ELIAMEP

• EU cohesion policy is horizontal in nature and works in a complementary and supportive way to other public policies.
• Therefore, actions included in the National and Regional Programmes funded by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) in Greece must support (national) sectoral and regional policies.
• The aim of this policy paper is to trace the relationship between the Partnership Agreement for the Development Framework (PADF) 2014-2020 and Greece’s climate change adaptation strategy – a top policy priority at national and regional level.
• To this end, it examines the policy initiatives that took shape during the period 2013-2020 and looks for synergies between these processes and the programming of cohesion policy actions for the period 2014-2020 – and, subsequently, the period 2021-2027.
• The conclusion of this exercise is disappointing. On the one hand, years of delays in the formulation of the required plans have resulted in their complete disconnection from the investment programming of the PADF 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. On the other hand, the resulting plans do not produce meaningful policy commitments and lack implementation mechanisms.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by George Andreou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

 

• The Letta and Draghi reports begin with the same realisation, though they formulate it differently: that the international geopolitical environment has changed dramatically and that the EU must take immediate action as a result.

• The Letta report’s take-home message is that the Single Market must be transformed into something “much more than just a market”. Thus, research, innovation and education need to be integrated into its core, as a “fifth freedom”, and the Single Market extended to include the telecommunications, energy, financial services and defence sectors.

• There is fear at the heart of the Draghi report, fear of the “existential challenge” confronting the EU, which will require an extra €800 billion a year in investment. The report’s proposals are articulated around five major horizontal policies: closing the innovation gap, decarbonising the economy and making it more competitive, strengthening security and the defence sector and reducing dependencies in this area, financing investment, and strengthening EU governance.

• The Letta and Draghi reports agree on both the fields where intervention is required and the form such intervention should take. And while they differ in terms of the competition—and, still more, cohesion—policy they prescribe, they do so constructively while their proposals complement one another.

• In relation to Greece, the proposals made in both reports with respect to the defence industry, to reducing energy costs, and to the provision of generous funding for additional investment through —inter alia—joint borrowing, are of the utmost importance.

• No serious disagreement has been voiced with respect to the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, apart from the predictable German reaction to additional funding and new joint borrowing, coupled with unfounded criticism of the proposals as ‘unfeasible’.

• The “New European Agreement on Competitiveness” adopted in Budapest on 8 November is a critical development, given that it adopts the bulk of the key approaches contained in the Letta and Draghi reports, and sets specific milestones for some, as well.

• The two reports stress that, even if certain recent developments around the world cannot be considered favourable for the EU (political crisis in Germany, economic problems in France, Trump’s election in the US), Europe still has the “weapons” it needs to reverse the situation. And while the Budapest summit decision may not have gone as far as the situation demands, it still adopted the bulk of the proposals made in the two reports, making it crystal clear that the European Union has taken the need to regain the initiative fully on board.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior.

Introduction 

Looking back at the history of European integration, one quickly realises that its greatest moments were, without exception, preceded by a report highlighting the need for the major changes that followed. The founding of the EEC itself was prefigured by the Spaak report, Lord Cockfield’s white paper formed the basis for decisions on the establishment of the internal market, while the Padoa-Schioppa and Delors reports were precursors for the establishment of the EMU. Of course, the reverse is not necessarily true: not all reports necessarily lead to major change. Thus, for example, the McDougall report, which proposed as early as 1974 that the EEC budget should be raised to 5% of the Community’s GDP, is still waiting in vain —a full half century later—to finally be heeded.

However, there are multiple indications that suggest the Letta[1] and Draghi[2] reports will end up being in the first of these categories. And that is because they came about not as an initiative conceived of by certain inspired circles or individuals, but as a logical consequence of rapid geopolitical developments. As noted at the very start of the Letta report: “The Single Market is a product of an era when both the EU and the world were ‘smaller’” and must now be transformed into something that is “much more than a market”. Mario Draghi, in turn, speaks in rather dramatic tones of an “existential challenge” facing the EU and declares that Europe will lose its very raison d’être if it cannot guarantee prosperity, freedom and democracy to its citizens—values that can only be guaranteed if the bloc becomes more productive and changes radically.

The almost jubilant adoption by the Budapest European Council summit of the bulk of the proposals made in the two reports provides an initial confirmation both of their importance and of the role they are expected to play.

The Letta Report: The Single Market Must Become Much More Than a Market 

…the Single Market must be transformed into something much more than just a market. In this context, [the Letta report] proposes expanding the Single Market to include the telecommunications, energy, defence and financial services sectors.

The proposals included in the report by Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy (2013-2014), published in April 2024, are bold and at times provocative. The core of his report, summed up in its title, is that the Single Market must be transformed into something much more than just a market. In this context, it proposes expanding the Single Market to include the telecommunications, energy, defence and financial services sectors. 

The report does not restrict itself to expressing views on the workings of the internal market, and also makes proposals regarding most of the areas in which the European Union is active.

It begins with the need to establish a “fifth” freedom. As a central pillar of this strategy, it proposes that research, innovation and education be added to the core of the internal market through the creation of a European Knowledge Commons: a centralized digital platform providing access to publicly-funded research, data sets, and educational resources.

It then sets off in search of ways to finance the Union’s strategic objectives, with the primary goal of mobilising private capital. In this context, the report advocates a key change: creating a Savings and Investment Union to make use of the €33 trillion in private savings in the EU for investment.

…the report proposes to envision a state aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate a portion of their national funding to financing pan-European initiatives and investments.

Worried about the distortions to competition caused by the state aid economically powerful states make available to national companies, the report proposes “to balance a stricter enforcement of State aid at national level and the progressive expansion of EU-level funding support” and “to envision a state aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate a portion of their national funding to financing pan-European initiatives and investments”. 

The Letta report’s other potentially trailblazing proposal concerns the need to provide substantial support to the European defence industry with funds from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). On this point, while the author does not hide his preference for the issuance of a European defence bond, the report does not actually highlight this course of action, as Mario Draghi would do a few months later.

…European telecommunication companies having an average of 5 million customers, while the corresponding figure in the US is 107 million and in China 467 million.

The Letta report underscores the centrality of both energy and electronic communications to any industrial policy. When the Single Market was created, these sectors were deliberately excluded from its scope, as they were considered too strategic to be removed from national control. However, national control is now proving an obstacle to the development and competitiveness of these sectors at a European and global level. As the report takes pains to stress, fragmentation has resulted in European telecommunication companies having an average of 5 million customers, while the corresponding figure in the US is 107 million and in China 467 million!

Similar arguments can be made regarding the need for a common EU approach to defence. The inadequacy of Europe’s fragmented military industrial complex is becoming increasingly apparent. The report points out that, of all the military equipment sent to Ukraine by European nations since the start of the conflict, 78% was purchased from non-EU producers!

The report pays particular attention to the space industry, a crucial sector for the development of the Single Market. It also points out that how critically important it now is that the European dimension be incorporated into the health sector, particularly in the light of Europe’s demographic decline and the likelihood of crises in the future. At the same time, the report underlines the crucial nature of the transport sector for realising the full potential of the Single Market.

Data showing that people living in regions that are suffering decline often feel compelled to move by the lack of jobs or access to high-quality education and adequate services, lead Enrico Letta to table new and expanded content for the EU’s cohesion policy. Letta thus proposes that, while free movement must continue to be guaranteed, so must the freedom of European citizens to remain in their current place of residence; relocation should be a matter of choice rather than something that is forced upon them. 

As the report highlights, the further development of the Single Market can only be successful if it includes a social dimension that guarantees social justice and cohesion, addresses social inequalities, and ensures inclusive economic growth.

The report also highlights the need to strengthen digital infrastructure and skills, on the grounds that the digital economy is a fundamental tool for allowing citizens and businesses alike to realise the full potential of the Single Market, and for ensuring their freedom to stay where they live.

Furthermore, given that most EU SMEs are active in the services sector, the Letta report also argues that a renewed commitment to removing barriers to their activity is a necessity. According to the European Commission’s own research, around 60% of the barriers in the Single Market for services identified in 2002 still exist today. 

