictions” that structural forces produce come to the fore when “sparks” or “triggers” take place. These can be assassinations, earthquakes, fires, natural disasters—or wars, especially unsuccessful wars that strain already impaired economies, militaries, regimes, and populations. It was World War I that destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires and World War II that almost destroyed the Soviet Union, especially after Joseph Stalin’s massive structural changes weakened the Soviet system and made it prone to collapse.

Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine is probably just such a spark. The regime, army, and economy have gotten weaker, and there is no reason to expect things to get better anytime soon. This means that, the longer the war takes, the likelier the structural forces will grind against one another, the greater the contradictions, and the likelier Russia’s breakdown becomes. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, in Russia and the West, time is not on Putin’s side. He’s not getting any younger, and his regime is not getting any stronger. The West should therefore refrain from negotiating with Putin until his country and regime weaken beyond easy repair.

So, don’t be taken in by his forced bravado. The tune he’s singing is his swan song. As to when Putin Russia will meet its end, it may be sooner than you think. Indeed, consider holding your breath.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

All images are Shutterstock. 

Summary: This article considers the capabilities of modern air-defense systems like the Russian S-200, S-300, and S-400, suggesting that while these systems could potentially target the SR-71 at its historical speed and altitude, an upgraded SR-71 with advanced jamming technology would likely remain immune to their missile threats.

Could the SR-71 Outrun the Russian S-400 Triumf?

During the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbirds" nearly 25 years in service, the high-speed aircraft set numerous speed records, and on July 28, 1976, a Blackbird reached an impressive 2,193.167 miles per hour. Flying at roughly 36.55 miles per minute, or 3,216.4 feet per second, it was faster than a bullet fired from the World War II-era M1 Garand rifle, which had a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second.

Moreover, the aircraft still holds the record for a cross-country flight, traveling from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. in just 64 minutes, 20 seconds.

The SR-71 achieved a record top speed of 2,193 mph – and while other aircraft could reach such extreme speeds in theory – but would melt due to the atmospheric friction and heat – the Blackbird could maintain it for extended periods. It was able to cruise along at more than 2,200 mph (Mach 3+ or more than three times the speed of sound), and at altitudes greater than 85,000 feet.

In addition to flying fast, the SR-71 also set an altitude record – reaching 25,929 meters. It flew so high that pilots navigating by sight couldn't even rely on ground features such as roads and instead needed to look at the mountains, rivers, and major coastlines to get their bearings.

SR-71: It Could Outrun Missile

The SR-71 earned its reputation for incomparable speed. No aircraft could catch it, and neither could missiles.

As previously reported, while a dozen Blackbirds were lost to accidents during its service history, not a single aircraft was shot down by an enemy. Though the aircraft carried radar countermeasures to evade interception efforts, the Blackbird's great protection was still its combination of very high speed and high altitude. It also had a low radar cross-section, which gave a very short time for an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) to acquire and track the aircraft.

By the time a SAM site could track the Blackbird, it was out of range. In theory that made it almost invulnerable. Moreover, if a SAM site was able to track the SR-71 and fire a missile, the aircraft flew high enough to evade it. Yet, those on the ground still tried their best, and during its service history, the SR-71 reportedly evaded some 4,000 missiles fired its way.

Some 800 missiles were fired at Blackbirds over Vietnam alone­but not a single one was lost to enemy fire. One came close, and a CIA A-12 did take a piece of shrapnel from an SA-2 missile that exploded 100 meters away. In addition, SR-71 pilots did report that missiles launched without radar guidance and no launch detection had passed as close as 150 yards (140 m) from the aircraft.

So What About the S-400 Triumf?

Though the SR-71 has been retired, at least a few experts believe the high-speed aircraft would still be able to get the job done even against the best air-defense systems in service today.

The AviationGeekClub.com recently quoted Damien Leimbach, former United States Air Force Avionics Technician on U-2 aircraft, who said via a post on Quora that "The S-200, S-300 and S-400 are amazing platforms, and given their stated performance, the 300 and 400 could probably hit a target at the SR-71's speed and altitude. But that is not the same as hitting an SR-71."

Leimbach explained that while the Russian-made air-defense systems "could" shoot down the version of the SR-71 that existed in the 1970s or 1980s, it likely couldn't come close to hitting an upgraded SR-71.

The SR-71 was designed as a long-range, high-altitude, strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Its mission equipment for the plane's aerial reconnaissance role included signals intelligence sensors, side-looking airborne radar, and a camera. If the aircraft were in service today it would also have the latest jamming technology.

"It would have received the same jamming and Electronic Warfare upgrades as other planes have," noted Leimbach, who further suggested, "Would these EW jammer upgrades make the plane immune from those missiles? Yes it would."

Leimbach said he spent 6 years, recently, working on the sibling of the SR-71, the U-2 and as an electronics specialist he claimed to have been directly responsible for installing and maintaining the AN-ALQ 221 jammer that made the high flying, but slow moving, U-2 Dragon Lady immune to those missiles."

"The U-2 and the SR-71 don't just take pictures. They listen to cell phones. They monitor radios. And they also listen to, record and analyze the frequencies, pulse rates, variable modes and power outputs of enemy SAM systems like the S-200, 300 and 400," Leimbach noted.

The electronics specialist also noted that the S-300 is Russian technology from the 1970s, which made it about as sophisticated as American tech from the 1950s, while the S-400 is just an upgraded version. Both are very good, but the U.S. has had a lot of time to develop countermeasures.

