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Vendredi 13 novembre au soir, Barack Obama s'est adressé aux Burundais dans un message radiodiffusé enregistré à la Maison Blanche. Dans ce message, le président américain exhortait notamment pouvoir et opposition à participer à un dialogue sous médiation régionale hors du Burundi. Mais il condamnait également une rhétorique haineuse utilisée par les autorités. Ce à quoi les autorités burundaises ont réagi ce dimanche.

Dans les heures qui ont suivi les premières attaques et surtout après l'annonce française du rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières, l'essentiel des pays de l'Union européenne ont décidé de renforcer leur sécurité. Entre les mesures de sécurité annoncées par les différentes capitales et les déclarations faisant le lien entre les attentats de Paris et l'afflux massif des migrants de Syrie suite à la découverte d'un passeport syrien près du corps d'un des kamikazes, l'Europe fait face à la tentation du repli national.

In the international discussion on Pakistan´s many problems, the low-level conflict in its Balochistan province does not get much attention. The issue of nuclear arms, for instance, is considered more immediately frightening; Balochistan is just the area where these arms are tested. But the province is also the arena for a long-standing, complex and multi-faceted conflict, which, with every new upturn, is becoming more intractable. Even in Pakistan itself, the situation in Balochistan tends to be ‘crowded out’ by other dramatic events. The lack of media access to areas under military control is another cause for whatever goes on in Balochistan to remain in the background. Yet, the province is crucial to several infrastructural mega-projects, among them the huge investment programme signed with the Chinese government in April 2015. These projects are regional in nature – and so is the conflict in Balochistan. Ann Wilkens, member of AAN’s Advisory Board, provides an overview of this complex issue and concludes that political dialogue is urgently needed, if economic investment is to bring the intended, regional uplift and, most importantly, bring peace to a long-suffering population.

The province, the people

With around 46 per cent of the total area, Balochistan is Pakistan´s largest province, but it has the smallest population, representing around five per cent of the country’s total. (1) This is not the only dichotomy. While, as the name indicates, Balochistan is the home of the Baloch, there is also a large Pashtun contingent, making up around 40 per cent of its population, and the Pashtuns form the majority in the province´s capital, Quetta. Another spill-over from Afghanistan, dating back to the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan in the 1890s, is the Hazara community, who form the third largest ethnic group, also with a strong presence in Quetta. Another ethnic group, normally included in the Baloch but originating from Southern India, are the Brahui, whose Dravidian language is spoken by a dwindling population mainly in central Balochistan, notably in and around the former princely state of Kalat, the historic centre of the Baloch quest for self-rule.

Balochistan is the least developed province of Pakistan. Marginal living conditions have prompted a large part of the population to leave in search for a better existence, mainly in Karachi or abroad. But the province has huge reserves of natural gas, as well as other natural resources yet to be fully explored, which have the potential to provide a basis for economic development. Geographically, it is on the path of several regional infrastructure projects, which have been stalled for various reasons, one of them being the lack of stability in the region, including in Balochistan. Thus, lack of stability results in lack of development, while lack of development is also a major source of instability.

Economic migration aside, the Baloch are spread over three countries. The largest group is in Pakistan, around six million, but there is also a sizable Baloch population in Iran, around two million, and a smaller group in Afghanistan, estimated at around 600,000, most of them in the southwestern province of Nimroz. (2) Balochi is an Iranian language (like Farsi, Pashto and Kurdish). The majority of the Baloch are Sunni Muslims. For the Iranian Baloch in the equally deprived Iranian province of Sistan Balochistan, the marginalisation of the Sunni sect is an important reason for conflict with the Shia-led theocracy in Teheran, regularly resulting in attacks directed at the Iranian state, which in turn accuses Pakistan of hosting these opponents (see for instance here).

Regional interface

During the course of the Pakistani Baloch insurgency, the militants among them have become increasingly secessionist and are now commonly referring to Pakistan as an occupying state, rather than a problematic homeland. In Pakistan, after the breakup of the original nation and the forming of Bangladesh in 1971, secessionist talk has been a trigger of existential anguish, and that may be one reason why intransigence rather than dialogue has been characteristic of the Pakistani state’s response to Baloch insurgencies. Moreover, although rooted in a more or less secular orientation, many militants are becoming increasingly radicalised in religious terms, in tune with a growing global movement of religious extremists transcending national borders.