The Letta report concludes by stating that the dynamism and effectiveness of the EU are currently severely hampered by a number of factors, notably an excessive regulatory burden and bureaucracy. For this reason, the report argues, the mechanism for formulating proposals must be improved, with consultation procedures and the Better Regulation toolbox streamlined, impact assessments conducted for proposed amendments before the final decision is taken, and other related measures.

The report concludes by urging “the Single Market to go fast and go far”, moving beyond Europe’s borders.

The report concludes by urging “the Single Market to go fast and go far“, moving beyond Europe’s borders in order to achieve a balance between competitiveness, strategic autonomy and global conditions and to promote strategic partnerships.

Letta’s proposals do not stop there, of course. Rather, the full text renders them specific through a host of innovative and sometimes revolutionary suggestions coupled with exhortations that they be enacted without delay. The implementation of most—if not all—of these proposals is presented as a necessary and sufficient condition for ensuring the competitiveness of a united Europe, promoting its strategic autonomy in the new geopolitical context, and, ultimately, securing its economic and cultural survival. For this reason, the report urged the Council “to delegate to the European Commission the task of drafting a comprehensive Single Market Strategy”, which it went on to do at the informal European Council summit in Budapest (8 November 2024), at which the Commission was invited “to present, by June 2025, a new and comprehensive horizontal strategy on the deepening of the Single Market, including a roadmap with clear timelines and milestones“. This is undoubtedly a very important development which must be credited to the Letta report.

The Draghi Report: Europe is Facing an Existential Challenge

The main, dramatic message of the report prepared by Mario Draghi, former Governor of the European Central Bank (2011-2019), former Prime Minister of Italy (2021-2022), which was made public in September 2024, is that the EU is facing an “existential challenge”. To extricate itself from the low productivity and weak growth which keep it lagging behind the United States and China in the international rankings, Europe needs to invest an additional 800 billion euros per year: representing as much as 5% of EU GDP, this is much higher than even the 1-2% of GDP the Marshall Plan invested in the reconstruction of Europe after World War Two.

Mario Draghi considers the situation to warrant an urgent response. As he points out in the foreword: “We should abandon the illusion that only procrastination can preserve consensus. In fact, procrastination has only produced slower growth, and it has certainly achieved no more consensus.”

Covering almost all the critical spheres in which Europe must act, the Draghi report articulates its proposals around five major horizontal policies which should, it argues, both operate in tandem and complement one another: closing the innovation gap, decarbonisation and making the economy more competitive, increasing security and reducing dependencies, financing investments, and strengthening EU governance.

Covering almost all the critical spheres in which Europe must act, the Draghi report articulates its proposals around five major horizontal policies which should, it argues, both operate in tandem and complement one another: closing the innovation gap, decarbonisation and making the economy more competitive, increasing security and reducing dependencies, financing investments, and strengthening EU governance. Wanting to underscore that his report is complementary to the Letta report, Mario Draghi states that he has not included a separate chapter on the internal market, because this subject has already been dealt with systematically in the Letta report, which also presents the relevant proposals.

It should also be noted that there is no mention of agriculture, because agriculture was the subject of a separate report commissioned from Professor Peter Strohschneider, a figure with whom the European public is largely unfamiliar. The fact that Strohschneider is not a public figure with the international stature of Draghi—or Letta—may be indicative of the (lack of) importance the European Commission leadership assigns to agriculture in relation to all the other sectors examined in the Letta and Draghi reports.

The report’s most prolonged cry of anguish concerns the EU’s failure to keep up in innovation, which Draghi sees as the root cause of the bloc’s low competitiveness and productivity. He sees digital technology, in which Europe currently lags behind, as a key factor in the productivity gap between the EU and the US. The report also estimates that European public spending on Research and Innovation (R&I) is significantly below the levels invested by its competitors. To remedy this, Draghi proposes the creation of a Research and Innovation Union that would lead to the joint formulation of a common European R&I strategy and policy capable of promoting a “European Action Plan for Research and Innovation”. It also recognises the need to establish European academic institutions at the forefront of global research.

Mario Draghi has no qualms about sacrificing many of the EU’s “sacred cows” on the altar of Europe’s future, starting with competition policy, which, he argues, has long been aimed in the wrong direction, focusing on competition between Member States rather than on competition between the EU and the rest of the world. He therefore proposes that those aspects of EU competition policy that relate to mergers, state aid, etc. be radically overhauled, so they no longer impede the bloc’s ability to compete with the US and China. However, his report does not go as far as the Letta report, which proposes the gradual replacement of state aid with European aid. Rather, it attaches greater importance to removing barriers to mergers, which Draghi blames for Europe’s inability to put forth players capable of taking on the global competition.

The Draghi report proposes “updating” the respective policies “to reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”, so the bloc’s cohesion policy keeps up with its efforts to boost innovation and complete the Single Market.

A similar observation could be made about another of the EU’s “sacred cows”: its cohesion policy. The Draghi report proposes “updating” the respective policies “to reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”, so the bloc’s cohesion policy keeps up with its efforts to boost innovation and complete the Single Market. The more sceptical may see this translating into cohesion policy resources being moved away from the original goal of reducing disparities between EU regions and towards more general EU development objectives[3]. For comparison, as mentioned above, Enrico Letta proposes “freedom to stay in one’s own place”, i.e. providing each region with the means to retain its population.

It should be noted, however, that the Draghi report advocates the preservation of the European social model[4], noting that while the EU should aim to draw closer to the US model in terms of productivity and innovation, it should steer clear of the disadvantages of the US social model.

The Draghi report attaches particular importance to the development of a common European policy with regard to the defence industry, and argues that the relevant actions should focus on joint procurement and joint management of industrial defence stocks. It considers that, along with the urgent need to increase overall defence investment, there is also a need for greater cooperation between Member States in the defence industrial sector, as well as for efforts to bolster Research and Innovation. It proposes joint European financing of the defence industry from new EU resources, including Eurobond issues.

As well as calling for the development of the defence industry, the report proposes a new industrial strategy for Europe which calls for the Single Market to be fully implemented and for industrial policy, competition policy and trade policy to be more closely interlinked.

…the EU should, [the report] argues, form a genuine Energy Union, so that those functions of the energy market that are of cross-border significance can be regulated at a centralized European level.

Viewing decarbonisation in terms that extend beyond the environment, as a factor that can also contribute decisively to the competitiveness of the European economy, the Draghi report proposes a strategy which, while eliminating carbon emissions, will also provide Europe with the opportunity to bring down the high cost of its energy, which is a major obstacle to growth, and to play a leading role in clean technologies, while simultaneously becoming more energy secure. At the same time, the EU should, it argues, form a genuine Energy Union, so that those functions of the energy market that are of cross-border significance can be regulated at a centralized European level.

…it proposes extending qualified majority voting to more areas and to consider the possibility of “enhanced cooperation” in areas where it proves hard to pass decisions.

The Draghi report makes bold proposals in relation to the financing of the entire plan for boosting EU competitiveness. Finding that the support the EU can provide for both public and private investment is limited by the size of its budget and by the insufficient mobilisation of private capital, Draghi proposes the creation of a Capital Markets Union to free up private capital. He goes on to propose that the EU should seek to complete its Banking Union in order to boost the financing capacity of the banking sector, and proposes without prevarication that the EU should proceed with regular bond issuances to finance joint investment projects among Member States, thereby contributing to its economic and financial integration.

As mentioned above, the Draghi report estimates that the EU needs to invest an additional €800 billion per year, i.e. up to 5% of its GDP, a percentage which is far higher than even the 1-2% of GDP the Marshall Plan invested in rebuilding Europe after World War Two. It is proposed that the bulk of these funds come from private capital, although a significant portion is still left over to be covered by European public funds. The proposal that these European public funds should come from the joint debt issuance is hugely significant, as such a move mark a further major step towards EU fiscal union.

The Draghi report concludes by underlining the need for a EU new governance, without which the new industrial strategy and the entire project aimed at strengthening European competitiveness cannot succeed. The report proposes that a new ‘competitiveness coordination framework’ be created at EU level in the priority sectors, and opines that a ’28th regime’ is needed to allow companies to opt out of national regulatory frameworks and follow rules that apply across the EU. Finally, it proposes extending qualified majority voting to more areas and to consider the possibility of “enhanced cooperation” in areas where it proves hard to pass decisions.