To his point, "If (Russia's) modern weapons can't even take down the U-2, they could not shoot down the SR-71."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Su-25 and Su-34 fighter jets often work in packs during combat operations, Russian state media outlets confirmed last year. The Russian military is likely employing its Su-34 platforms to “cover” the Su-25 as it flies low-altitude attack missions. Analysts studying Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine believe the Su-25 has suffered the most losses over the last two years. In March, widely circulated cellphone footage depicting a downed Su-25 fighter was shared on social media.

While the airframe’s journey to the ground was not documented, the remnants of the platform indicate it most certainly fell from the air.

Regardless of the Su-25’s track record so far in Ukraine, Moscow still depends on the Soviet-era fighter.

Introducing the Su-25 “Frogfoot”

In the 1960s, the Soviet Air Force established a competition in order to find its next battlefield close-support aircraft.

Manufacturer Sukhoi developed the T-8 prototype around this time, which evolved into the Su-25 fighter. The ground-attack airframe took its first flight in the early 1970’s and after five years its certification trials were completed.

The USSR’s desire to develop its own close-support airframe followed America’s endeavor to create its A-10 Thunderbolt II “Warthog” tank-busting jet. While the Warthog and the Frogfoot were designed to accomplish similar missions, the two airframes sport quite different capabilities.

The A-10 Warthog vs. The Su-25 Frogfoot

Both the Su-25 and A-10 are heavily armored and are often referred to as “flying tanks.” 

However, the Frogfoot is smaller, lighter and faster than its American counterpart. Earlier variants of the Russian jet featured two R-95Sh non-afterburning turbojets.

The aircraft is equipped with self-sealing, foam-filled fuel tanks that provide a total fuel capacity of around 3,600l. Additionally, the provision of four PTB-1500 external fuel tanks which are carried on the underwing pylons can extend the range of the jet.

According to Air Force Technology, the Frogfoot can climb at a rate of 58m/s. “The maximum speed of the aircraft is 950km/h. The combat radius and ferry range of the aircraft are 375km and 7,500km respectively. The normal range of the Su-25 is 750km, while its service ceiling is 7,000m. The take-off and landing roll of the Su-25 are 750m and 600m respectively. The aircraft weighs around 10,740kg and its maximum take-off weight is 17,600kg.”

The Su-25 does not have a stellar war record

The Soviets used the Frogfoot extensively during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s.

Since Afghan-fighters trained on U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles were able to shoot down many of the S-25s, the fighter proved to have some significant vulnerabilities. Particularly, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) wreaked havoc on the Soviet fleet.

The Frogfoot also saw action during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent Abkhazia War, where the jet was flown by Georgia’s Air Force.

The Su-25 was exported widely in the 1980s and many of these “flying tanks” ended up in former Soviet states following the collapse of the USSR. Additionally, the Su-25 serves with Air Forces in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South Africa. 

In late February, Ukrainian forces took out a Russian Su-25 airframe and captured its pilot as “revenge” for earlier airstrikes. This incident, along with other reports of Su-25 losses throughout the war, indicate that Russia’s “flying tank” is not performing as well as the Air Force intended.

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Meet the Qaher-313 Stealth Fighter: In late February last year, Iran’s defense ministry revealed that the country was ready to convert its “fifth-generation” stealth fighter into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The televised announcement was made by Brigadier General Afshin Khajefard, who said the Qaher platform had reached full technological maturity. Iran’s announcement follows a series of lethal drone shipments it has sent Russia over the last year or so.

While Tehran has emerged as quite the prolific drone manufacturer, the country has lagged behind in terms of airplane capabilities.

The Iranian Air Force still flies a version of the aging F-14 Tomcat, suggesting that the Qaher’s purported abilities are exaggerated at best. 

A brief history of Iran’s homegrown “stealth” fighter

The first mockup of the Qaher-313 fighter was first revealed in 2013 as the regime’s first fully indigenous stealth platform.

According to the defense ministry, the Qaher was developed and designed fully by the Iran Aviation Industries Organization, a division of the Ministry of Defense.

The first jet prototype was revealed almost four years later. Iranian officials boasted that the Qaher could sport a 2,000 kilogram bomb or at a minimum six air-to-air-missiles.

Additionally, Tehran’s former defense minister claimed that the platform had a small radar-cross section, is capable of flying at very low altitudes and can carry a litany of homegrown munitions. 

Aviation buffs consider the Qaher-313 to be a joke

For many reasons, industry experts and aviation buffs widely dismissed Iran’s dubious claims. At this time, Iran released some footage and photographs of its new premiere fighter. Perhaps laughably, in one video an Iranian pilot is seen crouched down in the cockpit of the jet, which is clearly way too small to actually fly a human being.

Without space for a pilot, the Qaher definitely can’t carry the internal payload as Iranian officials have claimed. Iran also did not possess the analytical and sensor technologies required to develop the capabilities the fighter was purported to have. 

Initial analyses of the available footage of the Qaher highlighted the airframe’s sharp edges, angles and twin tail form, similar to the American-made F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation platforms. As observed by The Aviationist editor David Cenciotti, “The aircraft sports fixed canards and air intakes a bit too small to feed a modern jet plane’s engine; air intakes resemble those used by modern [unmanned aircraft] designs,” adding that “They are located above the wing meaning that at high AoA — angle of attack—the intakes would get turbulent or no air at all for the engine.”

Another serious design flaw appeared to be the nose section of the Qaher. The nose was so tiny that hardly any radar could fit inside it. Additionally, the airframe did not possess a nozzle, which would result in the melting of the entire fighter by the engine’s afterburners.

Could the Qaher-313 become an exportable UAV?

While the Qaher certainly didn’t make the cut as an actual fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, the plane could be revived as a new UAV flown by Iran.

Tehran’s drone arsenal has become an increasingly lethal enterprise for the regime. In fact, Iran has steadily ramped up its UAV development alongside the expansion of its ballistic missile program.