With the concept of ‘Greater Balochistan’ overshadowing the borders of three countries, the Baloch national issue provides a reflection of the Kurdish conflict in the Middle East, as well as other areas around the world where ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity do not square with geographical boundaries. From the point of view of the Baloch tribespeople, many of them still nomads, their territory stretches across the boundaries between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, a vast area where they believe they have ancestral rights to move around.

From the point of view of the three governments involved, however, such movements add to the already complicated relations between them. Support for each other’s rebel groups is a component in this picture, which may be used in a tit-for-tat manner. For instance: India, claiming that Pakistan is infiltrating insurgents across the Line of Control into India-controlled Kashmir, may respond by cooperating with Afghanistan to support Baloch rebels. Pakistan may be irritated when Baloch leaders fleeing from Pakistani security forces are allowed to settle in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan may then point to the presence of the leadership council of the Afghan Taleban, known as the Quetta shura, on Pakistani territory.

At the same time, there are grave, humanitarian aspects of the cross-border movements. While large waves of Afghan refugees have been received in Pakistani Balochistan, particularly during the last decades of war, there are also Pakistani Baloch refugees in Afghanistan (for more on the latter, see here).

Quite another facet of the regional interface is the drugs trade, which continues to flourish in what looks like a rare bird of functional, regional cooperation. This is a sign that, when profits are high enough, barriers can be transcended: where there is a will, there is a way.

A history of insurgency

Historically, Balochistan has never been a comfortable part of the Pakistani nation state which was initiated with the division of the subcontinent in 1947 and promoted by a movement of Urdu-speaking, urban Muslims in what is now northern India, who never had much in common with Baloch tribesmen. British Balochistan, which did not include the princely states, was integrated into Pakistan with a special status as a Chief Commissioner´s Province, and was raised to the status of Governor´s Province only in 1953. As for the 570-odd Indian princely states, four of which were in the territory of today´s Balochistan, the provision was that they could opt for independence but, in the end, most of them were integrated into either India or Pakistan. However, for the Baloch princely states, a history of extended autonomy made the situation more fluid, especially for the most well-known one, the Khanate of Kalat, which wanted to retain its independence and tried to establish itself as a tribal monarchy. This did not succeed for long and its accession, under pressure, to Pakistan in March 1948 triggered the first wave of armed revolt against the state.

The imposition of military rule in Pakistan on 6 October 1958, when General Ayub Khan took over the country as ‘Chief Martial Law Administrator’, again exacerbated the situation in Balochistan, where tribesmen refused to turn in their weapons at the local police stations. The following scheme of assembling all of West Pakistan into ‘one unit’ (as opposed to East Pakistan, later Bangladesh) was bitterly opposed until 1960, when the rebels thought they had negotiated an exception to this policy, as well as safe conduct and amnesty for themselves. Instead, they were arrested and seven of them executed. This did not end the opposition to Ayub Khan´s centralisation efforts and a third round of conflict characterised the latter part of the 1960s.

The fourth, and more extensive, uprising in Balochistan came in 1973, again as a reaction to the thwarting of provincial autonomy. After the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan´s president Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to strengthen centralised rule in what was left of the country. He was also under pressure from the Iranian government, which feared that its Baloch province might be drawn into a movement towards strengthened indigenous rule in Pakistan´s Balochistan. On a flimsy pretext, Bhutto dismissed the elected provincial government and used the ensuing calls for secession as an excuse to send in the army. The armed clashes peaked in the winter of 1974-75, but did not cease until three years later, when Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq, who again imposed military rule but at the same time tried to restore peace in Balochistan through political and economic means. Accordingly, there has been no consistent and direct link between military rule in Pakistan and active conflict in Balochistan. Rather, disregard for Baloch sensitivities has run through Pakistan´s short history, under various rulers.

The fifth, and still ongoing, Baloch uprising started in 2004, during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. While the Marri and Mengal tribes had been at the centre of previous rebellions, this time it was the Bugti tribe that led the uprising and was subsequently targeted. On 26 August 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who besides leading the Bugti tribe had also served as both governor (1973-74) and chief minister (1989-90) of Balochistan, was killed in a clash with the army at his hideout in the hills in north-eastern Balochistan. This provided the nationalist rebels with a martyr of renown beyond the province.