Similarities and Differences between the two Reports

Even though the Letta and Draghi reports (a) were requested by different bodies (the Letta report by the Spanish and Belgian EU Presidencies, the Draghi report by the European Commission), (b) were compiled by authors with different political backgrounds, and (c) focus on different subject matter (the former on the Single Market, the latter on competitiveness), they converge to such an extent that the value of their findings and—above all—their proposals is rendered virtually self-evident. Indeed, Mario Draghi has said he did not include a chapter on the Single Market in his report because “the Letta report has systematically analysed the key challenges facing the Single Market and provided recommendations”; in practice, however, most of the recommendations on both sides are essentially identical.

Indeed, though formulated differently, both begin with the realisation that the global geopolitical environment has changed dramatically and that the EU must take immediate action to meet what Mario Draghi calls the “existential challenge”. They largely coincide in terms both of their proposed fields of intervention and the interventions they advocate in those fields.

Both agree on the need for drastic intervention in the field of financial services, with Letta proposing a Savings and Investment Union and Draghi favouring a Capital Markets Union.

Both agree on the need for drastic intervention in the field of financial services, with Letta proposing a Savings and Investment Union and Draghi favouring a Capital Markets Union. Their common goal is to mobilise private capital on a grand scale in order to finance the investments Europe needs to make.

The two reports also agree that the main obstacle confronting Europe is the fragmentation of the Single Market, particularly in the energy, telecoms and defence sectors, while both also make concrete proposals for tackling the issue.

Another common goal is eliminating the use of coal for energy production and reducing energy costs. 

Both reports also place considerable emphasis on joint defence procurement and on the strengthening of the European defence industry, which will have to serve as the engine driving the EU’s overall industrial and economic development and the bloc’s efforts to achieve strategic autonomy.

…the reports coincide, too, in attaching great importance to Research and Innovation.

In addition, the reports coincide, too, in attaching great importance to Research and Innovation. Letta views it as a “fifth freedom” in the Single Market, while Draghi considers the EU’s deficiencies in this area to be the primary cause of the growth gap that has opened up between the bloc and the US.

The two reports also contain common references to, and views on, the importance of and need to promote the digital transition, transport networks and Space-related actions, but also the need for meaningful interventions that address both skills gaps and the governance deficit.

Letta and Draghi—the former less daring in his formulations, the latter more direct and on the nail—also agree on the need for new joint borrowing to provide the European public funds required to finance part of the EU’s investment deficit. Draghi estimates the total size of this investment deficit at 800 billion per year. The remaining—larger—part of this deficit will have to be covered by private funds.

It is worth nothing that the two reports differ in terms of the competition policy they prescribe, but do so constructively and with proposals that complement one another.

It is worth nothing that the two reports differ in terms of the competition policy they prescribe, but do so constructively and with proposals that complement one another. The Letta report considers the misuse of state aid to distort competition and therefore proposes, in addition to the stricter enforcement of state aid regulations, the creation of a European State Aid Contribution Mechanism. This mechanism would oblige Member States to contribute part of their national state funding to a common fund for financing pan-European initiatives and investments. And though the Draghi report does not make a comparable proposal, it still attaches considerable importance to the mergers aspect of competition policy, arguing that if European firms are to emerge as international leaders, especially in the tech field, it will require flexibility in relation to the clearing of mergers and to companies acquiring “dominant positions”.

Both reports represent radical departures which, if adopted, will turn European competition policy into a key tool for promoting both the overall development of the EU and its economic and social cohesion.

The two reports are more differentiated when it comes to European cohesion policy.

The two reports are more differentiated when it comes to European cohesion policy. As mentioned above, the Letta report views economic and social cohesion as a crucial element of the new form of Single Market it proposes. The new and broader content it imbues this cohesion with focuses on European citizens’ freedom to remain in the area they call home; it therefore complements—rather than impedes—the four currently guaranteed freedoms of movement: of persons, goods, capital and services. For its part, the Draghi report proposes “updating” cohesion policy so its programmes “reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”. This may translate into cohesion policy resources being redirected towards more general EU growth objectives—as the previous Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies suggested—and thus into a shift away from the policy’s original objective of reducing disparities between EU regions. (We noted above that this proposal is already finding application in the field of defence—according, at least, to a recent article in the Financial Times.)

What remains to be seen, of course, is whether a strict and above all unilateral adherence to the traditional principles of cohesion policy is the best response to the new challenges. Already, the proposals being put forward by the European Commission’s Committee of Wise Persons on the Future of Cohesion Policy[5] no longer insist on this.

What the Letta and Draghi Reports Mean for Greece

Regarding the significance of the two reports for Greece specifically, over and above their obvious importance for the country as an EU member state, we could focus on the specific proposals for:

• Strengthening the defence industry at European level and developing a common European policy in this field. This could be the precursor to the formation of a genuine common defence policy, with obvious positive impacts for Greece in terms both of defence expenditure and guarantees for the security of its national borders.

• Additional investments of €800 billion per year, which could cover Greece’s investment deficit, which is estimated at €20 billion per year.

• New joint borrowing, which could help maintain the level of European funding to Greece and avoid the falling growth rates that could stem from a possible reduction.

• Decarbonisation and the replacing of coal with “green” and cheaper energy sources, which, in combination with other measures, could reduce energy costs for Greek consumers, who are currently suffering from high energy prices.

The other fields (technology/industrial recovery, climate change, etc.) are very important but, as Tasos Giannitsis[6] believes, they are only of marginal significance for the national choices Greece makes. He argues that “The [Draghi] report should be studied carefully; taking a close and dispassionate look ‘behind the mirror’ will reveal what it entails for Greece, in the form, too, of reactions to its proposals. Reading the various issues the report draws attention to raises questions we can either ignore or address: given our strengths and weaknesses (negative net savings, overconsumption, low levels of investment, poor international ranking in terms of education / the Pisa report, the functioning of the Rule of Law, corruption, our technological infrastructure and state efficiency), do we feel we can rest easy, or should we be concerned?”

The Objections Raised to the two Reports

The Letta and Draghi reports have been welcomed almost universally and with enthusiasm in many quarters, in terms both of their findings and conclusions and of the proposals they make. This positive reception culminated with the adoption of almost all their proposed actions by the informal European Council in Budapest on 8 November 2024, and the incorporation of their formulations into the “Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal”[7].

Objections of varying seriousness were, of course, made. These generally related to the Draghi report, both because of its outspoken proposal for new joint borrowing, and because of the greater visibility it received as a result of its publication being delayed by the European elections, but also because of Mario Draghi’s personality and his (well-earned) reputation as the saviour of the eurozone.

The most negative response to the Draghi report came from Christian Lindner, the now sacked German Finance Minister, who was quick to condemn the proposal for new joint borrowing. Lindner’s criticism was supported by representatives of other “frugal” Member States.

The most negative response to the Draghi report, which was made almost immediately after its publication, came from Christian Lindner, the now sacked German Finance Minister, who was quick to condemn the proposal for new joint borrowing. Lindner’s criticism was supported by representatives of other “frugal” Member States (Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden).

…the most serious dissenting opinion came from the former Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Monti , who, along with the considerable praise he lavished on the Draghi report, also expressed a reservation in relation to its proposed revision of EU competition policy, and its approach to mergers, in particular, which he felt would be detrimental to the great majority of European businesses.

Apart from this reaction, which surprised no one, the most serious dissenting opinion came from the former Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Monti[8], who, along with the considerable praise he lavished on the Draghi report, also expressed a reservation in relation to its proposed revision of EU competition policy, and its approach to mergers, in particular, which he felt would be detrimental to the great majority of European businesses. “Size matters”, Mario Monti notes, “but it is not the only factor (in determining competitiveness), and it would be a shame to weaken one of the very few tools the EU has the authority to wield at a European level, at a time when it is perhaps more important than ever to use it”.