Over the last decade or so, Iran has mastered the development and shipment of cheap, less advanced but deadly drones to its region-wide proxy groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and sporadic Iranian-aligned groups in Syria all receive consistent deliveries of these combat UAVs.

Most recently, Iran has provided Russian Forces with a variety of lethal drones, including the Shahed family. Due to Tehran’s deliveries, Moscow has been able to carry out a litany of barrages targeting a range of residential buildings, critical infrastructure and personnel in Ukraine.

Drone warfare has arguably monopolized Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine, fueling Iran’s ambition to become a UAV manufacturing powerhouse. Weakened economically by sanctions, Tehran has been turning to its sale of drones to fund its military apparatus. If successful, the future drone-turned Qaher could be another cash cow for the Iranian regime. 

About the Author

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East as part of a broader effort to combat Russia’s increasingly provocative behavior in the region.

Over the last year, Russian fighters have engaged in malign behavior targeting American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) quite frequently. This week, the U.S. military said that Moscow’s fighters have “harassed” American drones over Syria for the third day in a row.

Three MQ-9 Reaper drones were the target of Russia’s harassment, versatile primary offensive strike UAVs for the Air Force. According to the head of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, “Russian aircraft flew 18 unprofessional close passes that caused the MQ-9s to react to avoid unsafe situations.” While these types of provocations over Syrian airspace are significant, Russian fighters have also intercepted a Reaper drone over the Black Sea a few months ago. 

By sending over Raptors in response to Russia’s hostile behavior in the region, the U.S. military is telling Moscow to watch out.

As the world’s first ever fifth-generation fighter platform, the F-22 is widely considered to be the most sophisticated of its kind to ever fly the skies. Russian pilots should consider another time in history when these formidable fighters were sent to protect American spy drones against Soviet aircraft one decade ago. 

F-22 Tells Iran F-4 'You Really Ought to Go Home' 

In 2012, a pair of Iranian Air Force Su-25 pilots attempted to shoot down the U.S. drone which was operating roughly 16 miles from Iran’s coastline. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator UAV was designed primarily for patient reconnaissance and did not pose a threat to any airframes.

In fact, if attacked, the drone would struggle quite a bit to defend itself. For this reason, the Iranian pilots considered the Predator to be an easy target. Flying Soviet-era Su-25 “frogfoots,” the Iranian pilots reportedly closed in on the drone and opened fire using their 30mm cannons. The Su-25s failed to destroy the drone.

However, the message they were sending was received by the U.S. Going forward.

The Pentagon decided to send F-22 Raptors or F-18 Hornets to escort Predator drones involved in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions on the move. 

In 2013, Iranian pilots would again try to take down a Predator drone close to the Iranian shoreline. This time, however, F-22 Raptors were nearby. A pair of Iranian F-4 Phantom pilots began to close in on the Predator, likely scoping out how to best take it down. Unbeknownst to the Iranian pilots, an F-22 piloted by Lt. Col. Kevin “Showtime” Sutterfield was eying the F-4 Phantoms the whole time. Then-Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh explained what happened next:

“He [the Raptor pilot] flew under their aircraft [the F-4s] to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there, and then pulled up on their left wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home.’” 

While Russia does fly more modern fighters than the Su-25 these days, no airframe in its arsenal would be completely safe around an F-22 Raptor tasked with protecting an American UAV. The redeployment of Raptors to the Middle East does not bode well for Moscow’s future provocations in Syria’s airspace. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

The news that the U.S. Department of Defense failed to inform the American public that its Secretary of Defense was hospitalized in Walter Reed for four days represents a stunning breach of transparency standards. It is also a measure of reputational damage from which Secretary Lloyd Austin will never recover. He must be forced to resign.

The original admission – dropped at the end of a Friday to minimize exposure – that the Secretary received multi-day treatment for an unidentified elective surgery introduced immediate and intense scrutiny from national security reporters. It drew a formal admonishment from the Pentagon press.

The issue may have died there, but the subterfuge further grew the story. Additional reporting revealed some critical details not released by the Pentagon in its Friday announcement: Austin was in in-patient intensive care, generally reserved for those in immediate danger. Meanwhile, his Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, was vacationing in Puerto Rico.

Many questions now must be answered: Who was adjudicating the Pentagon’s support for the war in Gaza? Who was coordinating with Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant on behalf of the U.S. military? Who approved the Jan. 4 strike into Baghdad that killed a militia leader believed responsible for attacks on American troops? Who coordinated that strike and its aftermath with defense officials in the Middle East? These are the kinds of actions that require leadership from inside the Pentagon. Why did the Deputy Secretary of Defense remain on vacation with the Secretary incapacitated?

Further, still – what is the health status of our Secretary of Defense? Only a severe condition would introduce multi-day hospitalization amidst multiple crises in the Middle East, a log-jammed war in Ukraine, and new Chinese threats against Taiwan. The statement Austin released late Saturday in an attempt to tamp down the controversy reveals he is “on the mend” – whatever that means – and looks forward to “returning to the Pentagon soon.” How long is he out? This seems much more serious than elective surgery – the line the Pentagon press officers are sticking with. What is his medical status at age 70?

More questions still: What did the Pentagon press officers know, and when did they know it? Surely, they are aware of the protocol for publicly announcing medical procedures for cabinet officials. Who was in on the deception? The Secretary of Defense travels with an entire operations center around him at all times: note-takers, communications experts, and intelligence analysts. These people all report to defense officials, who report to other defense officials. It’s hard to believe the Pentagon’s press office was unaware that the Big Boss was in the hospital. In fact, hiding the Secretary of Defense during a tumultuous work week for the American military surely involved the collusion of multiple senior officials.

