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Military Purchasing News for Defense Procurement Managers and Contractors

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$305.5M Contract to LM for JASSM | Army Plans to Lighten Load on Gray Eagles | Army & AF Invest in Countermeasures

Thu, 15/10/2015 - 02:20

Americas

Lockheed Martin has been awarded a production contract for the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), with the $305.5 million contract also covering upgrades, logistics and support services. The stealthy cruise missile’s extended-range (ER) upgrade hit full-rate production in December last year, with the US planning to purchase around 2,400 JASSM missiles and a further 3,000 JASSM-ER variants. Poland became the third JASSM export customer in September after Lockheed Martin announced a Foreign Military Sales contract to provide forty missiles to equip the Polish Air Force’s fleet of F-16C/D fighters.
The Navy has announced that there will be an independent review into the Remote Minehunting System, a module designed to operate with the Littoral Combat Ship fleet. The review is due by the end of November, with concerns over the program’s technical capabilities leading to a delay in operational testing in September. The RMS completed developmental testing in December 2013, with Senators McCain and Reed expressing particular criticism of the RMS. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin has pushed back at this criticism, stating that the RMS has achieved its operational availability and reliability requirements.
The problems grounding lightweight pilots from flying the F-35 are now thought to be centered on the Joint Strike Fighter’s sophisticated Gen III helmet. The helmet – designed and built by Rockwell Collins and Elbit Systems – is now thought to be too heavy to ensure a safe ejection at low speeds. The precise issue of whether the Martin Baker ejection seat or the helmet requires modification – or both – is currently under review by the Joint Project Office.
As the Army looks to standardize equipment to better enable Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), the datalink equipping AH-64E Apaches will be replaced by one capable of operating across a broad spectrum of bandwidths used by various UAV systems. L-3 was awarded a contract last month for the MUM-TX datalink capable of operating across this spectrum, with this set to equip the future Apache fleet. In June the Army carried out a MUM-T test involving an AH-64 Apache and a MQ-1C Gray Eagle, with the Apache demonstrating the ability to launch a Hellfire missile using data remotely received from the UAV’s sensors.
Meanwhile, the Army is looking to field a wider array of weapons on the MQ-1C, with a particular focus being given to cheap, small munitions to complement the expensive AGM-114 Hellfires to which it sis currently limited. The program office is also looking for subsonic, lightweight weapons weighing around 30lb. The Hellfire currently weighs in at 105lb, with the reduced weight allowing for more weapons to be carried by the UAV. The Army also wants to implement a host of other improvements to the Gray Eagle, including more jam-resistant datalinks and assured position navigation and timing.
The Air Force has awarded a contract to Orbital ATK for next-generation aircraft countermeasures, with the “spectrally matched” system – known as the MJU-73/B – capable of accurately replicating an aircraft’s heat signature to fool incoming missiles. The Army has also been investing in infrared countermeasure systems for its helicopter fleets, awarding a $35.3 million EMD contract to a Northrop Grumman-led team in late August – loser BAE Systems has since protested this decision.

Europe

As Norway eyes a defense budget hike for FY2016, the country’s defense establishment is looking to bolster funding for its future fleet of 52 F-35s. With procurement of the first 22 F-35As cleared by the Norwegian Parliament – covering deliveries to 2019 – the program is expected to see a doubling of its budget in 2016, with the country’s P-3 Orion ASW fleet also seeing a budget boost.

Middle East North Africa

Sky News is reporting that several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are negotiating a potential sale of Israeli air and missile defense systems as fears over Iranian missile technology grow. The Iron Dome system the countries are looking to acquire would be purchased through Raytheon. In August 2010 the company partnered with Rafael Advanced Defense Industries to position the system for the US export market. The GCC states are also reportedly interested in acquiring the longer-range David’s Sling system, which when used in conjunction with Arrow interceptors can target subsonic intercontinental ballistic missiles. An integrated GCC missile shield system has been discussed for years, with the concept receiving a renewed push after the signing of the JCPOA with Iran in July.

Asia Pacific

China will reportedly deliver a further fifty JF-17 Thunder fighters to Pakistan, with deliveries spread over a three-year period. Pakistan has received sixty of the co-developed aircraft already, with these forming two combat squadrons and a training, test & evaluation contingent. The two states have also reportedly signed an agreement to keep the JF-17’s technology away from strategic rival India, with China also reported to have pressured Pakistan to keep this technology away from the US.

Today’s Video

The Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) during trials by the Royal Australian Air Force:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

It’s All in the Package: the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mission Modules

Thu, 15/10/2015 - 02:18

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What makes the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship designs truly different? They’re built with minimal fixed equipment and large empty spaces for modular gear, instead of a set array of weapons and mission electronics. Otherwise, they’re almost the size of Britain’s Type 23 frigates, and might well be classified as frigates, were it not for their shallow water design and equipment choices.

LCS is a great concept that has been marred by poor execution, and design decisions that have robbed it of flexibility in the one area where the ship is weakest. The US Navy is buying quite a few of them anyway, and so the capabilities of the ship’s mission packages will determine what kind of contribution they can make.

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Packages… The Concept: Packages & Boxes LCS designs
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For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. As such, both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull offer potential top speeds of 40-50 knots over short distances. That speed is very unusual in a vessel their size, but it isn’t the LCS’ most distinctive feature.

The terms have changed over time, but the US Navy has downgraded the term “mission modules” to mean individual components plus their support equipment. They’re generally containerized in fully outfitted ISO 20′ containers that include power and other connections built in per LCS specs. Integrated arrays of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission are now called “mission packages.” They include all task-related mission modules, onboard aircraft, and their corresponding crew detachments.

The original concept was to have these packages switch in and out of ships in under 72 hours. Wargaming simulations showed that even then, a clever enemy could yank the US Navy’s chain by switching the threat, and keeping the LCS ships in transit to ports for refits rather than on the front lines. In reality, recent GAO reports acknowledge that the required tools, need for specialized personnel, and other factors will make switch-outs a 3-week affair.

Mission packages still offer long-term fleet flexibility, therefore, but switch-outs aren’t realistic as a tactical option.

Each mission package will be fielded in at least 4 increments, stretching from 2014 – 2019. The base ships are:

Standard Equipment MH-60R Seahawk
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Fixed equipment is minimal, but still present.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, American Littoral Combat Ships will carry a BAE Systems Mk.110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, using Mk.295 ammunition whose fuzing makes it effective against aerial, naval, or ground threats.

Raytheon’s RIM-116 RAM Rolling Airframe Missile. RAM is designed to handle anti-ship missiles, aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, and even small boats, but its range of just 9 km/ 5 nm will only protect its own ship. Unlike larger missiles such as the RIM-162 ESSM, RAM systems cannot perform fleet defense.

Like all modern naval vessels, LCS ships will have onboard helicopters, in a mix of medium-sized MH-60 helicopters and/or MQ-8B/C Fire Scout helicopter UAVs. Other robotic vehicles will include a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV), which form the backbone of the mission packages.

Planned Packages

The ships’ first and most important mission package isn’t officially listed. It consists of a small but very cross-trained crew. LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations.

There are concerns that this is a design weakness, leaving the LCS crew at the edge of its capabilities to just run the ship, with insufficient on-board maintenance capabilities, and too little left over for contingencies such as boarding and search, damage control, illnesses, etc. USS Freedom’s addition of 20 more bunks before her 1st Asian deployment, and the Navy’s decision to add or retrofit that extra capacity to every LCS, validated the point.

Beyond the human element, the LCS program will initially draw upon packages for Mine Warfare (MIW: 24 planned), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW: 16 planned) and Surface Warfare (SUW: 24 planned). The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies to these ends, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module. Costs per module have gone down over time, but that hasn’t been from any genius in planning and fielding. Rather, it results from a high program failure rate of individual components, and their replacement in the program by less expensive items.

A 2014 report from the US CRS placed the cost of common installed equipment required by all packages at $14.9 million.

ASW Package: Sub-Hunter ASW, 2013
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The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) module has experienced a lot of turbulence, and after early testing went poorly, the Navy is re-thinking this entire module.

In: A new General Dynamics USV, and acoustic sensors such as Lockheed’s SQR-20 multifunction towed array. The towed array will be accompanied by a ship-towed variable-depth sonar, and a towed torpedo countermeasure device. While the components themselves are mature, integration and testing will take a while. Fielding of the entire revised module is now slated for 2016.

Out: The Advanced Deployable System (ADS) had been at the heart of the ASW anti-submarine module. It was intended to be a fast-deploying underwater sensor net developed by Lockheed Martin under the Maritime Surveillance Systems program office (PMS 485). The Navy soon concluded that it needed a moving capability, rather than a barrier approach, and that was that for ADS.

The next ASW mainstay was expected to be Lockheed’s WLD-1 sub-surface USV towing the AN/AQS-20A, but it was relegated to mine warfare only in late 2009.

So far, the ability to carry a pair of MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters is the only thing that distinguishes an ASW-equipped LCS from a small corvette, and even there, LCS performance is likely to suffer by comparison. The towed sonars have depth limitations that may prevent their use in shallow water, and the LCS waterjets are so noisy that unlike an ASW corvette, a bow sonar isn’t really an option. In deeper water, GAO is concerned that the ship’s lack of defensive capabilities don’t make it survivable enough to act as an ASW escort beyond any initial attacks. Meanwhile, the lack of torpedo tubes or vertical launch cells remains a weakness, removing the ability to take fast shots at discovered submarines unless a helicopter is in the air already.

A 2014 report from the US CRS estimated the cost of the ASW Package at $20.9 million, with the caveat that it’s still in initial development.

MCM/MIW Package: Mine Detection & Clearance MCM 2013
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The LCS’ Mine Counter-Measures package addresses a significant and growing threat around the world’s maritime chokepoints, even as proven assets with service life still remaining are being removed from the US Navy. To that end, the MIW is trying to integrate a number of systems developed by the Mine Warfare program office (PMS 495).

Initial equipment includes the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting (RMS) UUV System towing an AQS-20A sonar, and a specialized MH-60S helicopter with the somewhat iffy Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (AES-1 ALMDS), and an Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) UUV. Even that won’t be available until late 2014.

The helicopter-based AMCM systems will eventually be supplemented by robotic partners in the air, on the surface, and underwater. In the air, UAVs will carry the COBRA system.

On the surface, RMS will be joined by the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) consists of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV), towing the Sweep Power Subsystem for combined acoustic and magnetic minesweeping.

Underwater, the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (SMCM) UUV includes 2 of Bluefin Robotics’ large Bluefin-21 UUVs and an advanced sonar payload developed by GD-AIS.

A number of current and previous MIW systems have failed outright or performed poorly in tests. Despite more than 6 years of development, the US Navy is still fielding older minesweeping systems and ad-hoc UUV/USV options like Seafox and Remus 600/ Kingfish to confront a serious mine threat around the Strait of Hormuz. Worse, weight and space limitations mean that MCM mission commanders will have either UISS and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, or the SMCM Knifefish – but not both systems.

A 2014 report from the US CRS estimated the cost of the MCM Package at $97.7 million.

See DID’s in-depth “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” feature for more program details and updates, including current issues with each of the system’s components.

SUW: Surface Attack, So Under-Whelming LMCO proposal
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The Surface Warfare (SUW) attack module makes use of 4 weapon stations. In addition to the 57mm naval gun, firepower would include the same Mk.46 30mm cannon system used in the Marines’ canceled Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. That level of armament would make the LCS a $550 million coast guard cutter in littoral regions filled with missile-armed fast attack craft, as well as motorboats with torpedoes.

Unfortunately, plans for the rest of this module have fallen apart.

In: The Navy was leaning toward a smaller, very short-range laser/GPS-guided missile called the AGM-176 Griffin B, but ended up choosing the radar-guided, fire and forget AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow missile instead. Range is about 3.5 miles, which is less than 1/6th of the Raytheon NLOS-LS PAM’s planned 25 mile range. This severe range cut, coupled with the warhead’s size, sharply limits LCS ranged engagement options. Hellfires are suitable for engaging maneuvering targets like enemy speedboats, but can’t function as naval fire support for ground forces, or engage Fast Attack Craft or larger vessels.

There are plans to use an improved missile, but reports indicate that the Navy may have to push any replacement missile back to 2020.

NLOS-LS PAM
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Out: Initial plans wanted to add a version of the US Army’s Non Line-of-Sight – Launch System (NLOS-LS), aka. NETFIRES. Each of 3 on-board weapon stations were sized to carry a Netfire “missile in a box” modules with 15 cells, for 45 missiles total. These precision attack missiles (PAM) roughly duplicated the effects of a 155mm shell, and had a range of up to 40 km/ 24 miles. Cost and development issues led to an Army pullout from the joint program in 2010, followed by Navy cancellation.

Note that even this system would have been badly outclassed by common anti-ship missiles mounted on enemy boats and ships, which offer ranges of 100 – 300 miles, and warheads packing 200 or more pounds of explosives. Successful 2014 test-firings of Kongsberg’s stealthy NSM anti-ship missile from the LCS-2 class are a step n this direction, but may be aimed at a derivative frigate design rather than LCS. What’s certain is that until the US Navy fields a capable SuW set, LCS’ surface attack module will remain a gaping weakness by comparison to any other naval combat vessel.

A 2014 report from the US CRS estimated the cost of the SUW Package at $32.6 million.

Think Inside the Box: Other Options TransHospital
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The LCS’s mission bays can also be adapted for other purposes. Indeed, one of the key benefits of the entire concept is that new mission modules can give ships new capabilities, in response to emerging needs over its lifetime, without creating massive refitting costs. Some ideas that have been floated include:

Housing: The Danish Absalon Class multi-mission frigates have already shown that reconfigurable bays can be adapted to carry troops and vehicles, in a manner reminiscent of the 1930s-era APDs adapted from World War 1 destroyers. Special Forces modules, Coast Guard/VBSS boarding team modules, and troop transport for Marines are obvious options, given the ships’ low draught, high speeds, flexible mission spaces, advanced communication systems, and ability to launch ancillary craft.

Medical: With military medical facilities already shifting toward ISO containers for deployment, they’re an obvious fit for LCS. EADS’ TransHospital is one of the most mature designs on the market, but not the only one.

NFS? The Marines were reportedly interested in a Naval Fire Support module, employing a variant of the Army/Marine Corps’ 227mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). That system might fix some of the LCS’ lackluster firepower at sea as well, especially given emerging MLRS guidance options. Their lack of recoil also poses fewer engineering problems than artillery-at-sea programs like Germany’s MONARC 155mm howitzer, or Britain’s naval Braveheart.

At present, there are no firm plans for an MLRS mission module, and developments elsewhere are beginning offer 5″/ 127mm naval guns ultra long-range (LRLAP 5″, Vulcano) GPS-guided shells with a 55+ mile reach. LCS can’t use those weapons, which means the task has to be taken up by $2+ billion ships capable of ballistic missile defense.

Surveying: Ocean environment data can be extremely relevant to missions like submarine hunting. The prototype PLUS (Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance) system creates an undersea network with 6 Kongsberg Marine Remus 600 UUVs, and 5 slow but silent University of Washington Sea Glider UUVs that dive to pick up and relay Remus data. PEO LCS is managing development, but LCS hasn’t been picked as the platform yet.

Carter Copter Mu-1+
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ISR/Strike. Under DARPA’s TERN (Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node) program, the USA is trying to come up with a UAV that can take off and land from the LCS 2 Independence Class, LSD/LPD amphibious ships, JHSV ships, or even DDG-51 destroyers. It would carry a 600 pound ISR/strike payload on missions up to 900 nmi from the ship, and carry a maximum ISR/strike payload of 1,000 pounds. DARPA will accept a threshold 500 pound/ 4kW ISR payload, with an operating radius of 600 nmi, which can operate only from the LCS 2 Independence Class.

If DARPA succeeds, TERN could become an important carrier for some mission module payloads (COBRA), partially replace the surface scan volume coverage once provided by now-retired S-3 Viking sea control jets, and provide the LCS Surface Warfare module package with its 1st truly useful capability: a persistent ISR/strike option that doesn’t exist yet in the US Navy.

The larger question, if and when TERN is handed off to the Navy or USMC, is why the LCS? The Navy’s ultimate goal of deploying TERN aboard DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers would offer a big step forward for US Navy capabilities as a whole, while diluting the LCS’ uniqueness beyond LCS-2’s huge deck size and storage volume. Would the Navy even want to pay to switch out or supplement its beloved MH-60R ASW helicopters aboard a destroyer? Deployment as a partner asset for the US Marine Corps aboard LPD/LSD amphibious ships might be a more natural fit all around. In a tight budget environment, however, even that might have to compete with more capable fixed-wing UAVs that could deploy from a flat-top LHA/LHD amphibious air support ship.

Contracts & Key Events Griffin launch
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Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Some items are covered separately. Mine countermeasures technologies covered in full at “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development“, but notes and link entries may also appear here for some events, in order to provide an integrated timeline perspective or reference specific ships. The same is true for Raytheon’s RAM air defense and surface attack missile, and its Griffin missile.

Note that the structure of weapon contracts like the RAM, Mk-46 gun, Mk-110 gun, etc. may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship. Inclusions here should be considered illustrative, rather than comprehensive.

FY 2016

Independent Review of Remote Minehunting System

October 15/15: The Navy has announced that there will be an independent review into the Remote Minehunting System, a module designed to operate with the Littoral Combat Ship fleet. The review is due by the end of November, with concerns over the program’s technical capabilities leading to a delay in operational testing in September. The RMS completed developmental testing in December 2013, with Senators McCain and Reed expressing particular criticism of the RMS. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin has pushed back at this criticism, stating that the RMS has achieved its operational availability and reliability requirements.

FY 2015

More modules ordered. Crossed fingers for hoping new tests show they meet Navy’s minimum requirements.

Feb 3/15: Still more modules ordered.Northrop Grumman announced it got a $21.6 million contract to provide two more mission modules: one for mine countermeasures the other for surface warfare. With three of each delivered, another mine countermeasures module in production, and two coming along for surface warfare, the total will now amount to eleven.

FY 2014

MQ-8Bs deploying in mixed UAV/H-60 squadrons; RMS testing. LCS + NSM

Sept 23/14: SuW? The US Navy confirms a successful live fire test of Kongsberg’s stealthy Naval Strike Missile from USS Coronado [LCS 4], via a launcher mounted on the flight deck. The Navy is noncommittal about issuing a requirement that would lead to NSM integration with LCS, beyond deployment as part of any SSC derivatives. Sources: US Navy, “Navy Successfully Tests Norwegian Missile from LCS 4” | Kongsberg, “Successful test firing of KONGSBERG’S Naval Strike Missile from US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship” | USNI, “Norwegian Missile Test On Littoral Combat Ship Successful.”

Small ship, long sight

Sept 22/14: TERN Phase II. DARPA/ONR follow up with contract modifications to Phase II for the long-range TERN ISR/Strike naval V/STOUAV (q.v. Aug 26/13). Phase II narrows the field to 2 contenders and will conclude with sub-scale flight demonstrations by Sept 30/15. Carter Aviation’s slowed-rotor compound helicopter appears to be out, along with MAPC’s design. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, VA manages the contracts (HR0011-13-C-0099, PO 0002), and the winners were:

AeroVironment Inc. in Monrovia, CA receives a $19 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, for a cumulative total of $21.4 million so far. $5.75 million in FY 2014 DARPA RDT&E funds is committed immediately. Work will be performed in Monrovia, CA (80%); Tucson, AZ (5%); Fort Worth, TX (10%); and Sparks, NV (5%).

Northrop Grumman in El Segundo, CA, receives a $19.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, for a cumulative total of $22.1 million so far. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (48%), San Diego, CA (30%), Cincinnati, Ohio (5%); Benbrook, TX (15%); and Mojave, CA (2%).

In FY 2016, a single contractor will be picked to build the Phase III full scale demonstrator. Note that in May 2014 DARPA signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) that turned TERN into a joint program with the US Navy. ONR staffed Gil Graff as their deputy program manager, under DARPA PM Daniel Patt. Patt hopes that this early partnership with a service could become a template for DARPA. Sources: DARPA, “Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node (TERN)” | DARPA, “DARPA’s New TERN Program Aims for Eyes in the Sky from the Sea ” | FBO | AeroVironment, “DARPA Awards AeroVironment Phase II Tern Contract to Develop New Class of Maritime Unmanned Aircraft” | Northrop Grumman, “Northrop Grumman Advances Unmanned Systems Capabilities for Maritime Missions”.

TERN UAV Phase II

July 30/14: GAO weighs in. The US GAO releases another LCS-related report, which looks at overall ship weight and addresses ship mission packages. The LCS-2 Independence Class in particular lacks weight flexibility, maxing out at just 3,188.0 tons for its Naval Architectural Limit (NAL). The LCS-1 Freedom Class has a better weight margin and 3,550 ton NAL, but far less internal space. Meanwhile, a proposed move to shift both classes to a common SeaRAM air defense system up top would add extra weight to the LCS-1 class, and may create sea-keeping issues. In terms of the mission packages, it means that the 105 ton limit is likely to be a hard ceiling, which could make full exploitation and modernization more difficult and more costly. It’s already hitting the MIW/MCM package:

“Navy weight estimates for increment 4 of the MCM mission package, however, do not reflect all the systems being acquired for that package. Space and weight constraints have required the Navy to modify how it intends to outfit increment 4 of the MCM mission package. Although the Navy plans to acquire all the systems planned for that increment, space and weight limitations will not allow LCS seaframes to carry all of these systems at one time. According to LCS program officials, MCM mission commanders will have either (1) the Unmanned Influence Sweep System and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, or (2) the minehunting Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle—called Knifefish – available – but not both systems. As a result, LCS seaframes outfitted with the increment 4 MCM package may have decreased minesweeping or mine detection capability.”

Mission system related recommendations from the front-lines include replacing the LCS-1 variant’s “unreliable and poorly performing” WBR-2000 electronic warfare system from Argon ST, storing sonobuoys on board even if the ASW package isn’t loaded so that the ship has some ability to react, and developing an ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) mission package to augment existing capabilities. Of course, sonobuoys on board add weight, and an ISR module that might otherwise take advantage of the LCS-2 Independence Class’ spacious mission package area may not be usable alongside other modules if the result is too much weight. Sources: GAO-14-749, “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments.”

July 17/14: SuW. Navy Recognition interviews a US Navy representative re: the Surface to Surface Mission Module aboard LCS, which will sit above the helicopter hangar on the Freedom Class, and behind the 57mm gun on the Independence Class. Key excerpts:

“Longbow Hellfire is the selected missile to help meet the LCS Surface Warfare Mission Package’s (SUW MP) engagement requirement per the LCS Capabilities Description Document (Flight 0+). Currently, no new requirement exists to warrant acquisition of a new engagement capability…. An LCS variant can only receive one SUW mission package. This will have one Surface-to-surface Missile Module (SSMM), which will utilize one launcher structure that holds 24 Longbow Hellfire missiles…. There currently is no requirement for at-sea reloads.Therefore, the current SSMM design does not support at-sea reloads… It utilizes an existing Army M299 launcher mounted within a gas containment system.”

Looks like Raytheon’s SeaGriffin has lost its shot, despite tripling its previously-comparable range and adding comparable fire-and-forget capability in its latest iteration. Sources: Navy Recognition, “Q & A with the US Navy on Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles for Littoral Combat Ships”.

May 30/14: Support. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $20.9 million contract modification to provide integration services for LCS mission packages, as part of ongoing development and changes.

All funds are committed immediately, using a combination of Fy 2014 and 2015 budgets. Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (44%); Oxnard, CA (16%); Washington, DC (14%); Panama City, FL (10%); Dahlgren, VA (8%); San Diego, CA (4%); Hollywood, MD (2%); Andover, MA (1%); and Middletown, RI (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2015. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-06-C-6311).

Hellfire concept
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April 9/14: SUW – Hellfire. The US Navy confirms that they have picked the AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow radar-guided missile as the SUW Package’s initial missile. Its fire and forget guidance, salvo capability, and ability to use the ship’s radar tipped the balance.

Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire wouldn’t have any more range than Raytheon’s Griffin (~3.5 nmi), but the radar seeker allows the ship’s radar to perform targeting, while allowing salvos of multiple fire-and-forget missiles against incoming swarms. In contrast, the Griffin’s laser designation must target one boat at a time, from a position that’s almost certain to have a more restricted field of view.

Lockheed Martin says that the missile has had 3 successful test firings in vertical launch mode, and there are plans to test-fire the missile from LCS in 2014, using a new vertical launcher. Navy AGM-114L missiles would be drawn from existing US Army stocks, which will have shelf life expiry issues anyway. That’s one reason the Army intends to begin buying JAGM laser/radar guided Hellfire derivatives around FY 2017. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Navy Adds Hellfire Missiles to LCS” | USNI News, “Navy Axes Griffin Missile In Favor of Longbow Hellfire for LCS”.

Hellfire in for SUW, Griffin out

March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish. With respect to the mission modules, The Navy isn’t happy with the GAO’s comparison of the program against the FY 2008 baseline, as it doesn’t reflect the total acquisition. GAO responds that:

“In comparing the 2007 estimate with the acquisition program baseline, we used the Navy’s 2007 data, which included full procurement costs but only five years of development cost. The Navy has acquired eight packages [4 MCM, 4 SUW, will add 2 MCMs in FY 2014] without proving capability through operational testing…”

Which GAO sees as a bad idea. GAO program totals are reflected in this article’s charts, and their comments regarding the readiness level and timing of the “LCS Packages Program” have been discussed in detail by DOT&E and by other GAO reports.

Common equipment for all sets = $14.9 million
MCM Package = $97.7 (TL $112.6) million
SUW Package = $32.6 (TL $47.4) million
ASW Package is $20.9 (TL $35.8) million, though it hasn’t been fielded yet.

On the other hand, given that the MCM package has been cut down sharply and continues to report problems, key mission packages like ASW haven’t been fielded yet, and that some aspects like waterjet propulsion are ill-suited to the ASW mission, it’s hard to see the basis for saying:

“When assessed in terms of ability to perform the LCS program’s three primary missions [Mines, Small boats, and Submarines in shallow waters], the LCS fares well in terms of weaponry and other ship features in comparisons with frigate and corvette designs operated by other navies.”

Sources: US CRS, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”.

Feb 24/14: LCS cut. The Pentagon’s FY 2015 pre-budget briefing on the LCS seems to say that the number of ships will drop to 32, which would have implications for the number of mission modules:

“Regarding the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, I am concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward. With this decision, the LCS line will continue beyond our five-year budget plan with no interruptions.

The LCS was designed to perform certain missions – such as mine sweeping and anti-submarine warfare – in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely examine whether the LCS has the protection and firepower to survive against a more advanced military adversary and emerging new technologies, especially in the Asia Pacific. If we were to build out the LCS program to 52 ships, as previously planned, it would represent one-sixth of our future 300-ship Navy. Given continued fiscal constraints, we must direct shipbuilding resources toward platforms that can operate in every region and along the full spectrum of conflict.”

They haven’t actually terminated the program at 32, and they can negotiate for up to 8 ships beyond the current block buy that ends in FY 2015. Even so, the Mission Module program is likely due for an adjustment. Sources: US DoD, “Remarks By Secretary Of Defense Chuck Hagel FY 2015 Budget Preview Pentagon Press Briefing Room Monday, February 24, 2014” | Bloomberg, “Hagel Expands on Reservations’ About Littoral Combat Ship”.

Just 32 LCS

Jan 14/14: SUW – Hellfire? At the Surface Navy Association 2014 Symposium, PMS 420 (LCS Mission Modules) head Rear Adm. John Ailes says that the Navy is very strongly considering the AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow radar-guided missile as the ship’s initial SUW surface-strike missile. Sources: IHS Jane’s “Surface Navy 2014: USN weighing Longbow Hellfire against Griffin missile for LCS” | USNI News, “SNA 2014: Navy Won’t Rule Out Army Longbow Hellfire for LCS”.

Dec 9/13: MIW – WLD-1. The RMS (remote minehunting system: WLD-1 USV + AQS-20A sonar) completes developmental testing, to see if it can finally meet reliability, suitability and effectiveness requirements. The tests ran from Oct 22/13 – Dec 9/13, and the US Navy says that the system achieved its test objectives.

RMS operational assessment is scheduled for January 2014, off the coast of Palm Beach, FL. The complete LCS mine countermeasures mission package will undergo developmental testing in summer 2014, but initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is scheduled for 2015. Sources: USN, “LCS Remote Minehunting System Completes Developmental Testing”.

Nov 15/13: MQ-8B. USS Fort Worth [LCS 3] spends Nov 5-13/13 conducting testing with the MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV in the Point Mugu Test Range, CA. USS Fort Worth is scheduled to deploy in 2014 with “The Mad Hatters” of HSM-35, Detachment 1. The Navy’s first “composite” Air Detachment will include both a manned SH-60R helicopter and smaller MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs. Sources: USN, “USS Fort Worth Launches First UAV, Demonstrates LCS Capability”.

Nov 7/13: SUW. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Surface Warfare Mission package, which is to say its 57mm and 30mm guns, successfully complete Phase 2 of developmental testing aboard USS Fort Worth [LCS 3] at Point Mugu, CA. You’d hope a ship worth half-a billion dollars would be able to defend itself from a motorboat while at sea. Now, what about the rest of its missions? Sources: USN, “LCS Surface Warfare Package Completes Live-Fire Test” | Defense Tech, “LCS Defends Against Swarm Boats in Live Fire Tests”.

FY 2013

GAO report highlights the shaky state of the mission modules; Mine module becoming an urgent need; DARPA’s TERN UAV. MH-60S w. AQS-20 – out
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Sept 3/13: MCM. With over $50 billion in cuts coming, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s ALT POM reportedly proposed to end LCS buys with the current contract, at just 24 ships. The Navy is pushing to buy at least 32.

On the other hand, OSD is reportedly insisting that the Navy place a top priority on fielding the mine countermeasures (MCM) module, in light of challenges around the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere. One would think this would have been obvious years ago. Sources: Defenseworld, “U.S. To Limit Littoral Combat Ship Purchase”.

Aug 26/13: TERN. Initial DARPA awards for Phase 1 development of TERN UAVs (q.v. March 26/13), which would offer vertical or near-vertical takeoff, coupled with the weapon/ISR payload and endurance class of a Predator fixed-wing UAV. Proposals were due by May 10/13, and awards included:

AeroVironment in Monrovia, CA: $2.3 million. UAV innovator for over 20 years. Sierra Nevada Corporation will subcontract to AeroVironment for ship integration.
Carter Aviation in Wichita Falls, TX: $2.23 million. Their key design is a slowed-rotor compound helicopter that has solved several key technical issues faced by 1950s-era SR/C concepts, and can break the Mu-1 barrier.
Maritime Applied Physics Corp. (MAPC) in Baltimore, MD: $2.2 million. Their work in robotics has been focused on surface vehicles and control systems, so it will be interesting to see what they come up with.
Northrop Grumman Systems in San Diego, CA: $2.86 million. Manufacturer of the Bell 407-derived MQ-8C Fire Scout VTUAV.

While TERN is very promising in several areas, and the LCS-2 Independence Class are its focus ships, it can’t become part of a Mission Package until and unless the Navy or USMC adopts DARPA’s result as a program of record. Sources: FBO.gov | Aerovironment release, Nov 4/13 | Carter Aviation release, Sept 26/13 [PDF] | sUAS News, “AeroVironment joins DARPA program to develop long-range UAVs for launch from small ships”.

DARPA’s TERN

Aug 15/13: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $25.3 million contract modification to provide 3 (unspecified) mission modules, support containers, and engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages. All funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL (48%); Portsmouth, VA (30%); Bethpage, NY (18%); Manchester, NH (2%); and Hollywood, MD (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2015 (N00024-06-C-6311).

July 25/13: PLUS. Ocean environment data can be extremely relevant to missions like submarine hunting. The prototype PLUS (Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance) system creates an undersea network with 5 slow but silent University of Washington Sea Glider UUVs, and 6 faster and larger Kongsberg Marine Remus 600 UUVs. The Remuses act as deep sea sensors. The Sea Gliders dive underwater to collect data, then return to the surface to transmit that data to a collection and processing station; Iridium connections can call the data in to any location on the globe.

US Naval Sea Systems Command explain the system, and announce initial training and trials in Sea Glider’s UUV. Testing will continue until early 2015, when the Navy plans to deploy the system for overseas operations as a user operational evaluation. Depending on how things go, PLUS may become a go on to wider fielding.

It’s being fielded by PEO LCS, but the LCS hasn’t been picked as its platform yet. PLUS is designed to easily deploy from any ship with a winch and crane and sufficient storage capacity. They’re probably looking at at least 3 containers worth of space, which makes things a bit tight on an LCS, though the Independence Class’ large mission module space may make it a decent candidate. PLUS could also deploy on higher capacity ships like JHSVs or amphibious assault vessels. US NAVSEA.

Delays
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July 22/13: GAO Report. The US GAO releases GAO-13-530, “Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost”. The entire report is a long chronicle of the Littoral Combat Ship program’s history of falling short and unresolved issues, including a number of issues with the mission modules. GAO’s recommendation: slow buys to the very minimum until technical and testing issues are sorted out. Some unclassified issues were already noted in the 2013 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (q.v. March 28/13), but new information includes…

ASW: The new towed-array sonar, towed variable depth sonar, and towed torpedo countermeasures are mature technologies, but they’ll take a while to integrate into LCS, hence 2016. Outside observers beyond GAO have noted that waterjet propulsion systems are pretty noisy (q.v. May 5/13), and GAO agrees that towing sonars off of a much quieter research vessel during early testing may not be a useful guide to the challenges they’ll face aboard LCS. In addition:

“DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation officials have raised concerns about the new ASW configuration’s deepwater escort capabilities, stating that LCS is not designed to be survivable enough to stay and defend the escorted ship if potential adversaries attack. Further, OPNAV officials told us that with this new configuration the LCS will still be able to conduct littoral ASW, but that the water depths in which the LCS could operate may be limited because of the depths required to support deploying the towed arrays.”

MCM: Specific components are dealt with in a dedicated article. Unfortunately:

“…the concept of employment for the MCM mission package currently does not include embarked explosive ordinance disposal teams that are used on the existing mine countermeasures fleet… they are investigating how to integrate this capability…. to not only [eliminate] mines, but… exploit found mines for intelligence value, and OPNAV has identified their absence as a capability gap.”

SUW: Griffin missiles have been deployed on Cyclone Class patrol boats, but they may never be deployed aboard LCS:

“The Navy assessed over 50 potential missile replacements for LCS, and in January 2011 selected the Griffin IIB missile as an interim solution based, in part, on it costing half of [NLOS-LS per missile]. The program now intends to purchase one unit with a total of eight Griffin IIB missiles, to be fielded in 2015, which leave other SUW module equipped ships with a limited ability to counter surface threats. However, Navy officials told us that they may reconsider this plan because of funding cuts related to sequestration. According to OPNAV, funding for Griffin development and testing has been suspended for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. OPNAV and the LCS program office, with LCS Council oversight, plan to investigate using a more cost-effective, government-owned, surface-to-surface missile system that would provide increased capability, including increased range. According to Navy program officials, the deployment of the Increment IV [Griffin successor] missile could also be delayed by over a year [i.e. to 2020] because funding reductions have delayed early engineering work and proposal development for the missile contract.”

General: In dangerous environments, LCS’ specialty function will only be available close to a deployed group. This has long been known, and was accepted in the original LCS vision, but it’s still a notable drawback compared to similarly-expensive ships:

“…since LCS has only a self-defense anti-air warfare capability, it will require protection from a cruiser or destroyer in more advanced anti-air warfare environments, which reduces the LCS’s ability to operate independently and occupies the time of more capable surface combatants that might be better employed elsewhere.”

June 28/13: Support. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $19.4 million contract modification provide ongoing mission LCS module engineering and production planning services. $5.9 million in FY 2013 RDT&E funding is committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (44%); Oxnard, CA (16%); Washington, D.C. (14%); Panama City, FL (10%); Dahlgren, VA (8%); San Diego, CA (4%); Hollywood, MD (2%); Andover, MA (1%); and Middletown, RI (1%); and is expected to be complete by June 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington D.C. manages the contract (N00024-06-C-6311).

June 27/13: Kingfish MCM substitute. The US Navy announces that it has deployed MK18 MOD 2 Kingfish mine-detecting UUVs to the “5th Fleet Area of Responsibility” (read: Persian Gulf). The contractor-operated Kingfish isn’t part of AMCM, it’s an independent program based on the commercial REMUS 600, and it’s replacing the in-theater MK18 MOD 1 Swordfish that’s based on Kongsberg Marine’s smaller REMUS 100. The Kingfish’s Small Synthetic Aperture Sonar Module (SSAM) configuration provides wider sonar swath scan, higher resolution imagery, and buried target detection.

While it’s currently contractor-operated, the US Navy does intend to begin operating them in 2015. It probably could be loaded onto a Littoral Combat ship as an interim measure, ahead of the planned 2017 in-service date for Bluefin Robotics’ Knifefish SMCM UUV. US Navy.

May 2/13: New waterjets for LCS-1 class. LCS 5 Milwaukee will be the first Freedom Class ship to try out a set of 4 new waterjets. The technology was developed by Rolls-Royce Naval Marine in Walpole, MA, in collaboration with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Carderock Division. The joint project under ONR’s Future Naval Capabilities program began in 2007, and the April delivery to Marinette Marine marked its successful completion. The waterjets will be made in the United States, with primary manufacturing at Rolls-Royce facilities in Walpole, MA and Pascagoula, MS.

The new 22MW Axial-Flow Waterjet Mk-1 can reportedly move nearly 500,00 gallons of seawater per minute, providing more thrust per unit than the current commercial waterjets. Researchers believe the smaller, more efficient waterjets will help the LCS avoid excessive maintenance costs and ship component damage associated with cavitation. On the other hand, Information Dissemination points out an issue:

“Here is the problem. Waterjets are incredibly loud, as in they can be so loud that a ship with waterjets is probably going to significantly reduce the effectiveness of a bow sonar…. there is no bow mounted sonar [on LCS] and waterjets is why there never will be…. ONR is going to deliver super waterjets, which may increase the speed of LCS a knot or two, who knows. Here is the problem though – waterjets are still loud like a rock concert, and one of the primary missions of the LCS is to hunt littoral submarines.

When will this program start being about mission and stop being about features?”

Sources: USN, “New Waterjets Could Propel LCS to Greater Speeds” | Rolls Royce, Feb 21/12 release. | Information Dissemination, “More Speed!”

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. The Navy owns 3 MCM (mine, 1st delivery Sept. 2007) and 4 SUW (“surface warfare”, 1st delivery July 2008) mission modules, and has completely re-started the ASW anti-submarine module. Several of the sub-systems in these modules are still experiencing performance problems, many components are still in development, and the Navy has yet to fully integrate these technologies and test them on board an LCS in a realistic environment. In October 2012, DOD delegated future decision authority to the Navy and requested an acquisition program baseline within 60 days – which was not delivered on schedule.

MCM: The Navy plans to accept 1 more in 2013, but it doesn’t meet requirements. The MH-60S helicopter can’t tow the AQS-20A sonar as planned, the WLD-1 USV has performance issues, the ALMDS laser system gets too many false positives from surface reflections, and the RAMICS gun and OASIS decoy are out. Nonetheless, the Navy describes recent MCM tests as “very successful” – a characterization that isn’t backed up by subsequent reports. The Navy plans to conduct developmental testing in FY 2014 and establish initial operational capability with 7 MCM modules in September 2014. Full operational capability isn’t expected until 2018, by which time the Navy is expected to have 21 LCS ships in service, and 28 ordered.

SUW: Does not meet requirements. At the moment it’s just the 57mm gun up front, a pair 30mm guns, a helicopter, and an 11m RHIB small boat for boarding teams. This is about what a coast guard cutter carries, and it still won’t reach initial operational capability before September 2014. Even the Griffin missile with its miniscule 3 nmi range isn’t expected before 2015, and a competition for a missile with a more serious tactical range isn’t expected before 2019.

ASW: Canceled and has been restarted. The Navy plans for initial delivery in 2016, and full operational capability in 2018. The design is stripped down, involving a ship-based variable-depth sonar, towed array, and towed torpedo decoy for defense.

March 26/13: TERN. DARPA issues its Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node RFP. DARPA wants a UAV that can take off and land from the LCS 2 Independence Class, LSD/LPD amphibious ships, JHSV ships, or even DDG-51 destroyers. It would carry a 600 pound ISR/strike payload on missions up to 900 nmi from the ship, and carry a maximum ISR/strike payload of 1,000 pounds. They’ll accept a threshold 500 pound/ 4kW ISR payload, with an operating radius of 600 nmi, which can operate only from the LCS 2 Independence Class.

Either set of specifications are challenging for a conventional helicopter, including Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8C Fire Scout full-size helicopter UAV. Small fixed wing designs like Boeing’s ScanEagle can be launched and recovered to the threshold distances from a conventional warship, but they aren’t big enough to carry much payload. That’s why this is a DARPA project, rather than an off-the-shelf buy. While TERN could fill some useful niches for the ASW, MCM, and SuW modules, it can’t become part of a Mission Package until the Navy or USMC adopts DARPA’s result as a program of record.

Phase I will include concept definition activities (technical feasibility, low-cost demonstration system design, technical plan), with $9 million invested over 4 contenders (it actually totaled $9.6 million, vid. Sept 3-6/13). If TERN is seen as having enough potential, a single design will be picked, with up to $42 million for Phase II/III development, and a planned flight demonstration in summer 2016. Phase II will be a technology maturation phase that will include system preliminary design and risk reduction demonstrations, and Phase III will demonstrate the prototype. DARPA, TERN page | FBO.gov solicitation #DARPA-BAA-13-28.

March 18/13: IOC delays. Jane’s quotes director of navy staff Vice-Admiral Richard Hunt, who says that the Continuing Resolutions have “delayed us probably a year for IOC [initial operational capability] for a couple of those different modules…” The Mine Counter-Measures package is most affected, which makes sense because it has many components that are still in advanced development. The Anti-Submarine Warfare package is least affected, which again is not surprising as there isn’t much there to suffer from funding delays. Sources: IHS Jane’s, “US fiscal challenges delaying LCS mission modules, official says”.

March 15/13: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.6 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages. To date, those efforts haven’t gone very well, with many technologies failed out and no truly ready sets over 7 years after development began.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, VA (32%); Huntsville, AL (25%); Bethpage, NY (21%); Manchester, NH (11%); Silver Creek, NY (10%); Hollywood, MD (1%), and is expected to be completed by September 2014. All monies are committed immediately, using FY 2012 Navy Operations & Maintenance funding (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The LCS mission modules still have a lot of issues. There isn’t anything left to test any more in the ASW anti-submarine module, for instance, so DOT&E didn’t report on it while the Navy considers a re-start.

Mine Warfare: Begin with the MH-60S helicopter, which isn’t powerful enough to safely tow the AQS-20A sonar or OASIS decoy under all of the required conditions. Both are being removed from AMCM, and OASIS is removed from the MIW module. This would seem to be the epitome of a forseeable/ easily testable problem, but it’s being “discovered” 7 years after development began. Why?

The AQS-20A will now depend on the WLD-1 RMMV snorkeling USV, which is trying to correct its reliability and performance issues by 2015. RMMV v4.1 is showing some improvements in limited testing, but the ships themselves need to make changes to launch and recover it while underway. The AQS-20A sonar has its own problems with contact depth calculations in all modes, and with false contacts in 2 of 3 search modes. The Navy hopes to find AQS-20 engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered.

The AES-1 ALMDS laser mine-detection system doesn’t meet Navy requirements for False Classification Density or reliability, and the DOT&E expects to issue a formal test report in Q2 FY2013. The Navy hopes to find engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered. Some reports suggest that ALMDS will be cut entirely, but the raft of other MCM system casualties may force the Navy to keep it.

Surface Warfare: Still useless against anything but a lightly-armed motorboat, but that’s beyond GAO’s purview. What they do say is that the Navy hasn’t not finalized any tactical idea of how the ships will be used with the SUW mission module. Even within this limited set, the MK46 “30 mm guns and associated combat system exhibit reliability problems,” and the Freedom Class has performance deficiencies with its COMBATSS-21 combat system and TRS-3D radar that affect tracking and engagement of contacts.

Dec 28/12: RMS. Lockheed Martin in Riviera Beach, FL receives a $12.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to perform Remote Minehunting System/WLD-1 USV maintenance, testing and integration with the with Littoral Combat Ship. The WLD-1 is currently working on improving its reliability and performance, after falling short in these areas.

Work will be performed in Palm Beach, FL (87%), and Syracuse, NY (13%), and is expected to be complete by May 2013. $5.3 million is committed immediately, and $295,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-10-G-6306).

Dec 20/12: AMNS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI receives a $7.9 million contract modification, covering AMNS’ Critical Design Review.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, RI, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. All contract funds are committed immediately, and $4.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US NAVSEA in Washington DC in is the contracting activity (N00024-10-C-6307).

FY 2011 – 2012

NLOS-LS missile cancelled; Griffin very short range strike missile for SUW instead?; SMCM Bluefin-21 UUV for mines; UISS from USV for mines; RAMICS in trouble. Knifefish
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Feb 15/12: Support. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives an $18.7 million contract modification to provide LCS Mission Module engineering and production planning services. “Mission package capabilities are currently focused on primary mission areas of mine warfare emphasizing mine countermeasures, littoral anti-submarine warfare, and littoral surface warfare operations, including prosecution of small boats.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (45%); Washington, DC (20%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura County, CA (10%); and Dahlgren, VA (5%), and is expected to be completed by December 2012. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract.

Feb 10/12: Armed USVs. US Navy expeditionary warfare division branch chief Capt. Evin Thompson says that they are looking to arm their MUSCL (Modular Unmanned Surface Craft Littoral) USV unmanned boats with RAFAEL’s Spike anti-tank missile. Navy officials initially tested the weapon’s performance during the Trident Warrior exercise, aboard a USV originally designed as part of the LCS anti-submarine warfare package.

RAFAEL’s Spike packs roughly equivalent range and punch to the LCS’ Griffin missiles, with some variants having longer reach. MUSCL does look a bit light for it, but could certainly carry DRS/NAWCAD’s Spike missile. At this point, despite the involvement of the LCS PEO, there are no plans to deploy a USV/missile combination on LCS. AOL Defense.

Dec 19/11: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin announces the end of the 1st of 3 planned development and testing cycles, involving 500 hours of reliability testing on the U.S. Navy’s WLD-1 RMMV. These efforts are aimed at improving the Remote Minehunting System’s reliability and operational availability, which have been a serious problem for the sonar-towing snorkeling USV. A recent $52.7 million contract will continue the program to improve its reliability until 2013. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Nov 7/11: Griffin replacement? Inside the Navy reports [subscription] that the Griffin missile will be part of LCS’ initial surface warfare module, but a competition will begin in 2012, and:

“The program executive office for the Littoral Combat Ship has already identified capabilities that could replace the Griffin missile…”

IAI’s Jumper (vid. May 16/11 entry) comes to mind, and there appear to be others.

Sept 30/11: SMCM UUV. General Dynamics AIS in McLeansville, NC wins a $48.6 million contract with cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and firm-fixed-price line items for the engineering, manufacturing and development of the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (SMCM UUV, aka. “Knifefish”).

This will be a new part of the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mine Counter-Measures package, and includes 2 of Bluefin Robotics’ large Bluefin-21 UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, a support container, spare parts and support equipment, and an advanced sonar payload developed by GD-AIS. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Aug 25/11: A not-to-exceed $161 million contract modification to previously awarded contract for MK15 Mod 31 SeaRAM missile systems to equip the Independence Class ships LCS 6 Jackson and LCS 8 Montgomery, and Japan’s “DDH 2405 helicopter destroyer”; as well as Phalanx CIWS Block 1B class “A” overhauls, and land-based Phalanx Weapon System class “A” overhauls. See the linked article for further details.

Aug 1/11: RAM. A $7.4 million contract modification for 3 refurbished and upgraded RAM MK 49 Mod 3 Guided Missile Launch Systems with associated hardware, for use on LHA 7 (unnamed, America Class escort carrier, 2 systems) and LCS 5 Milwaukee (Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, 1 system).

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by March 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00024-11-C-5448). Note that the structure of RAM contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

July 21/11: MIW – UISS. The US Navy announces the successful completion of shore-based and at-sea integrated system tests on the prototype Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) USV and payload in Panama City, FL. UISS is designed for the LCS as part of the mine countermeasures mission package, supplementing the helicopter-based AMCM system. The system consists of an unmanned surface craft that carries and tows the combined acoustic and magnetic minesweeping payload.

The Phase 1 Sweep Operational Checkout was very basic, testing that UISS can be deployed and retrieved from Textron’s s Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), and that it tows the acoustic and magnetic Sweep Power Subsystem properly. The first phase of testing was completed on July 1/11; Phase II is currently ongoing, and the summer test program will include a full signature test and full mission profile that demonstrate minesweeping capability. US Navy | Textron Systems.

May 16/11: SUW. An Israeli answer for LCS missiles? Israel Aerospace Industries’ MLM Division announces that they’ll present a new maritime application for their Jumper missiles-in-a-box system at IMDEX Asia 2011, the Singapore International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference. Like Raytheon’s cancelled NLOS-LS, the Jumper missiles are launched from an 8-round Vertical Launcher Hive (VLH) mounted on a ship’s deck, a truck, or on the ground. The missiles then use GPS/INS and optional Laser guidance to hit targets at ranges of up to 50 km/ 30 miles, using fragmentation or penetration warheads.

Jumper had been showcased beginning in 2009, but as a land weapon. Its naval capability and good range is likely to draw interest from several quarters, but to play on the LCS, IAI would have to offer a lower-cost solution than Raytheon’s NLOS-LS PAM. IAI release | UPI | IAI’s Jumper page.

May 12/11: SUW – Griffin. Inside the Navy reports:

“The Navy may not have settled on the Griffin missile to replace the canceled Non-Line-Of-Sight missile on the Littoral Combat Ship, despite the service’s announcement in January that it planned to use the missile for both a short-term and long-term solution to the capability gap, officials told Inside the Navy last week…”

May 2/11: Alion Science and Technology announces a 3-year, $4.6 million contract from the US Naval Air Warfare Center Training System Division, to develop a PC-based training system for LCS-2 Independence Class Readiness Control Officers.

Alion will be developing the system based on its LCS-1 Freedom Class LCS RCO solution, but a number of changes are necessary because it’s a different ship design. It is intended that the LCS-2 RCO will ultimately integrate with the LCS Shore Based Training Facility in San Diego, CA.

April 13/11: Mk-110. BAE Systems announces a contract from Austal to supply various communications systems and its 57mm Mk 110 gun system, for use in the Independence Class as orders come in.

General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has had BAE Systems as a major partner for LCS communications systems since 2004. The Mk110 gun is used in both LCS classes, along with its accompanying Mk 295 pre-fragmented, 6-mode programmable, and proximity-fused (3P) ammunition that makes it useful against aerial or surface targets. A corresponding January 2011 contract covered gun systems for Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class.

Feb 14/11: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman will assemble LCS mission packages at Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA. The mission module supplier team will comprise:

Earl Industries in Portsmouth, VA (ISO TEU 20′ containers; Electrical systems)
Excelco in Silver Creek, NY (WLD-1 RMMV capture spine)
Granite State in Manchester, NH (RMMV cradles)
Smith Brothers in Shelby Township, MI (Maintenance stand assemblies mission module hardware)
Teledyne Brown, Huntsville, AL (gun mission modules).

The end items from each of those companies will be shipped to Port Hueneme, where a Northrop Grumman-Navy team will complete the assembly of each package.

Jan 24/11: MIW – RAMICS. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the RAMICS supercavitating 30mm cannon for killing shallow mines may be next on the chopping block, after performing poorly in testing. It would be replaced by the AMNS system, which would do double duty against both shallow and deep water mines using Archerfish towed kill vehicles, packing 4 shaped charges each.

The tradeoff would be one of greater performance certainty, cost certainty, timely delivery, and commonalty with AMNS; vs. the ability to engage more shallow water mines in far less time by using a RAMICS system that worked.

Jan 11/11: SUW – Griffin. Media report that the U.S. Navy is moving towards selecting Raytheon’s Griffin missile as the replacement for the cancelled NLOS-LS, instead of taking over that program’s development now that the Army has pulled out. USN surface warfare division director Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe told a Surface Navy Association convention audience in Arlington, VA that a 6-month review had settled on this Raytheon product, as something that can hit targets at “acceptable” ranges and cost.

That recommendation must be endorsed by the Navy before anything comes of this; if they do, the service would field the existing very short range Griffin by 2015, and try to develop a longer range version later. See “Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles” for in-depth coverage.

Jan 7/11: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a an $18.3 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura, CA (6%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. $1,51 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 6/11: NLOS-LS canceled. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announces the proposed cancellation of NLOS-LS, among many other programs. The Army had pulled out by the point, and the Navy considered picking up the program, but apparently decided against it. Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | Pentagon release.

NLOS-LS canceled

FY 2009 – 2010

GAO mission modules report not positive; NLOS-LS missiles have test problems; WLD-1 snorkeling USV out of ASW; Variable-Depth Sonar for ASW. MK46 naval

Sept 28/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.8 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules. Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL (56%), and Bethpage, NY (44%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Aug 31/10: GAO Report. US GAO report #GAO-10-523 on the LCS program sees problems. “Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.” Key excerpts:

“Navy analysis of anti-submarine warfare systems has shown the planned systems do not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission… Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules – a situation exacerbated by early deployments of initial ships… Further, the Navy has determined that an additional capability will be incorporated into future anti-submarine warfare mission packages. The existing anti-submarine warfare mission package procurement is temporarily suspended, and performance will be assessed during at-sea testing in 2010… To date, most LCS mission systems have not demonstrated the ability to provide required capabilities.”

With respect to USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] Surface Warfare module tests:

“The surface warfare mission package onboard LCS 1 has yet to be fully integrated with the seaframe and lacks key capabilities necessary to defeat surface threats. For example, the 30-millimeter guns have undergone testing with the LCS 1 seaframe, but have yet to be fully integrated with the ship’s combat suite. Also, while the guns provide a close range self-defense capability, Navy officials report LCS 1 is currently unable to automatically transfer tracking data from the ship’s radar to the 30-millimeter guns.”

Current plans involve just 8 partially-capable mission modules delivered by the end of FY 2012, instead of the 2007 plan of 11 partial and 5 fully-capable mission modules. As of August 2010, 5 partially-capable packages have been delivered: 2 Mine Warfare (MIW), 2 Surface Warfare (SuW), and one anti-submarine (ASW). The planned changes by end FY 2012 break down as follows:

MIW: From 3 partial and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 3 partial.
SuW: From 6 partial and 3 full capability by FY 2012 to 4 partial.
ASW: From 2 planned and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 1 partial.

One of the rationales behind the LCS mission module approach was precisely this decoupling of onboard payload development with ship fielding and development, so delays in one don’t create delays in the other. At the same time, the Navy now plans to purchase 17 ships and 13 mission packages between FY 2011 – 2015, which would leave the Navy with whose payloads and effectiveness are unproven.

Aug 5/10: SUW – Mk.46. The first MK-46 30mm gun module is installed aboard USS Independence [LCS 2]. US Navy PEO-LMW.

July 2/10: ASW – towed sonar. DRS Sonar Systems, LLC in Gaithersburg, MD received a $9.7 million firm-fixed-price contract to develop a high search rate variable depth sonar (VDS) for installation on the littoral combat ship. This contract includes options which would bring its cumulative value to $12.7 million.

The VDS will include a rugged specialized handling system with an articulating arm and capture mechanism, that can handle a towed body the size and weight of a small car. The towed active subsystem consists of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, a tow cable, handling and stowage equipment, and acoustic transmit assemblies. The sonar must be able to survive high sea states, work in deep water while being towed at flank speed, and possess enough power to detect submerged submarines.

Work will be performed in Gaithersburg, MD (10%); Panama City, FL (20%); and Stockport, UK (70%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. This contract was competitively procured, with 3 offers received by the US Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division in Newport, RI (N66604-10-C-0675).

June 2/10: Mk.46. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $22.3 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed fee contract for the MK46 MOD 2 gun weapon systems (GWS) and associated hardware, spares and services.

There are several Mk46s in the US Navy, but this one is a 30mm enclosed turret packing a Mk44 Bushmaster chain gun and advanced sights. It equips the US Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (Mk46, MOD 0), LPD-17 San Antonio Class amphibious ships, and the Littoral Combat Ship surface warfare package. This contract covers both naval platforms, where the turret is operated from a console inside the ship.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (69%); Tallahassee, FL (12%); Lima, OH (12%); Westminster, MD (4%); Scranton, PA (2%); and Sterling Heights, MI (1%). Work is expected to be complete by May 2013. $812,412 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Sea Systems Command, in Washington, DC (N00024-10-C-5438).

April 2/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY received a $17.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages and “improve mission capability in identified mission areas.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (12%); Hollywood, MD (12%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by March 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $1.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

April 1/10: ASW – WLD-1 out. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. One of the changes is to the Remote Minehunting System (WLD-1) in the Mine Warfare suite:

“The PAUC (Program Acquisition Unit Cost) increased 79.5% and the APUC(Average Procurement Unit Cost, no R&D) increased 54.6% to the current and original [baselines] as a result of a reduction in production quantities, the use of an incorrect average unit cost as a basis of estimate in the 2006 program baseline calculation, and an increase in development costs needed to address reliability issues. The Navy re-evaluated the capabilities of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and decided to eliminate the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) from the ASW Mission Package. This decision reduced the total number of RMMV production units from the program baseline quantity of 108 to the current quantity of 54. The increase in development costs was needed to address reliability problems, which arose during an operational assessment in 2008.”

This level of overage is a critical breach, a.k.a. Nunn-McCurdy breach for the legislation that forces the Pentagon to certify the program’s fitness to continue, and provides for potential Congressional involvement.

WLD-1 RMMV out of ASW

March 30/10: GAO update. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Regarding the LCS’ mission packages, the mine countermeasures package is either yet to be tested in a realistic environment (Surface USV, OASIS towed emitter, RAMICS cannon), or cannot meet system requirements (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System USV). With respect to other modules:

“The Navy has accepted delivery of partially capable Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) mission packages. Overall, operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages requires a total of 22 critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 5 weapons.

…The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable SUW(SUrface Warfare) mission package in July 2008. This package included two engineering development models for the 30 mm gun, but did not include the Non-Line-of- Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) launcher or missiles. Integration of the gun with LCS 1 was completed in January 2009… The program expects delivery of the second SUW mission package in March 2010. It will include the 30 mm gun module and the NLOS-LS launcher, but no missiles.

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission package in September 2008, but plans to reconfigure the content of future packages… recent warfighting analyses showed that the baseline ASW package did not provide sufficient capability to meet the range of threats… The first package underwent end-to-end testing in April 2009 and will undergo developmental testing in fiscal year 2010. During the 2009 end-to-end test, the Navy found that the USV and its associated sensors will require reliability and interface improvements to support sustained undersea warfare.”

Venezuela Spending $$ with Russia and China | Russia’s Escalation Niggles Norway to Acquire More F-35s | Russia Establishing FOBs in Syria

Wed, 23/09/2015 - 02:23

Americas

Lockheed Martin unveiled its bid for the Marines’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 program on Tuesday. The USMC released an engineering & manufacturing development (EMD) Request for Proposals in April, with the program intended to supply the next generation of armored ‘connector’ vehicles for the Marine Corps. Two designs are to be down-selected later this year, with five companies (ADVS, BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and SAIC) currently offering up designs.
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is reported to be planning a purchase of a dozen Su-30 fighters, along with equipment from China. The Venezuelan Air Force operates 23 Su-30MK2 multirole fighters, following a crash of one of these last week. Speaking at a ceremony to mark the loss, Maduro stated that he would talk with Vladimir Putin to acquire a replacement for the lost Su-30 as well as the twelve new fighters. The aircraft in service were procured from Russia as part of a $3 billion arms sale, following a refusal by then-President George Bush to sell replacement parts for the country’s fleet of F-16s.

Europe

The Dutch Defense Ministry has penned an agreement with engine-manufacturer Pratt & Whitney for a Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul & Upgrade workshop in the south of the country to support future F-35 operations. The company’s F-135 engine powers the F-35, with the new workshop at the Royal Netherlands Air Force’s Woensdrecht Logistics Centre set to become a dedicated engine support facility from 2019. The country was selected by the DoD in December to support F-35 heavy engine maintenance, along with Norway and Turkey, and placed its first order for eight F-35A fighters in March.
The Norwegian government announced on Monday that the country has partnered with Australia to finance the development a new RF seeker for the Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile (JSM), with the long-range air-to-ground missile scheduled for integration with the F-35. BAE Australia will design and integrate the new seeker, which will provide the JSM with a dual-seeker capability alongside its current imaging target seeker. The agreement plans for the cost of this integration to be split if Australia decides to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter. The two countries have been developing the JSM for a while, announcing in February their intention to adapt the JSM to fit into the F-35A’s slim internal weapons bay.
Meanwhile, Norwegian defense officials reiterated their commitment to the procurement of up to 52 F-35s, citing Russian power projection in Northern Europe as a reason to press ahead with the acquisition. The first F-35 deliveries to Norway are expected in 2017, with Initial Operating Capability expected two years later. The Norwegians opted to buy the F-35A in 2013, after the Lockheed Martin jet beat off competition from an upgraded version of Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The first F-35 manufactured for the Norwegian Armed Forces was rolled out by Lockheed Martin on Tuesday.
The UK’s Ministry of Defence is reportedly set to launch a tender for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robots, with this estimated to value up to $124 million. The tender, covering a base of 56 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and an option for a further 30, will see an Invitation to Tender (ITT) released by the end of 2015.
MBDA and BAE Systems have agreed to a marketing partnership for the latter’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) in an aim to flag the system to European customers. MBDA will lead the marketing charge for the APKWS in Europe, with the system developed by BAE Systems’ US subsidiary. The system bolts onto unguided 70mm rockets to transform them into a low-cost laser-guided weapon, which has been integrated with several platforms in the US inventory, including the Cobra and Huey helicopters, Apache AH-64D and A-10.

Middle East North Africa

With the number of Russian fixed-wing aircraft thought to have been deployed to Latakia, Syria now reaching 28, (including Su-24s, Su-25s and Su-30s), reports emerged on Tuesday that Russia has also supplied the Assad regime with at least five new aircraft. It is also thought that Russian forces have begun to operate from other areas, establishing two new forward operating bases according to the WSJ. Reports from last week indicated that the Syrian air force has also begun using more precise weapons, also the likely result of an arms transfer from Russia. Syria has operated Russian platforms for years; in August Turkish media reported that six MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors had been delivered to the Syrian regime, as part of a 2007 contract.

Asia & Pacific

India’s Cabinet Committee of Security has cleared the procurement of 22 AH-64E Apache and 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters in a deal estimated to value $2.5 billion. Headed by Prime Minister Modi, the CCS’ clearance paves the way for a contract within months, following years of delays to the deal owing to disputes over offset arrangements. The price quoted for the helicopters by manufacturer Boeing was extended for a tenth time in July, with this price guaranteed to the end of September. The Apache and Chinook helicopters beat out the Russian Mi-28N and Mi-26 respectively, with India currently operating an aging fleet of Hind helicopters.
Indonesian officials will meet their Russian counterparts later this month to discuss a possible acquisition of Su-35 multi-role fighters. The country has been looking to buy the Russian fighter for a while, with the Indonesian Air Force already operating earlier Su-27 models. Reports in the Indonesian press indicate that the government is planning to acquire half a squadron of Su-35s initially, with further orders planned to phase-out ageing F-5 Tiger fighters.

Today’s Video

Fast-roping with a GoPro:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Venezuela Buying SU-30s, Helicopters, etc. From Russia

Wed, 23/09/2015 - 02:22

SU-30, armed
(click to view full)

There have been a series of reports from a number of sources that Venezuela has finalized a deal with Russian arms manufacturers. Those reports have now shifted the total from $1 billion to around $3 billion, and expand its focus beyond SU-30MK2 (Mnogofunktzionniy Komercheskiy 2-seat) long-range multi-role fighters and various Russian helicopters to include other equipment as well. The final deal is reportedly still being negotiated.

Russian deals are extremely non-transparent, and often there are conflicting reports with no official confirmation of announced reports or additional details released. Based on news reports from various sources, however, here’s what DID can tell you about the likely shape of the deal and the nature of the equipment in question, aside from the USA’s predictably futile requests that Russia not go through with the sale.

DID’s coverage today includes updated information regarding the deal, and adds sources that have emerged sicce this article was first published on July 24, 2006. The latest news is the claimed crash of a Mi-35 – but DID explains why that story may be problematic…

Venezuela-Russia 2006: Deal, Updated
The Fighters: Sukhoi’s SU-30MK2s
The Helicopters: Plans for 33 Coming to Fruition?
Venezuela-Russia 2006: Follow-on Events & Milestones [NEW]
Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (July 31/06)

Veneuela-Russia 2006: Deal, Updated “You want WHAT!?!”

The Vedomosti business daily quotes Rosoboronexport’s CEO Sergei Chemezov claiming that Venezuela would sign deals worth $3 billion. On top of an expected deal to buy at least 24 Russian Sukhoi-30 jets, reports said Chavez will buy helicopters (up to 53 helicopters has been suggested), surface-to-air missiles and possibly even a submarine.

Kommersant’s hilarious July 28, 2006 article “The Kalashnikov Buyer” is an instructive tale of cultural mismatches at the highest levels of diplomacy. It also includes additional details re: the structure of Venezuela’s weapons purchases:

38 Russian military helicopters for $484 million, deal signed on July 15 (38 + 15 previously-ordered = 53). Types not broken down, but a RIA Novosti article on July 31 cited them as Mi-17V5 and Mi-35Ms only – no more Mi-26s;
24 Su-30MK planes, deal signed on July 17 (RIA Novosti would later say SU-30MK2 on July 31).

Kommersant adds:

“A high Kremlin source said that new shipments of weapons were discussed at yesterday’s talks. “Work in that direction is continuing,” the source said.

It can be suggested with great confidence that they are now talking about medium-range ballistic missiles. In addition, Venezuela dreams of conquering space. Chavez considers it his duty to launch the first Venezuelan into space (as if he wouldn’t go himself). Russian specialists understandably want it to be a commercial launch but, unfortunately, it will be a political decision.”

While DID respects Kommersant’s superior local sources, we would suggest that armored vehicles, surface-air missiles, and submarines are far more likely buys. Russia has learned a thing or two about medium range ballistic missiles and Latin American countries over the last century, and is unlikely to repeat the experience. Nor is it wise to sell a potentially lucrative repeat buyer the defense procurement equivalent of a hara-kiri kit.

The Fighters: Sukhoi’s SU-30MK2s FAV SU-30MK2
(click to view full)

DID has covered Venezuela’s thwarted $100 million attempt to upgrade its 1980s-vintage F-16s with more modern systems, which failed thanks to US pressure on Israel to abandon the sale. Long before that setback, however, Venezuela had also been talking about buying Russian fighters. Most speculation concerned the MiG-29, but some reports mentioned the much larger, longer-range, and more expensive SU-30s. There was even some talk about Chinese J-10s. Meanwhile, as DID pointed out, spare parts were still being delivered to keep its F-16A/B fleet operational.

While reports vary, it seems apparent that Venezuela has now bought between 24-30 SU-30MK2s, a multi-role 2-seat variant with substantial air-air and air-ground capabilities. The SU-30MK2 is not the most advanced Russian fighter developed; it lacks the canard foreplanes or thrust vectoring of more advanced variants like India’s SU-30MKI, or Sukhoi’s new variants the SU-34 strike aircraft or SU-37 fighter that are waiting for procurement orders. Having said that, SU-30MK2s as a base platform are the equal of China’s most advanced SU-30MKKK2s, and equal to or better than most SU-30 variants currently serving in Russia.

DID would add that the likely contract value is over $1 billion, as these aircraft traditionally sell for about $60 million per aircraft, and support deals also factor in. A sale of 24 aircraft at $60 million each is $1.44 billion all by itself. Hopefully, future reports will bring some clarity to this aspect [N.B. They are beginning to, suggesting that the purchase will be more like $3 billion].

SU-30MK2 Ordnance –
from Sukhoi
(click to view full)

One-one-one, and with other things being equal (both of which rarely apply in tactical situations), the SU-30s match up well against US aircraft. Where the US “teen series” fighters like the F-16, F-18 and F-15 are built around 1970 designs, the Sukhoi jets are late 1980s designs that apply many of the lessons from America’s teen series aircraft, plus some of their own twists. The result is an improved airframe with a large and capable radar and a higher-performance design; one capable of unique maneuvers and remarkably adaptable to modernization via canards, thrust vectoring, and other advanced features. Indeed, Sukhoi’s fighters have become the baseline against which most twin-engine western fighters are measured. Their only major weakness is the design’s inherent lack of stealth.

In air-to-air combat, many observers[1] consider the SU-30 to be superior to both the F/A-18 and F-15 variants, on even footing with the Rafale, outclassed by the Eurofighter, and very much outclassed by the stealthy F-22A. In terms of air-ground combat, however, their range, payload, and performance means their only western equal may be the F-15E+ Strike Eagle variants, with the F-22A excelling the SU-30s in specific missions like air defense suppression but unable to carry their weight or versatility of armament.

With that said, one should add that the fighter sale is only the first part of any military capability. Venezuela’s SU-30 fleet will depend on advanced missiles like the short-range AA-11/R-73 Archer and long-range AA-12/R-77 ‘AMRAAMski’ to give it real air-air punch – modern SU-30s include the ability to fire the R-77s in addition to the older R-27/AA-10 Alamo. In the strike role, possession of smart bombs and missiles (esp. antiship missiles) will make a significant different to the fighters’ full striking power. Paying attention to whether or not Venezuela buys those “ancillaries,” therefore, is as important as the aircraft sale itself.

The Helicopters: Plans for 33 Coming to Fruition? AEV Mi-17V5
(click to view full)

In 2005, Venezuela signed a $201 million contract for 15 Russian helicopters. According to Novosti, the deal consisted of 6 Mi-17 (probably Mi-17v5) “Hip” armed troop transports and 8 Mi-35M2 “Pirana” armored helicopter gunships. The Piranas are a modernized version of the “Mi-24 Hinds” used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, with a Venezuelan name and improved day/night capabilities, avionics, and weapons. One super-giant Mi-26T “Halo” transport and cargo helicopter was also included.

According to MosNews, Army commander Gen. Raul Baduel said in April 2006 that the military planned to buy a total of 20 Mi-17s, 10 Mi-35s and 3 super-giant Mi-26T helicopters from Russia. “This year, we should have 15 helicopters of the 33 that are expected in our country,” Baduel reportedly told state television. This was close, but Moscow Defence Brief would later report that:

Mi-35M Pirana
(click to view full)

“[On the eve of a July 2006 state visit] a new contract for 18 helicopters was signed, including 14 Mi-17B5, two Mi-35M and two Mi-26T. In addition, it appears as though another contract for the delivery of 20 Mi-17, including two VIP versions, was agreed upon. The cost of all 38 helicopters amounts to $484 million. Thus, the total size of Venezuela’s helicopter programs, which includes the delivery of 40 Mi-17, 10 Mi-35M and three Mi-26T amounts to $685 million.”

With many reports of the fighter deal also referring to “30 helicopters” and only $1 billion given as the deal figure, DID considers it likely that the deal actually involves buying the additional 14 armed Mi-17V5s, 2 Mi-35 gunships, and 2 Mi-26T machines to round out Venezuela’s purchase target [N.B. newly-reported deal figures of $3 billion may change this assessment, and there are reports of 38 new helicopters in the deal].

AEV’s Mi-26T
(click to view full)

The Mi-26T is the world’s largest helicopter, with a 20-tonne (44,000 pound) capacity that matches a C-130 Hercules medium transport plane. It is excellent for handling oversize loads, and some Russian and Ukranian Mi-26s have even been contracted by US CENTCOM to perform missions that need their unique capabilities. Venezuelan Mi-26Ts could well find infrastructure-related employment in the country’s oil and gas industry, or on the 6,000-8,000 mile Latin American pipeline that occupies Chavez’ fancies.

Of course, a quick conversion also allows this helicopter to carry up to 80 troops, or a mix of troops and small armored vehicles. It just can’t carry them to the same kinds of ranges managed by smaller American choppers like the CH-47 Chinook, because a helicopter its size with Russian engines drinks fuel like there’s no tomorrow. The addition of up to 4 external fuel tanks can offset this problem, however, and if there’s one thing Venezuela has in abundance, it’s oil.

Veneuela-Russia: Follow-on Events & Milestones Mi-35M
(click to view full)

September 23/15: Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is reported to be planning a purchase of a dozen Su-30 fighters, along with equipment from China. The Venezuelan Air Force operates 23 Su-30MK2 multirole fighters, following a crash of one of these last week. Speaking at a ceremony to mark the loss, Maduro stated that he would talk with Vladimir Putin to acquire a replacement for the lost Su-30 as well as the twelve new fighters. The aircraft in service were procured from Russia as part of a $3 billion arms sale, following a refusal by then-President George Bush to sell replacement parts for the country’s fleet of F-16s.

May 4/09: A helicopter crash, kills all on board, leaving a death toll of 18 Venezuelan soldiers that includes Brig. Gen. Domingo Alberto Feneite. Reports describe the helicopter as an Mi-35, and say that the local military base lost contact shortly after mid-day. The military helicopter crashed near the town of El Alto de Rubio, near the Colombian border. Associated Press.

The problem with the story is that 18 troops would be far, far above the Mi-24/35 type’s generally understood troop capacity of 8. It would be around the maximum for the Mi-17V5 model in hot conditions, however, and photos clearly show that Venezuela has armed those machines as well. If reports referred to an “attack helicopter,” and unwarranted assumptions were made, the mistake is conceivable.

In a country like Venezuela, of course, darker explanations for such mistakes are also possible.

Aug 3/08: AHN reports that “At least 24 Russian-made Sukhoi-30 fighter jets were delivered to Venezuela on [this day] as part of the country’s defense capability build-up.”

Dec 21/06: A Rosvertol release appears to confirm the figure of 10 Mi-35s and 3 Mi-26s:

“A batch of helicopters consisting of four combat Mi-35M and one multi-purpose transport Mi-26T helicopters is ready to be sent to Venezuela. Four Mi-35M helicopters (upgrade of Mi-24(35) type helicopters which have perfectly recommended themselves in more than 30 countries of the world) were delivered to this Latin American country in July 2006…Helicopters produced by Rostvertol Plc (Rostov-on-Don, Russia) will be sent to the Republic of Venezuela according to the earlier signed contracts. In total, ten Mi-35M and three Mi-26T helicopters will be delivered. Also, Venezuelan specialists passed flying and technical training and obtained appropriate certificates.”

Nov 30/06: According to MosNews, the first 2 Venezuelan SU-30s are delivered on this day to the Luis Del Valle Garcia naval base in Barcelona, some 230 km (145 miles) east of Caracas. Hat tip to DID reader Vincent van neerven.

Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (July 31/06) COPE India 2004: SU-30K,
F-15C, Mirage 2000
(click to view full)

Russia and Venezuela had already signed earlier contracts for Russian helicopters, and a $54 million contract for the supply of more than 100,000 AK-103 rifles (an AK-47 Kalashnikov variant), and on licensed production in Venezuela of the rifles and ammunition. With this new procurement, however, Chavez is taking his relationship with Russia to the next level while acquiring a suite of capabilities expressly designed to intimidate neighbouring states.

The San Francisco Chronicle quotes Carlos Mendoza, who was Venezuela’s ambassador to Russia until last year and is now an adviser to Venezuela’s Central Bank. He noted that Russia is investing $1 billion in an aluminum plant in southeast Venezuela, that Russian companies are investing heavily in Venezuelan oil and gas fields, and that if Chavez dream/fantasy of a 5,000 mile pipeline through South America were to become a reality, Russia’s expertise with long-distance pipelines would likely play a role. In terms of the broader strategic relationship:

“There is no ideological affinity, because Russia nowadays certainly embodies capitalism at its most savage… But Putin is one of the spokesmen for the cause of multipolarity, and Venezuela hopes that Latin America becomes one of those poles… I don’t know the secrets of the (bilateral) military negotiations, because those are conducted through other channels, but Russia is a key element of Venezuela’s ambitions to become a global player on many levels.”