Economic issues were at the centre of this round of conflict, among them the construction of the Gwadar port without much Baloch participation in either the decision-making process or the actual construction work. Another bone of contention was the distribution of the proceeds from the Sui gas fields, situated in the Dera Bugti area, as well as the distribution of the gas itself (which was said to be used to heat Punjabi homes and run Punjabi industries, while the Baloch were literally left out in the cold). Enhanced military presence in the Sui area followed from the conflict, and then subsequently added to it.

Human rights abuses and violence

As usual in situations of conflict, human rights suffer. Among the Pakistanis who have ‘disappeared’ during recent years, presumably after having been abducted by the security forces, young Baloch nationalists form a distinct and particularly recurrent group. Many of them have later turned up as corpses by the roadside bearing marks of torture. Despite attempts by various organisations, including Pakistan’s Supreme Court, to map the disappearances (see for instance here) and end the impunity surrounding them, no clarity has been achieved and bereaved families are still looking for closure. Accordingly, the number of victims cited in this context differs widely, from the tens to the ten thousands – it should be safe to say that at least hundreds of Baloch have disappeared in this way.

The conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state aside, the continuing turmoil and lack of strong governance in a multi-ethnic setting has brought a wider range of serious crimes against human rights, as well as a high level of criminal activity, both of which add to the difficulties faced by civilians trying to build a decent life. Various actors are contributing to this sad state of affairs, sometimes reflecting conflicts of interest between different population groups, and sometimes lending themselves to exploitation by, for instance, anti-state militants and/or perpetrators of sectarian violence. Punjabi settlers in the province, in many cases going back several generations, have been targeted by Baloch nationalists, leading to the exodus of a relatively well educated segment of the population. The Hazara Shia population in Quetta has also been particularly targeted, through a series of sectarian bomb attacks leading to hundreds of casualties.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

It is in this environment of multi-faceted conflict that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme (CPEC) is anchored. The programme amounts to over 45 billion US dollars and was agreed between the two countries in April 2015. The corridor has its starting point in the Chinese-built port of Gwadar, on Pakistani Balochistan’s southern coast at the Arabian Sea, and is linked to Chinese-funded, infrastructural mega-projects that are regional in nature, (for more, see here).

The programme has been flaunted as a turning point for the fragile Pakistani economy and an upcoming backbone of regional connectivity, which is supposed to create jobs and prosperity for everyone, the Baloch included. The government’s reasoning seems to be that, once the recalcitrant Baloch nationalists discover the benefits of improved infrastructure, they will return to the fold of the Pakistani motherland. However, until this spirit of cooperation takes root, the Chinese workers involved in the project will be protected by an additional security division comprising army battalions, as well as civil armed forces.

This smacks of wishful thinking. At the core of the recurrent insurgencies lies the resentment that the Baloch have been marginalised in their own country, and that Punjabis in particular, and the Pakistani state in general, are colonising and exploiting them. For the insurgents the socio-economic backwardness of the province serves as proof that this is so, whereas, on the government side, the argument may go the other way around: Balochistan is perceived to be poor and backward as a consequence of a tribal structure which benefits only self-serving feudal lords and stands in the way of the government’s efforts towards progress and development. So far, neither side has shown much willingness to negotiate and compromise, with both sides preferring to play a zero-sum game. The looming presence of a growing number of Chinese labourers and engineers, working under armed protection, seems more likely to increase the tensions than soften the positions. Even if the programme delivers all the goods promised, it is difficult to see how the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme can become the silver bullet leading to stability in Balochistan. Again, the province seems to be stuck in a vicious circle: investments could bring stability, yes, but investments need stability to be carried out and take effect.

Opening for political settlement?

While throughout the history of Pakistan coercion has been the main instrument in dealing with Baloch insurgency, there have also been recurrent attempts to settle the conflict through dialogue and compromise. The present time seems to be such a period, or to at least have the potential to become one. In an interview with the BBC Urdu service in August 2015, Brahumdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the most well-known of the Baloch separatist leaders, did not exclude talks with the government, provided that military action was ended and security forces withdrawn from Balochistan. Even the core question of separation could be discussed, according to Bugti, “if our friends, allies, comrades and the Baloch people want this.” From the government side, the chief minister of Balochistan welcomed this conciliatory overture and expressed the hope that talks might start after the recent Eid holiday. According to a recent report, talks have, indeed, been going on between the two sides and Brahumdagh Bugti might soon return to Balochistan, after having been in exile since the death of his grandfather in 2006.