The Pentagon could have avoided all these questions and all of this controversy with a press statement upon Austin’s entering the hospital and updates throughout. U.S. Air Force Major General Pat Ryder held two press briefings during Austin’s hospital stay – he could have provided updates on his boss’ condition from behind the podium. More importantly, he should have told us who was running the Pentagon. It’s unclear how the nation is to believe anything coming out of the Pentagon press office in the coming months.

The American Secretary of Defense walks the earth with the most essential information any of us can have. He renders decisions on behalf of this country that kill many people in other countries. Lloyd Austin represents American power to much of the world. He runs an enterprise that costs American taxpayers north of $840 billion and employs more than three million workers. We get to know where our Secretary of Defense is at all times. We get to know when he’s on vacation. We get to know when he’s in the hospital.

Lloyd Austin cannot recover from this breach of trust. In fact, he cannot be trusted any longer. If he wants to keep his hospital visits private, he should be allowed to do so – as a private citizen.

Joe Buccino is a retired U.S. Army Colonel public affairs officer and the former communications director of U.S. Central Command. He also served as the spokesman for Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

Summary: This article discusses the historical significance of the Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines during the Cold War. One notable incident occurred in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis when a Foxtrot-class submarine almost launched a nuclear torpedo against U.S. forces. The Foxtrot-class, designed to address the shortcomings of its predecessor, played a critical role in the Soviet Navy, with specifications including displacement, size, and armament details. Despite technological obsolescence by the 1970s, Foxtrot submarines remained formidable and was exported around the world.

Foxtrot-class submarines of the Cold War:

During the Cold War, one Soviet-designed submarine perhaps gained the most notoriety. In October 1962, four USSR Foxtrot-class diesel subs armed with nuclear weapons were deployed as part of the USSR’s massive Cuba strategy. Unbeknownst to the U.S. at the time, the B-59 Foxtrot nearly launched a nuclear torpedo against American anti-submarine warfare forces.

The Captain of the Soviet vessel mistakenly believed they were under attack. Eventually, the Captain learned that American ships were actually signaling, not attacking, the SSN and backed down. However, it was truly a close call. It was at this moment, when Washington and Moscow came concerningly close to all-out nuclear war, when the Foxtrot-class rose to global prominence.

Introducing the Foxtrot-class submarines:

As the former Soviet Union’s most successful post-Second World War diesel-electric attack submarine, the Foxtrot-class played a critical role in the Soviet’s Navy. These vessels were designed to replace the USSR’s aging Project 611 submarines, which were designated as the Zulu class by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Zulu ships had capabilities similar to the American GUPPY fleet-boat conversions. In the late 1950’s, six Zulu submarines were converted and became the first ballistic missile vessels ever to enter service across the globe.

One was armed with a single R-11FM Scud missile while five other ships in this family were equipped with two Scuds each. Perhaps the Zulu-class’ most recognizable trait is that it served as the basis for the Foxtrots.

Project 641 (NATO codename “Foxtrot”) was developed with the Zulu shortcomings in mind. Specifically, Soviet officials wanted to rectify the perceived lack of strength of these vessels. Each Foxtrot displaced 2,000 tons when surfaced and more than 2,500 tons when submerged. The ships measured 295 feet and were powered by three Kolomna 2D42M diesel units of 2,000 horsepower output, three Electric motors with two generating roughly 1,300 horsepower, with the third outing about 2,700 horsepower.

The first Foxtrot-class keel was laid down in 1957 and commissioned one year later. The last submarine in this class was completed in the early 1980’s. Each boat was built for the Soviet Navy at the Sudomekh division of the Admiralty Shipyard (currently Admiralty Wharves), Saint Petersburg.

Foxtrot-Class: Specs & Capabilities

While the Foxtrot was larger in size than its Zulu predecessors, each ship in this class had 2 of its 3 decks dedicated to batteries. This enabled underwater endurance for up to 10 days, which stymied the submarines’ speed. The Foxtrot could only travel at an average rate of 2 knots at its maximum submerged time capability.

By the time the last Foxtrot models were laid down in the early 1970s, the submarine family was deemed technologically obsolete. One of the last active service Project 641 vessels- the Zaporizhia- was captured by Russian forces during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Notably, when the submarine was seized, the Black Fleet did not want the Cold War sub. Instead, the Russian military offered to return the submarine back to Ukraine.

In terms of armament, the Project 641 submarines were quite formidable. The family of ships in total carried twenty-two torpedoes. During the Cold War, the Foxtrot class was a regular component of all four Soviet Navy fleets. In the late 1960’s, India became the first foreign client of this submarine series.

Eight new-build ships were delivered to the Indian Navy and were later renamed as the Kalvari-class. Libya would follow suit a few years later, procuring six boats between the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Around this time, Poland also received a pair of these ships which they operated until 2003.

How the Foxtrot-Class Rose to Global Prominence

During the height of the Cold War, several Foxtrot submarines were sent to Cuba from their base on the Kola peninsula to patrol the Caribbean. In one incident, U.S. Navy destroyers dropped practice depth charges near these Soviet submarines to force them to surface and be identified. While three of the four Foxtrots were forced to surface, one was able to evade U.S. detection. Since B-59 was too deep to establish radio contact, the ship believed war had broken out between Moscow and Washington.

Both the captain and political officer onboard the submarine firmly believed that the signaling charges were actual depth charges and that the vessel was under attack. This line of thinking forced both individuals to strongly advocate for arming and firing the nuclear-tipped torpedo onboard. Miraculously, the flotilla admiral Vasily Arkhipov was on B-59 and refused to give his consent to launch the nuclear weapon. By overruling the two other officers on board, Akhipov can be commended for single-handedly preventing the outbreak of nuclear war at this time.