The question is what “global player” means, not only in larger geopolitical terms but also on the regional level.

MiG-29OVT, aka. MiG-35
(click to view full)

The order provides some answers via its choice between MiG-29 and SU-30 aircraft. A posture that sought to defend Venezuela above all else would arguably have been better served by buying a larger quantity of MiG-29 lightweight fighters – perhaps even the new thrust-vectoring, multi-role MiG-29OVT/MiG-35 – for the same amount of money. This would still have given Chavez the best combat aircraft in Latin America, with the ability to carry the same sophisticated air-air armament as the SU-30s, and greater air-air combat capabilities than any carrier-borne US fighter. The ability to conduct precision attacks locally would be retained, but MiG-29s have an operational range that would restrict their ability to carry out long-range attacks, as well as limiting their carrying capacity on missions outside of Venezuela’s territory. This would have made for a more clearly defensive and hence regionally stabilizing force.

Instead, Chavez chose to buy fewer aircraft, but with the capability to launch long-range strikes carrying much larger amounts of ordnance. The SU-30MK2 has up to 6 hardpoints for strike weapons (each of which can potentially hold more than one weapon, depending on type), and the Russians claim that its range is 3,000km/ 1,800 miles on internal fuel. This will not be a stabilizing force in the region, especially given many of his neighbors’ complaints of hostile Venezuelan meddling in the region’s internal affairs, and efforts to export revolution to their countries.

AEV Mi-17V5 & Paras
(click to view full)

The helicopters are also an important factor, but their importance lies inward. Even after this purchase, Venezuela lacks the transport capability and combat punch to conduct ground operations at a distance that go beyond guerilla warfare. Nor would helicopters serve well against a full-fledged opponent like the USA. Helicopters’ mobility and versatility make them a critical component of counter-insurgency operations, however; and when its 33 aircraft buy is complete, Venezuela will have what is arguably the best and most heavily-armed helicopter force in the region.

This is a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it can provide a welcome capability to a major oil exporter that allows it to protect its infrastructure with rapid-reaction forces. On the other hand, this assortment of Russian helicopters (and especially the Mi-35s) make it nearly perfect as a pocket force for the violent and decisive crushing of civil unrest. Much depends on one’s evaluation of Chavez and his intentions, and on how he has dealt with dissent in Venezuela and met his obligations to democracy and liberty.

SU-30MK2 on runway
(click to view full)

With other concerns preoccupying the USA, however, Latin America is no longer seen as important strategic terrain. Which means that many of these issues are likely to be left to the region itself to sort out.

Whether Chavez’ moves will trigger regional counter-moves, or even a local arms race, remains to be seen. Brazil’s military is showing growing concern over Chavez’ moves, especially given his meddling in Bolivia where Brazil gets a significant percentage of its natural gas. Brazil’s temporarily-shelved fighter modernization program in particular may represent an excellent bellwether in terms of regional reaction – giving observers one more reason to follow that competition closely.

UPDATE: Brazil went on to revive its F-X fighter program, and double its defense budget. Colombia also undertook significant modernization, and spending in the region generally is on the upswing.

FOOTNOTES

fn1. Many of these assessments are based in part on a mid-1990s British DERA(Defense Evaluation Research Agency) study, though the performance of SU-30s against US aircraft in COPE India 2004 and COPE India 2005 has tended to strengthen those general views. In all cases, however, one must stress again the sheer number of variables involved, the imprecision of any estimate, and the importance of situation and other factors beyond just the aircraft themselves when attempting to determine relative advantage.

Additional Readings & Sources

Sukhoi Company – The Su-30MK2 Double-Seat Fighter
Sino Defence – SU-30MKK/MKK2 Multirole Fighter Aircraft. SU-30MKK2s are the most modern fighters in China’s arsenal, and have improved anti-ship capabilities that include the ability to carry the supersonic Kh-31/Kh-17A Krypton anti-ship missile.
GlobalSecurity.org – SU-30MK
Air Force Technology’s “Projects” section is also good place to go for data on various fighters, including the SU-30MK… but DID believes some of their information confuses India’s unique version with the class as a whole, and is wrong.
Air force Technology – Mi-24P (Mi-25 and Mi-35) Hind Attack / Transport Helicopter, Russia
Sino Defence – Mi-17 Multirole Helicopter. Unlike other summaries, it includes details re: the newer Mi-17V5 version.
SAORBATS – Proyecto “Pemon,” Mi-17-V5 del Ejercito de Venezuela. In Spanish; has lots of good photos of the Venezuelan Mi-17V5s.
Rostvertol – Mi-26t Transport Helicopter
DID – Brazil Embarking Upon F-X2 Fighter Program. And doubling its defense budget, including an Mi-35 buy of their own.
DID – Colombia’s Defense Modernization
DID (Nov 11/07) – Russia Looks to Triple Arms Exports to Venezuela. To about $12 billion; other deals are said to be in the pipeline.
Moscow Defense Brief #1 (7) 2007 – The Venezuela Contracts. Includes Algeria in the overall Russian arms & policy overview.
RIA Novosti (July 31/06) – Weapons for Venezuela: Nothing personal. Cites the 38 helicopters as Mi-17V5 and Mi-35M, and the fighters as SU-30MK2s.
Kommersant (July 28/06) – The Kalashnikov Buyer. Very illuminating and at times quite funny in its personal profiles of Chavez & Putin’s interactions. MRBMs?!? Uh, ask the Cubans about that one…
Reuters (July 27/06) – Russia’s arms sales to Venezuela may total $3 billion
Novosti (July 27/06) – Venezuela’s Chavez hopes for Russia aid to build $20bln pipeline
Voice of America (July 25/06) – US Urges Moscow to Reconsider Venezuela Arms Deal
M & C News (July 25/06) – Venezuela’s Chavez pursues arms deals in Russia, Belarus (Roundup)
RIA Novosti (July 24/06) – Russia signs $1bln aircraft contract with Venezuela-Ivanov
Brazil’s DEFESA@NET (July 23/06) – Brasil-Venezuela: Relaciones peligrosas. “Babelfish” translation available via a link on the page. Brazilian defense planners and various political sectors are beginning to take notice of Venezuela’s new arms purchases and activities, and concern is growing.
San Francisco Chronicle (July 23/06) – Chavez forging his own links: Venezuelan president makes arms deal with Russia, strengthening his agenda to counterbalance U.S. influence
Agence France Presse (July 20/06) – Russia Breaks Into Venezuela with Fighter Sales: Newspaper. Places the deal at 24 SU-30MK2s.
Interfax (July 19/06) – Yesterday in Brief for July 19, 2006
MosNews (April 4/06) – Venezuela to Buy 30 More Russian Helicopters, Eyes Combat Fighters
DID (Feb 14/06) – Love on the Rocks: CASA’s $600M Venezuelan Plane Sale In Heavy Turbulence
DID (Jan 19/06) – US Tech-Transfer Laws Freeze Spain-Venezuela Aircraft Deal. They would also freeze Brazil’s planned sale of Super Tucano aircraft, which can be used as trainers but also make fine counter-insurgency aircraft – for instance, in Colombia’s battles against FARC narco-terrorists et. al. Columbia accuses Chavez of supporting FARC, a charge he naturally denies.
DID (Nov 22/05) – F.I. Looks At Latin American Arms Market, Sees Venezuelan Buildup. That’s their forecast for the next decade, anyway; the rest of the market is forecast to be relatively quiet during this period, unless things change.
DID (Oct 26/05) – US Roadblocks re: the Venezuela-Israel F-16 Upgrade: Politics or Protectionism?
Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 24/02) – Su-30MK Beats F-15C ‘Every Time’ In a set of USAF simulations, using a specified set of tactics that include taking a shot with a BVR missile and then turning into the “clutter notch” of the F-15’s radar.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Norway Reiterates Commitment to F-35s

Wed, 23/09/2015 - 02:20

F-35: takeoff.
(click to view full)

Back in 2006 Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Lightning II team were facing difficulties and controversies in Norway. Since then, there have been some successes. The next milestone MoU was signed on Jan 31/06, amidst industrial and missile deals designed to bring Norway on board – but even that signing came with express statements that the country was keeping its options open.

Norway had threatened to back out of its Tier 3 partnership in the JSF program, but a Kongsberg JSM/NSM missile deal helped, and a subsequent conditional composite structures deal shored up support. Norway’s JSF production MoU was signed on December 31/07. On June 17/11, Parliamentary opposition caved and endorsed an initial buy of 4 F-35As. Now, Norway is moving into the full procurement phase.

Norway’s Plans (click to view full)

With Dassault’s Rafale’s removal from the competition and EADS’ Eurofighter’s withdrawal, the battle came down to the F-35A vs. an upgraded JAS-39NG derivative. WikiLeaks documents suggest that it was never a real competition, with the F-35A ordained from the start.

The official figure for the program is NOK 62.6 billion in adjusted 2013 currency value, which is around $10.7 billion as of April 2013. That figure has remained stable since 2008, despite Pentagon adjustments that have seen official F-35 prices rise by well over 30%.

The current plan is for 4 training & transition F-35As to arrive at Eglin AFB, FL in groups of 2: 2 in 2015 and 2 in 2016. A steady set of orders would then see F-35As arrive in Norway beginning in 2017, with Parliament approving and budgeting for the purchases annually, 6 at a time. This approach offers Norway more flexibility than the previous plan of a 42-plane order to begin arriving in 2018, with the last 6 aircraft as a separate and optional purchase. If costs become a problem, course correction is possible – but at that point, their only real option will be to reduce their fighter fleet size.

Most RNoAF F-35As will be based at Ørland Main Air Station in south-central Norway, near Trondheim. The airfield at Evenes in northern Norway, near Narvik, will host a small Forward Operating Base that will be upgraded to offer Quick Reaction Alert. It will hold about 10% of overall RNoAF F-35 flights.

Kongsberg’s stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM) is technically separate from Norway’s participation in the F-35 program, but the Norwegians aren’t treating it that way. It’s currently the only long-range strike weapon that’s slated for carriage inside the F-35A’s weapon bays, and Norway has high hopes for export success. To them, it’s a cornerstone of their industrial participation. The JSM is scheduled for full F-35 integration in Block 4. Block 3 is the final F-35 version that will emerge from development in 2018 – 2019, which means Block 4 would be ready around 2021 at the earliest.

Contracts & Key Events 2013-2015

F-35 & JSM
(click to view full)

September 23/15: Meanwhile, Norwegian defense officials reiterated their commitment to the procurement of up to 52 F-35s, citing Russian power projection in Northern Europe as a reason to press ahead with the acquisition. The first F-35 deliveries to Norway are expected in 2017, with Initial Operating Capability expected two years later. The Norwegians opted to buy the F-35A in 2013, after the Lockheed Martin jet beat off competition from an upgraded version of Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The first F-35 manufactured for the Norwegian Armed Forces was rolled out by Lockheed Martin on Tuesday.

April 26/13: Parliament. The Norwegian government submits a formal Parliamentary request to authorize 6 F-35As for delivery in 2017. That would place them within Lot 9 production, in US FY 2015. The NOK 12.9 billion ($2.18 billion) request includes the fighters, plus advance training for operators and maintainers, simulators, and integration work. That total could rise as high as NOK 15.9 billion ($2.71 billion), if the full “uncertainty allowance” is also spent.

These aircraft would be the 1st F-35s to fly in Norway; the RNoAF’s first 4 F-35As will be based at Eglin AFB, FL for training purposes. This year’s announcement also includes a shift in plans to 6 fighters submitted for approval each year, for arrival in Norway from 2017-2024.

In other news, Kongsberg’s stealthy JSM anti-ship and land strike missile now has a firm slot for integration: F-35 Block 4. Norwegian MoD.

March 12/13: Issues & allies. JSF PEO Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, offers a number of important pieces of information at the Credit Suisse/McAleese defense programs conference in Washington, DC. One is that he hopes to have unit cost, including the engine, down to $90 million by 2020 – about 10% lower than current Pentagon estimates beyond 2017. Allies “need to know where their money is going”, especially since orders after LRIP-8 (2014) are expected to be about 50% allied buys. Unfortunately there’s an issue with IOT&E processes, which has been left unaddressed until the issue became a source of buying uncertainty:

“Adding insult to injury, the JSF program office classified all documents as “U.S. only,” which upset partner nations. Even if they are all buying the same aircraft, each country has its own air-worthiness qualification processes and other administrative procedures that require they have access to the aircraft’s technical data. JSF officials are working to re-classify the documentation, Bogdan said.”

Regarding Operations & Support costs, which are over 2/3 of a weapon system’s lifetime cost: “If we don’t start doing things today to bring down O&S now, there will be a point when the services will see this aircraft as unaffordable.”

Most of those costs trace back to design, so changes at this point are possible, but difficult. One design and support issue is that the 80% commonality between variants envisaged at the program’s outset is now closer to 25-30%. That means more expensive non-common parts due to lower production runs, larger inventories for support of multiple types in places like the USA and Italy, more custom work for future changes, etc. Information Dissemination | National Defense.

Feb 28/13: Block 8 long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $333.8 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), advance acquisition contract, covering early equipment buys for 35 LRIP Lot 8 planes: 19 USAF F-35As ($155.2M/ 46%), 6 USMC F-35Bs ($85.4M/ 26%), and 4 USN F-35Cs ($27.5M/ 8%); plus 4 F-35B STOVLs for Britain ($45M/ 14%), and 2 F-35As for Norway ($20.7M/ 6%). All contract funds are committed immediately.

This would be Norway’s 2nd set of training aircraft. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-13-C-0008).

2011 – 2012

RNoAF F-16
(click to view full)

Sept 27/12: Engine lead-in. United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives an estimated $89.2 million for long-lead components, parts and materials associated with the 37 engines in LRIP Lot 7. The rest of the contract will follow, but initial purchases include $4 million from Norway (4.5%) for 2 F135 standard engines.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (67%); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5%); and Indianapolis, IN (16.5%), and is expected to be complete in September 2013. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-12-C-0060).

June 20/12: Initial contract. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $20.1 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for Norway’s first 2 F-35As, to be ordered in the LRIP-7/ FY 2013 production lot.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%). Work is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-12-C-0004).

June 15/12: First 2 authorized. Norway takes the next step, and formally authorizes the purchase of 2 F-35A fighters, which are intended for delivery in 2015. They will be based in the United States as part of a joint partner training center, which almost certainly means Eglin AFB, FL. The 2 aircraft authorized today are expected to be joined by a second pair in 2016. They are to be followed by up to 48 additional aircraft orders from 2017, which will be based at Orland AB and Evenes FOB in Norway. The overall cost of the F-35’s procurement phase is estimated at NOK 60 billion/ $FY12 10 billion.

This is not a contract yet, but one can be expected fairly soon. Meanwhile, American support for internal F-35 integration of the JSM strike missile allows Norway to begin preparing it for deployment. This is very good news for Lockheed Martin, which is working through a 2-month long extended strike by its machinists, and a harsh US GAO report concerning the F-35’s progress. Norwegian MoD | Business Insider | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | WFAA Dallas.

1st 2 approved

June 15/12: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $489.5 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for the delivery of 35 low rate initial production Lot VII F-35. The order involves 19 USAF F-35As, 3 F-35As for the government of Italy, 2 F-35As for the government of Turkey, 6 USMC F-35B STOVL(Short Take-Off Vertical Landing), 1 F-35B for Britain, and 4 F-35Cs for the US Navy.

This contract also funds long lead-time efforts required for the incorporation of a drag chute in Norway’s F-35As. Drag chutes are especially useful when landing in cold climates, where runways and tires may fail to provide the same level of traction.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to US FAR 6.302-1, by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-12-C-0004).

June 14/12: Norway’s Storting (parliament) approves a significant increase in defense spending, with the F-35 purchase playing a central role. The country will also be making investments in modernizing and adding CV90 tracked armored vehicles, and purchasing UAVs.

Overall, Norway will see a budget increase of 7% by 2016. Monies spent of the Afghan deployment will be continued and redirected, while “significant” supplementary funds will be added for the F-35 purchase. Source.

June 14/12: US GAO Report. Congress’ Government Accountability Office delivers a report on the F-35 program. Key excerpts from GAO-12-437: “Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks” :

“The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001… Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. Affordability is a key challenge… Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 important objectives… Late software releases and concurrent work on multiple software blocks have delayed testing and training. Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky… Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than 1 year late. Program officials said the government’s share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contract.”

March 23/12: Norway releases its new Defence Plan. Their goal is still 52 F-35As: 48 operational and 4 for training, but 6 planes can now be considered options. Basing will be at Orland in mid-Norway, with a secondary forward base at Evenes in the north.

The plan is to buy the 4 training aircraft in 2015, instead of 2016. That’s later than the originally-envisaged full buy of 48 from 2014-2018, but the F-35’s schedule has changed, too.

The rest of the buy would be stretched. Norway is considering 2017 as the start date for orders of the remaining 42, and the final procurement year could be as late as 2023-2024. That makes for an average buy of 5-6 planes per year, though Norway could also choose to buy fewer in early years and more in the later years, if that means lower prices. The final 6 operational aircraft would be a separate decision, after the main set of 4 training + 42 fighters had been ordered. That effectively turns them into a financial buffer, making them vulnerable to budget cuts or fighter cost increases. Norwegian MoD | Fort Worth Star-Telegram Sky Talk.

March 5/12: After a meeting of the existing F-35 partners at the Canadian embassy in Washington, Norwegian Defense State Secretary Roger Ingebrigsten says that Norway was finalizing its plans to buy “approximately 50 fighters.”

Even though Lockheed Martin has said that it expects F-35 prices to rise, Ingebrigsten said that does not expect any significant cost increases to its order. At the same time, he declined to provide details ahead of the Norwegian government’s mid-March submission to parliament. A hint may be provided by the fact that the government’s original plan had a range of NOK 52 – 72 billion (vid. June 6/11), so a NOK 20 billion hike could be claimed as meeting the original plan. Reuters.

Nov 24/11: $50 billion? Norwegian MP Roger Ingebrigtsen [Troms, Labour Party], and Rear Admiral Arne Røksund, head of their Department of Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning, visit Canada. They respond to Canadian MP Christine Moore [Abitibi–Temiscamingue, NDP], who asks about Norway’s planned budgets:

“Mr. Roger Ingebrigtsen: It’s about $10 billion U.S. That’s for 51 or 52 air fighters. That’s $10 billion today…

RAdm Arne Røksund: …The life cycle costs will be, I think, about–this is not public yet, so I have to be careful – $40 billion U.S. over 30 years. So that’s life cycle costs over 30 years, all included.

Ms. Christine Moore: …So the $10 billion is simply to purchase the aircraft themselves.

RAdm Arne Røksund: That is for the planes, initial logistics included, repair kits, and so on, for the first few years.”

The purchase figures are consistent with accounts of NOK 61 – 72 billion, but the 30-year sustainment costs are new. Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch.

June 17/11: Opposition caves. The initial buy of 4 F-35s has been approved in Norway, as opposition parties cave. The resolution gets unanimous approval. While a decision on the full F-35A buy isn’t expected until 2014, this vote effectively seals the buy.

In the aftermath, the governing coalition’s Socialist Left party is calling for a probe to be carried out by state auditor Riksrevisjonen. Former Labour Party defense minister Jorgen Kosmo will comply in his current job as State Auditor, if a Parliamentary majority requests it. Continued opposition divisions make that unlikely, however, as the Conservatives (Hoyre) say an audit into a decision process would violate parliamentary practice. If Labour and Hoyre vote against, a majority resolution is impossible. VNN | F-16.NET | Reuters | Stortinget Prop. S110 [Nynorsk, PDF].

4 approved

June 6/11: Defense Minister Grete Faremo is called in to an open Parliamentary hearing about the F-35A. She maintains the NOK 1 billion ($180 million) cost increase figure, but the Aftenposten newspaper reports that actual cost estimates won’t be available until 6 months after the first 4 aircraft have been ordered. The government’s long-term plan, which will include fewer air bases, and F-35 lifetime cost estimates, isn’t due until well into 2012.

That “costs only after commitment” delay has drawn complaints from the opposition Conservative party (Hoyre), whose representatives complain that total cost estimates now vary from NOK 145 billion – 200 billion for the program. The government insists that the 1st 4 training jets must be ordered by the end of 2011 (Q1 of FY 2012 for the Pentagon), in order to arrive by 2016. On the other hand, the Conservatives, plus the Socialist Left, Progress, and Christian Democrats, would be a Parliamentary majority in Norway if they all voted together, and there is talk of voting against the initial 4-plane order.

What the Defense minister will say is this (translated from Norwegian):

“With the revised assumptions, the estimated cost of the acquisition of 56 aircraft now estimated at about [NOK] 52 billion [present value 2011 figure]. Without discounting the expected cost (P-50) for the entire combat aircraft purchase 61 billion 2011-NOK. Including uncertainty deposition (P-85)… 72 billion 2011-NOK.”

That’s a range of $9.7 – 13.43 billion, or about $173 – 240 million per plane. The entire program would, of course, include other costs beyond flyaway purchase. Norway’s Forsvarsdepartmentet statement [in Norwegian] | VNN.

April 18/11: VNN reports that the government’s Socialist Left party coalition partner (SV), and opposition parties the conservative Progress Party (Frp) and the Christian Democrats (Krf), have joined together to demand a detailed accounting of the F-35’s costs. The demands are connected to the government’s April 7/11 announcement of its intention to spend NOK 4.5 billion on 4 F-35As as a training and transition squadron, followed by 52 operational fighters.

A final decision from Parliament is due in May 2011, but the nature of that decision is contested within the government. That matters, because SV has 11 seats, and the margin between the governing coalition and all opposition parties is 86-83. The SV maintains that the Parliament has not granted final approval to actually buy the jets, and its Parliamentary leader Bard Vegar Solhjell says:

“I think it’s right that we stop and go carefully through the numbers… We need to debate whether we are where we should be, or someplace else.”

Labour Party State Secretary Roverg Ingebrigtsen has a different point of view, saying that:

“Norway has decided to buy the F35… That decision has been made.”

April 7/11: Norway’s current government, known as Stoltenberg’s Second Cabinet, makes a Parliamentary announcement of its intent to buy 4 F-35As as operational training aircraft, for delivery in 2016. That means a FY 2013-2014 order, in advance of the full 52-plane order a couple years later. The goal is to ensure that Norwegian pilots are prepared to use the operational F-35As when they begin arriving in 2018.

The government is also required to update their cost estimates, compared to the 2008/09 estimate in St.prp. nr. 36. The official estimate raises acquisition costs by NOK 1 billion (about $180 million now), which is only a 2.5% increase. The reason is cited as delayed US buys, which is true, but Pentagon estimates have also been raising the expected cost of the fighters, and that is not reflected here. Norwegian Forsvarsdepartementet [in Norwegian], and their updated cost structure [PDF, Nynorsk].

Jan 6/11: Norway’s government reacts to the news with reserved non-commitment, saying that it will seek more information, and adding that the program changes may change the timing of its F-35 purchase submission to the Stortinget (parliament). Norwegian Forsvarsdepartementet [in Norwegian].

Jan 6/11: F-35 program shifts. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states that he is placing the Marine Corps’ F-35B on the equivalent of a 2-year probation, extends the program’s development phase again to 2016, and cuts production of all models over the 2012-2016 time period, including 47 fewer F-35As. During the low-rate initial production phase, cuts in the number bought mean that the price for each plane doesn’t drop as quickly, making purchases more expensive. Pentagon release re: overall plan | Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | F-35 briefing hand-out [PDF] || Aviation Week | Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Sky Talk blog.

2009 – 2010

Loaded for bear…
(click to view full)

Dec 8/10: Industrial. The Labour Party’s Minister for Defense Grete Faremo addresses the US-Norway Defence Industry Conference. Among her remarks:

“Through the best value system, which entails strong international competition, Norwegian companies have already won contracts for about 350 million USD. This demonstrates that Norwegian companies have the skills, competence and production facilities to meet the very demanding standards of the aerospace industry.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence and Norwegian industry have put substantial effort into developing products to enhance the operational capabilities of the F-35: The Joint Strike Missile and 25mm ammunition (APEX), – products which should generate interest in the other F-35 partner nations, the United States included… We also eagerly anticipate the results of the US Analysis of Alternatives for future Offensive Anti Surface Warfare. I expect that this joint effort and the Analysis will pave the way for a successful integration of the JSM on the F-35.”

Dec 3/10: Sham competition? Wikileaks documents reveal that the Norway’s F-16 replacement competition was a sham, and that the USA used its weapons export laws as a way of hindering competition.

The contents of the leaked cables include a 2008 meeting between Sweden’s defense minister Sten Tolgfors and US ambassador Michael Wood, where Tolgfors asked for permission to buy an American-made Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system for the Gripen. In response, US diplomatic cables included a recommendation that the USA use its weapons export laws. A July 8/06 cable reportedly reads:

“Given this potential impact of AESA releasability on the Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition… we suggest postponing the decision on AESA releasability for the Gripen until after Norway’s decision in December.”

Not content with that hindrance, the USA added political pressure on Norway to buy F-35s. Subsequent cables reportedly state that “other contacts, primarily in the MoD, have reassured us that the MoD will recommend the F-35.” Deputy Minister Espen Barth Eide (which other cables say is “regarded as the force which steers the defense ministry”, though “very senior US officials… characterized Barth Eide as ‘weasily’ “) is reported as telling USAF Europe commander Gen. Roger Brady to “trust the process, do not overplay your hand.” Before any decision was formally made, the cables describe success, with the caveat that “We must continue to act like an honorable and elegant competitor [even though the decision is already set].” Sweden’s Aftenposten [in Swedish] | Sweden’s The Local | Stockholm News | Swedish Wire | Aviation Week Ares | Flight International | Fort Worth Star-Telegram Sky Talk blog (incl. Cablegate URLs).

A Sham?

Sept 29/10: Delay. Norwegian defence minister Grete Faremo informs the Norwegian parliament that the F-35 buy will be delayed. Instead of receiving 48 fighters from 2016-2010, Norway will buy 4 training aircraft in 2016 instead of 2014, and the arrival of operational aircraft has been shifted to 2018 instead of 2016. The delay in fielding its new fighters may force the ministry to reconsider upgrading at least some of Norway’s F-16s, in order to cover the gap.

Norway has said it will stick with the F-35, citing $350 million in contracts to date, with a potential for up to $5 billion depending on the eventual number of F-35s produced worldwide. The RNoAF’s F-35 operating base is still scheduled to be picked in 2011. Defense News | Flight International | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | Key Publications.

2008 and Earlier

Eurofighter (lost)
(click to view full)

Dec 23/08: Aviation Week reports that the Norwegian government has taken the next formal step, and submitted a formal legislative bill to parliament. The document reportedly lists 2016-2020 as the dates for F-35A phase-in.

Dec 10/08: “Say what?!?” Saab’s CEO Ake Svensson holds a press conference and presentation that challenges the fairness and legitimacy of the Norwegian selection process. His objections are specific and detailed (Transcript | Presentation [PDF]). Excerpts:

“The claim that Gripen does not fulfil the operational requirements required by the Norwegian air force is important to understand. It also turns out to be founded on simulations previously unknown to us. To our understanding those simulations must be based on incomplete performance information, simply because such information about Gripen has neither been communicated to us nor requested from us or the Swedish government. The Norwegian evaluation committee has thereby not had access to the parameters required to reach the announced results.”

“…A key argument for Gripen is its extremely competitive life cycle cost… If the claimed estimates are correct it would be cheaper for Norway to obtain JSF, even if Sweden would have developed and given 48 Gripen Next Generation (NG) as a gift to Norway… It is Saab’s assessment that only 20% of the Norwegian evaluation committees cost estimates are based on the facts presented in the Swedish offer… The number of aircraft has been changed from 48 to 58 and the operational life cycle has been extended from 25 to 35 years. These are two new conditions entirely decisive for the calculation. That these calculations to a large extent have been conducted without dialogue is most unusual…

Saab’s own calculations of upgrade costs are based on 50 years of experience of developing and upgrading fighter aircraft… Norway has applied its experiences from the F-16 to these costs – a very different and in important aspects non-comparable aircraft. Upgrade costs according to the Norwegian calculation are several times higher than the costs Saab and Swedish authorities have calculated and provided. Our estimated value of fuel consumption is based on experience from 120,000 flight hours with Gripen… the evaluation committee chooses to raise the values we have provided, adding further additional costs. The cost for replacing aircraft is part of the estimation, with the assumption that almost half of the aircraft fleet will crash in 35 years. This is completely unfounded if applied to Gripen’s [operational] statistics. This also adds further billions to the calculation.

Further to this is a number of questions that the Norwegian evaluation group has chosen not to respond to, such as what specific currency rate was used, what price was used for calculating purchase of further aircraft, what other considerations in the calculation that had the procurement price as basis for the calculation and how much the weapon procurement was estimated to.”

“…We now move on and gather strength on markets where there is a real interest to evaluate Gripen based on our offers and a genuine and mutual interest to establish long-term industrial cooperation.”

Dec 6/08: Defense-Aerospace reports admissions from Norwegian government and industry officials that “Norway did not obtain a firm price from Lockheed Martin for the Joint Strike Fighter, and the price it was quoted will change substantially before the contract is signed in 2014”.

The report adds that reports of a $2.57 billion fly-away (i.e. no weapons or spares) cost for 48 aircraft are wrong because the NOK 18 billion figure must use January 2008 exchange rates rather than November 2008’s – raising the cost to about $3.27 billion. Maj. Jarle Ramskjaer of Norway’s Project Future Combat Aircraft Capability office explains the complex calculations:

“Conversion between NOK and USD is somewhat more complex than multiplying with the exchange rate. The net present value is then derivated as follows: First, we periodize expenses according to the payment plan and adjust for the escalation indices. Then we create a “currency future” based on the money marked interest rates in the two currencies, as advised by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Those “currency futures” are then used for each period, converting foreign currencies to NOK. Last, we discount with a factor to get real time yearly cost.”

Using the same January 2008 baseline, the NOK 145 billion life cycle cost of 48 F-35As over 30 years works out to $26.3 billion, rather than the reported $20.7 billion. Unless various forms of financial lock-in are used, these prices will obviously fluctuate as the respective currencies fluctuate. Defense-Aerospace adds that:

“Ramskjaer says, for example, that Norway did not receive, nor did it expect, a firm price at this stage, and that contractual prices, escalation clauses and penalty clauses for late delivery “will be addressed in the [2014] contract.” “

Nov 21-30/08: Reactions. Reactions to the decision continue; the question is whether they will gather enough momentum to affect the final choice. Questions are being raised by the Norwegian and Swedish media, and by Saab, about the simulations used to evaluate the fighters, Norway’s procurement math – and, in an unusual development, ongoing veiled accusations of bad faith.

While the JAS-39 has a long flight history, the upgraded JAS-39NG does not, and neither does any version of the F-35. The Norwegian Defense Institute’s simulations must therefore rely on a wide set of assumptions. Those assumptions are being questioned, and NyTeknik notes the interesting presence of the Russian (and possibly Russo-Indian) Sukhoi PAK-FA next-generation fighter those simulations. PAK-FA is still in development, but if the project succeeds it would be fielded during the next fighter’s service life. After a post Cold War break, Russian military activities in and around Norway have risen sharply in recent years. Norway’s unease with Russia’s intentions appears to be returning.

Speaking of assumptions, a huge difference between Saab’s figures for through-life support, and the Norwegian government’s, is emerging as a live issue. Norway calculates the through-life cost of a 44-plane Gripen NG fleet as NOK 165 – 175 billion (about $23.5-25.0 billion), while Swedish calculations based on over 100,000 hours of flight experience with JAS-39 A-D versions give a NOK 55 billion figure (about 7.85 billion). A 300% plus difference is hard to explain. The fact that the discrepancy came to light at the end of the competition, and that no effort appears to have been made to resolve such a crucial figure, make it appear that the explanation may involve political engineering rather than aerospace engineering.

On which topic, earlier coverage has noted inflammatory statements by Norway’s defense minister. Aftenposten adds an unprompted mailing to the Croatian government from the Norwegian embassy, bearing the official press-release of Norway’s decision. Croatia is in the middle of a fighter choice of its own involving the JAS-39 Gripen, and Saab rightly considers this to be an “unneccessary and unfriendly” act. Posting Saab’s final offer on the government’s we site, a detail which is generally kept secret in order to avoid affecting other negotiations, has not helped either. Aftenposten adds that a member a Danish parliamentary defense committee has said that “this reduces Gripen’s chances to zero” in Denmark’s own competition.

All of this might be a tempest in a teapot, except for the international stakes involved – and the fact that Sweden and Norway recently embarked on an extensive defense cooperation plan, with elements that include both military and industrial integration. Aftenposten [Norsk] | Aftenposten re: defense cooperation [Norsk] | Aftenposten re: Danish fallout [Norsk] Dagbladet [Svenska] | NyTeknik [Svenska] | NyTeknik re: PAK-FA [in Swedish].

F-35A #AA-1
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Nov 20/08: F-35A picked. Norway’s Ministry of Defence releases its decision in favor of the F-35A as Norway’s F-16 replacement, though Parliament still needs to approve the deal to buy up to 48 aircraft. At this point, the immediate cost is expected to be NOK 18 billion (about $2.54 billion – later revised to $3.27 billion based on currency exchange), and the total cost of the deal over a 30-year life span is expected to be about NOK 145 billion ($20.7 billion, later revised to $26.3 billion) for the fighter, weapons, maintenance, infrastructure and operations. Norway’s MoD:

“The JSF is the only candidate which fulfils all the operational requirements specified by the Norwegian Government and is furthermore offered at a lower price than the Gripen NG… Both candidates’ performance have been evaluated against a number of different scenarios. The scenarios used in this evaluation are the same as the ones used in the Long-term Defence Plan, says Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen… The Joint Strike Fighter is considered to be the better of the two candidates regarding intelligence and surveillance, counter air, air interdict and anti-surface warfare, says [Minister of Defence Anne-Grete] Strom-Erichsen.”

Strom Erichsen ratcheted things up a step further when she told Norwegian news agency NTB that “The JSF is considered to be better than the Gripen in every major requirement for a combat aircraft.” StrategyPage claimed that:

“What changed Norwegian minds was a series of computer simulations by the Norwegian Defense Institute, which concluded that the Gripen could not provide much of a fight against the Russian advanced Su-30 fighters, or the new Russian fifth generation fighter.”

In a paper exercise, of course, assumption are everything and may not correspond to battlefield realities. At present, Norway’s Labor and the Center Parties are backing the decision to choose the U.S. fighter, while a 3rd coalition member (the anti-NATO Socialist Left party) wants more time to discuss the decision and said the party would make its decision in early December. Opposition parties also wish more time to study this conclusion. Since Norway does not expect to sign contracts for the F-35 jets until 2014, the delays create no urgency, though the MoD naturally wishes to begin negotiations with Lockheed Martin as soon as possible.

Across the border, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt called Norway’s decision “a setback” for Sweden, but stressed their right to make that decision. Saab’s CEO expressed disappointment, while pointing out that “Many [Swedish-Norwegian] industrial ventures we had planned were tied to selling Gripen, so if Gripen doesn’t happen, neither do they.” Behind the scenes, however, the reaction is stronger. Former Saab VP Jan Nygren had this to say in a Swedish newspaper article:

“We have tried to treat our Norwegian friends as serious and thorough… For which reason was it necessary to call a press-conference and then reveal that that the Gripen is lacking in a number of operational abilities? We are amazed that our neighbour Norway feels entitled to make these kind of claims of an aircraft that’s currently operative in our air-force… This will most likely mean that Saab will demand to have a look at the underlying assumptions. And I imagine that the government and the FMV are equally interested. For this is no small infringement, to use a blunt expression… Yesterday, we were all just dumbfounded. Today the mood’s more irritated, putting it lightly.”

F-35 picked

FSi/LO/NITO conclusion
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Oct 16/08: Industrial. The Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association (Forsvars og Sikkerhetsindustriens forening/ FSi) and 2 of Norway’s largest unions, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge/ LO) and the Norwegian Society of Engineers and Technologists (Norges Ingenior og Teknologorganisasjon/ NITO) publish a report comparing the industrial benefits of the F-35 and the JAS-39NG for Norway.

Their conclusion favors Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The short synopsis of their report is that the F-35 would be more attractive to a few select firms, but that Gripen offsets would have greater value to Norway as a whole, and spread industrial benefits into more regions. Industrial offsets are important to Norway, and the source of the report adds weight to its political implications. EuropeanDefence.co.uk report | FSi release [Norsk] | Full FSi/LOP/NITO report [PDF, Norsk].

April 28/08: Gripen International delivers its bid to the Norwegian government. Dagbladet reported, and Gripen’s release confirmed, that Norway added a new wrinkle – a guarantee that it would not be the only operator of this fighter type:

“An integral part of the Swedish offer to Norway, is a commitment on the part of the Swedish Government to operate the same advanced version of the Gripen fighter aircraft as offered to Norway, in the event that Norway selects Gripen as its future combat aircraft. This offer creates a win-win situation for both countries, as they would not only share the development costs for the new fighter but would also share future enhancements over the future operational life of Gripen fighter aircraft for the next 30-40 years.”

Read “Gripen Delivers Norwegian Bid – With a Twist” for more coverage and analysis.

Dec 21/07: No Eurofighter. EADS pulls its Eurofighter out of the Norwegian and Danish competitions, leaving both future fighter programs as a straight-up competition between the JAS-39 and the F-35. The rationales given are vague and make little sense, but many sources believe the key objection is official favoritism toward the F-35. The government-to-government nature of the F-35 deal, it seems, wouldn’t require the same industrial offsets, though the F-35 program has pledged significant production contracts with Denmark’s Terma and with Norwegian firms.

The Motley Fool, on the other hand, wonders if the same dollar devaluation that’s hammering EADS in the passenger jet market is also creating a price chasm for the Eurofighter. Which was already a significantly more expensive aircraft before dollar devaluation, at $100-120 million per aircraft vs. $50-70 million for its Gripen and Lightning II competitors. Bloomberg | Financial Times | Flight International | Motley Fool.

May 21/07: DID – Norway Renews Eurofighter Development Agreement.

May 2/07: DID – Norway Signs Development Agreement for JAS-39N Gripen

Feb 2/07: DID – Lockheed & Kongsberg Partner to Bring NSM to JSF

Jan 31/07: US Department of Defense and Norway Sign Joint Strike Fighter Agreement.

Jan 26/07: DID – Norway Signs on to JSF Production Phase, But Keeps Options Open

Jan 26/07: DID – Kongberg Wins F-35 Contracts – Maybe

Jan 12/07: Jas Gripen jubler over norske signaler. DN.no article headline translates as “Gripen jubilant over announcement of “Compensating Measures”

Additional Readings & Sources F-35: The Joint Strike Fighter

DID FOCUS Article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Events & Contracts
DID Spotlight – The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy. A controversy in Australia goes global, and claims are being made for and against the F-35. What’s going on, what do we really know, and how is this issue likely to affect prospective customers?

US GAO (June 14/12, #GAO-12-437:) – Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks

The “Competition”

“Odin,” the Norwegian Government Online – Conceptual Framework for the Fighter Purchase [MS Word format, Norwegian]
Norwegian Ministry of Defence (Jan 26/07) – Industripakkane i sÃ¸kelyset. Includes presentations from the contenders. The Ministry now has an English translation of Espen Bareth Eide’s speech to this “Combat Aircraft Seminar.”
Wikileaks (Dec 16/08) – cable 08OSLO670, LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF.
DID FOCUS Article – The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4th Generation Wild Card
DID – Eurofighter’s Future: Tranche 3, and Beyond
Eurofighter official site
DID – France’s Rafale Fighters: Au Courant In Time?
Dagbladet (Nov 19/06) – Dropp amerikanske kampfly na [in Norwegian]. Second commentary by John Berg, defense analyst with Jane’s Defense. The title doesn’t need much translation.
Dagbladet (Nov 2/06) – Bestemmer Stortinget eller Luftforsvaret norsk sikkerhetspolitikk? [in Norwegian]. First commentary by John Berg, defense analyst with Jane’s Defense. He believes Norway should pull out of the F-35 program, and explains why.
Dagbladet (Nov 10/06) – Framtidas fly: Jacob Borresen Flaggkommandor og seniorradgiver ved Institutt for strategiske studier [in Norwegian]. Commentary by Jacob Borresen, former Commodore of the Norwegian Navy.
DID (Aug 31/06) – Rafale Out for Norway
DID (May 11/06) – Norway’s Future Fighter Competition: A Norwegian View . By Endre Lunde.
Eurofighter GmbH (June 15/05) – Norway ups budget to increase Eurofighter industry funding (from EUR 23.2 million to EUR 35.7 million).

Other News & Developments

Aftonbladet (Dec 3/10) – Här blir vi blåsta [in Swedish]. Relates in part to the Wikileaks cables.
Flight International (Jan 1/07) – Forecasts 2007: Pressure will be on the F-35 project team to secure firm orders from its European partners
Gripen International (Dec 22/06) – Gripen in the race for future fighter replacement in Norway
Nordlys (Dec 12/06) – SAAB oppdaget nordomradene [in Norwegian]. Saab International visiting Tromso.
Flight International (Dec 12/06) – Nordic Special: Buying Power. “Two of the Nordic states are weighing their options for new fighters, while all four are seeking to access strategic airlift. What’s on their shopping list?”
Norway 24 (Dec 4/06) – Vil stoppe jagerflykampen: Norge skal bruke seks ganger mer pa utvikling av JSF-jagerflyene enn Eurofighter [in Norwegian]. Norwegian Progress Party expressing their wish to end participation in JSF.
Roglands Avis (Nov 24/06) – SV-nei til jagerfly [in Norwegian]. Socialist Left announcing their opposition to the fighter purchase.
DID (Oct 11/06) – Norway’s Proposed FY 2007 Defense Budget

Appendix A: The Play of Politics The Griffon in Winter…
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The recent MoU has not discouraged Mr. Burbages’s competitors. The Saab/BAE partnership Gripen International has been especially diligent in its lobbying campaign, and may finally be seeing some results. On Nov 22/06, the members of parliament of the Socialist Left party, one of 3 parties in the Norwegian coalition government at the time, and outspoken critics of both the United States and NATO, proclaimed that they were opposed to any Norwegian fighter purchase. Instead, they wished to see the service life of the current F-16 fleet extended for another 10 years. As a secondary option, however, their spokesman explicitly said that they would prefer the procurement of the JAS-39 Gripen, due to the prospects of improved Swedish-Norwegian industrial relations.

Given the F-16s’ lifespans, a 10 year postponement seemed very unlikely, though by 2010, it was acknowledged that delays to the F-35 would end up keeping the F-16s in service to 2018 or later anyway. A joint “Conceptual Framework” for the fighter acquisition was accepted by the Norwegian government on Dec 14/06, and it included an option of postponement as a likely nod to the wishes of the Socialists. The report itself deprecated this option, however, on the grounds that it would lead to much higher overall costs than buying new aircraft now. Despite this defeat, the Socialist Left Party retained control of Norway’s powerful Ministry of Finance, and remained in a prime position to affect the final choice.

JAS-39N concept
(c) Gripen International
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Lockheed Martin’s potential problems did not end there. Socialist Left Defense Spokesman Bjorn Jacobsen confirmed in a media comment that their opposition to further Norwegian participation in the JSF program is fueled by their dislike of Lockheed Martin itself. This makes it unlikely that any measures will win them over. More ominously for Lockheed, the traditionally US-friendly Progress Party stated in December 2006 that they wanted Norway out of the F-35 project, as Lockheed Martin had “not in any way” fulfilled the set requirements. In contrast, Gripen International has won political support by playing the Nordic, neutrality, and industrial cards, while the Eurofighter explicitly aligns itself with enthusiasm for the broader EU project.

This political hostility brings up the question of how the competition would be conducted. Following the decision to sign the most recent JSF memorandum, The Norwegian government has also announced “compensating” measures for the other 2 candidates, to offset Norwegian investments in the F-35 as a Tier 3 partner. Norway was formally a member of both the JSF and Eurofighter consortia, and decided in the end to offer financial support all around, which was a first for Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen in an international competition.

When Norway’s decision was released in November 2008, however, the Eurofighter consortium had already bowed out almost a year hence. They may have known something Saab did not. Sweden was surprised by the decision, and also by Norway’s derogatory comments about the Gripen’s performance and costs, comments that did not reflect the experience of other air forces flying the aircraft. With the November 2010 release of the Wikileaks cables, the USA’s maneuverings to secure the deal were laid bare – along with their clear belief that the competition’s results were determined long before the competition ended.

Appendix B: The Defense Debate: Strike-Fighter or Interceptor? Norwegian EEZ

Another important factor in this recent face of debate has been public statements from several former high-ranking members of the armed forces. Their main arguments have not been connected to the politics or the money, but to if the F-35’s capabilities and their fit (or lack thereof) with Norway’s requirements. It is pointed out that the F-35 is primarily designed as a strike aircraft, with air defense and air-to-air combat as a secondary role. As such, its abilities to function as an interceptor and to operate within the air policing role have been questioned due to limitations in the F-35’s speed and agility when compared to its 2 competitors. Even its stealth advantage has been questioned, as several commentators say they expect it to be negated during the plane’s service lifetime by future developments in radars and sensors.

Range and over-water performance are also entering the capabilities debate. Recently, there has also been a renaissance of attention to the security challenges of its oil and fishing-rich Exclusive Economic Zone in the North Sea and Barents region. In November 2006 Norway even announced that it was considering a request to station fighters and Maritime Patrol aircraft in Iceland, following the closure of the US Naval Air base at Keflavik. Negotiations detailing this future cooperation are currently underway.

Apparently aware of the development, Saab International’s vice president Jan Nygren visited the Northern Norwegian town of Tromso in December 2006, and stressed then the potential of expanded investments from both SAAB and other Swedish businesses, particularly in the north, should Norway choose the Gripen. What he didn’t mention was the JAS-39’s short range, which would hamper its odds of selection if policing the air lanes from Norway to Iceland became a significant requirement. Reports that Saab is offering a version of the JAS-39 that carries more internal fuel, and can carry more external fuel tanks as well, may be able to mitigate this disadvantage.

All of these considerations are currently being aired in the Norwegian press by former high-ranking members of the armed forces, and by other defense experts.

F-16 of 338 skv
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A preference of the air policing role, increased pressure to focus on the northern seas, and an expanded area of operations over water would all bode ill for the F-35. Indeed, the latter 2 requirements would work to exclude any single-engined aircraft, given the need for high reliability and the potential for tragedy should an engine fail.

They would, however, be good news for the Eurofighter Typhoon. EADS’ presentation refers to US figures that showed the difference between single-engine F-16s and twin-engine F-15s who had “Class A” engie failure incidents. Both fighters had Class A engine problems as 38-39% of total Class A serious incidents. Every one of the F-16s to experience Class A engine failure was lost. Rate of aircraft loss for the F-15s in similar situations was 8%.

Eurofighter boasts by far the most engine power and agility range among the three competitors. Its main handicap is that it boasts the highest sticker price, and would very likely remain the most expensive option even if the F-35As were to experience a moderate-sized increase in price [DID: EADS later withdrew from the competition].

The Gripen’s new “next generation” JAS-39N version is a single engine fighter, which may be able to offset some of the existing Gripen model’s range issue. It has already garnered key political support, however, and is considered to be superior to the F-35 in speed, agility, likely sticker price – and possibly even in jobs.

Appendix C: 2006 Analysis – Could JSF Really Lose in Norway? F-16B & X-35
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Despite all this, it would be highly surprising if Norway would decide to pull out of the JSF program now that the production MoU is signed. Although the Norwegian government stresses that no final decision will be made before 2008, there is little doubt that any Norwegian withdrawal after signing this latest MoU has significant potential to become a political scandal. Tom Burbage has previously stated that should Norway choose to withdraw, it could trigger demands of reparations from Lockheed Martin in the range of almost $1 billion. While this is an expected negotiating tactic, it’s a demand that would be backed by contract provisions that could not simply be ignored.

The effects a withdrawal could have on the JSF program as a whole are unknown, but they could be significant despite the small number of aircraft involved (approximately 48). With F-35 costs rising and still uncertain, and political opposition from an anti-American Left that is often an important political force in Europe, there is no desire to give a potential “domino effect” of withdrawals any breathing room. The seriousness of this scenario to Lockheed Martin is illustrated by the repeated visits by high level corporate officials such as Mr. Burbage to Oslo, as well the extensive industrial efforts made to secure continued Norwegian partnership. In this respect, Norway’s decision to sign the Production MoU is a significant victory for the F-35 program.

Fortunately for Lockheed, the anti-American coin has a flip side. One concern that has also been lurking in the background all along has been the possible effect of a withdrawal on the overall relationship between the US and Norway. The current Norwegian government withdrew all military support for the US presence in Iraq when it took office in 2005, which has affected the relationship between the two administrations ever since. The government has attempted to make amends by making Afghanistan their main foreign policy priority; but even there, they refuse to get involved in the more troubled areas in the south alongside The Netherlands, Britain, Canada, et. al. This is in sharp contrast to neighboring Denmark, which has long been involved in combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A Norwegian withdrawal from the F-35 program could add insult to injury, and bring the relationship to a new all time low. While some Norwegian parties do express an ingrained hostility to the United States, most treat the relationship as a serious foreign policy matter and will factor such things into their decision making.

Finally, the F-35 enjoys systemic preference, in that it reportedly has the support of the Air Force and the military bureaucracy, while the JAS-39 Gripen for instance enjoys predominantly political and some industrial support. The final choice will greatly depend on Gripen and Eurofighter’s ability to play and capitalize on their political attractions to key segments within the Norwegian parliament, and any lingering or ingrained resentment of Lockheed Martin. In Eurofighter’s case, their chances also rest on their ability to widen Norway’s defense debate in ways that suit their strengths in air-air combat and long-distance maritime overwatch.

If they fail to do so, however, and the military gets to forward their own preference, then barring a surprise development, Tom Burbage can be confident that the process will take its course – and the F-35 Lightning II will replace the F-16 as the Norwegian Air Force’s next fighter.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

APKWS II: Laser-Guided Hydra Rockets in Production At Last

Wed, 23/09/2015 - 02:17

Hydras & Hellfires
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The versatile Hydra 70mm rocket family is primed for a new lease on life, thanks to widespread programs aimed at converting these ubiquitous rockets into cheap laser-guided precision weapons. Conversion benefits include cost, use on both helicopters and fighters, more precision weapons per platform, low collateral damage, and the activation of large weapon stockpiles that couldn’t be used under strict rules of engagement.

Firms all over the world have grasped this opportunity, which explains why strong competition has emerged from all points of the compass. America’s “Advanced Precision-Kill Weapon System (APKWS)” is one of those efforts, but the road from obvious premise to working weapon has been slow. After numerous delays and false starts since its inception in 1996, an “APKWS-II” program finally entered System Design and Development (SDD) in 2006. In 2010, it entered low-rate production, and it was fielded to the front lines in 2012. That date will still put APKWS on the cutting edge of battlefield technology, as a leading player in a larger trend toward guided air-to-ground rockets.

The USA’s APKWS Programs BAE/GD APKWS
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Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and BAE Systems were all battling for the APKWS program, which could pick up large US and international orders, and remain in production for a long time. BAE Systems’ team won in April 2006, but Lockheed Martin and Raytheon both proceeded with independent efforts to develop their own products. Meanwhile, the Army’s APKWS budget request was “zeroed” out in FY 2008.

Fortunately for BAE and General Dynamics, the US Navy kept them in the game. In November 2008, they formally picked up the APKWS-II System Design & Development (SDD) contract, and kept it going. SDD finished in November 2009, and evaluations wrapped up in January 2010. APKWS-II was approved through Milestone C in April 2010, and initial production orders followed in July 2010. A February 2011 JCTD contract will add APKWS to fixed-wing fighters: the USMC’s AV-8B Harriers, and the USAF’s A-10C Thunderbolt close air support planes. By January 2012, the 1st fixed-wing test firing had added the AT-6C turboprop light attack plane to this list, and showed clear potential for broader fielding. The US military fielded APKWS in March 2012, beginning with US Marine Corps UH-1 utility and AH-1 attack helicopters. The 1st Full Rate Production order was placed at the end of July 2012.

APKWS: Concept and Weapon APKWS
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The BAE and General Dynamics team offered an unusual approach to APKWS-II, in order to solve the problems inherent in launching several guided rockets at once. Instead of adding a guidance unit to the rocket’s nose, where it could be damaged or confused by the flames, corrosive soot, overpressure etc. created by nearby rocket firings, they opted for a mid-body guidance approach. BAE’s Distributed Aperture Semi-Active Laser Seeker (DASALS) uses fiber-optic connections to a set of optical sensors, distributed within the rocket’s pop-out fins.

Since the fins are folded and sealed during firing, their seekers are protected. The technical challenge after that, is making sure that the pop-out fins don’t flex or vibrate a lot in flight. The use of distributed sensors can compensate for some movement, but too much movement would create accuracy problems for the DASALS optical bench.

The entire guidance section screws in between the warhead section and the rocket motor section, and can be added in the field. Since the seeker is a semi-active laser, rather than a beam-rider, APKWS can be directed by laser sources beyond its launcher, so long as they have the correct laser modulation code. This is a standard approach for laser guided missiles, but some competitors still use beam-riding guidance. Thales’ low-end LMM missile, for instance, will begin as a beam rider. Most other competitors, however, will use semi-active laser or imaging infrared seekers.

By 2019, APKWS will be able to use the new 13.7 pound M822 tri-mode penetrating/ blast/ incendiary warhead, which can punch through 40″ of reinforced concrete or 1″ of steel, while creating over 1,500 fragments and a 2,000F degree zirconium burn. Instead of just 1 AGM-65 Maverick per hardpoint, or 3 MBDA Brimstone missiles, certified aircraft would have 7 anti-armor weapons that can defeat many armored personnel carriers, and all lesser vehicles.

Compatible Platforms F/A-18C fires Hydras
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APKWS has been qualified for use aboard USMC UH-1Y Venom utility and AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, and from Bell’s militarized 407GT scout helicopter. The next targets are the US Navy’s MH-60S utility helicopter (2014) and MH-60R anti-submarine & strike helicopter (2015), and the USMC’s AH-1Z attack helicopter (2015), using a digital LAU-61G/A 19-rocket pod.

Successful tests have been conducted from an AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, and Australia has tested APKWS from its EC665 Tiger ARH scout/attack helicopter, while using Forges de Zeebrugge’s FZ90 rocket instead. No modifications were required, and that combination could also be in service by 2015.

APKWS Fixed-Wing is actually a different rocket, because it has to survive and perform through the freezing temperatures of high-altitude flight, as well as the high turbulence produced by high speed aircraft. That means a cartridge activated device to force open the control canards during high speed launches, and a modified guidance control system for the rocket.

On the fixed-wing front, successful APKWS-FW tests have been conducted from AT-6 turboprops, and from A-10C Thunderbolt II, AV-8B Harrier II, and F-16 jets. The US Navy plans to certify it aboard USMC F/A-18C/D Hornet fighters in 2017-2018.

Why APKWS? Combat Advantages Click for video

A 70mm rocket’s size and warhead are good enough for most military targets, offering both reduced collateral damage compared to larger missiles, and greater warhead flexibility. Precision rockets can carry infantry-killing flechettes, dispersed bomblets, small unitary warheads, and more. Adding thermobaric warheads creates a system that can kill personnel, destroy most armored personnel carriers and lighter vehicles; and even collapse buildings, if the Marines’ SMAW experiences in Fallujah are any indication. All without incurring the high-end price of full anti-armor missiles like the TOW RF, Hellfire, etc.

Using 70mm rockets also benefits the platforms carrying them to the battlefield. Laser-guided rockets would expand the range of aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs carrying precision weapons, as well as increasing the number of precision weapons each platform carries. The future of warfare may even see small rocket pods mounted on some ground vehicles, if recent experiments with Boeing’s Humvee-mounted Avenger system are any indication. That would conserve valuable missile rounds by eliminating easy targets like UAVs, provide a second type of guidance threat against incoming helicopters and aircraft, and create the option of using the system in ground combat against infantry positions or vehicles.

Each of those changes, individually, is a significant increase in combat power. All of those changes together would make US Army precision fires nearly ubiquitous on the battlefield, alongside weapons fired from UAVs, and guided ground-launched rockets, mortars, and artillery shells. When coupled with persistent surveillance concepts like Task Force ODIN, it nudges the Army and USAF toward a more equal footing of “federated airpower” in counterinsurgency fights. In full-scale battles like the 1991 Desert Storm, it can turn NATO’s long-standing “assault breaker” doctrine of tactical decapitation into routine procedure, as enemies showing leadership behaviors are quickly targeted from the air or ground, and eliminated.

Beyond the USA, laser guided 70mm rockets open up a large market for counterinsurgency weapons. Many countries operate older fixed wing planes as their primary strike force, but haven’t been able to afford the expensive conversions and weapons that precision attack requires. With guided rockets, that goal is suddenly within reach. Rocket pods are a universal weapon option, almost all countries have existing stocks of unguided rockets, and targeting can even be done by troops on the ground. This setup can work with very basic aircraft integration, so the technical and cost requirements aren’t difficult. What’s difficult, is the training and coordination required to make close air support effective. Which may not stop eager customers.

Contracts and Key Developments

APKWS is designed as a screw-in insert to existing 70mm rockets, so it’s bought as mid-body “guidance sections.” BAE Systems Information and Electronics in Nashua, NH is the official prime contractor, though they’re partnered with General Dynamics. US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD manages the contracts.

FY 2014 – 2015

Orders: USA, Jordan; Testing on AH-64D; US Navy begins program for MH-60R/S; Australia wants APKWS for EC665 Tiger and MH-60RS. APKWS numbers

September 23/15: MBDA and BAE Systems have agreed to a marketing partnership for the latter’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) in an aim to flag the system to European customers. MBDA will lead the marketing charge for the APKWS in Europe, with the system developed by BAE Systems’ US subsidiary. The system bolts onto unguided 70mm rockets to transform them into a low-cost laser-guided weapon, which has been integrated with several platforms in the US inventory, including the Cobra and Huey helicopters, Apache AH-64D and A-10.

Nov 12/14: The US DSCA announces the Shi’ite government of Iraq’s official export request for up to 2,000 APKWS rockets, weapon and test support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, transportation, and other forms of US government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $97 million.

Iraq’s most likely platform for these rockets is its IA-407 armed scout helicopters, which are qualified for 70mm rockets and can also carry Hellfire missiles. Its AC-208B Combat Caravan prop planes might need additional integration, but their current tiny load of just 2 Hellfire missiles has been an operational problem. Adding laser-guided rockets would greatly improve their combat effectiveness.

The principal contractor will be BAE Systems in Nashua, NH. The proposed sale will involve multiple trips to Iraq involving U.S. government and contractor representatives for approximately 3 years for program management, program and technical reviews, training, maintenance support, and site surveys. Sources: US DSCA #14-35, “Iraq – Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)”.

DSCA request: Iraq (2,000)

Nov 3/14: USMC Plan. The USMC’s Aviation Plan to 2030 deals with weapons as well. The AH-1Z attack helicopter will be added to the AH-1W in 2015, which will also see integration on the MH-60R naval ASW helicopter. So far, use in the field on AH-1W, MH-60S, and UH-1Y helicopters is going reasonably well:

“APKWS II has been operationally successful, generating a direct hit rate of nearly 90% during contingency operations.”

By 2019, APKWS will be able to use the 13.7 pound M822 tri-mode penetrating/ blast/ incendiary warhead. Instead of just 1 AGM-65 Maverick per hardpoint, the Hornet fleet will have 7 anti-armor weapons that can defeat many armored personnel carriers, and all lesser vehicles. Sources: USMC, Marine Aviation Plan 2015 [PDF].

Oct 13/14: Australia. APKWS is about to get its 2nd export customer, as Australia finishes testing APKWS-II aboard its EC665 Tiger ARH scout/attack helicopters. August 2014 trials at Woomera were conducted by Airbus subsidiary Australian Aerospace’s Operational Support Group, and saw APKWS go 7-for-7 in tests while mounted on a new 70mm rocket: Forges de Zeebrugge’s FZ90.

BAE director of precision guidance solutions David Harrold touts the no-modifications use of APKWS on the FZ90 as a testament to the mid-body design’s versatility, but Australia has a 2nd reason to prefer APKWS. BAE’s system will be integrated on American MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters, and Australia bought that type off the shelf as their future naval helicopter. Once the US Navy is done developing and testing its MH-60R upgrade, Australia can adopt it at very low cost. The tests pave the way for Australia to place an order, then field the laser-guided rockets on its Tiger and Seahawk helicopters beginning in 2015. Sources: BAE Systems, “Laser-Guided Rocket Successfully Demonstrates Precision Strike Capability for Australian Defence Forces”.

Sept 30/14: MH-60. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training in Owego, NY receives $6.9 million for integration of APKWS Digital Rocket Launcher capabilities into MH-60R and MH-60S avionics software. $2.6 million in FY 2014 Navy RDT&E budgets is committed immediately.

APKWS will give equipped MH-60S and MH-60R helicopters 7 guided weapons per hardpoint, instead of 4 Hellfires. The rockets don’t pack the same punch as a Hellfire against larger naval targets or main battle tanks, but against small boat swarms and most targets ashore, there are no degrees of dead.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (95%), and Patuxent River, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in July 2016. Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-14-G-0019, DO 4007).

AC-235 concept
(click to view full)

May 7/14: Jordan. Jordan has formally signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance via the US Navy for BAE’s APKWS-II laser-guided 70mm rocket, which will be deployed on the kingdom’s CN-235 light gunships. This marks the guided rocket’s 1st export sale.

APKWS rockets give the gunships an intermediate option between the 30mm gun, and heavier AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles. A 70mm rocket is perfectly adequate for most counter-insurgency situations, is less expensive than a Hellfire, and can be carried in a pod that holds 7 guided rockets on the hardpoint instead of 2 Hellfires. Sources: BAE, “Kingdom of Jordan to Purchase BAE Systems’ Precision Rockets to Strengthen Military”.

Jordan is 1st export sale

March 28/14: FRP-3. A $37.4 million firm-fixed-price contract buys 1,372 APKWS-II WGU-59/B Guidance Sections, the Navy shipping and storage container; and supporting technical and program documentation. That makes 4,758 kits ordered so far.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY14 USN & USMC ammunition budgets. Work will be performed in Nashua, NH (70%); and Austin, TX (30%), and is expected to be complete in September 2015. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-14-C-0044).

FRP-3 order

Dec 18/13: MH-60R/S: H-60 Program Manager Capt. James Glass discusses programs to arm the MH-60S naval utility and MH-60R strike and ASW helicopters with APKWS rockets.

The MH-60S is slated to integrate APKWS by March 2014, using a new 19-rocket LAU-61G/A launcher. and is about to begin test-firing the same M197 3-barrel 20mm gatling gun used on Cobra attack helicopters.

The MH-60R is slated to integrate APKWS by March 2015, by which time the LAU-61G/A launcher should have full mixed-rocket capabilities. Sources, Military.com, “Navy Arms MH-60S Helicopter with Gatling Gun” | US Navy, “NSWC IHEODTD Supports Digital Rocket Launcher Early Operational Capability”.

Oct 22/13: Testing. BAE announces that the US Army has finished 8 successful tests from an AH-64D Apache. Shots were fired at up to 150 knots, from as far as 5 kilometers from the target, at altitudes between 300 and 1,500 feets. This earns it an an Airworthiness Qualification, which allows existing AH-64D customers to order APKWS.

BAE director of precision guidance solutions David Harrold had an interesting addendu,m, when he noted that “…the final shot from the Apache hit within inches of the laser spot – despite the rocket and warhead being visibly scorched from two adjacent firings”. No doubt that was part of BAE’s motivation for using mid-body guidance sensors, which are inherently protected from such effects. Sources: BAE, “Laser-Guided Rocket Successfully Qualified to Support Apache Crews”.

FY 2011 – 2013

Fixed-wing, Apache tests. IOC; combat deployment. FRP-2. APKWS loading, AT-6C
(click to view full)

Sept 27/13: Testing. CENTCOM releases a Military Utility Assessment (MUA) confirming that the APKWS FW fixed-wing variant has met its performance targets in test shots from the USAF’s A-10C Thunderbolt IIs and F-16s, and the USMC’s AV-8B Harrier II V/STOL fighters. The rocket has also been tested from AT-6 turboprops, but that work took place under the Light Air Support program.

APKWS FW is actually a different rocket, because it has to survive and perform through the freezing temperatures of high-altitude flight, as well as the high turbulence of high speed aircraft. That means a different guidance control system for the rocket, and a redesigned deployment mechanism for the 7-rocket pod. Sources: US NAVAIR, “Rocket safe for fixed wing aircraft, ends demonstration phase”.

April 2/13: Testing. Eglin AFB announces successful tests of the APKWS laser-guided 70mm rocket from an A-10C, marking the 2nd test from a fixed-wing aircraft (a Beechcraft AT-6B was the 1st). For the final A-10C test sortie, 2 APKWS rockets were fired at a surface target at altitudes of 10,000 and 15,000 feet. The first rocket hit within inches, and the 15,000 foot shot hit within 2 meters despite a 70-knot headwind.

The USAF used a US Navy rocket launcher, because the guidance section adds 18″ to the Hydra rocket. If the USAF continues to move forward with APKWS on the A-10C and F-16, they’ll buy the Navy’s modified launchers to replace their 7-rocket LAU-131s. The US Navy is preparing to qualify APKWS on the MQ-8C VTUAV, USMC AV-8B Harrier II V/STOL jets, and F/A-18 family fighters. Pentagon DVIDS.

March 4/13: Bell 407 qualified. BAE Systems announces that APKWS is now qualified on Bell Helicopters 407GT, after a 7-shot test at Yuma, AZ. The Bell 407 joins that firm’s AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom helicopters, and Beechcraft’s AT-6B light attack turboprop, as qualified APKWS platforms. Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAV is expected to follow shortly.

BAE Precision Guidance Solutions director David Harrold says that the qualification “is significant because [the 407GT] is Bell Helicopter’s first commercially qualified, armed helicopter…” It’s also significant because the US Navy is about to introduce its MQ-8C UAV based on the 407, and Iraq has already fielded armed Bell 407s. The MQ-8C combines a Bell 407 airframe with Fire Scout electronics.

Nov 27/12: FRP-2. A $41.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 1,476 APKWS-II WGU-59/B Guidance Sections, shipping and storage containers, and support technical data. That makes 3,386 production kits ordered so far.

Work will be performed in Nashua, NH (70%), and Austin, TX (30%), and is expected to be complete in September 2014. All contract funds are committed (N00019-12-C-0006).

FRP-2 order

July 31/12: FRP begins with FY 2012 order. A $28.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 985 APKWS-II WGU-59/B guidance sections, Navy shipping and storage containers; and support technical data. That makes 1,910 production APKWS kits ordered so far.

Work will be performed in Nashua, NH (70%), and Austin, TX (30%), and is expected to be complete in December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-12-C-0006). A subsequent BAE release confirms that this is the beginning of Full Rate Production, and confirms that APKWS is available for foreign military sales.”

Full-rate production &
Export ready

April 17/12: APKWS to Afghanistan. BAE announces that APKWS was cleared for fielding by Marine Corps HQ, and shipped to Afghanistan in March 2012. The cite over 100 firings since 2007, with a 94% success rate, and an average distance from the center of laser spot to the impact point of less than one meter.

The rockets will initially be deployed on USMC AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, and UH-1Y Venom utility helicopters.

The Program’s Manager Navy Captain Brian Corey said that Initial Operating Capability (IOC) had been declared on March 27. The Navy is working to integrate the weapon on MQ-8 Fire Scouts by 2013. US NAVAIR | BAE Systems.

IOC & combat deployment

January 2012: 1st Fixed-Wing Shots. APKWS is fired from a HawkerBeechcraft AT-6C turboprop light attack plane at Eglin AFB, its 1st fixed-wing shots. BAE says they’re still working to upgrade APKWS so it can handle high-speed, high-g firings from fighter jets, per the Feb 10/11 JCTD contract.

The AT-6C shots were step 1, and involved 2 rockets: an unguided round as a demonstration of safety and basic operation, followed by a guided shot from 3 miles that “successfully hit within inches of the center.” As an added demonstration, BAE Systems personnel added the APKWS mid-bodies and assembled the rockets on site. Time from beginning of assembly to flight and the successful shot was 3 hours.

The shots will help both BAE and HawkerBeechcraft, whose setback in the 20-plane American LAS competition was mitigated by an initial sale of 6 “weapons capable” T-6C+ to Mexico. Mexico has used existing Pilatus trainers against domestic insurgencies before. The T-6C family’s proven ability to fire laser-guided rockets makes the new planes more valuable to Mexico, and to other potential customers. BAE | HawkerBeechcraft | Aviation Week.

1st fixed-wing shot

Sept 9-13/11: New warhead. USMC UH-1Y helicopters successfully fire 6 APKWS-II rockets at targets 1.5km – 5 km away (3 miles maximum) on the range at China Lake, CA. The tests are part of APKWS’ low-rate initial production phase, and mark the 1st time that the new, safer Mk152 warhead has been fired from any air vehicle.

New warhead

APWKS-II fielding is still set for 2012. BAE Systems.

Feb 10/11: Fighter JCTD. BAE Systems in Nashua, NH receives a $19.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for development of the fixed wing APKWS-II for deployment on USMC AV-8B Harriers and USAF/ANG A-10C aircraft, as a joint capability technology demonstration.

American fast jets must currently rely on aging AGM-65 Maverick missiles for laser-guided strikes. An update and production relaunch is underway, but a full-size Maverick missile can be overkill. Using laser-guided 70mm rockets instead would sharply increase the number of laser precision strike weapons on board, using cheaper weapons. It’s not a perfect substitute, but it would be an excellent complement.

Work will be performed in Nashua, NH, and is expected to be complete in May 2013. $7.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1, by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-11-C-0033).

APKWS for fighters, too

Jan 3/11: LRIP-2 order. BAE Systems Information and Electronics in Nashua, NH receives a $17.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for the 2nd Low Rate Initial Production Lot (LRIP-II) of 600 APKWS II guidance sections for the US Navy, including shipping and storage containers.

Work will be performed in Nashua, N.H., and is expected to be completed in November 2012. US Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD manages the contract, which is presumably issued under N00019-10-C-0019.

FY 2008 – 2010

SDD. Milestone C. APKWS concept
(click to view full)

July 30/10: LRIP-1 order. BAE Systems Information and Electronics in Nashua, NH receives a $15.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for the first Low Rate Initial Production Lot (LRIP-I) of 325 APKWS II guidance sections for the US Navy, including shipping and storage containers. The contract will also fund integration with the Marines’ new UH-1Y utility helicopter, technical and training manual updates, and support equipment and support test equipment.

Work will be performed in Nashua, NH, and is expected to be complete in October 2012. This contract was not competitively procured by US NAVAIR, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-10-C-0019). BAE Systems.

April 9/10: Milestone C, LRIP OKed. The US Navy has approved low-rate production of the APKWS after the weapons system passed its Milestone C. The USMC plans to initially deploy APKWS on its AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters. The Navy decision follows successful testing of the weapons system from the AH-1W helicopter in January (see Jan 11-18/10 entry). BAE Systems release

Milestone C

Jan 11-18/10 The USMC completes APKWS’ operational assessment, scoring 8 direct hits from AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters in live-warhead trials over 2 weeks. The final step in the APKWS development program is system qualification for the environments in which it might be employed, transported, and stored. That testing is expected to be finalized in time to allow the Navy to complete a production decision within the next 60 days, leading to low-rate initial production if the decision is positive. BAE Systems release.

Jan 4/10: Fixed-Wing JCTD. US FedBizOpps announces, in solicitation #N00019-10-C-0028:

“Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) intends to award a sole source contract to BAE Systems, Nashua, NH for the FY10-12 development of the Fixed Wing (FW) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II for AV-8B and A-10 platforms to support a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). It is anticipated that the resultant contract shall be Cost-Plus Incentive Fee type for the development of FW APKWS II weapons that show operational utility upon integration with AV-8B and A-10 platforms. Fifty (50) FW APKWS II plus FW APKWS II tests units (quantities TBD) including Navy Shipping and Storage Containers (NSSC) are to be delivered for technical demonstrations and operational assessments.”

The AV-8B is a USMC aircraft, while A-10s are operated by US Air National Guard and some USAF units.

Jan 4/10: In the combined synopsis/solicitation #N00421-10-T-0042, US FedBizOpps announces an RFQ on a firm fixed-price, sole-source basis with Summit Instruments, Inc., for APKWS-related electronics. Summit makes accelerometers and inertial measurement systems, which can be used to help precision weapons establish their position, just as a simpler set of accelerometer + software in an iPod Nano can tell you how far you’ve jogged today.

CLIN 0001 – Quantity 5 each, Repackage 65210E to fit in 2.75″ diameter rocket body and add 2GB memory… Award is expected 04 Jan 2010.

Nov 23-27/09: SDD done. During the final phase of SDD testing, 4 APKWS rockets fired from a U.S. Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter hit laser-designated moving and stationary targets under a variety of operational scenarios while the rockets were fired at varying altitudes and airspeeds. Each shot strikes well within the required distance from the laser spot.

Navy and BAE Systems representatives confirm that APKWS has undertaken 28 guided flights over the last 7 years. The weapons are known to have hit their targets 22 times since September 2002, and most of those firings (12) have been from USMC AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. In the latest test series, there have been no APKWS issues.

The rockets are approaching Milestone C decision that approves a system’s performance, durability, safety, and successful integration with specified systems, and allows Low Rate Initial Production to begin. The US Navy will begin Operational Assessment of APKWS in January 2010, with 8 live fire events. In the next 12 to 14 months, the Navy expects to shoot approximately 90 weapons in combined developmental and operational testing, on the road to the program goal of Initial Operational Capability in 2011. BAE Systems.

Nov 13/09: BAE Systems announces that APKWS has entered its final phase of testing, intended to confirm both production readiness and reliable accuracy. According to BAE, APKWS has hit its targets 18 times since September 2002 in ground and air-launched shots, including a recent firing from a USMC AH-1 attack helicopter against a stationary target. That test firing initiated a sequence of more than 20 firings that will comprise the program’s final test phase, to be completed by the end of 2009.

BAE Systems and the Navy are preparing for Navy demonstration test flights and full government qualification testing, with a goal of production in 2010.

APKWS from Cobra
(click to view larger)

Nov 4/08: BAE Systems announces that the APKWS contract has been transferred from the U.S. Army to the Department of the Navy.

Development funding will also be used for testing and qualification of APKWS for use on the Marine Corps’ AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter, and BAE Systems’ Nashua facility plans to begin producing the rockets at the end of 2009.

July 15/08: BAE Systems announces that the Department of the Navy will assume the $45.7 million APKWS development contract with BAE Systems to complete demonstrations of the system. The Navy is expected to assume that contract by end of August 2008, and the contractor team plans to begin APKWS production in 2009.

April 9/08: Saved by the Navy. Congress approves the APKWS-II Reprogramming Request. In combination with the President’s Budget Request for FY09 (submitted to Congress the first week of February), the Reprogramming approval makes APKWS-II’s development phase a fully-funded program. This development represents a major breakthrough for the BAE/GD offering, which now looks as if it will survive long enough to reach the competitive market.

Whether their APKWS-II can continue its success, and win volume orders against a growing set of rival systems from Lockheed Martin, ATK, Raytheon, et. al., remains to be seen at this point. As noted below, the US Navy is also funding a LOGIR program with Korean cooperation. It’s also a guided 70mm rocket, but it uses Imaging Infrared instead of laser seekers. That makes it especially effective against swarm attacks by enemies like small boats, as there’s no need for ongoing guidance.

Saved by the Navy

FY 2005 – 2007

BAE win. Emerging competitors. APKWS on target
(click to view full)

Sept 19/07: Testing. BAE Systems shoots 2 guided APKWS rockets from a U.S. Marine Corps Cobra helicopter at NAS China Lake, marking the weapon’s first flights from an aircraft. Following the launches, both APKWS rockets were guided by a laser designator to a ground target. The first rocket was guided to the target by a ground-based laser designator. The pilot guided the second rocket to the target using laser designation equipment onboard the helicopter. Both rockets struck the target board well within accuracy requirements established by the Army and Marine Corps.