In addition, analysts at Bruegel[9] have opined that, while the Draghi report’s analysis of the EU’s digital weaknesses raises the right issues, it fails to address them adequately with its proposals. They also found the report to contain good ideas for reducing the overall cost of the energy system, but questioned its proposals for reducing the cost of energy-intensive industry on grounds of fairness and of efficiency. They point out that disregarding either budgetary constraints or World Trade Organization rules could easily backfire, making the EU’s frugal Member States even less willing to agree to increasing the EU’s budgetary resources, and thus undermining the Union’s efforts to accelerate decarbonisation around the world and not just in Europe.

…analysts from the Bruegel have expressed the view that Letta’s proposals for public sector investment in Research and Innovation ignore the fact that the level of private sector investment in this area now far exceeds what the public sector could fund.

Furthermore, analysts from the same think tank[10] have expressed the view that Letta’s proposals for public sector investment in Research and Innovation ignore the fact that the level of private sector investment in this area now far exceeds what the public sector could fund, while failing to take it into account that the main driver of R&D funding is the income generated by the commercial exploitation of its findings. 

“New wine in an old bottle”[11] is how the Draghi report is described by those who argue that the EU’s lack of investment and capital in due to the bloc’s long-standing insistence on stability and fiscal discipline, and that decarbonisation will not be possible without critical raw materials and green technologies from China (which is also the most important market for many EU products). They note that “military Keynesianism” (meaning the common defence industrial policy) cannot be implemented in any form, given that the report does not recognise that NATO’s defence shield in Europe implies the purchase in return of armaments from the US. Finally, they also point out that, while the report proposes the largest investment programme in the history of the EU, the social conditions required to ensure that the benefits are shared fairly are absent.

There are also some who, without rejecting the content of the Draghi report, describe it as utopian and unworkable, especially with regard to its proposals for funding and joint borrowing.

There are also some who, without rejecting the content of the Draghi report, describe it as utopian and unworkable, especially with regard to its proposals for funding and joint borrowing. This group includes leading players from Greek industry (one of whom also represents an important branch of European industry), who agree that both the Letta and Draghi reports capture the magnitude and urgency of the stakes for the European Union[12], but consider Draghi’s proposals to be unrealistic. Paradoxically, just a month ago, one of these players was highlighting the positive proposals contained in the report for industrial competitiveness and predicting that many would be well-received by Europe’s struggling industrial sector, primarily because they touch upon the issue of costs[13].

However, as Tasos Giannitsis notes[14]: “Draghi’s proposals were criticised as utopian when they were first made public, especially in so far as they advocate an increase in EU debt and the issuance of European bonds. These objections are familiar and understandable. But whether the Report is utopian or not depends on how one evaluates both the current threats in the three areas it addresses, and the will on the part of European societies to confront them. It also depends on how one views the changes over the last decade in how much weight the EU carries on the international stage.”

The ‘New European Competitiveness Deal’ Adopts the Leta and Draghi Reports

The two reports provide a solid foundation on which we will ambitiously advance our work. We seize their wake-up call. It is imperative that we urgently close the innovation and productivity gap, both with our global competitors and within the EU. We will work in unity and solidarity for the benefit of all EU citizens, businesses and Member States.

The “New European Agreement on Competitiveness”[15] adopted by the informal European Council in Budapest (8 November 2024) is a very important development, as it adopts most of the key approaches contained in the Letta and Draghi reports, setting specific milestones for some, too. As the European Council stresses emphatically in its Declaration: “We welcome [these reports]. They provide a solid foundation on which we will ambitiously advance our work. We seize their wake-up call. It is imperative that we urgently close the innovation and productivity gap, both with our global competitors and within the EU. We will work in unity and solidarity for the benefit of all EU citizens, businesses and Member States.”

Of course, the Deal studiously avoids even mentioning the possibility of joint borrowing. In relation to new sources of funding, it limits itself to “exploring the development of new [financial] instruments”, etc. Of course, with Germany currently in the throes of a major political crisis—not to forget France, with its huge budget deficit—how much further could the Deal have gone at this juncture? Probably for the same reasons, the Deal does not even touch on the proposals the two reports make for radical changes to the bloc’s competition policy, and everything that would entail for the state aid the German government currently lavishes on German businesses.

The Budapest Declaration concludes with “The need for a unified response has never been more compelling”, its dramatic tone probably dictated by Trump’s election in the US, before calling on “all EU institutions, Member States and stakeholders to urgently implement and deliver this New European Competitiveness Deal.” Finally, the European Council pledges to continue to provide further strategic guidance and to review progress regularly over the coming year.

The almost jubilant adoption of the two reports by the 27 leaders, albeit incomplete with its proposals vis-a-vis competition policy and financing left out, is extremely encouraging for the EU’s short- and medium-term prospects. It remains to be seen whether, and how quickly, the two major issues which the New European Deal on Competitiveness fails to address will be added, and whether the agreement will be turned into legally binding and enforceable texts.

Conclusions

The European Council accepting the bulk of the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and doing so in short order (by EU standards), indicates how important they are for the future of Europe. This assessment is further reinforced by the inclusion of many of their proposals in the action guides which Ursula von der Leyen has handed out to the members of the new European Commission.

It is not only Draghi and Letta who are raising the alarm. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund itself predicts a further widening of the gap between Europe and the US by the end of the decade. According to the IMF, this is mainly due to low productivity and an ageing population in Europe, coupled with the bloc’s failure to keep up in the spheres of innovation and technology. Indeed, Europe can only muster a growth rate of 1.45% per annum, compared with 2.29% in the US. The report also points out that European productivity in general, and in tech in particular, has stagnated over the last 20 years, while it has increased by 40% in the US (!). The IMF has called on the EU to take action to further integrate the economies of Europe[16].

The two reports show the “weapons” with which the EU can confront, and perhaps reverse, the above trends, defending itself but also launching a counter-attack in the ongoing undeclared tariff and subsidy war between the US and China in which the bloc will inevitably be embroiled, willingly or otherwise.

The two reports show the “weapons” with which the EU can confront, and perhaps reverse, the above trends, defending itself but also launching a counter-attack in the ongoing undeclared tariff and subsidy war between the US and China in which the bloc will inevitably be embroiled, willingly or otherwise.

However, the difficult context in which the EU finds itself having to wage its own ‘war’ must also be taken into account. In Europe today, the advocates of “illiberal democracy” and ethnocentric approaches to critical issues such as immigration, have become dangerously emboldened as they grow in strength. This political landscape, combined with the ‘leadership deficit’ that has emerged due to Germany and France’s current inability to pull the European train behind them, is not conducive to the realisation of Draghi’s proposals, and by extension to the taking of initiatives that will help the EU to survive in the new geopolitical and economic environment.

The difficulties are exacerbated by the recent rift between the European People’s Party (EPP) and the European Socialists, the two pillars on which the EU’s institutional balance and stability rests. A Europe that is divided rather than united is not the best response to the existential dangers it faces.

However, the political crisis and the early elections in Germany also have their positive side. Before the crisis broke out, the start of negotiations for the EU’s multiannual budget for 2028-2034 was expected to be delayed until elections were held in Germany in autumn 2025. Barring any dramatic surprises, the early elections in Germany will allow the Commission to present its proposal faster, and discussions on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, to which the financing of the additional investment proposed by the two reports is linked, to start earlier than expected.

To these adverse circumstances, we must add Trump’s election to as Presidency of the United States and the uncertainties, if not threats, this entails for the EU’s prospects. On the one hand, this development may strengthen and accelerate the bloc’s awakening, confirming Jean Monet’s prophetic comments yet again on the contribution crises have made to European integration. On the other hand, there is always the risk that the losses incurred in the meantime (from the imposition of draconian tariffs on European products, other protectionist measures, the withdrawal of the US defence umbrella, etc.) may precede the “awakening”, and not only halt any recovery efforts underway, but also cause Europe to regress, possibly irreversibly. Which is why how Europe reacts is important, but so is when it reacts.

Still, it is encouraging that—as all the indications show—change is now afoot in Europe.

Still, it is encouraging that—as all the indications show—change is now afoot in Europe. And while the Budapest decision may not have gone as far as the situation demands, it still makes it crystal clear that the European Union has taken the need to regain the initiative fully on board. It remains to be seen whether this momentum can be maintained. Which is certain is that the problems cannot wait a moment longer.