The Foxtrot-class may no longer be in service, but the Soviet submarines will always be remembered for the critical role it played during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Summary: The article highlights the anticipated Type 095 submarine by China's navy. It emphasizes its advanced features, potential applications in escorting aircraft carriers, and its significance in marking a turning point in China's submarine capabilities. Despite historical setbacks, China is steadily advancing its naval strength, possibly evolving into a formidable blue-water submarine force. 

China's Type 095 Nuclear Submarine, explained:

China is working to become a peer of the United States with respect to geopolitical power and influence. And although the US enjoys advantages that China will have a difficult time mitigating (including the world’s most favorable geography and the world’s most robust military budget), China has unrivaled latent economic potential and a revisionist ambition that has alerted American observers. Naturally, the US is beginning to pay closer attention to China’s ability to wage war.

Assessing the Chinese threat

China has the world’s largest population: 1.4 billion people. And while China’s population is aging, reducing its ability to wage war, China still enjoys a unique ability to field a large army, navy, and air force. China, to augment the abilities of their profound human capital, is investing in the development of cutting edge military technologies.

Examples include the recently developed J-20 Mighty Dragon, a fifth-generation fighter that many believe incorporates American technology attained through industrial espionage; the H-20 stealth bomber, which is in the early stages of development; the Fujian aircraft carrier, equipped with a magnetic catapult system comparable to the US’s Ford-class carrier; hypersonic missiles, which the US currently does not possess (and would have a difficult time defending against); and a planned third-generation nuclear attack submarine: the Type 095.

The Type 095 program will complement the ongoing Chinese shipbuilding spree – which has been one of the largest shipbuilding efforts in human history.

Presently, the US still maintains a naval edge over China, respecting fleet quality – but the Chinese have recently surpassed the US with respect to quantity, raising the hackles of the Indo-Pacific region in the process.

The Type 095 is of particular concern to observers – understandably, given that the submarine is a mysterious and fear-inspiring machine, something like the military equivalent of a shark, lurking beneath the ocean's surface. And considering that submarines can deliver nuclear ordnance, submarine-related anxiety is well warranted.

China’s Submarine Fleet

Today, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force (PLANSF) operates a fleet of 56 submarines.

China “possesses both a nuclear-powered submarine fleet and a robust diesel-electric submarine fleet,” the Nuclear Threat Initiative explains. “While the PLAN is currently developing its nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, its diesel-electric submarine fleet remains the backbone of China’s submarine forces. While its growth is declining, the United States government reports indicate the fleet could grow to between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020s.”

The most pressing contemporary concerns are the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine and the Type 093 Shang-class submarine. China operates six Type 094s, which is consider China’s first sea-based nuclear deterrent, boasting 12 JL-3 SLBMs with a 6,200 mile range. The Type 093, meanwhile, represented a significant advancement in China’s underwater sub warfare capability, with six 533mm torpedo tubes that can launch either anti-submarine or anti-ship torpedoes.

But despite the adequacy of the Type 094 and Type 093, the most pressing concern of tomorrow, for China’s adversaries, will be the Type 095.

Future of the PLANSF: The Type 095

The Type 095 is expected to have an improved hull design, with a significantly reduced acoustic signature. Relative to the Type 093, the Type 095 will have an improved nuclear reactor, vertical launching system (VLS) cells, and more advanced sensors (including active/passive flank array sonar and low-and high-frequency towed sonar array).

Reports indicate that the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industrial Corporation will be building the Type 095 at a new plant in Huludao of the Liaoning province. The program is shrouded in secrecy, but expectations are that the Type 095 will be used to escort Chinese aircraft carrier task forces.

Here’s what else is speculated about the Type 095 program: “one commentator found it likely that the Type 095 would have electronic noise-cancellation technology, like your noise canceling headphones, a shaftless drive, and a single hull,” Caleb Larson reported. “All of these would be a huge step forward for China’s submarine program.”

Indeed, the Type 095 indicates that the Chinese could be turning a significant corner with respect to submarine technology. “For many years, China was the subject of ridicule in naval circles,” Larson wrote. “The Korean War put the  brakes on Chinese naval innovations, and the Cultural Revolution also hindered naval advancement.” Yet, “despite these setbacks, China has steadily developed its naval capabilities.”

And while China was initially focused on near-shore capabilities, “like smaller diesel submarines, shore-based missile defense, or fast littoral boats, China is now possibly capable of fielding a true blue-water submarine force.”

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Rien qu'en 2023, le Kosovo s'est retrouvé par deux fois sous les eaux. Les inondations sont de plus en plus fréquentes et de plus en plus graves, mais il n'y a pas que le changement climatique qui est en cause : les facteurs humains exacerbent fortement les risques. Explications.

- Articles / dérèglement climatique, Kosovo 2.0, Kosovo, Environnement, Société

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BRICS+ leaders met in St. Petersburg in November 2023 as part of the Fifth International Municipal Forum amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The organization, which has invited Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates to join in 2024, has taken pains to project the image of a coherent international organization.

Russian politicians capitalized on the meeting to challenge perceived Western digital hegemony. Dmitry Gusev, a Russian Duma member in charge of digital affairs, announced a request had been sent to Russia’s Digital Development Ministry to work on creating “a single inclusive BRICS+ cyberspace,” with a unified technical system. This BRICS+ internet would be separate from the Western-dominated current system and in line with the “traditional values” and national laws, but no specific details were included. BRICS+ itself is a nebulous enough entity that the most significant challenge would be getting the constituent members to agree to such a proposal, to say nothing of the technical hurdles.