The flights, held in partnership with the U.S. Navy program office, were designed to confirm the APKWS rocket’s compatibility with the Cobra’s carriage and launch systems, and to demonstrate that APKWS can be launched from the platform without requiring aircraft integration or modifications. The tests also proved again the weapon’s ability to acquire, track, and hit a laser-designated target. BAE Systems North America release.

BAE informs DID that the US Navy and USMC continue to pursue funding of APKWS-II within the FY 2008 appropriations process, with the goal of completing SDD and entering Milestone C in the second quarter of CY 2009. Meanwhile, development continues using FY 2007 funds.

April 11/07: BAE Systems’ APKWS II successfully completes environmental tests. They verified protection from sand, dust, vibration, ice, and other environmental hazards likely to be found in combat situations. Locating the weapon’s Distributed Aperture Semi-Active Laser Seeker (DASALS) within the rocket’s mid-body, with wings and optics sealed within the guidance section, certainly helps. In addition, a fully assembled 35-pound rocket dropped directly on its nose from a height of 3 feet sustained no damage to the guidance section. BAE Systems release.

March 19/07: Zeroed? BAE Systems informs DID that APKWS II funding has been zeroed out in the FY 2008 budget request, and they are putting the program on hold. Congressional reinstatement is always possible – but if it fails BAE may face an uphill battle getting its product to market, given the advance of competitors like Lockheed Martin’s DAGR and the US-Korean LOGIR.

DAGR launch test
(click to view full)

March 7/07: Competitor – DAGR. Lockheed Martin may have lost, but it didn’t give up. While “Hellfire Jr.” is an apt description of the class as a whole, it’s especially apt in this case. The DAGR (70mm Direct Attack Guided Rocket, not to be confused with DAGR hand-held GPS locators) completed development with private company funding, leveraging existing Hellfire and Joint Common Missile technology to create semi-active guided rockets that offer a wider aiming cone and full Hellfire functionality. Indeed, they can be launched from any platform that currently supports the Hellfire missile, removing any requirements for additional training or infrastructure.

The DAGR rocket was formally unveiled as complete and for sale on Sept 11/07, at Britain’s DESi defense exhibition, and remains a strong competitor in the USA and beyond. See “Guided Hydra Rockets: Program Halts & New Entries” for more information and updates re: competitive programs from Lockheed Martin, Korea, Raytheon, ATK, et. al.

March 2/07: USN Competitor – LOGIR. Korea and the United States have agreed to cooperate in developing guided air-launched rockets, signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for “LOGIR” (Low-Cost Guided Imaging Rocket) development. The budget for this project is reportedly more than $60 million. See “Guided Hydra Rockets: Program Halts & New Entries” for more information and updates.

BAE/GD APKWS
(click to view larger)

April 27/06: The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM) awards a 3-year, $45.7 million contract to BAE Systems in Nashua, NH for the system development and demonstration of the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II. The contract includes priced options for qualification of the system and 2 years of Low Rate Initial Production that could begin as early as 2007. The total program, if all options are exercised, will be $96.1 million.

Interestingly, BAE Systems uses a mid-body guidance approach. The guidance component is its Distributed Aperture Semi-Active Laser Seeker (DASALS), which is also used in the Army’s Precision Guided Mortar Munitions Program. BAE Systems is partnered with General Dynamics (who makes the Hydra rockets) and Northrop Grumman, and is reported to be on track to provide the first production baseline units for evaluation prior to the Critical Design Review in July 2006. See also BAE North America release.

DID’s focus article for the Hydra-70 rocket family goes into more detail re: the past history of the APKWS effort, including its cancellation and replacement by the APKWS II competition.

BAE wins SDD

Sept 29/05: BAE Systems announces [BAE North America release | different BAE Systems release] 2 successful flight tests at the U.S. Army’s Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Their 70mm rockets scored direct hits on laser-designated stationary and moving targets.

BAE also announced that it will bid on APKWS II as a prime contractor, along with Northrop Grumman Corp. and General Dynamics. They join other consortia already in the APKWS II competition, led by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

BAE Systems – Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). See also video page.
BAE Systems – Distributed Aperture Semi-Active Laser Seeker (DASALS™)
DID Spotlight article – Guided Hydra Rockets: Program Halts & New Entries. Covers Lockheed Martin’s competing DAGR, which was formally unveiled as a complete, for-sale system on Sept 11/07, the US-Korean LOGIR program, and efforts from Canada, Israel, the UAE, France, and beyond. APKWS-II will have a lot of competitors.
DID FOCUS article – Hydra-70 Rockets: From Cutbacks to the Future of Warfare.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Stratofortresses to Lose Nuke Capability under New START | Challenger 2 or Aramata; UK’s MoD Looks for Improved MBT | Rep Calls for Sale of UAVs to Jordan for Fighting ISIS

Tue, 22/09/2015 - 02:20

Americas

The US Air Force has begun removing nuclear weapons capability from 42 B-52H Stratofortresses, in line with regulations set out under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in April 2010. Thirty operational and a dozen mothballed Stratofortresses will be converted to solely conventional bombers, with work having already begun to this effect and due for completion by 2017. Both Russia and the US have until February 2018 to comply with the treaty’s terms. Despite the conversion, planned work to upgrade the fleet of B-52H bombers will form part of a modernization effort to keep nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52s flying into the 2030s and 2040s respectively, with this forecast by the GAO [p. 11] back in July to value $24.4 billion over the FY2015-2024 period.
Canadian Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau has announced that his party would not sign a contract for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters if it were to win next month’s federal election, instead opting for a competition to replace the Canadian fleet of CF-18 Hornet fighters. The acquisition of the F-35 has become a highly politicized issue in recent years, with the ruling Conservative party signing a contract for 65 F-35s in 2010 before abandoning the deal in 2012 following a probe into the decision. Last week news broke that a contract to acquire the F-35 would rise above previous cost estimates owing to a low Canadian dollar.

Europe

The UK’s Defence Ministry is reportedly looking into options for an improved Main Battle Tank (MBT), including assessing an option to procure new vehicles to replace the 227 Challenger 2 MBTs in service. A response to the Russian T-14 Aramata MBT unveiled in May, the Challenger 2 is now coming under scrutiny as officials examine whether the tank is capable of matching the new Russian design. Despite some scepticism over Russian descriptions of the vehicle’s capabilities, the T-14 has shaken up the British Army sufficiently to speed up a possible Life Extension Program (LEP) for the Challenger 2 or the procurement of a completely new fleet.
Airbus Defence & Space is marketing the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Litening 5 targeting pod as an option for future Eurofighter Typhoon customers. The pod will be installed on a company aircraft to demonstrate the improved capability. The system is reported to have already been purchased by a European Eurofighter operator. The Litening 5 was unveiled at the Paris Air Show earlier this year and uses two FLIR systems and a CCD HD-TV camera to improve target acquisition at long ranges. The pod is expected to becoming operational by the end of next year.
The British Ministry of Defence will help the country’s defense industry sell its wares abroad, according to the Conservative government’s Defence Secretary Michael Fallon. The Eurofighter will be one of two strategic export campaigns set to receive MoD assistance, with the other being complex weapon systems; likely a nod to arms behemoth BAE Systems and missile house MBDA . The UK government usually assists industry through an organization known as the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO), working closely with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, with the MoD usually fire-walled from export campaigns.

Middle East North Africa

Tunisia is upgrading its fleet of F-5E/F Tiger II fighters with new avionics, with a $32.5 million Foreign Military Sales contract awarded to Northrop Grumman by the US Air Force. Tunisia requested avionics upgrades for a dozen F-5 aircraft in September 2013, including Northrop Grumman’s LN-260 navigation system. The estimated cost detailed in the DSCA request was valued at $60 million, including logistics support and training. The contract awarded to Northrop Grumman does not detail the inclusion of logistics support or training, potentially accounting for the discrepancy between the contract value and DSCA estimate.
Egypt is reportedly in talks with Russia over a possible sale of 46 MiG-35 fighters, with the potential deal estimated to value $2.2 billion. The manufacturer has been struggling in recent years, suffering from slack demand; the MiG-35 has yet to secure an order from either the Russian Defense Ministry or a foreign customer. However, a flurry of interest in the MiG-35 from a diverse range of nations, including Vietnam and India, as well as Russia, could see contracts in coming months.
A Republican Congressman is calling on the Obama administration to sell armed unmanned aerial vehicles to Jordan, following the decision in October to deny a Jordanian request for unarmed MQ-1 Predator UAVs. China reportedly stepped into the breach in May to offer an alternative to the spurned Jordanians, now thought to be the Caihong-5, unveiled at the end of August. Rep. Duncan Hunter is calling on the President to sell the Gulf state Predator and Reaper UAVs to help in the country’s fight against ISIS, using an exception clause in the Missile Technology Control Regime agreement to enable the sale.

Asia & Pacific

China and Pakistan have reportedly signed an agreement to prevent technology from the co-developed JF-17 fighter making its way into US and Indian hands. Chinese engineers are also said to be reducing the aircraft’s radar signature through using a divergent supersonic air intake with the JF-17’s Klimov RD-93 engine, with the majority of high-end technology equipping the jet coming from China, including radar, avionics and weapons.
China may have tested a hypersonic aircraft, with this thought to be a different design to the WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle tested for for the fifth time in August. Reports indicate that this mysterious new aircraft may have been manned, with state-owned AVIC seemingly leaking news of the test on its company website before the page was swiftly removed.

Today’s Video

The Caihong-5:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Up to $11.9B for B-52H Maintenance & Modernization

Tue, 22/09/2015 - 02:18

B-52H: flyin’ low,
dyin’ slow…
(click to view full)

Officially, it’s the B-52H Stratofortress. Unofficially, it’s the BUFF (Big Ugly Fat F

cker). Either way, this subsonic heavy bomber remains the mainstay of the U.S. strategic fleet after more than 50 years of service. A total of 102 B-52H bombers were delivered from FY 1961-1963, and 94 were still on the books as of May 2009, flying mostly from Barksdale AFB, LA and Minot AFB, ND. Of these, 18 are slated for retirement, leaving a planned fleet of 76. By the time that fleet retires in the 2030s, many will be around 70 years old.

The B-52H can’t be flown against heavy enemy air defenses, but a steady array of upgrades have kept the aircraft relevant to follow-on strikes and current wars, where its long time on station and precision weapons have made the BUFF beautiful. Those changes have included advanced communications, GPS guided weapons, advanced targeting pods, and more. The USAF isn’t done yet adding new features, and maintenance remains a challenge for an aircraft fleet that’s always older than its pilots. All of these things require contracts, and the B-52H fleet has several of them underway. So, how does 2010’s 8-year, $11.9 billion umbrella contract fit in…?

CONECT, ESP, SWING: How Does This One Fit In?

USAF bombers:
B-52H, B-1B & B-2A
(click to view full)

At the moment, there are at least 3 major contracts underway for the B-52H fleet.

The CONECT (Combat NEtwork Communications Technology) contract was issued in April 2005, and could be worth up to $500 million. CONECT offers a series of upgrades that tie the B-52s into the USAF’s current communications networks. Its most significant combat improvement is the ability to receive new missions in flight, and re-target weapons in the middle of a mission. Ultimately, however, CONECT is an interim contract en route to deeper modernizations. First flight of a refurbished B-52 took place in May 2009. The program accomplished its first test flight on Jan 17/10, and plans further tests in 2011.

Execution of CONECT’s development would remain under the current contract until it’s done, but full production, or any future communications upgrades would apparently fall under the $11.9 billion September 2010 IDIQ.

B-52H: choices, choices…
(click to view full)

The 12-year, $150 million SWING (Smart Weapons Integration Next Generation) contract came into force in June 2006. Under this contract, Boeing performs work to integrate new ordnance on the B-52 fleet, from MALD unmanned decoys, to Sniper ATP surveillance and targeting pods, to AGM-158 JASSM missiles and beyond. Most of this work is software related, and the most important aspect of SWING was adding the Universal Armament Interface as a sort of weapons Application Programming Interface, in order to make integration of future weapons much easier.

Work under the SWING contract will continue in parallel with the new September 2010 contract.

In June 2009, the US Air Force issued the latest B-52 Engineering Sustainment Program (ESP) contract for the fleet, with a 10-year, $750 million ceiling.

There are some important things missing from ESP, however, such as spare parts, modernizations or fleet-wide changes outside of CONECT or SWING, etc. All of those things will fall under the September 2010 contract instead, and so will some previous ESP efforts.

The Sept 2010 contract’s initial spending surprisingly modest – the $600,000 minimum order, as the 1st payment for a $2.3 million order of 16 Evolutionary Data Link (EDL) Phase III kits, plus some basic engineering support through the end of February 2012. As noted above, the $11.9 billion is really a ceiling amount for a lot of other efforts, which may or may not go forward. If they do go forward, however, there’s an umbrella contract ready with all the terms worked out.

B-52H: gas guzzler
(click to view full)

Several well-known upgrades are under consideration for the B-52 fleet, but haven’t been approved and funded yet. USAF spokesman Lt. Col. Jack Miller has told DoD Buzz that it could cover things like:

“Combat Networks Communication Technology (CONECT) production, Extremely High Frequency (EHF) engineering development and production, Strategic Radar Replacement development and production, Tactical Data Link engineering studies, MIL-STD-1760 Internal Weapons Bay production, trade studies, and other programs critical to maintaining B-52 mission capability out to the year 2040.”

The Strategic Radar Replacement Program he mentions would install advanced new radars that could greatly improve the B-52’s ground and aerial surveillance capabilities, identifying targets at long ranges. New radar technologies could also assist with low-level flight, and reduce long-term maintenance costs.

Another oft-discussed upgrade is the on-again, off-again Stand Off Jammer program, which would turn some B-52s into very powerful, very long range, very long endurance electronic warfare aircraft that could blind even sophisticated enemy air defenses; locate, classify, analyze, or jam radar or radio signals; or even prevent remote detonation of IED land mines in a given area. B-52 SOJ has been started twice, and suspended twice for lack of funding.

While the USAF has done some necessary re-wiring work, a deep re-wiring akin to the C-5 AMP program is logical at some point, especially in conjunction with upgraded power generation on board to handle all of the new electronics. Any B-52 SOJ program would almost have to do this, and a radar improvement contract may require it as well, but it’s certain that the whole fleet will need this sooner or later. It’s very time-consuming work, but the good news is that some modern ultra-high capacity wiring has also become self-diagnosing, removing one of the biggest maintenance headaches in any airplane.

In a similar vein, but with even more immediate benefits, there has long been talk of re-engining the B-52H fleet, swapping out the ancient and hard to maintain JT3D/TF33 engines with modern turbofans that would dramatically improve performance, fuel efficiency, strike range, and maintainability. The USAF has experience with the benefits and pitfalls of these conversions, having made these kinds of upgrades to its KC-135 tanker fleet to produce the KC-135R, moved forward with re-engining the related E-8C JSTARS fleet of land battle surveillance and control aircraft, and endured the challenges of the C-5M RERP Super Galaxy program for some of its huge aerial transports.

Of course, before major steps like these can be taken, the USAF will need engineering studies. ESP doesn’t cover that, but as Lt. Col. Miller noted, the September 2010 contract does. It would also cover integration and installation of these upgrades into the B-52 fleet, as decisions are made to go forward with specific items.

Contracts & Key Events

B-52H and B-17:
only as old as I feel…
(click to view full)

September 22/15: The US Air Force has begun removing nuclear weapons capability from 42 B-52H Stratofortresses, in line with regulations set out under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in April 2010. Thirty operational and a dozen mothballed Stratofortresses will be converted to solely conventional bombers, with work having already begun to this effect and due for completion by 2017. Both Russia and the US have until February 2018 to comply with the treaty’s terms. Despite the conversion, planned work to upgrade the fleet of B-52H bombers will form part of a modernization effort to keep nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52s flying into the 2030s and 2040s respectively, with this forecast by the GAO [p. 11] back in July to value $24.4 billion over the FY2015-2024 period.

Sept 29/10: Boeing in Wichita, KS receives a sole-source indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to support the USAF’s B-52H fleet, including modernization work. It could be worth up to $11.9 billion over an 8-year period, but no funds have been committed yet by the ASC/WWVK at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH. “Individual delivery orders will be issued through three contracting activities” (FA8628-10-D-1000). See also: Boeing.

Additional Readings

USAF Factsheets – B-52H Stratofortress
Air Force Technology – B-52H Stratofortress Long-Range Multirole Bomber, USA
DoD Buzz (Oct 7/10) – Why the B-52 Got $11.9 Billion
ARINC (March 31/10) – ARINC Will Deploy Its Airborne SMARRT System for Battlefield Awareness at JEFX 2010 Exercises . Good example of the types of ongoing improvements under consideration.
DID – CONECT: B-52H Receiving a Communications Upgrade.
DID (Jan 13/10) – Boeing Wins $750M to Support the B-52H Fleet. This is ESP.
DID (July 10/06) – MUSTANG Aims to Check-Out B-52s Faster
DID (June 29/06) – $150M to Integrate New Weapons on the USA’s B-52 Bombers (updated). This is SWING.
Mechanical Engineering – CIME (Jan 1/90) – The B-52 – engineered to endure

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

AF Releases RFI for Re-Winging A-10s | MDBA Delivering Sea Ceptor Hardware in Prep for CAMM | Call for RN to Open Competition on $3.1B Maritime Patrol Contract

Mon, 21/09/2015 - 04:03

Americas

The Air Force released a Request for Information on Friday to identify potential industry sources for the re-winging of an unspecified number of A/OA-10A close air support aircraft. Over half of the A-10 Warthog fleet is already undergoing a re-winging program, with Boeing acting as prime contractor for 173 of the aircraft, with options for an additional 69. The RFI comes despite repeated calls by the Air Force’s top brass to retire the fleet early in order to free up money and resources. These calls have been blocked, with this latest RFI part of the A-10’s Thunderbolt Lifecycle Program Support (TLPS) program, intended to keep the aircraft flying until at least 2028.
DARPA has released a solicitation for the Gremlins aerial UAV launch and recovery program, following a Request for Information release last year. With an industry day scheduled for Thursday, DARPA is hoping for a flurry of innovative ideas to push onto a concept and system architecture development Phase I.
The Navy has test fired a Rolling Airframe Missile Block 1A from an Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship, the USS Coronado (LCS-4). The trimaran’s SeaRAM air defense system fired the missile as part of a risk-reduction and certification trial. The SeaRAM system incorporates the Rolling Airframe Missile and the Block 1B Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) as a more flexible air defense system, trading bolt-on versatility for a reduced missile load compared with the RAM system on its own.
Following the increased F-35 procurement cost suffered by the Netherlands last week, Canada is likely to see any possible F-35 procurement skyrocket in cost thanks to international exchange rates. Canada needs a replacement for its CF-18 Hornets, with a possible acquisition of the F-35 a highly politicized issue, this latest cost estimate revision likely to see any future program take the form of either a down-sized F-35 buy or comprise another aircraft design altogether, such as a Canadian F/A-18 Super Hornet fleet.

Europe

MBDA has completed a final set of qualification firings of the company’s Common Anti-air Module Munition (CAMM) missile in Sweden, ahead of planned testing next year by Lockheed Martin for the 3-Cell ExLS Stand Alone Launcher designed to fire the missile. The European missile manufacturer has also begun delivering Sea Ceptor hardware to the Royal Navy for installation on HMS Argyll, with the air defense system intended to modernize the aging Type 23 frigate by replacing the Seawolf system currently fitted. The CAMM missile forms part of the Sea Ceptor system, along with advanced targeting sensors. The system is also capable of receiving targeting data from a third party, allowing it to form part of a comprehensive air defense network.
Germany will upgrade 16 Dutch Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks to the 2A7 configuration, before these are integrated into the Bundeswehr’s 1st Panzer Division, according to reports on Friday. The Dutch already operate airborne forces embedded with Germany’s rapid reaction force, with this the first time a main battle tank unit will be directly integrated into a German division. The two armies also cooperate on air and missile defense, as part of bilateral military cooperation agreements. Krauss-Maffei Wegmann previously upgraded German Leopard 2s to the 2A7 configuration, including twenty former Dutch tanks supplied by Canada. Germany has been looking to bolster its tank inventories in recent months, dusting off approximately 100 Leopard 2A4s in April to bring back into frontline service, with upgrades planned from 2017.
Despite Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon seemingly earmarked for a lucrative Royal Navy maritime patrol aircraft contract as part of the UK’s Strategic Defence & Security Review (due for release in coming weeks) industry competitors and the Royal United Services Institute are calling for a competition to open up the deal, estimated to value GBP2 billion ($3.1 billion). Airbus, Finmeccanica, Lockheed Martin, L-3 and Saab are among those calling for such a competition, along with Northrop Grumman, thought to be considering offering the company’s Triton UAV. The UK has been without a dedicated airborne maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare platform since the MRA4 Nimrod was scrapped in 2010.
The Royal Navy’s AW159 Wildcat helicopter has completed heat trials in the Middle East, with these taking place aboard Type 45 destroyer HMS Duncan, following dispatch of the helicopter to Bahrain.

Middle East

Russia has deployed ground-attack aircraft to its forward operating base in Latakia, Syria, satellite imagery revealed over the weekend. The aircraft appear to be SU-30SM multi-role aircraft capable of conducting long-range ground attack missions, despite incorrect identification in early reports identifying the four aircraft as SU-27 air superiority fighters. Several Mi-24 Hind attack and Mi-17 Hip utility helicopters have also appeared at the base in recent days, along with T-90 main battle tanks, BTR-type APCs, artillery units and other equipment. Strategic transport aircraft have also been identified unloading at the base, amid reports that Russian personnel are keeping their Syrian partners at an arm’s length from the base.

Asia & Pacific

A Pakistani military official reportedly confirmed rumours on Friday of negotiations to buy Russian SU-35 fighters, despite scepticism from analysts over Pakistan’s ability to operate and maintain the aircraft, as well as concern over potential political backlash from India. The negotiations were first reported earlier this month, with the discussions also thought to involve a possible acquisition of Mi-35M attack helicopters. Pakistan’s Air Force reportedly requires a twin-engined aircraft with a longer strike range than the JF-17s, Mirage-5s and F-16s it currently operates, with reports from last year indicating a possible interest in the Chinese J-31 to this end.
Four or five Indian companies are reportedly competing for a contract to assemble Ka-226T helicopters in India alongside Russian Helicopters. The Indian government cleared the helicopters’ procurement in May, following a competition restart in March. The Russian design beat bids from Airbus and Bell to clinch the $700 million deal for 197 helicopters, with these destined for use by the Indian Army. Moscow is hoping that an agreement between the Indian and Russian governments during Modi’s visit to the country later this year will help the helicopter deal bypass India’s notorious Defence Procurement Procedure acquisition process.

Today’s Video

The Royal Navy’s Wildcat display team, the Black Cats:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Exchange Rate Causes Sharp Rise in Dutch F-35 Program | UK to Launch Competition for Infantry Vehicle | UK MoD Signs $39.5M Contract for ISR UAVs

Fri, 18/09/2015 - 02:20

Americas

Air Force Special Operations Command is reported to be looking to acquire an expendable unmanned system capable of acting as remote sensors deployable from C-130 gunships. A Coyote UAV is currently being used as a concept-demonstrator, with a longer-term solution also reported to be underway. AFSOC also wants to see lasers incorporated into the gunship of the future, retaining some aging C-130s to use as test beds. The Air Force wants industry to come up with a solution for an electric-powered laser weapon to equip the AC-130J by the end of the decade, the first aircraft of which was delivered at the end of July.

Europe

The Dutch F-35 program could rise in cost by an additional half-million euros, bringing the program up to EUR5.2 billion ($5.9 billion). The rising cost has been attributed to the dollar’s exchange rate, something likely to continue altering the program’s costs as the Dutch place incremental orders to eventually fulfill their requirement for 37 F-35s, replacing their fleet of F-16s. The first tranche of eight F-35s was ordered in March, with these scheduled for delivery in 2019.
The UK’s Ministry of Defence is reportedly close to relaunching a competition to equip the British Army with a 8×8 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle, following a breakdown in negotiation between the MoD and General Dynamics in 2008. The British Army has already got underway testing various vehicles, with the winning design set to operate alongside the recently-renamed Ajax (formerly Scout) family of armored vehicles, currently under construction by General Dynamics in Wales.
Italian armaments manufacturer Beretta has unveiled its ARX-200 battle rifle design, intended to supply Italian special forces [Italian] as part of the country’s future soldier program. Final production models of the 7.62mm rifle are reportedly scheduled for delivery to the Italian army later this year, with the rifle likely to be used as a designated marksman rifle, equipping one soldier per section.
The SOM-J cruise missile currently being developed by Lockheed Martin and Turkish firm Roketsan is reportedly scheduled for flight testing in 2017. The testing on an F-16 fighter will lay the foundation for integration testing on the F-35. Recently entering a risk reduction phase, the SOM-J is intended to fit inside the F-35’s internal weapons bay, with the two firms signing a cooperation agreement at DSEI to further develop the missile.
The United Kingdom’s Defence Ministry is bringing two ISR UAVs into its equipment “core fleet”, signing support contracts worth £23 million ($39.5 million) on Thursday. The Black Hornet nano and Desert Hawk III UAVs were used extensively by British troops in Afghanistan. The former recently underwent testing with the US Army, while the Desert Hawk IV design is also reported to be undergoing evaluation.

Asia & Pacific

With Airbus walking away from the competition earlier this month, the Japanese Defense Ministry has reportedly selected the Boeing KC-46A to supply the country’s next generation refuelling tanker. Price negotiations are now scheduled, with the number of tankers the Defense Ministry plans to procure not yet determined. Boeing lost out in South Korea to the Airbus A330 MRTT in July.
Thailand has opted to buy four Korea Aerospace Industries T-50 trainer/light attack jets, with the South Korean design fending off competition from the Hongdu L15. Thailand joins South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines as the fourth Asian state operating the T-50, with the jet also participating in Peru’s light attack aircraft competition.
The Pentagon and India’s Defence Ministry are fast-tracking India’s Foreign Military Sale acquisition of 145 M777 Howitzers, following delays to the acquisition. The two sides are reported to be jointly drafting a letter of acceptance, following procurement clearance of the BAE Systems-manufactured guns by the Indian government in May. With a revised price of $700 million, the letter of acceptance is also reported as a prompt for BAE Systems to kick offset arrangements in motion with local Indian firms, with this estimated to cover approximately 30% of the contract’s value.
AVIC has unveiled an upgraded version of its Wing Loong UAV, with the II model reportedly capable of carrying a dozen air-to-surface missiles, ten more than the Wing Loong I design. Still in development, the larger Wing Loong II is also reportedly equipped with synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical sensors and self-protection systems. The Wing Loong I recently carried out weapons drops, reportedly involving eight different weapon types. The new model bears a strong resemblance to the MQ-9 Reaper and is thought to possess similar performance characteristics.

Today’s Video

US forces with the M777:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Korea’s T-50 Family of Trainers/Fighters

Fri, 18/09/2015 - 02:18

T-50 Golden Eagle
(click to view full)

South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family offers the global marketplace a set of high-end supersonic trainer and lightweight fighter aircraft. They’re hitting the international market at a good time: just as many of the world’s jet training fleets are reaching ages of 30 years or more, and high-end fighters are pricing themselves out of reach for many countries.

Most recently, Thailand is increasing its defense budget and the speed of its procurement process to, among other things, procure a replacement for its aging L-39. The T-50 is one of three candidates.

The ROK’s defense industry is advancing on all fronts these days. Its shipbuilding industry, one of the world’s busiest, is beginning to turn out its own LHDs, and even high-end KDX-III AEGIS destroyers. On the armored vehicle front, Korea’s XK2 tank and K9/K10 self propelled howitzer are beginning to win export orders, and its XK-21/KNIFV amphibious infantry fighting vehicle may not be too far behind. All fill key market niches, promising performance at a comparatively inexpensive price. Now its aerospace industry is in flight abroad with the KT-1 turboprop basic trainer, complemented by the T-50 jet trainer, TA-50 LIFT advanced trainer & attack variant, and FA-50 lightweight fighter.

The TA-50 and FA-50 are especially attractive as lightweight export fighters, and the ROKAF’s own F-5E/F Tiger II and F-4 Phantom fighters are more than due for replacement. The key question for the platform is whether it can find corresponding export sales.

T/F/A-50: The Planes T-50, 3-view
(click to view full)

The T-50 was developed by Korea Aerospace Industries, Ltd., with cooperation and global marketing support from Lockheed Martin. Both firms were aware that many training aircraft fleets are aging, even as higher-performance fighters demand trainer aircraft that can keep up. The Korean government needed a fleet of trainers, and saw an opportunity to give their aerospace sector a strong boost in the process. Total investment in the T-50’s RDT&E program amounted to more than $2 billion: 70% from the Korean government, 17% from KAI, and 13% from Lockheed Martin.

With a length of 43 feet and a wingspan of 30 feet, the 2-seat T-50 is about 4 feet shorter than the F-16; overall, it’s only about 80% of the F-16’s size. The relative size of the control surfaces and tails are larger, however, to improve handling characteristics at lower speeds and make the aircraft easier to land. Larger landing gear is also fitted, to absorb harder landings, which is to be expected from student pilots. Its form’s resemblances to Lockheed Martin’s F-16 are suggestive, and include the blended mid-set wing, complete with leading-edge root extensions and rear ‘shelf’ fairings ending in F-16-style split airbrakes. The air intake layout on the sides is somewhat similar to the F/A-18 Hornet or Northrop’s excellent but ill-fated F-20A Tigershark, and the aircraft is powered by the same engine: GE’s popular, reliable and fuel-efficient F404, with slight improvements over the F404-GE-402 to enhance single-engine redundancy and reliability.

The T-50 trainer carries a basic navigation / attack system, which gives it some multi-role capability. The aircraft can carry Sidewinder missiles on the wingtips, as well as fuel, rockets, or qualified bombs on its 5 underwing and center pylons. The center pylon and 2 inner underwing pylons are “wet,” and can accommodate 150 gallon fuel drop tanks.

The T-50 family’s empty weight is 14,000 pounds, and maximum takeoff gross weight is 27,700 pounds. The plane’s F404-GE-102 engine produces 17,700 pounds of thrust at afterburner. Maximum rate of climb is 39,000 feet per minute; and the maximum speed is Mach 1.5. Service ceiling is 48,500 feet, the design load factor is 8gs, and the trainer airframe is designed for up to 10,000-hour service life (8,344 hours for the A-50).

T-50 cockpit
(click to view full)

Still, the plane is designed to be a trainer, with better rear visibility than a 2-seat F-16. An “active stick” ensures that stick movements in the front or rear are transmitted to the stick in the other seat, to improve monitoring and learning. Embedded training features, in-flight recording and post-mission debriefing capability are all built in. The standard tools of a modern fighter pilot’s trade are likewise present: “glass cockpit” of digital screens, HUD (Head Up Displays), HOTAS (Hands On Stick And Throttle) control systems to keep everything at the pilot’s fingertips, triple-redundant electrical system, fly-by-wire, advanced radio and navigation systems including INS/GPS, and a Martin-Baker zero-zero ejection seat. The seat back angle is 17 degrees – similar to the seat angles of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-22.

Per the standards for modern trainers, the aircraft is part of a larger, integrated training system that includes simulators, computer-based training, cockpit and maintenance trainers, and a training management system.

Maintenance has also received careful thought. The new trainer’s airframe will require no mandatory depot maintenance, and the aircraft boasts a “single-tier design” with some 250 access panels, allowing technicians to get at any major system. Extensive self-diagnostics are expected to help keep maintenance costs down.

All in all, the T-50 may remind some people of the F-16 that was originally designed by the 1970s “Fighter Mafia,” who were busy breaking every big-jet, multi-role, high-priced rule the USAF had cultivated for over a decade. The T-50’s 0.65:1 thrust/weight ratio ensures that it’s no F-16. Even so, more than 25 years after the F-16 entered service, the T-50 family retains one more comparison point: a similar price point in absolute dollars. Its $20-30 million cost places it firmly on the high end of the modern trainer market, but its supersonic performance and fighter versatility could still make the T-50 family very popular indeed.

Key market competitors include the subsonic BAE Hawk, Aermacchi’s now-supersonic M346, and its Russian twin the Yak-130.

T-50 Variants Black Eagles
(click to view full)

At present, 3 variants of the T-50 are planned, beyond the basic T-50 trainer aircraft.

T-50B aerobatic variant. It has replaced ancient A-37 Dragonflys in South Korea’s “Black Eagles” national aerobatic team. This makes South Korea 1 of just 4 countries whose aerobatic teams fly locally designed and manufactured supersonic aircraft. Their Black Eagles perform in this category alongside the USA’s Thunderbirds (F-16) and Blue Angels (F/A-18), Russia’s Swifts (MiG-29) and Knights (SU-27), and China’s 1st Aerobatic Team (J-10s).

TA-50 lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT). Offers weapons training and usage, eliminating weapon training hours in more expensive jets, and allowing operational employment. TA-50s add an internal 3-barreled M61 20mm cannon, and can carry AIM-9 Sidewinder air-air missiles, AGM-65 Maverick short-range strike missiles, rocket pods, Mk80 family bombs, and SUU-20 practice bomb carriers. The TA-50 has full avionics including stores management, and the IAI/ LIG Nex1 version of the ELM-2032 multi-mode radar is an option. Some reports add Lockheed Martin’s AN/APG-67v4 multi-mode radar as an alternative option, derived from the radar that equipped Northrop’s F-20 Tigershark.

Other reports have mentioned that the TA-50 has provisions for radar warning receivers and specialty pods, if customers wish to add them, but this isn’t confirmed. That would seem like a better fit with the FA-50, as a complete low-end light fighter that’s able to add precision strike bombs and other weapons to its arsenal.

KAI’s FA-50
(click to view full)

FA-50 lightweight fighter. A slightly more expensive variant that’s fully fitted for the lightweight fighter and light attack roles, with a secondary role as a lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) if necessary. It is beginning to gain good traction in the international marketplace.

Weapons are slated to include the same lightweight 3-barreled M61 20mm gun and weapon set as the TA-50. The ELM-2032 radar is a big step forward, and the plane’s electronic architecture reportedly adds the ability to integrate GPS-guided weapons like JDAM bombs, WCMD/SFW cluster bombs, and eventually JSOW glide bombs. A targeting and surveillance pod, AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided air-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and other advanced weapons will likely follow, as the ROKAF and other customers look to diversify their roles.

KAI on FA-50

There is a small catch. The FA-50 is a joint KAI/ Lockheed Martin project, and the associated co-operation agreements reportedly included a number of restrictive terms. One is that Lockheed Martin won’t transfer aircraft source code to other nations, leaving Lockheed as the sole integrator for key capabilities. A 2nd provision is that the T-50’s capabilities cannot exceed Korea’s F-16s. A 3rd provision reportedly banned South Korea from integrating T-50 variants with non-U.S. technology that the United States doesn’t have.

Provisions 2 and 3 had a big influence on the plane’s radar options. Instead of SELEX Galileo UK’s Vixen 500E AESA, the first FA-50s will use a cooperatively produced version of IAI’s popular ELM-2032 multi-mode radar, via LiG Nex1 and SamsungThales. The radar will be tied to additional datalinks like Link-16, radar warning receivers, and a MIL-STD-1760 databus. FA-50s will also be able to carry additional electronic countermeasures equipment, and specialty pods like LITENING or Sniper ATP for targeting, surveillance, etc.

SamsungThales and LiG Nex1 may be enough “laundering” for ELM-2032 radar exports to Islamic countries. Reports re: Iraq’s sale say nothing about a substitution, and any radar switch would require a full integration project. Lockheed Martin’s AN/APG-67v4 radar, developed for the F-20, would be an obvious alternative, and Selex ES’ Grifo is a popular global choice for light fighters. A longer-term possibility involves a step up to more advanced AESA radars, which are already making inroads into the medium end of the fighter market. An imminent program to upgrade the ROKAF’s KF-16s with AESA radars could offer KAI a way up. Once the ROKAF adds Raytheon’s RACR AESA radars to its F-16s, the FA-50 could add the same radar without violating the FA-50’s MoU restrictions. The need for Lockheed Martin’s agreement to integrate an American AESA radar would be the only remaining obstacle.

T/F/A-50: The Program T-50 cutaway, KAI

Click here for full graphic, from KAI [1500 x 696, 454k].

Home Customer: 142 ROKAF: 50 T-50, 10 T-50B, 22 TA-50, 60 FA-50.
Export Customers: Indonesia (16 T-50i), Iraq (24 FA-50), Philippines (12 FA-50).
Prospects: Botswana, Chile, Peru, Thailand, Brunei, UAE (~48), USA (up to 350).
Losses: Israel (M-346), Poland (M-346), Singapore (M-346), UAE (M-346 picked 2009, but still no contract).

Arirang report

KAI is the T-50’s prime contractor, and is responsible for the design of the fuselage and tail unit, final assembly of the aircraft, and design of the accompanying training systems. The mid-mounted variable camber wings are manufactured by Lockheed Martin, who is also responsible for the avionics and fly-by-wire flight control system, and provides technical consulting.

The production line at Saechon is designed for a 1.5-aircraft-per-month production capability with a single shift, but the assembly process can produce up to 2.5 aircraft per month by simply adding another shift if orders increase. Man Sik Park, director of the T-50 management team at Sacheon, adds that “Getting more customers than our line can currently handle is no problem because we can increase the production rate further with additional tools and assembly jigs.”

KAI’s TA-50

The ROKAF already has production orders for 102 of KAI’s aircraft: 50 T-50 trainers, 22 TA-50 LIFT/ light fighters (with an option for another 22), 10 T-50B aerobatic aircraft that replaced the Black Eagles’ A-37 Dragonflys, and 60 FA-50s to replace the RoKAF’s F-5 Tiger II and F-4 Phantom fighters.

Outside South Korea, Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems and KAI have created the T-50 International Company (TFIC) to pursue export markets. Indonesia (16 TA-50 “T-50i”), Iraq (24 FA-50 “T-50IQ”), and the Philippines (12 FA-50) have signed contracts. Botswana and Chile have both reportedly expressed interest, as well as Brunei. The UAE has yet to sign its trainer deal for 48 planes, and wants an armed variant that doesn’t exist for its chosen M-346, so KAI may yet be able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, as they did in Iraq. The USA is TFIC’s biggest target, however, thanks to the 300-plane T-X program to replace the USAF’s supersonic T-38 trainers.

The FA-50 in particular will offer performance that competes favorably with peers like the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and India’s Tejas LCA. All 3 of these jets are likely to find themselves dueling for the niche once occupied by a pair of 1960s-1970s era competitors – Russia’s MiG-21s, and Northrop’s amazingly popular F-5, which still flies with the ROKAF. Both aircraft types are still flying in many air forces, and both are reaching the end of their lifespans. Hence the market opportunity. The difference is that unlike its Chinese and Indian competitors, the F/T/A-50 family’s secondary trainer role makes it attractive to 1st and 2nd world air forces as well.

Contracts & Key Events 2015

Thailand chooses T-50 over Hongdu L15; FA-50 & AGM-65G

September 18/15: Thailand has opted to buy four Korea Aerospace Industries T-50 trainer/light attack jets, with the South Korean design fending off competition from the Hongdu L15. Thailand joins South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines as the fourth Asian state operating the T-50, with the jet also participating in Peru’s light attack aircraft competition.

June 26/15: The first of twelve Korean Aerospace Industries FA-50 fighter aircraft sold to the Philippines through a government-to-government deal with South Korea in 2013 has successfully completed its first test flight, with the first deliveries expected by December, when the Philippines will receive its first two FA-50s ahead of schedule. The full dozen should be delivered by 2017, with the Korean fighter/trainers a strategic interim as the Philippines looks ahead to acquiring more capable multi-role aircraft.

Feb 4/15: Peru.The Peru tender for about $1 billion of fighters is the next target for South Korea. The decision is supposed to happen in the second half of the year. Other expected competitors include firms from Russia, Italy and China.

2014

Philippine contract for 12 FA-50s; Export prospects; Indonesian deliveries done; Does the ROKAF need stopgap rental fighters?

Dec 14/14: Philippines. Filipino President Benigno Aquino says that the first 2 of 12 FA-50s ordered back in March are on track to be received by his country sometime in 2015, with the remaining 10 to follow by 2017. That’s a couple years later than they were aiming for when the negotiations started, but the order took about 2 years to materialize. Source: Manila Standard: “First 2 Korean jets to arrive next year”.

Dec 12/14: Brunei? Brunei Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah gave a smiling thumb up aboard an FA-50 on display at the Gimhae airport. According to South Korea’s Yonhap agency, this may be more than a photo op as an envoy from Brunei visited the headquarters of KAI in Sacheon last month. Source: Yonhap: “S. Korea’s FA-50 jet to be displayed at Busan airport”.

Oct 10/14: Weapons. The FA-50 fires an AGM-65G Maverick short-range strike missile for the first time, hitting a retired ship moored 7 km away in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The Maverick actually has an outside range of around 20+ km, but that wasn’t what they were testing here. Sources: Chosun Ilbo, “FA-50 Fighter Jets Hit Target with Guided Missile” | Joong Ang Daily, “Air Force successfully test fires guided missile.”

July 17/14: USA The USAF experiences a flight in a ROKAF TA-50, as part of their due diligence for the coming T-X advanced trainer competition. Major-to-be Lee Seong-wook and Lieutenant Lee Kwang-won from the 16th fighter wing put the American team in the backseat of their TA-50s for 4 sorties.

The American due diligence team also visited South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), 16th Fighter Wing and Logistics Command, and the 16th fighter wing’s operation and maintenance. Sources: ROK MND, “Korean Trainer Aircraft TA-50 shows its excellence”.

March 28/14: Philippines. The Philippines signs the P18.9 billion contract for 12 FA-50 jets, paid for from the P85 billion initial fund under the Revised Modernization Program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That’s currently $420.9 million, which is close to the $422 million at which the government starts paying the exchange risk. Let’s hope they’re hedged. The moves will give the Philippines a fighter force again, with 2 jets arriving for training and IOT&E 18 months after the Letter of Credit is “opened,” another 2 a year after that, and the last 8 by 2017. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin had an interesting way of describing the negotiations:

“In the Philippines we have an old saying that goes like this, “Pagkahaba-haba man ng prusisyon, sa simbahan din ang tuloy. Literally, this translates to no matter how long the procession is, it still ends up in the church. What we went through these past months even years is akin to a procession: slow, tedious and full of challenges. And like a procession we knew where our destination was and why we’re doing it.”

That last sentence becomes especially interesting, in light of PAF spokesman Col. Miguel Okol’s comments to GMA News. He said “kung anong ibbiigay sa atin ngayon, we make do what is given,” while adding that the FA-50s are “a step in the right direction.” The PAF ultimately wants more advanced fighters, with full multi-role capabilities. They may find their FA-50s growing into precisely that, as the ROKAF adds more advanced weapons. Otherwise, they’ll need to be able to afford what they want. Sources: KAI, “KAI won a contract to export 12 FA-50s to the Phil” | GMA News, “PAF wants more sophisticated fighter planes, but will make do with FA-50” | Philippine Daily Inquirer, “PH acquires P23.7B-worth of fighter jets, helicopters” | The Philipiine Star, “2 contracts for purchase of fighter jets signed today” | Rappler, “PH Air Force a joke no more, gets fighter jets” | Arirang, “Korean government to sell 12 FA-50 fighter jets to Philippines”.

Philippines: 12 FA-50s

March 28/14: Exports. A post on KAI’s official blog announces the Philippine sale, and confirms that “KAI is eyeing to further exporting the T-50 variant aircraft to the U.S.A., Botswana, the U.A.E., Thailand and Peru.” Chile no longer gets a mention, but they still have a need. Sources: KAI, “KAI won a contract to export 12 FA-50s to the Phil” | KAI Fly Together Blog.

March 26/14: Fill-ins. The ROKAF needs to retire its fleets of 136 or so F-5E/F Tiger light fighters, and about 30 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers. Meanwhile, The F-16 fleet is about to begin a major upgrade program that will keep part of that fleet out of service. The F-X-3 buy of F-35As is expected to be both late, and 20 jets short of earlier plans. The KF-X mid-level fighter project will be even later – it isn’t likely to arrive until 2025, if it arrives at all. The ROKAF is buying 60 FA-50s to help offset some of the F-5 retirements, but the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) sees this combination of events leaving South Korea about 80 planes short.

FA-50 deliveries only began in August 2013, and foreign FA-50 orders from Iraq and the Philippines are beginning to take up additional slots on the production line. As such, the ROKAF may be leaning toward a quicker stopgap:

“The Air Force is considering leasing used combat jets as part of ways to provide the interim defense capability because replacement of aging F-4s and F-5s wouldn’t take place in a timely manner,” a senior Air Force official said, asking for anonymity. “As midlevel combat jets are mostly in shortage, the Air Force is considering renting 16 to 20 used F-16s from the U.S. Air Force…. “The U.S. Air Force stood down some F-16s in the wake of the defense spending cut affected by the sequestration,” another Air Force official said, asking not to be named. “Under current circumstances, we can rent F-16s or buy used ones.”

It will be interesting to see if the USAF will let the ROKAF lease, or just have them buy the jets at cut-rate prices. Sources: Yonhap, “S. Korea considers F-16 lease deal to replace aging jets”.

Feb 21/14: Philippines. News reports say that the 2 sides have reached agreement, with a formal contract signing to follow in March 2014. It’s reportedly a $422 million deal for 12 FA-50s, denominated in US dollars, with the Philippine government taking the exchange risk that total costs won’t climb much above P18.9 billion. They’ve also decided to reduce spare parts purchases by $500,000, which is almost always a false economy that hurts aircraft availability. In exchange, KAI accepted a much lower down payment of 15% per Philippine law (q.v. Dec 26/13), and will take risks regarding the cost of some equipment furnished through the USA.

The first 2 FA-50s will be delivered by September 2015. Sources: Philippine Daily Inquirer, “Deal to buy 12 fighters jets from South Korea reached” | Rappler, “PH completes negotiations for 12 fighter jets” | Yonhap, “FA-50 sales to Philippines make headway, deal possible as early as March: source” | The Malay Mail, “Philippines to buy 12 South Korean fighters for US$422m”.

Indonesian T-50i
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Feb 13/14: Indonesia. KAI has completed the delivery of all 16 T-50i jets, via a series of ferry flights between September 2013 and January 2013. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono hosts a commemoration ceremony celebrating the T-50i’s deployment at Halim Perdanakusumah Airport in Jakarta. Sources: KAI release [in Korean] | The Korea Herald, “S. Korea completes delivery of 16 T-50 trainers to Indonesia”.

Indonesian deliveries done

2013

ROKAF follow-on FA-50 buy, takes 1st FA-50 delivery; Iraq buys 24 FA-50s; Philippines pick FA-50; Loss in Poland; FA-50 potential in Indonesia; Opportunity in Taiwan? TA-50 drops tank
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Dec 26/13: Philippines. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin says that they’ve recommended an exemption from laws that limit government contracts to 15% payment before goods are delivered, in order to allow KAI’s requested 52% down payment for FA-50 fighters. Ultimately, it will be President Aquino’s decision.

Defense Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez had more good news concerning negotiations, saying that: “We have settled the turnaround time issue. We are discussing the payment scheme” (q.v. Dec 2/13). It sounds like they’ll end up pretty close to KAI’s request payment schedule, but Velez still wouldn’t place any kind of timeline on negotiations. The issue is that any delays beyond this point are going to change the in-service date for the country’s air force, and the planned 2015 time frame is already a bit late, given Chinese pressure. Sources: The Philippine Star, “DND seeks release of funds to buy Korean fighter jets”.

Dec 20/13: Poland. Poland’s MON picks the M-346 as its next jet trainer. The package includes 8 planes + 4 options, along with simulators and other training systems, spares, and technical support.

Even though the M-346 was the only finalist without certified dual-role capability, Alenia (PZL 1.167 billion / $377.1 million) was the only contender to submit an offer within the MON’s PZL 1.2 billion budget. BAE’s Hawk T2 LIFT (PZL 1.754 billion/ $566 million) and KAI/Lockheed’s T-50 (PZL 1.802 billion/ $582 million) did not fit, and consideration of lifetime costs wasn’t enough to save them from disqualification. Read full coverage at: “Poland’s New Advanced Jet Trainer: M-346 Wins“.

Loss in Poland

Dec 12/13: FA-50. Iraq signs a $1.1 billion deal to buy 24 T-50IQ light fighters, which Korean news agencies cite as an FA-50 variant. The price works out to about $46 million per plane, but it necessarily includes added costs like initial training infrastructure. If the Iraqis have learned anything from their other programs, it will also include a solid initial supply of spare parts. KAI expects a 25-year, $1 billion T-50IQ support deal to follow shortly.

These “T-50IQs” will apparently serve double duty: as the IqAF’s advanced jet trainers once pilots graduate from T-6B turboprops, and as a backup fighter force. The deal is a big save for KAI, as Iraqi interest in the TA-50 armed trainer had apparently waned in favor of the Czech L-159T. Increased instability in the region may have helped revive their interest, as it will take more than the IqAF’s 36 ordered F-16IQs to provide even reasonable airspace control. A supersonic “F-16 lite” provides Iraq with better air defense, though it may come at the cost of some counterinsurgency strike performance relative to the L-159. KAI is quoted giving a delivery window of 2015 – 2016, while Reuters cites April 2016 – 2017.

Note that the Yonhap article has a key error. The plane exported to Indonesia, Peru & Turkey is KAI’s KO-1/KT-1 turboprop trainer and counterinsurgency aircraft, not the T-50 family. The T-50 family has been exported to Indonesia, and the Philippines is negotiating. KAI hopes that the breakthrough in Iraq may trigger interest elsewhere in the Middle East. Perhaps it will re-open the UAE’s 48-plane armed trainer pick, which has been stalled since 2009. Sources: KAI, “KAI has signed the contract with Iraq for exporting T-50 supersonic advanced jet trainer & light attack” | Korea Times, “Korea exports 24 attack jets to Iraq” | Reuters, “S.Korea’s KAI sells fighter jets worth $1.1 billion to Iraq” | Yonhap, “S. Korea to export 24 FA-50 light attackers to Iraq”.

Iraq: 24 FA-50s

Dec 2/13: Philippines. As China places growing pressure on the Philippines and Korea alike over territorial claims, TA-50/ FA-50 negotiations drag on and actual fielding of useful jets is farther and farther away. The issues seem to be substantive, however, rather than bureaucratic. South Korea wants a 52% down payment of PHP 9.8 billion ($224.25 million). The budgeted funds involved 15% down, which is apparently tied to government contracting laws rather than a different self-evaluation of customer risk. The 2nd issue reportedly concerns delivery times for spares under the support contract. South Korea wants a much longer delivery time.

Philippine Defense Undersecretary for Finance Fernando Manalo says that they’re preparing a “firm position” for submission to KAI, who have to decide whether they’ll accept it. If not, however, the Philippines’ alternatives are sparse. India’s Tejas isn’t ready, and the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17 is out of the question. They could take on the risk of old, high flight hours, early-block F-16s from the USA. Or, they could seek to buy refurbished Israeli Kfir C10s for less money, if Israel is willing cross China by selling them. Meanwhile, they’ll remain helpless against Chinese aerial provocations. Sources: Rapler, “‘Major issues’ with South Korea delay PH fighter jets”.

Nov 13/13: Taiwan? Submarines remain high on Taiwan’s agenda, but they aren’t the only items. The ROCAF plans to go outside the USA entirely for its new jet trainer, but replacements for the AIDC AT-3 Tzu Chung have been canceled before. The last AT-3 was delivered in 1990, but South Korea’s T-50 family is reportedly quite tempting.

Taiwan needs to grow its fighter fleet, and a TA-50 sale would also provide Taiwan with a local interceptor and light attack jet. China has been antagonizing South Korea lately, and a TA-50 sale would certainly provide a diplomatically painful riposte. Sources: Defense News, “Taiwan Still Hungry for More US Arms”.

Oct 28/13: KF-X shrunk? Aviation Week reports that KAI has responded to the KF-X’s program’s stall with a smaller, single-engine “KFX-E/ C501” design that uses the F-35-style C103 design as a base, and proposes to reuse some systems from the FA-50. South Korea’s subsequent decision to short-circuit a competition in favor of Lockheed Martin’s F-35A fighter means that the T-50 partner is also committed to helping with KF-X, and efforts to move the delivery date earlier will add impetus to plans that reuse existing technologies. Read “KF-X Fighter: Pushing Paper, or Peer Program?” for full coverage.

Oct 22/13: Poland. President Park Geun-hye and President Bronislaw Komorowski signed a cooperation pact in Seoul, spanning issues from defense to trade and energy. President Park pitched T-50 trainers as well as submarines. Her counterpart sounded somewhat noncommittal, as the AJT competition remains open at least until early 2014.

Oct 17-21/13: Philippines. For her first state visit at home since her election, President Park received Filipino President Benigno S. Aquino III to discuss several bilateral agreements, including defense cooperation. The phrasing of her official statement implies that a contract for FA-50 aircraft has not been signed yet, but a Memorandum of Understanding has. So much for a deal signed by July (q.v. Jan 30/13).

The MoU request is confirmed at 12 jets, backed by a budget set aside of close to PHP 19 billion (about $440.5 million). After the official visit, the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reported that China had pressured South Korea not to sell the planes. This was officially denied by the South Korean government, but confirmed by anonymous government officials. China and the Philippines have unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in that section the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea. Sources: ROK President | Chosun Ilbo.

Sept 10/13: Indonesia. The first 2 T-50i jets take off from Sacheon airfield in Korea, en route to Indonesia. Their trip will take it to Gaishung, Taiwan; Cebu, Philippines; and Spinggan, Indonesia; before arriving at its future home base of Ishuwahyudi, Indonesia. Source: ROK MND | KAI release, Sept 10/13.

June 28/13: T-50i cert. The T-50i receives its military type certificate through the South Korean Government’s airworthiness authority committee, which is chaired by the DAPA defense procurement agency’s bureau of analysis and evaluation, MACA (Military Airworthiness Certification Authority).

KAI adds that 6 pilots from the Indonesian Air Force have been training since February 2013 with the T-50 and TA-50, accompanied by Indonesian ground maintenance crews. T-50i deliveries are expected to begin in September 2013, with all 16 delivered within the first half of 2014. Source: KAI release, June 28/13.

T-50i military type cert

Aug 20/13: FA-50. KAI delivers the 1st FA-50 fighter to the ROKAF, with another 60 due for delivery by 2016 to replace about 120 Vietnam-era F-5E/F Tiger II fighters. KAI sees a bright future in Asia, where IHS projects that defense budgets will increase beyond by 35% from 2013 – 2021.

Park Jeong-soo and other KAI officials say they aim to sell about 1,000 T-50 family planes by 2040 or so, but even factoring in Asian growth, their success or failure in the USA’s 300 plane T-X requirement will play a huge role in whether or not they achieve it. Source: Reuters, “South Korea targets growing Asian defence market with fighter jets”

TA-50 delivered

June 19/13: Indonesia. KAI representatives at the 50th Paris Air Show tell Flight Global that Indonesia will receive its full complement of 16 T-50i jet trainers (q.v. May 25/11) between September 2013 – February 2014. They’re also pursuing a deal for 12 FA-50 light fighters, which would replace the TNI-AU’s F-5s. Flight Global.

May 7/13: FA-50s. KAI borrows the people who seem to write most of the technical manuals for consumer electronics, in order to describe the 1.1 trillion won (about $1.02 billion) ROKAF contract for full rate production of the FA-50. Based on our translation of their English translation, KAI seems to be saying that follow-on FA-50s will begin arriving in August 2013, and that production will continue into 2016. This timeline fits previous reports, and implies that KAI has been doing advance production work.

KAI’s writers wouldn’t be faithful to the spirit of those technical manuals if they didn’t leave out important information, so they made sure to leave out the number of planes bought. The ROKAF ordered 20 FA-50s in December 2011, and was slated to order another 40-110 as the follow-on. Given the contract funding, and expected costs, it appears that the ROKAF has ordered another 40 FA-50s, at around $25.5 million per plane. Subsequent reports confirm it.

You’re denying yourself one of life’s guilty pleasures if you don’t read the original KAI release in all its glory. See also: UPI.

ROKAF: 40 FA-50s

March 6/13: Philippines. The Zamboanga City Times reports that the country’s Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) has only just given the go-ahead to draw up a Terms of Reference document, in advance of a government-to-government deal for 12 FA-50 fighters.

The document will define what has to be achieved; stakeholders, roles and responsibilities; resource, financial and quality plans; work breakdown structure and schedule; and success factors/risks. That isn’t a small job, yet the official line is that the TOR will be done and negotiations held by the end of 2013, which aircraft flying within about 2 years – or about a decade after they retired the F-5s in 2005. It’s possible, but both of those dates seem optimistic at best.

Jan 30/13: Philippines. Agence France Presse reports that the Philippines is headed into negotiations with KAI in February 2013, and expects to have a deal by July. Their jets won’t arrive until 2015.

The big question is, which jets they will be? AFP and Flight International report that they’ll be FA-50 fighter variants, rather than the TA-50 armed trainers. If the PAF technical team mentioned in the Oct 29/12 entry came back with unsatisfactory answers about the TA-50, KAI’s FA-50 is the logical next option. Close parsing of the public statements made by Presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda and Defense Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez don’t provide direct confirmation. FA-50s will be more expensive, however, making TA-50s a potential fallback option in negotiations. Nothing is final yet, and we’ll only know the answer when the deal is done.

Postscript: Manila Channel wins the award for media confusion, by posting a graphic of Russia’s developmental T50 stealth fighter in their story. Uh, guys, these aren’t the fighter jets you’re looking for. Chosun Ilbo | Manila Channel | Manila’s Sun Star | Bloomberg | Flight International.

2012

ROKAF orders 1st FA-50s; Philippines picks TA-50? KAI privatization fails. T-50 line
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October 2012: FA-50. The FA-50 gets South Korean type certification. Source.

Oct 29/12: Philippines. The Philippine Star says that a PAF technical team is investigating whether the TA-50 can deliver “medium range missiles”, and the quality of its radar system. If the country decides to remain on course for a competition, these questions will become more important.

Radars are important to surveillance as well as air superiority, and the Philippines needs both. South Korea has a partnership with IAI for its EL/M-2032 radar, which includes surface scan capabilities, on the FA-50; will the Philippines pay for that? Beyond the radar, the term “medium range missile” is very ambiguous. TA-50s can deliver AGM-65 Maverick short-range strike missiles or AIM-9 Sidewinder short range air-to-air missiles, but they would require additional integration to deliver a medium range anti-ship weapon like an American AGM-154C JSOW glide bomb, an anti-ship missile like the AGM-84 Harpoon, or a medium-range air-to-air missile like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Oct 28/12: Philippines. The Philippine Star reports that their buy is becoming a competition again:

“The Philippine Air Force (PAF)’s planned acquisition of lead-in fighter jets from South Korea or any friendly state may take longer than expected after it was decided that the multi-billion peso defense procurement will be bid out instead of the government entering into a government-to-government deal.”

That changes Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin’s June announcement of a TA-50 buy from South Korea, with deliveries expected to begin in 2013. Philippine media report that the offer of 12 jets would include a soft loan of $560 million from South Korea’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund, disbursed through the Export-Import Bank of Korea.

Aug 31/12: KAI Privatization fails. Korean Air Lines Co. is the only bidder to register by the extended deadline, but rules governing sales by government entities require at least 2 bids.

Korean Air generated 3.3% of revenue making plane parts in 2011, and has tried to buy into KAI before. Beyond stepped up Korean orders for T-50 jets and Surion helicopters, KAI is also makes civil and military parts for Boeing, and is building a new plant to make Airbus A320 wing components under a $1.2 billion deal signed in March 2012. Bloomberg.

Privatization

Aug 6/12: KAI privatization crashing. The government wants to privatize KAI, but finding a bidder has been difficult, and it looks like they’re about to fail on the Aug 16/12 deadline.

The government and its Korea Finance Corporation (KoFC) wanted to sell 41.75% of KAI via a publicly opened bid, which includes 11.4% of KoFC’s 26.41%, and shares owned by Samsung Techwin (10%), Hyundai Motor (10%), Doosan (10%), and KDB Bank (0.34%). The bid terms require at least 2 competing bidders, but as the JoongAng Daily explains, all of the major South Korean firms who could afford such a bid have other priorities. The asking price is also perceived to be high, and the market is reinforcing that by driving down KAI’s share price in anticipation of a failure to privatize it. Now political opposition to privatization is also growing, which could be the final nail in the coffin.

Aug 2/12: Philippines pick. The Philippines DND’s undersecretary for finance, munitions, installations and materiel, Fernando Manalo, makes the country’s choice official: KAI’s T-50s. Chinese bullying in the West Philippine Sea around Scarborough Shoal played a significant role in pushing them toward a more capable fighter, which would remove the M-346 from contention. Meanwhile, used F-16s were seen as too expensive to operate, with little airframe life left.

The problem is that without an approved modernization budget, the armed forces can’t sign a contract. If the country does sign a contract by the end of 2012, they want 2 of the Golden Eagles to be delivered immediately, so that their pilots will be trained by the time the other 10 arrive in 2015. Manilla Bulletin | Manilla Standard Today.

June 20/12: Philippine buy? ABS-CBN news of the Philippines quotes Philippine air force officials as saying they will buy 12 TA-50s, in order to restore the air force’s ability to police Philippine airspace.

That ability was lost when the country retired its remaining F-5 aircraft in 2005, and the USA no longer bases fighters at Clark AB or USNB Subic Bay. Chinese violations of Philippine airspace and claimed maritime zones have been creating a lot of tension, and the country has been looking at its options for a couple of years now. Their efforts have involved requests for 12 used American F-16s, as well as examination of KAI’s TA-50 and Alenia’s M-346 Master. The M-346 doesn’t have an armed version yet, and the USA hasn’t issued a formal DSCA clearance yet. That leaves the TA-50 as its only approved option that can be bought right now.

The TA-50 deal is reportedly worth around 25 billion pesos (about $590 million), with a contract expected by the end of 2012. All 12 fighter jets are expected to be delivered by the end of 2013. If so, the Philippines would join its neighbor Indonesia as a TA-50 customer.

A 2nd contract for 6 fixed-wing aircraft is expected to replace the country’s OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes, and designs from the USA (likely the AT-6B), Brazil (Super Tucano), and Korea (likely the KT-1) are expected to compete. Given the TA-50’s 2-seat design and ability to use laser-guided weapons, another possibility would be to add options to any TA-50 contract, and use it in both roles. This would be less effective for counter-insurgency, or as an intermediate trainer, but contribute more to airspace policing and defense. It depends where the country’s priorities lie at the time, and external events are unstable enough to change them. Philippines’ ABS-CBN | ABS-CBN re: 2nd buy | South Korea’s Yonhap.

May 16/12: Philippines. Philippine President Benigno Aquino says that his government had asked to buy second-hand F-16s from the USA, but is concerned that maintenance costs on these aging aircraft could end up being too high. This was the problem that forced the country to mothball its F-5 force in 2005, but it seems there is good news. From the AFP report:

“We do have an alternative, and – this is a surprise – it seems we have the capacity to buy brand-new, but not from America… These are manufactured by another progressive country that I won’t name at this point.”

Feb 17/12: US T-X delayed. The USAF confirms that it won’t make a T-X selection until 2016, and doesn’t expect initial operational capability for its new trainers until 2020. Until then, they will continue to use 2-seat F-16Ds to bridge the gap from T-38 trainers, to the F-22A and F-35. Flight International.

Feb 16/12: Israel. The T-50 loses to Alenia’s M-346, as the preferred bidder to stock IAI & Elbit’s TOR public-private joint training venture. Governmental approval is required, and a contract award for 30 planes is expected later in 2012. If the expected billion-dollar contract is signed, deliveries would be expected to begin in the middle of 2014. In return, Italy is rumored to have pledged to buy an equivalent amount of equipment from Israel: IAI’s CAEW 550 AEW&C jets, and a new jointly-developed reconnaissance satellite.

Those contracts were signed in July 2012. Until now, South Korea has been buying a lot of defense gear from Israel. The question is whether that will continue. Read “Trainer Jets for Israel: From the Skyhawk, to the Master” for full coverage.

Israel loss

Feb 11/12: International training. South Korea’s Yonhap news agency quotes an unidentified defense ministry source who said that Portugal has become the preferred partner for a WON 300 billion (about $267 million) T-50 International Military Flight Training Center Consortium (IMFACC). A Memorandum of Understanding might be reached as early as March 2012.

If Portugal wins, they will have beaten potential sites in the USA, Australia, the Philippines and Spain. IMFACC will be a training center for international customers like Indonesia, as well as South Korean pilots who need to be free of flight time restrictions in their own, crowded country. Portugal has large over-water territories to facilitate flight training, and offers a more central location than Australia or the Philippines.

Feb 7/12: FA-50 radars? IAI reveals a $150 million order from an unnamed customer for its EL/M-2032 fighter radar, from an unnamed customer. A Globes report places the customer within Asia, and the timing is one of several factors that suggests a South Korean order.

Read “IAI’s $150M EL/M-2032 Radar Contract Mystery” for full coverage. It includes a survey of potential Asian customers, and the other likely candidate for this order.

Feb 3/12: US T-X. Asia One reports that recent announcements of US budget cuts are expected to affect the T-50, as the USA’s cornerstone T-X program looks set to be delayed:

“The US is by far the largest market for KAI, which hopes to sell at least 350 units to it. But it has deferred its decision on whether to acquire new trainer jets or develop them on its own, or turn their old fighters into trainer aircraft. The so-called T-X project is expected to be further delayed given the US defence cuts. Experts have estimated that the global demand for trainer jets and light fighters over the next three decades will amount to around 3,300 units. KAI aims to export around 1,000 units during that period.”

2011

FA-50 order; Indonesia is T-50’s 1st export customer; TA-50 rollout; Polish do-over; Israeli competition; KAI IPO. FA-50 prototype
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Dec 28/11: FA-50. Korea Aerospace Industries signs a 20-plane, $600 million FA-50 production contract with DAPA, bringing total T-50 family orders to 102 planes. This is a follow-on to the December 2008 development contract, which produced 4 prototype and test aircraft. Deliveries to the ROKAF are expected to begin in 2014.

South Korean orders could eventually swell to over 100 FA-50s, as the ROKAF seeks to replace its F-5E/Fs. This could also help in competitions like Poland’s, by broadening KAI’s in-production T-50 family technology options. KAI | Flight International.

ROKAF: 20 FA-50s

Nov 22/11: AESA for KF-16s? Raytheon declares that it is “responding to the Republic of Korea’s official launch of the F-16 radar upgrade competition with the Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar system (RACR).” RACR is designed as a drop-in AESA radar for F-16 fighters, and is based on the technologies in the AN/APG-79 radar that equips US Navy Super Hornets.

No word yet on other competitors, but any KF-16 AESA upgrade could break a technology logjam for the FA-50 as well.

Oct 28/11: Poland. Poland steps back from its existing trainer & light fighter RFP, and says it will re-do the competition. They seem to have been surprised at the cost of meeting their previous specifications, and will opt for a trainer with lower combat capabilities in the next round. That means the new jets won’t really be able to replace their SU-22s, but it also means that, in the words of deputy defense minister Marcin Idzik, Poland won’t “be the sole country to acquire such an [aircraft as we had requested].” This implies that even the TA-50, which looked to have good odds of winning the bid, was insufficient.

The new RFP is expected in spring 2012. Read “Poland Seeks Advanced Jet Trainers/ Light Fighters” for full coverage.

Oct 10/11: Israel. The Jerusalem Post reports that KAI has formally partnered with Lockheed Martin in its bid to sell T-50 trainers to Israel, citing the advantage of being able to use American military aid funds. That possibility has been a live option since September, but this makes it official.

In Israel, KAI is once again competing against Alenia’s M-346 Master. Italy has reportedly made an interesting barter offer, and the 2 countries built close ties under Prime Minister Berlusconi. Israel’s final choice will be a significant geopolitical decision – read “Trainer Jets for Israel: Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era” for a full explanation, and ongoing coverage.

Sept 15/11: US FACO? The Korea Herald reports that Lockheed Martin is setting up a T-50 final assembly and check-out (FACO) plant in the USA. That makes perfect sense as it competes for the USA’s pending T-X trainer competition, and it also affects Israel’s buy. If the T-50 series can be considered an American product, that means Israel could buy it with American foreign aid dollars. The M-346 is unlikely to be able to offer that, which would give the Korean jet a significant edge.

The existing T-50 Golden Eagle contract reportedly states that KAI takes 70% percent of the production work, while Lockheed takes the rest. The firms would not address speculation that this ratio might be adjusted for the US T-X and /or Israeli competitions.

June 2011: Iraq. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Iraqis may have made an oil-for-aircraft deal to buy Korean T-50 family jet trainers, some of which could also serve as effective light fighters. If so, this indicates serious budget issues, and makes the reported deal for Aero Vodochody L159T jet trainers questionable. Will the L-159’s potential Iraq deal become yet another canceled Czech?

As of Jan 5/12, however, no public announcement had been made regarding either platform.

May 26/11: KAI IPO. If KAI seemed to jump the gun on the Indonesia announcement, there may be a clear motive. The Korea Exchange has just approved an IPO for the firm to go public, which is expected to raise around $525 million in cash for the firm. Announcing the sale just ahead of that approval is permissible, and has the effect of boosting the expected asking price. Woori Investment & Securities, and Hyundai Securities, will manage the deal. Reuters | Wall St. Journal.

KAI IPO

T-50: takeoff
(click to view full)

May 25/11: Indonesia win. Well, that was fast. KAI executive VP Enes Park is quoted as saying that the Indonesian Defense Ministry signed a $400 million deal for 16 jets – or $25 million per plane, which is not the deep discount deal touted earlier. Aviation Week says that the contract reportedly involves a T-50 with a gun and weapon pylons (i.e. TA-50), though the actual designation is T-50I.

The planes will replace about 10 Hawk Mk.53 subsonic trainers, and may also supplement or replace the TNI-AU’s 5-6 remaining F-5E/F fighters. Read “Indonesia Looking for Trainer/Attack Aircraft” for full coverage.

May 20/11: Indonesia win? In the wake of an ROK-Indonesian agreement to expand economic and industrial cooperation via a joint secretariat, and reports that KAI has been designated as Indonesia’s preferred trainer jet bidder, Indonesia’s Amir Sambodo suggests that Indonesia might buy 16 T-50 family jets, in exchange for 4 or more additional CN-235 aircraft bought from Indonesia’s Dirgantara. Read “Indonesia Looking for Trainer/Attack Aircraft” for full coverage.

April 12/11: Indonesia. The Indonesian government sends a letter to KAI, designating the South Korean firm as the preferred bidder to replace Indonesia’s BAE Systems Hawk 53s. Source.

Indonesia is 1st export win: 16 “T-50i” TA-50s.

Feb 24/11: UAE stall. Flight International reports that M346 negotiations between the UAE and Alenia Aermacchi have stopped, with no word on when they might resume. Having said that:

“The door appears to remain closed to KAI and the T-50, with officials from the South Korean company agreeing. “Obviously, we would love to get back into the competition and offer the T-50. But we have not had any discussions with the UAE officials about the T-50 since they picked the M-346, and we are not expecting that to change any time soon,” says a KAI official.”

That quote would seem to contradict recent reports by UPI and Defense News, which said that the UAE had re-opened talks.

Jan 24/11: TA-50 rollout. South Korea rolls out the first production TA-50 variant, with light attack capabilities. The TA-50s will mostly be used to train new military pilots on air-to-air and air-to-surface missions before they deploy to KF-16s or F-15Ks, but they can also perform combat missions themselves as secondary air patrol or ground attack assets, and could be asked to do that in the event of a war.

South Korean media report that TA-50 deliveries will continue until 2012, to be followed by full F/A-50 fighters from 2013 onward. KAI | Korea Herald | idomin [in Korean, picture]

TA-50

2010

50th T-50 delivery; SFW bombs for FA-50s; Singapore loss; Iraq stall. Alenia’s M346
(click to view full)

Oct 25/10: Iraq Czeched? Prague Monitor and Iraq Business report that the Czech Republic might sell up to 25 used Aero L-159s to Iraq. Iraq has been holding a competition for 24 jet trainers between Korea’s T-50, the UK’s Hawk, and Italy’s M-346.

If the L-159 has become a focus, rather than just a competitor, it’s likely that the price of new jet trainers was too high, given other pressing needs – and that Iraq is now looking at value over newness. Time will tell.

Sept 28/10: Singapore loss. Rumors of a loss in Singapore are confirmed, via a EUR 250 million contract to supply Singapore with 12 M-346 trainers and related systems. The win comes via Alenia’s global marketing agreement with Boeing, who already supplies Singapore’s new F-15SG fighters. Read “Finmeccanica’s M-346 AJT: Who’s the Master Now?” for full coverage.

Singapore loss

Sept 2/10: Poland RFP. Poland’s Ministry of Defense (MON) issues its jet trainer RFP for 16 planes, plus support, related training systems like simulators; and initial training for 6 instructors, 6 pilots, and 50 ground crew. 1.45 billion zlotys (about $467 million) has been budgeted, and the T-50 is a contender.

Aug 9/10: Indonesia finalists. Air Forces Monthly reports that Indonesia’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration has narrowed its 16 plane advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft shortlist to the Czech Aero L-159B, South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle, and Russia’s Yak-130.

That leaves both Alenia’s M346 Master and China’s JL-9/FTC-2000 out in the cold. Interestingly, the common denominator for the 2 eliminated types is poor secondary ground attack capabilities.

July 1/10: Singapore loss? Defense News reports that Singapore’s government has selected Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 as the preferred bidder in its $1.3 billion competition for 48 advanced jet trainers. Aermacchi teamed up with Singapore’s ST Aero to compete against the KAI-Lockheed team, with Boeing providing the ground-based training system to support the M-346.

Singapore’s MINDEF has not made its decision public, and neither KAI, nor Aermacchi, nor South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) procurement and export agency could confirm the tip. The report adds that the UAE’s M346 deal remains in limbo over a side deal to develop UAVs together, which may give the T-50 an opening. Singapore’s loss in particular is a sharp blow to the platform, however, and may set other events in motion – including privatization:

“The state-owned Korea Development Bank (KDB) announced in April 2009 that it would sell its 30.5 percent stake in KAI, which has three other major local shareholders – Samsung Techwin, Doosan Infracore and Hyundai Motors, each with a 20.54 percent stake. But KDB temporarily withdrew from its decision in the face of opposition from KAI’s labor union, which argued that the privatization effort could hurt overseas sales of the T-50… Earlier this year, a KoFC(Korea Finance Corp.) official said, “If KAI fails to sell the T-50 to Singapore, discussions of the KAI privatization would certainly be resurfaced. Our position will be re-established after that.”

See also the official SAF cyberpioneer’s articles covering the BAE Hawk, Alenia M346, and KAI T-50.

May 12/10: #50. The ROKAF holds a ceremony to celebrate the delivery of the 50th T-50 jet, which completes the RKAF’s orders for that variant.

The Korea Herald reports that the T-50 project had cost WON 2.2 trillion ($1.9 billion) on the T-50 project as of 1997, with training beginning in April 2007. The jet has been used to train 190 pilots so far. KAI | Korea Herald.

Last ROKAF T-50

April 6/10: SFW for FA-50s. Textron Defense System announces that the ROKAF will integrate their Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) smart cluster bombs on the FA-50 light combat aircraft. Through a foreign military sale led by the Eglin Air Force Base Air Armament Center and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration of South Korea, Textron Defense Systems expects to begin providing inert integration rounds starting in 2010.

2009

ROKAF’s Black Eagles switch; UAE loss; IAI EL/M-2032 radar & Elisra ECM for FA-50; M61 20mm gun contract. Black Eagles T-50B
(click to view full)

Oct 29/09: AESA offered. Flight International reports that Raytheon officials are touting their RACR model AESA radar for the F/A-50 at the 2009 Seoul air show. Northrop Grumman’s similar SABR radar, which has been designed to compete with RACR in the F-16 retrofit market, is another possibility. Buying an American radar would step around the provisions that F/A-50 source code may not be shared with other countries; whether it would also overcome the agreements’ other obstacles remains to be seen.