However, facts on the ground still send mixed signals. Enforced disappearances are still reported and security operations have escalated as a result of the National Action Plan to crack down on terrorism, which was adopted after the army school massacre by the Pakistani Taleban (the TTP), in Peshawar in December 2014. According to the provincial interior minister well over 8,000 people had been detained by the end of September 2015, while over 200 persons had been killed in these operations. Among them, presumably, is Allah Nazar Baloch, the leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), who was reported killed by security forces in an intelligence-led operation in July 2015. Allah Nazar was the most prominent of the Baloch separatist leaders still in Pakistan. His organisation has been behind a number of deadly attacks, including the one that killed three Chinese engineers in Gwadar in May 2004.

Still, the recent overtures indicate an increased willingness for dialogue on both sides and, thus, provide hope that the vicious circle characterising the development in Balochistan, where rounds of violence have continuously fed into each other, could finally begin to be reversed. Concrete and constructive commitment is now needed. The urgency of the situation is underlined by global trends. The winds of radicalisation continue to sweep through the Muslim world, carrying with them, first and foremost, frustrated young people with poor prospects, such as potential Baloch militants.

In Pakistan´s turbulent history, Balochistan seems to have always come in as the last priority. In the long run – and it is already a long-running conflict – this high-handedness may backfire, and, with it, the infrastructural investments now set in motion. On the other hand, in the alternative scenario of serious dialogue aimed at solving political and economic grievances, these investments could enhance the peace dividend in a long-suffering but potentially prosperous part of the world.

 

(1) Figures differ between different sources. The figures cited here are taken from “Jago Pakistan – Wake Up, Pakistan”, Report of The Century Foundation International Working Group on Pakistan, May 2015, 53.

(2) These figures, by no means exact, are weighted from several, different sources.

 

Sources:

Axmann, Martin: Back to the Future, The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955, Oxford University Press 2009

Lieven, Anatol, Pakistan, A Hard Country, Allen Lane 2011

Jalal, Ayesha, The Struggle for Pakistan, A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014

En République démocratique du Congo, le gouvernement a promis que les trois militants du parti d'opposition Fonus (Forces novatrices pour l'union et la solidarité) allaient être présentés devant la justice. Selon le porte-parole Lambert Mendé, ils sont accusés d'incitation aux troubles à l'ordre public. Maman Kapinga Mingala, coordinatrice, Jerry Okundji et Paulin Lodi, tous deux membres de la ligue de la jeunesse des Fonus, ont été arrêtés le 5 novembre dernier.

Les populations africaines ont-elles le sentiment que la police est à leur écoute et qu'elle maintient l'ordre dans leur pays ? Ces questions sont au coeur d'une nouvelle enquête qui vient d'être publiée par le consortium d'instituts de sondages « Afrobaromètre ». Afrobaromètre a compilé des données venant de 34 pays africains. Celles-ci témoignent d'un manque de confiance des citoyens vis-à-vis des forces de police.

The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (NAFSN) launched in May 2012 under the auspices of the G8 aims to create the conditions that will allow the African countries concerned to improve agricultural productivity and develop their agrifood sector by attracting more private investment in agriculture. The participating countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania) adopted 'country cooperation frameworks' (CCFs) listing their policy commitments, and companies provided 'Letters of Intent' identifying intended investments. While the general objective of the NAFSN is sound, certain deficiencies remain: the CCFs are silent on the need to shift to sustainable modes of agricultural production and to support farmers' seed systems, on the dangers associated with the emergence of a market for land rights, or on the regulation of contract farming; and they are weak on nutrition as well as on the recognition of women's rights and gender empowerment.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

November 15, 2015 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's opposition alliance National Consensus Forces (NCF) Sunday said the security agents at Khartoum airport has detained one of its leaders upon his return from Paris where he attended opposition meeting.