The proposal is part of a broader effort to challenge American financial and technological hegemony, and it echoes proposals made earlier this year by Russian politicians to create a common BRICS+ currency and shift away from the dollar as a global reserve currency. But, just as these currency proposals face massive and potentially insurmountable challenges, so do proposals to build a separate internet.

RUNET

Russian efforts have hitherto focused on moving more internet infrastructure in-country and increasing internet censorship. These policies have had mixed success but point to the potential future of the Internet in an era of great power conflict.

Proposals for a separate “BRICSNET” are not new: Russia proposed creating a separate internet for what was then called the “BRICS” in 2017 when the Kremlin’s National Security Council began exploring the idea of creating a sovereign internet system. Implementation focuses on creating an alternative network of domestic DNS servers, which could function if Russia is cut off from the global Internet. DNS functions as the Internet’s phonebook, resolving the domain names that users enter into their browsers with the IP addresses that host the domains. The thirteen authorities for the DNS root server networks, which operate as the highest tier in the DNS system, were assigned to organizations that functioned as early internet exchange points in the United States, the UK, Sweden, and Japan.

Russia has stepped up testing of its internet system since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is difficult to ascertain how successful these tests have been, as the testing has also led to the cutoff of government services. Tests in early July 2023 led to reports of massive interruption in online services for Russia’s state-owned railway system and their Agricultural Authority, despite claims by authorities that the tests were successful.

The organization that controls the DNS system is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit corporation headquartered in Los Angeles. The problem with breaking away from ICANN and creating a separate BRICSNET is that many developing countries are increasing partnerships with the system. Over the past two decades, the organization has opened offices and engagement centers in Istanbul, Brussels, Singapore, and Montevideo. As a result, the developing world continues to integrate its DNS infrastructure with ICANN, which announced that Kenya would be the location for Africa’s first root server cluster in December 2022. The further digitalization of economies in the global south will make them more dependent on ICANN DNS infrastructure, not less.

BGP Barriers

If DNS is the Internet’s phone book, then Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is its global trade route system. Attempting to create a national DNS system is a challenge, but for a genuinely separate internet system, BRICS+ would likely need to create alternative protocols for data transmission.

BGP functions as the highway of the Internet, and data streams flow according to various transmission protocols for data to move most efficiently. Flows must occur between different Tier One Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for the system to function. Creating a “separate internet” would involve not only creating root DNS servers but also a system for ISPs and separate routing protocols located at the border of national internet infrastructures so as not to be reliant on the current system.

The competition for constructing undersea cable networks that facilitate global internet traffic is a natural arena for great power competition, but one where the prize is access to markets as internet demand grows in the developing world and access to some of the data flowing for intelligence purposes. China is increasingly aggressive about expanding its market share in internet infrastructure, but these cables do not constitute a separate global internet.

Another complication for a BRICSNET is that search engines, cloud technology, Internet of Things (IoT), and other emerging technologies that are upending traditional network technology are still concentrated in the United States. Cloud infrastructure, in particular, is U.S.-dominated, with China’s Alibaba and Tencent Cloud only controlling 6 percent of the global market, less than a fifth of the share of Amazon Web Services.

The War on Internet Freedom

More worrying are the moves by authoritarian states, including current and prospective BRICS+ members, to share best practices to challenge Internet freedom. While China had the foresight to create the Great Firewall as the Internet was being introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s and the creation of “chokepoints” was possible for traffic flowing into the country, retroactive creation of such a leviathan of censorship is practically impossible. Iran has also managed to establish chokepoints, which enabled internet shutdowns in 2022 amid the backdrop of anti-government unrest. The unregulated, ad-hoc expansion of the Internet throughout much of the developing world would make retroactively creating such chokepoints extremely difficult, however.

Russia has attempted to make up for previously lax internet policies by blocking various Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) since the Kremlin began its sovereign internet initiative. Still, international VPN providers have refused to comply. The only country with more VPN downloads in 2022 than Russia was India, highlighting that citizens in developed countries are not the only ones concerned about shielding their browsing from internet censors.

The policies have devolved into a wack-a-mole since the invasion of Ukraine, where VPNs are blocked, and users seek new ways of bypassing the censorship. Independent analysis published in November 2023 by digital rights groups has found that nine of sixteen popular services have been blocked in Russia to varying degrees. Still, VPN services continue to introduce new technologies to subvert bans. Russian lawmakers recently indicated that they plan to attempt to ban VPN services that are refusing to comply with blacklists from being displayed in search results.

Russia’s efforts to create its own home-grown domestic network of certificate-issuing authorities for TLS, the key infrastructure that secures HTTP traffic for the World Wide Web, have been partially successful. Russian citizens are increasingly forced to download government-issued TLS certificates created by a firm that works closely with the FSB to perform basic internet functions. Russia’s largest bank estimated that 25-30 percent of domestic devices had downloaded the certificates as of June 2023. 

These restrictions continue to spread globally: Belarus’s authorities attempted a mass shutdown of internet service during violent protests against fraudulent Presidential election results in 2020 and was partly successful. China’s Great Firewall continues to roll out new technologies to detect and block encryption, and authorities in Russia have stated that they are developing machine learning systems for the same end. 

The Internet is an American Citizen

Boastful proclamations aside, building an entirely separate internet would be a task for a super-civilization. Just as much of the rest of the world remains dependent on the U.S. defense of global trade routes, global internet systems also continue to rely on American technology and expertise. Proposals for a separate BRICS+ internet have thus far gone nowhere for a reason: they are nigh impossible from a technical and organizational standpoint.