Sept 23/09: EL/M2-2032 radar deal. Israel Aerospace Industries announces a $280 million pair of contracts with South Korea, one of which covers EL/M-2032 radars for the TA-50 and FA-50 fighters. The fighter radar will be co-produced by IAI ELTA and South Korea’s LIG Nex1.

The other order reportedly involves Israel’s Oren Yarok (“Green Pine”) long-range air defense and missile tracking radar. Earlier discussions had revolved around figures of about $215 million for 2 Green Pine radar systems, and current reports offer a figure of $200 million for an undisclosed number of systems. The low number of TA-50 and F/A-50 fighter orders at this early stage of their development, and the EL/M-2032 fighter radar’s low R&D needs given its mature state, makes those figures plausible in the absence of a detailed breakout between the 2 contracts. Globes adds that IAI’s usual contract policies involve a down payment of 25-35%, suggesting that it will record $70-98 million revenue from these contracts in its consolidated financial report for 2009.

The release and follow-on reports do not mention South Korea’s KF-16s, which are also slated for a radar upgrade. IAI release | Globes business | Agence France Presse | Flight International.

M-2032 radar deal

Sept 21/09: Israel. Flight International reports that Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 Master and the Korea Aerospace Industries/Lockheed Martin T-50 have emerged as the leading candidates to replace the Israeli Cheyl Ha’avir’s TA-4 Skyhawk advanced jet trainers. See also full DID coverage: “Israel’s Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era.”

Aug 2/09: Israel. As reports of Israeli radar cooperation to equip KAI’s TA-50 and FA-50s swirl around the media, Israel has sent a formal delegation to evaluate and test-fly the T-50 as a potential replacement for its Skyhawks. This is the first time in 40 years that Israel is considering purchasing a fighter jet not made either locally, or in the United States.

Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reports that other candidates include the T-45 Hawk variant, and Alenia’s M-346. Media reports currently cite the T-50 family as the front-runners for the 20-30 plane Lead-In Fighter Trainer order. Read “Trainer Jets for Israel: Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era” for ongoing coverage.

July 23/09: IAI radar. The Korea Times reports that South Korea’s LIG Nex1 will sign a deal with Israel’s IAI Elta Systems on Sept 3/09. That deal will involve the first phase of development for an indigenous radar based on the EL/M-2032 passive phased array radar, to equip TA-50 and F/A-50 aircraft. The radar’s back end ends up being a SamsungThales project.

An official from the ROK’s DAPA procurement agency told the Times that the radar is expected to be built by the end of 2010, and enter service in 2011. In the mid- to long-term, sources told The Kora Times that the domestically-built radar is likely to be installed on upgraded KF-16 fighters. The Times adds that the effort may even lead to Korean development of an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar under future agreements with IAI Elta, who has also developed the EL/M-2052 AESA.

The South Korean Air Force is buying 50 T-50 trainers, 22 TA-50s with secondary attack capabilities, and 10 T-50Bs modified for aerobatics; and is expected to add 60 F/A-50 light fighters by 2012 to replace its F-5 Tiger and F-4 Phantom fighters.

April 30/09: Black Eagles switch. The ROKAF’s Black Eagles acrobatic flight display team retired its Cessna A-37 Dragonflys after the 2009 Seoul Air Show. The ROKAF announces that they will re-debut with a fleet of 8 T-50B Golden Eagles at Seoul’s international air show in October 2009. Note that the final Black Eagle paint scheme ended up being different than the initial scheme depicted in the photo, above.

This will make the Black Eagles one of the few air force aerobatic teams to use locally designed and manufactured supersonic aircraft, alongside the USA’s Thunderbirds (F-16) and Blue Angels (F/A-18), Russia’s Swifts (MiG-29) and Knights (SU-27), and China’s 1st Aerobatic Team (J-10s). Defense News.

Black Eagles fly T-50B

March 15/09: UAE post-mortem. The Korea Times cites an upcoming $500 million competition in Singapore between the Aermacchi M346 and KAI’s T-50, while delving into some of the reasons behind the recent UAE loss:

“The government’s role is much bigger than it appears in this kind of competition,” [the military analyst] said. “And what the Korean government did in the UAE is, to be frank, far from [adequate].” Italy, which had developed close ties with Middle Eastern countries over the years, rolled out marketing promotions there with pledges of large industrial cooperation projects, including construction of an F-1 racing track… [in contrast] None of the Korean projects have been delivered to Abu Dhabi through a ministerial channel.

When National Assembly Speaker Rep. Kim Hyeong-o visited the UAE in January, he heard from Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, that the preferred bidder will be “decided upon industrial cooperation offered, as well as the trainer jet quality.” He remarked that the country hadn’t heard anything from Seoul for nine months… To make matters worse, Seoul didn’t even take the opportunity of a last chance from Abu Dhabi, after the Korean delegation failed to make it to February’s International Defense Exhibition & Conference held there, where UAE was awaiting a new offer.”

March 12/09: Price problem? The Korea Times publishes an article that wonders if the T-50’s supersonic speed has created a price handicap:

“Although the UAE acknowledged the T-50 has remarkably high quality, the country apparently put more value on cooperative projects in the aerospace industry that the Italian side pledged,” the Ministry of Knowledge Economy said in a statement, which also pointed out a disadvantage in price. A T-50 jet’s flyaway cost is set at 20 billion won to 25 billion won ($13.5 – $16.9 million), while the M-346 costs 18 billion won to 20 billion won.” [$12.15 – $13.5 million]

DID’s take? Advanced jet training does focus on in-air operation, take-off and landing, and blind flying, with secondary weapons training opportunities. Within those constraints, the price of supersonic flight may not be seen as worthwhile. What the capability does, is give the T-50 family a full secondary fighter role that goes beyond the traditional “secondary light ground attack” role for trainers. The ultimate question for the market to answer is how much it values that capability, in an era of shrinking defense budgets that create stronger demands for multi-role platforms, as well as closer attention to costs.

Feb 25/09: UAE setback. At IDEX 2009, the UAE announces that it has begun negotiations for 48 M-346 aircraft from Finmeccanica’s Aermacchi. If the EUR 1 billion deal is finalized, the T/A-50 will have lost this export competition.

Feb 24/09: Iraq. Iraq officially requests T-50 jets, even as Iraq and the ROK sign economic agreements to develop oil fields near Basra, and open Iraqi public infrastructure contracts to South Korean firms. For full details and updates, read “T/A-50 Golden Eagles for Iraq?”

Feb 11/09: Elisra ECM for FA-50. Flight International reports that Israel’s Elisra will supply the F/A-50’s electronic warfare and self-protection equipment, under an initial contract worth $7 million for the initial 4 prototypes. The equipment will be supplied over the next 2 years, and “Elisra sources indicate that the selected EW system will include radar warning receivers and chaff and flare dispensers.”

This contract involves the adaptation of proven systems, rather than a new design. The joint Elbit systems (70%)/ IAI (30%) venture Elisra already makes the self-protection systems that equip many of the IAF’s F-16s.

Jan 15/09: Iraq. South Korea’s Yonhap news agency and the World Tribune both file reports concerning Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul-Qader al-Obeidi’s ongoing visit to South Korea, which included inspection and a test flight of the T-50. South Korea sent a 3,600-strong contingent to the northern Iraqi city of Irbil in September 2004 as part of the U.S.-led forces, and a total of 18,000 South Korean troops served in rotation around northern Iraq until 2008.

DJ Elliott of the Long War Journal says that the T/A-50 was suggested in fall 2007 to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense by MNSTC-I’s Coalition Air Force Transition Team. Iraq’s pending trainer aircraft purchase appears to be Hawker Beechcraft’s T-6 Texan II, but a jet trainer is required as an interim step between the T-6 and more advanced planes like the F-16s Iraq is requesting. If Iraq begins with T/A-50s, however, they would also become the new IqAF’s first jet fighters, and give Iraq qualitative parity with many of the fighters currently flown by its semi-hostile neighbors Syria and Iran.

Read “T/A-50 Golden Eagles for Iraq?” for more.

Jan 12/09: M61. General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products announces a contract by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for up to 82 of its 3-barreled M61 20mm cannons that will equip the TA-50 and FA-50 variants. Price was not disclosed, but deliveries will begin in October 2010. By May 2013, there are enough orders to account for all guns.

Manufacturing will be performed at General Dynamics’ Saco, ME, facility, and the program will be managed by General Dynamics’ Burlington, VT facility. S&T Dynamics, LTD of South Korea is the designated Korean Industry Partner (KIP) for the program, and they will produce the ammunition containers under a subcontract arrangement with General Dynamics.

Jan 8/09: Poland. The Korea Times reports that Vice Defense Minister Kim Jong-cheon will visit Poland later from Jan 19-23, and that his agenda includes a push for the T-50 trainer. The jets may have very stiff competition, however, as Finland is re-selling its used BAE Hawk trainers.

The report also confirms that competitions are still active in Singapore (12-16 jets, up to $500 million) and the UAE (35-40, $1+ billion, subsequently lost to M346).

2008

FA-50 development contract; Radar complications. EL/M-2032
(click to view full)

Dec 30/08: FA-50 development. South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signs a WON 400 billion (about $317 million) contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) to develop 4 prototypes of the F/A-50 light attack jet by 2012.

Full production of about 60 aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2013, at which point the F/A-50s will begin replacing 1960s era A-37 dragonfly attack jets, F-5E/F Tiger II light fighters, and F-4 Phantom II fighters as the ROKAF’s low-end fighters. The Korean buy could extend to 150 aircraft, and its capabilities and price point make exports likely.

That potential was one of the reasons the F/A-50 project has been delayed. The F/A-50 is a joint KAI/ Lockheed martin project, and the agreement includes a number of provisions related to American weapons export policies, and to corporate interests at Lockheed Martin. One stipulation was that Lockheed would not transfer aircraft source code to other nations. Another was that the T-50’s capabilities could not exceed Korea’s F-16s. A 3rd provision banned South Korea from integrating T-50 variants with non-U.S. technology that the United States doesn’t have.

Korea originally wanted to equip the F/A-50 with the lightweight Vixen-500E AESA(Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar developed by U.K. firm Selex Sensors and Airborne Systems, but that would have violated all 3 of the above provisions. Lockheed Martin pushed for its AN/APG-67v4 radar, which equips the T/A-50 LIFT. Instead, the Koreans chose the proven EL/M-2032 mechanically scanned radar from Israel’s IAI Elta Systems. That radar serves on some Israeli F-16s and also equips a range of other aircraft around the world that include F-16s, F-4 Phantoms, F-5 Tigers, MiG-21s, Kfirs and other Mirage variants, India’s Sea Harriers, and India’s forthcoming Tejas lightweight fighter. Korea Times.

FA-50 development

Dec 10/08: After more than 40 years of service, Israel is finally looking to replace its versatile A-4 Skyhawk fleet. KAI’s T-50 family is reportedly one of the 4 contenders. Read “Israel’s Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era“.

Aug 28/08: An upgraded F/A-50 lightweight fighter counterpart would be a logical replacement for South Korea’s vintage F-5E/F and F-4 fighter fleet, and may also prove attractive as a global export. Flight International reports that the design is almost complete, but program approval for additional South Korean F/A-50s is being held up by 2 key issues.

One is the desire for an AESA radar, which would sharply improve the little fighter’s capabilities while lowering maintenance costs. Both Northrop Grumman (SABR) and Raytheon (RACR) have designed new AESA radars for F-16 refits, and the nature of AESA radars allows them to be resized very flexibly. The bad news is that negotiations with the US government haven’t been able to secure US authorization for AESA radar exports to South Korea. This forces the Koreans to go ahead with a more conventional but limited radar like the AN/APG-67v4, or put the F/A-50 on hold until AESA approval is granted. If it would be granted to a project that’s likely to compete with made-in-USA F-16s on the global export market.

The other issue is Lockheed Martin’s participation. Lockheed helped develop the T-50, and has the fighter development and advanced weapon integration experience that KAI lacks. On the other hand, its involvement raises costs. KAI is reportedly pushing for this partnership, but the government must conclude that the benefits would be worth those extra costs. Likely arguments to that end include lower project/financial risk, improved export prospects, and greater likelihood of American technology export approvals.

2006 – 2007

ROKAF orders 50 more; 1st T-50 delivery; Lockheed Martin MoU; UAE opportunity. T-50, underside
(click to view full)

Nov 1/07: UAE. Reports claim that Aermacchi’s M-346 and KAI’s T/A-50 are the finalists in the UAE competition, with Britain’s Hawk LIFT eliminated by BAE’s own admission. Flight International report. A Korea Times report pegs the UAE’s purchase total at 35-40, rather than 60. Time will tell.

They also add a market prediction from KAI officials that expect T-50 variants will secure about 30% of the 3,300 aircraft global trainer market within 25 years – about 1,100 aircraft.

Oct 26/07: KOIS reports that Korea’s commerce and industry minister Kim Young-ju is headed to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the T-50 is competing against the BAE Hawk Mk128 LIFT and Aermacchi’s M-346 for an estimated 60-plane, $1+ billion order. The UAE is expected to choose its next generation trainer jet by early November 2007. See “Korea’s commerce, industry minister pitches T-50 jet to UAE.”

Oct 15/07: On the eve of the Seoul 2007 Air Show, KOIS reports that the T-50 is poised to pick up orders in the United Arab Emirates (60 jets), Greece (30), and Singapore (40). “Korea is expected to sign the deals with the three nations this month or next month,” said Yoon Cha-young, executive director of the Korea Aerospace Industries Association.

Dec 13/06: 2nd ROKAF order. The Government of South Korea has signed a contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for “approximately 50” additional T-50 and TA-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainers. The new aircraft will be used for advanced jet training and lead-in fighter training. All the aircraft will be delivered from KAI’s production facility in Sacheon, South Korea.

Subsequent reports from South Korean media mail this order down at 57 planes: 25 more T-50s, 22 TA-50s, and 10 T-50Bs to replace the Black Eagles’ aerobatic planes. Lockheed Martin release.

ROKAF #2: 57 planes

Nov 16/06: Lockheed MoU. Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Lockheed Martin sign a memorandum of understanding today to expand their strategic relationship. Ralph Heath, president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, in the Lockheed Martin release:

“First, the memorandum is a recommitment to continue our efforts in marketing the T-50 Golden Eagle to international customers. Additionally, we will seek ways to collaborate on future opportunities in Korea, the United States and the international marketplace. We value the important, long-standing relationship we have with KAI.”

“First, the memorandum is a recommitment to continue our efforts in marketing the T-50 Golden Eagle to international customers” said Ralph Heath, president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. “Additionally, we will seek ways to collaborate on future opportunities in Korea, the United States and the international marketplace. We value the important, long-standing relationship we have with KAI.”

Hae Joo Chung, KAI president:

“This new agreement means that our two companies will look to cooperate in the areas of aircraft modification and upgrades, as well as the future fighter requirements for the Korean government. The new business sector of Performance Based Logistics Support provides an important opportunity for cooperation with Lockheed Martin in Korea and with international customers.”

Lockheed MoU

July 17/06: Lockheed Martin release: “Last month program officials announced the opening of a new marketing office in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. This facility gives KAI greater proximity to potential customers in the Middle East and Europe and allows the Korean-based company an opportunity to grow its business-base.”

Jan 4/06: 1st delivery. Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) delivers its first 2 production T-50 advanced jet trainer aircraft to the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). Designated KAI-1 and KAI-2, these aircraft are the first deliveries to a customer since the award of the production contract just 24 months ago. In addition to these 2 aircraft, KAI will deliver another 8 aircraft to the ROKAF in 2006, and 1 per month afterward. Lockheed Martin release.

1st deliveries

2005 and Earlier

Testing milestones. T-50: KAI-1
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Feb 11/05: The supersonic T-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainer has attained several significant technical milestones, including reaching maximum load factors (8g), maximum operating speed (Mach 1.3, design limit Mach 1.5), beginning stores separation testing (fuel tank jettison), and completing its second lifetime (lifetime = 8,334 flight hours) of structural durability testing. Lockheed Martin release.

Oct 26/04 – Jan 6/05: The T-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainer successfully completes aerial gunfire testing. A total of 10 test flights were conducted under a variety of flight conditions, including 3 supersonic flights. Testing included operation of the gun and ammo handling system, plus measurement of vibration levels and adequacy of the gun bay gas purging capability.

The tests used the 3rd Full Scale Development aircraft, the first in the A-50 lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) configuration. The gun is a lighter weight, internally mounted 3-barrel version of General Dynamics’ standard 6-barrel M61 used by many fighters. It has a rate of fire of 3,000 rounds per minute, and the ammo system holds 205 rounds of ammunition. The gun will be used for both ground strafing and aerial gunnery training. Lockheed Martin release.

Feb 7/04: As part of the aircraft’s external stores testing, the first flight with external fuel tanks occurs. The 150-U.S. gallon, jettisonable fuel tanks are built by Sargent Fletcher of El Monte, CA. A single tank extends mission duration and range about 15-20%, and the three-tank configuration extends them by about 40%.

These external stores tests aim to verify the T-50 aircraft’s stability and control, flutter and handling qualities when loaded with fuel tanks, weapons, and other stores. Later flights will verify performance, store functionality and interfaces, and store separation. Approximately 280 sorties utilizing all 4 of the T-50 flight test aircraft are planned for external stores testing with external fuel tanks installed, and external stores flight testing will continue until the end of Full-Scale Development. The ROKAF is conducting the flight testing from Sacheon Air Base, South Korea. Lockheed Martin.

March 15/04: Lockheed Martin announces that the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) has begun engine air start flight testing of the T-50’s F404-GE-102 jet engine. Air start testing involves intentionally shutting down the engine in flight and restarting it, in order to verify the air start envelope and procedures. This effort is expected to include 15 flight tests over a 7-month period.

Dec 19/03: 1st orders. KAI receives a production contract from South Korea’s DAPA for 25 T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainers. The undisclosed contract covers the aircraft, alternate mission equipment, integrated support, and production start-up costs. The aircraft will be built at KAI’s modern aircraft production facilities at Sacheon, South Korea, with Lockheed Martin as the principal subcontractor. The first production T-50 will be delivered in late 2005. Lockheed Martin adds that:

“The Korean government had earlier approved plans to purchase about 100 aircraft, half in the basic T-50 configuration and half in the T-50 Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) version. The T-50 LIFT version is designated the A-50 by the ROKAF and includes a multimode radar, an internal 20 mm cannon and… weapons… The 25 aircraft in the initial contract to KAI are all in the basic T-50 configuration. The remaining aircraft in the approved plan will be purchased in a follow-on contract.”

ROKAF order: 25 T-50s.

Nov 3/03: T-50 Flight testing with captive AIM-9 air-to-air missiles is initiated. Source.

July 29/03: F/A-50? Flight International reports that KAI has begun a study for a possible fighter version of the T-50, even as it finalizes production plans with Lockheed Martin in preparation for an expected order for the first 24 T-50s next month.

April 28/03: The T-50 Golden Eagle completes its 100th test flight, and reaches a speed of Mach 1.2 on the same day.

On April 25th, the airframe durability vehicle completed one lifetime of testing, equivalent to 8,334 flight hours, at the Agency for Defense Development testing laboratory in Taejon, South Korea. Testing continues on a second lifetime, which is expected to be complete in April 2004. Lockheed Martin.

Feb 19/03: Supersonic. The T-50 achieves supersonic flight for the first time. The milestone flight was accomplished on the No. 1 flight-test aircraft during the 60-minute flight from the air base at Sachon, South Korea. The top speed achieved was Mach 1.05 at an altitude of 40,000 feet. Full afterburner on the General Electric F404-GE-102 engine was used to accelerate to the target speed, then minimum afterburner was used to sustain the speed. Approximately one minute was spent in the supersonic regime.

“The aircraft accelerated through the Mach smoothly and quickly,” said Major Choong Hwan Lee, Republic of Korea Air Force test pilot for the flight. “I observed no adverse flight or handling characteristics. I was able to hold the target speed of Mach 1.05 with plenty of excess power available, so I have no doubt this aircraft will be able to achieve its maximum design Mach of Mach 1.5.” Lockheed Martin release.

Supersonic

Nov 25/02: The T-50 Golden Eagle advanced supersonic trainer reaches its stated operational ceiling of 40,000 feet during a test flight. All systems operate normally.

The actual maximum service ceiling for the T-50 is estimated to be 48,500 feet, the altitude where rate of climb is limited to 100 feet per minute at maximum power (full afterburner). Lockheed Martin.

Nov 8/02: The 2nd T-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainer successfully completes its 47-minute flight from KAI’s facility at Sachon, South Korea. Lockheed Martin.

Additional Readings The T-50 Family

KAI – T-50 Family
Lockheed Martin – T-50 Multirole Trainer
Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine (Q4 2005) – T-50 Triumphs. Very detailed overview of features, and of their manufacturing approach as well.
Air Force Technology – T-50 Golden Eagle Jet Trainer and Light Attack Aircraft, South Korea’
Aeroflight UK – Korean Aerospace Industries T-50 Golden Eagle
GE Aviation – Model F404-GE-102 engine
LiG Nex1 – TA/FA-50 Radar. Based on a collaboration with IAI Elta, using the ELM-2032.
LiG Nex1 – Korean Joint Tactical Data Link System. FA-50s also use the widely adopted Link-16 standard.
SamsungThales – Electronic Warfare Systems: T-50, TA-50, FA-50
DID – South Korea Looking to Upgrade its KF-16s. This could have an impact on the FA-50’s radar as well.
Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine (Sept 26/11) – T-50 Program In Full Swing.
Flight International (Oct 12/09) – South Korea’s fighter requirements come to the fore. Extensive discussion of the F/A-50, and the KF-X.
Defense News (April 30/09) – S. Korean Aerobatic Team to Debut T-50s [dead link].
Singapore Armed Forces cyberpioneer (June 30/08) – KOREAN GOLD The T-50 Golden Eagle. See also their articles covering its competitors: BAE’s Hawk and Alenia’s M346 [all links dead; M346 was picked].
Lockheed Martin, Code One Magazine (January 2007) – T-50 Golden Eagle.
Flight International (Feb 21/06) – Korea high: T-50 flight test Aside from a slight “wing rock” issue when attempting to reach g limits during certain turns, “My overriding impression of the T-50 was trainer that was easy to fly, with carefree aircraft and engine handling, and combined stunning performance with modern avionics. It also has the digital capacity to enable future upgrades that will allow the trainer to mimic closely the fourth-generation fighters it will support throughout its life. KAI has produced the T-50 at the right time and with the right specification to capitalise on a growing need for more advanced trainer.”
Aviation Week, Paris Air Show (June 17/01) – T-50 Builders Court NATO Buyers And They First Show Cockpit Here . “The project is about three months ahead of schedule, for which the partners credit “a disciplined design, development and fabrication approach” that cut typical drawing release time by eight months and parts fabrication and subassembly time by five months. Major component mating began just 17 months after the partners froze the outer mold line design.”

Competitors & Market

DID – KF-X: Pushing Paper, or Peer Fighter Program?. Will it be an FA-50 derivative? Will it even go ahead?
Air Force Technology – Hawk Trainer / Light Combat Aircraft, United Kingdom. Hawk is probably the world’s most popular trainer.
Air Force Technology – Hawk Mk 127 / Mk 128 LIFT Lead In Fighter Trainer, United Kingdom.
DID FOCUS Article – Pakistan & China’s JF-17 Fighter Program. TA/FA-50 light fighter competitor, with no secondary trainer capabilities.
Air Force Technology – L159 ALCA Advanced Light Combat Aircraft, Czech Republic. Now it’s also a 2-seat trainer version. Bought by Czech air force, which is trying to sell some of its fleet due to budget issues, but without much success.
DID FOCUS – Finmeccanica’s M346: Who’s the Master Now?. The T-50’s most frequent competitor.
Air Force Technology – M346 Advanced Fighter Trainer, Italy. Italy & Greece are involved.
DID FOCUS Article – LCA Tejas: An Indian Fighter – With Foreign Help. The indigenous Kaveri engine project is dead, replaced by a foreign partnership attempt. Like the FA-50, current Tejas fighters also fly with GE’s popular F404 engine, and IAI ELTA’s EL/M-2032 radar.
DID – Russia’s Yak-130 Trainer & Light Attack Jets. Closely related to the Aermacchi M346; they were once a joint program. Currently serves with or ordered by Russia and Algeria.
Forecast International (March 25/09) – Fighter R&M Market Facing Conflicting Priorities. “In its new analysis entitled “The Market for Fighter/Attack/Trainer Retrofit & Modernization,” Forecast International estimates that nearly $20 billion will be spent on military aircraft upgrades during the 2009-2018 period. The United States alone is expected to earmark $9.5 billion for fighter/attack/trainer retrofit & modernization (R&M) programs, with the rest of the world kicking in another $10.3 billion… Caught between changing needs and tight budgets, militaries will seek upgrades for their air fleets that grant the greatest capability without being prohibitively expensive – literally, the most bang for their buck.”

Competitions Covered

DID – Indonesia’s New Trainer/Attack Aircraft. The TA-50 and EMB-314 Super Tucano were bought to fill those roles.
DID – Iraq’s New Trainers: FA-50 Bounces the Czech. The Czech L-159 was picked instead, but the deal stalled and KAI recovered with an order for 24 FA-50s.
DID – Trainer Jets for Israel: Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era. T-50 lost to the M-346.
DID – Poland Seeks Advanced Jet Trainers/ Light Fighters. The M-346 beat the TA-50 and Hawk Mk.128, even though it has no combat capability, because it was the only entry to meet Poland’s budget target.
DID – UAE Gives M346 a LIFT. But the contract hasn’t closed, several years after the type was picked in 2009. An opening to the T-50?

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

The C-130J: New Hercules & Old Bottlenecks

Fri, 18/09/2015 - 02:12

RAAF C-130J-30, flares
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The C-130 Hercules remains one of the longest-running aerospace manufacturing programs of all time. Since 1956, over 40 models and variants have served as the tactical airlift backbone for over 50 nations. The C-130J looks similar, but the number of changes almost makes it a new aircraft. Those changes also created issues; the program has been the focus of a great deal of controversy in America – and even of a full program restructuring in 2006. Some early concerns from critics were put to rest when the C-130J demonstrated in-theater performance on the front lines that was a major improvement over its C-130E/H predecessors. A valid follow-on question might be: does it break the bottleneck limitations that have hobbled a number of multi-billion dollar US Army vehicle development programs?

C-130J customers now include Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, India, Israel, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tunisia, and the United States. American C-130J purchases are taking place under both annual budgets and supplemental wartime funding, in order to replace tactical transport and special forces fleets that are flying old aircraft and in dire need of major repairs. This DID FOCUS Article describes the C-130J, examines the bottleneck issue, covers global developments for the C-130J program, and looks at present and emerging competitors.

The (Private) Labors of Hercules: the C-130J Family C-130J Hercules
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Most American planes rely on their huge home market as their base, then seek exports. The privately-developed C-130J “Super Hercules” was different. Australia, Britain, Denmark, and Italy were all ahead of the curve, and have been operating this heavily redesigned upgrade of the popular C-130 Hercules transport aircraft for several years. By the time the C-130J finally reached “initial operating capability” for the US military late in 2006, these faster-moving foreign customers were already banding together to create a common upgrade set for their serving fleets. A number of variants are currently flying in transport (C-130J), stretched transport (C-130J-30), aerial broadcaster (EC-130J), coast guard patrol (HC-130J), aerial tanker (KC-130J), special forces (MC-130J), and even hurricane hunter weather aircraft (WC-130J).

The C-130J looks a lot like its predecessors, except for the new 6-bladed Dowty propeller. In reality, a number of changes have been made to its construction and components, and its internal systems are almost wholly new. Unlike most defense programs, however, the C-130J was not a government contract. Lockheed Martin spent almost $1 billion of its own funds developing the update, then began selling it in the USA and abroad.

Base Platform: The C-130J Super Hercules Promo
click to play video

The C-130J’s improvements are mostly clustered around 2 key characteristics: performance, and operational costs. Instead of Rolls Royce 4,600 shp T56 Series III turboprop engines, it uses lighter Rolls-Royce AE2100D3 engines, coupled with a 6-blade Dowty R-391 propeller system made of composite materials. The overall system generates 29% more thrust, while increasing fuel efficiency by 15% and offering improved reliability and maintenance. Compared to the 1960s-era C-130E (note: there was an intermediate C-130H version), maximum speed is up 21%, climb-to-altitude time is down 50%, cruising altitude is 40% higher, and range is about 40% longer.

The enhanced capacity of the “J” variant is especially noteworthy in hot climates and/or high altitude operations, where the new plane can deliver 40% better payload/range performance than earlier versions. US experience in places like Afghanistan and Iraq indicates that as many as 3 C-130H models may be required to do the job of 1 C-130J in these “hot and high” conditions.

C-130J Cockpit
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The C 130J only requires 2-3 crew members for most missions instead of 4, and avionics have been changed to incorporate more advanced capabilities into the night-vision-system compatible “glass cockpit” (computer screens, not dials) and heads-up display. A pair of mission computers and 2 backup bus interface units provide dual redundancy. Equally important, they host an integrated diagnostics system to assist with maintenance and reduce long-term ownership costs.

The interior of the C-130J has also seen a number of improvements, simplifying and automating key cargo tasks. An automated airdrop system, for instance, delivers parachute loads more precisely. These kinds of additions have dropped the crew required for airdrops from 4 to 2 (pilot, co-pilot). In addition, innovations such as flip-over rollers allow loaders to reconfigure the cargo area in about 5 minutes instead of the traditional 25, getting planes out of airstrips quickly and maximizing overall loading/unloading efficiency during larger operations.

An optional dorsal aerial refueling system can extend the C-130J’s range significantly, while optional aerial taker kits can convert the C-130J into a flying gas station that offloads fuel faster than previous KC-130 versions, and can handle both helicopters and jets due to its range of flight speeds.

Finally, the C-130J Maintenance and Aircrew Training System (MATS) is designed to complement the C-130J, adding a high-tech simulation angle to both flying and maintenance training.

The worldwide fleet of C-130Js exceeded 355,000 flight hours As of August 3/07.

C-130J vs. C-130J-30
via CASR
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The stretched C-130J-30 adds 15 feet of fuselage length over its C-130J counterpart, most of which is placed forward of the wing as the plane stretches from 97’9″ (29.3 m) to 112’9″ (34.69 m). The extra cargo space allows it to add adds 2 standard pallets (to 8), 23 litters (to 97), 8 CDS bundles (to 24), 36 combat troops (to 128), or 28 paratroopers (to 92) over C-130H/J models, and the aircraft’s maximum weight increases by 9,000 pounds (to 164,000 pounds/ 74,393 kg).

Maximum allowable cargo payload rises by a ton over the C-130J, from 42,000 pounds to 44,000 pounds/ 19,958 kg); the 36,000 pound maximum normal C-130J-30 payload is 2,000 pounds higher than the C-130J, but 500 pounds lower than the C-130H’s 36,500 pounds. Even so, the extra space comes in handy. C-130J-30s can carry 33% more pallets of equipment or supplies, 39% more combat troops, 31% more paratroopers, or 44% more aeromedical evacuation litters than previous unstretched Hercules versions. The stretched C-130J-30 also shares the C-130J’s ability to use much more of its theoretical cargo capacity in hot or high altitude environments than previous C-130 versions.

In exchange, the stretched C-130J-30 suffers a speed drop of 7 mph (410 mph at 22,000 feet) vs. the C-130J, a 2,000 foot lower ceiling (26,000 feet with full payload), and maximum range at full payload that falls by 115 miles to 1,956 miles. It does outshine the smaller C-130J when carrying only 35,000 pounds of cargo, however: its 2,417 miles is a 576 mile increase over the C-130J, and a 921 mile increase over the C-130H.

Note that except for maximum normal payload, all of the C-130J’s figures remain significantly better than the C-130H, with statistics of 366 mph cruise speed at 22,000 feet, a 23,000 foot ceiling, and range at maximum normal payload of 1,208 miles.

C-130J Variants

As one might imagine, Special Forces variants are undergoing the most change, but the platform’s versatility is also pushing Lockheed Martin toward an advanced naval variant.

AC-130J “Ghostrider”. This new gunship will be based on the MC-130J, but it won’t carry hose-and-drogue refueling pods. It will have a 400 Amp power supply, added defensive systems, more surveillance sensors, terrain-following radar, and a Precision Strike Package (PSP).

The PSP includes a side-firing 30mm GAU-23A chain gun, wing-mounted GBU-39 GPS-guided SDB-I bombs, and laser-guided AGM-176 Griffin missiles launched from a “Gunslinger” attachment on the rear cargo door. It may eventually add a side-firing 105mm howitzer like existing AFSOC AC-130H/Us, and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles like the USMC’s KC-130J Harvest Hawks, but those aren’t currently funded. These weapons will be controlled from a dual-console Mission Operator Pallet in the cargo bay, which will include multiple video, data, and communication links.

Ghostrider surveillance equipment will include 2 day/night surveillance and targeting pods and a ground-looking synthetic aperture radar pod, tied into the pilot’s helmet-mounted display. Defensive systems will include the AN/ALR-56M radar warning receiver, AN/AAR-47(V)2 missile warning system, and AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing system, along with standard options like fuel tank foam, system redundancy, and some armoring.

One sore point is its comparative lack of armor compared to the AC-130H/U, with no armoring for the Mission Operator Pallet and just 7.62mm level protection elsewhere. Most AC-130s brought down in Vietnam were killed by 37mm guns.

HC/MC-130J Increment 1. Modifications include additional defensive countermeasure dispensers, high-altitude ramp and door hydraulics, a 4th flight deck crew member station, an extra intercom panel and 60-Hertz electrical outlets in the cargo compartment.

HC/MC-130J Increment 2. Includes increased 28-volt direct current internal power capacity, crash-worthy loadmaster scanner-position seats, and provisions for Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures defensive systems. This is as high as the HC-130J Combat King IIs are expected to go, though they’ll also receive a T-1 communications modification with a Specialized Automated Mission Suite/Enhanced Situational Awareness system (SAMS/ESA: SADL data link, High Power Waveform, and Air Force Tactical Radio System-Ruggedized), Blue Force Tracker, and the Joint Precision Airdrop System.

HC/MC-130J Increment 3. Includes a 400 Amp power supply, dual special mission processors, and a secure file server. MC-130J Commando IIs will be improved to Increment 3.

SC-130J Sea Herc

SC-130J MPRA. A proposed maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, created by moving a number of P-3 Orion systems onto and into the C-130J. A Magnetic Anomaly Detector boom is installed in the tail for submarine detection, along with a sonobuoy storage pallet and 2 rotary launchers in the rear interior. A day/night surveillance turret goes under the nose, a 360 maritime radar is mounted under the fuselage, and ESM electronics for pinpointing and geolocating radars, communications, etc. are mounted via on wingtip pods and fore and aft fuselage points. A set of roll-in console modules would contain the necessary electronics and screens to manage it all.

Countries that wanted to go beyond surveillance would push further development to add wing hardpoints for torpedoes and missiles, and/or a weapons bay and torpedo racks in the front fuselage.

C-130J operator Britain is Lockheed Martin’s biggest SC-130J target, and the plane’s flexibility could appeal to others who see the value in fleet commonality and good mid-range performance, with easier upgradeability than standard MPAs. The downside is that the C-130J is designed for short-field performance first, and efficient cruising operation second. That will make it expensive to operate compared to smaller twin-engine competitors, which are typically derived from commercial light cargo and passenger aircraft. The Airbus ATR-72 MPA is an example of a larger competitor that also follows this pattern; ATRs have won significant share in the mid-range regional airline market on the strength of their operating efficiency.

The Value of Variants KC-130J’s “gunslinger”
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These variants and kits give the C-130J an edge in the global market, and will help Lockheed Martin retain that edge as the 20-ton tactical transport market starts to get crowded in 2020 or so. The type’s strong Special Forces niche has already helped to close orders with export clients like India, who could easily have chosen additional orders of plane types already in its fleet (AN-32, IL-76). The second big edge for the platform is a related niche: multi-role armed transports that can deliver troops and supplies, then provide close-air support for counterinsurgency fights. The KC-130J’s Harvest HAWK kits, and C-130H-derived MC-130W Dragon Spear, offer prospective customers an important set of clip-on capabilities that none of its major competitors (A400M, KC-390, MRTA) are even designing, let alone fielding. The SC-130J maritime patrol option could become a similar kind of selling point.

Those “ecosystem strengths” are going to become more important in future. The C-130XJ, unveiled in December 2011 at the Credit Suisse aerospace and defense conference in New York, NY, may not offer enough savings by itself to prompt orders from target customers like South Africa. A cheaper base aircraft, plus existing modifications available on the market, is more appealing. Likewise, the C-130NG could sell among existing C-130J customers, but its changes by themselves might still leave it lagging behind the price of low-cost turboprop options like China’s Y-9, behind the performance of new jet-powered rivals like Embraer’s multinational KC-390 and HAL/Irkut’s MRTA, and very much behind the capacity of Airbus’ larger A400M.

The existence of clip-on kits and proven specialty variants may have to sell it, instead. Especially if the C-130NG also fails to resolve the biggest limitation in today’s medium tactical transport field…

Turbulent Flight: The C-130J Program WC-130Js
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The privately-developed Hercules variant has been the subject of heavy criticism and a 2005 near-death budget experience, followed by its reinstatement by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on the stated grounds that canceling the contract would be almost as expensive as completing it – though a later government report established that its cancellation costs were wildly overstated.

In order to comply with the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, however,Air Force Print News reported that the C-130J contract was converted from the existing commercial item procurement to a traditional military procurement in FY 2006. In technical terms, it was converted from a Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12 to an FAR Part 15 contract, which includes much more extensive Congressional oversight and cost reporting requirements. In bottom line terms, this involved repricing 39 aircraft, resulting in net savings anywhere from $170-245 million (reports vary). Under the restructured contract, the Air Force said Lockheed cut the program cost by 8% for the remaining 26 Air Force C-130Js, and nearly 12% for 13 Marine KC-130Js.

The Wall Street Journal reported this as a decision by Lockheed Martin to cut its profit margins on the plane, after investing $1 billion in private funds to develop it. Lockheed spokesman Tom Jurkowsky was quoted as saying that “national defense outweighs the continued recovery of funds we invested in its development.” It’s widely suspected in reports from Associated Press et. al. that direct criticism of the FAR Part 12 contract by Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] played a role as well.

Excel
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Since FY 2006, American C-130J orders have continued, and the aircraft has continued to expand its export successes as well. C-130J aircraft are now flown and/or under contract by the USAF and Air National Guard, US Marines, and US Coast Guard; and by Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, India, Israel, Italy, Iraq, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Tunisia. DSCA requests that have yet to become publicly-announced contracts include Mexico (2012), Libya (2013), and Brunei (2014).

According to official Pentagon documents, the C-130J’s past and planned American budget breakdowns include:

Note that each year’s procurement budget almost always includes advance “long-lead time material” orders for the next fiscal year. That way, once the main contract is issued, construction isn’t delayed by long waits for predictable items.

The C-130J and the 20-ton Bottleneck RAF C-130J & friends
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The C-130J offers a genuine improvement over past versions of the Hercules, especially in hot and/or high-altitude environments where all aircraft lose lift and carrying capacity. It has proven these capabilities during deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, where its additional reserves of power have come in very handy on the front lines.

On the other hand, the ability to fit into tactical transports is a very common requirement and benchmark for ground systems, including armored personnel carriers. Billions have been spent on R&D for the wheeled Stryker armored vehicle family, and for the USA’s $160+ billion Future Combat Systems MGV armored vehicle family. Both vehicle families were sold as options that would fit into US tactical transports, in order to meet the military’s timeframe goals for deploying units to crisis situations. Both projects failed to meet their goals after spending billions in R&D, leaving the USA’s expensive C-17 fleet overworked, and achievement of the USA’s strategic deployability goals unlikely.

Unlike the pending Airbus A400M, therefore, which offers a larger interior and a 33-35 ton vehicle capacity, the C-130J doesn’t solve the sub-survivable 20-ton armored vehicle limit that has stymied multiple US armored vehicle programs. As such, it represents an improvement that fails to address US tactical airlift’s key bottleneck limitation. Meanwhile, reports from the USAF indicate that C-130Js are often flying with very little weight and/or small cargo, because the demands of counterinsurgency airlift lead to more and smaller requests from a number of front line sources.

The C-130J thus finds itself in the odd position of offering capabilities that are both too great for many tactical needs, while being too small to meet important American strategic goals. Even Special Forces worry that future air defense threats will make the C-130 non-survivable in future gunship and insertion roles.

A400M
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That’s the bad news. On the other hand, its major competitor the Airbus A400M went through major delays and contract re-negotiation in System Design & Development, and has a production backlog of over 180 aircraft as deliveries are beginning. Future competitors like the Indo-Russian MRTA, and Embraer’s multinational KC-390 are currently in even earlier R&D stages. Which means that any nations needing to replenish a 20+ ton tactical airlift fleet any time soon are limited to a choice of buying the C-130J, or purchasing old designs like Russia’s AN-12 or China’s Y-8 aircraft.

As the A400M becomes available, and the 20-ton segment begins to crowd with new offerings, the C-130J will face a very different competitive environment. Without major American C-130J buys, or establishment of the C-130J as a market leader in key segments like Special Operations, recouping its $1 billion investment would have been challenging for Lockheed Martin. Fortunately for the firm, they’ve made considerable progress toward both of these goals.

Contracts and Key Events C-130J: SIGINT roll-on
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The USA’s JMATS contracts for C-130J simulators and training are a critical but separate component, and are covered in their own article. International customers aren’t part of JMATS, so their arrangements may be covered here.

DID has covered C-130J buys in Canada, India, Israel, Iraq, and Norway; and the UAE’s potential buy, as dedicated articles. Important milestones from those purchases may also appear here.

DID also has a separate article covering training and simulators, under the MATS, JMATS, and JMATS-II programs.

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the Headquarters Air Force Material Command (AFMC) in Wright Patterson AFB, OH; and the contractor is Lockheed Martin Corporation in Marietta, GA. Note that coverage is complete only from Jan 1/06 forward.

FY 2015

Requests: Brunei. Kuwaiti KC-130J
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September 18/15: Air Force Special Operations Command is reported to be looking to acquire an expendable unmanned system capable of acting as remote sensors deployable from C-130 gunships. A Coyote UAV is currently being used as a concept-demonstrator, with a longer-term solution also reported to be underway. AFSOC also wants to see lasers incorporated into the gunship of the future, retaining some aging C-130s to use as test beds. The Air Force wants industry to come up with a solution for an electric-powered laser weapon to equip the AC-130J by the end of the decade, the first aircraft of which was delivered at the end of July.

July 29/15: The Air Force has reportedly retained some ageing C-130U Hercules aircraft for use as airborne laser testbed aircraft. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) plans to use the aircraft to test both offensive laser weapons and defensive lasers designed to act as less-than-lethal options. DARPA has been field testing the use of lasers against hostile projectiles, with the Air Force expecting to field airborne lasers on larger cargo aircraft models from 2021. However, the further development of these capabilities could be hamstrung by sequestration and a lack of political will.

March 24/15: The Air Force is adding one HC-130J to its original 2012 contract, at a cost of $72.7 million.

Oct 7/14: The US DSCA announces Brunei’s export request for 1 C-130J aircraft, 6 AE2100D3 turboprop engines (4 installed and 2 spares), Government Furnished Equipment, communication equipment, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of US Government and contractor support.

The C-130J would become Brunei’s largest aircraft, far bigger than its 3 ordered CN-235MPA maritime patrol planes. why does such a tiny country need it? Not to haul the Sultan’s famous fleet of over 300 top-end cars, but:

“This proposed sale of a C-130J to Brunei will provide a critical capability to assist in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions. The aircraft will enable Brunei to provide aid and assistance in greater capacities to regional allies and partners in need. The aircraft will also provide the ability to execute maritime patrol missions and contribute to search and rescue missions in the region.”

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin-Aerospace in Marietta, GA, and the estimated cost is up to $343 million. That’s over 5x the standard flyaway price for a C-130J, a huge differential given that the notice that no additional contractors will be needed in Brunei. Perhaps they plan to perform long-term support elsewhere; it’s hard to think of another explanation if the notice’s facts are correct. Sources: US DSCA #14-37, “Brunei – C-130J Aircraft”.

DSCA request: Brunei (1 C-130J)

FY 2014

Orders: USA (7 SOCOM etc.), Saudi Arabia (2 KC-130J), India (6 C-130J-30), Israel (2 C-130J-30), Civil (10 LM-100J); Long-term engines supply contract; Indian crash; ROKAF deliveries done; AC-130J flies; DOT&E testing report. C-130J at work
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Sept 29/14: Engines. GE Aviation Systems (actually Dowty Propellers) in Sterling, VA receives a sole-source $20.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 42 C-130J propellers (P/N 69703900) and spare parts. All funds are committed immediately using FY 2012-2014 USAF aircraft budgets, and funds from Foreign Military Sales – but the announcement doesn’t identify the foreign customers.

Work will be performed at Gloucester, UK and is expected to be complete by May 31/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (SPE4A1-14-G-0009-RJ03).

Sept 29/14: Software. A $6.6 million contract modification to integrate system and Mission Computer (MC) software changes into SOCOM’s HC/MC-130J Increment 2 aircraft. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 USAF RDT&E budgets.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by March 31/17. Fiscal 2013 research, development, test and evaluation and procurement funds in the amount of $6,568,120 are being obligated at the time of award (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0277).

Sept 26/14: +7. A $413.2 million finalization for 1 HC-130J and 6 MV-130J aircraft, subsuming previous advance procurement funding into full production efforts. That works out to $59 million per aircraft, plus the cost of government-furnished equipment for these special forces planes. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 & 2013 USAF aircraft budgets.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Nov 30/15 (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0239).

USA: HC-130J & 6 MC-130Js

Sept 26/14: Sensors. Raytheon in McKinney, TX receives an $18.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 12 Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems (AN/AAS-54) and spare parts for the Air Force C-130 program. Short version: it’s for Special Forces HC/MC-130s. Long version: the AAS-54 combines long-range day and night cameras for high-altitude target acquisition, and adds tracking, range-finding, and laser designation for all tri-service and NATO laser-guided munitions. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 & 2013 USAF aircraft budgets; $7.7 million will expire on Sept 30/14.

Work will be performed in McKinney, TX, and is expected to be complete by September 2016. The US Navy’s Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Indiana manages the contract (N00164-12-G-JQ66).

Aug 6/14: FY15 long-lead. A $116.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy long lead parts for 14 FY 2015 C-130Js. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 USAF advance procurement budgets.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by June 30/15. The USAF Nuclear Weapons Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8625-14-C-6450, PO 0001).

July 23/14: Counter-fighter. Defensive tactics against enemy fighters isn’t the first thing you normally associate with a C-130, but a pair of 317th Airlift Group C-130Js had to do just that en route to Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, TX. The exercise demonstrated C-130J capabilities that will be used during the multinational fighter meet at Red Flag-Alaska.

Here’s how it worked: The loadmasters sat high in the flight decks of their aircraft, looking through a bubbled window in the ceiling. They communicated to the pilots, who reacted and maneuvered to delay the fighter pilot’s ability to locate and lock on the C-130Js. 39th AS assistant director of operations for tactics Maj. Aaron Webb described the tactics as “pretty effective,” adding that a casual observer “doesn’t expect a 130,000-pound cargo plane to be able to maneuver as nimbly as the J-model does.” Sources: USAF, “Dyess C-130Js successfully evade F-16”.

July 18/14: India. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics in Marietta, GA receives a maximum $564.7 million contract modification to to fund 6 more India foreign military sales C-130J-30s, field service representatives and 3 years of post-delivery support after the first aircraft delivery. $50.9 million of this contract is committed immediately, and this brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $2.067 billion; but the contract itself applies to orders beyond India’s.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA and is expected to be complete by April 30/20. Once all 6 planes are delivered, India’s fleet will rise to 11, given the March 2014 crash of KC3803. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract as India’s agent (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0273).

India: 6 C-130J-30

July 16/14: LM-100J sale. ASL Aviation Group in Dublin, Ireland signs a Letter of Intent with Lockheed Martin to order up to 10 LM-100J commercial freighters. Their Safair subsidiary in Johannesburg, South Africa currently operates 6 L-100-30 (C-130E/H) aircraft, but the LM-100J will be an entirely new type for their Air Contractors subsidiary in Dublin. Lockheed Martin adds:

“Engineering and detailed design of the LM-100J is currently underway. Assembly of the first aircraft will begin in 2015 and first flight of the LM-100J is expected by early 2017. Because much of the flight test done to civil certify the C-130J in the late 1990s will be directly applicable to the LM-100J, testing and certification of the newest Hercules variant is expected to take about twelve months.”

Which means deliveries can be expected in 2018, unless problems arise in testing. The firm sold 115 L-100s from 1964 through 1992, positioned to address the oversize cargo market and unimproved airfields. They’ve also been used for airdrops and humanitarian aid, VIP transport, aerial spraying, aerial firefighting, etc. Unfortunately, Lockheed acknowledges that legacy L-100s have higher direct operating costs relative to Russian An-12s, or even relative to 737 freighters when the 737’s special ground-handling cargo equipment is available. The LM-100J is intended to address that, while adding CNS/ATM compliance that will allow them to fly in civil airspace after 2015.

The firm predicts double-digit growth in the Latin American, African, and Middle Eastern air freight industries over the next decade, as a subset of overall 4% per year growth in the global market. Sources: Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine, “LM-100J: Airlifter For Hire” | Lockheed Martin, “ASL Aviation Group Signs Letter of Intent To Procure Lockheed Martin LM-100J Freighters”.

Civil: 10 LM-100Js

May 30/14: Korea. The ROKAF’s final 2 C-130J-30s fly out from Marietta, GA, to join their fellows in South Korea (q.v. Dec 2/10, March 27/14). Lockheed Martin is still working under an initial 2-year support and training program for the 4 planes, and is also involved with the ROKAF’s C-130H fleet. Sources: Lockheed Martin, “ROKAF Receives Additional C-130J Super Hercules Aircraft”.

Korea deliveries done

April 25/14: Extended Life. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives an initial $27.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for extended service life center wing boxes [DID: the section of the fuselage that connects to the wings] on 5 C-130J aircraft. Aging C-130E/H planes have received replacements; USAF C-130Js only began entering service in February 1999, but it’s the mileage that matters. Lockheed Martin would say only that replacement decisions are “based upon the service life of the part”, which can be shorter if a plane is subjected to heavy operational use. Meanwhile, the ESL wing boxes are equipping production line aircraft as well.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 budgets. Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/16. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition by the USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLKCA at Robins AFB, GA (FA8504-14-C-0003).

March 28/14: Crash. An Indian Air Force C-130J-30 (tail #KC 3803) hits a hillock during low-level flight training, and crashes in a riverbed 116 km west of Gwailor. Everyone dies, including the 2nd-in-command of the 77 ‘Veiled Vipers’ squadron, Wing Commander Prashant Joshi, 2 pilots, and a trainee.

The C-130J was reportedly part of a 2-plane formation that had taken off from Agra. Sources: The Indian Express, “5 officers killed as IAF’s new showpiece Super Hercules crashes near Gwalior”.

Crash

March 27/14: Korea. The ROKAF takes delivery of 2 of its 4 ordered C-130J-30s (q.v. Dec 2/10), in a Marietta, GA ceremony. This makes them the plane’s 14th customer. Sources: Lockheed Martin, “Republic Of Korea Air Force Accepts First C-130J Super Hercules”.

March 6/14: Sensors. Raytheon in McKinney, TX receives a $10.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 10 Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems, to be installed on AFSOC HC/MC-130Js.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY12 aircraft procurement budgets. Work will be performed in McKinney, TX and is expected to be complete by April 2015. There’s 1 set source for these, so this contract was not competitively procured per FAR 6.302-1. The US Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division in Crane, IN manages the contract (N00164-12-G-JQ66-0045).

March 4/14: FY15 Budget. The USAF and USN unveil their preliminary budget request briefings. They aren’t precise, but they do offer planned purchase numbers for key programs between FY 2014 – 2019. The C-130J program is still waiting for the full FY 2014 contract (q.v. Dec 6/13, Feb 12/14), but that budget introduced a multi-year contract (q.v. April 10/13), which makes cuts in FY 2015-2018 very difficult.

The USAF’s FY 2015 budget request involves 13 C-130Js (7 regular USAF, 2 MC-130J, 4 HC-130J), while the USMC plans to buy 1 KC-130J. The overall effect will drop US annual production from 17 in FY 2014 (6 C-130J, 1 KC-130J, 5 AC-130J gunships, 1 HC-130J, 4 MC-130J) to 14 in FY 2015, but steady exports should cushion that.

The USAF’s initial materials don’t delve beyond FY 2015, but the USMC plans to order another 5 KC-130Js from FY 2016 – 2019. They’ll finish the FY 2014-2018 deal 1 KC-130J short of their maximum, though, with only 6 planes bought, and make up the 7th in FY 2019. Sources: USN, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF] | USAF, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Overview.

Feb 28/14: Support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $54.3 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for depot level repair of 50 KC-130 aircraft engines, propellers and other propulsion system components for the US Marine Corps (47 planes/ $50.2M / 92%) and the government of Kuwait (3 planes/ $4.1M/ 8%).

$24.5 million is committed immediately, using FY 2014 Navy O&M budgets. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN (92%), Al Mubarak, Kuwait (2.1%); various locations in Japan (2%); Cherry Point. NC (1.3%); Miramar, CA (1.3%); and Fort Worth, TX (1.3%), and is expected to be complete in February 2015. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-D-0007). See also Rolls Royce, “Rolls-Royce supports US Marine Corps KC-130Js through $50 million contract”.

Feb 25/14: Support. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Marietta, GA receives a sole-source $12.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to provide spare parts that are unique to US SOCOM’s HC/MC-130Js, and can’t be drawn from general C-130J fleet spares.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 aircraft budgets. Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Feb 16/16. USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WISK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0209).

Feb 12/14: Engines. Lockheed Martin and Rolls-Royce complete a long-term agreement worth up to $1 billion, to deliver approximately 600 AE2100 turboprop engines for American and international contracts from 2014 through 2018. That works out to about 150 aircraft, but it’s probably closer to 125 with spares added in. Rolls Royce benefits from more predictable demand, while Lockheed Martin presumably benefits from lower prices.

Rolls Royce adds that “the agreement secures the Rolls-Royce AE 2100 as the engine of choice for all variants of the C-130J to 2025.” That was never really in doubt. The most likely break-point for an engine upgrade would be the design of a new C-130NG variant, in order to address competition from jet-powered 20-ton class transports after 2020. Sources: Rolls Royce, “Rolls-Royce and Lockheed Martin agree US$1BN deal to power future C-130J aircraft”.

Multi-year engine contract

Jan 31/14: AC-130J. The USAF flies a fully-converted AC-130J gunship for the 1st time, at Eglin AFB, FL. They also appear to have scales the program back a bit:

“A total of 32 MC-130J aircraft will be modified for AFSOC as part of a $2.4 billion AC-130J program to grow the future fleet, according to Capt. Greg Sullivan, the USSOCOM AC-130J on-site program manager at Det. 1.”

The Pentagon’s recently-released DOT&E report for FY 2013 had placed the AC-130J program at 37 aircraft. Sources: USAF, “New AC-130J completes first test flight”.

Jan 31/14: Support. A $105.3 million indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity contract modification, exercising the 3rd option under the USAF’s C-130J Long Term Sustainment Program. It’s a 2-year ordering period for sustainment services including logistical support, program management support, engineering services, spares, and technical data. Funds will be committed as needed through task orders.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Jan 31/16. USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLKCA at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract (FA8504-06-D-0001, PO 0026).

Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). Their focus is on US SOCOM’s variants: HC-130J/MC-130J Combat King II CSAR/ Commando II transports, and AC-130J “Ghostrider” gunships. The USAF intends to field 37 HC-130J Combat King IIs developed to Increment 2 capability, 57 MC-130J Commando IIs developed to Increment 3 capability, and 37 AC-130J Ghostrider gunships that will be converted from MC-103Js (TL: 94 MC-130Js produced).

All: The core problem across this fleet involves the enhanced electrical system and in 400 Amp power supply, which is required for Increment 3 upgrades and AC-130J gunship conversions. At present, the fleet is limited to a 200 Amp system. Minor issues include Mean Time to Diagnose a Fault of 119 minutes (30 required), and just 83% probability of completing a 4-hour mission without a failure (95% required). The good news is that DOT&E deems the HC/MC-130J to be operationally effective and operationally suitable, with a 95% mission availability rate (89% required) and survivable in the low to medium threat environments it was meant for.

AC-130J: The program conducted a Preliminary Design Review in March 2013 and a Critical Design Review in August 2013, and 1st flight was expected in January 2014. The PSP weapon set is planned in 3 increments, and both development and the Live Fire Alternative Test Plan (ATP) will leverage some data from the C-130H-based AC-130W. This was concerning, though:

“Armor requirements and the amount of armor differ significantly between the AC-130U and AC-130J aircraft. The AC-130U armor was designed to provide protection to the aircrew stations, personnel, ammunition, and critical systems against a single 37 mm high-explosive incendiary round at a range of 10,000 feet, while the AC-130J’s primary crewmember positions and oxygen supplies should be protected against single 7.62 mm ball projectile at 100 meters [DID: just 330 feet, where bullet velocity is higher] …. The planned armor layout on the AC-130J does not include the Mission Operator Pallet, which should be considered a “primary crewmember” position and protected in accordance with the associated Force Protection Key Performance Parameter (KPP).”

The 37mm criterion isn’t random: most AC-130 kills over Vietnam involved 37mm guns. It isn’t rare for gunships to face enemies that can deploy 14.5mm – 23mm guns, to say nothing of the common .50 cal/ 12.7mm caliber. Even an unarmored C-130J would be a difficult kill for a 12.7mm machine gun. With that said, it sounds like they’ve left the crew nearly unprotected, in an aircraft that’s designed to go where the enemy is shooting. That does require an explanation.

Jan 27/14: Engines. Rolls Royce in Indianapolis, IN receives an $182.7 million firm-fixed-price, requirements contract modification, exercising the 7th annual option for AE2100-D3 engine logistics support, program management support, engineering services, spares, and technical data.

Funds will be spent as needed. Work will be performed at Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete by Jan 31/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLKCA at Robins AFB, GA, manages this contract (FA8504-07-D-0001, PO 0023).

Jan 21/13: LM-100J. No, it’s not gamerspeak for iRobot’s “Looj” gutter cleaner, or for a fast sled. It’s Lockheed Martin’s new civil variant of the C-130J, and the FAA just received Lockheed Martin’s Program Notification Letter for a type design update. FAA documents refer to it as an L-382J, but it will be marketed at the LM-100J. Sources: Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin Files For FAA Type Design Update”.

Dec 26/13: Support. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA ereceives an $11,060,628 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for logistics and engineering services in support of the C/KC-130J Aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps/Marine Corps Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard and the Kuwait Air Force.

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA (65.3%); Afghanistan (12%); Palmdale, CA (9.2%); Kuwait (3.3%); Okinawa, Japan (3%); Miramar, CA (1.8%); Cherry Point, NC (1.7%); Elizabeth City, NC (1.6%); Fort Worth, (1.5%); and Greenville, SC (.6%); and is expected to be completed in December 2014. No funds are being obligated at time of award. Funds will be obligated against individual delivery orders as they are issued. This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Marine Corps/Marine Corps Reserve ($8,886,223; 80.3%); U.S. Coast Guard ($1,423,148; 12.9%); and the Government of Kuwait ($751,257; 6.8%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.SC 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-14-D-0006).

Dec 6/13: long-lead. A sole-source, maximum $169.7 million firm-fixed-price advance procurement contract for funding related to 18 C-130Js. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 procurement budgets.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Oct 31/16. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages this contract (FA8625-14-C-6450).

Dec 3/13: long-lead. A $48.5 million advance procurement contract modification for funding related to 5 more C-130Js. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 procurement budgets.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 aircraft budgets. Work under this multi-year contract will be performed at Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA until Dec 31/16. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0230).

Dec 3/13: #4. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives a not-to-exceed $81.2 million modification to an existing contract to fund Israeli C-130J-30 aircraft #4, advance long-lead procurement of C-130Js #5 and 6, and external fuel tank modification kits.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be completed by June 30/16. This contract is 100% foreign military sales for Israel, with the USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH acting as Israel’s agent (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0231).

Israel: 4th C-130J-30

Oct 10/13: DMS Redesign. Lockheed Martin Corp., Marietta, Ga., was awarded a $21.6 million contract modification to redesign the C-130J’s Color Multipurpose Display Unit and Multi-Function Color Display for C-130J aircraft. Computer equipment goes out of production quickly, and the CDU & MFCDs need new central processor and graphics processor chip sets, in order to cope with “diminishing manufacturing sources.”

Sure beats trying to source spares from grey traders whose supply chain includes Chinese counterfeits.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA and is expected to be complete by Sept 30/15. This contract actually includes 15% foreign military sales to C-130 customers Norway, Israel and Kuwait, on top of the $21.6 million in FY 2012 in USAF procurement funds that are committed immediately. USAF Force Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0228)y. (Awarded Oct. 10, 2013)

Oct 3/13: A maximum $181 million not-to-exceed contract modification lets Saudi Arabia buy 2 KC-130J transport and tanker aircraft under the US umbrella deal, along with associated non-recurring engineering support. It’s just a small part of the 25-plane, $6.7 billion request (q.v. Nov 9/12).

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be completed by April 2016. This contract is 100 percent foreign military sales for Saudi Arabia. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0177).

Saudi Arabia: 2 KC-130J

FY 2013

US order; Saudi request; DOT&E report. Saudi C-130
(click to view full)

July 25/13: Israel. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics in Marietta, GA receives a maximum $13 million unfinalized contract for the advanced procurement of a 4th Israeli C-130J-30 and field services representatives, out of an FMS case for up to 9 planes (q.v. July 30/08). The total cumulative face value of the contract it’s bought under is now $1.631 billion, but most of that contract doesn’t involve Israel.

Work will be performed at Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract as Israel’s FMS agent (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0172).

July 11/13: Engines. Rolls Royce in Indianapolis, IN a $22.4 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for more USMC KC-130J Power-by-the-Hour support.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. US Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-09-D-0020).

July 2/13: Training. IKBI Inc. in Choctaw, MS receives a maximum $7.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for a Special Forces HC-130J Simulator Facility at Moody AFB, GA. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received by the Army Corps of Engineers in Savannah, GA (W912HN-13-C-0011).

June 10/13: Libya. The US DSCA announces the new government of Libya’s official export request [PDF] for 2 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, 10 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engines (8 installed and 2 spares), aircraft modifications, Government Furnished Equipment (including radios), support and test equipment, personnel training package, and a 3-year package for other forms of US Government and contractor support. Libya would join their neighbor Tunisia as a C-130J-30 customer.

The DSCA request cites “a mix of legacy C-130s” in operation, but pre-revolution reports weren’t clear on their airworthiness, and it’s unclear if the new government has working C-130s to fly alongside its (former Air Libya) BAe-146. The estimated cost for the 2 stretched C-130Js is $588 million, which is a tremendous amount, but they’ll need to build up the associated infrastructure from a very damaged base. The scale of the support is made clear by the request. A USAF logistics specialist will help Libya establish supply systems for flight operations, supply management, inventory control, and documentation procedures. At the same time, 4 contracted Field Service Representatives (FSR) and 1 Logistics Support Representative (LSR) will need to have expertise in airframe, avionics/electrical systems, propulsion systems, ground maintenance systems, and logistics support. As expected, Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor.

Libya has been making a number of announcements about rebuilding its air force, and favoring countries that helped them during the war. It’s hard to give much credit to reports that the country will be buying both Rafale and Eurofighter jets in the near future, though one understands why they might want to repay France and Britain in some way. Meanwhile, transport is a higher priority for a large country with lots of hostile terrain, and a weak central government.

DSCA request: Libya C-130J-30s (2)

May 31/13: LAIRCM. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives a $16.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to finish designing LAIRCM aircraft modification kits (A-Kits) for the USMC’s KC-130Js, to protect them against shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. This modification includes 10 LAIRCM A-Kits, a test kit installation of a LAIRCM A-Kit, and a validation installation of a LAIRCM A-Kit.

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA (51%); Greenville, SC (31%); and Rolling Meadows, IL (18%), and is expected to be completed in November 2015. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 and 2013 contract dollars. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-13-C-0017).

April 29/13: Iraq. Lockheed Martin announces that it has ferried Iraqi C-130J-30s #4-6 to the USAF, as an interim step in delivering them to Iraq. Once the planes arrive in Iraq, they will complete the order, though the contract itself will continue with support services. Lockheed Martin.

Iraqi C-130J-30s all delivered

April 10/13: FY 2014 & MYP. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

The C-130J program submits a proposed $5.809 billion multi-year buy from FY 2014 – 2018, which would purchase 79 planes: 43 aircraft for SOCOM (25 MC-130J + 13 HC-130J + 5 AC-130J), 29 C-130Js for the USAF, and 7 KC-130Js for the US Marine Corps.

All aircraft would be fully funded with initial spares in their order years, and the multi-year deal would include a priced option for 5 more United States Coast Guard HC-130Js – whose base aircraft and array of radars and equipment are very different from SOCOM’s HC-130Js.

Multi-year buy proposed

April 4/13: Tunisia. Lockheed Martin announces that they’ve delivered the 1st of 2 stretched C-130J-30 Super Hercules to the Republic of Tunisia, marking the first delivery to an African country.

Tunisia currently operates a fleet of C-130Hs and C-130Bs, but they were bought in the mid-1980s. Lockheed Martin’s 2010 contract involved 2 planes between 2013 – 2014, plus training and an initial 3 years of logistics support. The Tunisian government fell in the meantime, but the new government still needs the planes.

Feb 22/13: Engines. Rolls Royce in Indianapolis, ID receives a $16.8 million modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for more additional power-by-the-hour work in support of the USMC’s KC-130Js.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in July 2013. Funds will be committed by individual delivery orders, as needed. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-09-D-0020).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The report covers the C-130J platform generally, as well as the HC/MC-130J special forces variants.

The biggest take-away is that the USAF is scrapping plans to field the Block 7.0 upgrade, or incorporate the set into the production line. Block 7.0 has been experiencing delays, and is expected to enter test & evaluation in early 2013, but the results will probably just be used to plan the USAF’s Block Upgrade 8.1.

On the bright side, the C-130J family’s DTADS maintenance support system is a “significant improvement” in multiple areas, but the Windows XP operating system means it can’t connect to government networks. Windows 7 is apparently the minimum.

With respect to the special forces platforms, the HC/MC-130J got a preliminary rating of being as good or better than previous variants, and availability/ maintenance rates were also improvements (vid. Nov 1/12 entry). Key strengths include better takeoffs from short or unimproved runways, expanding the flight envelope for aerial refueling, and improved cargo loading and unloading features. Despite that latter assessment, airdrops create very high workloads and head-down time for the pilot monitoring the drops. The new HC/MC-130Js may also have to do some retrofits to add standard search and rescue equipment: flare launcher tubes, large forward scanner windows, additional oxygen regulators, and intercom panels.

Survivability and situational awareness were another area mentioned, though the specific survivability issue wasn’t detailed. With respect to situational awareness, pilots would like a tactical datalink such as Link 16, so they’re more aware of what’s around them. Inside, the loadmasters want more control over cargo lighting, especially since the night vision lighting is a bit problematic for covert operations. On an audible level, the loadmasters want the intercom system to transmit system tones for diagnostic or defensive system alerts.

Jan 16/13: India support. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $6.7 million contract modification for Power by the Hour support to the IAF’s C-130Js.

Work will be performed at Hindan Air Station in New Delhi, India, and is expected to be complete by Jan 30/13. The AFLCMC/WLKCB at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract on behalf of their FMS client (FA8504-07-D-0001-0501-09).

Aug 6/12: Made in India. The Hindu reports that the offset program has begun to bear fruit, with some components now made in India:

“The latest feather in the Tata cap is that certain critical components for the C-130 are now being ‘Made in India’… on the outskirts of Hyderabad. That is the promise held out by Tata Lockheed Martin Aerostructures Ltd., (TLMAL), a joint venture between Tata Advanced Systems and Lockheed Martin. The Friday gone by was a landmark day with TLMAL delivering the first C-130 Center Wing Box (CWB) to Lockheed.”

Nov 9/12: Saudi Arabia The US DSCA announces [PDF] Saudi Arabia’s DSCA request for up to 25 C-130J family aircraft, in a deal that could be worth up to $6.7 billion once a contract is negotiated.

The RSAF currently operates 30 C-130H medium transport aircraft, and another 7 KC-130H aerial refueling tankers with secondary transport capabilities. External engine fleet and depth maintenance contracts take care of them, but as the hours pile up, replacement looms. The Saudis would replace their fleet with just 20 stretched C-130J-30s, and another 5 KC-130Js. On the other hand, the stretched planes offer more room, and the C-130J’s extra power makes a big difference to real cargo capacity in Saudi Arabia’s lift-stealing heat. The request includes:

20 C-130J-30 stretched transports
5 KC-130J aerial tankers, which could be armed in future
120 Rolls Royce AE2100D3 Engines (100 installed and 20 spares)
25 MIDS-LVT Link-16 systems
Plus support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, and U.S. Government and contractor support.

The prime contractors will be Lockheed-Martin in Bethesda, MD (C-130Js); General Electric Aviation Systems in Sterling, VA; and Rolls Royce Corporation in Indianapolis, IN (engines). Implementation of this sale will require the assignment of U.S. Government and contractor representatives to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for delivery, system checkout, and logistics support for an undetermined period of time.

DSCA request: Saudi C-130J-30 & KC-130J (25)

Nov 1/12: MC/HC-130J. Lockheed Martin announces that their HC-130J Combat King II and MC-130J Commando II special operations planes have been formally certified as “Effective, Suitable and Mission Capable” by the USAF’s Operational Test and Evaluation Center.

Oct 23/12: 13 more. An $889.5 million contract modification for the USA’s FY 2012 production aircraft buy of 13 planes: 7 MC-130J CSAR planes and 4 HC-130J Commando IIs for SOCOM, 1 KC-130J for the USMC, and 1 USAF C-130J production aircraft.

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA, and run to July 31/15 (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0139).

FY 2012 main buy

FY 2012

Israel buys #3/9; USCG buys 3; Senior Scout SIGINT kit; India’s follow-on request for 6 more; Mexican request; C-130XJ, C-130NG, and SC-130J “Sea Hercules” concepts unveiled; AC-130J gunship appears. Norwegian C-130J
(click to view full)

Sept 28/12: A $218 million contract modification to buy 3 more US Coast Guard HC-130J Long Range Surveillance aircraft, which will bring the USCG fleet to 9, and add 2 more roll-on mission suites. The 3rd plane will get its mission equipment from a future contract, scheduled for FY 2013. By 2016, the Coast Guard plans to accept these aircraft and base them at Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii.

The HC-130J’s special mission suite is comprised of a 2-person mission system operator station located behind the pilot and co-pilot, a belly-mounted 360-degree Seaspray 7500 long range search radar, nose-mounted day/night surveillance turret, and an advanced mission communications suite. Work will be performed in Marietta, GS, and Greenville, SC. The contract runs until May 31/16 (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0069).

The current Coast Guard C-130 LRS fleet includes 23 HC-130Hs, and 6 HC-130Js based at Air Station Elizabeth City, NC. The USCG’s HC-130Hs are running out of useful service life, and by 2027, the USCG is planning to have a uniform fleet of 22 HC-130Js. See also USCG | Lockheed Martin.

3 USCG HC-130Js

Sept 25/12: Mexico. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Mexico’s official request for 2 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, 10 AE2100D3 engines (8 installed and 2 spares), aircraft modifications, communication equipment, other Government Furnished Equipment, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment and publications, personnel training and training equipment, and other US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $412 million, which is very expensive for 2 C-130Js, but there are a number of add-ons to consider, and actual cost will depend on contract negotiations.

The DSCA notice says that Mexico will use the planes as “Presidential support,” but local defense expert Inigo Guevara says that they’re mostly intended for regular defense use. The FAM’s existing tactical transport fleet of 7 old C-130E/K/Ls is reaching its limits, and the recent buy of 4 new C-27J Spartan light tactical transports replaced an original requirement for 5 used C-130H aircraft to upgrade that fleet. The 2 C-130J-30s offer a heavier-lift option with some C-27J engine and avionics compatibility. Guevara says that current requirements will eventually add another 2 Super Hercules transports, leaving a tactical transport fleet of 4 C-27Js and 4 C-130Js. Any VIP modules are likely to be “roll-on, roll-of” options. Guevara adds that:

“The Presidential fleet is getting a new aircraft in the form of a strategic transport (very likely a Boeing 787 Dreamliner), which will replace the current B757 and should arrive by 2016. It is apparently being acquired through a [full turnkey] wet lease.”

DSCA request: Mexico C-130J-30s (2)

Sept 21/12: The Air Force’s 19th Special Operation Squadron is retiring its MC-130E Combat Talon I simulator, and they are waiting for an MC-130J simulator to replace it. They do not quite seem to know what to do with it. Any takers? It would be quite the living room conversation piece.

Sept 10/12: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $9.7 million indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract modification, to meet increased requirements for the USMC’s “power by the hour” per-engine support contract. Translation: the USMC is flying its KC-130J fleet for more hours than the contract had expected.

Work will be performed in Cherry Point, NC, and is expected to be complete in February 2013. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-09-D-0020).

Sept 5/12: Iraq. The 1st of 6 C-130J-30 Super Hercules for the Iraqi Air Force has completed its first flight, at Lockheed Martin’s Marietta, GA facility. Lockheed Martin.

Aug 30/12: Oman delivery. The 1st C-130J ordered by Oman is formally accepted by the country at a signing ceremony in Marietta. Lockheed Martin initially told DID that the delivery of this plane was likely to happen in early November, but the Sultanate sped up the process and flew its plane home on September 12. Lockheed Martin.

Aug 28/12: Sea Hercules? Defense News reports that Lockheed Martin is working on an SC-130J Sea Hercules modification. It’s designed as a $150 million alternative, to be developed in 3 stages. Stage 1 will involve roll-on/ bolt-on radar and electro-optical sensors, and accompanying processing workstations. Stage 2 would add wing-mounted surface attack weapons, along with upgraded workstations and weapon control systems. Stage 3 would be a full anti-submarine conversion, including sonobuoys, a magnetic anomaly detector boom, extra fuel pods, and 2 added bays for 6 Harpoon missiles.

Lockheed Martin reportedly says they expect to sign at least one contract “in North Africa”. Tunisia, who already has a contract for 2 C-130J-30s that was signed shortly before their revolution, could certainly use that capability. So could Britain, which has its own fleet of C-130s, but no maritime patrol planes since they retired the Nimrod fleets.

Lockheed Martin will have no shortage of competitors around the world. Established competitors include EADS’ CN-235 Persuader, C-295 MPA, ATR-42 MP, and ATR-72 ASW turboprops; and Embraer’s P-99 MP jet. On the development front, Boeing is starting to look at options beyond its P-8A Poseidon, because their customers are saying that they don’t need its full versatility, and find its $200 million price tag prohibitive. Bombardier’s Challenger 600 seems to be the target platform. There’s also some talk in Britain of adding maritime patrol capabilities to its Sentinel R1 ground surveillance jets, based on Bombardier’s Challenger. Saab has options are in development based on the Saab 2000 regional turboprop and Piaggio P-180 executive turboprop, and Russia has a unique offering in development based on its Beriev Be-200 amphibious aircraft.

Aug 8/12: Oman. Flight testing begins for the 1st of Oman’s 3 ordered C-130Js (1 C-130J-30, 2 C-130Js). Oman currently operates a fleet of 3 C-130Hs purchased in the early 1980s, and their first new Hercules is scheduled for delivery later in 2012. Lockheed Martin.