 

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf

[2] Part A:https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c- f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf Part B: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ec1409c1-d4b4-4882-8bdd-3519f86bbb92_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness_%20In-depth%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_0.pdf

[3] This approach is already starting to be applied in the field of defence, at least according to an article in the Financial Times (11 November 2024) https://www.ft.com/content/eb0de7f4-5ba1-460a-a83d-1a7302fc1536)

[4] “We‘re still Europe though“, Mario Draghi stressed as he presented his report to the European Parliament.

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/el/pres_00_900

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:en:PDF

file:///C:/Users/30697/Downloads/forging%20a%20sustainable%20future%20together-KN0623048ENN-4.pdf

[6] https://www.tanea.gr/print/2024/09/14/opinions/i-ekthesi-ntragki-kai-ta-minymata/

[7] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/the-budapest-declaration/

[8] https://www.kathimerini.gr/world/563302615/mario-monti-poios-tha-xypnisei-ti-synestalmeni-eyropi/

[9] https://www.bruegel.org/newsletter/mario-draghis-eu-competitiveness-report-landmark-plan-was-promised

[10] https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/eu-savers-need-single-market-place-invest

[11] https://www.in.gr/2024/09/28/world/emmoni-tou-ntragki-tin-antagonistikotita-den-tha-vgei-se-kalo-ton-eyropaion-ti-lenei-eidikoi/

[12] https://www.sev.org.gr/deltia_typou/spyros-theodoropoulos-aparaititi-i-synergasia-politeias-epicheiriseon-kai-ergazomenon-gia-na-epitefchthei-to-ependytiko-alma-pou-echei-anagki-i-chora/

[13]https://www.capital.gr/oikonomia/3864923/e-mutilinaios-olokliromeni-kai-emperistatomeni-i-ekthesi-ntragki-thetikes-protaseis-gia-ti-biomixania/

[14] https://www.tanea.gr/print/2024/09/14/opinions/i-ekthesi-ntragki-kai-ta-minymata/

[15] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/the-budapest-declaration/

[16] Oikonomiki Kathimerini, 27 October 2024

• The key objective of the smart specialisation strategy is to mobilise research and innovation at regional level, focusing on existing potential, enhancing economic diversification and creating a comparative advantage.
• It was implemented at the European level for the first time during the 2014-2020 programming period with the mobilisation and active participation of national and regional authorities in the development and implementation of the strategy at its core.
• The research and development environment in Greece was already unfavourable both due to structural weaknesses and because of the deep economic crisis.
• The country’s institutional framework both in the management of the NSRF in general and in the management of the Smart Specialisation Strategy in particular was the main weakness that prevented the effective implementation of the strategy, with delays and lack of coordination between stakeholders.
• Despite the difficulties, Greece has managed to improve its performance with respect to the European innovation indicators, but has not managed to reach the European average.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for October 2024.

On October 5, 2024, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a working breakfast at his residence in Chania with a group of Republican US Senators who participate, among others, in the Committees on Appropriations, Intelligence and Energy of the United States Senate. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias, while the US side was represented by Senators Jerry Moran (Kan.), Susan Collins (ME), John Boozman (AR), John Cornyn (TX), John Hoeven (ND) and the US Ambassador to Athens, George Tsunis. During the meeting, they discussed the excellent level of Greek-American relations and Greek-American defence cooperation, as well as Greece’s role as a pillar of stability and security in the wider region.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), Greece is rekindling discussions with the US regarding the potential acquisition of four littoral combat ships (LCS) as part of the so-called ‘Blinken package’. Following previous negotiations that faltered due to the aging and defective nature of the offered ships, Athens is seeking alternatives that better meet its needs. The Hellenic Navy insists on acquiring upgraded LCS vessels, specifically the Wichita, Billings, Indianapolis and St Louis, rather than the older Milwaukee, Detroit, Little Rock and Sioux City.

On October 24, 2024, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Mr. Giannis Kefalogiannis, met the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. James C. O’Brien, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. Joshua R. Huck, in the Ministry of National Defence. The Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff, General Dimitrios Houpis, also participated in the meeting. During this meeting, common security and regional stability matters were discussed, while the strategic importance of the defensive cooperation between Greece and the United States, as that is defined in the updated Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) of 2021, was highlighted.

According to the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), on October 31, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo visited Greece and held a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister. As Secretary of State in the first Trump administration, Pompeo had expressed his support for Greece on several occasions with his visit to Chania in 2020 focusing on the US naval base in the Gulf of Souda and his letter on Greece-US strategic cooperation to his then Greek counterpart, Minister Nikos Dendias, in 2020.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The policy paper “Cybersecurity: how to shield the country’s digital future” summarizes and elaborates on the conclusions of the roundtable discussion organized in March 2024 by the Center for Cyber Resilience of the Delphi Economic Forum, in collaboration with ELIAMEP, with the support of Vodafone Greece and the participation of leading government, political, academic and market representatives.

This paper presents: a) a brief historical review of the evolution and shaping of the cybersecurity architecture at the European Union level, as well as the corresponding efforts to formulate a policy framework in Greece; b) the findings of a public opinion survey on cybersecurity among Greek citizens and businesses operating in Greece, conducted by Metron Analysis; c) a set of policy proposals for strengthening cybersecurity in Greece.

Read the paper here (in Greek).

 

The policy brief outlines the strategic vision and structural reorganisation of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen’s second term. Emphasising “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0 consolidates power through a streamlined, centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, aiming for a more responsive and efficient EU. Each Commissioner has been assigned specific, often overlapping, missions focusing on key areas such as the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, and European defence. This centralisation marks a shift toward a more presidential model, raising concerns about governance complexity and missed opportunities for deeper citizen engagement and clearer portfolio distinctions. At the same time, it constitutes the core strategic approach to addressing the EU’s complex priorities.

• Vision: President Ursula von der Leyen prioritises “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” aiming for a responsive, flexible, and efficient European Union.

• New Commission Structure: The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 introduces a centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, removing traditional Vice-Presidents to streamline leadership.

• Mission Letters: Each of the 26 Commissioners-designate received specific missions, with major focuses on the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, industrial sovereignty, and European defence.

• Presidentialisation: The Commission’s structure reflects increased centralisation, reinforcing von der Leyen’s authority and moving towards a presidential model.

• Challenges: Overlapping portfolios (e.g., environment, defence, and competitiveness) create complexity and redundancy across roles.

• Missed Opportunities: The new structure lacks a dedicated focus on EU governance reform and clearer citizen engagement pathways, which could enhance responsiveness to public concerns​.

• Strategic Approach: The persistent overlap of portfolios necessitates a centralised, streamlined structure to improve governance and address the EU’s complex priorities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the ‘Arian Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Dimitrios Kollias, Junior Research Fellow, Programme Manager, Ariane Condellis European Programme, ELIAMEP, Stefanos Spyridon Pappas, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP; Lefteris Foivos Vasilopoulos, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen opened the game with a straight ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ flush. The Commission President envisions a Europe that is more responsive to its citizens, grounded in local engagement and characterised by greater flexibility and efficiency. This vision is evident in the President’s initial written addresses to the Commissioners-designate. In the Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029), President von der Leyen establishes the priorities and expectations guiding each portfolio, setting a strategic tone for the responsibilities of each Commissioner and the collaborative goals within the Commission.

These letters draw upon insights and recommendations from landmark reports commissioned by previous administrations of the European executive. These documents include the Draghi Report, addressing the future of European competitiveness; the Strategic Dialogue report on the future of EU Agriculture; and the Letta Report, which focuses on the development of the Single Market. Additionally, the recent Niinistö Report, which will guide Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness, is also referenced. The incoming Commission will leverage these reports to underpin new proposals and initiatives.

The strategic orientation and concrete directives in each Commissioner-designate portfolio will be thoroughly discussed during the European Parliament’s rigorous screening process, scheduled between November 4th and 12th. This process is of high value in democratic and political terms. It will legitimise the Commission and reveal where prospective Commissioners stand on the more sensitive issues of the next five-year agenda.

This policy brief outlines and analyses the revamped structure and key features of the von der Leyen Commission 2.0. More importantly, it offers a comprehensive overview of the mission letters issued to the Commissioners-designate in anticipation of the forthcoming hearings.