Despite a contested cyberspace, global internet traffic is growing by 27 percent per year, with more people reliant on the worldwide network than ever before. The Internet remains humanity’s most significant engineering project, providing ever-more stunning innovations in trade, communication, and debate. Fevered great power dreams of dividing the Internet do not accord with reality. Nonetheless, the desire to replicate “best practices” among authoritarian states to clamp down on internet access and civilian encryption are developments that should be taken seriously by all who care about a free and open internet.

Luke Rodeheffer is the founder and CEO of Alpha Centauri, a cyber security and due diligence firm.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the greatest superpower of all? That is the question being asked once again by foreign policy pundits in Washington, as elsewhere—bearing in mind, as America and the world enter into 2024, that changes in the global balance of power do not develop linearly and tend to run contrary to earlier predictions. The new year found the United States engaged diplomatically and militarily on three global fronts: responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine by strengthening the Western alliance; containing the Chinese geo-strategic and geo-economic surge and, in particular, its threat to Taiwan’s independence; dealing with the threat posed by Iran—and its regional proxies—to America’s allies in the Middle East, amid the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas War.

One way of assessing the American responses to these challenges is to see them as part of an effort by an embattled global hegemon to maintain the international order it had established, together with its allies, in the aftermath of World War II. It was within this order that America gained a dominant position in the “unipolar moment” following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ushering in of the era of globalization.

This international order seems, so far, to have withstood the test of strategic and diplomatic challenges that ensued following the costly U.S. military fiascos in the Greater Middle East. True, the Americans failed to remake the Middle East through regime changes and nation-building. This, in turn, led to the humiliating withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, which raised doubts about the ability of the U.S. to maintain its global leadership position. And yet other aspects of recent events proved that America can still shape the global agenda. 

Thus, while the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing fears of the return of the Great Recession did seem to pose a threat to U.S. global economic supremacy when China was pumping its economic muscles, it actually served as a stress test for the ongoing U.S.-led economic globalization and trade liberalization.

However, it had taken time for Americans and Western Europeans to recognize the economic and military costs resulting from American military interventions in the Middle East as well as from trade liberalization policies in the form of rising financial budget deficits and socio-economic dislocations. These effects helped produce the political backlash that brought about the rise of populism, leading eventually to Brexit and later to the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and the rise of critics of globalization elsewhere.

Political changes that reflected growing isolationist and protectionist public sentiments, therefore, constrained American politicians from pursuing grandiose strategic designs or even limited military interventions abroad. They also made it more difficult to promote globalization as a central form of geo-economic policymaking. This explains American reluctance to react more assertively in response to the Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 and its invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the effort on the part of Washington to avoid a military conflict with Iran through the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran.

At the same time, the rising geo-economic status of China has ignited bipartisan anti-China attitudes in Washington, increasingly constraining U.S. engagement with China and replacing the reigning free trade agenda with a more-or-less economic nationalist paradigm. The latter became even more dominant during the coronavirus pandemic and following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Indeed, Putin’s aggression—coupled with the continuing global rise of China—helped convince Western elites that economic interdependence in itself doesn’t necessarily help resolve national conflicts; if anything, it tends to aggravate them. Hence, the pursuit of national interest should be central to U.S. foreign policy. Washington faced the acute re-emergence of great power competition, being forced to revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and establish a meshing network of similar military partnerships across the Pacific. At the same time, America used its military production base as well as economic power to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine and limited China’s access to new technologies that could be applied for military purposes.

The new balance of power that reflects this continuing great power competition and seems increasingly driven by nationalist and protectionist pressures will dominate the geo-strategic and geo-economic map of 2024.

At its center will remain the United States and its Western allies—still powerful, even as they face an evolving axis of authoritarian regimes led by Russia and China, including North Korea as well as Iran and its proxies—whose aim is to weaken America’s global position and the international order it has been trying to defend.

As 2023 ended, the United States was challenged to maintain its global position as its partners—Ukraine in Europe and Israel in the Middle East—were under pressure from anti-Western powers that were aggressively seeking to overthrow the status quo. In Europe, after the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, Russia is now in a better position to preserve its hold over those parts of Ukraine, and in particular Crimea, that are presently under its control. Growing resistance among isolationist Republicans to increasing U.S. military and economic aid to Ukraine plays directly into the hands of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who may well hope to see Donald Trump again in the White House in 2024.

If that happens—and with America’s European allies unable or unwilling to replace Washington as Ukraine’s supporter of last resort—there will be growing pressure on Kyiv to agree to a ceasefire and eventually make a diplomatic deal with Moscow. While it’s possible that Ukraine would be invited to join the European Union (EU) and perhaps even NATO at some point in the future, any agreement between Russia and Ukraine would leave Putin in a stronger position, especially if a second-term President Trump, as many expect, would take steps to weaken American commitment to NATO.

Under these circumstances, standing up to Iran’s challenge in the Middle East assumes global as well as regional importance. Much would depend on President Joe Biden’s evolving response to the currently successful effort by Iran and its regional allies and proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the rebel Houthi regime in Yemen, to challenge the American position in the Middle East. Indeed, Hamas’ attack on Israel succeeded in sabotaging an American strategy of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel and creating an Arab-Israeli partnership aimed at containing Iran and its camp.

Hamas’ assault, coupled with Hezbollah’s strikes against northern Israel, has shattered the latter’s deterrence and, by extension, America’s effort to shift the balance of power in the region in its favor. Hoping to repair it, the Americans have deployed two aircraft carrier strike forces, air assets, and a marines’ contingent to the Middle East as a warning to Iran to refrain from turning the Gaza war into a regional conflagration. But when it comes to dealing directly with Iran, the Biden administration has refrained, until recently, from responding to strikes by its proxies against American forces in Syria and Iraq—or, for that matter, to the Houthis’ threat to international shipping—through direct military attacks on Iranian targets. 