July 23/12: AC-130J. Production begins in Marietta, GA, but the gunship is actually built as an MC-130J Commando II. It will become an “AC-130J” (vid. Feb 19/12 contract) when it’s equipped with a “Precision Strike Package. When queried, Lockheed Martin representatives said that:

“The initial contract is to cross-deck the current MC-130W [DID: link added] equipment to the new AC-130Js. The PSP referenced here is a new package.”

AC-130J Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for 2015, and AFSOC expects to order 16. Lockheed Martin.

AC-130J begins

June 7/12: Norway request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Norway’s formal request to buy 2 C-130J-30s equipped to the USAF baseline, 9 Rolls Royce AE2100-D3 Engines (8 installed and 1 spare), plus aircraft modifications for Norwegian specifications, Norwegian-compatible communication equipment and support, defensive countermeasure systems, other Government Furnished Equipment, tools and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of US government & contractor support.

If a contract is signed, Norway’s C-130J-30 fleet will rise to 5 planes. The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA, but the proposed sale won’t require any more representatives in Norway. The estimated cost is set at up to $300 million, however, which is about the cost of Norway’s first 4 planes (vid. Nov 7/07 entry). Actual amounts will depend on negotiations, but it looks like Norway is thinking about a significant support contract as well.

DSCA request: Norway C-130J-30 (1)

June 4/12: Norway. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, ID receives a $14.3 million (face value) firm-fixed-price contract to purchase spares, field services support and program management, return and repair support, and engineering services support for the Royal Norwegian Air Force’s C-130J fleet at Gardermoen AFB, Norway. Work is to be complete by Jan 31/14. The WR-ALC/GRBKB at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract, on behalf of its Norwegian client (FA8504-07-D-0001-0602).

May 8/12: Canada. The Royal Canadian Air Force formally accepts the 17th CC-130J Super Hercules at a Marietta, GA ceremony, completing the order placed in December 2007. Lockheed Martin.

Canada: all delivered

April 2/12: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $25 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for contractor logistics support and technical engineering support of USMC KC-130Js’ AE2100-D3 turboprop engines, and R391 propellers.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in February 2013. All funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00019-09-D-0020). Navy/USMC C-130Js fall under a separate engine maintenance agreement than the USAF – see also April 6/10, Feb 27/09 entries.

March 9/12: MC-130J “Commando II”. USAF officials announce that the MC-130J’s designation will change from “Combat Shadow II” to “Commando II”.

The 1st aircraft with the “Commando” designation was the C-46, which flew missions “over the hump” from Burma to China in World War II, conducted covert missions during the Korean War, and flew many missions for the CIA’s “Air America”. Some still fly to this day, for civilian airlines in remote areas. Hopefully, the MC-130J won’t also be adopting the C-46’s reputation as a maintenance nightmare that was dangerous to fly on military operations. USAF.

MC-130J becomes “Commando II”

March 15/12: Norway crash. Norway’s newest C-130J-30 crashes into Sweden’s Mount Kebnekaise at an altitude of almost 5,000 feet, during the international military exercise “Cold Response.” All 5 crew are killed, and the RNoAF is left with just 3 C-130J-30s. Read “Norway Renews Its Tactical Transport Fleet” for full coverage.

Crash

Feb 29/12: AC-130J, etc. A $70 million firm-fixed-price advance procurement contract, buying long-lead items for US AFSOC: 2 AC-130J gunships, 1 HC-130J “Combat King” Combat Search And Rescue, and 4 MC-130J “Combat Shadow” transport aircraft. This is the FY 2013 budget request, but long-lead materials to ensure on-time construction are always in the previous year’s budget.

The AC-130J is new, and hasn’t been talked about much. The current AC-130H “Spectre” and AC-130U “Spooky” gunships remain vulnerable to even light defenses like anti-aircraft cannons, and are often restricted to night flying. On the flip side, they offer unparalleled fire support volume and accuracy, up to and including 105mm howitzer fire, to help special forces and friendly troops out of jams. SOCOM’s heavy gunship fleet has seen predictably heavy usage in recent years, and needs replacement. The hanging question is what capabilities a full C-130J gunship option might have.

Work will be performed Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete during calendar year 2016. The USAF/AFMC Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0081).

Feb 22/12: Israel #3. Israel buys its 3rd C-130J-30, out of a formal October 2008 FMS request for up to 9 special forces capable planes. It does so by exercising a maximum $58.3 million firm-fixed-price option, on top of previous planning and advance long lead procurement funding (vid. April 8/11).

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA, and expected to be complete by Nov 30/14. The ASC/WLNN at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH is Israel’s Foreign Military Sales agent for these buys (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0085).

Israel: 1 C-130J-30

Feb 22/12: Support. A $7.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for C-130J and HC/MC-130J spares for at Moody Air Force Base, GA. Work will be performed in Marietta, GA, and the contract runs through Dec 31/13. USAF AMC’s Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0085).

Feb 22/12: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $45.2 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option for AE-2100D3 turboprop engine and R-391 propeller contractor logistics and technical engineering services, for the USMC’s KC-130Js.

Funds will be committed only as services are needed, and work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN until February 2013. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00019-09-D-0020).

Feb 16/12: #250. The 250th C-130J Super Hercules variant ever built is delivered to Dyess Air Force Base, TX. It’s the 15th of 28 planes that will ultimately be delivered to Dyess AFB by 2013.

To put that in perspective, a Jan 30/11 MC-130J delivery to US Special Operations Command marked the 2,400th C-130 delivered, of all types, since production began. Lockheed Martin.

#250

Jan 31/12: Engines. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $112.2 million firm-fixed-price, requirements type contract, exercising Option V/ Year 6 of the C-130J’s AE2100D3 engine and R-391 propeller support contract. That includes logistics support, program management support, engineering, spares and technical data are included.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN until Jan 31/13. The Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, GA manages this contract (FA8504-07-D-0001, #0600).

Jan 31/12: Support. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives a $63 million firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-award-fee, time-and-material, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to support systems unique to the C-130J. Their work will include logistics support, program management support, engineering services, repairs, spares and technical data.

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA until Jan 31/14. The Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, GA manages this contract (FA8504-06-D-0001, PO 0020; Delivery order 0700).

Jan 31/12: Norway. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives a $7.8 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-material contract for spares, field support representatives, program management, return and repair support, and engineering services from the Royal Norwegian Air Force, to support their new 4-plane C-130J fleet.

Work will be performed in Marietta, GA until Jan 31/14. The Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, GA manages this contract (FA8504-06-D-0001, #0606).

Dec 28/11: Support. An $8.5 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for spares and material in support of the USMC’s KC-130Js. Funds will be obligated by individual delivery orders as they are issued. Work will be performed in Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete in December 2013. US NAVAIR manages this contract (N00019-09-D-0015).

Dec 13/11: Engines. A $10.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 9 spare C-130J quick change engine assemblies, under the terms of the Fiscal Year Orientation Committee IV contract. The units are a split buy: 5 units for the U.S. Air Force; and 4 as a Foreign Military Sales effort for Kuwait (q.v. May 27/10, July 20/09 entries). Work will be performed in Marietta, GA, and is expected to be complete by Nov 28/14 (FA8625-11-C-6597, PO 0068).

Dec 7/11: SIGINT kit. Lockheed Martin delivers the USAF’s 4th Senior Scout containerized roll-on, roll-off signals intelligence (SIGINT) system. Senior Scout was 1st fielded in Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) in 1991, but the latest model is enhanced to be structurally compatible with the newest C-130J, adds updated system interfaces and technology enhancements, and offers better maintenance access. Lockheed Martin considers Senior Scout to be part of its DRAGON Shield series of modular ro-ro ISR offerings.

Acceptance testing is about to begin, and if all goes well, the USAF’s other 3 Senior Scouts will be converted to the same standard over the next 2 years. Lockheed Martin.

Dec 2/11: New variants. Flight International reports on Lockheed Martin EVP Ralph Heath’s presentation to the Credit Suisse aerospace and defense conference in New York. The presentation mentions 2 new variants: the stripped-down C-130XJ, without the automatic loading system and other niceties; and a more streamlined C-130NG concept aimed at the market beyond 2020.

Oct 27/11: India request. The US DSCA announces India’s official request to buy up to 6 more C-130Js, which would bring its fleet to 12. The previous May 25/07 request also asked for C-130J USAF baseline aircraft, but the order involved stretched C-130J-30s. It remains to be seen whether India will order more stretched C-130J-30s (likely), or 6 of the smaller C-130Js. The estimated cost is up to $1.2 billion.

Read “India Buys C-130J-30 Hercules for Special Forces” for full coverage.

DSCA request: India C-130J (6)

FY 2011

Israel buys #2; MATS II training contract; Block 7.0 software contract; Australian software innovation; Oman’s request; Crashworthy seating; What India left out. Deliveries: 1st SOCOM HC-130J & MC-130J, Qatar’s 4; India’s induction. MC-130J enhancements
(click for video)

Sept 29/11: 1st MC-130J delivered. Lockheed Martin delivers the 1st of 20 MC-130J Combat Shadow IIs to United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), at Cannon Air Force Base, NM. Delivery had been scheduled for August.

While the HC-130J is the combat rescue model, the MC-130J is the standard special operations insertion and cargo plane. It’s also based on a KC-130J tanker, with the UARRSI boom refueling receptacle, Enhanced Service Life Wing, Enhanced Cargo Handling System, a surveillance and targeting turret, a combat systems operator station on the flight deck, and dual SATCOM. They’re more or less the same planes, actually, just with different roles, and different operators. Initial operational capability is planned for 2012.

Sept 28/11: Qatar. Lockheed holds a delivery ceremony in Marietta, GA for Qatar’s 4 ordered C-130J-30s. Arabian Aerospace.

Qatar – full delivery

Sept 24/11: 1st HC-130J delivered. US Air Combat Command officials receive their 1st HC-130J Combat King II, at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, AZ. Delivery had been scheduled for August.

The new HC-130J will be flown by the testing squadron, then members of the 79th Rescue Squadron will complete the 8 months of training needed to fly and operate the new model. USAF officials expect HC-130Js to begin regular duty at the base in early 2013. USAF.

Sept 16/11: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract modification to increase the ceiling on engine support contract line items for the KC-130J fleet. They include power by the hour, which pays a fixed fee per engine flight hours, and spares. The KC-130J fleet are triple-role aircraft: cargo, aerial refueling, and on-call strike aircraft (with the Harvest Hawk roll-on kit).

Work will be performed in Cherry Point, NC, and is expected to be complete in February 2012. No funding is being committed at time of award, but it’s available if needed. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract, as the KC-130Js are USMC birds (N00019-09-D-0020).

July 11/11: A not to exceed $89 million firm-fixed-price contract modification commits FY 2011 Congressionally-mandated advance procurement funding for 9 C-130J family planes: 1 USAF stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, and 8 US SOCOM HC-130J/ MC-130Js.

These 9 planes will receive their main orders in FY 2012, but advance ordering ensures that manufacturing can start when that order does come in (FA8625-11-C-6597 PO 0029).

May 2/11: Qatar. The 1st of 4 Qatar Emiri Air Force C-130J-30s has completed production at the Lockheed Martin facility in Marietta, GA. It would make its first flight on June 8th. See also Oct 7/08 entry.

April 8/11: Israel #2 & 3. Israel exercises $76.2 million in fixed-price not-to-exceed (NTE) options to buy a 2nd C-130J-30 aircraft, and begin planning and advance long lead procurement for the 3rd Israeli aircraft.

This unfinalized contract also includes recurring in-line production modifications for the 2nd aircraft to include but not limited to the following: Block 6X Operational Flight Program (July 30/08 DSCA cited Block 7.0, looks like Israel-specific mods), enhanced service life wing, 2 embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation System Embedded Module IVs with Precise Positioning System and GAS-1 controlled radiation pattern antenna, and a UARRSI receptacle on top of the plane to accept aerial refueling booms. The 657th AESS at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597).

Israel: 1 C-130J-30

April 5/11: MC-130J i3. A $21.4 million contract modification for MC-130J increment 3, to develop 1 trial kit installation, and perform developmental tests of this capability on 1 MC-130J increment 2 aircraft. The overall scope of this effort is to add the C-130J Block 7.0 software upgrades, and “a special mission processor capability that include both developmental [work] and integration of known/low risk improvements.” The ASC/WLNNC at Wright Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8625-11-C-6597 PO0002).

March 31/11: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA receives a $10 million firm-fixed-price contract to obligate FY 2010 advance procurement funding for 1 FY 2011 C-130J aircraft. Work will be performed at Marietta, GA (FA8625-06-C-6456-P00243).

March 29/11: MC-130J rollout. Lockheed Martin officially rolls out the 1st MC-130J Combat Shadow II for the U.S. Air Force’s Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Contracts have been placed to build 15 MC-130Js, and AFSOC is authorized to buy up to 20, against an approved long term requirement for 37 to replace the aging MC-130H fleet. Initial Operational Capability with the new type is expected in 2012.

All C-130J special forces configurations are based on the KC-130J aerial tanker, as they also have aerial refueling roles for SOCOM helicopters. Beyond that, MC-130Js will have the Enhanced Service Life Wing, a boom refueling receptacle (UARRSI) so they can be refueled in mid-air, more powerful electrical generators, a day/night surveillance turret, a combat systems operator station on the flight deck, and provisions for LAIRCM missile defense systems, among others. Technically, it’s basically the same as the HC-130J, it just performs a different role. Lockheed Martin.

MC-130J rollout

March 29/11: India. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an $8.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to provide “spares, fuser, and program management support” for the Indian Air Force, to support the arrival of their new C-130J fleet. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract (FA8504-07-D-0001-0501).

March 22/11: USAF Air Combat Command’s HC-130J personnel recovery aircraft, completes developmental testing by receiving fuel from an aerial tanker boom. This test point also applies to AFSOC’s MC-130J Combat Shadow II aircraft.

Rollout of the first MC-130J is later celebrated at the Lockheed Martin facility in Marietta, GA on March 29/11, and the first HC-130Js and MC-130Js started deliveries in September 2011, instead of August. Initial Operational Capability for both is scheduled for 2012.

March 18/11: Support. An $8.5 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to provide C-130J logistics support through Jan 31/12. Work will be performed at Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA (FA8625-11-C6597).

March 1/11: Australia – C-17 or C-130Js? Australian Minister for Defence Stephen Smith confirms that the government is looking into buying a 5th C-17, and has sent a Foreign Military Sale Letter of Request to the United States asking about costs and availability.

The tradeoff under consideration was whether to buy 1 more C-17A, or buy 2 more C-130J-30 Super Hercules tactical transports between 2013-2015 under project AIR 8000 Phase 1. One C-17A can carry up to 4 C-130 Hercules loads in a single lift, and cover twice the distance in three-quarters of the time. On the other hand, it costs over 3 times as much, and can’t be in 4 places at once. In the end, Australia chose to buy the C-17 instead.

Feb 14/11: The 1st MC-130J Combat Shadow II for US AFSOC completes manufacturing, and will begin flight tests after additional special mission equipment like the chin-mounted sensor turret is installed. MC-130Js work insertion missions, almost always at night. Their missions can include low-level aerial refueling missions for special operations helicopters, along with infiltration/ exfiltration, and resupply for special forces teams.

Feb 5/11: India induction. The 1st Indian C-130J-30 with Special Forces enhancements is inducted in a special ceremony at Air Force Station Hindon, India. There’s still work to do, however. IAF chief Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik says of the American communications and security systems that were left out: “We have our own communication system and yes, we will be integrating them on the aircraft. They are already being made and they will be put on the aircraft.” Andrha News | MSN India.

Jan 31/11: Engines. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $203 million contract modification to cover support services for the C-130J’s AE-2100D3 engines and R-391 propellers, under the Option Year IV (5th overall year) of their support contract. Sustaining services will include logistics support, program management support, engineering services, spares and technical data.

At this time, $49.6 million has been committed by the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center GRBKA, at Robins Air Force Base, GA (FA8504-07-D-0001, 0500).

Jan 31/11: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA receives a $69.8 million contract modification to cover support for systems unique to the C-130J fleet, as opposed to systems that are common to C-130Js and earlier model Hercules. The contract exercises the 2nd option, covering years 6 through 8 of logistics support, program management support, engineering services, repairs, spares and technical data.

At this time, $20 million has been committed by the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center GRBKA, at Robins Air Force Base, GA (FA8504-06-D-0001, PO 0015).

Jan 28/11: Iraq, Norway. A $16.9 million contract modification exercises an option to purchase support equipment and spares for Iraq, as well as logistic support services for Norway. Both are C-130J customers, and Norway has already received its 4 aircraft. At this time the entire amount has been obligated by the ASC/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8625-06-C-6456).

Jan 11/10: USA, Norway. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems in Marietta, GA receives a $13.3 million contract modification, exercising an option to purchase support equipment and spares for the United States and Norway.

While the platform is not named, the contract number is the C-130J contract. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the ASC/WLNNC at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8625-06-C-6456).

Indian C-130J-30
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Dec 21/10: Sub-contractors. BAE Systems Technology Solutions & Services in Rockville, MD receives a $12 million contract for C-130J/J-30 Loadmaster crashworthy seats systems. The contract will buy 101 systems: 7 “first article” systems for testing, then up to 88 systems and 6 systems of spares. $8.5 million has been committed by the WR-ALC/GRBK at Robins AFB, GA (FA8504-11-D-0003).

Dec 17/10: India. India’s 1st C-130J is formally delivered in a ceremony at Marietta, GA.

Dec 2/10: South Korea. Lockheed Martin announces a contract with the Republic of Korea for 4 stretched C-130J-30 Super Hercules aircraft, which are a one-for-one replacement of the ROKAF’s 4 C-130H-30s in its 12-plane Hercules fleet. Deliveries will take place in 2014, and the contract also contains a 2-year support program including aircrew and maintenance training.

The absence of a previous DSCA announcement indicates that this is a Direct Commercial Sale. Prices were not disclosed, but the flyaway cost of a C-130J-30 is around $65 million, and the modifications and maintenance agreement will be extra.

South Korea: 4 C-130J-30

Nov 30/10: Training. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $23.3 million contract for the HC/MC-130J Special Operations variant’s weapon systems trainer. At this time, $2,044,798 has been committed by the ASC/WNSK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8621-06-C-6300).

Nov 18/10: Oman request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] The Sultanate of Oman’s request for equipment, support and training associated with 1 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft being bought through a separate Direct Commercial Sale (see June 5/09 entry). The RAFO C-130J-30 would receive 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures System, 7 AN/AAR-54 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 2 AN/ALR- 56M Radar Warning Receivers, 2 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Sets, plus communication and navigation equipment, software support, repair and return, aircraft ferry and refueling support, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is $76 million.

Lockheed Martin sells the C-130, but for this request, the prime contractor will be Northrop Grumman Corporation in Rolling Meadows, IL. Implementation of this proposed sale will require annual trips to Oman involving up to 10 U.S. Government and 10 contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, and program management for a period of approximately 6 years.

DSCA request: Oman support & defensive

Nov 10/10: A $160 million contract modification that commits FY 2010 advance procurement funding for 16 C-130J aircraft that will have their contracts completed in FY 2011. At this time, the entire amount has been committed (FA8625-06-C-6456; P00174).

Nov 8/10: Production accelerating. Flight International reports that Lockheed Martin has entered the final 12 months of F-22A production in Marietta, GA, and details the shifts underway. They add that the plant is also working to treble the C-130J’s production rate, to about 36 aircraft per year.

Oct 7/10: Australian innovation. Australian Defence magazine reports that Australian software investments are about to benefit global C-130J fleets, thanks to strong support from RAAF No. 37 squadron and the DSTO. The software is estimated to save about $2 million in maintenance hours and fuel over the plane’s lifetime. How?

Multi-engine propeller planes need to “balance” their propellers, in order to reduce vibration levels. That’s normally a labor-intensive process involving up to 5 maintenance staff, and multiple ground runs, over 1-2 days. Australia’s DSTO decided to look into a software solution that drew on an existing advanced engine monitoring capability, and coupled it with algorithms that take the flight data. Balancing now takes 2 hours, without the need for engine ground runs.

Flight tests before and after were promising, and the UK, Italy, Denmark, Canada and Norway will begin using the software soon. The USA is still reviewing the software license.

Oct 6/10: India omissions. Indian defense journalist Shiv Aroor lists the technologies that he says will not be in India’s C-130J-30 special forces aircraft, as a result of India’s refusal to sign the USA’s CISMOA End-User Monitoring agreement: AN/ARC-222 SINCGARS radios, KV-119 IFF Digital Transponder (Mode 4 Crypto Applique), TACTERM / ANDVT Secure Voice (HF) Terminal, VINSON KY-58 Secure Voice (UHF/VHF) Module, and no SINCGARS/crypto features in the embedded AN/ARC-210v SATCOM Transceiver.

Oct 5/10: India. The 1st of 6 Indian C-130J-30 special forces aircraft takes flight from Lockheed Martin’s plant and airfield in Marietta, GA.

FY 2010

USA plans to increase buy; Israel buys 1st; Kuwait buys 3; Oman requests 2 and buys 2; Tunisia buys 2; Australian modernization plan; Italian 5-year support deal; US multi-year contract proposal; Deliveries: Canada accepts 1st; Norway’s 4th and last; HC-130J rollout. Danish C-130J
(click to view full)

Sept 13/10: A $59.8 million contract modification to buy 1 more FY 2008 OCO C-130J aircraft. At this time, $39.6 million has been committed (FA8625-06-C-6456; PO0193).

DID offers our readers the usual caveats, and reminds them that buying an aircraft doesn’t necessarily include “government furnished equipment” niceties like engines, etc.

Sept 2/10: A $315.6 million contract modification buy 3 FY 2008 “Overseas Contingency Operations” (supplemental wartime funding) C-130Js; 1 FY 2008 OCO KC-130J aerial tanker/ transport for the US Marines; and 1 FY 2010 HC-130J aircraft for US SOCOM. At this time, $250.8 million has been committed (FA8625-06-C-6456; PO0178).

Aug 31/10: Sub-contractors. UK firm GKN Aerospace announces that they have delivered the 1,000th C-130J engine nacelle. The firm has been supplying these since 1993, and plans to increase production from 18 aircraft sets (72 nacelles) per year in 2008 to “near double that” in 2011. GKN has set up a new state of the art production line at their Isle of Wight facility.

To meet this significant production rate increase GKN Aerospace has moved manufacture to an entirely new, state of the art production line at the Company’s site on the Isle of Wight, UK.

Aug 16/10: Oman contract. The Sultanate of Oman buys 2 C-130J aircraft, to complement the stretched C-130J-30 that’s already under contract for delivery in 2012. When this buy is complete, they will have replaced their existing fleet of 3 1980s-vintage C-130Hs with 3 C-130Js.

The 2 new C-130Js will not be the stretched J-30 version discussed in the July 2/10 DSCA announcement, and will be delivered in 2103 and 2014. Price is not disclosed, and the DSCA announcement referred to a “direct commercial sale” of the aircraft themselves, to accompany Oman’s request to buy up to $54 million worth of defensive equipment and support through the Foreign Military Sale procedure.

Oman: 2 C-130J

Aug 5/10: Italian support. Finmeccanica subsidiary Alenia Aeronautica signs a 5-year, EUR 155 million (about $203 million) contract with the Italian Air Force to provide technical and logistical support services to their fleet of 20-21 C-130Js and C-130J-30s.

Alenia will partner with Avio and Lockheed Martin to offer a fully integrated service that will be responsible for the supply of spare parts, management of the supply chain, equipment maintenance including landing gear, the maintenance of the Air Ground Equipment (AGE), and engineering support activities, including responsibility for the C-130J flight simulator based at the 46th Air Brigade of Pisa.

Alenia will have overall responsibility, and will execute most of the work. Avio will be in charge of the complete propulsion system, including overhaul and technical/logistical and engineering assistance to the Aeronautica Militare’s 92 Rolls Royce AE2100D3 engines. C-130J builder Lockheed Martin will be responsible for the supply of repair components produced in the U.S. and for any modifications. These 3 companies have been providing support and technical and logistical assistance to the Italian C-130J fleet since 2007.

Italy support

HC-130J
click to play video

July 29/10: The 1st production HC-130J personnel recovery variant flies at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Marietta, GA. It’s due for delivery to USAF Air Combat Command in September 2010, and is scheduled to reach initial operational capability in 2012. An Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOCOM) MC-130J variant of this aircraft will fly in early 2011.

July 20/10: Canada Engine support. Rolls Royce announces a contract from Lockheed Martin. The base contract to support the Canadian CC-130Js’ AE 2100D3 engines is worth USD $70 million, and the entire contract could be worth up to $260 million over the CC-130J fleet’s lifetime.

Under this contract, Rolls-Royce will be providing all engine management and repair, logistics support and on-site technical support for the engine. It is paired with the long-term fleet support contract mentioned in the Dec 18/09 entry. Read “Replacing Canada’s Failing CC-130s: 17 C-130Js” for full coverage.

Canada engine support

July 1/10: Norway. The last of 4 ordered RNoAF C-130J-30s heads off to Norway. Read “Norway Renews Its Tactical Transport Fleet” for full coverage.

Norway: all delivered

July 2/10: Oman request. The US DSCA announces Oman’s request to buy additional equipment, logistics support, and training for 2 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, which are being bought via a Direct Commercial Sale outside of the DSCA’s Foreign Military Sales process. Additional military equipment bought under FMS rules includes 2 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 2 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, 2 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Sets, plus communication equipment, software support, repair and return, installation, aircraft ferry and refueling support, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $54 million.

The Royal Air Force of Oman currently operates 3 C-130H aircraft, and has already bought 1 C-130J-30 (q.v. June 5/09). They can absorb the new equipment, but a sale would require annual trips to Oman involving up to 10 U.S. Government and 10 contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, and program management for a period of approximately 6 years.

DSCA request: Oman support & training

June 18/10: Multi-year proposal. The Hill reports that Lockheed Martin continues to work on a multi-year C-130J buy, and that the current negotiations for 65 C-130Js would serve as a starting point. Lockheed Martin’s international VP for air mobility business development, Jack Crisler, says the key target is 10% savings demonstrated, adding that his firm plans to propose the multi-year contract in September-October 2010.

The proposal could also become more inclusive, potentially adding US Special Operations and US Coast Guard aircraft. If other multi-year deals serve as any guide, the deal might also end up including foreign buys, which would benefit from the US government’s volume pricing. USAF acquisition chief David Van Buren says the USAF is receptive to the idea, but past discussions haven’t shown that 10%+ savings over the existing year-by-year contracts. The USAF reportedly pegs the current price of a C-130J, without spares or Government-Furnished Equipment such as engines and some electronics, optional refueling pods, etc. at $57.6 million.

June 4/10: Canada acceptance. Canada formally accepts the first of 17 CC-130J Super Hercules aircraft, to the Canadian Forces 8 Wing in Trenton, ON, 6 months ahead of the original delivery schedule. The remaining 16 aircraft will begin delivery in winter 2010 as planned, with deliveries running into 2012. Canadian DND.

May 27/10: Kuwait contract. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA announces a $245 million contract to provide 3 KC-130J aerial tankers to the government of Kuwait. This order is part of a larger approved request to buy up to 8 KC-130Js and associated equipment (see July 20/09 entry).

KC-130Js will provide aerial refueling for the Kuwait air force’s F/A-18 C/D fighter fleet, and augment its current airlift fleet of 3 L-100s (civilian C-130). Kuwait’s KC-130Js also will perform air mobility, disaster relief and humanitarian missions throughout the world.

Kuwait: 3 KC-130J

April 30/10: Israel +1. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA receives a $98.6 million contract, to provide one C-130J aircraft for the government of Israel. The contract also includes additional non-developmental items for the aircraft, and $18.5 million of foreign military financing has been committed by the 657th AESS at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8625-06-C-6456).

This order has been some time in negotiation, and follows a July 30/08 DSCA announcement that covered up to $1.9 billion for 9 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, with Special Operations features.

Israel: 1 C-130J-30

April 19/10: HC-130J rollout. Lockheed Martin rolls out the first HC-130J combat rescue tanker, at an official ceremony in Marietta, GA. The 563rd Rescue Group, based at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ and at Kirtland AFB, NM will be the first bases to receive the new model for training purposes once it has undergone initial testing, which typically takes about a year. Initial Operational Capability is slated for 2012. Maj. Gen. Thomas K. Andersen, USAF Air Combat Command’s director of requirements, said that:

“The recapitalization of the C-130 fleet is a big deal and the new model represents a quantum leap in technology which allows us to continue completing the mission. Right now, the C-130 has one of the lowest availability rates [emphasis DID’s] in the Air Force and the introduction of the J-model will increase that rate by 46% as well as decrease needed crewmembers from 7 to 5.”

The HC-130J, like all of the Special Forces C-130Js, uses a KC-130J tanker baseline. It adds the Enhanced Service Life Wing, Enhanced Cargo Handling System, a dorsal aerial refueling boom receptacle, an electro-optical/infrared sensor, a combat systems operator station on the flight deck, and provisions for the large aircraft infrared countermeasures system (LAIRCM) missile defense system. The maintenance techs especially appreciate the C-130J-standard improved diagnostic systems, as opposed to the C-130H models’ more manual approach. Lockheed Martin is currently contracted to build 21 HC/MC-130Js, and the USAF is currently authorized to buy up to 31 (11 HC-130J, 20 MC-130J). USAF | Lockheed Martin.

HC-130J rollout

April 6/10: Engines. Rolls-Royce announces $51 million engine production and MissionCare services contract for the AE 2100D3 engines on the USMC’s KC-130J tanker. The award falls under a 4-year contract with US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), which is administered at NAS Patuxent River, MD.

Rolls-Royce will provide engines, engine management, support, trouble shooting, parts supply and logistics support for aircraft operating at 3 US Marine Air Stations: Miramar, CA; Cherry Point, NC; and Okinawa, Japan.

April 3/10: The first HC-130J combat rescue tanker leaves Lockheed Martin’s main assembly building in Marietta, GA. The plane next steps include a trip to the painting facility, production flight testing, and formal presentation to the USAF on April 19/10. The HC-130J will be delivered later in 2010, then undergo operational flight testing to meet an Initial Operating Capability target of mid-2012. Lockheed Martin release.

April 1/10: Support. Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA received a $77.1 million modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-09-D-0015) to provide additional funding for logistics and engineering services in support of the US Marine Corps KC-130J aircraft.

Work will be performed in Cherry Point, NC (36%), Miramar, CA (36%), and Okinawa, Japan (28%), and is expected to be complete in December 2010. The Naval Air Systems Command manages the contract.

April 1/10: SAR – more C-130Js. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. The C-130J is featured, because the US military wants more of them:

“C-130J – Program costs increased $3,148.8 million (+26.2%) from $12,029.3 million to $15,178.1 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 34 aircraft from 134 to 168 aircraft (+$2,749.3 million), and increases in other support costs (+$972.8 million) and initial spares (+$394.7 million) associated with the quantity increase. These increases were partially offset by decreases for actual contract values for aircraft costs (-$541.5 million), to properly account for advanced procurement that was erroneously reflected in the previous report (-$246.0 million), and for funding reductions in fiscal 2010 through fiscal 2015 (-$140.9 million).”

SAR – more C-130Js

March 2/10: Tunisia contract. Lockheed Martin announces an unspecified contract with Tunisia for 2 C-130J-30 stretched transports, and says the contract was signed in February 2010.

Deliveries are scheduled for 2013-2014, and the Tunisian contract also contains an initial 3 years of logistics support. The country currently operates a fleet of C-130Hs and C-130Bs, first purchased in the mid-1980s.

Tunisia: 2 C-130J-30

Feb 25/10: Australia upgrades. Australia’s government announces that they have approved AUD $45 million to upgrade and modernize their C-130J fleet, as part of a multi-national Joint User Group Global Project Arrangement with United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Canada and Italy. The “Block 7.0” upgrades will address system obsolescence, maintain international compatibility, and enable these aircraft to comply with new global air traffic standards. Defence minister Sen. Faulkner is quoted as saying that:

“Importantly, there is likely to be significant opportunity for Australian Industry to be involved in the national installation and support of the upgrade. Funding for these elements will be considered by Government following successful testing of the first modification kit on an Australian C-130J. [as a] risk management strategy.”

Feb 1/10: Engines. Rolls-Royce Corp. of Indianapolis, IN receives a $146 million firm-fixed-price contract, exercising Option III (year 4) of logistics support, program management support, engineering services, spares and technical data in support of the C-130J propulsion systems. This includes the AE2100D3 engine, and the R-391 propeller as well.

At this time, $42.7 million has been committed by the 330th ACSG/GFKA at Robins AFB, GA (FA8504-07-D-0001, Delivery #0400).

Jan 22/10: Support. A $16.7 million contract completely funds an “engineering change proposal” (ECP) to replace the C-130J’s Star VII mission computer. (FA8625-06-C-6456).

Jan 13/10: Canada. The 1st Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules produced for Canada leaves the company’s paint facility in Marietta, Georgia.

CC-130J: just painted
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Dec 18/09: Canada support. The Government of Canada signs a C$ 723 million (currently $698 million) contract amendment with Lockheed Martin. This initial CC-130J fleet support funding covers an initial 5 1/2 year period ending June 30/16.

The contract also includes a mechanism to extend the period of in-service support throughout the fleet’s service life, to 20 years or more. Public Works Canada release.

Canada support

Dec 22/09: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $14.5 million contract to provide FY 2010 operations and maintenance services for the C-130J. At this time, $3.5 million has been committed (FA8621-06-C-6300, P000046).

Dec 19/09: The 86th Airlift Wing at Ramstein AB, Germany, flies its first C-130J Super Hercules mission in support of U.S. Air Forces Africa to bring home 17 American troops from a training mission in Mali. 37th Airlift squadron of the 86th Airlift Wing, 17th Air Force flew the mission.

The USAF release cites the C-130J’s increased range as a helpful factor in Africa, and also cites the aircraft’s improved cargo capacity, especially in hot and/or high-altitude conditions. A pickup of this nature exercises the former but not the latter, expanding operational familiarity with the aircraft, in return for higher operating costs to perform this particular mission.

Nov 23/09: Italian crash. Italian air force C-130J #MM62176 crashes and burns after a touch-and-go landing, during a routine training sortie from Pisa. The crash kills both pilots, and all 3 passengers. It could have been worse – the plane crashed on a nearby railway line, but an oncoming train managed to stop.

C-130J MM62176 was delivered to Italy in 2000 as its 1st of 12 regular C-130Js, but was later adapted for tanker applications. The Italians have not halted flying operations with their remaining 21 C-130Js, which include 1 KC-130J and 10 stretched C-130J-30s.

This is not the 1st C-130J lost. On Feb 12/07, A UK Royal Air Force C-130J was extensively damaged by 2 land mines that were detonated while it was landing on a semi-prepared strip in southern Iraq. The British decided to destroy the plane. Flight International.

Crash

Nov 9/09: Engines. Rolls-Royce announces an $8.5 million contract to provide AE 2100D3 spare engine parts to power the C-130J military transport aircraft for the US Air Force. As part of this order, deployable kits and initial provisioning spares will be delivered to Cannon AFB in NM, Dyess AFB in TX and Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

The contract, which is managed by Robins Air Force Base in GA, involves an initial 956 AE 2100D3 spare engines parts for delivery through 2011.

Oct 20/09: Industrial. Lockheed Martin CFO Bruce Tanner, discussing Q3 2009 earnings, reveals that global C-130J deliveries will grow from 12 aircraft in 2008 to 16 in 2009 and 26 in 2010. Q3 Earnings slides [PDF] | Flight International.

Oct 19/09: Shadow Harvest. Flight International reports that Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division wants clearance to export its “Shadow Harvest” roll-on/roll-off suite of intelligence sensors for the C-130 Hercules, which was developed for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with sponsorship from the Miami, Florida-based Southern Command.

Shadow Harvest is designed to identify targets concealed under camouflage or foliage, and reportedly includes BAE’s SPIRITT hyperspectral camera, and a low frequency/ multi-band synthetic aperture radar (MB-SAR), among other sensors, plus containerized roll on/off controllers and displays. It’s expected to become an official USAF program of record by 2012.

Oct 19/09: C-130 plans. Flight International has a video of 2 USAF Colonels who are answering questions regarding a number of C-130-related programs, including potential future gunships, programs to add weapons to C-130s beyond the USMC’s KC-130Js, SOCOM programs, etc.

Oct 16/09: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Marietta, GA received an $827.4 million contract for advance procurement funding for 3 FY 2010 C-130J aircraft, 4 FY 2010 HC-130J aircraft, and 4 FY 2010 MC-130J aircraft. An option is being exercised for the acquisition of 1 HC-130J aircraft to be fully funded with FY10 funds. Note that MC/HC-130Js are Special Operations aircraft.

At this time, $8.3 million has been obligated. The 657 AESS/SYKA at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH manages the contract (FA8625-06-C-6456, P00087).

Oct 5/09: Lockheed Martin officially launches production of its HC/MC-130J special forces search-and-rescue aircraft. Future upgrades involve an internal investment to design a retractable housing for the aircraft’s MTS-A turret, in order to reduce drag and extend range. Other possibilities reportedly include airframe changes to accommodate more equipment, possibly including an enlarged nose section, and a wider cross-section for the fuselage. Flight International.

FY 2009

Qatar orders 4; Iraq orders 4; USA begins arming C-130Js; UAE says “maybe”; France interested – really?!?; Australian 5-year support deal; Canadian 5-year support deal; Shadow Harvest kit clearance?; Italian crash; Video re: USAF thinking. AE2100 engine
c. Rolls-Royce plc 2009
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Sept 30/09: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp., of Orlando FL received a $9.9 million contract which will provide for FY 2010 C-130J maintenance and training, as orders are placed by the 677th AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8621-06-C-6300).

Sept 10/09: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an $11.1 million modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-09-D-0020) from the U.S. Marine Corps, for 3 of the C-130J’s AE2100D3 turboprop engines. Work will be performed in Cherry Point, N.C., and is expected to be complete in May 2012. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract.

Aug 24/09: Engines. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Marietta, GA receives a $30.2 million modified contract to purchase the quick engine change assemblies for American C/KC/BC/HC/MC-130J aircraft, and Foreign Military Sale aircraft for Norway and India.

“At this time $31,972,726 has been obligated.” The US Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages this contract (FA8625-06-C-6456).

Aug 11/09: Iraq order. A $140.3 million unfinalized firm-fixed-price contract modification for 2 more Iraqi C-130J-30s, completing their 6-aircraft request. The contract also includes engineering and integration tasks associated with Iraq’s distinctive C-130J-30 configuration.

At this time no funds have been obligated. The 657 AESS at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH manages this contract (FA8625-06-C-6456/P00098). Read “Iraq Orders C-130Js” for all contracts and requests related to that program.

Iraq: 2 C-130J-30

July 20/09: Kuwait request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Kuwait’s official request to buy up to 8 KC-130J cargo/refueling aircraft and associated equipment, parts and support for an estimated cost $1.8 billion. This would significantly upgrade Kuwait’s air force, which currently lacks aerial refueling aircraft, and depends on just 3 L100 civilian C-130E equivalents for transport duties. Kuwait’s purchase would reinforce a trend in the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has seen similar purchases and requests in the last year from Saudi Arabia (A330s), Qatar (C-130J-30s), and the UAE (C-17s, C-130Js pending).

Kuwait has requested 8 KC-130Js with the accompanying 32 AE-2100D3 Turbo propeller engines, plus 8 spare AE-2100D3 Turbo propeller engines, 4 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, 4 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 4 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispenser Sets, and 20 AN/ARC-210 (RT-1851A(U)) Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency HAVEQUICK/SINCGARS Radio Systems. The contract, to be negotiated, would also include spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, and other related elements of program support.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Marietta, Georgia. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

DSCA request: Kuwait KC-130J (8)

June 5-15/09: France? With the A400M program seriously behind schedule, and a fleet of C-160 and Lockheed Martin C-130H tactical transports that continue to see heavy demand, France is apparently looking at the one option its government had said would not be considered.

French Defense Minister Herve Morin is quoted as saying that the government has expanded its stopgap options to include lease or purchase of some C-130Js; and Bloomberg reports that France has officially requested C-130J availability and performance data for review. Other possibilities for France include stepped up per-hour leasing of Russian AN-124s under NATO’s SALIS pool, per-hour C-17 leasing under NATO’s SAC pool, acquisition or lease of EADS’ smaller C-295Ms, or advancing their planned Airbus 330 MRTT aerial tanker & transport buy. France has also approved the modernization of its 10 newest C160 Transalls so they can remain in service until the first A400Ms arrive, which is now expected to happen in 2014-15.

These options group themselves by tradeoffs. Some contenders (C-295M, A330 MRTT) lack the reinforced floors required for dense tactical loads like armored vehicles. Others (AN-124, A330 MRTT, C-17s to lesser extent) require longer runways to operate from, which removes some of their utility as front line delivery aircraft. Range and refueling capability are potential issues for some (C-295M, some C-130Js), while maintaining overall fleet strength and front line airlift availability is a concern in other cases (AN-124, C-17, A330 MRTT to some extent). The C-130J sits in the middle of many of these tradeoffs, which may be why it has climbed back into consideration. Bloomberg.

June 5/09: Oman order. Lockheed Martin announces that the Sultanate of Oman has ordered a single stretched C-130J-30, to complement its 3 existing C-130H aircraft which were bought in the 1980s. Price is not disclosed.

The Lockheed Martin release doesn’t mention the UAE as a customer, despite earlier reports that contracts had been negotiated at IDEX 2009 (see Feb 25/09 entry). Company representatives informed DID that they are in final negotiations with the UAE, but have no contract yet, adding that negotiations are also underway with Israel (see July 30/08 entry).

Oman: 1 C-130J-30

May 27/09: Engines. Rolls-Royce announces an $80 million contract to provide AE 2100D3 spare engines and parts to power the C-130J military transport aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, the Royal Norwegian Air Force and the Indian Air Force.

The contract, which is managed by Robins Air Force Base in GA, involves an initial 27 AE 2100D3 spare engines and parts for delivery through 2011.

May 8/09: Armed C-130Js. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Marietta, GA received a $22.8 million firm-fixed-price contract to develop a roll-on, roll-off armed targeting capability for the Marine Corps’ KC-130J. The program is known as Harvest Hawk.

Work will be performed in Palmdale, CA and is expected to be complete in December 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $15.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-09-C-0053).

May 4/09: Armed C-130Js. The USAF is also interested in roll-on armament for its C-130 fleet, and issues a PIXS solicitation for a “Precision Strike Pkg 360 Degree Situational Awareness Camera System.” The solicitation adds that:

“This system would operate at altitudes at or above 10,000 feet and act as a hostile fire indicator system to provide aircrew with the ability to virtually scan the outside of the aircraft for hostile ground threats that would possibly target them. This system is part of a broader Persistence Strike Package (PSP). The purpose of the PSP program is to add a modular PSP to a medium lift cargo aircraft, to include a medium caliber gun and Stand-Off Precision Guided Munitions (SOPGM).”

April 30/09: Iraq order. Lockheed Martin of Marietta, GA receives a maximum $292.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy 4 C-130J-30 aircraft for the Iraqi government. At this time, $6.9 million has been obligated. The 657 AESS in Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH issued the contract (FA8625-06-C-6456,P00080).

Note the July 25/08 entry. The initial request was for 6 aircraft. Since the DSCA request went unchallenged, Iraq’s government has the freedom to buy up to 2 more aircraft at a later date.

Iraq: 4 C-130J-30

April 30/09: The Air Force is modifying a fixed price contract with Lockheed Martin Corp., of Marietta, GA for $15.8 million. This contract modification will exercise options to purchase Special Forces configuration equipment for 6 MC-130J Global War on Terror aircraft. At this time, the entire amount has been obligated. 657 AESS, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio is the contracting activity (FA8625-06-C-6456).

March 11/09: Australia support deal. Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) announces a contract to EADS Eurocopter subsidiary Australian Aerospace to provide Through Life Support services for the RAAF’s fleet of 12 C-130J and stretched C-130J-30 Hercules aircraft. Australian Aerospace already supports the RAAF’s AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft, so this is not a huge departure for the firm. Lockheed Martin will be the sub-contractor for aircraft maintenance, engineering, and supply chain management; and engine support will continue to be provided by Dubai Aerospace Enterprise subsidiary StandardAero under an existing contract arrangement.

The contract is worth up to A$ 292 million, and is structured as a 5-year rolling contract whose continuation will reportedly be linked to demonstrated performance and cost containment, with an eye to: improved delivery of services; performance-based, long-term, support arrangements; relationship with the Commonwealth; price disclosure; and meaningful transfer of risk. Contract extensions can continue under these arrangements, through to expected life-of-type in 2030.

RAAF Air Vice-Marshal Thorne says that the contract will create over 80 additional industry jobs in the Sydney/Richmond area over the next year. Australian DoD.

Australia support

March 5/09: Britain. Britain’s RAF is under strain, trying to sustain an aerial supply bridge for 8,000 deployed troops in Afghanistan. With its 20 C-130Ks (C1/C3) being forced toward retirement, Aviation Week reports [link now broken] that Britain is looking at the possibility of leasing 5 C-130Js as a potential “bridge” until the A400Ms can begin to arrive, and/or finding ways to add to their 6-plane C-17 fleet.

Senior British Defense Ministry officials are believed to have met on March 4/09 to examine proposals for the ministry’s next “Planning Round 09.” Airlift and budget issues would have been prominent within those discussions.

Feb 27/09: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $106 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for logistics support, technical engineering support services, and spare engines and associated parts for the U.S. Marine Corps KC-130J, which includes the AE2100D3 turboprop engine and Dowty R391 propeller.

The KC-130J MissionCare contract is a single contract line item number is used to pay a fixed price based on aircraft hours flown. Under the terms of the agreement, Rolls-Royce will provide engine management, support, trouble shooting, parts supply and logistics support for the aircraft, operating at 3 U.S. Marine Air Stations: Miramar, CA, Cherry Point, NC and Okinawa, Japan.

The contract covers a base year plus 3 option years, with the base year funded at $39.1 million and running to February 2010. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-09-D-0020).

Feb 26/09: Norway engine support. Rolls-Royce announces a $23 million MissionCare support services and spares contract for AE 2100D3 engines. The engines are installed on the Royal Norwegian Air Force’s (RNoAF) C-130Js.

The contract is modeled after the USAF’s Power By The Hour contract, providing a comprehensive support package to the RNoAF on a per-engine flight-hour basis. The contract covers on-site technical support, maintenance support, training, provision of spare parts, supply replenishment with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for the engine, and supply of an R391 Dowty propeller.

Feb 25/09: UAE. The UAE announces an AED 5.9 billion (about $1.6 billion) deal for 12 of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J medium-range tactical transports, which will accompany a deal for 4 of Boeing’s larger C-17s. Abu Dhabi’s privately-owned Waha Capital usually finances airline purchases, and has been tapped to finance the C-17 and C-130J contracts.

Neither deal is finalized, and the C-17 contract takes a while. The C-130J contract remains unsigned as of September 2012.

Feb 2/09: Engines. The USAF is modifying a contract to Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN for $120 million, in return for spares, program management support, engineering services, and technical data in support of the C-130J’s AE 2100D3 engine and R-391 propeller. At this time $17.5 million has been committed, and the contract will be managed by 330 ACSG/GFKA at Robins AFB, GA (FA8504-07-D-0001, P00004).

Dec 16/08: Industrial. Reuters reports that Lockheed Chairman and CEO Robert Stevens told the Reuters Aerospace and Defense Summit in Washington that the company expected to sell “hundreds [of C-130Js] domestically and hopefully hundreds internationally” in coming years. “We’re building one airplane a month and our goal is to maybe double that…” he said.

Dec 12/08: Engines. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN received a $6 million modification to a previously awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract (N00019-03-D-0002). The Us Marine Corps is buying 2 more AE2100D3 turboprop engines for their KC-130Js.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete in July 2010. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract.

Dec 3/08: Canada. The Ottawa Citizen’s defense reporter Davd Pugliese reports that Canada has signed a contract for early delivery of 2 of its 15 ordered C-130Js. One aircraft will arrive in June 2010, and the other will arrive in July 2010.

This still misses the RFP’s original must-deliver date of early 2009, but that was based on a contract being signed in 2006, instead of in 2008. Under the signed 2008 contract, the delivery deadline for the first Canadian C-130J would have been January 2011.

Dec 1/08: MC-130J mods. The USAF is modifying a firm-fixed-price not-to-exceed $74.9 million contract to Lockheed Martin Corp in Marietta, GA. It includes time and material and cost reimbursement, and covers an Engineering Change Proposal for one-time efforts to incorporate Special Operations Forces-unique modifications in the MC-130J. At this time, $19.6 million has been committed (FA8625-06-C-6456).

ULA Nixes Aerojet Rocketdyne Offer | Pentagon Office Critical of Marines F-35 Tests in Leaked Memo | UK’s MoD Signs $462M Contract for ASRAAM Missiles

Thu, 17/09/2015 - 02:18

Americas

A leaked memo has uncovered serious concerns over the Marine Corps’ operational testing of F-35B aircraft aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1) in May, undermining the aircraft’s Initial Operating Capability in July. The memo, penned by the director of the Pentagon’s Operational Test and Evaluation Office, cites a poor availability rate, a lack of realistic operational challenges and an absence of key mission systems. The first has been noted before, with this new memo as critical of how the tests were designed and supported as the aircraft themselves, including the discovery that the Wasp required software upgrades to communicate effectively with the F-35Bs.
The first KC-46A tanker is expected to fly on 25 September, following a year-long delay. The trouble-hit tanker has become a headache for Boeing, which has been absorbing increasing development costs through a firm-fixed contract signed in February 2011 which capped Air Force costs at $4.9 billion. The most recent setback resulted from an accident involving the insertion of chemicals into the aircraft’s refuelling system in early August, pushing the tanker’s schedule back by a month. The first KC-46A is scheduled to demonstrate mid-air refuelling in early 2016, with a milestone C decision and subsequent low-rate initial production production contracts anticipated for April.
The Missile Defense Agency opened the procurement process for the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA back in July, according to reports Wednesday. Raytheon revealed at DSEI that the MDA awarded an $87 million long-lead materials procurement contract to the company, with a follow-on for additional materials expected early next year. The opening contract provides for the materials necessary to produce 17 of the exo-atmospheric missiles, designed to hit and kill ballistic missiles; these are slated for testing and will also equip an Aegis Ashore facility in Poland. Flight testing with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 5.1 system is also expected to take place in late 2016, following a rescheduling in September 2011. A cooperative US-Japanese program, the Block IIA is slated to value approximately $20-24 million per missile and is 7.5″ larger than the 13.5″ Block I variants.
Boeing has rejected an unsolicited bid from Aerojet Rocketdyne to buy the United Launch Alliance joint venture, of which Boeing owns a 50% share along with Lockheed Martin. The $2 billion offer was also reportedly rejected by Lockheed Martin, owner of the remaining 50%. The engine manufacturer Aerojet Rocketdyne also announced on Wednesday that development of the AR-1 rocket engine, intended to replace the Russian RD-180 rockets currently used, could be delayed without sufficient US government funding, with the engine currently scheduled for certification in 2019, the same year as use of the RD-180 by the Air Force comes to an end.
Sikorsky was handed a $22.6 million Foreign Military Sales contract modification to produce two UH-60M helicopters for the Mexican Navy, following a DSCA request in March for three of the helicopters. The original request application was for five Blackhawks, with a host of other intelligence, mission planning and communications systems as well as spares. In December 2014 the company was similarly awarded a $56.4 million modification to produce five UH-60Ms for Mexico, following two orders in September 2014 for 8 and 18 UH-60Ms, worth $93.2 million and $203.6 million respectively. The four orders are all scheduled to deliver the helicopters in May and June 2016.

Europe

The United Kingdom has awarded a contract to Raytheon’s UK subsidiary for the development of a penetrating warhead for the Paveway IV guided bomb. Intended to equip the Royal Air Force’s fleet of Eurofighters, the new munition is scheduled to enter service in 2019 and replace the current penetration capability provided by the RAF’s Tornado GR4s and Paveway III bombs. The new warheads will fit existing stockpiles, with BAE Systems handling the integration work. Raytheon UK has stated that the new warhead will likely equip the RAF’s F-35Bs and could do the same with Reaper UAVs.
The UK’s Ministry of Defence also signed an eight-year, $462 million contract with MBDA for upgraded ASRAAM missiles. The AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile found export customers in India last year, with Australia also ordering the missile for use on the RAAF’s F/A-18 fighters. The UK first welcomed the missile into service in January 2002, after a nine-month dispute over acceptance.
Slovakia has become the first customer for Saab’s Carl Gustav M4 recoilless rifle, the company announced on Wednesday. The anti-tank weapon has also been acquired by two other undisclosed countries for evaluation, with it first unveiled in September 2014. Capable of launching programmable ammunition, including anti-personnel, anti-structure and illumination rounds, the system reportedly weighs around 7kg (15.4lb).

Middle East North Africa

The Saudis are reportedly set to choose Lockheed Martin’s Littoral Combat Ship for the country’s Arabian Gulf-based frigate modernisation program, with a deal thought to be announced by the end of the year. The company is one of two teams constructing LCS for the US Navy. The Saudis have previously requested the ability for their LCS vessels to launch Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) air defense missiles but are thought to have dropped previous plans to procure the Aegis combat system owing to cost.

Asia & Pacific

Malaysia is buying STARstreak air defense missiles and ForceSHIELD integrated air defense systems, with Ministers from the United Kingdom and Malaysia signing official support for the deal at DSEI. The signing gives the official nod to a deal reported in July between Thales UK and Malaysian partner Global Komited. The deal, valuing over $154 million, includes radar control systems, mobile weapons systems and communications systems.
The Royal Thai Army has also placed a multi-million dollar order for STARstreak missiles, following an original order in November 2012. Aside from Thailand and now Malaysa, Indonesia is another regional customer for the STARstreak, ordering the system in January 2014.
North Korea is reportedly planning to launch a new satellite, a possible indicator of advancements in ballistic missile technology, potentially indicating an increase in range or payload. The North has also restarted its nuclear reactor, a worry for international security as the country looks to miniaturize nuclear weapons sufficiently to equip a missile. The North’s claim that this has been achieved is doubtful, however plans to launch a satellite are likely a cover for testing of a potential delivery system.
India has successfully tested the indigenously-developed second generation Amogha-1 anti-tank missile, the first missile designed and tested by the Bharat Dynamics Ltd company. The two missiles reportedly struck targets at ranges of 2.6km and 2.8km, with the company planning to offer the missiles to the Indian Army after qualification and certification.

Today’s Video

Interception testing of the Standard Missile-3 Block IA in November 2014:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Armed & Versatile: Sikorsky’s ‘Battlehawk’ Helicopters

Thu, 17/09/2015 - 02:17

AH-60L
(click to view larger)

The UH-60M Black Hawk is currently the most advanced UH-60/S-70 model, whose variants are in service with the US Army and over 20 other countries around the world. To date, UH-60M customers include the USA, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, plus a request from Egypt. Unlike global competitors such as Russia’s Mi-8/17 series, however, the UH-60’s operational armament is generally limited to door guns. That may be about to change, thanks to a UAE initiative.

Colombia currently flies the armed S-70 “Arpia III”, and Sikorsky has worked on armed “AH-60” versions as an offering in some foreign competitions, but efforts to sell the concept in Australia and elsewhere were less successful. Nevertheless, Sikorsky executives see considerable potential for multi-role helicopters and conversion kits, in an era of global insurgencies, tight budgets, and limited helicopter numbers. Now, the UAE has become their launch customer. What is Sikorsky’s Battlehawk, and what are their plans?

The Battlehawk Concept and Sikorsky’s Kits MH-60Rs fire Hellfire
(click to view full)

Armed H-60 helicopters are not new. Naval Seahawks can be armed with a variety of weapons including Mk54 torpedoes, Penguin anti-ship missiles, and Hellfire anti-armor missiles. On land, US Special Operations have been arming their MH-60s to various levels, and Colombia’s S-70 “Arpia III” helicopters can mount rockets and forward-firing gun pods. Even a US Army UH-60L model has provision for Hellfire missiles, but the US Army has elected not to add the necessary equipment to make that an operational capability.

Australia was offered an “AH-60” for its armed reconnaissance helicopter competition, but chose the dedicated Eurocopter Tiger ARH instead. Nevertheless, Sikorsky believes that tight budgets will push existing and future customers toward multi-role helicopters. Colombia’s success led to Sikorsky’s announcement of its Battlehawk program at the 2006 Farnborough international air show, and interest from Israel and the UAE led to a refined 3-level set of kits. A mature Battlehawk program could give Sikorsky an important export edge over rivals like the European NH90 TTH, and offer feature parity with Russia’s popular Mi-17.

Technically, “Battlehawk” is a Sikorsky trademark, referring to a new-build UH-60M helicopter with a full weapons kit. The company’s larger goal is actually a set of kits that can be retrofitted to existing aircraft, or incorporated into newer models to take advantage of more advanced features. In most cases, the cost of conversion will be higher for older helicopters, because a larger number of systems must be upgraded. This can be offset somewhat by upgrading them to a lower level, to reduce the number of modifications needed.

Sikorsky’s initiative really took off with the UAE’s February 2011 order, and Sikorsky representatives say that this kit will be available for export to other customers. The firm is happy to talk to new partners, but integration of new capabilities and specific weapons will occur on a customer by customer basis, and the choices made by those initial customers will help to define the initial kits offered.

Battlehawk: 3 Kits Colombian Arpia
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Level 1 Kits already exist, in Colombia’s UH-60L/ S-70 Arpia models. They were fitted with surveillance turrets under the nose, and added stub wings to mount fixed weapons like gatling guns or unguided rockets, but these helicopters have no guided weapon capabilities. This is the cheapest kit conversion, and the most proven. The helicopter retains its full cabin capacity, and may retain its full soldier load, depending on the weight of the weapons fitted and ammunition carried.

Level 2 Kits would add guided weapons, including optical and laser guided anti-armor missiles like TOW, Spike, and Hellfire, and emerging laser-guided rockets. The baseline under consideration in 2009 would mount 12.7mm/.50 caliber gatling guns on the inboard pylon pair, and either missiles or a 19-rocket launcher on the outboard pylons. This will include laser-guided missiles and rockets, and combat optics are upgraded accordingly; the baseline configuration’s AN/AAQ-22E BRITE Star II turret or L-3 WESCAM MX-15Di include laser targeting, as well as surveillance. The armed kit be integrated with the helicopter’s flight and weapons management systems, which will link to a day/night capable helmet-mounted display.

A helicopter with this kit retains its full cabin capacity for 11 soldiers, but its ability to carry that many on a specific mission will depend on the weight of the weapons it’s fitted with. Owners may also choose to devote some of its space and weight limits to mounted and/or in-cabin ammunition and weapons, extra fuel on board, 2 door gunners with 7.62mm gatling miniguns, etc. As equipment is added, troop carrying capacity will decline.

Battlehawk Level 3

Level 3 Kits would add all Level 2 features, plus a gun turret on its underside for 180 degree firepower. The Israelis tested a French 20mm turret from Nexter, which has been developed to equip a number of helicopter types around the world. Unlike other conversions, the Level 3 kit does eat into the helicopter’s forward cabin space, reducing the number of soldiers it can carry.

Over time, Sikorsky personnel expect that the options available under the 3 weapon kits will grow. As a simple example, special operations helicopters can add fuel tanks to extend the helicopter’s range or staying power. As of December 2009, however, Sikorsky representatives said that “wet pylon” capabilities weren’t part of their program. Other options will likely present themselves, as customers show interest.

The Israeli Tests, & the UAE Israeli Lvl-3 demonstrator
(click to view larger)

The Israeli Air Force has already conducted a number of tests, under a program that lasted from November 2007 – December 2009. Sikorsky participated in conjunction with Israeli manufacturers Elbit Systems and RAFAEL, and France’s Nexter. Testing used an Israeli Air Force (IAF) S-70A-55 Black Hawk helicopter, modified with Elbit’s weapon management system and ANVIS-HUD helmet mounted display, Elbit/ATK GATR-L laser-guided 70mm rockets, RAFAEL Spike-ER optical anti-armor missiles, and Nexter’s 20mm belly turret. The gun was a particular testing concern due to its required airframe modifications and potential for vibration issues, but it proved accurate and reportedly placed little stress on the airframe.

Sikorsky has marketing agreements with Elbit and Rafael for joint marketing of this demonstrator configuration, which could give the concept a boost in Israel, South America, and some countries in Europe and Asia, where those Israeli firms have developed solid relationships. The Israeli efforts were proof of concept and flight tests rather than an official integration program, however, and do not represent formal qualification of the weapons involved. Once a customer signs on, therefore, Sikorsky would need to include and charge for production qualification, full weapon qualification, full avionics integration, and reliability and component life testing.

The United Arab Emirates’ formal 2008 Foreign Military Sale request made them the expected launch customer for the UH-60M Armed Blackhawk mission kit, and that finally came to pass in 2011.

Sikorsky can leverage previous structural and electronics work from the Israeli demonstrations, and the UAE can replace Israeli equipment with alternatives like Cirit laser-guided rockets, sensors and helmet-mounted sights from other manufacturers, etc. Their DSCA request lays out an initial equipment set that appears to correspond to the Level 2 kit – but note that the Level 3 kit’s Nexter 20mm gun comes from France, and would not be subject to US DSCA disclosure if the UAE wanted it at any time.

The UAE has taken on pioneering roles in the past by paying for R&D programs like its Mirage 2000v5 and F-16 E/F Block 60 jet fighters, and earned millions of dollars in licensing revenues when Dassault exported the Mirage 2000-5 design to other countries. While Sikorsky representatives would not talk publicly about this dimension, they did note that the UAE’s fully-qualified kit would be available for export on the global market. A similar sort of royalty agreement with the UAE should be expected.

Contracts and Key Events Part-converted UH-60M
(click to view full)

September 17/15: Sikorsky was handed a $22.6 million Foreign Military Sales contract modification to produce two UH-60M helicopters for the Mexican Navy, following a DSCA request in March for three of the helicopters. The original request application was for five Blackhawks, with a host of other intelligence, mission planning and communications systems as well as spares. In December 2014 the company was similarly awarded a $56.4 million modification to produce five UH-60Ms for Mexico, following two orders in September 2014 for 8 and 18 UH-60Ms, worth $93.2 million and $203.6 million respectively. The four orders are all scheduled to deliver the helicopters in May and June 2016.

July 24/14: Tunisia. The US DSCA announces Tunisia’s official request for 12 UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters, complete with Level 2 Battlehawk kits that allow them to be used as attack helicopters. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT; and GE in Lynn, MA are the core contractors, but the overall request includes:

12 UH-60Ms in standard US configuration
30 T700-GE-701D Engines (24 installed and 6 spares)
30 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles
26 Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Inertial Navigation Systems
30 MXF-4027 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency radios
15 AN/APX-117 IFF Transponders
15 AN/ARC-220 radios
15 Very High Frequency/Digitally Selective Calling radios
15 ARN-147 VOR/ILS, 15 AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation Systems
6 Aviation Mission Planning Systems
1 Aviation Ground Power Unit
15 Wescam MX-15Di or Brite Star II day/night surveillance turrets with laser designators
24 M134 7.62mm Machine Guns
24 GAU-19 .50 cal Machine Guns
Integration of Precision Guided Rocket System capability to permit launch of laser-guided variants of 2.75 rockets
24 M261 Hydra-70 Rocket Pods
9,100 2.75″/ 70mm Hydra Rockets. Laser guidance would come as a bolt-on kit from BAE (APKWS), Lockheed (DAGR), Raytheon (TALON), Rojetsan (Cirit), et. al.
20 M299 4-missile Hellfire launch systems
100 AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles
15 AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems
15 AN/APR-39A(V)4s Radar Warning Receivers
15 AN/AVR-2B(V)1s Laser Warning Systems
Plus aircraft warranty, ammunition, air worthiness support, site surveys, facility construction, spare and repair parts, support equipment, communication equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, tool and test equipment, and other US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $700 million, or about $58.3 million per helicopter with weapons and support.

Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of 3 U.S. Government and 5 contractor representatives in Tunisia to support the delivery and training for 2-5 years. Sources: US DSCA #14-23, “Tunisia – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters”.

DSCA request: Tunisia UH-60M Battlehawks (12)

Dec 30/11: Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives an $81.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, “to convert UH-60M aircraft to the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces unique configuration.”

Discussions with Sikorsky representatives reveal that this add-on contract finalizes both the recent 14-helicopter order, and the original 26-helicopter order. Of the UAE’s contracted helicopters, 30 have been delivered so far, including all of the 14 helicopters ordered in 2009. Remaining conversions to the UAE’s base UH-60M configuration actually involve a few helicopters from the original order for 26 UH-60Ms. The contract for armed helicopter kits and qualification continues as a separate effort.

Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the UAE’s Foreign Military Sale contract agent, US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).

Oct 11/11: UAE. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $38.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, as a follow-on to its Dec 29/09 contract to buy 14 UH-60Ms. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages this contract (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).

As noted earlier, this is not a confirmed Battlehawk contract. It will be up to the UAE to decide which of its 40 UH-60M helicopters to modify with the kits, though new-build machines may be seen as an easier option.

Feb 21/11: UAE. At IDEX 2011, the UAE announces an AED 993.5 million (about $270.5 million) order from Sikorsky, through the Abu Dhabi Aircraft Technologies Company, to upgrade 23 UH-60Ms with Battlehawk kits. This makes the UAE Battlehawk’s launch customer. The bulk of the work will be undertaken by the AMMROC maintenance, overhaul and repair joint venture between Sikorsky and Abu Dhabi Aircraft Technologies.

Sikorsky representatives later said that the number announced at IDEX isn’t necessarily their number. They did confirm that this Direct Commercial Sale contract includes the additional development and qualification work, for a kit that they believe will be among the most sophisticated helicopter weapons capabilities in the world. The first helicopters with their fully-qualified kits aren’t expected before 2014.

A 2nd AED 65 million (about $17.7 million) deal with Sikorsky will train Black Hawk pilots and technicians. Defense News | Janes.

UAE: Battlehawk contract

Dec 29/09: UAE. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $171 million firm-fixed-price contract to produce 14 UH-60M helicopters, plus conversion to the UAE’s unique configuration. Work is to be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/12 (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).

Sikorsky has confirmed that these are not full Battlehawk helicopters, just the exercise of an option that will raise the UAE’s total UH-60M fleet to 40 machines. Battlehawk kits will be a separate contract. See also Oct 11/11, Dec 30/11 entries.

UAE: 14 UH-60Ms

Sept 9/08: UAE. the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces the United Arab Emirates’ formal request to buy additional UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, plus weaponization kits and weapons/ Those kits would turn some UH-60Ms into multi-role attack helicopters that could transport troops, or operate in a light attack role alongside the UAE’s existing fleet of AH-64 Apache heavy attack helicopters.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formal request includes:

14 more UH-60M helicopters with engines. When added to the previous order for 26, this option would bring the country’s UH-60M fleet to 40.
6 T700-GE-701D spare engines
14 AN/ALQ-144Av3 Infrared (IR) Countermeasure Sets
14 AN/APR-39Av4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets
14 AAR-57v3 Common Missile Warning Systems
14 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets

The request also states that the UAE is also looking to “weaponize” 23 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, and is interested in the following additional weapons.

30 M299 Hellfire launchers, each of which can hold 4 Hellfire missiles, or up to 16 DAGR laser-guided rockets, or any combination thereof. The UAE already operates these on its AH-64 fleet.
390 AGM-114N Hellfire II missiles. The AGM-114N is the “Augmented Metal Charge” (thermobaric/ fuel-air) version of the laser-guided Hellfire II. Its devastating explosions can kill or suffocate enemies in caves, collapse buildings, or do significant damage to enemies in an open blast area.
8 Hellfire training missiles.
23,916 MK-66 Mod 4 2.75″/ 70mm Rocket Systems in the following configuration: 1,000 M229 High Explosive Point Detonate, 540 M255A1 Flechette (anti-personnel darts), 1,152 M264 RP Smoke, 528 M274 Smoke Signature, 495 M278 Flare, 720 M274 Infrared Flare, 20,016 HA23 Practice rockets. The UAE’s TALON program with Raytheon is creating a bolt-on laser-guidance option for 70mm rockets like this.
22 of General Dynamics’ GAU-19 3-barrel, .50 caliber/ 12.7 mm externally-powered gatling gun systems.
93 of Dillon Aero’s M-134 6-barrel, 7.62mm ‘mini-gun’ gatling guns.
Spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, aircraft survivability equipment, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

The estimated cost of these items is $774 million. While the various sub-systems and weapons are made by a number of manufacturers, the principal contractors will be: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation of Stratford, CT and General Electric of Lynn, MA (engines). The USE does have an active industrial offsets program, and will be requesting them in negotiations with the contractors involved.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 6-8 Contractor Field Service representatives to the United Arab Emirates for approximately 2 years after initial fielding, to assist in the delivery and deployment of the helicopters.

DSCA request: UAE (14 UH-60Ms and armed kits)

Additional Readings & Sources

DID would like to thank Sikorsky’s Ray Burke (Battlehawk Program Manager), Mike Ambrose (VP – International Military), and Matt Rodgers (Black Hawk program Marketing Manager) for their assistance and clarifications regarding the firm’s Armed Black Hawk programs.

Sikorsky – BattleHawk(TM)
Global Security – AH-60L / S-70 Battle Hawk.

Key Weapons & Systems

FLIR Systems – BRITE Star. A day/night surveillance and targeting turret. Used in Level 2+ options. Level 1 Arpia-III S-70s appear to be using FLIR’s STAR Safire HD instead.
DID – US Hellfire Missile Orders, FY 2011-2014. Includes a breakdown of the different Hellfire variants. The AGM-114R is the most recent.
DID – Hydra, Awakened: Guided Air-Ground Rockets. Most are laser-guided, via bolt-on additions to standard 70mm rockets. Options include BAE’s APKWS-II, Elbit & ATK’s GATR, Kongberg & MDA’s CRV-7PG, Lockheed’s DAGR, Raytheon’s TALON, and Roketsan’s CIRIT.
L-3 WESCAM – MX-15D. The “D” suffix indicates laser designation capability for laser-guided weapons. Used in Level 2+ options.
RAFAEL – SPIKE Family of multi-purpose, tactical missiles. Dual IIR/ fiber optic visual command guidance; SPIKE-ER used on Israel’s Level 3 demonstrator.
Nexter – Their THL 20 is a 20mm cannon turret designed to equip light helicopters.

News & Views

Sikorsky (Dec 14/09) – Armed BLACK HAWK Demonstrator Completes Test Program. This is the Israeli demonstrator program.
Jerusalem Post (Aug 30/09) – IAF testing new Black Hawk models [dead link]. Israel may be set to join Colombia and the UAE in this concept, though no commitment has been made: “The arming of the Black Hawk is being done jointly by the IAF, Sikorsky and several local defense contractors. One of the helicopters has already successfully test-fired an air-to-surface missile. The helicopter has also been equipped with a rapid-fire cannon that sits under the aircraft’s belly.”

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Paveway IV Dual-Guidance Bomb On Aircraft Integration Path

Thu, 17/09/2015 - 02:16

Paveway-IV components
(click to view larger)

In 2003, Raytheon UK operation won the GBP 120 million pound contract to develop and produce Paveway IV, beating Boeing’s INS/GPS guided JDAM. The GPS/INS and laser-guided 500-pound bombs are a British project, and will add a number of other enhancements, including longer range than previous Paveway versions.

The British military had wanted to deploy Raytheon’s latest Paveway IV bombs in Afghanistan by September 2007, on board its newly-upgraded Harrier GR9 aircraft. Unfortunately, testing problems with Thales UK’s Aurora fuze removed that option. The MoD found a way to deploy the smart bombs with lesser capabilities by December 2007, and eventually deployed full Paveway IVs on its Harriers in Afghanistan. The weapon is now ready for use with its Tornado GR4 strike aircraft, which are replacing the Harriers, and has been qualified on the RAF’s Eurofighters.

Paveway IV: Capabilities and Challenges Deliberate miss

Paveway IV is a 500 pound guided bomb, with limited glide capabilities using its tail fins. When integration work on the different aircraft types is added, the National Audit Office’s 2006 Major Projects Report forecast overall development costs of GBP 341 million. Raytheon UK has contracts to integrate Paveway IV on the F-35B (July 2007 contract, GBP 24 million), Tornado GR4 (agreement in principle, contract February 2008, in service by 2010, used in Libya 2011), and Eurofighter Typhoon F2 (issued from BAE, in service). It’s also scheduled to enter service with Britain’s F-35Bs as an internally-carried weapon, once the Block 3F software is fielded (scheduled 2018, but software delays make 2019 or later likely).

The Paveway IV brings 2 significant new capabilities to the table for the RAF, and for any future export customers.

One is joint laser/GPS guidance. GPS/INS guidance allows pilots to bomb from safe altitudes through clouds, into duststorms, and in other conditions that would make laser guidance impossible. When it can work, laser guidance offers more accuracy due to last minute corrections, and can even be used to hit moving targets under certain conditions.

Paveway-IV modes
(click to view larger)

The other key capabilities Paveway IV brings reside in its programmable attack modes, which can be set from the cockpit during a mission.

One set of modes involves attack style. Within its range, which depends upon variables like speed and altitude of launch, the pilot can select a desired direction of approach and angle of impact. This improves the likelihood of the weapon’s arrival on target, and lowers the possibility of collateral damage in crowded urban areas.

The other programmable pilot option involves weapon fuzing. A UK-developed fail-safe fuse mechanism means that the bomb will only detonate once it has reached its intended target. When it does, the bomb has 3 fuzing modes. Airburst detonates at a set height above ground, to maximize the effect on soft targets out in the open. Detonate on impact is the standard mode. Delayed detonation after impact maximizes the bomb’s effect on hardened targets, by ensuring that more of the blast takes place inside.

The UK MoD’s SPEAR (Selective Precision Effects at Range) CAP 1 program will enhance the bomb with low collateral damage and penetrator warhead options, enhanced moving target capability thanks to laser seeker improvements, and enhanced range.

Challenge, and Response Paveway-IV partners
(click to view full)

Unfortunately, those Thales “Aurora” variable fuzes turned out to be a problem. UK MoD, 2007:

“As a result of poor system reliability during operational evaluation trials, the Paveway IV in-service date is likely to slip. Mitigation action is being investigated and we cannot, as yet, confirm the new date.”

While other aspects of the system performed well, fuze difficulties mean bombs that don’t go off.

Fortunately for the Ministry, the Paveway IV contract was firm-priced, so the contractors bore the burden of any cost overruns caused by testing failures, re-work, extended schedules, etc. That work began quickly, even as production of other Paveway IV components continued. Once the fuzing issue was sorted out, deliveries would be able to ramp up as quickly as possible.

In the meantime, a clever swap gave British forces the front-line solution they needed. Since production of other components was underway, the RAF could join the Paveway-IV’s Enhanced Computer Control Group to an existing Paveway-II bomb. That gave them a usable weapon with all-weather capability, while waiting for the fuze fix.

Defense News’ August 20/07 report quoted Raytheon UK Paveway IV program manager John Michel, who believed that qualification of the complete Paveway-IV would be delayed at least until November 2007, with an estimated sign-off on the weapon’s final design certification coming at the end of 2007, and a new set of capability trials during “the first half of 2008.” He was reasonably close; front line usage began in November 2008.

Paveway IV: Contracts & Key Events 2015

Development of Penetrating Warhead ordered;

September 17/15: The United Kingdom has awarded a contract to Raytheon’s UK subsidiary for the development of a penetrating warhead for the Paveway IV guided bomb. Intended to equip the Royal Air Force’s fleet of Eurofighters, the new munition is scheduled to enter service in 2019 and replace the current penetration capability provided by the RAF’s Tornado GR4s and Paveway III bombs. The new warheads will fit existing stockpiles, with BAE Systems handling the integration work. Raytheon UK has stated that the new warhead will likely equip the RAF’s F-35Bs and could do the same with Reaper UAVs.