The New Structure of von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0

Reshuffling of portfolios for a new Commission term is standard practice, necessary to accommodate the growing number of Commissioners and changing priorities. The 2019–2024 College of Commissioners bore some similarities to previous structures but also introduced notable differences. The Commission was directed by the President alongside Executive Vice-presidents (EVPs) and Vice-presidents (VPs). Each one of them was assigned the task of leading groups of Commissioners who focused on specific strategic pillars with a thematic orientation. Key portfolios, such as the European Green Deal, Promoting the European Way of Life, and Stronger Europe in the World, operated under the leadership of an EVP or VP, who in turn reported directly to the Commission President.

The mission letters addressed to the 2019-2024 College of Commissioners highlighted a clear distinction in structure and roles. Under von der Leyen’s initial leadership model, eight Vice-presidents were entrusted with guiding and coordinating thematic groups of Commissioners, each focused on one of the Commission’s key priorities, with support provided by the Secretariat-General. Every Commissioner was involved in one or more of these groups, with a notable exception: the Commissioner for Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn, reported directly to the President of the European Commission. Among the eight Vice-presidents, three held the special role of Executive Vice-president, balancing dual responsibilities. These Executive Vice-presidents not only led a specific Commissioners’ Group, but also managed an assigned policy domain, overseeing a Directorate-General within their remit. A unique feature of this structure was that one of the three, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, assumed the role of chairing the College in the President’s absence.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems. Vice-presidents are out and the six Executive Vice-presidents (5 + the High Representative, Kaja Kallas) now oversee a select group of Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying considerably by position. This resulting organizational structure is simpler, eliminating one layer of command and control, i.e. the Vice-presidents. This new organizational architecture is expected to remain irrespective of how the upcoming hearings of the Commissioners-designate play out.

Source: Politico, ‘Who works for whom in the new EU power structure’

 

Mission Letters in Brief

Reviewing the complete set of all twenty-six mission letters is a formidable task, even for EU enthusiasts. For this reason, we have compiled a table of concise overviews of the portfolios and the respective missions of the 2024–2029 Commissioners-designate.

Commissioner Portfolio Mission Teresa Ribera Rodríguez Executive VP for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition Circular Economy, European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy
• Clean Industry Deal
• European Climate Law: 90% reduction in emissions till 2040
• Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund Henna Virkkunen Executive VP for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy Cybersecurity, AI, Tech Sovereignty and internal security, border management – frontier technology, EU Digital Norms and Standards Internationally, digital public infrastructure
• Europe’s 2030 Digital Decade Targets
• AI Strategy – AI Factories Initiative
• European Data Union Strategy• European Democracy Shield Stéphane Séjourné Eexecutive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty Productivity, Innovation, competitiveness, industrial strategy, horizontal Single Market strategy, research and development, Critical Raw Materials Act
• Clean Industrial Deal
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Kaja Kallas High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission Strengthening security and defence, strategic partnerships, joined-up foreign policy
• Preparation of regular College of Commissioners’ debates on foreign policy issues.
• Modern and joined up FP (new foreign economic policy, external financial instruments) Roxana Mînzatu Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness Training and education, Erasmus+, European Sport Model, Quality Jobs roadmap
• European Pillar of Social Rights, New Pact for European Social Dialogue
• EU Anti-poverty Strategy
• European Affordable Housing Plan Raffaele Fitto Executive VP for Cohesion and Reforms Productivity, innovation, competitiveness, Next GenerationEU, resilience and sustainability
• Effective right to stay for every citizen
• European Affordable Housing Plan / New European Bauhaus Initiative
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maroš Šefčovič Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency Competitiveness, security, sustainability, free and fair trade, World Trade Organization, international negotiations, EU and the G7, new economic security doctrine
• European Economic Security Strategy
• Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships
• EU Customs Authority Valdis Dombrovskis Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification Stability, Growth, NextGenerationEU, European Semester, competitiveness, digital euro
• Stability and Growth Pact
• Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Dubravka Šuica Commissioner for Mediterranean Mediterranean, demography, external aspects of migration policy, security, crime, terrorism, Southern Neighbourhood
• New Pact for the Mediterranean
• Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Green Tech Cooperation Initiative
• Reconstruction plan for Gaza
• Gulf Strategy Olivér Várhelyi Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare Health and Animal Welfare, European Health Union, modernisation of rules on animal welfare, food safety standards
• Critical Medicines Act
• European Biotech Act
• European Health Data Space Wopke Hoekstra Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Climate risks, climate diplomacy, security, ecological transition, emissions trading scheme and taxation
• European Climate Law
• Clean Industrial Deal / European Climate Adaptation Plan
• Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive Andrius Kubilius Commissioner for Defence and Space European Defence Union, space, military mobility, civil-military, EU-NATO strategy
• White Paper on the Future of European Defence
• EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence / EU Space Law
• European Defence Fund / European Defence Industrial Strategy Marta Kos Commissioner for Enlargement Enlargement, EU neighbourhood policy, Ukraine, Turkey, Balkans, Southern Caucasus
• Gradual integration of candidate countries
• Black Sea Strategy Jozef Síkela Commissioner for International Partnerships Clean trade and investment partnerships

• Team Europe approach

• Global Gateway Costas Kadis Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans Coastal communities, food security, food sovereignty
• Common Fisheries Policy
• EU Ocean Research and Innovation Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maria Luís Albuquerque Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union Financing green, social and digital transition, EU as global leader in sustainable finance

•             Banking Union / European Deposit Insurance Scheme

•             European Savings and Investments Union Hadja Lahbib Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management; Equality Civil preparedness, integrated approach to crisis management, international humanitarian law, roadmap for women’s rights, antiracist action, LGBTIQ rights, People with Disability Rights, and rights of minorities
• EU Preparedness Union Strategy / EU Preparedness Law
• European Civil Defence Mechanism
• Gender Equality Strategy
• Anti-racism Strategy
• LGBTIQ Equality Strategy
• Strategy for the Persons with Disabilities Magnus Brunner Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Internal security, strong common borders, migration, fight again organised crime, cybercrime, improvements of Schengen framework
• European Internal Security Strategy
• EU Visa-Policy Strategy
• Pact on Migration and Asylum Jessika Roswall Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy European Green Deal, water security and resilience, natural world, bioeconomy, global water leadership
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan
• New European Bauhaus Piotr Serafin Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration Responsive budget, anti-fraud, modern public administration
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Conditionality Regulation
• European Anti-Fraud Office Dan Jørgensen Commissioner for Energy and Housing Energy Union, sustainable and affordable housing
• European Affordable Housing Plan
• Clean Industrial Deal
• Electrification Action Plan Ekaterina Zaharieva Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation Startups, research and development, innovation
• European Innovation Council / European Research Council
• European Innovation Act
• European Research Area Michael McGrath Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law Democracy, Justice and Rule of Law, fairness and integrity, single market
• European Democracy Shield
• Rule of Law Report
• Consumer Agenda 2025-2030 Apostolos Tzitzikostas Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism Resilient and competitive tourism sector, sustainable transport

• Trans-European Transport Corridor

• Single Market for Transport Services

• Comprehensive EU Port Strategy Christophe Hansen Commissioner for Agriculture and Food Food security, rural areas, food sovereignty
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Vision for Agriculture and Food Glenn Micallef Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport Strategy on Intergenerational Fairness, youth participation, Culture Compass, European Sport Diplomacy
• Youth Policy Dialogues
• President’s Youth Advisory Board
• EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child

 

The Keywords of the new Commission: Presidentialisation, Overlap and Missed Opportunities

In her re-election speech to the European Parliament and subsequent political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic framework of action centred around seven key pillars. These define the focal areas of her vision and include:

• A New Plan for Europe’s Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness
• A new era for European Defence and Security
• Supporting people, strengthening our societies and our social model
• Sustaining our quality of life: food security, water and nature
• Protecting our democracy, upholding our values
• A global Europe: Leveraging our power and partnerships
• Delivering together and preparing our Union for the future.

In their in-depth analysis of the political guidelines and mission letters Levente Kocsis and Eric Maurice, identify 194 specific commitments made by the President of the Commission. These commitments are broadly organised across the strategic pillars mentioned in the guidelines, as seen in the following graph, in percentage terms. They also align closely with the priorities defined in the Strategic Agenda adopted in June 2024, as well as with those of the European political parties whose support was essential for von der Leyen’s re-election by the Parliament.