Leaders and delegates of the Sudan Call forces pose in a collective picture at the end of their meeting outside Paris on November 13 2015 (ST Photo)

NCF spokesperson Abu Bakr Youssef told Sudan Tribune that National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) has detained the chairman of the Sudanese National Alliance Party (SNAP) Kamal Ismail early on Sunday morning upon his return from Paris for several hours.

He added that NISS seized Ismail's passport and forced him to sign a pledge to report to its office after a week.

Youssef noted that NISS had previously seized passports of five opposition leaders including the secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) Mohamed Mukhtar al-Khatib, SCP leading figures Siddiq Youssef and Tarig Abdel-Mageed, chairman of the Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) Ibrahim al-Shiekh and chairman of the Unified National Unionist Party (UNUP) Galaa al-Azhari, saying the passports are still in NISS position.

Last week, NISS banned al-Khatib, Youssef, Abdel-Mageed and al-Azahari from travelling to Paris to attend the opposition meeting.

He expected that NISS would also detain the rest of the opposition leaders upon their return from Paris, saying the move is inconsistent with the laws and the constitution as well as the national dialogue climate.

“We believe this move doesn't help the ongoing national dialogue or the [security arrangement talks] which would convene within hours”. Youssef said.

“We urge the regime to look at Paris meeting differently if it is serious about [holding] the national dialogue,” he added.

It noteworthy that the opposition “Sudan Call” forces including the NCF, National Umma Party (NUP), rebel umbrella Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) and the Civil Society Initiative (CSI) held a four-day meeting outside Paris to discuss issues of regime change as well as organizational issues pertaining to the alliance.

They decided to “liquidate” the regime and establish a transitional national government either through dialogue or popular uprising.

(ST)

November 15, 2014 (KHARTOUM) - United Nation Children Fund (UNICEF) has warned against the worsening conditions of children in eastern Sudan due to malnutrition.

UNICEF Deputy Executive Director, Omar Abdi, (C) speaks in a press briefing on November 15, 2015 (Photo UNICEF)

UNICEF deputy executive director Omar Abdi, expressed fear over the challenges facing the work of UNICEF in Sudan, particularly with regard to accessing all children.

He said that some areas are still suffering from children malnutrition despite the progress made in reducing the death rates of children below five years old from 83% to 68% together with increasing the number of children enrolled in schools and those who have access to water.

Abdi, who spoke at a press conference at the conclusion of his visit to Sudan Sunday, pointed that the budget allotted for Sudan amounts to $130 million, saying it only covers 60% of the actual needs.

He urged the partners to continue their support for UNICEF programs in Sudan, adding he discussed the work of UNICEF in Sudan with several officials including the First Vice-President Bakri Hassan Salih.

Abdi pointed the Sudanese government stressed commitment to cooperate with UNICEF to promote children's welfare, saying he inspected the security situation and several IDP's camps in North Darfur state.

For his part, UNICEF resident representative in Sudan, Geert Cappelaere said the malnutrition in eastern Sudan is worse than in Darfur, noting that UNICEF would open an office in eastern Sudan to strengthen its presence there.

“We would launch a call to provide a budget to address malnutrition issue particularly as the budget allotted to Sudan is limited,” he said

He said that 7% of the South Sudanese refugees in Sudan are children, pointing to high mortality rate among them due to malnutrition and lack of vaccination.

The director of the international cooperation department at Sudan's foreign ministry Sirag al-Din Hamid , for his part, asked for UNICEF help to lift the unilateral economic sanctions imposed on Sudan in order to allow the implementation of programs pertaining to children and education.

He described the visit of UNICEF deputy executive director to Sudan as important, saying that Khartoum attaches great hopes to the visit which reflects the level of cooperation between UNICEF and Sudan.

(ST)

November 15, 2015 (JUBA) - The summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) leaders in Juba has been again rescheduled to 23 November, South Sudanese information minister announced on Sunday.

President Salva Kiir poses with other leaders of African countries during a photo session before the opening session of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in Yokohama on June 1, 2013. (Getty)

In statements to the Turkish news agency Anadolu, Michael Makuei Lueth said that the meeting of IGAD heads of states and governments was delayed from 19 to 23 November, adding the decision was taken by the regional body and not Juba government.

Lueth said the delay is due to previous commitments to the African leaders.