2013 – 2014

Saudi export sale; Eurofighter qualification; SPEAR upgrades. RSAF Eurofighter

Nov 27/14: UK F-35s. BAE Systems announces that initial aircraft handling trials were successfully conducted by a UK test team at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, MD. 9 flights were performed by 2 F-35Bs carrying dummy Paveway IVs and ASRAAMs. The next series of tests will take place early next year with weapon separation then guided releases. This comes right after the Ministry of Defence signed a contract for the 1st production batch of 4 F-35Bs.

Nov 25/14: UK Typhoons. Trials continue to test air-to-surface capability onto the Typhoon Tranche 2 aircraft. Following last year’s P1E upgrades (q.v. Oct 28/13), the latest P1Eb program includes the successful release of 2 Paveway IV munitions to multiple targets, out of a possible 6 guided bombs RAF Typhoons will be able to carry. The test was executed by No 1(Fighter) Squadron at Cape Wrath Training Area.

P1Eb is focused on air to ground capabilities with enhancements to the Litening III Laser Designator Pod (LDP) and Helmet Equipment Assembly (HEA) (helmet mounted sight) integration. As of mid-October 2014 the RAF had 17 aircraft upgraded to that configuration. Source: Royal Air Force.

Nov 18/14: Penetrator variant. Defense News reports that according to the MoD, work is still underway on requirements and preliminary design of a bunker busting capability. This follows a July 11/12 announcement that at the time laid out 25 months of tests, under the SPEAR enhancement program. So this project has stretched by a few months beyond its original schedule but the MoD still sounds rather tentative, describing it as “potential future compact penetrator capability” [emphasis DID]. Source: Defense News, RAF To Be Equipped With Bunker Busting Version of Paveway IV.

March 25/14: Exports. The Paveway IV has its 1st export customer. It will equip an “unidentified” nation, after long delays created by American attempts to use its ITAR weapons export procedures for protectionist purposes (q.v. July 16/13). The 2010 request was reportedly cleared in February 2014. One is surprised that Britain didn’t simply design the American technologies out.

The deal is generally believed to be worth around GBP 150 million, to equip the Saudi Arabian Air Force’s Tornado and Typhoon fighters. Deliveries are expected between 2015 – 2017.

It’s a timely order, as Britain’s replenishment buy (q.v. Dec 4/12) is finishing up to create about 4,000 total deliveries so far. Elsewhere in the Gulf, Oman should begin receiving their Eurofighters soon, creating another potential export customer now that there’s a precedent for ITAR clearance. Sources: Defense News, “Raytheon Secures First Export for Paveway IV” | Raytheon April 11/14, “Raytheon Awarded First International Contract for Paveway IV”.

Saudi export order

Oct 28/13: Eurofighter. The Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancements (P1E) program has finished flight testing in Manching, Germany and Getafe, Spain. the upgrades will be ready for installation and retrofit on existing Tranche 2 and new Tranche 3 aircraft by the end of 2013.

P1E implements full Air-to-Surface capability, with full integration of a Laser Designator Pod (RAFAEL LITENING III), full smart bomb integration (Paveway laser-guided, and dual-mode Paveway IV/ EGBU-16 with GPS and laser), Helmet Mounted Sight System upgrades for ground attack use, Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe, improved Radios and Direct Voice Input, Digital integration of Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (full IRIS-T integration with HMSS for high off-boresight shots, and allowing future AIM-9X integration), and an updated MIDS/Link-16 Datalink for wider interoperability. All of these enhancements will come factory-installed in Tranche 3 aircraft. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 28/13 | Aviation Week, “Partners Chart Course For Eurofighter Typhoon Enhancements”.

July 26/13: Upgrades. AIN interviews Raytheon UK’s chief engineer of weapons systems, T.J. Marsden. Over 1,000 Paveway IVs have been dropped by the RAF so far, and Raytheon is preparing a number of upgrades under Britain’s Selected Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) Capability 1 program.

One is a low collateral-damage warhead, which has undergone hydrocode modeling with help from QinetiQ and Cranfield University, and is moving to the prototype stage. A second project with QinetiQ involved a penetrator warhead (q.v. July 11/12), using a new discarding shroud design. The 3rd set of changes involves guidance: SASSM GPS anti-jam technology, proportional navigation for laser guidance, and a digitized laser seeker with a wider field of view for fast, maneuvering targets. Sources: AIN, “Raytheon UK Describes Paveway IV Upgrades”.

July 16/13: Saudi Arabia. IHS Jane’s reports that a Paveway IV export deal with Saudi Arabia is close.

“A long-awaited sale to Saudi Arabia of Raytheon’s Paveway IV precision-guided bomb is close to being signed…. will equip Eurofighter Typhoons with the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)…. A senior programme source has told IHS Jane’s that “there is an imminent first export customer for the Paveway IV and we expect to have that signed and secured before the end of the year.” The source noted that the deal had been delayed by US technology transfer concerns and, specifically, a “reluctance by [the US] State [Department] to release that kind of capability into the region”.”

That last bit, of course, is pure bunk. Yes, the US State Department has placed itself in the way of British Paveway IV sales (q.v. March 19/12, June 2012). Somehow, the same State Department approved and released a Saudi DSCA export request on Oct 20/10, which included up to 1,000 Lockheed Martin DMLGB bombs. They match the Paveway IV very closely: 500 pound bombs with dual GPS/laser guidance. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Saudi Paveway IV deal gets the green light”.

2011 – 2012

Britain buys more, but USA stalls export sales; Eurofighter integration. Paveway IV on Tornado
(click to view full)

Dec 4/12: UK. Raytheon UK announces a GBP 25 million contract to supply the RAF with more Paveway IVs. This latest contract will adhere to the accelerated delivery timeframe of the 2 previous orders, placed over the last year. This order would bring the total for all 3 to about GBP 99 million (about $160 million at this point). UK MoD | Raytheon.

UK buy

July 11/12: UK Buy, Penetrator variant. Raytheon UK announces a GBP 14 million British order for Paveway-IV bombs.

The release also announces progress on a “bunker busting” penetrator warhead, in collaboration with QinetiQ and Thales. The new variant has the same outer shape and mass, and has just finished sled trials at the Pendine test range. Next steps in the 25 month initiative will include transportation, handling and air carriage tests. Raytheon UK and QinetiQ have been working closely with Thales on this aspect of the SPEAR CAP 1 program, under the UK’s Weapon Technology Centre Compact Penetrator program.

UK buy

June 2012: Saudi Arabia. Combat Aircraft reports that Saudi Arabia is considering France’s AASM Hammer GPS-guided bombs for its Eurofighter Typhoons, given problems securing American export approval for Raytheon UK’s dual-mode Paveway IV. The SBU-38 GPS-guided and SBU-54 dual-mode GPS/IIR variants are deployed on French aircraft, and a dual-mode SBU-64 AASM laser/GPS variant is in testing.

The bad news is that the Saudis would have to pay full freight for integration of the AASM onto the Eurofighter, then find a way to get it squeezed into existing P1E development priorities. Sources: Combat Aircraft, “Saudi Typhoon Advances.”

April 3/12: UK. The UK gives Raytheon UK a GBP 60 million (currently about $95 million) replenishment contract, to restore the national stockpile in the wake of the Libya conflict. Raytheon had already begun long lead-time procurement and worked with its supply chain, shortening the delivery schedule from 18 months to 7 months. The UK MoD is certainly enthusiastic about the weapon, vid. Wing Commander Clive Roads, IGMR FreeFall IPT Leader:

“The MOD is extremely pleased to work with a company which understands the operational imperative, placing this first in their support to our Forces. Raytheon UK have been able to react very quickly to the need to replenish our stocks of… Paveway IV… to maintain our ability to react at short notice to emerging threats. The weapon has now been extensively used in all types of employment roles and has proven to exceed all expectations for reliability, accuracy and its ability to limit collateral damage through its sophisticated and integrated guidance, and fuzing systems.”

Raytheon adds that it will pursue a number of export opportunities for Paveway IV, “particularly where Typhoon and Tornado are deployed and the weapon is already integrated.” The export customer prospect list for Tornado & Eurofighter comprises Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Saudi Arabia. Germany, Italy & Spain aim to equip their Typhoons with the dual-mode EGBU-16 Paveway-III, which suggests that Raytheon UK may have its best opportunity with the Saudis. UK MoD | Raytheon.

UK buy & Export prospects

March 19/12: Saudi Arabia. Defense News reports that the USA is blocking efforts to sell Paveway IVs to Saudi Arabia:

“The deal to sell Paveway IV weapons developed by Raytheon’s U.K. arm has been on the table since mid-2010, but the U.S. State Department has rebuffed British efforts to secure ITAR approval despite high-level intervention by the government…”

Which is odd, because they allowed a request for DMLGB weapons with the same capabilities to become part of Saudi Arabia’s OCT20/10 DSCA export request. Sources: Defense News, “U.K., U.S. at Odds Over Saudi Deal”.

Dec 5/11: Eurofighter. Raytheon announces that the Paveway-IV has been successfully released from (vid. March 5/11) and integrated with the Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighter. The release says that “Initial operational capability is planned for 2011,” but it’s the end of 2011 already. The original schedule was 2013.

July 5/11: Support. Raytheon announces a 4-year, GBP 10 million (about $16 million) contract to continue in-service support for Britain’s full set of Paveway weapons, including the new Paveway IVs. Raytheon UK will be responsible for configuration management, design support, obsolescence, safety management, spares provision and quality assurance. Flt. Lt. Chris Wright, 31Sqn QWI, was quoted re: Paveway IV use in Afghanistan and Libya:

“Paveway IV has brought us to a new level in weaponeering capability. Simple to employ with generous launch envelopes, the ability to alter the flight, impact and fusing of the weapon in-cockpit all the way until release, gives aircrew huge flexibility in achieving the exact effect desired. This has resulted in it being our weapon of choice for a wide range of targets and is hugely popular with Forward Air Controllers who love the range of effects available in one weapon from airburst to delay fusing, and hybrid laser and GPS guidance.”

This agreement builds on the 2005 RaPID agreement.

March 7/11: Eurofighter. The first ever Eurofighter release of a Paveway IV dual guidance bomb takes place from development aircraft IPA6, in an hour long test flight over the Aberporth Range in Wales. BAE Systems | Eurofighter GmbH, incl photo.

Jan 20/11: Raytheon announces a $475 million contract with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for Paveway II and Paveway III kits, including dual-mode Enhanced Paveway weapons with laser and GPS guidance. Read “Saudi Smart Bombs: Paveways from Raytheon“.

2007 – 2010

Initial problems overcome; Harriers qualified; Tornado GR4s qualified; Paveway IV operational. Paveway IV on Harrier
(click to view full)

July 16/09: Tornado. A UK Ministry of Defence article announces that Paveway IV is ready for operational use on Britain’s Tornado GR4 strike aircraft, which are replacing the Harriers at Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan.

Tornado ready

Dec 10/08: Operational. The UK Ministry of Defence officially declares that the Paveway IV has entered operational service. At the moment, its sole platform is the Harrier GR9. A Defense News article contends that the weapon deployed to Afghanistan in November, and has been used in combat. UK MoD | Defense News.

Into service

Aug 1/08: Testing. The Royal Air Force reports that the Paveway IV has completed its combined Demonstration of Capability and Operational Evaluation Trials, which were conducted in the USA at the Naval Air Warfare Centre in China Lake, CA. The trials demonstrated the full range of Paveway IV’s capabilities, including all of the weapon’s fuzing modes. The RAF added that:

“Whilst the formal AWC trials reporting process is ongoing, there were no issues identified which would prevent the weapon’s progression into Service.”

The tests were conducted using Harrier GR9 aircraft. As noted above, further integration of Paveway IV onto Britain’s Tornado GR4 strike fighters and Eurofighter Typhoons is underway, and weapon integration will also be extended to the future F-35B Lightning II.

Feb 20/07: Tornado. Raytheon’s UK subsidiary adds the RAF’s Tornado GR4/4A strike aircraft to its strike contracts, moving from agreement in principle to a GBP 8.5 million (about $16.6 million) contract to integrate the weapon with that fighter fleet in 2010.

The program will focus on providing weapon system performance documentation, advice to the development of the aircraft stores management systems, and flight clearance of the weapon onto the aircraft. In support of the flight trials and certification program, Raytheon will provide BAE Systems with the required trials hardware and weapon system simulators. Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ, will supply the enhanced computer control group, telemetry sub-systems, instrumentation, test equipment and associated support. Raytheon release.

GR9 with Paveway-IVs
(click to view full)

Dec 6/07: Redesign. When there’s a will, there’s a way. In response to an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) for better aerial support in Afghanistan, representatives from BAE Systems and the MOD met key suppliers in the United Kingdom and America (Raytheon Missile Systems, Portsmouth Aviation Limited, and EDO-MBM). Contracts were exchanged in just 10 days, and 4 months later, weapons are headed into theater.

How to get around the problems with Paveway-IV? By joining the Enhanced Computer Control Group from a Paveway-IV to an existing Paveway-II bomb. Integration of the new weapon, rig test, flight trials, weapon performance analysis and certification are all complete, and the hybrid weapon provides the UK’s GR9A Harriers with an integrated precision bombing capability that will still work through clouds, dust storms, and other obscurants. UK MoD release.

Interim solution

Additional Readings

UK MoD’s DSTL – Precision guided Paveway IV.
Raytheon UK – Paveway IV brochure [PDF, 2007 snapshot]. It’s de-emphasized on the corporate site, mentioned under Raytheon UK Missile Systems.
RAF – Paveway IV
UK Defence Suppliers Directory (not MoD) – Precision Guided Bomb (PGB) Weapons System (Paveway IV)

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships

Thu, 17/09/2015 - 02:15

Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, the Navy hasn’t been able to reconcile what they wanted with the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, or with what could be delivered for the sums available. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. Now, the program looks set to end early. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

LCS: Concept & Needs LCS-I missions
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Ultimately, the US Navy is trying to replace 56 vessels: 30 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters.

The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are spawning in regions with shallow seas, where the ability to operate near-shore and even in rivers will be vital for mission success.

That requires the ability to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. It also requires intelligence gathering and scouting, some ground combat support capabilities, and the ability to act as a local command node, sharing tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

At the same time, however, the US Navy needs ships that can act as low-end fillers in other traditional fleet roles, and operate in the presence of missile-armed enemy vessels and/or aerial threats.

Given the diversity of possible missions in the shallow-water and near-shore littoral zones, and the potential threats from forces on land, any ship designed for these tasks must be both versatile and stealthy. History also suggests that they need to be able to take a punch. Meanwhile, the reality of ships that are expected to remain in service for over 30 years gives rise to a need for electronic longevity. As the saga of the USA’s cost-effective but short-lived FFG-7 frigates proved, “future-proofing” and upgradeability for key systems, electronics, and weapons will be critical if these small surface combatants are to remain useful throughout their mechanical lives.

While a ship’s hull and design makes a number of its performance parameters difficult to change, the Americans believed they may have a solution that lets them upgrade sensors and key systems. Denmark’s Standard Flex 300 corvettes pioneered a revolutionary approach of swappable mission modules, based on ISO containers. In contrast to the traditional approach, which is to cram a wide-ranging set of bolted-in compromise equipment into fixed installations, “flex ships” can radically changes the ships’ capabilities, by swapping in a full breadth of equipment focused on a particular need.

Swappable modules also give the Navy new options over time. One option is technology-based, via spiral development that focuses on rapid insertions of new equipment. This creates a long series of slight improvements in the mission modules, and hence the ship’s capabilities. Over time, the cumulative effect can be very significant. The 2nd benefit is cost-related, since upgrades require far less work and cost to install when mission technologies evolve. The 3rd benefit is risk-related. The ability to do low-cost, spiral upgrades encourages frequent “refreshes” that remain within the existing state of the art, rather than periodic upgrade programs that must stretch what’s possible, in order to handle expected developments over the next 25 years.

LCS: Designs & Teams

There are currently 2 different LCS designs being produced and procured as part of the competition.

LCS-1 Freedom Class Monohull

Team Lockheed Martin’s LCS-1 Freedom Class offers a proven high-speed semi-planing monohull, based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. The design will use the firm’s COMBATSS-21 combat system as the fighting electronic heart of the ship, has shock-hardened the engine systems, and uses a combination of a steel hull and aluminum superstructure. USS Freedom has faced persistent reports of weight and stability issues, however, which required additional bolt-on buoyancy fittings at its stern.

Team Lockheed LCS
(click to view full)

The ships have a smaller flight deck than the Independence Class at 5,200 square feet, but a larger 4,680 square foot helicopter hangar. The Freedom Class’ LCS mission bay is the biggest difference – it’s under half the size, at 6,500 square feet. On the other hand, its RAM missile launcher is the 21-round Mk.49, and if the ships need weapon upgrades, export designs stemming from the Freedom Class mount full strike-length Mk.41 vertical launch cells. These can handle any vertically-launched system in the fleet, including SM-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, and Tomahawk long-range precision attack missiles.

Lockheed’s core team includes various Lockheed divisions, plus naval architects Gibbs & Cox of Arlington, VA; shipbuilder Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; and shipbuilder Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI. Niche providers and related partnerships include:

Angle Incorporated
Argon ST (threat detection systems)
Blohm + Voss
Data Links Solutions
DRS Technologies
EADS (TRS-3D radar)
Fairbanks Morse (Colt-Pielstick PA6B-STC diesel engines)
Fincantieri (diesel generators)
Izar (now Navantia)
L-3 Communications
MAAG Gear AG
MacTaggart Scott
Raytheon
Rolls Royce (MT30 gas turbines, shaftlines, bearings, software, Kamewa waterjets)
Sensytech
Sperry
Terma
Unidynamics
United Defense, now BAE Systems

LCS-2 Independence Class Trimaran USS Independence
(click to view full)

The LCS-2 Independence Class offers a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran, based on Austal designs and experience with vessels like the US Marines’ Westpac Express high-speed transport, and the Army and Navy’s TSV/HSV ships. It offers an especially large flight deck (7,300 square feet) and internal mission volume (15,200 square feet mission bay) for its size, with a 3,500 square foot helicopter hangar. The hull is aluminum, but the trimaran design offers additional stability options, and may help the ship survive side hits.

The Independence Class will carry a General Dynamics designed combat system, and standard LCS weapon fittings. The RAM defensive missile launcher sacrifices some size, but the 11-round SeaRAM is a self-contained unit with its own radar. If the LCS should require a full suite of naval weapons in future, export designs based on the this class tout “tactical-length” vertical launch cells that are limited to shorter weapons like RIM-162 ESSM and SM-2 air defense missiles, and VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles.

Not anymore…

The initial teaming arrangement was led by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipbuilder as prime integrator, with Austal of Mobile, AL (a subsidiary of Austal Ships of Australia) as the main design partner and ship-building site. That alliance was broken by the requirements of the 2010 RFP, which demanded a 2nd builder for the designs that was unaffiliated with the first.

Austal is now the sole prime contractor for the LCS-2 Independence Class design. GD subsidiaries remain heavily involved, including General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products Division in Burlington, VT; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA; and General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. Other key participants include:

Boeing in Seattle, WA
BAE Systems in Rockville, MD
L3 Communications Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA
Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD
Maritime Applied Physics Corporation in Baltimore, MD
GE (LM 2500 gas turbines)
MTU (8000 Series diesel engines)
Saab (AN/SPS-77v1 Sea Giraffe AMB radar)
Wartsila (water jets)

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Packages… LCS Flight 0 Basics
(click to view full)

At 115 – 127 meters in length and 2,800 – 3,100 tons of displacement, the USA’s competing LCS ship designs are almost the size of Britain’s Type 23 frigates. They might well be classified as frigates, were it not for their shallow water design and employment. For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. As such, both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull offer potential top speeds of 40-50 knots over short distances.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, the ship will carry a BAE Systems Mk.110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, and Mk.295 ammunition that works against aerial, surface or ground threats. The ship will also carry .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine guns, plus defensive systems including automated chaff/flare dispensers and a launcher for Raytheon’s RIM-116 RAM Rolling Airframe Missile. RAM is designed to handle anti-ship missiles, aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, and even small boats, but its range of just 9 km/ 5 nm will only protect its own ship. Unlike larger missiles such as the RIM-162 ESSM, RAM systems cannot perform fleet defense.

LCS ships will also rely on their onboard MH-60 helicopters and/or MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs, plus other robotic vehicles including a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). The terms have changed over time, but the US Navy has downgraded the term “mission modules” to mean individual components plus their support equipment. Integrated packages of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission are now called “mission packages.” They include all task-related mission modules, onboard aircraft, and their corresponding crew detachments.

The ships’ first and most important mission package is not officially listed. It consists of a small but very cross-trained crew. LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 (now 50) sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a Blue crew and a Gold crew, which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations.

There are concerns that this is a design weakness, leaving the LCS crew at the edge of its capabilities to just run the ship, with insufficient on-board maintenance capabilities, and too little left over for contingencies such as boarding and search, damage control, illnesses, etc. USS Freedom’s addition of 10 more bunks before her 1st Asian deployment indicates that the US Navy may be about to concede this point, but even with 50, performance wasn’t great.

Beyond the human element, the LCS program will initially draw upon packages for Mine Warfare (MCM: 24 planned), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW: 16 planned) and Surface Warfare (SUW: 24 planned). The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies to these ends, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module. Costs per module have gone down over time, but that hasn’t been from any genius in planning and fielding. Rather, it results from a high program failure rate of individual components, and their replacement in the program by less expensive items:

The following DID articles offer in-depth coverage of current and proposed Mission Packages:

It’s All in the Package: the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mission Modules. Covers the full set of mission packages.
LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development. MCM is the most complex module, and receives a dedicated article.

LCS: Controversies & Cautions Into battle
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The cost and size of LCS ships are now comparable to other countries’ high-end naval frigates. As the US Navy’s primary low-end vessels in the future fleet, they will be expected to perform many of the same roles. The cargo hold’s size has created some challenges in fitting all of the required equipment into the mission modules, without compromising high-end performance at the modules’ particular tasks. Even so, LCS ships can be expected to perform the mine countermeasures role very well, and the frigates’ traditional anti-submarine role reasonably well, thanks to their helicopters, array of robots, and rapidly upgradeable systems.

Other traditional roles for frigate-sized vessels are more controversial. The biggest controversy surrounds the ships’ one severe inflexibility: their weapons fit.

Present LCS designs don’t even carry torpedo tubes, or vertical-launch systems (VLS) that could accommodate present and future attack and/or defensive missiles. Even with the Surface Warfare module installed, LCS ships will carry a very light armament set for a major naval vessel: a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system; RIM-116 SeaRAM short range defensive missiles; 30mm cannons that would replace very short range Griffin missile launchers if installed; 12.7mm machine guns; plus any missiles or 70mm rockets carried by its accompanying helicopters (up to 2 H-60 slots or up to 4 MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV slots).

That armament is closer to a support vessel than a naval surface combatant, and larger high-speed support designs like the JHSV would offer far more mission module space for reconfigurable specialty support ships. Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett has pithily described the current compromise as:

“…3000 ton speedboat chasers with the endurance of a Swedish corvette, the weapon payload of a German logistics ship, and the cargo hold of a small North Korean arms smuggler.”

LCS-I components
(click to view full)

The LCS weapons array also compares unfavorably with comparable-sized frigates that can perform the full array of anti-submarine, fleet air defense, and naval combat roles. The new Franco-Italian FREMM Class, or even Britain’s much older Type 23/Duke Class, outclass it considerably as multi-role ships. So do smaller corvettes like Israel’s US-built, $260 million Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, and Sweden’s ultra-stealthy Visby Class. Even the tiny Danish Flyvefisken Class, whose swappable “flex ship” modules helped pave the way for the LCS idea, has a Mk 48 vertical launch system that can handle medium-range air defense missiles, and mounts launchers for Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

LCS’ lack of weaponry may not matter against small boats like the “Boghammers,” fielded by the Iranians during their late-1980s guerrilla warfare at sea against the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, many nations field 90’+ Fast Attack Craft equipped with anti-ship missiles. Despite being 1/3 the LCS’ length and 1/5 of its displacement or less, their employment would create a threat that could attack an LCS from beyond its range of reasonable retaliation, with weapons that the LCS’ may not be able to stop or survive.

It’s telling that brochures for the International LCS versions offered by each team feature a major radar capability boost via the small SPY-1F AEGIS system or other radar upgrade, and are armed with torpedo tubes, anti-ship missiles and vertical-launch system (VLS) cells.

USS Stark, 1987
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, survivability has become an issue on 3 fronts. One is the slim margins created by a very small crew, leaving little margin for tasks like damage control if automated systems are damaged or fail. The other issues involve questions of shock/survivability testing, and of aluminum structures. The original concept for LCS was a ship whose damage resistance could save the crew, but not the ship, in the event if a significant strike. That was upgraded slightly to potentially saving the crew and the ship, but not continuing to fight while doing so. As the Exocet missile strikes on the HMS Sheffield (sank) and USS Stark (survived, barely) proved, even steel warships designed to keep fighting after a strike may find it challenging to meet their design specifications. Navy revelations that the LCS ships would not meet even Level I standards, let alone the OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level II standard of the frigates they’ll replace, has caused some consternation.

So, too, has the use of aluminum in ships exposed to hostile fire. The LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure, while the LCS-2 Independence Class is primarily an aluminum design. While both ships have had to certify to the same fire-proofing standards asked of other ships, aluminum conducts heat very well, and melts or deforms easily. If the ancillary fire-fighting systems, resistant coatings, etc. fail, or cannot handle a given situation at sea, structural integrity problems and secondary fires could become fatal concerns very quickly.

The emerging scenario in the USA is a cost for the base ships that continues to hover around $400-500 million each, plus weapons, electronics, and mission modules that bring the price per fully-equipped ship to $450-600 million, even under the proposed new fixed-price contract. That’s no longer a cheap $220 million corvette class price tag. Instead, it’s a price tag that places the USA’s LCS at the mid-to-upper end of the international market for full multi-role frigate designs. Even as overall American procurement trends make LCS ships the most common form of US naval power.

In that environment, unfavorable comparisons are inevitable. A versatile surveillance and special forces insertion ship whose flexibility doesn’t extend to the light armament that’s its weakest point, and isn’t able to deal with anything beyond token naval or air opposition, won’t meet expectations. Worse, it could cause the collapse of the Navy’s envisaged “high-low” force structure if the DDG-1000 destroyers and CG (X) cruisers are priced out of the water, and built in small numbers.

That domino has already fallen, as DDG-1000/ DD (X), production has been capped at just 3 ships, and CG (X) was canceled entirely in the FY 2011 budget. As Vice-Admiral Mustin (ret.) and Vice-Admiral Katz (ret.) put it in a 2003 USNI Proceedings article:

“Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD (X), there is no requirement for [the Littoral Combat Ship] to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD (X) and CG (X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD (X) or CG (X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or “grow” LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD (X) and CG (X). Neither option is acceptable.”

Especially if the low end has grown to a cost level that makes it equivalent to other countries’ major surface combatants, while falling short on key capabilities that will be required in the absence of higher-end ships.

The LCS Program

In 2009, the CBO estimated LCS shipbuilding costs at around $30.2 billion, with a fleet average of 1.2 mission modules per ship (TL. 66) bought separately at about $100 million per module. As of 2012, the split had changed a bit, but the overall total was around $39 billion. This contrasts with the original hope of $22 billion total costs for 55 ships and 165 mission modules, at $400 million per ship ($220M construction + (3 x $60M) mission module options).

The US Navy’s current shipbuilding plan envisions building 32 littoral combat ships and 64 mission modules until about 2040. Technically, only 45 LCS ships would count toward Navy fleet totals. Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 or fewer ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class. Even so, that number of LCS ships is likely to make up 20% of the Navy or more. The US Navy has already sagged to under 300 ships, and unless major changes in course lie ahead for its budget or its chosen designs, the total number of ships will sink farther.

Acquisition Structure

In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed from PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last.

It’s normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. The Littoral Combat Ship program has shifted its entire buy strategy several times during its short lifetime – a sorry sequence of orders, budgets not spent, contract cancellations, etc. documented in Appendix A.

The last buy strategy has lasted long enough for a multi-ship contract. After buying 4 ships and taking bids under their 2009 revised strategy, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 ships for a total advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 ships they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts were issued at the end of December 2010. Each contractor would get 1 initial ship order, then 9 more options, with the ship purchases spread across FY 2010-2011 (1 per year for each contractor); then FY 2012-2015 inclusive (2 per year for each contractor). Cost overruns will be shared 50/50 between the government and contractor, up to a set cost cap.

Budgets

By the end of FY 2013, the program is expected to be at about a quarter of total procurement, in units ordered and dollars spent.

LCS: Ship Roster Team Lockheed, Freedom Class

LCS 1, USS Freedom. Commissioned Nov 8/08.
LCS 3, USS Fort Worth. Commissioned Sept 22/12.
LCS 5, Milwaukee
LCS 7, Detroit
LCS 9, Little Rock
LCS 11, Sioux City
LCS 13, Wichita
LCS 15, Billings

Team Austal, Independence Class

LCS 2, USS Independence. Commissioned Jan 16/10.
LCS 4, USS Coronado. Commissioned April 5/14.
LCS 6, Jackson
LCS 8, Montgomery
LCS 10, Gabrielle Giffords
LCS 12, Omaha
LCS 14, Machester
LCS 16, Tulsa

LCS: Export Potential MMCS
(click to view full)

Once one steps beyond small patrol craft, growing capabilities have made frigate-sized vessels the most common naval export around the globe. With many nations confronting challenges in the world’s littorals, which include the globe’s most important shipping choke points, one would expect some interest in the Littoral Combat Ship beyond the USA. A Dec 11/06 Austal release claimed 26 potential buyers worldwide for the ship and its companion equipment, “with two near-term contenders and four others that have expressed active interest.”

There are 2 interesting aspects to LCS export bids. One is their equipment, which is radically different from the US Navy’s set.

Lockheed Martin’s international Multi-Mission Combat Ship (MMCS) version, which attracted some interest from Israel before cost issues intervened, has a variety of configurations from OPV/corvette to large frigate size. Upgraded radars range from CEAFAR active-array radars on smaller ships, to the option of Lockheed’s SPY-1F for the largest variant. Fixed weapons include torpedo tubes and 8 Harpoon missiles, though some exhibit models have used 12 Kongsberg NSMs. Concept diagrams also show between 4-48 VLS cells, some of which are full strike-length size.

General Dynamics’ trimaran adds an upgraded radar (SPY-1F in diagrams), torpedo tubes, and 16 tactical-length vertical launch (VLS) cells.Among other payloads, those cells could hold VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles to extend anti-submarine reach, or quad-packed RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles for area air defense. Exhibited models have also displayed up to 16 NSM anti-ship missiles.

Turkish MEKO 200
(click to view full)

The other aspect worth noting is the Littoral Combat Ship’s failure to close any export sales over 7+ years. At present, both LCS designs have received preliminary export inquiries, but Israel and Thailand are the only cases where it has gone farther than that.

Israel did step up in July 2008, and confirmed its request for an LCS-I based on Team Lockheed’s design. Israel’s variant was very different from LCS 1 Freedom, however; it featured a fixed set of weaponry rather than full mission module spaces, and its proposed SPY-1 AEGIS or MF-STAR radar and weapons array and made it far more capable in critical roles like air defense and ship to ship warfare. As noted above, similar changes have been a common theme among international LCS offerings, but an estimated ship cost of over $700 million eventually pushed Israel to rethink its plans. That country is now pursuing cheaper options based on Blohm + Voss’ MEKO family of corvettes and frigates, or South Korean designs. The Freedom Class also lost the Thai competition.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed interest in a fixed armament version of the General Dynamics/Austal design. That interest was reiterated in 2010, but they’re also evaluating Lockheed Martin’s design for the Arabian/Persian Gulf fleet. In 2011, it emerged that the Saudis might skip an LCS buy altogether, in exchange for a much more heavily-armed, versatile, and expensive option: the USA’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class multi-role destroyers, with ballistic missile defense capability.

Meanwhile, designs like the German MEKO family, the multi-role Franco-Italian FREMM, the modular-construction Dutch Sigma class, and even refurbished 1980s-era NATO frigates continue to find buyers around the world.

LCS: Ship Contracts & Key Events

This section covers the core LCS program. Mission Packages are discussed in-depth in “It’s All in the Package: the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mission Modules“; and the complex mine countermeasures package gets its own in-depth treatment in “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development“.

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

FY 2015

LCS 7 & 8 christened; New TRS-4D radar for Freedom Class after LCS 15. LCS 4 & JHSV

September 17/15: The Saudis are reportedly set to choose Lockheed Martin’s Littoral Combat Ship for the country’s Arabian Gulf-based frigate modernisation program, with a deal thought to be announced by the end of the year. The company is one of two teams constructing LCS for the US Navy. The Saudis have previously requested the ability for their LCS vessels to launch Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) air defense missiles but are thought to have dropped previous plans to procure the Aegis combat system owing to cost.

August 27/15: Austal is enjoying the start of the sweet spot of its $3.5 LCS contract, showing record profits and anticipating additional efficiencies as it starts to knock out the remaining 9 LCS ships.

August 18/15: The Littoral Combat Ship USS Coronado (LCS-4) has successfully conducted live-fire testing using the ship’s surface warfare mission module, firing the ship’s Mark 46 30mm cannon and Mark 110 57 mm gun, hitting surface targets off the West Coast. The BAE Systems Mk 110 gun equips the Navy’s LCS fleet as standard, with the Mark 46 forming part of the surface warfare (SuW) module.

July 21/15: Lockheed Martin has launched the ninth Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the Freedom-class USS Little Rock (LCS 9). Austal christened LCS 8 (the USS Montgomery) in November 2014, with LCS 9 the fifth of eight LCS timetabled for construction by Lockheed Martin. The ship will now undergo testing and equipment fitting before being delivered to the Navy later this year.

Sources: US Navy Moving Forward With LCS | USNI News.

July 9/15: Littoral Combat Ship 6 (USS Jackson) has completed acceptance trials with the US Navy in the Gulf of Mexico. LCS 6 is the third Independence-class to be built by Austal, which shares the construction of the LCS program with Lockheed Martin under a $3.5 billion ten-ship block buy awarded in December 2010. The company laid the keel for the fourteenth LCS (USS Manchester) in late June this year, having already delivered two Independence-class vessels.

July 1/15: Austal has laid the keel of the fourteenth Littoral Combat Ship in Alabama, with the future ship destined to become the USS Manchester. Austal shares the construction of the LCS program with Lockheed Martin under a $3.5 billion ten-ship block buy awarded in December 2010.

Feb 23/15: USS Omaha keel laid, sixth in Independence class.
Austal USA laid the keel for the USS Omaha (LCS 12), the latest and sixth littoral combat ship in the Independence class.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appears to have shied away from making any drastic dedision with the future of the LCS, by choosing to base 20 future Small Surface Combatants… based on “modified LCS hull designs.” The use of the plural form implies that there is no down-select to just one of the 2 LCS designs. By omission, mine warfare seems out, since modular requirements are maintained solely for capabilities against surface ships and submarines.

Predictably the SSCs will have to be both more survivable and better armed, since these points are among the weaknesses most often pointed out by LCS detractors. The list of goodies to achieve that:

over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missiles
air defense sensor and weapon upgrades
1 advanced electronic warfare system
advanced decoys
1 towed array system for submarine detection and torpedo defense
2 25mm guns
1 armed helicopter equipped with Hellfire missiles and MK-54 torpedoes
1 unmanned FireScout helicopter for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting

The armed helicopter and rotorcraft are not new, and 25mm guns are not going to make much of a difference except against the smallest threats. The rest is getting SSCs closer to how LCS has been pitched to export prospects, and to what even smaller ships pack in foreign fleets. Beyond that, the Navy still has to pin down many specifics, discuss crew size, or explain how they will contain costs.

Nov 17/14: CSBA Paper. The non-partisan CSBA releases “Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare.” Their recommendations are wide ranging, including a major shift in US Navy weapons configurations toward higher capacity medium-range air defenses. That would take place in order to free up VLS cells for long-range offensive surface attack, anti-submarine, and air-denial weapons.

The paper believes that LCS ships should be forward based abroad, given their limited range and low ability to maintain themselves at sea. Their mission packages should also be disentangled from the LCS platform, creating “independent, stand-alone capability sets that could be carried on a wide range of ships in the National Fleet.” Beyond that, the SSC/ LCS could take advantage of LCS’ higher power generation to mount anti-aircraft rail guns and/or lasers, hosting RIM-162 ESSM air defense missiles, and distributing offensive attack capabilities via their VLS cells.

The paper recommends that the Navy pick 1 existing LCS design to convert to the SSC, adding a vertical launch system and retrofitting VLS to some of the Flight 0 ships as well. The problems come down to capability and cost. At minimum, an SSC derived from the LCS would need to carry the ASW mission package full-time, and incorporate longer-range missile capabilities via a vertical launch system. The reality is that the cost is inevitably higher than the $515 million for an LCS with the ASW package, but the Navy isn’t planning for any increase as it plans for 20 SSC ships. This is so even though the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class, which was developed in the 1980s as a similar sort of budget frigate platform, would cost $774 million in adjusted modern dollars. Conclusion? The Navy won’t get 20 SSCs, which is one more reason to retrofit VLS cells on Flight 0 LCS ships. Sources: CSBA, “Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare” (incl. full PDF) | USNI, “CSBA Recommends New Course for U.S. Navy Surface Forces”.

Nov 8/14: LCS 8 christened. The US Navy christens the Independence Class LCS 8 Montgomery, in a ceremony at Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipyard. The ship was launched in August 2014, and is making preparations for trials and delivery in late summer 2015. Austal adds that:

“Jackson (LCS 6) is preparing for sea trials in early 2015. Final assembly is well underway Austal USA’s Bay 5 on Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) and in Bay 4 on Omaha (LCS 12). Modules for Manchester (LCS 14) and Tulsa (LCS 16) are under construction in Austal USA’s Module Manufacturing Facility.”

Sources: Austal, “USS Montgomery (LCS 8) Christened: Second Independence-variant LCS christened this year”.

Oct 28/14: LCS-1 sensors. Airbus North America announces that Freedom Class ships will have a new and improved radar, beginning with LCS 17. Instead of the current TRS-3D, they’ll be equipped with the more powerful and flexible TRS-4D naval radar, a rotating version of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) fixed panel GaN radar that equips Germany’s forthcoming F125 Class expeditionary frigates.

AESA radars offers a 2x-3x range or resolution boost compared to PESA technologies, and GaN circuits offer further improvements to a radar’s power to performance ratio. Flexibility comes from programming that can segment and shift all of its individual T/R modules in order to steer beams, offer near-simultaneous modes, actively illuminate multiple targets, etc. What it doesn’t offer yet, is the Saab Sea Giraffe AMB’s ability to backtrack incoming artillery and rocket fire to its origin point.

There’s talk of moving to a single LCS radar, and maybe even a single combat system for the entire class. The TRS-3D was seen as being a step behind the LCS-2 Independence Class’ Sea Giraffe AMB, which can also backtrack incoming artillery to its origin point. The TRS-4D counters with superior overall performance, and strengthens EADS as a contender against the USMC’s TPS-80 G/ATOR, Saab’s Sea Giraffe 4A AESA, etc. It also improves Team Lockheed’s overall radar/ combat system position, which is already strong because of its interface commonalities with Aegis. Sources: Airbus North America, “New Radars Provided by Airbus Defense and Space, Inc., to Support Improved Survivability for the Freedom Variant Littoral Combat Ships”.

Oct 18/14: LCS 7 christened. The US Navy christens and side-launches trhe Freedom Class LCS 7 Detroit, in a ceremony at Marinette Marine Shipyard, WI. We’re trying to resist the temptation to make a crack about ceremonially burning down the mission module area, but we can’t resist. On the other hand, the city of Detroit hasn’t given up. A ship could do worse.

Detroit will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette until her expected delivery to the Navy in late 2015. Sources: US Navy, “Navy Christens, Launches Future USS Detroit” | LMCO, “Lockheed Martin-Led Team Launches Future USS Detroit”.

Oct 14/14: LCS-2 Support. Austal USA, LLC in Mobile, AL receives an $8.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to a previously awarded contract to exercise an option for Core LCS-2 Independence Class Services. They’ll assess engineering and production challenges, evaluate costs and schedule risks for engineering change proposals, and keep up class baseline documentation. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 US Navy shipbuilding budgets.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (60%), and Pittsfield, MA (40%), and work is expected to be complete in October 2015 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Oct 12/14: 57mm gun. The US Navy has removed BAE’s Mk.110 57mm naval gun from their DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class ships. The reported reason was that the 30mm Mk.46 RWS did better against key target types like small boats than the Mk.110 or notional 76mm guns. That’s more than slightly surprising to some observers, who note that a 30mm cannon is only lethal within about a mile – but the Navy is saying that they were equally surprised. Program Manager Capt. Jim Downey is quoted saying that:

“They were significantly over-modeled on the lethality…. The results of the actual live test-fire data was that the round was not as effective as modeled…. it gets into the range of the threat – the approach of the threat, what the make-up of the threat is and how it would maneuver, how it would fire against our ship. There is a whole series of parameters that are very specific on what the threat is and how you take it out through a layer of defenses…. not what we expected to see.”

Downey categorically denies that the Mk.110’s 10+ ton weight difference was an issue, and also confirmed that his program’s findings haven’t been shared with other NAVSEA entities like PEO LCS, let alone the Coast Guard who uses the gun on some cutters. The Navy is working on creating those mechanisms, but they don’t exist yet. Defense News, “Experts Question US Navy’s Decision To Swap Out DDG 1000’s Secondary Gun”.

Oct 9/14: LCS 7. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a $10.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, exercising an option for LCS 7 Detroit’s post-delivery support. This is normal, and involves deferred design changes that have been identified during the construction period, before the post-delivery test and trials. $500,000 in (FY 2011?) US Navy shipbuilding budgets is committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (57%); Hampton, VA (14%); Moorestown, NJ (11%); San Diego, CA (11%); and Washington, DC (7%), and is expected to be complete by October 2016 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Oct 9/14: LCS 8. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $10.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, exercising an option for LCS 8 Montgomery’s post-delivery support. This is normal, and involves deferred design changes that have been identified during the construction period, before the post-delivery test and trials. $500,000 in FY 2011 US Navy shipbuilding budgets is committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (70%); Pittsfield, MA (20%); and San Diego, CA (10%), and is expected to be complete by October 2016 (N00024-11-C-2301).

FY 2014

Orders for ships 17-20; Congress wimps out on oversight, but then USN wants to stop at 32 ships; USN finally wakes up to the importance of “combat” with the SSC frigate idea, but is it too late? BIW wins multi-year support contract for both types; LCS 5 & 6 launched; Mayport, FL to host 6 Freedom Class ships; Poor performance on LCS 1 deployment to Singapore; Naval Strike Missile test from LCS 4; Could rail guns and lasers save the day?; LCS lifecycle costs are high; Weight margins are a huge problem for LCS, and so is under-manning. Ch-ch-changes…

Sept 25/14: GAO on lead ships. The GAO issues a report saying that the Navy technically stayed within acquisition regulations in its acceptance of the 2 lead ships, thanks to cost-reimbursement contractual clauses. But extensive use of waivers to expedite LCS 1 and LCS 2 trials and acceptance, and for a variety of short-term concerns, led to a lot of additional time and money spent later on. That discussion may seem somewhat moot a decade after the initial contract awards, but consequences are felt to this day:

“Even as of August 2014, the combat management system continued to face significant limitations, which has restricted its use during fleet operations.”

Separately, the April 17 SAR report, obtained 2 months later through the Freedom of Information Act, shows the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) for LCS 2 is now set for August 2015, followed by Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 1 month later. According to the Navy, that delay trickled down from delayed completion of the Mine Countermeasures Mission Package’s (MCM MP) own IOT&E. Despite all of the delays, the first 2 ships in the class still don’t look very capable. Sources: GAO-14-827, “Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery” | CRS, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” [Aug 4/14 update, PDF] | SAR [PDF].

LCS + NSM

Sept 23/14: Weapons. The US Navy confirms a successful live fire test of Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile from USS Coronado [LCS 4], via a launcher mounted on the flight deck.

NSM is a full-range, stealthy sub-sonic missile that delivers both anti-ship and land attack capability. Its presence would instantly turn the SuW module into something other than a joke, but the Navy is noncommittal about issuing a requirement that would lead to NSM integration with the existing LCS fleet. What is certain, is that a missile of this nature will be required as part of any SSC frigate derivatives. Sources: US Navy, “Navy Successfully Tests Norwegian Missile from LCS 4” | Kongsberg, “Successful test firing of KONGSBERG’S Naval Strike Missile from US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship” | USNI, “Norwegian Missile Test On Littoral Combat Ship Successful.”

Sept 9/14: SSeCret. A classified briefing for the House Armed Services Committee about the findings of the small surface combatant task force is postponed at the last minute, with a new date yet to be rescheduled. A Navy spokesperson tells USNI that all they’re willing to talk about at this point is their thought process. The report itself was submitted internally on July 31, but the Navy does not want to talk about its content before budget negotiations with the Pentagon. If the past is any indication, the Navy will keep Congress in the dark as long as possible. Ronald O’Rourke notes in his CRS report, about the aborted 2009-10 downselect:

“…this was the third time in the history of the LCS program that the Navy presented Congress with an important choice about the future of the LCS program late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of its committee markups.”

If the Navy wants ships in this category before the end of the decade, some sort of LCS 2.0 seems a much more realistic option rather than a brand new design – short of buying an off-the-shelf design abroad. So much for Secretary Hagel’s call that “all options are on the table” – and the core reason is the US Navy’s history of added costs and slow execution for ship designs that they haven’t fielded before. Source: USNI, “HASC Cancels LCS Replacement Briefing Over Lack of Information.”

Aug 22/14: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives an initial $9.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract to provide planning yard services in support of both variants of in-service Littoral Combat Ships. Bath Iron Works will be the single planning yard, providing engineering, planning, ship configuration, material and logistics support to maintain and modernize both variants of the LCS class, managing the scheduling of all planned, continuous, and emergent maintenance, and associated maintenance periods that involve multiple private and public organizations. $6.2 million in FY 2014 US Navy O&M budgets are committed immediately, and options could bring the contract’s cumulative value to $100.4 million.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME and is expected to be complete by August 2015. This contract was competitively procured via FBO.gov with 3 offers received. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-4313).

Dual-class Planning Yard services

Aug 22/14: Support. CACI Technologies, Inc. in Chantilly, VA is being awarded a $25.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for professional support services in support of Program Executive Office LCS. Services include professional services in the areas of: program management and acquisition support, technical and engineering support, business and financial management support and logistics support. $15 million is committed immediately from various budgets, and this contract includes options which could bring its cumulative value to $44 million.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC (90%); Norfolk, VA (4%); San Diego, CA (2%); Panama City, FL (2%); Newport, RI (1%); and Monterey, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete by February 2015. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) as implemented in FAR 6.302-1. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-6307).

Aug 7/14: Basing. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that Naval Station Mayport, FL, will be receiving 6 Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships: LCS 9 Little Rock, LCS 11 Sioux City, LCS 13 Wichita, LCS Billings, LCS 17 Indianapolis, and LCS 19. NS Mayport, which recently lost its frigates, will pick up about 900 Sailors and support personnel. Sources: Maritime Executive, “Six Navy LCS’ Find Homeport”.

July 31/14: LCS-1 Support. Rolls Royce Marine North America in Walpole, MA receives a $9 million firm-fixed-price repair order for the repair of 1 MT-30 gas turbine engine for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Freedom variant, including re-assembly into the LCS configuration, and pass-off testing to validate performance. All funding is committed immediately, using FY 2014 US Navy O&M budgets.

Work will be performed in Bristol, UK and is expected to be complete by February 2016. The order was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 USC. 2304(c)(1), by US NAVSEA in Washington, DC (N00104-09-G-A755).

LCS testing plan
(click to view full)

July 30/14: GAO Report. The US GAO releases another LCS-related report, which looks at the program as a whole but has a greater emphasis on the class’ weight issues. Both initial ships have inadequate weight margins, and the LCS-2 Independence Class will stay that way even after the design is stabilized for LCS 6, with just 31.3 tons to spare (3,156.7 tons of 3,188.0 Naval Architectural Limit) instead of 50. The LCS-1 Freedom Class does better, with 67.3 tons to spare by LCS 5 (3,482.7 tons of 3,550.0 NAL). GAO recommends changes to contractor weight reporting, whose lack of centralized tracking has contributed to surprise weight problems.

Low margins are problematic, because they harden the 105-ton limit for mission packages, and limit or inflate the cost of weapon upgrades, extra crew, or other changes needed to make the ship relevant throughout its life. Accepting the penalty of going overweight, on the other hand, would hurt ship speed, handling, range, and service life. USS Freedom is itself overweight, and she illustrated this problem during the Singapore deployment. Her gas turbines had to remain switched off most of the time to conserve fuel, giving this “fast” ship such slow transit speeds that it was “hard for LCS to easily or efficiently get around the [7th fleet’s large Pacific] theater”.

To make matters worse, there’s already a call for extra weight. It will take another 10-20 tons, and a pervasive ship redesign, to address the under-crewed fatigue demonstrated during LCS 1’s Singapore deployment. That was present even though the crew recruited contractor technical representatives for routine ship tasks, during a peacetime operation. The Navy’s response is that they don’t intend to change the number of people on board, and they’re also compromising the ship’s mission capability in other ways:

“Navy weight estimates for increment 4 of the MCM mission package, however, do not reflect all the systems being acquired for that package. Space and weight constraints have required the Navy to modify how it intends to outfit increment 4 of the MCM mission package. Although the Navy plans to acquire all the systems planned for that increment, space and weight limitations will not allow LCS seaframes to carry all of these systems at one time. According to LCS program officials, MCM mission commanders will have either (1) the Unmanned Influence Sweep System and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, or (2) the minehunting Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle—called Knifefish—available—but not both systems. As a result, LCS seaframes outfitted with the increment 4 MCM package may have decreased minesweeping or mine detection capability.”

The final argument has to do with the RFP to continue production after LCS 24. GAO recommends no approval for additional ships or even an RFP until both seaframes have deployed to “a forward overseas location” like Singapore (not scheduled for the Independence Class until 2017); completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability testing; and completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission package on the Independence variant. The Navy, as usual, wants to keep production going regardless, setting continued production and savings now vs. the risk of major RFP amendments and delays, expensive refits later, or flawed ships on the front lines. Sources: GAO-14-749, “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments.”

July 26/14: Force structure. The US Navy has a problem. Its 11 remaining FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates have largely been disarmed, but they’re still underway on missions more often than many other fleet ships. When the frigates are all retired by FY 2015, the US Navy will only have 8 LCS ships, with no real anti-submarine capability beyond a helicopter, and an unproven ability to sustain existing missions like longer-term counter-drug operations or carrier escort.

CSBA analyst Cmdr. Bryan Clark (ret.) sees the US Navy falling back on cargo vessels, the Mobile Landing Platform ship, and JHSV transport catamarans to pick up some of the slack. Even so, anti-submarine work will devolve to its high-end destroyer fleet, and recent issues with sustained operations during LCS-1 Freedom’s initial trials are not encouraging. Sources: Gannett’s Navy Times, “Retiring frigates may leave some missions unfilled”.

July 24/14: Weapons. The US Navy confirms that USS Coronado [LCS-4] is scheduled to test-launch Kongsberg’s stealthy, 13-foot Naval Strike Missile (NSM) at the Point Mugu, CA test range. NAVSEA says this isn’t about any specific requirement, it’s just a one-off event to test the Independence Class’ ability to handle more advanced weapons, and “provide insights into the weapon’s stated capabilities of increased range, survivability and lethality.”

It’s possible that NSM could fit into the LCS SuW mission module at some future date, with the LCS using UAVs etc. to close the kill chain at range. Amazingly, the US Navy is still wondering whether it should confine itself to weapons that work only within the ship’s unaided detection range, despite the fact that 500-ton Fast Attack Craft fielded by other countries carry full-range anti-ship missiles.

The Independence Class’ too-small weight margin may seem to be a problem for heavy weapons, but the “Surface Warfare” module is so vestigal that there’s plenty of weight margin in the mission package’s 105-ton weight limit. The anti-submarine module is also pretty basic, and it will be interesting to see if the class can handle an ASW/SuW fleet scout loadout.

On a related note, the NSM is a candidate to eventually replace the sea-skimming, radar-guided RGM-84 Harpoon missiles abord US Navy ships, and a full range anti-ship and surface attack missile will be critical to the USA’s Small Surface combatant frigate program (q.v. April 7-8/14). Since the Navy’s approach makes it hard for anything other than an adapted LCS to succeed, this test has significant long-term implications for the Independence Class. Sources: Gannett’s Navy Times, “LCS to conduct test of Norwegian missile”.

July 17/14: SAC Budget. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. It includes the LCS, but they aren’t pleased in the shift from 4 ships to 3, and the planned extension of block-buy pricing into FY 2016. They also note the program cut to 32 and the untested performance of the mission modules:

“Given the testing concerns raised by GAO and the Department’s current strategic pause on the LCS program, the Committee finds it prudent to also slow the procurement of LCS mission modules. Therefore, the Committee recommends a total reduction of $71,314,000 to the fiscal year 2015 budget request for LCS mission modules and related components.”

See also DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding”.

Life-cycle costs
(click to view full)

July 8/14: GAO Report. After USS Freedom returned to San Diego from its mission in Asia, nearly every LCS stakeholder – including the operational commander of the ship in Singapore (Commander, Destroyer Squadron Seven) and each of the USS Freedom crews – produced lessons-learned summaries. Mostly, we’ve learned that the Freedom Class has some critical problems in real-world 7th Fleet operations, and that its operating costs will approach destroyers with 3x its tonnage.

Bluntly, the ship’s crew of 50 still couldn’t cope, even in peacetime, testing nothing of substance beyond RHIB boats, and with onboard defense contractor support reps drafted into jobs they weren’t supposed to be doing. Crews averaged 6 hours sleep while underway, instead of the Navy’s recommended 8.

The “good” news is that USS Freedom spent 58% of its time in port, vs. a 20% average for other fleet ships. Mechanical issues were part of that, with 55 total mission days lost that cut short 2 exercises and removed 2 planned operations. It might have been worse, but failure-prone medium-pressure air compressors were constantly monitored by sensors and replaced before they could fail.

On the costs front, the number of shore personnel to support the ship has more than tripled from 271 in the 2011 estimate to 862. An updated life-cycle cost estimate is expected in fall 2014, but GAO estimates place them at $79 million ($64M ships + $15M mission modules) per ship per year, vs. $24M for a minehunter, $54M for a frigate, and $88M for a DDG-51 Ballistic Missile Defense destroyer. Additional overseas deployment-related cost data is likely to raise LCS costs, but deployment schedules mean that we probably won’t have good data for both variants until well after 2017. Sources: GAO-14-447, “Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs” | USNI, “Document: GAO Report on USS Freedom Deployment”.

June 13/14: LCS 4. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives $11.7 million cost-plus-award-fee modification to the previously awarded order to provide engineering and management efforts in support of USS Coronado’s [LCS 4] post-shakedown availability work, to fix the last set of things from INSURV testing. The ship was commissioned on April 5/14.

$5 million in FY 2014 ship conversion budgets is committed immediately. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by December 2014. The US Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, Maine manages the contract (N00024-13-G-2316, #0001).

May 12/14: MQ-8 MUT. USS Freedom [LCS 1] operates an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV together off the coast of San Diego, CA for VBSS (visit, board, search & seizure) exercises. Flying them together doesn’t seem like much, but operating safely in the same space as a manned helicopter is something that needs to be worked out very thoroughly before it can be used operationally.

Fire Scouts can maintain longer surveillance over a target or area of interest, but these helicopter UAVs lack the total firepower and/or troop capacity of an MH-60R or MH-60S. Sources: NGC, “Northrop Grumman, US Navy Conduct Successful Simultaneous Manned, Unmanned Helicopter Flight Tests Aboard the Littoral Combat Ship”.

May 6/14: Cyber-security. US Fleet Cyber Command head Vice Admiral Jan Tighe says that the Navy is working to close the cyber-security gaps identified in the 2013 DOT&E report (q.v. Jan 28/14). The Navy has teams considering “what do they need to do to change, and/or replace” on Freedom Class (and presumably Independence Class) ships, in order to close gaps and create the communications systems needed to transmit critical data to the shore-based support facilities LCS ships are so dependent upon. Sources: Bloomberg, “Cyberdefenses for Littoral Combat Ship Getting Retooled”.

April 30/14: Politics. It looks like LCS support is well and truly slipping. The House Seapower subcommittee version of the FY 2015 defense spending bill would cut planned Navy buys from 3 ships to 2, plus advance procurement funding for 2 in FY 2016, while prioritizing submarines and aircraft carriers. Worse:

“A source familiar with the subcommittee’s deliberations noted there had been a “real effort to zero out the LCS request,” based on perceptions of a flawed program and the need to eliminate some spending.”

20+ ships into a program is a bit late for such realizations, but the reality of not enough money is beginning to force choices that Congress didn’t really have to face before. Sources: Defense News, “House markup cuts one LCS, supports 11 carriers” | Subcommittee markup [PDF] | Full committee NDAA.

April 22/14: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives an unfinalized $28.7 million contract for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class design services. This includes class baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies and interim support services.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 shipbuilding and FY 2014 RDT&E budgets. Work will be performed in Bath, ME (54%); Pittsfield, MA (45%); and Mobile, AL (1%), and is expected to be complete by May 2015. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-2302).

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report, which includes LCS.

“Program costs decreased $11,332.1 million (-33.4%) from $33,955.5 million to $22,623.4 million, due primarily to a quantity decrease of 20 ships from 52 to 32. The Department of Defense has determined that no new contract negotiations beyond 32 Flight 0+ LCS ships will go forward. The Navy has been directed to complete a study to support the future procurement of “a capable and lethal small surface combatant.” The Navy has also been directed to submit “alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant,” and the study should consider options for “a completely new design, existing ship designs (including LCS), and a modified LCS.” This SAR reflects the initial estimate of a 32-ship LCS program. The results of the study, to be completed in time to inform the FY 2016 President’s Budget, will determine the configuration of the ships (future flight of LCS or different small surface combatant) that will fulfill the small surface combatant requirement.”

Program cut cuts costs

April 9/14: SSCTF RFI. The US Navy issues a very non-specific Request for Information #N00024-14-R-2306, in the hopes that responses will inform its SSCTF (Small Surface Combatant Task Force). Basically, they’re looking at specifications and cost drivers for existing designs, but they don’t specify what range they’re looking in:

“The Navy is interested in the shipbuilding industry perspective on mature ship designs and concept designs that have the capability and lethality generally consistent with a small surface combatant. Systems and sub-system information will be the subject of the second RFI. The Navy is also interested in market information on system and sub-system level approaches to providing small surface combatant combat capabilities including hull, mechanical and electrical systems; weapon and sensor systems; command, control, communications, computers and intelligence networks; electronic warfare systems; signature reduction technologies; and mission module concepts for consideration in future small surface combatants including modified LCSs.”

Sources: FBO.gov, “Intent to Issue Requests for Information (RFI) for Market Information Pertinent to the Navy’s Future Small Surface Combatant”.

RFI for frigate replacement

April 9/14: Weapons. The US Navy confirms that they have picked the AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow radar-guided missile as the SUW Package’s initial missile. Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire wouldn’t have any more range than Raytheon’s Griffin (~3.5 nmi), but the radar seeker allows the ship’s radar to perform targeting, while allowing salvos of multiple fire-and-forget missiles against incoming swarms. In contrast, the Griffin’s laser designation must target one boat at a time, from a position that’s almost certain to have a more restricted field of view than the ship’s main radar.

Lockheed Martin says that the missile has had 3 successful test firings in vertical launch mode, and there are plans to test-fire the missile from LCS itself in 2014, using a new vertical launcher. Navy AGM-114L missiles would be drawn from existing US Army stocks, which will have shelf life expiry issues anyway. That’s one reason the Army intends to begin buying JAGM laser/radar guided Hellfire derivatives around FY 2017. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Navy Adds Hellfire Missiles to LCS” | USNI News, “Navy Axes Griffin Missile In Favor of Longbow Hellfire for LCS”.

April 7-8/14: Weapons. With the USA considering its options for 20 frigates, Finmeccanica is proposing the OTO Melara 76mm Super Rapid gun as an upgrade to existing and future LCS/ASSC ships. Already in service with 56 navies, the water-cooled gun can maintain high rates of fire, while extending naval gun range. Specialty options include GPS-guided Vulcano super long-range shells for naval fire support out to 22 nmi, or the optional STRALES system that adds a radar to the gun mount, and uses DART radar-guided shells for surface warfare and air defense. The bad news is that the US Navy isn’t sure that it will fit on the LCS-2 Independence Class’ narrow hull (q.v. CRS report, Feb 25/14).

Meanwhile, Kongsberg is presenting scale models of armed Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at the Sea-Air-Space 2014 Exposition, fitted with their stealthy new Naval Strike Missile. The Freedom Class gets 12 NSMs in 2 recessed modules above the helicopter hangar, while the trimaran Independence Class ends up with 18 missiles in 2 recessed launchers just behind the bridge, and another in the hull behind the naval gun.

Those loadouts would make the ships formidable surface combatants. If they control multiple UAVs for surveillance and targeting, their strike role actually starts to look like an aircraft carrier with 1-launch aircraft, and this configuration wouldn’t require ship radar upgrades. That could even position them for the post-2019 Surface Warfare Module upgrade within the existing fleet. On the other hand, a real frigate-type ship will need other weapons, which means 8 or more Mk.41 vertical launch cells that can carry VL-ASROC anti-submarine rockets, longer range air defense missiles like quad-packed RIM-162 ESSMs, etc. Unless the air defense missiles have independent guidance, like MBDA’s Sea Ceptor or Raytheon’s future ESSM Block 2, a frigate-class radar and combat system will also be necessary. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Finmeccanica Proposes 76mm Gun for LCS” | Naval Recognition, “Sea-Air-Space 2014 Show Daily News – Kongsberg NSM”.

April 5/14: LCS 4. USS Coronado is commissioned at North Island Naval Air Station, in Coronado, CA next to San Diego. This ship is 6 months late, but shows quality improvements over LCS 2. Which you’d certainly hope would be the case, compared to a first-in-class ship. Sources: UT San Diego, “USS Coronado commissioned”.

LCS 4 commissioned

April 4/14: Manning. Breaking Defense published the results of an unreleased study re: LCS 1’s Singapore deployment:

“[LCS sailors] averaged about six hours of sleep per day, 255 below the Navy’s eight-hour standard, and key personnel such as engineers got even less. That’s in spite of

extensive reliance on contractors both aboard and ashore, with a “rigid” schedule of monthly returns to Singapore that restricted how far from port the LCS could sail;
the decision to increase Freedom‘s core crew by 25 percent, from 40 to 50 — the maximum the ship can accommodate without a “significant” redesign; and
the 19-sailor “mission module” crew, who are supposed to operate LCS’s weapons, helicopters, and small boats, pitching in daily to help the core crew run the ship’s basic systems.

The core crew’s engineering department in particular told GAO they had no idea how they’d keep the ship going without help from the mission module’s engineers. But…. while the entire 19-sailor anti-surface module crew has skills useful in running the ship itself, the MCM crew has only four sailors who could help, and the ASW module only one. That means an LCS outfitted to hunt mines or subs would effectively be 15 to 18 sailors short – about 20 to 25 percent.”

The Navy says they’re testing engineering modifications and new approaches. But then, that’s what they’ve always said about this issue. Sources: Breaking Defense, “Sleepless In Singapore: LCS Is Undermanned & Overworked, Says GAO”.

Manning still a problem

April 2/14: Testing. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $6.7 million contract modification to build a live fire test module in support of the Navy’s LCS-2 Independence variant LCS survivability testing program. It certainly took the Navy long enough to get this going.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 RDT&E budgets. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL, and is expected to be complete by March 2015. Fiscal 2013 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $6,726,406 will be obligated at the time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding Gulf Coast in Pascagoula, MS manages the contracts (N00024-11-C-2301). See also Austal, “Austal Awarded Contract For Survivability Testing On LCS”.

March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish. The LCS has 16/18 key technologies listed as mature, the 2 exceptions being LCS-1 mission bay overhead launch and retrieval system and the LCS-2 aluminum structure. Design changes include a stronger stern ramp for LCS-1 ships, and bridge wings and a 7m RHIB boat for LCS-2 ships. The report adds:

“LCS 1 completed a ten-month deployment to the western pacific in December 2013 where it operated out of Singapore. During this deployment it encountered two significant engineering issues that significantly curtailed its ability to get underway: the lubrication cooling system ruptured and the ship service diesel engine generator had reliability issues. In addition to these engineering issues, LCS 1 had a number of combat system and other material failures; including radar underperformance and the combat system unexpectedly rebooting during operations.”

March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The USAF and USN unveil their preliminary budget request briefings, and slowly release numbers over the next week. LCS procurement drops from 4 ships to 3 in FY15, but then it actually rises from 2 to 3 per year in FY16, FY17, and FY18, and overall budgets rise too. That would close out Hagel’s 32-ship limit. The Navy’s presentation also shows 2 LCS ships beyond that, however, in FY19. A note indicates that this is “Pending FY16 decision.”

The obvious resolution of the Navy presentation’s discrepant data would involve an initial advanced small surface combatant award. The Pentagon’s noises about “alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, consistent with the capabilities of a frigate” have dominated outside discussions ever since Hagel’s Feb 24/15 briefing. The extent of the required changes make it difficult to understand how they could move forward under current acquisition regulations, without creating a new program. On the other hand, detailed budget documents show a Navy that intends to continue LCS as a program beyond the 32 ships. Sources: USN, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF].

March 10/14: FY 2014. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC issues the FY14 orders for 4 Littoral Combat Ships. Ships 17-20 will cost a total of $1.383 billion:

Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives $698.9 million for LCS 17 & 19, including basic seaframe construction, selected ship systems integration and test, and some onboard systems like engines and radars that aren’t bought under independent contracts.

All funds are committed immediately, using Navy FY14 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%), Walpole, MA (14%), Washington, DC (12%), Oldsmar, FL (4%), Beloit, WI (3%), Moorestown, NJ (2%), Minneapolis, MN (2%), and various locations of less than 1% each (7%), and is expected to be complete by June 2018 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives $683.7 million for LCS 18 & 20, including basic seaframe construction, selected ship systems integration and test, and some onboard systems like engines and radars that aren’t bought under independent contracts.

All funds are committed immediately, using Navy FY14 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%), Pittsfield, MA (13%), Cincinnati, OH (4%), Baltimore, MD (2%), Burlington, VT (2%), New Orleans, LA (2%), and various locations of less than 2% each (26%), and is expected to be complete by June 2018 (N00024-11-C-2301).

FY15: 4 ships

March 10/14: LCS-FFG. Ever since Hagel’s late February announcement, his mention of a Small Surface Combatant/ frigate as a follow-on after LCS #32 has dominated discussion. Recall: “I’ve directed the Navy to consider a completely new design, existing ship designs, and a modified LCS.” His memo to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus specifies that “These assessments should consider survivability, performance, sustainment cost, materiel readiness, lethality and growth potential…”

CNO Adm. Greenert now says he will disband the LCS Council, which still seems to have work to do in terms of getting the ships ready to deploy and work with the fleet, in favor of a group that will study the Navy’s Small Surface Combatant options.

Early indications are that it won’t be much of a study. SecNav Mabus has already compared the task to successive flight/block modifications of previous ship classes, while continuing a strained relationship with the truth by dismissing license-built foreign designs as: “Well, number one, I don’t think any foreign design is up to our — our standards.” That’s patently ridiculous, and indicates either a lack of the most basic grasp of this field, or willful dishonesty. Breaking Defense is quite correct in adding that many off-the-shelf foreign designs would be far superior – though they miss Navantia’s serving 5,300t Nansen Class ASW frigate, which already comes with Lockheed’s SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system, and uses the Mk-41 VLS. Norway paid Navantia $480 million per ship (NOK 21 billion for 5, on June 23/00).

Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute argues that the design has to be an LCS derivative for a different reason – the Navy doesn’t have a decade to hold the competition, design a new vessel, and get it produced. That kind of wait would push the future frigate’s funding right into the buzz-saw of SSBN-X and F-35B/C buys. Which is true.

On the other hand, neither LCS model has a fully-armed derivative in even detail design form, and both LCS contenders have potential issues that will require added testing if the ships’ size grows. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman is proposing a frigate variant of the USCG’s Bertholf Class cutter. It would be interesting to compare development and certification times for a lengthened LCS with different weight distribution and new systems, vs. NGC’s model. Or vs. a close Nansen Class derivative built by Bath Iron Works. Sources: Breaking Defense, “LCS Lives! Mabus, Hamre Argue Littoral Combat Ship Will Survive Cuts” | Defense News, “CNO: Group Will Study New LCS Designs” | Forbes, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters”.

Feb 28/14: Support. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC exercises a pair of options to perform post-delivery planning, and implementation of deferred design changes, on the Freedom Class ship Milwaukee [LCS 5] and the Independence Class ship Jackson [LCS 6].

Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives $10.8 million for LCS 5. All funds are committed immediately, using USN FY10 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (57%); Hampton, VA (14%); Moorestown, NJ (11%); San Diego, CA (11%); and Washington, DC (7%), and is expected to be complete by October 2015 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA in Mobile, A receives $7.1 million for LCS 6. All funds are committed immediately, using USN FY10 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (70%); Pittsfield, MA (20%); and San Diego, CA (10%) and is expected to be complete by September 2015 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Feb 25/14: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service revises their Background and Issues for Congress report. While the report includes useful information about the program’s history, and details some of the current problems with both seaframes, its timing means that the basis for the Pentagon’s move to stop at 32 LCS ships is a focus. CRS raises the concern that the same ‘field first, analyze missions and design next, justify in retrospect’ philosophy may be applied to the follow-on frigate. Is a frigate the best option for meeting the described need? They do admit that:

“Countering improved Chinese maritime military forces will involve procuring ships (such as destroyers and attack submarines) that are oriented toward ballistic missile defense, anti-ship cruise missile defense, countering larger surface ships, and countering submarines that are operating far from shore as well as in littoral waters.48 The LCS is not optimized for most of these missions.”

The report’s pricing for mission packages is useful; according to an Aug 26/13 Navy document, the common equipment for all sets is $14.9 million, the MCM Package is $97.7 million (TL $112.6M), the “SUW” Package is $32.6 million (TL $47.4M), the future ASW Package is $20.9 million (TL $35.8M). Given that key mission packages like ASW aren’t even close to being fielded yet, and that some aspects like waterjet propulsion are ill-suited to the ASW mission, it’s hard to see the basis for saying:

Sources: US CRS, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”.

Mission Module costs

Feb 24/14: Backing away? The announcement isn’t a surprise (q.v. Jan 6/14), but there’s less to Chuck Hagel’s FY 2015 pre-budget briefing on the LCS than meets the eye:

Additionally, at my direction, the Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. I’ve directed the Navy to consider a completely new design, existing ship designs, and a modified LCS. These proposals are due to me later this year in time to inform next year’s budget submission.”

Consideration of these questions is a decade overdue, but there’s only 1 takeaway here that really means anything: “the LCS line will continue beyond our five-year budget plan with no interruptions”. They haven’t actually terminated the program, and they can negotiate for up to 8 ships beyond the current block buy that ends in FY15, and follow-on comments from Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus show that he overwhelmingly favors modifying LCS for the Small Surface Combatant. This is so despite likely issues with effective anti-submarine warfare due to waterjet noise, low damage tolerance, and comparative cost vs. proven frigates once upgrades to the radar, combat system, and weapons are added. Sources: US DoD, “Remarks By Secretary Of Defense Chuck Hagel FY 2015 Budget Preview Pentagon Press Briefing Room Monday, February 24, 2014” | Bloomberg, “Hagel Expands on Reservations’ About Littoral Combat Ship”.

Semi-commitment to stop at 32, follow-on “capable small surface combatant” proposed

Feb 21/14: Support. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives a $23.6 million contract modification for LCS fleet support.

All funds are committed immediately, using Navy FY14 O&M dollars. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA and is expected to be complete by September 2014. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

Jan 23/14: Sub-contractors. L-3 Corp. Systems West, Salt Lake City, Utah, is being awarded a $17.6 million indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract modification for supplies and services associated with Littoral Combat Ship configurations of the Hawklink Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) Surface Terminal Equipment, and with Vortex Mini-TCDL Shipset components. While Hawklink is most closely associated with the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, these supplies and services are in support of the Fire Scout MQ-8B/8C.

Funds will be committed as needed. Work will be performed in Salt Lake City, UT (90%), Point Mugu, CA (5%), and the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, MD, (5%), and is expected to be complete in December 2014. US Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-13-D-0001).

Jan 19/14: New deal? Defense News is reporting that the Navy and Pentagon have come to an uneasy compromise of sorts re: LCS. The program would be put on probation, but ship buys would continue to a total of 26-28, which would be until FY 2017 or so. Before any more ships could be bought, the ship would need to pass evaluation by the Pentagon’s independent DOT&E testing office, which has been critical of the ship.

This new proposal gives existing shipbuilders and supporters more time to prove that the ship can meet its base claims and specifications. It also gives them more time to lobby. A passed FY 2015 budget that stopped buys at 32 becomes hard to overturn, even though production would continue for several years, because the Navy would begin filling future budgets with other programs instead. An open-ended “we dare you to stop us later” agreement has a very different dynamic.

Note, too, that DOT&E’s mandate doesn’t include re-evaluating the ship concept, which is coming under more fire these days. All they can do is state whether the ship meets the Navy’s specifications and can perform its assigned missions, which is a different judgment than the one that Pentagon’s leadership was implicitly making. Sources: Defense News, “Navy, Pentagon battle over LCS future”.

Jan 13/14: Aviation Week looks at the LCS program, and reports that the crew size will rise to 50 core crew on both ships. That still wasn’t really enough during USS Freedom’s recent deployment (q.v. Nov 12/13). Beyond that, the article quotes Vice Adm. Thomas Copeman, commander of the Naval Surface Force and U.S. Pacific Naval Surface Force. Amazingly, the Navy has finally concluded that reducing crew sizes first, then hoping for technological innovation, is a bad approach.

Copeman adds that combat power is indeed one of LCS’ requirements, as he distinguishes between routine operations and combat operations. It may have “my complete attention,” but naval analyst Norman Polmar points out that the design process sacrificed the Navy’s flexibility regarding this defining characteristic of a warship. You can’t shoot attention at the enemy, though technological improvements may create new options in a decade or more (q.v. Jan 10/14). Polmar is also dismayed at the delays for mission modules that address long-standing naval challenges: “If the modules were something exotic, like nuclear lasers, I’d understand.” In fairness, they are trying to address standard challenges in non-standard ways.

We’ll add that combat options do exist for LCS, but retrofitting designed-out features is expensive. They’d need to cut into the decks to install a MK41 vertical launch system, then code and test major changes to the combat system so it could handle advanced weapons like the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow. In practice, that means they’d either (a) stick to a narrow range of weapon improvements that are largely self-contained, and require minimal integration, at the possible cost of fleet commonality – vid. MBDA’s Sea Ceptor missile; (b) pick just one LCS class to have real combat capability, and make changes to it; or (c) spend more to implement radar and combat system commonality across both classes, as part of a full weapons upgrade. Sources: Aviation Week: NavWeek, “Skimming the Surface.”

Jan 6/14: To 32. A Pentagon memo from acting deputy defense secretary Christine Fox recommends that the LCS program slash total numbers by 20 ships, from 52 – 32. Looks like the Navy “won” the internal battle, which could have decided to terminate the program at just 24 (q.v. Sept 3/13). That would leave just 8 ships to be bought after the current multi-year buy contract ends in FY 2016, and options reportedly include speeding up production, or running a follow-on buy that might pick just 1 type.

Even at 32 ships, the program will have bought over 80% of its ships before the end of operational testing.

It’s important to note that this isn’t set in stone yet. The 2015 budget proposal will contain the final plan, but that document will be delayed to late February or March. Then it has to pass through Congress. Meanwhile, leaked copies of the Pentagon’s DOT&E test reports are expected to be critical of both LCS ship types, and of the Mine Counter-Measures package in particular. Sources: Bloomberg, “Pentagon Said to Order Cutting Littoral Ships by 20” | Bloomberg, “Navy Littoral Ship Reliability in Doubt, Tester Says” | ABC2 WBAY Wisconson, “Marinette Marine Monitors Pentagon Recommendations” | Alabama,com, “Navy will reportedly cut littoral combat ship order by 20” | U-T San Diego, “Navy’s littoral ships to be slashed?”.