Source: EPC, COMPENDIUM EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME 24 OCTOBER 2024

When considering the new structure of the Commission (absent of Vice-presidents) in tandem with the study of specific policy areas in each portfolio, three features emerge: increased presidentialisation, continuity of overlapping mandates, and missed opportunities to upgrade policies and streamline Commision’s work.

Presidentialisation

Von der Leyen’s first term has been characterised by a slow but undoubtable shift of power to the Commission’s centre, i.e. a presidentialisation of the institution, that is especially poignant compared to the two previous office holders, namely José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker (Kassim 2021). The initial presidentialist thrust owes much to the first use of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014 (Dimitrakopoulos et al. 2024: 8). The multi-faceted and continuous crisis environment, from the global pandemic to the land war at the EU’s doorstep, have created windows of opportunity for the incremental centralisation of power and authority in the hands of the Commission President (Moens et al 2024). Von der Leyen has capitalised on all the above. This trend conflicts with the traditional Commission ethos of purely collegial pluralism, wherein Commissioners are of de facto equal rank and free to exercise independent judgment, as enshrined in the Treaties (Article 17(8) TEU and Articles 234 and 250 TFEU).

Still, there are references in the Treaties that pave the way for a different conceptualisation of the Commission President’s role. Such alternative approaches could be justified by the fact that Commission Presidents are elected first (as President-elect) and exercise considerable control over the subsequent composition of the College (Article 17(7) TEU). Furthermore, after the confirmation of the Commissioners, the President retains full control of the body. Their power to unilaterally compel the resignation of an individual Commissioner, except the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is proof of this (Article 18(1) TEU). Finally, the Commission President has wide-ranging organisational powers that allow them to exert significant control over individual Commissioners, whether through re-shuffling of portfolios or division of portfolios (Article 17(6) TEU and Article 248 TFEU) (Cotter 2024).

…centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. 

The ongoing centralisation is accompanied by greater politicisation that risks undermining the technocratic nature of the Commission. The fusion of politics and technocracy may be anathema to many, whilst others may see it as a necessary step towards further political integration in the European project. Nevertheless, centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. While acknowledging the legitimacy concerns of such a development, its positive effect may prove catalytic for the association between European demos and the – oft demonised – EU institutional architecture.

Regardless of one’s disposition towards the Commission’s presidentialisation, what appeared to be an unorganized and seemingly improvisational manoeuvre in von der Leyen’s first term now seems baked into her strategy. The Commission’s new structure, with its murky portfolios and downgraded Vice-presidents now limited to a seemingly obedient executive role, hints at a transformation of the Commission from a collegial body into a Presidential office, as Alberto Alemanno argues. This restructuring is designed to drive key priorities forward by simplifying the ‘line of command’. In the new format, Executive Vice-presidents oversee only a select few Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying significantly across roles. Certain Commissioners—including ‘heavy guns’ like former Vice-presidents Valdis Dombrovskis and Maros Šefčovič but also Piotr Serafin who will handle the EU budget ‘hot potato’ during the Multi-Annual Financial Framework negotiations—will report directly to the President. The new setup clearly indicates a Commission that operates under the strict supervision and guidance of President von der Leyen in most if not all key issues, including economic security and productivity. Thus, the structure of the new Commission is clearly hierarchical, which testifies to its further presidentialisation.

Overlaps

Each new College of Commissioners is typically prefaced by discussions around “overlap,” an issue recognised as fact rather than speculation. After successive enlargements, the number of Commissioners now exceeds the scope of EU competences, raising valid questions about the substantive content of certain portfolios. This presents a structural problem that underlies any discussion about the inevitable overlap of individual portfolios.

Clear examples of overlap include Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, Executive VP for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition and Stéphane Séjourné, Executive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty. The authority of Ribera Rodriguez appears somewhat uncertain. Although officially tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Green Deal, her remit includes control over the powerful Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), the EU body with exclusive competence over competition; this is a policy area currently being transfigured by economic sovereignty concerns. She is tasked, among others, with the Circular Economy (although there is a Commissioner on Circular Economy: Jessika Roswall), the European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy, the Clean Industry Deal and the Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund. Crucially, Séjourné, responsible for prosperity and industrial sovereignty (and not competitiveness), is also responsible (among others) for Productivity (as opposed to growth strategy), competitiveness, industrial strategy the Clean Industrial Deal, the European Competitiveness Fund and the Competitiveness Coordination Tool.

Furthermore, an even more weirded situation exists between Roxana Mînzatu, Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness, in a triple (or more) partial overlap with Executive VP of Cohesion and Reforms Raffaele Fitto; and Commissioners-designate Glenn Micallef, Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport; and Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner on Energy and Housing. The first focuses on skills and labour gaps, training and education, Erasmus+, the European Sport Model, the Quality Jobs roadmap, the European Pillar of Social Rights, the New Pact for European Social Dialogue, the EU Anti-poverty Strategy and the European Affordable Housing Plan. The second, Raffaele Fitto, also focuses on the European Affordable Housing Plan and New European Bauhaus Initiative, the Climate Adaptation Plan, competitiveness and NextGenerationEU. Glenn Micallef follows with every youth and culture-related topic before going back to Dan Jørgensen and sustainable and affordable housing, specifically the European Affordable Housing Plan and the Clean Industrial Deal (among other things).

Maroš Šefčovič, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency, has a portfolio that overlaps with the International Partnerships portfolio of Commissioner Jozef Síkela.

Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen, overseeing Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, manages a portfolio that intersects significantly with technology—particularly AI—and the strengthening of external borders, especially in relation to managing migration flows. Her role directly references the Pact on Asylum and Migration and is closely aligned with the operations of Frontex. This creates a reciprocal overlap with Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space; Magnus Brunner, Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration; and Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, highlighting a cohesive yet complex interrelation across portfolios.

Having already highlighted the overlap between Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, it is essential to address another area of significant overlap—namely, the intersection of foreign policy and defence. Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission, among others, also operates with a mandate to strengthen security and defence (focusing on Ukraine, European Defence Union, NATO, and sanctions).

Bearing in mind the above discussion, three features characterise the structure of the new College: overlapping hierarchy; significant differences between executive Vice-presidential portfolios; and reporting lines that run in different directions with several Executive Vice-presidents responsible for several Commissioners and von der Leyen being directly responsible for some parts of the Commissioners’ portfolios (Patrin 2024).

Missed Opportunities

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios.

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios. An example is that of the Belgian Commissioner-designate, Hadja Lahbib, who is responsible for “preparedness”, encompassing mainly prevention and crisis management. However, her portfolio also includes the promotion of gender equality and the combating of discrimination—two areas of competence notably distinct from her primary crisis-related duties, creating some confusion and raising doubts about the rationale behind this competence allocation. Moreover, considering the portfolio of Olivér Várhelyi, integrating public health policy with animal health could inadvertently undermine the efforts within his primary sector—a potentially shortsighted approach. Health policy is intricately connected to economic drivers such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and is essential in addressing significant challenges, including demographic shifts, the implications of an ageing population, workforce sustainability, and the potential emergence of future health crises, such as pandemics.

A second missed opportunity regards interaction with European citizens. Although the Mission Letters broadly state that the Commission intends to usher in a new era of dialogue with citizens, this commitment is not clearly reflected in the responsibilities assigned in the mission statements. If the new Commission aims to integrate citizens into its work, this priority should have been explicitly incorporated into the Commission’s structure, ideally through the defined role of at least one Executive Vice-President (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis, 2024).

Finally, the overarching goal of strengthening EU governance, rendered especially important in response to numerous internal and external challenges and the potential expansion to over 30 member states, is notably absent in the new Commission’s structure. This priority is only lightly touched upon in the general section of the Mission Letters and is not evident in the distribution of major portfolios. Such omissions strongly suggest that governance reform within the EU is not a central focus of the second von der Leyen Commission. 

Conclusion

…a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission.