The meeting was delayed from 14 to 19 November in order to give more time to the former president of Botswana, Festus Gontebanye Mogae to settle the outstanding issues between the signatories of the peace agreement.

On Thursday Juba said the first vice-president designate Riek Machar would take part in the meeting which aims to encourage him and president Salva Kiir to implement the peace agreement and settle the outstanding issues.

However the SPLM-IO said its leader would not participate in the meeting before the arrival of its advance team and the resolution of political and security issues in the peace agreement.

(ST)

November 15, 2015 (ARUSHA/JUBA) - The European Union (EU) has welcomed the recent release of the African Union Commission of Inquiry report on human rights abuses in South Sudan and vowed to support the establishment of a Hybrid Court on the world's youngest nation.

The second continental judicial dialogue taking place in Arusha, Tanzania on November 5, 2015 (Pan African Lawyers photo)

The EU's assurance came during the second continental judicial dialogue on “connecting national and international justice” held in Tanzania last week.

The three-day judicial dialogue, among other resolutions, supported the idea to establish a continental network of African judiciaries under the auspices of the African Union to bring together superior courts of the African Union member states.

Both warring factions in the South Sudanese conflict committed war crimes in Juba, Bor, Bentiu and Malakal towns, the African Union Commission of Inquiry said in its report.

It however said most “indiscriminate” and “unlawful” killings of civilians or soldiers in Juba were committed by element of government security forces.

“These attacks resulted in massive killings in and around Juba. The people killed were either found during the house to house search or captured on roadblocks,” partly reads the 318-page report Sudan Tribune obtained.

The five-member commission also said there are reasonable grounds to believe war crimes of rape and torture were committed against civilians in and around Juba, citing evidences that point to state security involvement.

“The evidence collected also suggests that war crime of forced enlisting of children in the army were committed,” says the report from the commission, which was headed by former Nigerian president, Olusegen Obasanjo.

War crimes, it said, were believed to have been committed by government soldiers in Malakal Teaching Hospital through the killings of civilians by some of the soldiers within the South Sudanese national army (SPLA).

“The civilians killed were Nuers who had sought shelter at the hospital at night. About six Nuers were killed on diverse dates between 22nd January and 17th February 2014,” it said. “Some others men women and children were selected, gathered and taken to the river where they were killed”.

There are also various accounts and testimonies on killings said to have been conducted by state security agents in the South Sudanese towns of Juba, Bentiu and Bor.

The five-member commission, established in March last year and tasked to investigate the human rights violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan, equally attributed war crimes allegedly committed to the armed opposition (SPLA/IO) and the white army forces allied to the country's former vice president, Riek Machar in Bor.

The commission further considers that there are reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes in relation to massive and indiscriminate attacks against civilian property were carried out in Bor town, reads the report.

“Visible evidence of torched non-military objectives like houses, market place, administration houses, hospital, form the basis to believe that these crimes were committed,” it adds.

The commission, however, said there were reasonable grounds to believe that no crimes of genocide were committed during the mid-December 2013 conflict despite the seeming ethnic nature and dimension the violent war.

It still maintained though that some of the serious violations of human rights could amount to crimes against humanity were committed during the conflict and that further investigations be done to identify those responsible.

JUDICIAL REFORM PROCESS

Meanwhile, the commission found that the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan gives the presidency too much power amidst a weak institutions and a gap between the judiciary, legislature and the executive.

As such, it said, the South Sudanese president's power to remove some state officials, often without proper controls, was one cause of instability in the country.

“The Commission recommends that the future Constitution should establish a well-balanced system of separation of powers with adequate checks and balances,” it said.

This, the report further noted, should be achieved through empowering and strengthening the capacity of the legislatures at both levels of government; subjecting major executive appointments to legislative approval; strengthening the judiciary (ensuring structural and financial independence from the political branches) and adherence to separation of powers, cultivating a culture of respect for judicial independence and rule of law.

The commission of inquiry recommended that appointment and removal of the country's vice president be subjected to the approval of the legislature.

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

The AU Commission of inquiry, among others, recommended the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a mandate to investigate human rights violations dating back to the agreed cutoff date.

The peace and reconciliation process, it said, should be driven by the commission.