Jan 16/14: The US Navy has come up with its own designation for the Sea Giraffe radar that equips LCS-2 Independence Class ships: AN/SPS-77(V)1. It’s adapted for US operations by Saab Defense and Security USA Sensor Systems in Syracuse, NY, who also handles installation, testing, and maintenance.

So far, the radar has been installed on 3 Independence Class ships, with 5 more radars in production. Sources: Saab, Jan 16/14 release.

Jan 10/14: LCS 1 & 3. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives a maximum $13.2 million cost-plus award fee contracting modification, finalizing LCS 1 and 3 planning yard support efforts for Freedom Class LCS ships, esp. USS Freedom and USS Fort Worth. That means vendor training and crew familiarization; trainer support; availability advanced planning; long lead time material planning and procurement; material warehousing; logistics product updates; and class sustainment management.

One thing we’re noticing is that over the last couple of years, similar support contracts seem to cost more for the Freedom Class than they do for the Independence Class (q.v. Dec 23/13, March 15/13, Dec 20/12).

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 O&M budgets. Work will be performed in Washington, DC, and is expected to be complete by September 2014. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329, 0017).

Naval laser trials

Jan 10/14: LCS EM Weapons module? The current US Navy program manager for DDG 51 acquisition, Capt. Mark Vandroff, says that the service has begun to look at the requirements for a “DDG-51 Flight IV” destroyer, which wouldn’t begin service until the 2030s. Rail guns and lasers are part of the early conversation, and it isn’t just because they’re cool:

“Some of the thinking involves senior leaders talking about getting on the other side of the cost curve. Right now if someone shoots a missile at us, we shoot a missile back at them. The missile we shoot at them cost about as much, if not more, than the missile that got shot at us. They are burning money and we are burning money to defend ourselves…. The down side is this kind of technology does not exist today and even if it does, you have to look at what kind of maritime platform could you put it on and what that would look like. When that technology starts to get close to mature, then you will see the Navy start to figure out what it has to do in order to field that technology.”

This could be the opportunity LCS has been looking for. Converting DDG 51 ships to hybrid-electric drive would be a minimum requirement to host these weapons, but the redesign could become very expensive, and even that may not be enough. HII is touting their LPD-17 Flight II amphibious assault hull as a future air and missile defense cruiser platform,. It has enough power generation capacity, but that’s a $2.5+ billion proposition. Looking downscale, Littoral Combat Ships have plenty of onboard power, plus accessible free space for capacitors etc. Switching the 57mm forward gun for a railgun, and adding laser weapons for air and surface defense, would give an LCS with the “EM weapons” package unique Naval Fire Support and air-defense roles within the fleet. LCS-2 ships might even have enough room remaining to add other mission package capabilities. As Vandroff says, we’ll know more as the technology becomes mature. Sources: Military.com, “Future Destroyers Likely to Fire Lasers, Rail Guns”.

Dec 23/13: Support. US NAVSEA issues a pair of options for LCS core class services. Those include engineering and design services, as well as efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a $23.3 million contract modification, with $12.1 million in FY 2013 shipbuilding funds committed immediately. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (36%), Hampton, VA (30%), Washington, DC (23%), and Marinette, WI (11%), and is expected to be complete by December 2014 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL receives a $14.1 million contract modification, with $4 million in FY 2013 shipbuilding and R&D funds committed immediately. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%), and is expected to be complete by December 2014 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Dec 23/13: LCS 2 & 4. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $7.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for LCS-2 and LCS-4 Planning Yard Services, as they prepare for in-service sustainment. These services will include: vendor training and crew familiarization; in-service engineering support; trainer support; availability advanced planning; long lead time material planning and procurement; material warehousing; logistics product updates; and class sustainment management.

$1 million is committed immediately, using FY 2014 O&M funds. Work will be performed in Bath, Maine, and is expected to be completed by Dec 21/14 (N00024-12-G-4330).

Dec 18/13: LCS 5 launch. Marinette Marine christens and launches LCS 5 Milwaukee from its Marinette, WI shipyard. This is the Lockheed Martin team’s 1st ship under the 2010 block buy. Unlike LCS 6, this one slides into the river in a traditional manner. Sources: USN, “Future USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) Christened and Launched, Marks Production Milestone” | Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin-Led Team Launches Future USS Milwaukee”.

Dec 14/13: LCS 6 launch. Jackson is launched at Austal’s shipyard in Mobile, AL. This is Austal’s 1st ship under the 2010 block buy, and the 1st ship built in the shipyard’s new 59,000-square-foot Bay 5 assembly hall.

Launches have become more complex these days. Instead of just sliding down a ramp, the 1,600t assembly was lifted almost 3 feet in the air by Berard Transportation’s self-propelled modular transporters (SPMTs), and moved about 400 feet onto an adjacent moored deck barge. The barge was towed a half mile down river to BAE Systems’ Southeast Shipyard for transfer to BAE’s floating Drydock Alabama. Launch happens when Alabama submerges, floating Jackson free. The ship will undergo final outfitting and activation at Austal’s shipyard.

Dec 13/13: Demands, but no teeth. The House FY 2014 defense bill has some key provisions in Section 124 re: the LCS program, and the Senate is unlikely to mess with them. It doesn’t matter, since the there are no real penalties for non-compliance.

The bill demands a review from the Pentagon’s JROC saying that they’ve looked at existing and required capabilities; think the current capabilities development document remains valid given performance, and will produce an adequate ship; and confirm that capability production documents exist for each ship type, and will exist for each mission module before operational testing begins. The odds of the JROC saying “we were wrong to give our go-ahead, this is a complete mess, LCS fails” are basically zero.

Beyond that, the bill demands a report from the CNO, and also from the Pentagon’s far more skeptical Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, within 60 days of the FY 2014 defense budget becoming law. That report will looks at the LCS’ concept of operations, which the Navy admits is sketchy now. It will also look at the ships’ ability to meet the Navy’s core strategy; compare the combat capabilities of the mission modules against the FFG-7 frigate and Osprey Class minehunting ships LCS would replace; assess LCS’ expected survivability in combat, given threats in the near-shore environment; offer an overview of test progress and plans; and look at maintenance, manning and support issues for the class, with special attention paid to failures so far.

Fine. So, what if the reports aren’t produced, or the results are negative? The GAO Report (q.v. July 22/13) recommended dropping to minimum sustaining rate production for ships, and halting module buys. So, what did the House do? Nothing. They said that FY 2014 monies couldn’t be used to buy items for LCS 25-26, until the bill’s conditions were met. For reference, FY 2014 is about ships #17-20, and the entire multi-year contract ends at #24. Sources: House FY 2014 NDAA [PDF] | Breaking Defense, “Congress Targets Littoral Combat Ship Survivability In NDAA” | USNI News, “More Littoral Combat Ship Oversight Unlikely to Affect 2015 Block Buy”.

Dec 2/13: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL receives an $8.3 million contract modification, exercising option for Independence Class core class services. They’ll assess engineering and production challenges, and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from new efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.

All funds are committed immediately from FY 2013 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (60%), and Pittsfield, MA (40%), and is expected to be complete by November 2014 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Nov 20/13: Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Naval Expansion Program II will shape the Kingdom’s next set of buys, and discussions have ranged from American LCS frigates, to full-size DDG-51 Aegis destroyers capable of ballistic missile defense. They could turn to options like Spain’s Navantia (F100 family), if they wish to buy Aegis ships from a source other than the USA. The Saudis are also evaluating France’s new FREMM frigates, which could offer missile defense capabilities of their own, and share some commonalities with their existing Al-Riyadh Class.

October statements by Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan may have said that the kingdom was hoping to make a major shift away from the United States, but Lockheed Martin continues to pursue discussions. The Royal Saudi Navy’s core currently consists of French Al-Riyadh (Lafayette) and Al-Madinah Class frigates at the high end, and older US-built Badr Class corvettes and Al-Sadiq Class patrol boats at the low end. Sources: Reuters, “Lockheed sees more clarity on Saudi naval buy in next months” | UAE’s The National, “Challenges in the Middle East for US defence companies“.

Nov 16/13: LCS 1. USS Freedom leaves Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, which she had been using as a logistics and maintenance hub. Those kinds of bases are key to the LCS concept, because the crew design and load-out of the ship have most maintenance and almost all repairs performed in port, with very little capability on board ship. The Navy adds that:

“Prior to getting underway, Freedom accomplished repairs to the feedback cable in the port steerable waterjet which delayed her participation in exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Brunei. All wajerjets are now functioning normally, and Freedom still expects to conduct a brief port visit in Brunei as part of the exercise.”

Since arriving in Singapore April 18, Freedom has participated in the International Maritime Defence Exhibition (IMDEX), 2 CARAT exercises with Malaysia and Singapore, and the multinational SECAT exercise. CARAT Brunei will undoubtedly be counted in future USN releases, even though the ship was actually prevented from taking substantive part. Sources: “USS Freedom (LCS 1) Gets Underway From Singapore For Final Time”.

Nov 12/13: Shock and Awwww. The Wall Street Journal reports that LCS 1’s maintenance problems in Singapore were a shock to Navy leadership:

“When Navy leaders were given an expedited assessment on the ship’s performance last week, they found the scope of those problems to be “a little stunning,” says Rear Adm. Tom Rowden, the Navy’s director of surface warfare.”…. In war games last year, the Freedom seemed to struggle with multiple tasks and appeared overwhelmed, says Petty Officer Manuel Navarro, a combat leader aboard the USS Sampson, a 500-foot destroyer that took part in the exercises. “From a combat perspective, from what I can see, they did horribly,” he says.”

The ships’ heavy dependence on pierside maintenance is a new concept for the Navy, and the key question is whether this is the sort of normal teething problem associated with that newness, or an illustration of a flawed concept that hasn’t been used for good reasons. The same question arises re: ship manning, which may not have been enough even with 10 extra core sailors on board.

As the Navy ponders these issues, pressure is growing to cut the LCS buy from the original plan of 55 to 32 or even 24 ships (q.v. Sept 3/13). That would probably be achieved by taking GAO’s advice, and dropping orders to the minimum sustainable level. A 32-ship program would still end very early, with last orders in 2022 or so. Sources: Wall Street Journal, “Navy Ship Plan Faces Pentagon Budget Cutters” | Newsmax, “Navy’s Problem-Plagued Ship of Future Facing Cutbacks”.

Nov 11/13: LCS 1. More problems, just before a planned naval exercise in Brunei. USS Freedom had issues with feedback in the portside steerable waterjet, which needed additional repairs. This comes shortly after the starboard steerable water-jet hydraulic system had been contaminated with seawater and required extra maintenance. Sources: Russia Today, “Glitch-ridden US advanced warship pier-side ahead of Singapore drills”.

LCS 1: CARAT Brunei

FY 2013

$1.38 billion for LCS 13-16; Program cut to 50 ships; Undersecretary Robert Work’s overview of the program is followed by 2 negative Navy reports, as capability controversies continue; GAO program report; DOT&E report on LCS issues; Keel laying for LCS 8 & 9; USS Freedom deploys to Singapore, with difficulties; New Freedom Class waterjets solve a problem – and add to one?; Export loss in Thailand. To Singapore
click for video

Sept 3/13: Ship cuts? With over $50 billion in cuts coming, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s ALT POM reportedly proposed to end LCS buys with the current contract, at just 24 ships. The Navy is pushing to buy at least 32.

Aug 12/13: Support. Small business qualifier Manufacturing Techniques Inc. in Kilmarnock, VA receives a $32.7 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract with cost-plus-fixed-fee completion and firm-fixed-price delivery orders. It’s a support contract involving battle management systems, Dragon Spear (SOCOM’s MC-130W aircraft), and Littoral Combat Ship programs. They’ll provide help with rapid prototype development, hardware fabrication, hardware and software for prototype or prototype pre-production units and kits.

Just $68,263 in FY 2012 funds are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Kilmarnock, VA, and is expected to be complete by August 2018. This was competitively procured via FBO.gov, with 2 offers received by the US Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division in Dahlgren, VA (N00178-13-D-1022).

Aug 12/13: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $9 million cost-plus-award-fee order to provide material and labor for USS Independence’s post-shakedown availability (LCS 2 PSA Phase 2). Efforts will include program management, production supervision, temporary protection services and transportation services.

$6.9 million in FY 2012 – 2013 funding is committed immediately, and $2.3 million in FY 2013 funding will expire by Sept 30/13. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA and is expected to be complete by December 2013. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-13-G-2316).

LCS & Mission modules
2012-2019
(click to view full)

July 25/13: HASC Seapower hearing. The House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces holds hearings in the wake of the GAO’s report. It makes for interesting viewing in places but that’s mostly in the prepared statements. GAO explains that they aren’t advocating cancellation, but unless Congress steps in now, they’ll find themselves unable to exercise any influence on the program. The Navy repeats the party line that everyone loves the LCS, and all problems will be fine.

The real takeaway is that the basic format for Congressional hearings is broken and next to useless if a program is in trouble. At 3-5 minutes per member present, it’s impossible to ask more than 1 substantive question, or offer the kind of consistent questioning and follow-up required to even establish key facts. That’s a perfect environment for evasive or meaningless answers, secure in the knowledge that they can’t be examined in any depth. Which is exactly what happens. Watch for yourself. Sources: HASC Seapower, Acquisition and Development Challenges Associated with the Littoral Combat Ship (Video Part 1 and Part 2) | GAO Testimony Transcript.

July 22/13: GAO Report. The US GAO releases GAO-13-530, “Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost”. The entire report is a long chronicle of the Littoral Combat Ship program’s history of falling short and of unresolved issues, side-by-side with warnings concerning a program that will have bought 24 ships, started a second multi-year contract in FY 2016, and bought 31 mission packages before full operational testing is done.

That “could lead to the Navy risking taxpayer investments of over $40 billion in 2010 dollars in systems that may not provide the expected – and yet to be fully defined – militarily useful capability.” This timing also strips outside bodies of meaningful oversight and influence, while buying equal numbers of ships even if a specific type is better for certain missions. As the GAO notes:

“…the former Under Secretary of the Navy and others have posited that the Freedom variant may be better suited to the Middle East region and the SUW mission given its maneuverability [DID: the TERN UAV’s restriction to LCS-2 would change even that advantage], while the Independence variant may be better suited to the western Pacific region and the ASW and MCM missions given its longer range and larger helicopter deck.”

This is just a small slice of the issues with the LCS program. One issue that was accepted in the original LCS vision is its need to stay close to a deployed group when in medium to high threat environments. That restriction isn’t shared by similarly-expensive ships, and creates an added burden on task groups. Nor is this the only issue:

“…since LCS has only a self-defense anti-air warfare capability, it will require protection from a [DID: likely missile defense capable] cruiser or destroyer in more advanced anti-air warfare environments, which reduces the LCS’s ability to operate independently and occupies the time of more capable surface combatants that might be better employed elsewhere”…. [There are] classified concerns with the capability or planned capability and employment of the SUW, MCM, and ASW mission packages…. Elements of the LCS business case, including its cost, the time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated capabilities have degraded over time. There are also significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts that could affect the cost of the program and soundness of the business case…. Some of these questions, discussed in table 5, are likely to have impacts on the ongoing LCS acquisition, including what seaframe variant should be purchased and how the ships will actually be operated and supported… .At the Milestone B decision for the seaframe program, the Navy estimated O&S costs to account for 62% of the program’s life-cycle cost estimate, or $87 billion of $124 billion in total ownership costs through fiscal year 2057.[20] The Navy’s point estimate for the LCS seaframe program total life-cycle cost estimate was at the 10% confidence level, meaning that there is a 90% chance that the costs could be different – and likely higher based on the data – than the point estimate [the spread is between $108 – 170 billion in then-year dollars].”

They recommend that Congress appropriate LCS funding under the existing contract, but with conditions attached to complete LCS technical and design studies, assess changes, and offer an analysis of what they want to change for greater commonality, before the money is freed. GAO also recommends shifting to minimum sustaining production for mission modules (now) and ships (LCS 25-), until and unless the Navy has produced a new independent cost estimate and a new validated capabilities document, and received a full rate production decision. Sources: GAO-13-530, || See also detailed report coverage re: sub-systems for LCS mission packages and the Mine Counter-Measures package in particular.

GAO study cites multiple program issues, recommends program slowdown & conditions

July 11/13: The US Navy offers its latest update on the LCS program, via its official blog. There are a number of specific details re: the doings of LCS 1-3, but overall, it boils down to: “All is well. Really.” Sources: USN Navy Live, “LCS: Latest Update”.

July 20/13: LCS 1. USS Freedom limps back into port in Singapore after an overheated diesel generator took out propulsion during a helicopter VERTREP with USNS Ceasar Chavez [T-AKE 14]. The ship’s overall power stayed on, and the supply run was completed, but it had to pull out of planned Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises with the Singaporean Navy.

Exhaust leaks in the turbochargers on 2 generators will require turbocharger replacement, and the generators will require further troubleshooting in Singapore. The ship has had similar problems before on its trip – see March 19-29/13, May 21/13 entries. Just another successful deployment. Defense News | Reuters.

LCS 1: Shutdown off Singapore

July 19/13: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a sole-source $7.5 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification, to provide engineering and management services in support of USS Independence’s post-shakedown availability. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 RDT&E budgets; $602,083 will expire on Sept 30/13.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (55%), and San Diego, CA (45%), and is expected to be complete by March 2014. The USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, Maine manages the contract (N00024-09-G-2301, ER09).

June 27/13: LCS 9. The official keel-laying ceremony for the future USS Little Rock is held at Marinette Marine Corp. in Marinette, WI. Lockheed Martin.

June 26/13: LCS 8. The official keel-laying ceremony for the future USS Montgomery is held at Austal’s yard in Mobile, AL. Given modern ship-building methods, 36 of the 37 modules for the ship are already under construction. Austal.

June 6/13: Naming. The Secretary of the Navy names the next 2 LCS ships.

The Freedom Class LCS 15 Billings is named after the city in Montana. The Independence Class LCS 16 Tulsa is named after the city in Oklahoma. US DoD.

May 24/13: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF].

“Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – Program costs decreased $3,485.0 million (-9.3%) from $37,440.5 million to $33,955.5 million, due primarily to the decision to purchase 3 fewer ships resulting in a quantity decrease from 53 to 50 ships (-$2,945.7 million) and associated schedule and estimating allocations (+$150.0 million). Additional decreases were attributable to the application of new outyear escalation indices ($-1,050.6 million), realignment of LCS in the 30-year shipbuilding plan in FY 2019 to FY 2034 (-$519.8 million), and adjustments to the seaframe requirements estimate in FY 2012 to FY 2018 (-$406.3 million). These decreases were partially offset by the application of revised escalation indices (+1,216.4 million) and pricing changes for trainer and battle spare requirements (+$90.6 million).”

So, let’s see if we have this straight. Cost escalation indices during the budgeting period add over $1.2 billion, which seems to be a common theme among many SAR reports this period. Then, as soon as we leave the budgeting period, something magically changes and the program will save over $1 billion due to the same indices. That seems preposterous, and doesn’t fit any trends we’re aware of, but we’re open to a convincing explanation. If someone out there has one, we’ll print it.

SAR – Fewer ships & implausible accounting

May 22/13: User Interfaces matter. Respected Navy blog Information Dissemination takes note of a FY 2014 markup in the budget, and explains why rationalization to a single radar and combat system will likely leave both Saab and GDC4S out in the cold. From “House FY14 Mark“:

“Saab North America has a problem. They supposedly have this really great radar…. the problem is the radar is tied to the combat system on the Austal variant of the LCS, and that combat system has a fatal flaw typical of software development in government. The UI is terrible…. The surface warfare community has a user interface into the combat system that is standard across the entire AEGIS line of warships. The Freedom class version has a combat system that uses a very similar interface…. Instead of making the combat system user interface look and feel like every other combat system in the fleet at the User Interface level, the LCS-2 combat system insists their user interface is better.

….AEGIS is government owned. These folks who complain about Lockheed Martin’s monopoly in the Navy on the combat system are given chance after chance to compete, but they fail every time because no matter how good the technology is under the covers – and sometimes it is really fantastic – they lose to Lockheed Martin because they refuse to imitate the user experience of AEGIS that every sailor in the Navy is comfortable with. As an IT guy who develops enterprise systems for government, I laugh when observing a classic mistake contractors do far too often, and all I can say is these companies get exactly what they deserve when they get nothing. It isn’t the Saab North American radar. That radar might be legitimately great, but it doesn’t matter at all. The real problem is the software folks who insist their way of doing user interfaces for the US Navy is better than the way everyone in the US Navy does it. That’s just stupid!”

User Interfaces matter!

May 21/13: LCS 1. More problems push the ship pierside again in Singapore, as ship’s force inspection reveals rust on 2 of the reduction gear casings. The suggestion is that the oil has formed emulsions and lost some of its lubricating quality, as a result of maintenance that wasn’t performed quickly enough after the late April reduction gear seawater cooler failure. Sources: Information Dissemination, “Camo Gray and Never Underway”.

LCS 1

May 7/13: USN Report. Bloomberg gets its hands on a March 9/12 confidential draft report prepared for CNO Adm. Greenert by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. This document is separate from USN Commander of Surface Forces Vice-Adm. Copeman’s “Vision for a 2025 Surface Fleet”, which recommended a full set of weapon for LCS (q.v. March 18/13 entry). Perez’ report is broader, but his conclusions are similar: serious gaps between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute. Key areas of concern include:

Manning: “The minimal-manning level and subsequent fatigue result in significant operational and safety impacts, with notable degradation of crew readiness, performance levels and quality of life.” USS Freedom has since added 20 more berthings for its initial deployment, bringing total crew to 100 (40 core + 25 aviation + 15 mission package + 20).

Armament: Perez shares Copeman’s reservations about the LCS’ armament, and points out that Iran alone has 67 Fast Attack Craft that carry anti-ship missiles with a range of over 5 miles. Any one of them can strike LCS ships without direct retaliation, and deliver disabling hits.

CONOPS: He also cites the lack of a clear LCS concept of operations, and notes that getting all of the right people and equipment on station to swap a mission module can take several weeks, instead of the advertised 96 hours. As a result, the concept “no longer has the tactical utility envisioned by the original designers.”

Navigation: Finally, Perez points out that the Independence Class trimaran’s width “may be a navigational challenge in narrow waterways and tight harbors,” though Bloomberg’s account doesn’t quantify that in any way.

The disturbing thing about these reports isn’t their conclusions. It’s the fact that these conclusions have been obvious for years, and have been pointed out for years, while US Navy leadership pretended that everything was fine. That’s still the Navy’s M.O., and CNO Greenert dismissed questions by saying that “study is over a year old – we’ve done a lot since then”. Which doesn’t address what they’ve done to change the conclusions of the study. In a number of critical areas, the answer is “nothing” or “not much.” Perez Report Executive Summary [PDF] | Bloomberg | The Hill | Military.com | USNI, “Perez Report: Many in LCS Program Have Forgotten Key Fundamentals”.

Perez Report

May 2/13: New waterjets for LCS-1 class. LCS 5 Miwaukee will be the first Freedom Class ship to try out a set of 4 new waterjets. The technology was developed by Rolls-Royce Naval Marine in Walpole, MA, in collaboration with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Carderock Division. The joint project under ONR’s Future Naval Capabilities program began in 2007, and the April delivery to Marinette Marine marked its successful completion. The waterjets will be made in the United States, with primary manufacturing at Rolls-Royce facilities in Walpole, MA and Pascagoula, MS.

“Waterjets are incredibly loud, as in they can be so loud that a ship with waterjets is probably going to significantly reduce the effectiveness of a bow sonar…. there is no bow mounted sonar [on LCS] and waterjets is why there never will be…. ONR is going to deliver super waterjets, which may increase the speed of LCS a knot or two, who knows. Here is the problem though – waterjets are still loud like a rock concert, and one of the primary missions of the LCS is to hunt littoral submarines.

When will this program start being about mission and stop being about features?”

Sources: USN, “New Waterjets Could Propel LCS to Greater Speeds” | Rolls Royce, Feb 21/12 release. | Information Dissemination, “More Speed!”

April 25/13: Support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.1 million contract modification for professional support services in support of PEO LCS (Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ships). They’ll help with program management and acquisition support, technical and engineering support, business and financial management support, and logistics support.

Work will be performed in Washington DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by October 2013. Just $362,308 are being committed immediately, and $181,334 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-13-C-6322).

April 21/13: Thailand. Lockheed Martin’s MMCS Freedom Class derivative loses the competition, as the Royal Thai Navy picks South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. DSME won with their DW 3000H proposal, which builds on experience gained with ROKN projects like the FFX Incheon Class frigates. Bangkok Post.

Loss in Thailand

April 15/13: General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.6 million contract modification, exercising Independence Class Design Services for LCS 6 and following ships. Work includes baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition, and a liaison role for ship construction and post delivery.

Work will be performed in Bath, Maine (52%); Pittsfield, MA (47%); and Mobile, AL (1%), and is expected to be complete by June 2014. It’s completely funded by the FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion budget (N00024-09-C-2302).

April 12/13: LCS 3. As Coronado was conducting a full-power demonstration and running at high speed when insulation on the starboard diesel exhaust first smoldered, then ignited. The fire was reportedly “extinguished immediately.” All fires at sea are serious, but this one was pretty minor. The question is whether it happens again during full-speed trials. KPBS.

Minor fire

April 12/13: Naming. 2 LCS ships are among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.

The Freedom Class LCS 13 Wichita is named in honor of Kansas’ largest city, while the Independence Class LCS 14 Manchester is named for one of New Hampshire’s industrial centers. Pentagon.

April 8/13: Arming LCS. Austal VP Craig Hooper says it’s quite possible to arm the LCS-2 Independence Class with effective anti-ship weapons and vertical launch cells, which isn’t exactly a surprise since that has been in Austal brochures:

“You want Harpoon? I can give you eight to 16. You want VLS, 75mm gun? OK we can do it…. but is that the right path? If we hand over all the available margin on LCS to legacy weapons… do we risk losing the opportunity to exploit the changes that are coming in the war at sea?”

As with all things, there is a balance point. It isn’t at all obvious why a quad Harpoon launcher topside, or a 76mm gun with the ability to launch long-range shells, or an 8-cell VLS, must precludes mission module space in a class that has a lot of it. USN Director of Surface Warfare Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden doesn’t see an armament problem at all, even in the current undergunned state, saying “I’m the keeper of the keys for requirements. And I am here to tell you that LCS meets the requirements.”

A more thoughtful response comes from Bryan McGrath at ID, who notes that the last US Navy surface ship built to fire anti-ship missiles was USS Porter [DDG 78], the last Arleigh Burke Flight I destroyer. Every Flight II/IIA destroyer all the way up to DDG 116 has omitted those launchers, and every FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigate in USN service has removed theirs. Meanwhile, fleets like China’s have invested heavily in anti-ship missiles that work at longer and longer ranges, and routinely mount them on ships as small as corvettes. As DDG-51 Flight I destroyers have to retire due to age, the disparity will just get worse, and LCS is a contributor to the “out-sticked” problem rather than a solution. Military.com | Information Dissemination.

April 5/13: Review? Military.com reports that US Navy leaders plan to discuss the LCS and its fit in the future fleet at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space Symposium on April 8th. Word is that they’re considering a program review.

April 1/13: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin Mission System and Training in Baltimore, MD receives a $17 million cost-plus-award-fee order for USS Fort Worth’s post-shakedown work, including renewed post-repair trials. The ship was commissioned on Sept 22/12. This is in addition to the $12.7 million contract for post-shakedown planning (q.v. Oct 25/12).

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The full amount is committed immediately, using FY 2006, 2012, and 2013 Shipbuilding and Conversion funding. The USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

March 29/13: YGBKM. There’s a lot poor reporting out there on defense issues, and we don’t always call it out, but sometimes the standards are so poor that it’s necessary. Former ballet dancer Allison Barrie’s FOX News “reporting” on LCS’ Pacific arrival is in that category. Where to begin? MH-60 helicopters can’t carry heavyweight torpedoes, or key mine clearance equipment. The mine warfare module touted in the article isn’t ready, and the surface warfare mission module is only effective against motorboats. And what does “Should a battle erupt, Freedom can act as a hub to tie together sea, air and land assets” even mean?

The article paints a picture of a ship that can perform a number of specialized missions at a high level, right now – and almost none of it is true. A dash of skepticism and about 15 minutes of Google searching would have revealed the many and serious holes in this piece, especially given recent coverage in several major media outlets. Unfortunately, no-one at FOX seems to have put in the time or oversight. Falling below even the New York Times’ standards on defense issues should be a source of shame. FOX News | “Someone Help Allison Please“.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. GAO designates 16/19 critical LCS technologies as mature, and the 3 omissions are either minor differences (Freedom Class retrieval system) or unsatisfiable any time soon. If a 30-year ABS certification somehow fails to satisfy the 20 year operational hull life requirement, the only solution seems to be “wait 20 years and ask us again in 2032.”

For the Freedom Class, GAO says that the cracking problem “occurred either in high stress areas or were due to poor workmanship.” They’ve been repaired. The ship has also had corrosion problems in the mission zone due to a poor stern door seal, and class design changes were made in response to both issues. They do seem to be finding quite a few issues in this design, but LCS 5 & 7 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews. LCS 5 is listed as 53% complete, and LCS 7 is listed as 37% complete.

Austal’s Independence Class, “will now [add] a corrosion protection system similar to [the Freedom Class] to mitigate the corrosion and will backfit it on existing hulls.” That’s an unusual item to casually omit from 1 LCS class, but whatever. LCS 4 has experienced construction delays to summer 2013, but the program office says that these issues are resolved now. LCS 6 & 8 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews: LCS 6 is listed as 49% complete, and LCS 8 is listed as 24% complete.

In October 2012, the Navy rescinded their requirement to conduct a Milestone C/ Low Rate Production LCS review. That means there will be 24 ships under contract before there’s a systematic review to support a production decision, in FY 2019.

March 19-29/13: LCS 1. USS Freedom has now had 3 power outages during the ship’s transit from Pearl Harbor, HI to Guam. This isn’t the 1st time, vid. April 23/12 entry.

On this trip, Aviation Week reports that the 10-12 minute March 16th outage may have been caused by water getting into an SSDG diesel generator’s exhaust system. March 20th saw an 11 minute outage that was also supposedly related to an SSDG problem, and March 21st was the 3rd outage. The ship eventually makes it to Guam on March 29th, and the crew was able to work through the issues themselves, but loss of power is a serious problem if it doesn’t happen at a convenient time. Aviation Week | Marianas Variety || US Navy | Guam PDN.

LCS 1 loses power

March 19/13: 30mm Mk46s. General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $25.7 million contract option for eight 30mm MK46 MOD 2 gun turrets, including associated spares and shore based parts. It covers 2 gun weapon systems for the LPD 17 class, and 6 more to equip LCS 5, 6, and 7. The guns are part of the “surface warfare” mission package.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (43%); Tallahassee, FL (20%); Lima, OH (14%); Westminster, MD (11%); Sterling Heights, MI (10%); Scranton, PA (2%), and is expected to be completed by November 2014. All funding is committed immediately (N00024-10-C-5438).

March 18/13: USN Memo – Up-gun LCS. USNI reports that USN Commander of Surface Forces Vice Adm. Tom Copeman has proposed changes to the Navy’s LCS strategy. In late 2012, he reportedly submitted the classified memo “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet,” which calls for an “up-gunned, multimission variant” of a single LCS class going forward. Some observers have interpreted this as halving the 55 ship LCS buy, but that doesn’t necessarily follow. It’s perfectly possible to buy the same number of ships, with just 1 go-forward design.

With respect to the multi-mission requirement, both LCS classes have been promoted abroad with proper weapon fit-outs and upgraded sensors. A number of radar fit-outs would be possible, but the ship designs would have 2 important differences. Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class has less mission module space to give, but could host strike-length Mk.41 vertical launch cells that can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles and the largest SM-x family air and missile defense hardware. Austal’s Independence Class could retain much more mission module space after installing serious weapons, but would be restricted to tactical-length cells that would still be big enough for RIM-162 ESSM air defense missiles, and for VL-ASROC anti-submarine rockets.

There is some precedent. Undersecretary Bob Work’s draft assessment of the LCS program (vid Jan 29/13) explicitly cites the old Spruance Class destroyers. Later versions added a 61-cell VLS battery and 8 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, while subtracting a dedicated ASROC launcher and keeping its pair of 5-inch guns, 2 Mk15 Phalanx 20mm CIWS defenses, and RIM-7 Sea Sparrow air defense missiles. The likely radar and combat system changes would make LCS re-configuration more substantial, but even a tiny 8-cell VLS and provision for anti-ship missiles would significantly change the LCS’ tactical capabilities. USNI | Bloomberg | Defense News.

Copeman Report

March 15/13: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD received a $32.8 million contract modification for Freedom Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Lockheed Martin will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, N.J. (22%), and Washington, DC (19%), and is expected to be complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2300).

March 15/13: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL received a $20 million contract modification for Independence Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Austal USA… will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%), and is expected to complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 4/13: 2 Freedom Class. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives $696.6 million to build 2 FY 2013 Littoral Combat Ships. Note that this doesn’t include the mission modules needed to make the ships useful, or weapons provided as government-furnished equipment.

Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Walpole, MA (14%); Washington, DC (12%); Oldsmar, FL (4%); Beloit, WI (3%); Moorestown, NJ (2%); Minneapolis, MI (2%) and various locations of less than 1% each totaling 7%, and is expected to be complete by July 2018 (N00024-11-C-2300). See also Lockheed Martin.

March 4/13: 2 Independence Class. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives $681.7 million for 2 FY 2013 Littoral Combat Ships. Note that this doesn’t include the mission modules needed to make the ships useful, or weapons provided as government-furnished equipment.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%); Pittsfield, MA (13%); Cincinnati, Ohio (4%); Baltimore, MD (2%); Burlington, VT (2%); New Orleans, LA (2%) and various locations of less than 2% each totaling 26%. Work is expected to be complete by June 2018 (N00024-11-C-2301). See also GDLCS site.

4 LCS ships: 2 of each class

March 4/13: LCS 4. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.3 million contract modification, exercising an option for post-delivery support of LCS 4, the Independence Class ship USS Coronado. Bath Iron Works will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes identified during the construction period, which are necessary to support Coronado’s sail-away and follow-on post-delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (76%); Bath, ME (18%); and Pittsfield, MA (6%), and is expected to be complete by February 2014. The full amounts are committed immediately, using FY 2009 Shipbuilding and Conversion funds (N00024-09-C-2302).

March 1/13: Deployment. USS Freedom [LCS-1] leaves San Diego to deploy to Singapore and Southeast Asia for about 8 months. It’s the ship’s first regular deployment, though it has been sent on active missions in the Caribbean during its training and post-shakedown phases. USN All Hands, incl. video.

1st official operational deployment

Feb 8/13: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $6.9 million cost-plus award fee contract modification. They’ll provide engineering, management, advance planning and design work to support post shakedown work on LCS 2, the first-of-class USS Independence. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison and scheduling (see also May 21/12’s $7 million entry).

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (90%) and Pittsfield, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. All funds are committed, using FY 2013 RDT&E funding. The US Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

Jan 30/13: Thai competition. IHS Jane’s reports that Thailand is talking about buying 3 Chinese Type 054 Jiangkai-II frigates from Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, plus technology transfer to enable maintenance, repair, and overhaul and to locally produce unspecified components under licence. Thailand already operates some Chinese-built ships, and its 2 Nareusan Class frigates boast the very unusual feature of having American & European systems and weapons on board.

They see the Chinese ships as an option that could fit their total $1 billion budget, but Lockheed Martin has confirmed that they’re competing, too, with a variant of the Freedom Class LCS. Further competition can be expected from European manufacturers like TKMS (MEKO), Damen Schelde (SIGMA), and possibly DCNS (Gowind); and South Korea (FFX Incheon Class) adds a new international option in this category.

Jan 29/13: Work in progress. Undersecretary of the Navy, Robert O. Work offers a working paper draft of an in-depth report entitled “The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why”. It’s soon withdrawn from the US Naval War College Site, as he works to incorporate feedback into the final edit. It is accurately characterized as

“…the most thorough, honest, and detailed forensic outline of how LCS came pierside…. one-stop-shopping for anyone who would like to know the significant decision points in the process.”

Work is an LCS supporter. His outline is honest, but his conclusions are debatable. A fuller recounting and analysis is deserving of its own separate piece. DID awaits the final report, but offers this link to this interim document in the meantime. Commander Salamander naval blog | Scribd copy of the draft.

Undersec Report draft

Jan 22/13: Industrial. Austal announces a strategic partnership with Sembcorp Marine subsidiary Sembawang Shipyard Pte. Ltd., in Singapore. “Austal and Sembawang Shipyard will together provide rapid, high quality support specifically tailored to the US Navy’s fleet of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), both of which are expected to operate in the region.”

True, though the first example will be a Lockheed Martin ship.

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The LCS is included, and so are its Mission Modules/ Pakages. It does not paint a hopeful picture, demonstrating very serious mission package deficiencies that could and should have been addressed years ago. With respect to the ships themselves:

Freedom Class: During sea trials following post-shakedown availability, the ship developed a shaft seal leak and took 6 weeks to repair, but was graded as fit for service during special INSURV trials in May 2012. LCS 3 has made some design changes, and isn’t reporting any of the serious hull cracks found on USS Freedom. Final design isn’t expected to sail until LCS 5 Milwaukee.

Independence Class: Getting a system to combat corrosion (see Aug 12/11 and earlier), and an Impressed Current Cathodic Protection system is planned for the water jet tunnels on LCS 4. The Navy also continues to work through problems associated with the Twin Boom Extensible Crane on LCS 2. Final design isn’t expected to sail until LCS 6 Jackson.

General: LCS has problems fighting while maneuvering. “Ship operations at high speeds cause vibrations that make accurate use of the 57 mm gun very difficult.” Overall, “LCS is not expected to be survivable in that it is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment.” Crewing levels continue to worsen this vulnerability, while impairing capability:

“Crew size can limit the mission capabilities of the ship. Core crew size provides little flexibility to support more than one operation at a time; unplanned manning losses and corrective maintenance further exacerbate the problem. The Navy is reviewing manning levels and installing 20 additional bunks in LCS 1 for flexibility during its deployment [DID: vid. July 2/12 entry], but is not changing the final manning levels.”

LCS has been given class-specific survivability designations, rather than using the Navy’s general Level 1, Level 2, etc. LCS LVL 1 is an orderly abandon ship. LCS LVL 2 allows the ship to limp out of the area, while operating communications and small caliber weapons. LCS LVL 3 includes some remaining mission capability. The USN will conduct Total Ship Survivability Trials on LCS 3 and 4, but won’t conduct shock trials until the final LCS 5 & 6 designs sail. DOT&E | WIRED.

DOT&E 2012 report

Jan 10/13: Program update. Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden offers an update covering the LCS program and its mission modules.

USS Freedom is preparing for her Asian deployment, and LCS 3 USS Fort Worth is preparing to undergo a Post Delivery Test and Trials period. USS Independence is testing the Mine Counter-Measure module, and LCS 4 Coronado is under construction and slated for summer 2013 delivery.

On the mission module front, they’re now referred to as “mission packages.” The vestigal Surface Warfare MP is scheduled for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY 2014. USS Independence [LCS 2] has demonstrated successful launch and recovery of offboard vehicles for the Mine Counter Measures MP, which is also slated for IOC in 2014. The ASW MP is working on “[i]ntegration of the launch and recovery system into the hull, and won’t reach IOC until FY 2016. USN’s Navy Live blog.

Jan 10/13: PEO support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to support PEO Littoral Combat Ships. All funds are committed immediately, but $4.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13.

Work will be performed in Washington ,DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, per the sole-source allowances in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented in FAR 6.302-1 (N00024-13-C-6322).

Dec 26/12: LCS 1 fixes. Aviation Week reports that the US Navy has made a number of fixes to problems identified in their May report (q.v. April 23/12 entry), after vehemently denying that accounts of those problems were true.

Fixes include augmentation of the ship’s anti-corrosion system, complete repainting of the main machinery room and piping that had not been previously painted, non-destructive testing of piping that was then reviewed by the the American Bureau of Shipping, and changes to weld procedures and Non-Destructive Testing procedures on LCS-3 and subsequent Freedom Class ships. Fixes to the RIX air compressors don’t appear to have been effective, based on “ship sources.” They may be replaced with Sauer products. Program officials also supposedly redesigned the Isotta Fraschini ship’s service diesel engines (SSDGs) that have been causing power problems – but subsequent events indicate that it hasn’t fixed the problems. Maybe Finmeccanica shouldn’t have been given such carte blanche by Lockheed Martin to specify its own products.

Dec 26/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives $13.5 million for planning yard services to support LCS-2 and LCS-4, the first Independence Class ships. Services will include: vendor training and crew familiarization; in-service engineering support; trainer support; availability maintenance advanced planning; long lead time material planning and procurement; material warehousing; logistics product updates; and the class sustainment management.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. $9.4 million is committed immediately, and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year on Sept 30/13 (N00024-12-G-4330).

Dec 20/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship core class services. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (36%), Hampton, VA (30%), Washington, DC (23%), and Marinette, WI (11%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 20/12: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL receives an $8.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) core class services. They’ll assess engineering and production challenges, and evaluate the cost and schedule risks of affordability changes to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%) and Pittsfield, MA (49%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Oct 25/12: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.7 million cost-plus-award-fee order to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design to support of LCS-3 Forth Worth’s post-shakedown availability.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The USN supervisor of shipbuilding, conversion, and repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

Oct 5/12: Controversy. USMC Lt. Col. John Sayen pens an LCS article for TIME’s Battleland that minces few words, while comparing LCS to specific foreign ship classes:

“The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is not only staggeringly overpriced and chronically unreliable but – even if it were to work perfectly – cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much…. About the only threat the LCS might handle is the “swarms” of Iranian machinegun and RPG-carrying speedboats in the Persian Gulf…. When asked why the LCS has sacrificed so much for speed, Navy spokesmen tend to become vague.”

The US Navy fires back in short order, saying that:

“…the LCS was never designed to protect other ships or to support troops ashore. That’s not its job. Its job is to protect the sea base and high value naval units from swarming boats, hunt down and sink diesel submarines, and clear mines in littoral waters.”

Some of their other shots miss, but they’re right about a few things. In terms of major points, shipbuilding is to naval vessel standards, not commercial standards as Sayen claimed, a change that cost the Navy a good chunk of money on initial ships. That argument ducks the issue of lower survivability standards, however, which are a legitimate point of debate. The Navy’s contention re: superiority to 1980s-era FFG-7 frigates that have had all major weapons removed in a bit disingenuous, and it would be useful to understand the basis for their claims of superiority over much smaller and cheaper 1990s-era Osprey Class minesweepers. TIME Battleland | USN’s Navy Live blog | Military.com.

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC receives an $8.5 million contract modification, finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

FY 2012

$1.4 billion for LCS 9-12; Freedom Class breakdowns & questions – but program looks “unstoppable”; Navy establishes LCS Council to get it ready for deployment to Singapore; LCS 10-12 named; LCS 4 launched; LCS 5 keel laid; 20 New berths for Freedom Class; Cost is #1 now. LCS 4 launch
(click to view full)

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC wins a $7.5 million modification, as part of finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to complete by September 2013. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

Sept 28/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $7 million modification, finalizing the contract for LCS Independence Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4330).

Sept 22/12: LCS 3. The Freedom Class ship USS Fort Worth is commissioned at the Port of Galveston, TX, and is officially placed in service. US Navy.

LCS 3 commissioned

Aug 22/12: LCS Council. The US Navy convenes an “LCS Council” of high-ranking officers, in order to ensure that the LCS is ready to deploy to Singapore in 2013, per its commitments, and that the USN is ready to support it properly. “Addressing the challenges identified by [preparatory USN] studies necessitates” this high-level group, in order to drive fixes in multiple places across the Navy.

It’s filled with brass: Vice Adm. Rick Hunt, director of the Navy Staff, as its chairman, and the following senior officers also on board: Vice Adm. Mark Skinner, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander, Naval Surface Forces; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. The Plan of Action and Milestones are due no later than Jan 31/13. USN Memo [PDF] | POGO.

Aug 16/12: “Directional instability”. POGO and Aviation Week find documents that detail problems keeping LCS 1 on a straight course. While ships do need some directional instability to maneuver well, but “a source close to the LCS program told POGO that the directional instability affected the crew’s ability to operate the Lockheed ship.”

Worse, the problem occurred just before the Navy went to Congress, asking for permission to buy both ship types. The documents show the Navy instructing people to either not talk about this problem, or minimize it. POGO.

June 1/12: LCS to Singapore. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta tells the 11th Annual Shangri-La Dialogue on security that “American littoral combat ships will be berthing in Singapore.” Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey goes on to detail the specifics a couple of days later, saying that there will be 4 LCS ships committed to Singapore for 6-10 month rotations, and will make port calls throughout the region. Pentagon | Pentagon follow-on.

Singapore chosen for deployments

May 31/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.5 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract modification for LCS Independence Class design services. They’ll provide class baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition work, interim support services, and liaison for ship construction and post delivery with the class design agent for even-numbered ships from LCS 6 Jackson onward. This modification includes an option, which could bring its cumulative value of this modification to $25.1 million.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (54%), Pittsfield, MA (45%), and Mobile, AL (1%). Work is expected to be complete by June 2014 (N00024-09-C-2302).

May 31/12: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME receives a $7 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of LCS-2 USS Independence’s post-shakedown availability. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison, and scheduling.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by February 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the USN’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME (N00024-09-G-2301).

POGO Presentation
click for video

May 11/12: Push for GAO. House Armed Services Committee member Rep. Jackie Speier [D-CA] is leading a push to have the Congressional GAO audit office to review the LCS program. Rep. Duncan Hunter [R-CA] is also active in submitting LCS-related amendments that are critical of the Navy and its lack of disclosure. Speier says that:

“…serious flaws…. threaten the operational capabilities of the ship…. it’s disturbing that the Navy would accept a ship that fails to meet the basic requirements for a tugboat. The future of the fleet is corroding before our eyes.”

See: Maritime Executive | AOL Defense | The Hill.

April 23/12: POGO – cancel LCS-1 Class. The POGO NGO releases a series of Navy documents showing problems with the LCS-1 Freedom Class, which:

“…has been plagued by flawed designs and failed equipment since being commissioned, has at least 17 known cracks, and has repeatedly been beset by engine-related failures…. during those two outings: several vital components on the ship failed including, at some point in both trips, each of the four engines. In addition, there were shaft seal failures during the last trip,[22] which led to flooding. Additional new material… shows that the ship appears to have even more serious problems with critical ship-wide systems, including rampant corrosion and flooding….. The Navy has not been forthcoming with information about all of these problems.”

Aviation Week picks up on these allegations, and relates “extensive corrosion and manufacturing issues more recent and serious than anything the Pentagon or prime contractor Lockheed Martin has publicly acknowledged thus far,” including flaws in vital piping systems that are leaking. Their report is based on a guided tour of the ship in dry dock, as well as “sources intimately familiar with Freedom’s design, repairs and operations.” To make things worse, the ship has issues with underway speed. In moderate-severe Sea State 7 conditions, it’s no greater than 20 knots, with prohibitions against driving into head seas. Even in moderate Sea State 5 conditions, LCS 1 is restricted to 20 knots into head seas. POGO goes on to recommend that the USN adopt just 1 variant of the LCS, and further recommends canceling Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class variant. POGO | Aviation Week | USNI Blog | Commander Salamander blog | U-T San Diego | POGO vs. the USN, side by side comparison.

Widespread issues with LCS 1

July 2/12: 20 more berths. Defense News reports that the Navy is acknowledging the obvious, and adding 20 more berths to USS Freedom. They’re not adding any more space, of course, but they will add 2 officer berths, 2 petty officer berths, and 16 enlisted berths. No decision has been made yet about USS Independence.

LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations. In order to use the additional berths, the manning plan also has to change.

Other LCS 1 Freedom Class upgrades will reportedly involve an Aqueous Film-Forming Foam system, improvements to stern ramp fender stanchions, removal of its retractable bitts; and more fire suppression sprinklers, tank level indicators, and pipe hangers. Those sorts of changes aren’t unusual for a ship at this stage.

May 22-24/12: Despite the PREINSURV report of May 7/12, The Special Trial takes place anyway with an overall good assessment. Because the Freedom was on the pier for repairs, its crew had spent too little time on it prior to the inspection, which explains some of the hiccups.

These repairs have addressed some problems like hull cracks (see April 11/11 entry) but other vexing issues remain unsolved since they have been spotted in 2008, such as water intrusion up the hawse pipe and through the aft stern doors. Navy Times.

May 7/12: A PRESINSURV report recommends not to proceed with a scheduled Special Trial, as they have found the crew unprepared with the inspection and unfamiliar with their ship. At least they had a positive attitude. It should be noted that a pre-inspection is supposed to find issues, in order to get all ducks in a row before the real deal. Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination has the verbatim memo.

April 8/12: Program unstoppable? The New York Times writes an article about the Littoral Combat Ship: “The Next War: Smaller Navy Ship Has a Rocky Past and Key Support.” The money paragraph:

“Analysts say an important factor driving the Navy and Congress is that the vessels the ships are meant to replace – frigates and minesweepers – are aging, and that there is little else in the pipeline. The combat ship is seen as too far along in production to be killed now. [Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-CA says] It’s one of those things that once the snowball goes down the hill, it just keeps rolling…. There’s no way I’m going to stop it.”

See: New York Times | DoD Buzz.

March 16/12: 4 x FY 2012 ships. The US Navy issues 2 major contracts for FY 2012 LCS ships. A $715 million contract modification to Lockheed Martin Corporation will build LCS 9 Little Rock and LCS 11 Sioux City at Marinette Marine Corporation in Marinette, WI. A $691.6 million contract modification to Austal USA will build LCS 10 Gabrielle Giffords and LCS 12 Omaha in Mobile, AL. Amounts are based on the competitive, LCS dual block buy contracts (vid. Dec 29/10), and factor in approved FY 2010-11 change orders to the designs. Note that these contracts cover just the base sea frames, and installation of separately-purchased “government furnished equipment” like weapons, etc. Mission modules in particular must be noted as an expensive “extra.”

At present, USS Freedom [LCS 1, Fr] is undergoing serious repairs at its homeport in San Diego, CA. USS Independence [LCS 2, In] is currently undergoing test and trials in Mayport, FL. Fort Worth [LCS 3, Fr] is under construction and planned to deliver in June 2012, and Coronado [LCS 4, In] is expected to deliver in early 2013. Milwaukee [LCS 5, Fr] and Jackson [LCS 6, In] are in the early stages of construction. Detroit [LCS 7, Fr] and Montgomery [LCS 8, In] are in pre-production stages. US Navy.

4 ships: 2 of each class

March 14/12: US NAVSEA issues a pair of contracts for a year of “special studies, analyses, review and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services… [to] assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.” Work will last until March 2013.

The award disparity between the Freedom (Lockheed) and Independence (Austal) classes is interesting, and calls to mind the AvWeek report that suggested the need for a fundamental redesign (Jan 30/12). Maritime Memos’ Tim Colton wonders what the heck the government is thinking with the whole award. “…[T]hese are fixed-price contracts: the contractors should be doing everything they can to reduce costs and schedule at their own expense.” Which is true, but lifecycle costs are a bigger fraction, and are entirely the Navy’s problem unless there’s a contract to address them. Of course, not picking 40+ knot speeds as a key requirement would have done a lot to reduce operating costs and boost range – but it’s too late for the Navy to do that now.

Lockheed Martin Corp in Baltimore, MD receives a $33.6 million option (N00024-11-C-2300), with work to be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, NJ (22%); and Washington, DC (19%).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million option (N00024-11-C-2301), with work to be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%).

March 1/12: LCS 1. Gannett’s Navy Times:

“Barely a month after leaving dockyard hands, the Freedom, first of the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), is back [for a 6 week] dry dock in San Diego, this time to fix a broken shaft seal that caused minor flooding on board the ship [on Feb 1/12]… engineers from the Naval Sea Systems Command and Lockheed Martin… will pull the propeller shaft and examine the shaft and its seals to determine why and how the newly-installed seal broke. Repairs for the Freedom are covered under an Initial Support Plan contract with Lockheed-Martin…”

LCS 1 breakdown

Feb 15/12: LCS 11 & 12 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus names the next 2 Littoral Combat Ships. He keeps politics out of this naming set, naming the Freedom Class ship LCS 11 Sioux City, and the Independence Class ship LCS 12 Omaha. US Navy | Washington Times.

Feb 10/12: LCS 10 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus can’t seem to keep politics out of his ship names. He names LCS 10 after shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords [D-AZ], even though the naming convention for LCS ships has been cities. He did the same for Rep. John Murtha [D-PA] in the San Antonio Class LPDs.

Mabus’ politicized ship naming choices have drawn fire, to the point of sponsored bills and amendments that would add congressional oversight to SecNav’s traditional prerogative. Traditionally, there has been some level of politics in the process, but it has generally involved choices that had acceptance on both sides of the aisle. The Giffords naming would qualify, but coming after Mabus’ other choices, it’s raising the heat rather than dissipating it. US DoD | Austal.

Jan 30/12: Freedom Class a lemon? Aviation Week reports that after being given copies of Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) briefings the findings of Navy and industry reports, the set of defense analysts it probed believe that the Freedom Class may need to be fundamentally redesigned.

“The analysts also call for an investigation into how the ship was accepted in such – in their view – questionable shape…”

Jan 27/12: PM removed. LCS program manager Capt. Jeffrey Riedel is reassigned out of the program by LCS Program Executive Officer Rear Adm. James Murdoch, pending an investigation into allegations of “improper conduct.” Edward Foster will serve as the acting program manager until the investigation is complete, but even if the allegations are proven false, the report says that Riedel won’t be returning. Gannett’s Navy Times.

LCS PM removed

Jan 14/12: LCS 4 launch. LCS 4 is christened Coronado, after the California city near San Diego. Note that she is not yet USS Coronado. US Navy.

Dec 19/11: Support. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Freedom Class.

Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (20%); Virginia Beach, VA (20%); Washington, DC (15%); Marinette, WI (13%); Moorestown, NJ (12%); Baltimore, MD (10%); Manassas, VA (7%); and Arlington, VA (3%). Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 19/11: Support. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Independence Class.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (30%); Pittsfield, MA (30%); Malvern, PA (20%); Newport News, VA (13%); and various locations of less than 2% each, totaling 7% (N00024-11-C-2301).

Dec 19/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives a $15.2 million contract modification, exercising an option for LCS 3 (future USS Fort Worth) post-delivery support. Lockheed Martin will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes that have been identified during the construction period, and are deemed necessary to support Fort Worth’s sailaway and follow-on post delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (39%); Marinette, Wis. (34%); Hampton, VA (18%); and Washington, DC (9%). Work is expected to be completed by December 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-2303).

Dec 16/11: Philippines deployment? Discussions continue re: deployment of LCS ships to Singapore (vid. Dec 4/10), and reports suggest that the Philippines is also involved in discussions with the USA. The moves are said to be part of a broader US strategy to “pivot” its military focus toward the Pacific, and away from Europe. Reuters.

Nov 7/11: New LCS Office. Inside the Navy reports [subscription] that PEO-LCS has created an office dedicated to introducing the new ships to the fleet. It will be responsible for coordinating logistics, training, mission package support and ship sustainment. That sort of thing has been done before elsewhere in the Navy and US Military Sealift Command, but it’s new to the LCS following the July 11/11 merger of the ship and mission module PEOs.

Nov 2/11: LCS 5 keel. Team Lockheed Martin holds the official keel-laying ceremony for LCS 5 Milwaukee, their 3rd Freedom Class ship. Lockheed Martin.

LCS induction office

Oct 24/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin announces that LCS 3 Fort Worth has passed builder’s trials, and returned to Marinette Marine on Lake Michigan to prepare for Navy acceptance trials.

Oct 20/11: Cost is #1. LCS PEO Rear Adm. James Murdoch tells reporters that cost is now the overriding priority for the program, which means avoiding any changes unless there’s no choice. The flip side is that all of the 2 classes’ current weaknesses end up more or less frozen as is.

The mission modules will continue to evolve. He says that the Navy is still trying to reduce the Independence Class’ [LCS-2] preparation time to employ some of its mine-clearing mission package, so it can meet the Navy requirement to clear a (classified) area in a (classified) amount of time of a (classified) number of mines. They’re also taking steps to replace the anti-submarine USVs with simpler towed sonar arrays, which can be run at speed. Aviation Week.

FY 2011

Program shifts to dual-buy; Program SAR to $37.48 billion; LCS 5-8 bought; PEO LCS created; USS Independence corrosion issues; USS Freedom cracking issues; LCS 5-9 named; Marinette opens new facility; Saudi interest?; Official reports. Named.
(click for cutaway)

Sept 20/11: Sub-contractors. Saab and its American subsidiary Saab Sensis Corp. announce the official Sea Giraffe contract from General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, who is the Independence Class’ platform system engineering agent. Saab’s Sea Giraffe has always been the planned radar for the LCS-2 Independence Class, and has been ordered for the first 2 ships; this just makes it official for all ships under the new contract.

The 3-D Sea Giraffe AMB is used for aerial scans, water surface scans, and weapon guidance. Land-based counterparts can even back-track incoming rockets and ballistic projectiles to their firing point, and Saab confirms reports that the naval radar can do so as well. Saab Sensis manages the US technical baseline for Sea Giraffe AMB. They will provide US based program management hardware and software adaptations, system integration, testing, and total life-cycle support to in support of the radars on Austal’s LCS design.

Sept 8/11: LCS 2. USS Independence [LCS-2] arrives in St. Petersburg, FL. The question is now how the Navy will use it. GAO reports contend that USS Freedom’s previous deployment may have set the whole program back, by removing the ship’s use as a test bed for LCS mission modules. DoD Buzz discusses what they think we know:

“We can presume the ship’s corrosion issues are resolved since it was given the green light to leave Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and that it’s seaworthy because it made the trip around the state, and that it’s handling flight operations now – the ship stood into Tampa Bay with an MH-60 helicopter on its flight deck…”

Aug 29/11: Exports? Aviation Week quotes Lockheed MS2 VP of littoral ship systems, Joe North, who says that over 21 countries have expressed interest in their LCS design. He’s the first to admit that interest does not always equate to a budget, and the article notes that Chinese frigate designs are becoming thinkable alternatives to buying a ship like the Freedom Class.

Aug 22/11: LCS 5 begins. Lockheed Martin announces the start of construction on LCS 5 Milwaukee, at Marinette Marine. The ship is due for delivery to the U.S. Navy in 2014, and is the 1st of 10 Freedom Class ships awarded to Lockheed Martin under the December 2010 Navy contract.

Meanwhile, LCS 3 Fort Worth remains on track for delivery in 2012.

Aug 5/11: Freedom Class changes. Aviation Week’s “U.S. Navy Studies And Improves LCS-1” describes the post-shakedown process, which includes design and procedure changes that are incorporated into the class. Previous hull cracking issues aren’t on USS Freedom’s PSA list, but magazine modifications and a mooring configuration change are.

Aug 2/11: Corrosion. Prospective Deputy SecDef Ashton Carter sends a written response to the bipartisan Senate letter of July 13/11. It says that USS Independence’s galvanic corrosion problem was a design flaw, which is being changed at a cost of $3.2 million, plus about $250,000 for each future ship of class. An Impressed Current Cathodic Protection System and “additional sacrificial protection design” will be applied to USS Independence during its Post Shakedown Availability, and on future ships of class prior to delivery. With respect to the damage:

“…the complex geometry of the water jet assemblies and tunnels made sufficient insulation of the aluminum hull from the steel water jet assembly difficult… corrosion on LCS 2 is concentrated in small areas in the water jet tunnels and water jet cone assemblies… transition area between the two.”

That doesn’t sound like “aggressive” corrosion, which raises questions. The original design approach apparently did include cathodic protection in the waterjets, alongside coatings and insulation, but it wasn’t enough, and some of the insulation wasn’t installed properly. The system was also designed to commercial principles, which emphasize regular repair of corrosion, but the Navy is looking for a more permanent fix.

With respect to the LCS program’s cost estimates, Carter says the Navy’s figures were based on actual offers received, so he decided that was the best program estimate to use. Full Carter letter [PDF] | Defense News. See also July 13/11, June 20-22/11, and June 17/11 entries.

Independence Class corrosion issue

Aug 1/11: LCS 6 begins. The Navy authorizes the first cutting of aluminum for the Independence Class ship LCS 6 Jackson at Austal’s Modular Manufacturing facility in Mobile, AL. US Navy.

July 27/11: Rep. Duncan D. Hunter [R-CA-52] and Rob Wittman [R-VA-1] ask the GAO to update its 2010 audit of the LCS program. Full Letter [PDF].

July 22/11: LCS 2. General Dynamics – Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $10 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of the post shakedown availability for USS Independence [LCS 2]. While Austal is the builder and contract owner, GD-BIW began the LCS competition as their bid partner, and would likely have served as the “2nd shipyard” for the trimaran design, if the Navy had pursued that requirement.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (72%); Pittsfield, MA (20%); and Mobile, AL (8%). Work is expected to be completed by February 2013. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, Maine manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

July 15/11: LCS 9 named. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next Freedom Class ship, LCS 9, will be named USS Little Rock, in honor of Arkansas’ capital city.

The previous USS Little Rock began life as a Cleveland Class light cruiser after World War II [CL-92], and was one of 6 to be converted to a Galveston Class guided missile cruiser later on [CLG/CG-4]. She was decommissioned in 1976, and now sits in Buffalo, NY as a museum ship. US Navy.

July 13/11: Corrosion. A bipartisan group of 7 U.S. Senators sends a formal letter to the Pentagon’s Ashton Carter, asking for explanations about LCS certifications that had been waived by the Navy. Waived items included survivability-related certifications, an area that’s a known weakness for the type. Senators Webb [D-VA, former Secretary of the Navy], Begich [D-AK], McCaskill [D-MO], McCain [R-AZ], Brown [R-MA], Coburn [R-OK], and Portman [R-OH] question:

An April 7/11 Office of the Secretary of Defense certification to move the LCS to Milestone B, while waiving several requirements, with no explanation of why.
The use of Navy acquisition cost estimates, instead of those from the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group.
A waiver of the need to certify program tradeoffs, granted late in the program
How the LCS program “will ensure reliability and minimize major cost growth in operations and sustainment costs” in light of LCS-2’s corrosion issue; they also want detailed information about the problem, and a response to the Austal CEO’s public statement.

See: Full text of letter | Gannett’s Navy Times.

July 11/11: PEO LCS Created. The US Navy formally establishes Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS), during a ceremony at Washington Navy Yard, in order to oversee the program. Ship construction supervision is removed fro PEO Ships, while mission module supervision is removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which is dissolved.

Per predictions made in May, Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch is placed in charge of the office, which is designed to bring all elements of the troubled program together under one roof. US Navy | Information Dissemination (May 2011) was not enthusiastic.

July 5/11: US Navy:

“The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) is undergoing $1.8 million in maintenance while in dry dock at BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair. Freedom is scheduled to undock September 19, 2011.”

The accompanying picture clearly shows the single helicopter hangar, as well as the 2 boxy stern bustles, aka. “water wings,” which added at a late stage to address the type’s reserve buoyancy issues.

June 20-22/11: Corrosion. June 20-22/11: After USS Independence corrosion reports hit Austal’s share price, a company release addresses the issue. It notes the complete lack of such problems on all of Austal’s commercial and military ships to date, and suggests that the US Navy may have failed to follow basic procedures. Note that Westpac Express is a leased vessel, maintained by Austal:

“…having built over 220 aluminum vessels for defence forces and commercial clients around the world… galvanic corrosion has not been a factor on any Austal built and fully maintained vessel, and our technical experts are eager to support any request to identify root causes… The Westpac Express… has shuttled U.S. Marines throughout the Pacific Basin continuously for ten years, with a 99.7% availability over that period.

Austal has a well-developed methodology for the management of galvanic corrosion, which it has deployed globally… If selected to provide post-delivery support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class Services program, it is a straight forward process for Austal engineers… deploy temporary sacrificial anodes every time the vessel is moored, and ensure that high-voltage maintenance equipment is properly grounded before use aboard ship.”

Reports that the US Navy’s temporary fix involves installing a cathodic protection system aboard USS Independence do tend to suggest several major lapses: in specifications and acceptance (US Navy), by the Design Agent (Austal), and by the contract prime (GD Bath Iron works). Information Dissemination has a different take, and thinks there are grounds for believing that Austal’s JHSV ships, which may not have a cathodic protection system either, could also be at risk:

“In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. LCS-4 doesn’t have [a cathodic protection system] either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy. The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue… I’d be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.”

See: Austal release | Alabama Press-Register | Information Dissemination | WIRED Danger Room.

June 17/11: Corrosion. The US Navy has told Congressional appropriations committees that “aggressive” corrosion was found in the propulsion areas of USS Independence, which rely on Wartsila waterjets. The ship has been given temporary repairs, but permanent repairs will require dry-docking and removal of the water-jet propulsion system. The strong Australian dollar has hurt Austal’s commercial exports, so this blow to its defense business has added impetus. Bloomberg | Alabama Press-Register | Sydney Morning Herald.

Corrosion in new ships isn’t unheard of, though it’s never a good sign. Norway’s Fridtjof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates had this problem, for instance. The Independence Class runs some risks that are specific to its all-aluminum construction, however, as key subsystems with different metals create risks of galvanic corrosion. Interestingly, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) NGO notes that:

“The Senate Armed Services Committee’s markup of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, released today, gives the Pentagon $32.1 million to address “the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Control shortfall in funding requirements.” The Pentagon estimates that funding in this area yields an estimated 57:1 return on investment by reducing the costs for repairs and replacements of corroded systems and parts.”

June 16/11: WLD-1 launch testing. The US Navy Program Executive Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) announces the successful first time launch and recovery of the WLD-1 Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) semi-submerged USV from USS Independence [LCS 2], while underway near Panama, FL. The vehicle went through 5 successful cycles of deployment, towed operations and recovery, while also testing things like vehicle stability in the wake zone and remote operation.

In active use, the RMMV will tow the AN/AQS-20A sonar, and the entire Remote Minehunting System is scheduled for further testing in summer 2011 as part of the LCS MIW mine warfare module’s core AMCM system. This test matters to the LCS program for other reasons as well. The effectiveness of LCS rear launch and recovery systems has been a concern for both designs. US NAVSEA.

June 15/11: Saudi Arabia. Defense News reports that Saudi Arabia may be shifting their focus away from a fully armed variant of the Littoral Combat Ship, carrying the smaller AN/SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system. In its place, they received May 2011 briefings concerning DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers displacing about 3 times the tonnage, with ballistic missile defense capability upgrades. The cost trade-off would be about 4-6 modified LCS ships, in exchange for about 2 DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD ships.

The unspoken threat here is, of course, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The unspoken concern is the security of a top-level defense technology, which is critical to defending the USA and its allies, in Saudi hands.

To date, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class has never been exported per se, though their AEGIS combat system and accompanying AN/SPY-1D radars have. Another possible option for Saudi Arabia would be used US Navy DDG-51 Flight I ships, upgraded with AEGIS BMD. That would allow the Saudis to field more ships for the same money, if an agreement was reached. The costs would lie in questions about hull life and length of service, and the Flight Is’ lack of a helicopter hangar. Helicopters have been shown to be essential defenses against speedboat threats, of the kind that Iran fields in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Defense News | Information Dissemination.

June 4/11: LCS to Singapore. In a speech made at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates disclosed US plans to deploy new littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore. US Navy ships routinely stop in Singapore, but these would be the first US Navy ships permanently deployed there. SecDef Gates speech transcript | East Asia Forum.

June 2/11: Sub-contractors. Taber Extrusions LLC announces contracts to supply extruded aluminum products for JHSV 3 Fortitude, and LCS 6 Jackson, from its facilities in Russellville, AR and Gulfport, MS. Some structural extrusions for both ships will also be manufactured by Taber and supplied to Austal through a contract with O’Neal Steel Corp.

Taber has an 8,600 ton extrusion press with a rectangular container and billet configuration. The firm says that compared with smaller presses and round containers, their tool gives superior metal flow patterns with much tighter tolerances for flatness, straightness and twist; and better assurance of critical thickness dimensions. The resulting wide multi-void extrusions are friction stir welded into panels, and tight tolerances improve productivity while reducing downstream scrap. When finished, they make up some of the ship’s decking, superstructure and bulkheads.

April 15/11: LCS SAR. The Pentagon’s Selected Acquisitions Report ending Dec 30/10 include the LCS program:

“Procurement and construction cost estimates for LCS have been incorporated into the SAR following approval of Milestone B (entry into Engineering and Manufacturing Development) on April 8, 2011. Previous reports were limited to development costs… Since the December 2009 SAR, development costs increased $1,080.4 million (+3.0 percent) from $36,358.4 million to $37,438.8 million, due primarily to fully funding the required planning and execution of the post-Milestone B program, to include the requirements for developmental/operational testing and live fire test and evaluation (+$822.0 million). There are also increases to complete shipboard trainers (+$189.3 million) and post delivery efforts for LCS-1 and LCS-2 (+$60.9 million).”

Costs rising

April 11/11: Cracking. DoD Buzz relays US Navy LCS program manager Capt. Jeff Riedel’s words, from a briefing at the US Navy League’s annual Sea, Air Space conference. He says it isn’t a design issue – or is it?:

“Both Lockheed and the Navy are going through their final review that should be available in the next couple of weeks… The design is adequate, how I build it is a different story… If I was able to weld it as it was designed to be welded, it wouldn’t have been an issue. The real issue was, getting access to that area to be able to do the weld… We modeled the superstructure and we found that we had areas that were high stress areas, so we would expect, potentially, a crack to occur in that high-stress area… So we instrumented the superstructure and we used that instrumentation to validate the model and in fact, we’re now using that to better the design… for LCS-3 and following we’ve gone back and changed the design so we can reduce those stress areas.”

Beginning with LCS-3, Riedel says that the spot on the ship where the crack occurred was made easier for welders to reach, allowing them to lay an extra thick weld.

March 25/11: LCS 6 & 8 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the Freedom Class LCS 6 will be named the USS Jackson, after Mississippi’s state capitol, and LCS 8 will be named the USS Montgomery, after Alabama’s state capitol. US DoD

March 18/11: Freedom, cracked. US NAVSEA reveals that Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom has already experienced a 6-inch outside/ 3-inch inside horizontal hull crack, located below the waterline in the steel hull, during a heavy weather ocean trial. It leaked 5 gallons an hour, and originated in a weld seam between steel plates. The ship returned to port in San Diego at 8 knots, avoiding rough seas, and the crack was patched with a cofferdam by March 12/11. NAVSEA is reviewing the class’ design, construction drawings and welding procedures.

In response to questions, NAVSEA spokesman Christopher Johnson emailed Bloomberg to add that welding “defects” also showed up as smaller cracks in the welds of USS Freedom’s aluminum superstructure during 2010 sea trials. Changes apparently already have been made in the ship’s design to correct the superstructure stress.

Discussions with people who have been involved in shipbuilding produced a range of reactions, but the fact that the larger crack was found in the steel hull, not the aluminum superstructure, is significant. Aluminum is a tricky material for ships, precisely because of its tendency to crack. One sailor recalled being able to see daylight from inside a level 2 office in the USS Newport LST (now Mexico’s ARM Papaloapan), thanks to cracks at the welds in its aluminum superstructure. Steel is supposed to be less troublesome that way. The overall tenor was that cracks typically first appear near the areas that ‘want to move’ as the ship flexes, but are overly restrained from doing so. That is said to make cracks more of a design issue, and less of a welding issue, though poor welding or poor steel quality can cause problems. One question asked was about expansion joints, which allow the middle part of the ship that gets the most bending to be able to give up those forces in the rubber expansion joint. Many older frigates have an expansion joint at the middle of the ship, for instance, and if this was eliminated in the LCS design, that would more strongly suggest a design issue. Bloomberg (note that USS Independence, referenced as having better welds, is in fact Austal’s ship) | Defense News | Fort Worth Star Telegram | Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel Online.

LCS 1 cracks

March 18/11: LCS 5 & 7 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next 2 Freedom Class ships built by Lockheed Martin will be named the USS Milwaukee [LCS 5] and the USS Detroit [LCS 7]. LCS 3 Fort Worth is said to be about 85% complete at the moment, and on schedule for 2012 delivery. LCS 5 Milwaukee will begin construction in the summer of 2011, while LCS 7 Detroit isn’t expected to begin construction until May 2012.

The last ship named USS Detroit was a Sacramento Class fast support ship, T-AOE-4. It was decommissioned in 2005. The last ship named USS Milwaukee was T-AOR-2, a Wichita Class oiler that was decommissioned in 1994. US Navy | Alabama Press Register | Detroit Free Press | Australia’s Herald Sun (Victoria/ Melbourne) | Green Bay Press-Gazette | West Australia Business News.

March 17/11: 4 ships in FY 2011. The budget calls for 1 ship from each contractor. Note, however, that these awards don’t include the purchase of Government Furnished Equipment on board, or of the mission module needed to make the ships operational.

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a $376.6 million contract modification for 1 Freedom Class ship, LCS 7 Detroit. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Walpole, MA (14%); Washington, DC (12%); Oldsmar, FL (4%); Beloit, WI (3%); Moorestown, NJ (2%); Minneapolis, MN (2%); and various locations of less than 1% each, totaling 7%. Work is expected to be complete by April 2016 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Marinette Marine Co.’s President, Richard McCreary, says the firm expects to recall all 110 laid off employees by the summer, and add about 40 employees per month in August & September 2011.

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $368.6 million contract modification for 1 Independence Class ship, LCS 8. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%); Pittsfield, MA (13%); Cincinnati, OH (4%); Baltimore, MD (2%); Burlington, VT (2%); New Orleans, LA (2%); and various locations of less than 2% each, totaling 26%. Work is expected to be complete by October 2015 (N00024-11-C-2301). See also Austal | Lockheed Martin | Aviation Week | defpro | Philadelphia Inquirer | Upper Michigan Source.

FY 2011 order: LCS-7 & LCS-8

March 15/11: Support. Contracts to the 2 shipbuilders for Littoral Combat Ship class services, funding efforts to “assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives $34.1 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (31%); Marinette, WI (25%); Washington, DC (24%); and Moorestown, NJ (20%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (83%), and Pittsfield, MA (17%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 8/11: Controversy. The Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the Navy’s FY 2012 Navy budget and longer-term plan. SecNav Ray Mabus outlines the Navy’s view of the approved multi-year buy strategy.

“With an average cost of $440 million per ship, and with the cost reductions we have seen demonstrated on LCS 3 and 4, the Navy will save taxpayers approximately $1.9 billion in FY12-FY16. More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically reduced from the initial bids in 2009 will allow us to save an additional $1 billion – for a total of $2.9 billion – through the dual award of a ten-ship contract to each bidder.”

On the other hand, ranking member Sen. McCain continues to express concerns re: the LCS acquisition plan, though the multi-ship buy has been approved:

“As you probably know, I continue to think the Navy made a big mistake in going forward with a dual-source strategy on the LCS program. I believe that the true lifecycle costs of buying and sustaining both ships will be considerably more than what the Navy told us. I do not believe it is wise for Congress to authorize what amounts to a ‘bulk buy’ on a program without proving that its key aspects will work as intended and that its sustainability costs are reasonable. In the case of LCS, the Navy could not tell Congress what its plans are for the two different combat systems for the two designs; and, the combined capability of the mission packages with the sea-frames, which gives the ships combat power, remains unproven. I am concerned that the costs of operating and sustaining both variants will eventually require moving to a single combat system or going to a common propulsion and mechanical system. If that is where affordability concerns drive the Navy, why are we buying two versions of this ship?”

See: SASC Hearings record | Sen. Levin (chair) floor statement | Sen. McCain floor statement.