As previously noted, portfolio reshuffling and overlap among Commissioners is not uncommon. On the contrary, it has become the norm. The Treaty-enshrined high number of Commissioners, directly linked with the number of member-states, and the challenge of accommodating all of them in different portfolios remain ongoing concerns. This was a notable feature of the prior political cycle and continues to be so in the new Commission structure. Restructuring and reshuffling have not yet solved the major problem of overlap as evidenced by the priorities of the Commissioners-designate discussed in the first section of this policy brief. The shift toward a more centripetal approach, therefore, may not be an unforeseen or undesirable development, especially given the ambitious and highly complex triptych of ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ put forward by Von der Leyen herself. To achieve these goals, a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Given the inevitability of portfolio overlaps, adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission. 

 

References

Cotter, J. (2024) ‘La Commission, c’est moi? The invisible hand of Article 17(6) TEU in the presidentialisation of the European Commission’, 25 September, https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-new-von-der-leyen-president/

Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (2024) ‘Introduction: The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency’ in Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (eds) The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency Spitzenkandidaten and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan.

Draghi, M., 2024. Report on European Competitiveness. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en  [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2014. Letters by President Sassoli to Commission President-elect von der Leyen Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190930IPR62887/letters-by-president-sassoli-to-commission-president-elect-von-der-leyen [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2024. Confirmation Hearings Process Overview. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Union, 2024. Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/documents_en [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Council, 2024. Strategic Agenda Adopted by the EU. European Council Meeting, June 2024, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_3549 [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Fondation Robert Schuman, 2024. Analysis on the Structure of the von der Leyen II Commission. Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman. Available at: https://server.www.robert-schuman.eu/storage/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-764-en.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Kassim, H. (2021) ‘The European Commission: from collegiality to presidential leadership’, in D. Hodson, U. Puetter, S. Saurugger, and J. Peterson (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (5th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Kocsis, L. and Maurice, E., 2024. 194 Specific Commitments Analysis in European Politics and Institutions Programme. EPC Compendium on European Politics, European Policy Centre, Brussels.

Letta, E., 2024. Report on the Future of the Single Market. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Moens, B., Griera, M. and Barigazzi, J (2024) ‘From queen to empress: Inside Ursula von der Leyen’s power grab’, Politico, 19 September, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-europe-commission-brussels-power/

Niinistö, S. (2024) Safer Together Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Report by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, In his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Parliament Hearing Committee, 2019. Concerns on Nominees László Trócsányi, Rovana Plumb, and Sylvie Goulard. Internal Report, European Parliament Hearings, Brussels.

Patrin, M. (2024) ‘New Structure, New Priorities – Why the Next Commission May Be More Hierarchical but less Coherent’, 15 October, https://verfassungsblog.de/commissions-new-structure/

Piodi, F. (2007) A Study of the proceedings of the European Convention accompanied by archive documents, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/cardoc/pe_and_job_ce_en.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Strategic Dialogue Group, 2024. Report on the Future of EU Agriculture. European Commission, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4528 (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Taylor, S. (2014) How jeleva was forced out, POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-jeleva-was-forced-out  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf&trk=public_post_comment-text (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Re-election Speech to the European Parliament. European Parliament, Strasbourg, 4 July.

von der Leyen, U. (2019) Misson Letter Margrethe Vestager, European Commission. Available at: https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/document/download/0146cc5f-761f-48ee-8316-a3e92dc3e7ca_en?filename=mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf(Accessed: 01 November 2024).

Zuleeg, F. and Emmanouilidis, J. (2024) Reactions to the next commission, EPC – European Policy Centre. Available at: https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Reactions-to-the-next-Commission~5d5e58  (Access

Ioannis Armakolas and Alexandra Voudouri, co-authored the article “Relaunching Enlargement: How Will It Affect the Western Balkans?” for the 21st European Institute of the Mediterranean Yearbook, which focuses on the developments and perspectives of European policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

In their paper, the authors highlight the process of redefining the EU’s enlargement strategy in the light of geopolitical changes, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a focus on the integration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans by 2030. They argue that the cycle of indecision can be broken if the EU links the new Growth Plan to critical reforms and negotiating chapters, providing incentives for candidate countries to overcome bilateral differences. Furthermore, according to the authors, a credible roadmap for deeper integration, clarity on the necessary reforms and effective communication to ensure public support are essential for a successful enlargement process.

You can read the article here.

This database provides an inventory and critical appraisal of available estimates and indicators related to irregular migration flows.  The datasets include meta-level information on sources and methodology and a quality assessment based on MIrreM’s criteria.

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

 

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

The interview is available only in Greek here.

Source: Free Sunday

Commentary published in the newspaper “Filelevtheros” (available only in Greek here), which refers to the recently published report entitled “Structural Reforms in Greece during the Crisis: 2010-2014. Overview, Evaluation and Policy Proposals” edited by the Crisis Observatory

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under the Mercator European Dialogue (MED) program, successfully organized the strategic  workshop on: “Threat perceptions and scenarios for EU security and defense” on the 10th of July.

European MPs and researchers attended the event, had the opportunity to exchange views on critical issues of the European Union. This exchange has been initiated under the framework of the Mercator European Dialogue, a project organised by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in Athens and is funded by Stiftung Mercator and since 2017 also by the King Baudouin Foundation.

    

 

A new report entitled “Structural Reforms in Greece during the Crisis: 2010-2014. Overview, Evaluation and Policy Proposals”, has just been published by the Crisis Observatory. The report is the outcome of the research programme “The Political Economy of Structural Reforms in Greece”, which was assigned to the Crisis Observatory by the Bank of Greece.

The report was coordinated and edited by Dimitris Katsikas (Head of the Crisis Observatory). The researchers that participated in the research programme and contributed to the report are: Dimitris Katsikas, Marianthi Anastasatou, Elisavet Nitsi, Athanasios Petralias, Kyriakos Filinis, Giannis Vintzileos and AlexandroGeorgakopoulos.

A printed version of the report will be presented in a special event, which will be announced by the website and the social media of the Crisis/ Observatory and ELIAMEP.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

The vigorous development of military technology has changed the way in which military operations are carried out, and at the same time the way and structure of the Administration. Countries with strong armed forces have broadly developed the so-called “Network-centric War”. The result was to gain a military advantage in the battlefield against the enemy. Regular benefits have arisen due to good image, immediate and timely transfer of information and, finally, effective destruction of hostile targets. Apart from the US, China and Turkey are two countries that are implementing Net Centric Warfare.

Working Paper 95/2018: Net Centric Warfare – NCW (in Greek)

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

The three main protagonists in the Greek economic crisis, the Greek government, the IMF and the Eurozone partners ignored known lessons of how to deal with debt problems and committed policy errors that unnecessarily prolonged the crisis. This short note discusses the options for debt relief and restoration of creditworthiness at the end of the third bailout, which is soon approaching, and makes recommendations for Greek government policy that would promote viable, inclusive economic growth for the long term.

Click here to read the ELIAMEP Thesis “Greek Crisis: The End Game and Beyond“

INVITATION

 

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Athens Office, would like to invite you to a debate on:

The Future of European Defence – more Union needed?

This invite-only round table discussion aims to debate the recent trends in European security and defence policy. The panel of distinguished specialists will update us on the state of the EU’s structured cooperation agenda, discuss the degree of strategic autonomy we desire and need, and interpret the concepts of a European Defence Union and a European Army. It will explore the challenges of the current geostrategic context in the region and the stance of Greece within.

Inputs by:

Jo Coelmont, Egmont Institute Brussels, Former Belgian Permanent Representative to the Military Committee of the European Union

Thanos Dokos, Director-General, ELIAMEP, Athens

Hans-Peter Bartels, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Berlin

 

Followed by a discussion with all participants chaired by

Uwe Optenhögel, Vice-President of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies FEPS and editor of the book ‘Strategic Autonomy and the Defense of Europe’

 

The event will be followed by a reception.

The event will be held in English, on Wednesday 20 June 2018, at 18:30 hrs, at Aegli – Zappeion  – Privee hall (1st floor).

 

R.S.V.P.

Ms. Nina Papaioannou Τ: 210 7257111,  F: 210 7257114

e-mail: nina@eliamep.gr

 

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG

Athens office,  www.fes-athens.org