“Such a body should lead to truth, remorse, forgiveness and restitution where necessary, justice and lasting reconciliation being achieved,” it added and that process be established in relationship with ‘hybrid' mechanisms.

“Such mechanisms would operate under the national mechanism, which should develop guidelines that seek to among others, align the operations of grassroots mechanisms with human rights and other identified ideals”.

The South Sudanese government said it would not shield officials found to have masterminded the killing of members of ethnic Nuer in December 2013 when political differences within the leadership of the country's ruling party (SPLM) turned violent by spreading into the army.

“The government will not protect officials who will be found to have played roles pointing to facts and evidences that they were involved in the killing of some citizens on the basis of their ethnicity. I repeat if there are credible, reliable and empirical evidences about actions of some people, the government will hand them over to answer the cause of their actions," justice minister Paulino Wanawila told Sudan Tribune last week.

(ST)

Vantant à l'envi la « Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises » (RSE) lorsque celle-ci se fait sur une base volontaire, les multinationales font tout pour bloquer la moindre évolution réglementaire, même bien peu exigeante. Depuis 2013, les lobbies du secteur privé sont vent debout contre la proposition de loi (PPL) relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés-mères et des entreprises donneuses d'ordres, qui cherche à combler une faille du droit : une société, en tant qu'entité juridique, n'est pas (...) - 251 - novembre 2015 / Pillages des ressources, Multinationales, Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

A LégierőBloggernek ezúttal személyesen sikerült eljutnia a csak Törökország által elismert Észak-Ciprusi Török Köztársaság kiáltásának évfordulóját (idén a 32-iket) kísérő katonai parádékra Lefkosában (Nicosia) és Girnében (Kyrenia). Vajon most, hogy jószerivel összeomlott a szomszédos Közel-Kelet, vajon a ciprusi kérdés megoldása kerülhet-e közelebb?

Konkurszos katona a lefkosai felvonuláson.

A Solo Türk bemutatóját filmezi a közönség és egy drón.

A Perry osztályú Gökova fregatt felett a Török Csillagok egyik gépe.

Zord

Cinq des assaillants morts vendredi à Paris ont été identifiés. La plupart sont des Français. Parmi eux, Omar Ismaïl Mostefaï, qui s’est fait exploser au Bataclan. Bilal Hadfi, Français âgé de 20 ans, s’est pour sa part fait exploser près du Stade de France. Salah Abdeslam (photo), dont l’un des frères, Brahim, s’est fait exploser devant un restaurant sans faire de victime, courrait toujours.

L’exécutif français avait promis une riposte « impitoyable » contre les responsables des attentats de Paris qui, ont revendiqués par l’État islamique (EI ou Daesh), ont fait au moins 132 tués selon un dernier bilan non encore définitif. Ainsi, ce 15 novembre, soit 48 heures après les attaques, pas moins de 12 avions, dont 10 chasseurs bombardiers […]

Cet article L’aviation française a mené un raid massif contre le fief de l’État islamique en Syrie est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

L’UDC et la Lega échouent en Suisse alémanique et au Tessin. De son côté, le PLR perd un siège

Holnaptól érvényes a Belgrád–Szabadka autóúton az új fizetési rendszer, amely a sofőröknek olcsóbb útdíjakat hoz, jelentette ki Zorana Mihajlović kormányalelnök, építésügyi, közlekedési és infrastrukturális miniszter.

Il semble nécessaire de dresser l'évolution de la doctrine et de la stratégie militaire chinoises au fil des époques, en mettant en scène les actions de deux stratèges d'hier et d'aujourd'hui : Sun Zi et Xi Jinping. Tous deux ont su considérer et appréhender leur environnement contemporain au profit du développement et de la pérennité de la Chine. Sun Wu, plus connu sous le nom de Sun Zi, était général et stratège du roi Helu de Wu de 770 à 476 avant notre ère, durant la période des Printemps et des Automnes. Ce général chinois a décliné en treize chapitres, dans L'Art de la guerre, des préceptes qui traitent de la stratégie militaire et de divers aspects de l'organisation de l'armée chinoise. 2 500 ans plus tard, c'est Xi Jinping, chef de la Commission Militaire Centrale (CMC), qui est à la tête d'un pays d'une superficie de 9 596 961 km² et d'une population de 1,357 milliards de chinois. (...)