The Iranians may be translating this American caution as weakness and assuming that notwithstanding Biden’s rhetoric and the deployment of the U.S. aircraft carriers, the American president is worried about the potential fallout from direct U.S. military intervention. That could lead to war with Iran at a time when the United States is confronting Russia in Ukraine and is worried about the threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. The Iranians reckon that the Americans don’t have the military resources to fight on three fronts and that the American people don’t want to be drawn into a new quagmire in the Middle East. They wonder, therefore: When push comes to shove, would Biden be ready to pull the trigger?

At one point, President Biden may have no choice but to demonstrate to the Iranians that they are wrong—if he, indeed, wants to reassert the balance of power that collapsed on October 7. If not, Iran and its proxies could succeed in establishing a new balance of power in the Middle East in which Israel is damaged, Hamas isn’t destroyed, and the normalization of relations between the Israelis and the Saudis is stalled. 

While all this would not amount to Iranian “victory,” it would provide Tehran with more power and encourage the Gulf Arab states to appease it, as well as strengthen the position of Russia and China. Iran has been expanding its ties with Russia and providing it with drones and other weaponry, while China has been trying to increase its influence in the Middle East and even succeeded in mediating a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed (among other purposes) to end the civil war in Yemen. 

Both Russia and China are trying to build up their geo-economic stature by increasing diplomatic and economic ties with oil-producing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The perception that America is in decline in the Middle East would encourage them to make deals with Moscow and Beijing, in addition to Tehran. Given this perspective, if Biden refrains from pulling the trigger in the emerging duel with Iran, he will increase the chances that the Islamic Republic will be able to attain a dominant role in the Persian Gulf and the Levant and thus would be in a stronger position to achieve its long-term goal of evicting the United States from the Middle east altogether—and in the process, eliminating what it views as America’s proxy, Israel. Before this comes to pass, the perception of American weakness would debilitate Washington’s leverage over the Arab oil states and allow Beijing and Moscow a wider strategic opening in the region. 

If the opposite happens, on the other hand, there is no reason why a more assertive U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Tehran will not allow the Administration to revive its original strategy of co-opting Saudi Arabia into a partnership with Israel aimed at containing Iran and its proxies. This would be all the more meaningful if the Saudis could play a role in the reconstruction of post-war Gaza, together with other Sunni Arab states with a stake in regional stability. 

As for the balance with China, it is true that America has been forced to shift more attention and resources in response to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. This has been a blessing for China since this diverts American focus from the Indo-Pacific region and presumably contradicts earlier American pledges to “pivot” from the Middle East and the Atlantic to the Pacific. That American position, as put forward at the time by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, reflected Washington’s recognition that America’s wars in the Middle East had provided an opportunity for China to expand its power while weakening that of America. But things have changed again.

Washington may remain preoccupied with Ukraine and fall into a military quagmire in the Middle East. This outcome could send a message to American allies and partners in Asia, in particular members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that they may not be able to count on Washington for their security and that they, therefore, need to appease China.

Some in Washington are thus concerned that China may take advantage of America’s attention being diverted to Ukraine and the Middle East and use this opportunity to attack Taiwan. But even if that doesn’t happen, the American presidential election would be dominated by attacks on Beijing, with Republicans accusing President Biden of being “weak” on China, which would increase pressure on the Biden administration to strengthen ties with Taipei, a move that is likely to ignite Sino-American tensions. The latter would be inflamed further if Trump -promoting an economic nationalist and anti-China agenda—returns to the White House.

Having said all this, it will remain the case that American policies in the Middle East (and Ukraine) would affect its position in East Asia. An erosion of the American commitment to Ukraine and a failure to contain Iran’s ambitions for dominance will send a message of weakness to Beijing and could encourage it to test American resolve in the Indo-Pacific. 

Alternatively, signaling strength, the evolving American strategic cooperation with India, Australia, and Japan—the “Quad”—may become a nucleus of a NATO-like regional security grouping. Together with an Arab-Israeli partnership—expanding the I2U2 or “Western Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, and utilizing Saudi economic power and Israel’s technological edge—this could help shore up the global balance of power in America’s favor. In this context, the initiative put forward by Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India—to build a rail and shipping corridor linking India with the Middle East and Europe, would fit in as the model of an ambitious project aimed at fostering economic growth and political cooperation, strengthening the American geo-strategic position. 

As it enters 2024, the United States has the largest and most advanced economy and by far the largest and most powerful military. Even those cheerleading for China today agree that that country will not become the world’s largest economy before 2050—and even that proposition is very “iffy.” Moreover, no one expects any of America’s potential global competitors (whether friendly like the European Union and India or hostile like Russia and China) to overspend the United States on defense and overtake it in the military sphere any time soon. It just ain’t gonna happen.

It can, therefore, be accepted as a given that there is no great power—or even a combination of powers—ready to challenge the United States for global supremacy at this time in history. At the same time, while the United States will probably remain Number One for quite a while, the trifecta of challenges that it now faces around the world, in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Pacific, will make it more difficult for the United States to secure its military hegemony on its own.

As a consequence, the notion of a U.S. monopoly in the international system will have to be replaced with the concept of a like-minded oligopoly. The choice that Washington will face is between continuing to strive for dominance or working together with other powers—NATO in Europe, the Israeli-Arab partnership in the Middle East, and the Quad in Asia—to contain threats to the international system. In that case, the United States will be first among equals (or primus inter pares)—aside from being Number One, it’s the next best thing.

Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor with The National Interest, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for the Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post.

Image: Shutterstock.com.