March 7/11: Industrial. Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation breaks ground for a new panel-line fabrication building to support construction of the U.S. Navy’s Freedom-class LCS. It will use more automation, improve raw material storage, and cut the distance ship modules have to travel during construction. It’s part of a 5-year, $100 million modernization plan by the shipyard’s new parent company, and builds on 2009 improvements that included higher-capacity overhead cranes, plasma-cutting tables and pipe-bending machines.

In addition to this groundbreaking, Marinette Marine also marked the opening of its professional center and the completion of a project to expand its main indoor ship construction building. This expansion project nearly doubles the building’s size, creating enough space to house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. The firm’s counterpart, Austal, has also been investing in major facility improvements at its Gulf Coast shipyard. Marinette Marine [PDF] | Lockheed Martin.

Feb 1/11: Sub-contractors. EADS North America announces a contract from Lockheed Martin to supply its TRS-3D radar for up to 10 Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships through 2015. Under the terms of its contract, EADS North America will deliver the 1st radar unit to Lockheed Martin for installation in 2012.

Within the US armed forces, the TRS-3D also serves aboard the Coast Guard’s new frigate-sized National Security Cutters. Austal’s Independence Class trimarans use Saab’s Sea Giraffe AMB radar instead.

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Fairbanks Morse announces a contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 of its 17,000 bhp Colt-Pielstick 16-cylinder PA6B STC diesel engines, to power the Freedom Class LCS 5 ordered in December 2010. The engines will be manufactured and tested at the company’s facility in Beloit, WI, in accordance with American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules.

Price is not disclosed. If the entire set of 10 ships is ordered, the firm would provide 20 diesel engines.

It may be presumed that Austal is busy working on contracts with its engine suppliers as well: GE (LM2500 turbines) and MTU (800 series diesel).

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Rolls Royce Marine announces an immediate contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 more of its 36MW MT30 gas turbines, as part of a larger contract to equip up to 10 Freedom Class ships.

The MT30 is derived from the firm’s Trent engines that outfit large passenger jets. In the US Navy, the MT30 also serves on the forthcoming fleet of 3 DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyers. Each LCS-1 Freedom Class ship takes 2 turbines, so the total order would be 20 if all 10 Freedom Class ships are ordered. Price is not disclosed, and the release adds that:

“In addition to gas turbines and waterjets, a significant range of Rolls-Royce equipment is specified in the Lockheed Martin design, including shaftlines, bearings and propulsion system software.”

They have not been trouble-free, however: see esp. Sept 29/10 entry.

Build ’em both!
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Dec 30/10: Dual Buy. Now that the provisional spending authority is approved along with the Navy’s revised dual-buy plan, the Navy issues 2010-2015 block buy contracts to Austal and to Lockheed Martin. The contract includes options for up to 9 additional vessels in the following 5 years, plus post delivery support, additional crew and shore support, special studies, class services, class standard equipment support, economic order quantity equipment. These contracts were competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with 2 offers received.

Freedom class monohulls: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $491.6 million: $436.9 million for a Freedom class ship, and $54.7 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine Corporation will build the ships, and naval architect Gibbs & Cox will provide engineering and design support. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Walpole, MA (14%); Washington, DC (12%); Oldsmar, FL (4%); Beloit, WI (3%); Moorestown, NJ (2%); Minneapolis, MI (2%); and various locations of less than 1 percent (7%). Work is expected to be complete by August 2015.

If all 10 Freedom class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $4.07 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, the contract could rise to $4.571 billion, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source builder and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source (N00024-11-C-2300).

Independence class trimarans: Austal USA, LLC in Mobile, AL receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $465.5 million: $432.1 million to build an Independence class LCS, plus $33.4 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

This brings Austal’s total order book to A$ 1.3 billion; the same shipyard is also building the US Navy’s JHSV fast-transport catamarans. Austal is beginning LCS-related preparation work beyond its investments to date, including a $140 million facility expansion and workforce development program over the next 12 months, which will more than double Austal’s workforce to 3,800 employees. Construction of the first LCS vessel will begin in early 2012, and it’s currently scheduled for delivery by June 2015. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%); Pittsfield, MA (17%); Cincinnati, OH (3%); Baltimore, MD (2%); Burlington, VT (2%); New Orleans, LA (2%); and various locations of less than 2 percent each (24%).

If all 10 Independence class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $3.786 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source, the contract could rise to $4.386 billion (N00024-11-C-2301).

Note that these prices do not reflect the additional cost of Government Furnished Equipment, including all weapons, mission modules, etc. Those additional costs can be expected to be comfortably over $100 million per ship. See also US Navy | Austal | Lockheed Martin | Defense Tech.

Dual buy contract for up to 20 ships

Dec 22/10: Budgets. The US Senate passes H.R. 6523, the House’s Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Having passed in identical form in both the House and Senate, it was introduced to the President to be signed on Dec 29/10. US Senate [PDF]. See also Aviation Week debate coverage | Sen. McCain’s [R-AZ] floor statement, against inclusion of the LCS.

Dec 21/10: Budgets. The US house of Representatives’ “lame duck” session of outgoing Congresspeople passes a new continuing resolution proposed by Senate Democrats to keep the government running through early 2011. The only arms-program-specific language in the legislation says that: “Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 Littoral Combat Ships”.

On the other hand, the funding will not extend through the end of the fiscal year on Sept 30/11, as the incoming House and Senate will have full opportunity to pass their own budget. Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 14/10: GAO Report. The US Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the proposed LCS program change. Reuters | See esp. the US GAO testimony: “Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks,” which generally echoes their Dec 8/10 report.

Dec 13/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin and Austal extend their bid price offers to Dec 30/11, to allow extra time to finalize contracts at current prices. That’s necessary for 2 reasons. One is the funding uncertainty and turmoil created by continuing resolutions, as the 112th Congress tries to clean up the budgetless mess left by the last Congress. The other, related issue is that the latest LCS acquisition plan hasn’t been approved by Congress yet. Ranking Senate Armed Services Committee member Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] continues to oppose approval of that new acquisition plan, pending clarity on combat effectiveness and long-term costs. Green Bay Press Gazette.

Dec 10/10: CBO Report. The US Congressional Budget Office releases its report on the proposed program change: “Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships” [PDF]. The CBO often has different cost estimates than the US Navy – and CBO’s higher estimates have a history of being right. In this case, however, they acknowledge that they’re handicapped by not seeing the shipyard bids.

They see the central issues as twofold. One is future operating and maintenance costs, which the GAO has also flagged as a serious issue. Maintaining 2 types is both a plus and a minus. That could really help the fleet if one design performs better, and right bow, data is limited. n the other hand, it also means additional spares, maintenance and training infrastructure, which may have to be duplicated on both coasts depending on deployment plans.

The other issue is the hardwired central combat systems, which are said to cost about $70 million per ship. They’re a topic of special attention in the report, as they’re different for the 2 ship designs. On the other hand, aligning them to allow common upgrades and maintenance would result in high retrofit costs down the road. Some estimates place the cost between $910 million – $1.8 billion. See also subsequent coverage of the combat system issue by Aviation Week | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 8/10: GAO report on buy strategy. The US GAO releases its report – “Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program.” They still see the program as risky, and the risks are inherent in the design, concept, and execution, not the procurement strategy. The Navy doesn’t really understand operating and maintenance costs for the designs yet, which creates a big budget risk, though building both ships may hedge against the risks that one design turns out to be poor in this or other areas. Most significantly, the GAO points to a chronic and serious problem that has destroyed cost estimates for previous ship classes:

“In an effort to address technical issues on the first two ships, the Navy has implemented design changes for… LCS 3 and LCS 4… [that are] not yet complete. These changes are significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship systems including propulsion, communications, electrical, and navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for both designs are still being refined… contract modifications will need to be negotiated and priced. According to the Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships produced… In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are “not to exceed” $12 million – a feature that Navy officials state will bound government cost risk due to design changes. Pending full identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting the lead ships, the Navy’s ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be seen.”

While the US Navy says that designs for LCS 3 & 4 are stable as built, the GAO points out that this is because key changes have been deferred until post-delivery. As testing reveals other issues, the amount of deferred work for follow-on ships “can reasonably be expected to grow.” See also Bloomberg.

Dec 6/10: LCS-2. USS Independence (LCS 2) arrives at BAE Systems Ship Repair in Norfolk, VA to begin its first industrial post-delivery availability. During the availability, the ship will complete the installation of needed components not installed during construction. US Navy.

Dec 4/10: LCS 3 launched. The 2nd Freedom-class LCS, USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), is launched at the Marinette Marine shipyard, on the Menominee River. Lockheed Martin | Argon ST [PDF].

Nov 4/10: LCS Plan #5. The US Navy looks over the bids, and applies to Congress to change the procurement strategy one more time. The bids appear to be low enough that the Navy thinks it can order 20 ships total (10 from each builder), and bulk up the fleet sooner, for the amount it had budgeted to field 15 ships using a 10 + 5 split.

Congress must take action to authorize the proposed 2 block buys by mid-December 2010, or the Navy is likely to end up with its default approach of awarding one 10-ship contract. US Navy | Aviation Week | James Hasik | Reuters.

5th plan the charm?

Oct 26/10: Saudi Arabia. Lockheed Martin MS2 President Orlando Carvalho confirms that his company has supplied price and availability information on its version of the littoral combat ship (LCS) to Saudi Arabia, which is looking to buy 8 modern frigate-sized warships. Lockheed is proposing a very different LCS, configured as a frigate equipped with AN/SPY-1F radars, an AEGIS combat system, and set equipment instead of mission modules.

It remains understood the Saudi authorities are waiting to see which LCS version the U.S. Navy chooses, but the ship’s capabilities might be well suited to the Arabian/Persian Gulf’s shallow waters. At Euronaval 2010, a French official reportedly said that France is hoping to sell between 4-6 FREMM frigates for the Saudis’ western (Red Sea and Indian Ocean) fleet, while the LCS was seen as likely for the eastern (Gulf) fleet. Defense News | Shephard Group | Tactical Report.

Oct 14/10: CRS Report. The Congressional Research Service issues its updated report: “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” [PDF]. It offers details concerning the program’s history and current plans. Key issues examined include:

Whether Congress had adequate time to review the latest procurement strategy in 2010
Whether the Navy’s new plan gives it enough time to really evaluate how the initial ships of class perform
Whether the price-focused RFP properly balances sticker price against life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs and ship capability
What happens if the Navy picks a winner, and the winner can’t deliver to cost?
How does the Navy plan to evolve the winning ship’s combat system to a configuration that has greater commonality with one or more existing Navy surface ship combat systems?
What are the Navy’s longer-term plans regarding the 2 “orphan” ships from the LCS class that isn’t picked?
What potential alternatives are there to the Navy’s new acquisition strategy? CRS cites block buys of both types, Profit Related to Offer bidding, and having the Navy buy the combat system separately.
In light of the cost growth, is the LCS program still cost-effective? What is the LCS sea frame unit procurement cost above which the Navy would no longer consider the LCS program cost-effective?

Other concerns include survivability, and CRS quotes the December 2009 report from the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:

“LCS was designated by the Navy as a Level I survivability combatant ship, but neither design is expected to achieve the degree of shock hardening as required by the CDD [Capabilities Development Document]… Only a few selected subsystems will be shock hardened… Accordingly, the full, traditional rigor of Navy-mandated ship shock trials is not achievable, due to the damage that would be sustained by the ship… The LCS LFT&E [Live Fire Test and Evaluation] program has been hampered by the Navy’s lack of credible modeling and simulation tools for assessing the vulnerabilities of ships constructed to primarily commercial standards (American Bureau of Shipping Naval Vessel Rules and High Speed Naval Craft Code), particularly aluminum and non-traditional hull forms. Legacy LFT&E models were not developed for these non-traditional factors, nor have they been accredited for such use. These knowledge gaps undermine the credibility of the modeling and simulation, and increase the amount of surrogate testing required for an adequate LFT&E program. The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment as evidenced by the limited shock hardened design and results of full scale testing of representative hull structures completed in December 2006.”

See the US Naval Institute blog’s take on the report as well, with a particular focus on survivability and the lessons of littoral naval combat. One excerpt from the full report discusses an important procedural point:

“The Navy had earlier planned to make the down select decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the decision was delayed and reportedly will now occur within 90 days of September 15 – the date by which the two industry teams were told by the Navy to submit new proposal revisions. On this basis, it would appear that the decision could be announced as late as December 14. On October 12, 2010, it was reported that a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review meeting on the LCS program that was scheduled for October 29 has been postponed to a later date that has not been set. The Navy states that it cannot announce its down select decision and award a contract to the winner until after the DAB meeting occurs.”

FY 2010

RFP released, but decision delayed; Clarity on LCS 3-4 costs; LCS “not survivable in a hostile combat environment”; LCS concept fails in Persian Gulf war game; USS Freedom [LCS 1] deploys with US Coast Guard aboard; USS Independence [LCS 2] commissioned; LCS 1’s MT30 engine problems; Austal/GD team splits; Official reports. MT30 turbine
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Sept 29/10: MT30 improvements. Rolls-Royce Naval Marine, Inc. in Walpole, MA received a $9.8 million cost-plus fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for “engineering and technical services on the Rolls-Royce gas turbine engine product improvement program. This contract is being awarded to research potential improvements to Rolls Royce gas turbine engines. Delivery Order 0001 will be issued on the same day of contract award with initial contract funding in the amount of $800,000.”

Work will be performed in Walpole, MA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete by September 2015. $800,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, which is Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Ship Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia, PA (N65540-09-D-0016).

DID has not tied this contract directly to the LCS program yet, but a search through US Navy ship types didn’t reveal any ships using Rolls Royce gas turbines, except LCS 1.

Sept 23/10: MT30 problems. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that USS Freedom [LCS 1] shut down its gas turbine engines on Sept 12/10, while operating off southern California. The Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines had “high vibration indications” in the starboard engine, and the ship returned to port using its diesel engines. Subsequent examination showed that turbine blading had broken off, damaging the turbine.

Lockheed Martin’s monohull design uses MT30 engines, instead of GE’s less powerful LM2500 which is used in the Austal trimarans, and in most current US Navy surface combatants. The US Navy will conduct USS Freedom’s engine changeout in Port Hueneme, CA, which is seen as being similar to the likely locations in which a deployed LCS would have to do this sort of operation. The Navy has scheduled a week’s time for the complete procedure.

LCS-1 engine issues

Sept 15/10: Bids in. Final bids for the latest incarnation of the Littoral Combat Ship contract are in from Lockheed Martin and Austal USA. Lockheed Martin | Defense News.

Sept 14/10: Politics. The Senate defense appropriations subcommittee votes to fund just 1 Littoral Combat Ship in FY 2011, instead of 2. That’s a long way from being the final word on the matter, but chairman Sen. Daniel Inouye [D-HI] reportedly says that:

“…two ships funded in 2010 have not yet been contracted. Under the new plan, the Navy would seek to award four ships to a single contractor in the coming year. There is virtually no way that the winning contractor would be able to begin construction of four ships in 2011.” Funding for one ship in 2011 “is more than adequate,” he said. And it saves $615 million.”

See: Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination.

Sept 14/10: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia may be interested in the LCS as part of its rumored $60 billion weapons package. Despite previous focus on Austal’s trimaran design, a Washington Post report says that:

“The official said the Saudis continue to have internal discussions about those purchases and are watching to see the outcome of a competition to build a new Littoral Combat Ship.”

Sept 9/10: LCS a Lemon? In a piece called “Red Flags Everywhere,” influential naval blog Information Dissemination, which has generally been mildly supportive of the program, says:

“There isn’t just one thing wrong with the Littoral Combat Ship program – every thing is wrong with this program. There are so many red flags waiving frantically in the face of Congress, the Navy, and any casual observer in regards to the Littoral Combat Ship I feel like I am standing roadside in Beijing during a Party propaganda parade… The Littoral Combat Ship has traded survivability, armor, endurance, weapon payloads, cost efficiency, and reduced operational capabilities across the board for the advantage of speed. What is this advantage of speed that makes the trade off worth it? What is 40 knots giving the Navy’s new small combatant that 28 knots can’t?”

The piece comes in response to a generally supportive Lexington Institute piece:

“More recently, the Navy seemed to have the LCS program under control… Understanding the importance of the LCS, the Navy responded to initial problems with the basic ships or sea frames with the necessary attention, expertise and resources. The same effort must now be devoted to the development of working mission packages. This also includes developing the desired unmanned systems, particularly for subsurface operations.”

Sept 1/10: War Game Fail. Defense Tech reports:

“A recent Pentagon war game that ran the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship through simulated combat in the Gulf didn’t unfold quite as expected, according to participants… The war game featured the trouble-making Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps navy… Seeing their small boat swarm shot-up, the Iranians dispatched a bunch of small, air-breathing submarines to attack the LCS flotilla. The LCSs were forced to steam down to Diego Garcia to switch out the surface warfare modules with the anti-submarine warfare packages. That scenario repeated itself every time the Iranians changed up their attack and wrong-footed the LCS flotilla [due to the long change-out times].”

Designing the mission modules to be swappable by helicopter, and having medium-lift helicopters in the Navy with higher lift capacity then the planned H-60 models, might alleviate that problem. Neither approach has been taken.

LCS fails in war game

“The Navy plans to invest over $25 billion through fiscal year 2035 to acquire LCS. However, recurring cost growth and schedule delays have jeopardized the Navy’s ability to deliver promised LCS capabilities… technical issues with the first two seaframes have yet to be fully resolved… Challenges developing mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships’ utility to the fleet during initial deployments… Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems encountered problems in operational and other testing that delayed their fielding…”

With respect to the ships themselves:

“The Navy has required LCS seaframes to meet Level 1 survivability standards. Ships built to Level 1 are expected to operate in the least severe environment, away from the area where a carrier group is operating or the general war-at-sea region… Current ships in the fleet built to the Level 1 standard include material support ships, mine-warfare vessels, and patrol combatants.”

“…In our work on shipbuilding best practices, we found that achieving design stability before start of fabrication is a key step… Addressing [LCS 1 and 2] technical issues has required the Navy to implement design changes at the same time LCS 3 and LCS 4 are being built… Our analysis of the procurement section of the LCS total ownership cost baseline found the estimate lacks several characteristics essential to a high-quality cost estimate.”

See also the LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events section for additional excerpts related to those areas, and “MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development” for in-depth reports on the mine warfare mission module components. See also: Aviation Week | Information Dissemination on the larger cultural issues this report speaks to.

Aug 29/10: LCS 3s. DoD Buzz reports that “Lockheed Martin, with just a five-week head start, has completed 60 percent of LCS 3, compared to Austal, whose LCS 4 is only 26 percent complete.” Why is that? It’s partly because Lockheed Martin reused work done on the original LCS 3 contract, which was canceled mid-stride. Lockheed Martin MS2 business development director Paul Lemmo:

“Lemmo also pointed out that Lockheed Martin has kept parts and materials left over from the previously terminated LCS-3. The Navy originally terminated Lockheed Martin’s second LCS in April 2007… [but] the company decided to continue manufacturing about 50 to 55 systems all the way to their completion… “Those systems have been in storage either at the manufacturer or at some of our facilities and they will be brought to bear on the ship,” [Lemmo] said. “The value of that material is about at least half of the total value of the material on the ship. Half the material needed for Fort Worth was already purchased. Generically a lot of it is long-lead propulsion machinery–the engine, the gas turbines, diesels, gears, water jets, shafting, those kinds of things…what was on order.”

See: DoD Buzz | Defense Daily.

Aug 23/10: Selection delayed. The US Navy delays its final selection for the new Littoral Combat Ship contract. The decision appears to have been pushed back to Dec 30/10, but the exact date in unclear. Defense News.

April 12/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin announces that its industry team has submitted its proposal for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fiscal year 2010-2014 contract to the U.S. Navy today. The Navy will award the winning team a fixed-price incentive fee contract to provide up to 10 ships with combat systems, as well as combat systems for 5 additional ships, to be built at a second shipyard.

April 1/10: LCS SAR. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. One of the changes involves the Littoral Combat Ship, while another involves an ancillary system and is covered in that section. For the LCS “seaframe” itself:

“Program costs [DID: for the initial development effort] increased $883.9 million (+31.0%) from $2,848.6 million to $3,732.5 million, due to additional development and support for the mission package test program, seaframe testing, and crew training (+$241.5 million). There were also increases for the procurement of additional mission packages (+$183.6 million), a revised estimate for development, planning, and execution of Flight 0 and Flight 0+ (+$157.2 million), a revised estimate for seaframe pricing due to cost growth (+$131.5 million), changes to mission module development and phasing (+$77.8 million), additional funding for a technical data package (+$59.8 million), and the re-phasing of work due to a change in the schedule for Flight 0 (+$44.8 million).”

Cost increases

March 31/10: LCS 2. Aviation Week Ares describes the current state of USS Independence [LCS 2]. At this point, its captain says that she’s still in the pre-tactical risk mitigation stage. The crew is becoming familiar with the ship, and performing basic tasks like air defense testing, fast acceleration and deceleration, putting fast boats in the water while at sea, etc.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

With respect to the Littoral Combat Ship, the report places the program far below the desired level of technology and manufacturing knowledge for a program at this stage. Compared to its 2004 baseline, which was itself about 150% of original cost-per unit estimates, LCS R&D costs have increased by 169.2% of baseline. Procurement cost for the initial capability ships is up by a stunning 505.3%, total program cost for initial fielding has risen 285.9%, and acquisition cycle time rose 139% over the original baseline. The report also flags LCS weight increases that have led to LCS 1 stability issues due to a higher center of gravity, and mission modules that are only partially capable.

Mission Module findings are detailed in the Ancillaries section, but the key takeaway is that they’re not ready for effective service yet – and the ship’s chosen missile armament could become a serious problem.

March 22/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD receives a $14.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-2303) to provide engineering, program, and technical support for LCS class ships. This includes class baseline design services, class configuration management services, class documentation services, ship interim support, ship systems development, and other technical and engineering analyses.

Work will be performed in Norfolk, VA (41%), Moorestown, NJ (16%), Baltimore, MD (15%), Marinette, WI (14%), Washington, DC (8%), Arlington, VA (6%), and is expected to be complete by December 2010.

March 20/10: Costs. Inside the Navy:

“The Navy does not ask competing Littoral Combat Ship builders Austal USA and Lockheed Martin to arrive at an exact dollar figure for how much each bidder’s ship will cost over its lifespan in the current request for proposals for what will be the winning LCS design, sources told Inside the Navy last week. Yet, the sea service wants the competitors to “qualitatively: explain how they will manage “total ownership costs” in the future…”

March 16/10: Cracking. Reuters reports on a recent US Navy SBIR research solicitation, aimed at more quickly and cheaply diagnosing cracking in aluminum ship structures. From US Navy SBIR N10A-T041: “Fracture Evaluation and Design Tool for Welded Aluminum Ship Structures Subjected to Impulsive Dynamic Loading” :

“A new analysis tool combined with an experimental validation protocol is needed to accurately characterize the dynamic response and fracture behavior of welded aluminum ship structures subjected to extreme loading events. The goal of this effort is to develop an explicit dynamic failure prediction toolkit for fracture assessment of welded thin-walled aluminum structures. To efficiently characterize a large size ship structure, innovative modeling techniques using fractured shell elements are needed along with a mesh independent crack insertion and propagation capability. In addition to innovative crack simulation in a shell structure, advanced constitutive models have to be implemented in the toolkit to capture the rate dependence and anisotropy in strength, plastic flow and ductility. Developing and demonstrating novel damage simulation and fracture prediction methods has significant potential impact on design and operation of current and future Navy welded aluminum, ship structural systems.”

US Navy Commander Victor Chen reiterated the Navy’s confidence in the JHSV and LCS ships; the JHSV catamaran is aluminum construction, as is the LCS-2 Independence Class, and the LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure on a steel hull. He adds that:

“We already have a level of confidence in how to work with aluminum. The Office of Naval Research is trying to expand the knowledge base and build on what we already know.”

March 16/10: Drug busts. On her initial deployment to the Caribbean, the US Navy highlights USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] conduct of drug busts. The fast boats were intercepted with help from Freedom’s embarked MH-60S helicopter – a capability that is not unique to the LCS, by any means. Aviation Week Ares.

March 13/10: Industrial. New Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation in Marinette, WI breaks ground on an expansion that will nearly double the size of its main indoor ship construction building. The expansion will provide enough indoor space to simultaneously house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. It will also allow greater use of more efficient modular construction processes. The expansion is part of parent company Fincantieri’s 5-year, $100 million plan to modernize its U.S. shipbuilding operations and support the LCS program. Green Bay Gazette | MarineLog.

March 4/10: Austal & GD break up. Defense News reports that shipbuilding partners Austal USA and General Dynamics have agreed to revoke their teaming arrangement on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program: “We are now acting as prime going forward on the LCS program,” Austal president Joseph Rella told Defense News March 4.

The positions partner General Dynamics to bid on the 2nd set of 5 ships under the current procurement plan, if the LCS-2 Independence trimaran design wins. Competing with a rival prime bid is unrealistic for General Dynamics at this point, given the investments that would be required in aluminum-related manufacturing facilities and techniques. General Dynamics has confirmed that it does not intend to bid on the initial 10-ship competition, though the firms will continue their joint relationship when building the Coronado [LCS 4]. GD Advanced Information Systems will continue beyond that as an Austal team partner, and subcontractor for systems integration.

Austal & GD end partnership

LCS 1 & LHD 6
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March 3/10: CSBA Report. The USA’s non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment puts out a paper: “Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. While the report is generally positive about the LCS, and even offers several operational scenarios that use the ship’s capabilities, it does raise a few issues. Crew size is one, but the other relate to the standard trio of speed, armament, and sustainability:

“The disadvantage is that speed requires great power. By choosing speed the Navy has consciously chosen to accept lower carrying capacity and endurance. The impact on endurance is illustrated by the fact LCS’s cruising range of around 4,000 nautical miles (nm) at 20kts reduces to 1,500 nm at 45kts. This compares to an endurance of around 12,000 nm at 9kts for the US Coast Guard’s Legend- class National Security Cutter. Consequently, any mission that requires extensive use of speed will significantly limit the ship’s unrefueled time on station. Restrictions on payload and fuel capacity (including aviation fuel) mean that the LCS will require considerable logistical support for the provisioning of fuel, ammunition, perishable foods and other consumables. The Navy will almost certainly need to give greater thought to how the LCS can be supported when operating at distance from base areas.

…While taking due account of the fact that none of these nations operate carriers or long-range strike forces, the ability of the LCS to defend itself when compared to similar ships designed to undertake similar tasks appears to be limited, especially against air attack, regardless of which mission package is carried… The ship currently lacks a torpedo detection capability. The Navy is now taking urgent steps to rectify this worrisome omission… consideration needs to be given to providing a “mother ship” or tender in support able to resupply not only fuel but also other consumables, such as ammunition, perishables and spare parts, and provide medical treatment and workshop facilities. The LCS is designed to be self-sustaining for between fourteen and twenty-one days but in circumstances when it is operating at high speed this could conceivably drop to as little as four days. Workshop access may be particularly important because, as part of the drive to restrict crew size, much of the maintenance generally conducted by a ship’s crew has, in the case of the LCS, been transferred ashore.”

…NWDC laid equal stress on “frequently conducted” or “continuous” missions including SOF support, maritime interception operations/ SLOC(Sea Lines of Communication) patrol, and logistics. It pointed out that in the 29-year period prior to 1999, 60 percent of all naval missions were of this type… The implication of these statements is that the primary use of the LCS is increasingly considered to be as a naval constabulary vessel (which all naval vessels are to a degree) that is also able to undertake most naval diplomacy tasks and selected missions at the middle and lower ends of naval war fighting.”

Note that many of the scenarios to illustrate the ships’ usefulness depend on sustained high-speed operations, against the backdrop of a US Navy that is already short on oilers. Another involves escorts through the Persian Gulf, against fast attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles whose range the LCS cannot match, and whose strikes the LCS is ill-equipped to survive.

March 3/10: Fuel & Range. Inside the Navy publishes data about the relative fuel efficiency of the 2 LCS contenders (Source). There’s a significant difference, with implications for both operating costs and range, but the Navy proposes to treat them as equivalent, vid. Feb 25/10 entry:

“The General Dynamics variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) uses less fuel per hour during higher rates of speed than the Lockheed Martin vessel, according to a Navy document. The one-page LCS Consumption Curves shows that both ships use about the same amount of fuel, or barrels, per hour between zero and 16 knots. At five knots, the General Dynamics aluminum trimaran uses 3.2 barrels per hour versus 3.9 for Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull [DID: +21%]. At 14 knots, the General Dynamics ship uses 11.3 barrels per hour while the Lockheed Martin ship uses 12.7 [DID: +12.4%]. At 16 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship uses 18.4 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 15.5 [DID: +18.7%], according to the document. At 30 knots, the General Dynamics trimaran burns through 62.7 barrels per hour, while the Lockheed Martin monohull uses 102.9 barrels per hour [DID: +64.1%] … At 40 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship burns through 138 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 105.7 barrels per hour [DID: + 30.5%].”

The LCS-1 Freedom Class’ weight issues could change these figures, especially when fully loaded. The LCS-2 Independence Class also has greater fuel capacity.

Feb 25/10: Competition. US Sen. Sessions [R-AL] questions criteria for Littoral Combat Ship RFP, pointing out the RFP’s cost as sole determinant approach, despite capability differences. The Navy responds that they consider both ships to be equivalent, and says that the ships will spend a low percentage of their time at high speeds. AL.com | YouTube video | Gannett’s Navy Times article.

Feb 19/10: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Kim Martinez says that the Fort Worth [LCS 3] “is being assessed to preclude the same tank design,” and may be modified to avoid the need for USS Freedom’s bolt-on rear “water wings.” Gannett’s Navy Times blog Scoop Deck adds:

“Neither LockMart nor the Navy will say the original LCS 1 design included too little reserve buoyancy, but Martinez stressed that Freedom “meets all the Navy’s requirements, including for reserve buoyancy.” So does that mean the Navy discovered problems with its own requirements after accepting delivery of the Freedom? “That’s a question best answered by the Navy,” Martinez said.”

Feb 16/10: Freedom Class change. Gannett’s Navy Times’ blog “Scoop Deck” notes an interesting change to USS Freedom [LCS 1]:

“There is one big change, however: In a yard period late last year, Freedom acquired two large oblong metal boxes on its transom, on either side of the stern gate its crew uses to launch and recover boats. The sailors call these “buoyancy tanks,” although they look almost like a baby’s water wings for the pool… Do water wings added after the fact mean the Freedom – and Lockheed Martin’s design for the LCS 1-class – suffered from too little reserve buoyancy? “I can’t really talk much more about that,” [Gold Crew skipper, Commander Randy] Garner said.”

Feb 2/10: GAO Report. The US Congress’ GAO submits official report GAO-10-257: “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.” Key excerpts:

“GAO’s analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates showed that the [LCS] operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050 [divided $64.1B seaframes, $20.8B packages]. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate… The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system’s costs… With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size… an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a [LCS] crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy’s maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts… If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class… Navy officials from two divisions within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – the Surface Warfare Division and the Assessments Division – said they were unaware of any analysis supporting the total planned quantities for either the surface warfare package or its maritime security module. Also, Navy officials said that the Navy has not performed a force structure analysis on the antisubmarine package because the contents are under development.”

GAO’s core recommendation, among several:

“To improve decision making, we are recommending that the Navy conduct a risk assessment and consider the results before committing to buy LCS ships in order to link procurement with evidence that the Navy is progressing in its ability to implement its new operational concepts.”

Jan 27/10: RFP. The US Navy releases the revised Littoral Combat Ship RFP. See Sept 16/09 and Jan 11/10 entries; the winner will receive contracts for 10 ships over the next 5 years, and another competition will be held in 2012 for a 2nd shipyard. The 2nd shipyard will build 5 ships of the same design over 3 years, but can’t be associated with the winning shipyard. FedBizOpps Solicitation #N0002410R2301:

“For the requirements synopsized herein, the LCS team members are the only sources, with the requisite knowledge of LCS design, construction, systems, and extensive knowledge of, and experience with, mission module interface requirements to efficiently and effectively construct these additional follow-on ships within the required construction period, and perform the associated services. The requirement contemplated is for up to ten (10) ships with two (2) ships in Fiscal Year 2010 and for two (2) ships per year in Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014; up to five (5) additional Select Ship Systems to be provide to a Second Source in FY12; integration of up to five (5) sets of Select Ship Systems for a Second Source in FY12. The contract will be awarded through a limited competition pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. Companies interested in subcontracting opportunities should contact the LCS teams directly.”

The RfP lists 3 primary bid items (basic seaframe/ ship; combat & non-combat equipment; and the systems to handle the integration and testing. Technical and management factors in order of preference are: affordability and production approach; management; technical data package adequacy, and rights in technical data and computer software; design change impact; past performance; and life-cycle cost reduction initiatives. Navy statements strongly indicate, however, that this will almost exclusively be a cost-driven competition. Defense News | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Revised RFP issued

Jan 20/10: No LVL 1 Survivability. Reuters offers conclusions from the Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation. They include the failure of either design to meet Level I survivability criteria except among some sub-sections, and that neither ship could be expected to “be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class monohulls had problems in early air target tracking tests, which revealed deficiencies in the TRS-3D radar’s power supply and reliability, and serious problems with the combat system. The report added that the ship could face stability problems when fully loaded. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Jen Allen claims that stability is no longer a problem for this class, and Reuters reports that the Navy plans to install external tanks to effectively lengthen the ship’s stern, and increase its buoyancy.

General Dynamics/ Austal’s Independence Class trimaran had its builders trials delayed due to reported leaks at the gas turbine shaft seals, and more testing identified deficiencies in the main propulsion diesel engines. Reuters

Jan 16/10: LCS 2. The trimaran USS Independence [LCS 2] is commissioned. Austal | Gannett’s Navy Times.

USS Independence

Jan 11/10: Partnership break-up? Defense News reports that General Dynamics and Austal are set to break up their LCS partnership, which has GD Bath Iron Works as the prime contractor but most of the structural shipbuilding work done by Austal in Mobile, AL. Under the new procurement rules, the US Navy will require a second-supplier shipyard for the winning design, that can’t be associated with the primary builder. Before they take any final actions, however, the GD/Austal team is waiting to see the Navy’s latest RFP, which is a bit behind schedule but is still expected in January 2010.

General Dynamics had reportedly seen Bath Iron Works as the logical shipbuilding facility to take on shipbuilding work if their team’s trimaran design won, but there is some speculation that this may shift to T-AKE shipbuilder GD NASSCO in California, instead.

LCS 2 christening
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Dec 18/09: LCS 2 delivered. The General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship Team delivers Independence [LCS 2] to the US Navy. USN Commanding Officer Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Captain Dean Krestos officially accepted custody of Independence in Mobile, AL, where the ship will remain before its commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/10. That date will mark the first time a US Navy ship has been commissioned in Mobile since 1945. The ship will then prepare for its next set of trials, in the summer of 2010. US Navy | GD release.

Dec 17/09: LCS 4 keel. A brief keel laying ceremony is held in Mobile at Austal USA’s Assembly Bay 4 to record completion of the first major construction milestone for Coronado [LCS 4]. As one might expect, the centerpiece of the ceremony was the ship’s keel module, a large outfitted section of the aluminum center hull. GD release.

Dec 12/09: Coast Guard on USS Freedom. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will have US Coast Guard VBSS teams on board when it ventures into the Caribbean:

“The littoral combat ship Freedom is to take aboard a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment for part of its trial deployment early next year, Navy officials said, with the Coasties substituting for part of the Navy boarding team added to the LCS crew. Freedom is taking 20 sailors in two visit, board, search and seizure teams…”

Dec 3/09: Order clarity. The US Navy finally releases the cost data for recent Littoral Combat Ship contracts. Note that the cost of a fully-outfitted ship would add about $100 million for the installed mission module, in addition to other “government furnished equipment”. As such, actual costs to field operational ships are likely to end up above $600 million:

“As a result of the Navy’s change in acquisition strategy for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the Navy can now release the pricing… The total value of the LCS 3 contract, awarded to Lockheed Martin Corporation on March 23, was $470,854,144 which includes ship construction, non-recurring construction and additional engineering effort, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.

The total value of the LCS 4 contract, awarded to General Dynamics – Bath Iron Works on May 1, was $433,686,769 which includes ship construction, non-recurring construction and additional engineering effort, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.

The contract values do not include government costs which include government furnished equipment, change orders, and program management support costs. The contract values do not include the cost of continuation work and material used from the terminated original contract options for LCS 3 and 4. The value of the continuation work and material from the terminated LCS 3 was $78 million for Lockheed Martin Corporation and $114 million from the terminated LCS 4 for General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works.”

FY 2009 costs

Nov 13-21/09: LCS 1. USS Freedom [LCS 1] also conducts independent ship deployment training and certification at sea, operating with ships from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower [CVN 69] Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX). That was part of the Maritime Security Surge certification for the ship’s Gold Crew, which will deploy aboard Freedom in early 2010 to U.S. Southern Command.

Nov 19/09: Testing. The US Navy announces that LCS 2 Independence has successfully completed acceptance trials, after completing a series of graded in-port and underway demonstrations for the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV).

Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. Ship delivery is expected to occur with the ship’s commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/09 in Mobile, AL.

Oct 18/09: Testing. LCS 2 Independence successfully completes builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The trials included more than 50 demonstration events in preparation for final inspection by the Navy, including stable flight deck performance and ship control in Beaufort Sea State 5 conditions, sustained speeds of 44 knots, tests of the ship’s open architecture OPEN CI electronic backbone, and detection and engagement of a simulated cruise missile fire by an small jet aircraft. Austal release | GD release | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Oct 14/09: USS Freedom to deploy. The Navy announces the decision to deploy the USS Freedom [LCS 1] in early 2010 to the Southern Command and Pacific Command areas ahead of her originally scheduled 2012 maiden deployment (see also June 9/09 entry). Military.com says that:

“In evaluating options for deploying the Freedom earlier than originally scheduled, the Navy took into consideration several key factors including combat systems testing, shakedown of the ship systems and overseas sustainment with a new concept of operations and crew training. To facilitate the early deployment, the Navy adjusted the Freedom testing schedule, prioritized testing events needed for deployment and deferred others not required for the missions envisioned during this deployment.”

FY 2009

Another program shift; LCS 3 & 4 ordered, again, but we won’t tell you how much; LCS 4 named; LCS 2 launched; Naval Fire Support module? LCS 2, builder’s trials
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Sept 16/09: LCS Plan #4. The Pentagon reiterates its commitment to 55 LCS ships, but changes the LCS program’s acquisition structure, again. There will be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

This timeline would not give the Navy enough time to fully evaluate the ships relative merits before it makes its selection, essentially removing the entire rationale for building 2 types of Flight 0 ships. It would also leave the ships’ overall operational utility an open question.

Colton Company’s Maritime Memos adds that the envisioned structure may face challenges, depending on which design wins. It sees Team Lockheed’s steel hull as biddable to Northrop Grumman Pascagoula, GD Bath Iron Works, and GD NASSCO, plus VT Halter Marine; and possibly Todd, Bollinger in a break-away bid, or anyone who buys Bender in liquidation. The GD Bath Iron Works/Austal aluminum-hull design requires a more specialized set of skills, however, and those ships are too wide to be built on the Great Lakes and shipped out through the seaway. Colton believes a shipbuilder would have to invest in a new yard, or partner with an established aluminum boatbuilder, such as Swiftships or megayacht builder, such as Trinity Yachts. Colton adds:

“In essence, there might not be any credible competition for a second-source contract. Since almost everyone now agrees that the Austal design is clearly superior to the Marinette design, this could give the Navy a new problem.”

Acquisition plan #4

July 30/09: Politics. At the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee’s “Hearing on Efforts to Improve Shipbuilding Effectiveness,” Chair Gene Taylor [D-MS] states in his opening remarks that:

“The LCS program is still a disaster, there is no way to sugar coat it, the program is still a disaster. Those first vessels were constructed in the most inefficient manner possible, just like my house construction analogy, and now we are being told by both the contractors that the cost of these ships really is in excess of a half a billion dollars. I am not sure the Congress is willing to go forward with that program unless significant progress is made on cost control, and I do mean significant.

With the challenges being faced by all the Services in trying to reset from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Navy cannot count on additional funding for ship construction. We all need to figure how to rebuild our Fleet with the procurement dollars available. To do that all costs must come under control. Hard decisions need to be made. Soon.”

June 15/09: Inside the Navy, Vol. 22, No. 23:

“The House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee has proposed to restructure the congressionally mandated $460 million cost cap for the Littoral Combat Ship to solely include the price of each vessel [DID: and not its weapons, radars, and “mission equipment”], but if shipbuilders cannot meet the cost cap, lawmakers would require the Navy to rebid the ship.”

June 10/09: Testing. Austal announces “light off” of LCS 2 Independence’s 4 propulsion engines: 2 GE LM2500 22,000kW gas turbines, and 2 MTU 20V 8000 M71 9,100kW diesels. The light off followed fuel loading and testing of all 4 generators.

Activation and testing of the combat and other systems onboard Independence is continuing at Austal’s US facility in Mobile, AL. The beginning of sea trials is expected within a few weeks.

June 9/09: The Military Officers’ Association of America’s “Inside the Headquarters” blog says that the US Navy is thinking of deploying the LCS early:

“According to a source at Lockheed Martin, the Navy wants the USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy soon and well ahead of schedule. Apparently the chief of naval operations himself, Adm. Gary Roughead, has called for the move. Currently, the Freedom is not scheduled to deploy until 2012.”

The Somali coast would be the most likely destination. Efforts to move endangered weapons programs to the front lines, in order to secure a program’s future, have a long history in the US military.

June 9/09: Support. Alion Science and Technology Corp. in Washington, DC received an $8.6 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-F-B008) for support to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office. This will include program planning and management, business and financial management planning and execution, systems engineering, test and evaluation engineering, life cycle engineering and support, logistics and operation support, configuration and data management engineering, and combat systems development.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC, and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

June 1/09: Costs. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that based on FY 2010 budget justification documents, the price to build, outfit and deliver Team Lockheed’s USS Freedom [LCS 1] now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The price tag for the GD/Austal ship Independence [LCS 2], however, rose from $636 million to $704 million. Most of the cost growth on the LCS 2 is listed under Basic Construction Cost.

LCS 1, builder’s trials
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May 22/09: Testing. The USS Freedom wasn’t able to perform a number of key Navy acceptance tests on Lake Michigan, where she was built. A 2nd round of INSURV testing was required, and the US Navy PEO Ships release states that:

“There were no major safety issues or operational restrictions determined during the trial, although the ship must complete a number of scheduled system certifications before it can conduct unrestricted operations.”

INSURV inspectors noted that since the August 2008 lake trials, the ship has made improvements to its propulsion plant, machinery control system, communication systems, and information systems. The new salt water tests allowed inspectors to check the ship’s cathodic protection, degaussing, and reverse osmosis system. Ocean conditions let them test surveillance and identification systems at a sufficient distance from land without border issues. And stepping out of a lake used for drinking water let them demonstrate the ship’s fire suppression and waste discharge systems. Other major systems and features demonstrated for INSURV this time included aviation support, small boat launch handling and recovery, fin stabilizers, in addition to the full-power run.

May 15/09: LCS for NFS? Aviation Week reports that US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway is working with his Navy counterpart, Adm. Gary Roughead, to expand the concept of using the LCS as a naval fire support option for Marine landings.

Conway is quoted as discussing “a box of rockets” as the Marnes’ preferred option, which would seem to indicate the LCS surface warfare module’s planned NLOS-LS/NETFIRES “missile in a box” system. On the other hand, the report adds that:

“The services are still examining storage and elevator capacity aboard LCS, and Conway said “we don’t have [the] box we need.”

May 1/09: LCS 4. “US Navy Sinks LCS-4 Construction” chronicled the crash of the original program’s acquisition plan, and cancellation of the 2nd ships from each manufacturing team. Now, General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME has received a FY 2009 contract to build the USS Coronado [LCS 4]. The contract includes construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support. Phase II could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships.

What the US Navy will not do, is reveal those terms of Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics’ contracts, even though the original excuse that the Navy was in negotiations with General Dynamics for its part of the 2-phase buy no longer applies. The Navy simply says that “the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.” The LCS program’s cost overruns have been significant contributors to the program’s political troubles, and it certainly is convenient not to have to discuss that any more. One source of inference is that the award represents the 2nd half of the 2-vessel, $1.02 billion FY 2009 budget appropriation for the LCS program, but past LCS contracts and budgets have had little predictive value with respect to final outlays.

Austal had remained optimistic regarding the LCS program, but recently laid off 62 employees in Mobile, AL, due to slower work in the commercial ferry sector. There is no word yet on whether they will be rehired as a result of this contract. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%); Bath, ME (17%); Pittsfield, MA (14%); California, MD (1%); Baltimore, MD (1%); Leesburg, VA (1%); Burlington, VT (1%); Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (2%); and various locations of less than 1% each totaling 13%. Work is expected to be complete by June 2012 (N00024-09-C-2302).

Meanwhile, sea trials of Austal’s first LCS, the 127m Independence [LCS 2], are scheduled for mid-2009, with delivery expected later in the year. Austal | General Dynamics | Mobile, AL Press-Register | Mobile, AL Press-Register re: layoffs.

LCS 4 ordered, again

April 6/09: Budgets. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations, which include 3 LCS ships. Despite issues with the program, and concern about the ship’s combat capabilities, Gates reiterates the goal of eventually buying 55 of these $500+ million specialty support ships. The announcement bolstered confidence at Austal, which had been watching the budget deliberations closely.

March 23/09: LCS 3. US NAVSEA awards Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD an undisclosed sum for “LCS FY09 Flight 0+ ship construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.”

The Navy cancelled Lockheed Martin’s original LCS-3 contract in 2007, but new negotiations reportedly arrived at an acceptable arrangement for a fixed-price contract with incentives. The Fort Worth’s [LCS-3] price tag is reported to be in the $500 million range, which would represent a price drop relative to LCS-1.

NAVSEA is still negotiating with General Dynamics for LCS-4, so the award amount is classified source selection information under Federal Acquisition Regulations 2.101 and 3.104. Under the Navy’s FY 09/10 strategy (see Oct 17/08 entry), the Navy will attempt to buy 2 LCS ships in FY 2009, with option for up to 3 ships in 2010. Earlier acquisition strategies had focused on FY 2010 as the down-select date; that is still possible, but the Navy reportedly has the option of choosing another split for the FY 2010 buy.

Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (63%); Moorestown, NJ (12%); Washington, DC (11%); Clearwater, FL (4%); Baltimore, MD (4%); Arlington, VA (3%); Brunswick, GA (2%); and Eagan, MN (1%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012 (N00024-09-C-2303). See also: Reuters report.

LCS 3 ordered, again

March 12/09: LCS 4 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announces that LCS 4 will be named USS Coronado. A 4th LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships. The Navy’s release has a picture of the GD/Austal trimaran design next to the announcement, but the announcement does not confirm that type as LCS 4.

Coronado, near San Diego, CA is home to Naval Air Base North Island (NASNI) and Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, and has been home to the Navy since 1917. Coronado hosts 2 aircraft carriers, the west coast’s major SEAL special forces facility, and over 120 tenant commands between the 2 bases. US Navy.

March 11/09: Politics. Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week reports that one logical corollary of a “build to [blue]print” approach is that foreign shipyards might become eligible to compete for LCS construction:

“[Taylor] also noted to the conference that he’s visited other shipyards – Hyundai in Korea, Maersk in Finland – and concluded that “our yards have to get up to their [DID: highly automated] standards.” So if LCS goes to open bidding, would those shipyards be eligible to bid? “Traditionally the House has preferred to build our weapons domestically,” Taylor said, “but we’ve had a hard time getting it past Senator McCain. If I had my way I’d limit it to American shipbuilders. But I often don’t get my way.”

That statement can fairly be described as cryptic. Sweetman’s conjecture re: foreign construction is unlikely, for a variety of political reasons. Government funding for shipyard improvements, meanwhile, did not appear in the “stimulus” bill, and would be most likely to be funneled to the larger military shipyards if it was granted.

March 10/09: Politics. MarineLog reports that the Littoral Combat Ship program receives another bi-partisan rough ride at the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces. Chairman Gene Taylor [D-MS]:

“When I look at the plan from just two years ago, we should by now have at least 4 ships delivered, 3 more nearing completion from a fiscal year 2008 authorization, 6 under contract from a fiscal year 2009 authorization, and today we should be discussing the authorization of 6 more ships for fiscal year 2010. That would be a total of 19 ships. So instead of having 13 delivered or under contract with another 6 in this year’s budget, we have one ship delivered that will likely tip the scales well above two and a half times the original estimate and one ship that might finish this summer, with similar if not higher cost growth… Everyone should understand that the current situation of these vessels costing in excess of a half billion dollars cannot continue… There are too many other needs and too little resources to pour money into the program that was designed to be affordable.”

With respect to Taylor’s desire for a “build to print” approach, the answer appears to be that the government owns the rights to the ship’s physical design, but integration of all the sub-systems like the radar, Mk110 naval gun etc. is another matter. Rep. Todd Akin [R-MO] was critical of the Navy’s acquisition strategy, from the repeated changes over the last 2 years to the current strategy’s sustainability:

“We cannot reasonably expect the industry teams to make the investments in facilities and designs for affordability we demand, if we cannot articulate what we want to buy. Further, we cannot reasonably expect the taxpayers to continue to fund ships that we cannot definitively say we want… We need to be very cautious about increasing capacity for which the Navy lacks the volume to support… We must ensure that we are not creating two additional shipyards that rely on a sole customer for support. The strategy for building LCS at mid-tier yards was explicitly to avoid this phenomenon, since these yards had commercial work. Now, we hear that these yards may have turned away commercial work and are considering capital investments with the intent of constructing LCS only.”

See: MarineLog | Information Dissemination.

March 6/09: New LCS 3 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announces 6 that the LCS 3 will be named USS Fort Worth. A 3rd LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships.

The Navy says that the announcement continues the practice of naming the agile LCS vessels after American midsized cities, small towns and communities. Fort Worth, TX, near Dallas, is an especially important hub of aerospace manufacturing, but a number of other defense-related activities go on there. US Navy.

March 2/09: Industrial. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-03-C-2311) for “LCS program continuation efforts necessary to preserve production capability at its industry team shipyard facility.” Work is expected to be complete by April 2009, and will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Moorestown, NJ (13%); Clearwater, FL (11%); Brunswick, GA (10%); Washington, DC (8%) and Baltimore, MD (2%) under contract (N00024-03-C-2311).

Lockheed Martin has already delivered USS Freedom [LCS 1] to the Navy, and the Navy’s prior cancellation of LCS 3 has left that shipyard with a work gap. General Dynamics and Austal, meanwhile, continue to build LCS 2 Independence at their Gulf Coast shipyard. This award must be at least $5 million, or the Navy would not have announced it at all, but no figure was given. With respect to this award, the US Navy cites this justification for its lack of transparency:

“As this award represents efforts integrally related to Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.”

That translates as “we’re still negotiating with Lockheed Martin and with General Dynamics for fixed-price awards, and are appropriating these funds to buy advance materials and avoid layoffs at Marinette.”

Feb 24/09: Politics. Senators McCain and Levin, who have authored legislation to reform the US military’s procurement system, single out the LCS program in their comments. CNN:

“Levin said the ships are “way beyond” their projected construction time of two years, and the program has grown from a cost per ship of about $220 million to more than $500 million, according to a November report from the Congressional Research Service. “We can’t have a ship that’s a small ship that’s supposed to be built in two years run completely out of control to double or triple or quadruple its original cost estimates,” McCain said.”

Jan 28/09: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $37.75 million basic ordering agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) of the USS Independence [LCS-2]. Work will include the ship’s PSA efforts, testing, and materials, from program management to advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List, and required fixes.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%); Norfolk, VA (24%); and Mobile, AL (23%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012. This contract was not competitively procured (N00024-09-G-2301).

Dec 29/08: NVR cert. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in Houston, TX is a congressionally recognized agent of the government, and certification to set standards is one of their services. They receive a $55 million cost no fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinitely-quantity contract to provide for ship classification and classification-related services using Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), which form the core of the certification process for surface ships bought by US NAVSEA.

New construction contracts require the ships to be designed and constructed in accordance with ABS Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, and other referenced ABS Rules and Guides as necessary to comply with the designated class notations. Readers of this brief will recall that the switch to NVR rules during LCS construction was one of the key factors that inflated the costs of the first ships, and raised costs across the board for the class. On the other hand, ships built to NVR standards can be expected to survive damage better than comparable non-NVR ships.

Approximately 46% of ABS’ services will be performed in support of new DDG ships in Bath, ME (GD-BIW); Pascagoula, MS; and Gulf Port, MS (NG-SS) and approximately 46% in support of future LCS new construction ships in locations to be determined. The remaining 8% of services will be performed in Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; and various worldwide points as specified in task orders to be issued. Work is expected to be completed by December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, DC (N00024-09-D-4208)

Dec 17/08: Weight. Information Dissemination relays an Inside the Navy report hat covers ongoing platform issues in “LCS Weight Issue Revisited“. From Inside the Navy:

“In October, Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss confirmed that initial tests by the Navy were showing the vessel to be six percent overweight, but maintained that it was not cause for concern… “There’s stuff on board that I don’t think we need,” Gabrielson said. “There’s some pretty big things on board that I think we could live without.”

Nov 8/08: LCS 1. LCS 1 Freedom is commissioned during a 10 a.m. EST ceremony at Veterans Park in Milwaukee, WI. Upon completion of the ceremony, she becomes USS Freedom. US Navy PEO Ships advance notice | USS Freedom Comissioning Committee.

USS Freedom

Oct 31/08: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a $37.5 million Basic Ordering Agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) on the Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom [LCS-1]. The orders to be issued will encompass services include, but are not limited to program management, advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, and preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List. The orders will also encompass material and labor to perform the PSA for LCS 1, all testing, including post repair trials required to verify the accuracy and completion of all shipyard industrial work, non-standard equipment when approved, and technical manuals for non-standard equipment.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%) and Norfolk, VA (47%), and is expected to be completed by January 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C. (N00024-09-G-2300).

Oct 24/08: The Freedom [LCS 1] sails away from the Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, WI, en route to Duluth, MN for a four-day port visit beginning Oct. 27. This will be the first leg in the ship’s voyage of commissioning and transit to Norfolk, VA, where she will undergo fleet testing and evaluation away from the Great Lakes’ ice buildups. Maritime Reporter and Engineering News.

Oct 17/08: LCS Plan #3. The NY Times’ International Herald Tribune reports that the U.S. Navy has canceled plans to buy a 3rd new combat ship in FY 2008 from either Lockheed Martin Corp. or General Dynamics Corp., citing budget shortfalls. The article adds that:

“The Navy now plans to award one ship to each contractor under the fiscal 2009 budget, and hold a competition for another three vessels with funding in fiscal 2010 to keep competitive pressure between the two companies. Each of the 2009 contracts will come with options for future ships. However, the Navy said it will evaluate pricing of the fiscal 2010 ships before making a decision, and envisions awarding two ships to a winning contractor and one ship to a losing bidder, the same as its original plan.”

Acquisition plan #3

Oct 4/08: LCS 2 christened. The Austal/General Dynamics ship LCS 2 Independence is christened in a ceremony at Austal’s Mobile, AL shipyard. US Navy PEO Ships release | Austal release.

FY 2008

No ships this year; LCS 2 launched; LCS-4 canceled; Cost growth continues; Israeli request. Team GD LCS Concept
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September 2008: The US Navy has the appropriated funds to build an additional LCS ship, but decides not to issue that contract. Source.

No FY 2008 ship

Sept 30/08: Infrastructure. R. A. Burch Construction Co., Inc. in Ramona, CA received $6.5 million for a firm-fixed-price task order under a previously award multiple award construction contract. They will be responsible for upgrading Building 57 for the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron administrative headquarters at Naval Base San Diego. The task order also contains one option, which if exercised would increase cumulative task order value to $8.7 million.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by April 2010. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, and 3 proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-08-D-8607, #0005).

Sept 18/08: LCS 1 delivered. The Lockheed Martin-led LCS team delivers LCS 1 Freedom to the U.S. Navy. The delivery milestone marks the Navy’s preliminary acceptance of LCS 1.

Sept 4/08: CSBA Cool to LCS Concept. WIRED Danger Room’s post “Navy Already Shifting Away from Shallow Waters?” forwards an analysis by Bob Work, naval analyst at the respected, nonpartisan CSBA think tank in Washington. He sees the same pressures that turned the Navy against the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer program impinging on the future of the Littoral Combat Ship:

“The maritime area over which a strong coastal power can now influence with multidimensional, combined-arms naval reconnaissance-strike complexes is expanding. The combination of space-based sensors, over-the-horizon radars, maritime [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], patrol and strike aircraft, nuclear and [Air-Independent Propulsion] submarines armed with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, and now anti-ship ballistic missiles, poses severe threats to any surface ship. Under these circumstances, the Navy has to improve its ability to fight from range, in the open ocean.”

July 31/08: CRS report. In testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, Dr. Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office discusses the LCS program to date [PDF]:

“The Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan envisions building 55 littoral combat ships between 2005 and 2019. Because those ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the Navy would need to begin procuring their replacements in 2032… The Navy expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program.

…Originally, each sea frame was expected to cost about $260 million (in 2009 dollars, or $220 million in 2005 dollars). The Navy’s 2009 budget would allow the purchase of 18 LCSs during the 2009-2013 period, at an average cost of about $450 million per sea frame. That is 11 fewer than the 2008 plan envisioned… In the 2009 budget, the Navy estimates the cost of LCS-1 at $631 million and LCS-2 at $636 million… using the lead ship of the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate as an analogy… The first FFG-7 cost about $670 million to build (in 2009 dollars), or about $250 million per thousand tons, including combat systems. Applying that metric to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $600 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module… CBO estimates that the first two LCSs could cost about $700 million each, including outfitting and postdelivery costs… As of April 27, 2008, LCS-1 was 87% complete and LCS-2 was 72% complete. So, additional cost growth is possible…”

July 30/08: What happened to LCS? Naval Technology’s article “Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground” offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. In brief, it states that:

“Distilling the story yields the following guide to botching development projects in five steps […];

1. Make the goal as difficult as possible
2. Impose a management style ideally suited for commoditised products
3. When sourcing, be penny-wise and pound-foolish
4. Design and build simultaneously
5. When you’re in a hole, keep digging

[…] Perhaps the moral of the LCS story is this: the US can produce better ships, or produce ships better – but it can’t do both at the same time.”

July 28/08: Testing. LCS 1 Freedom begins builder’s trials on Lake Michigan. US Navy release | Reuters Aug 12/08 follow-up.

July 15/08: Israel request. The contracts with Lockheed Martin et. al. could be worth up to $1.9 billion for 4 ships, and would be the first LCS export sale. The design will be very different from the American Freedom Class LCS, however; mission modules will be replaced with vertical launch systems and fixed weapons, and the ship will sport an AEGIS radar system.

The Israelis eventually decide that the costs are prohibitive, and begin looking elsewhere. As of 2013, they still don’t have a contract for new ships, though they are upgrading the Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class to a Sa’ar 5.5 configuration in the meantime. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel” for details.

Israel request

April 28/08: LCS 2 launched. Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipyard launches LCS 2 Independence. The ship will be moored alongside the Austal USA facility for activation and testing of combat and other onboard systems is completed. Sea trials are expected to commence in late 2008. Austal release.

April 7/08: LCS SAR. Cost growth for the LCS program lands it on the Pentagon’s Selected Acquisition Reports for this period:

“Program costs increased $909.7 million (+46.9 percent) from $1,938.9 million to $2,848.6 million, due primarily to a revised estimate in Seaframe pricing that reflects substantial cost growth and post delivery work (+$496.1 million) and a revised estimate for Mission Module development and phasing due to maturation of the definition of the Mission Modules (+$271.2 million). Costs also increased due to a lengthening of the Flight 0 schedule to incorporate additional effort (+$71.3 million), a revised estimate for program development of Flight 0 and Flight 0+ planning and execution (+$42.3 million), and additional scope for Mission Module development (+$40.7 million).”

Costs rising

March 14/08: Controversy. The odds don’t look good for the US Navy’s FY 2009 request of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. The house Armed Services Committee’s Seapower & Expeditionary Forces subcommittee took testimony regarding that request, and the LCS request came under fire from both sides of the aisle. See “US Navy’s 313-Ship Plan Under Fire in Congress” for full links etc. Chairman Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS], a strong proponent of more naval shipbuilding:

“So, instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, we are asked to fund programs which are not… [the LCS] will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials how not to run a program. The LCS will be at least twice as expensive as advertised, it has taken twice as long to build the lead ships, neither vessel has been underway on its own power, and the Navy cancelled two contract options last year, which were already funded, because of cost overruns.

Yet this year we are asked to authorize two more ships – why? What has changed between then and now that indicates that this program is in any way ready to build more ships? We have been told the answer to this question is that there is an ’emergent need’ for these ships in the fleet. If that is true why did the Navy cancel two of the ships? At some point we must stop throwing money at this program until the Navy can prove that at least one of the ships can get to sea and do its mission.”

Ranking minority member Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD] was equally skeptical:

“And how much risk are we buying down if we procure two more Littoral Combat Ships, the year after we cancelled two, and the year in which the Navy plans to conduct an operational evaluation and possible downselect of LCS-1 and 2? Even if there is no downselect, the Navy has stated that there will be design changes made to the Flight One ships. So the two we buy now will be different than the remaining 50. Is that worth it, if those funds could keep a stable program like LPD-17 alive?”

Feb 4/08: Costs. FY 2009 budget documents released by the Navy give the expected final cost for its LCS-1 and LCS-2 ships: $631 million and $636 million, respectively. First-of-class ships usually cost more – but recall that prescient July 24/07 estimate of $630 million from the Congressional Budget Office.

Nov 1/07: LCS-4. The US Navy cancels construction of LCS-4 by the General Dynamics/Austal team, leaving its LCS acquisition strategy adrift amidst deep proposed funding cuts from Congress in the FY 2008 budget. There was also the minor problem of a second contractor who refused to accept a “deal” that let the Navy make any number of design changes, while the contractor was solely responsible for costs, and would pay for overruns above the proposed fixed-price contract.

The Navy eventually decides to revise its entire approach, and use planned FY 2007-2008 procurement funds to get LCS 1 & 2 built, rather than buying additional ships.

LCS-4 order canceled

Oct 11/07: Israel. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Israeli Navy “has launched a second study regarding the potential acquisition of the United States Navy’s (USN’s) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) focused on Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull design known as LCS-I (Israel). “That design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

See “An LCS For Israel?” for full coverage.

FY 2007

LCS-3 cancelled, LCS-4 ordered but iffy over cost growth; LCS Program Manager dismissed; LCS 2 inspection issues; ALCOA weight reduction work; Official reports. GD: Helicopter space
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Sept 27/07: Sub-contractors. Small business qualifier ALCOA Inc. in Alcoa Center, PA received an $8.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract to provide engineering services in support of the re-design of existing aluminum structures to improve performance and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) via weight reduction of selected assemblies or components. Work will be performed in Alcoa Center, PA (84%); Johnstown, PA (11%); Columbus, OH (3%); and various shipyards (2%), and is expected to be complete in September 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $3.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N00167-07-D-0010).

This contract will fund the Alcoa Collaborative Design Approach (ACDA), a phased program approach in which the following tasks will be applied to the LCS: selection of candidate assemblies and components; development of conceptual designs and down selection of design concepts; evaluation of design concepts and final selection; development and evaluation of prototypes; and ship integration. The components for improvement may include hull sections, doors/hatches, load floors, foundations, large apertures or similar structures.

Alcoa has considerable expertise in this area, having worked closely with Lockheed Martin on a very similar effort re: the F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighter.

Still, one wonders why, exactly, this has become a priority for the LCS program? The Dec 17/08 entry suggests that weight reduction was the goal.

Sept 24/07: LCS 2 issues. Newhouse News Service reports that “Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.” They are referring specifically to the General Dynamics/ Austal ships, and proceed to detail these issues in “Navy Inspectors Find Numerous Problems With Ship Project.”

Some of these items are “normal” issues that inspectors exist to catch, others are less so. Note, especially the time frames of the issues raised, as many date from 2006 and predate subsequent reports.

Sept 21/07: LCS 4? Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the US Navy and General Dynamics are expected to meet next week to discuss the LCS program:

“GD spokesman Kendall Pease confirmed the Navy had asked for the meeting but provided no further details, other than to say a specific date had not been set. Other sources, however, said the meeting was to discuss slowing construction on LCS 4, the second ship GD is building at its Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.”

The Navy was forced to reimburse Team Lockheed for a number of expenses after canceling LCS-3, and they are reportedly trying to restructure the deal with the GD/Austal team to avoid paying those costs in the event that LCS-4 is canceled. If the parties cannot agree, the Navy could always choose to cancel LCS-4 on those grounds, and pay the minor reimbursement fees that would be involved at this early stage. The downside is that a second cancellation decision would leave the entire LCS program in tatters, either turning it into a 1-ship each “sail off” competition, or throwing the entire program back to the drawing board.

Aug 8/07: Cost growth. US Navy acquisition chief Dolores Etter said in an interview with Reuters that General Dynamics is about 54% done with its first ship [LCS-2], which is due to be delivered in mid-2008. She also stated that “We … continue to see challenges with the program and with each platform, specifically with the propulsion system on LCS-1 and systems integration on LCS-2.”

With respect to the GD/Austal team’s effort to rein in costs, she said that “We do have points at which our concern will go up. You can’t predict what will happen, but things are moving forward in a good direction” in terms of the firm’s efforts to rein in costs.

Meanwhile, Reuters adds that US Navy officials have asked lawmakers to approve a 55% increase in a cost cap for the 5th and 6th LCS ships, to $460 million. They also said costs for the first Lockheed ship and GD’s LCS-2 could be up to 75% higher than expected. Reuters article: “US Navy sees progress on General Dynamics LCS ship.”

July 24/07: CBO Report. In a statement before the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Congressional Budget Office representatives testify that [PDF format]:

“Experience had suggested that cost growth was likely to occur in the LCS program. In particular, historical cost-weight relationships – using the lead ship of the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates (FFG-7) as an analogy – indicated that the Navy’s original cost target for the LCS was optimistic. The first FFG-7, including its combat systems, cost a total of about $650 million (in 2008 dollars) to build, or about $235 million per thousand tons. Applying that per-ton estimate to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $575 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module (to make them comparable to the FFG-7). In this case, looking at cost-weight relationships produced an estimate less than the apparent cost of the first two LCSs but substantially greater than the Navy’s original estimate.

As of this writing, the Navy has not publicly released an estimate for the LCS program that incorporates the most recent cost growth, other than its request to raise the cost caps for the fifth and sixth ships. CBO estimates that with that growth included, the first two LCSs would cost about $630 million each, excluding mission modules but including outfitting, postdelivery, and various nonrecurring costs associated with the first ships of the class. As the program advances, with a settled design and higher annual rates of production, the average cost per ship is likely to decline. Excluding mission modules, the 55 LCSs in the Navy’s plan would cost an average of $450 million each, CBO estimates.”

DID background: The FFG-7 frigates are still widely touted as a successful example of cost containment. The Oliver Hazard Perry Class met their budget and performance targets and served successfully. The USS Stark even survived a hit from an Iraqi Exocet missile while patrolling the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The ships paid a price in lower capability and lack of space for capability growth, however, and many were sold to other countries or retired early because upgrading them was too difficult. That experience was one of the inspirations for the LCS’ open-architecture, mission modules approach.

Mach 14/07: LCS 3 canceled. Full DID coverage, as Navy Cancels Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, warns General Dynamics. The Navy explains that they couldn’t reach agreement on a new contract. Lockheed Martin expressed “disappointment,” and says: “We believe that our proposal was fully consistent with the Secretary’s stated desire to bring the benefits of increased competition to shipbuilding while holding the Navy’s industrial partners accountable for cost performance within their control”. Note especially those last 3 words, given the role played by Navy specification shifts in that cost growth.

LCS-3 contract canceled

Mach 14/07: LCS program plan #2. Based on a comprehensive two-month review of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition program, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced that he is prepared to lift a previously issued stop work order for construction of Lockheed Martin’s LCS 3 – under a renegotiated contract.

The new decision will also affect the General Dynamics/ Austal team. Under the restructured Littoral Combat Ship program plan, the Navy will recommend deferral of FY 2007 LCS procurement, and use those funds to complete the construction of LCS 1-4 by the Lockheed and General Dynamics teams. This effectively cancels an expected order for the 5th and 6th ships.

This is part of a wider package of efforts aimed at controlling program costs… before those costs raise comparisons, questions, and dilemmas that begin to control the program. For full coverage, see “Cost Growth Leads to Stop-Work on Team Lockheed LCS-3 Construction (updated)“.

Revised acquisition plan

Feb 28/07: Costs. Reports surface that the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS design is also expected to face cost overruns, although the scope of the increases is not yet clear. Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter had said the first General Dynamics LCS ship would cost $350 million or more, but Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, Etter’s spokesman, said in an e-mail that:

“Etter mistakenly characterized the cost of LCS 2 to be $350 million or more. The estimated cost range of LCS 1 is $350 million-$375 million, as previously testified. That estimate is based on the best information to date. There is insufficient information to know precisely the final cost range of LCS 2… Although we anticipate some cost growth, it is premature to discuss specific numbers as they are unavailable at this time.”

Etter described Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom as 75-80% complete, and the GD/Austal team’s LCS-2 Independence as about 33% complete. Reuters report | Defense News report (March 20/07).

Jan 29/07: Personnel. Capt. Donald Babcock, the Navy’s LCS program manager, is relieved of his duties by Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton – who is also being reassigned.

LCS PM dismissed

Jan 12/07: Stop Work on LCS 3. “The Navy issued a stop work order Jan. 12 to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately, and is for a period of 90 days. The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin…”

The US Navy says they are “working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth… [and] reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program…” At this point, the GD/Austal team’s trimaran design and build-out of LCS 2&4 are unaffected. See full DID coverage with all updates, not to mention the Lexington institute’s predictive December 2006 report “Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy.”

Dec 8/06: LCS 4 order. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $208.1 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310, exercising an option for construction of the 4th Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the second by the GD-Austal team. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (55%); Pittsfield, MA (24%); and Bath, ME (21%), and is expected to be complete by August 2009.

The associated General Dynamics release trumpets its trimaran design as having “one of the largest usable payload volumes per ton of ship displacement of any U.S. Navy surface combatant afloat,” and notes its ability to carry even the CH-53 medium-heavy transport helicopter if the mission requires it.

Austal’s associated release discusses potential US Navy plans that could include an extended buy of the Flight 0 version ships, and adds that its workforce in Mobile is slated to grow to 1,200 by the end of 2007.

LCS 4 ordered

Oct 17/06: The FY 2007 defense budget is signed. LCS funding is not cut, but remains at $520.67 million

FY 2002 – 2006

Preliminary work with Norway’s Skjold, Lockheed’s Sea SLICE; Preliminary design contracts to 3; Down-select to 2 contenders; LCS 1 ordered & launched; Freedom Class named; LCS 2 ordered & keel laid; Independence Class named. LCS 1 Freedom christening
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Sept 23/06: LCS 1 launch. The US Navy christens and launches LCS 1 Freedom, the nation’s first littoral combat ship, at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The ship will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette Marine; it will be commissioned in 2007 and eventually homeported in San Diego, CA. The ship’s sponsor is Birgit Smith, wife of the late Medal of Honor recipient U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith.

July 26/06: CRS report. The US Congressional Research Service releases its report “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress.” Meanwhile, as negotiations in Congress go forward, The House-reported version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) recommends approval of this request. The Senate reported version recommends a 2-ship cut by funding just one LCS in FY 2007, and rescinding funding for 1 of the 3 LCSs procured in FY 2006.

June 26/06: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $197.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under a previously awarded contract, exercising an option for construction of one Flight 0 monohull Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Lockport, LA (63%); Moorestown, NJ (36%); and Arlington, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2009. See corporate release.

LCS 3 order

April 13/06: Israel. Israel is considering Lockheed’s Littoral Combat Ship design. Specifically, they’re considering Lockheed’s monohull design as a potential replacement for their Saar Class corvettes and missile boats. A funded initial study is underway to assess feasibility, and integration with Israeli systems and weapons is critical.

April 4/06: Independence Class. Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has named LCS 2, the first Flight 0 ship of the General Dynamics/Austal trimaran design. She will be the USS Independence. This Navy release notes the backgrounds of other ships who have borne that name. It’s all part of a speech on the future of Navy shipbuilding.

LCS-2 Independence Class

Jan 19/06: LCS 2 keel. GD/Austal Lays Keel for LCS 2. Austal USA hosts a traditional US Navy keel-laying ceremony to signify the start of construction on the first Flight 0 General Dynamics/Austal LCS trimaran. The keel laying follows on the heels of the official November 17, 2005 opening of Austal USA’s ship construction facility in Mobile, AL. See also General Dynamics team lead press release.

Dec 2/05: The U.S. Navy announced that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will be homeported at Naval Station San Diego, CA when it enters service. The ship is expected to be delivered to the Navy in December 2006, and arrive in San Diego in early 2007. See US Navy release.

Oct 7/05: LCS 2. The 1st GD-Austal Flight 0 LCS gets the go-ahead, as General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $223.3 million cost-plus-award-fee/ incentive-fee modification to exercise an option under contract N00024-03-C-2310 for detail design and construction of one Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%) – note that this represents Austal’s component, and is the company’s largest-ever individual contract. Work will also be performed in Pittsfield, MA (33%); Bath, ME (15%); and Baltimore, MD (2%), and is expected to be complete by October 2007. This award is one of the potential options described in the May 27/04 contract award.

LCS 2 order

Skjold Class
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June 2/05: LCS 1 keel. Lockheed Lays Keel for LCS 1, USS Freedom. This is the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design, and the ceremony was attended by numerous dignitaries. This event is related the Dec 15, 2004 shipbuilding contract, of course.

May 9/05: Freedom Class. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England has named LCS 1, the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design. She will be the USS Freedom. See DefenseLINK release.

LCS-1 Freedom Class

April 11/05: Bath Iron Works prepares for construction. Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $16 million cost-plus-fixed-fee option to previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310 for the advance procurement of required Long Lead Material for the first “Flight Zero” models of General Dynamics’ trimaran Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design. The contract award for Long Lead Material includes a description of the items to be procured, the supplier, the required ordering date, supplier lead-time, in-yard need date and a breakout by month of the dollar amounts required. Work is expected to be complete in September 2005.

Dec 15/04: LCS 1 ordered. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $188.2 million cost-plus award-fee/ incentive-fee option to contract N00024-03-C-2311 for detail design and construction of the first Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (38%); Marinette, WI (57%); and Arlington, VA (5%), and is expected to be complete by December 2006. This is one of the potential options described in the May 27, 2004 contract award. US Navy.

LCS 1 order

June 6/04: LCS 1 design. Lockheed unveils latest version of its LCS design.

May 27/04: Downselect and Initial Contracts. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received cost-plus-award-fee contract modifications to previously awarded contracts for final system design, with options for detail design and construction of up to 2 Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).

Lockheed Martin receives a $46.5 million contract modification for a 7-month final system design, which could go as high as $423.4 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are exercized. Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by December 2004. See corporate release for further details re: Team Lockheed’s design & objectives.

General Dynamics receives a $78.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to N00024-03-C-2310 for a 16-month final system design. The award could go as high as $536 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are exercised ($536,020,688 including all options). Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by September 2005. Corporate release for further information re: the GD team’s design goals.

Raytheon’s team is eliminated.

Final system design finalist contracts

Visby Corvette
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July 17/03: Preliminary Designs. The following 3 companies out of 6 offers won firm-fixed-price contracts for Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship Preliminary Design:

General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME (N00024-03-C-2310 – $8.9 million)

Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, Surface Systems in Washington, DC (N00024-03-C-2311 – $10 million)

Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI (N00024-03-C-2312 – $10 million).

Each contractor will perform a preliminary design effort to refine its proposed Littoral Combat Ship concept. Work is expected to be complete in February 2004. The 3 losing teams include Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Gibbs and Cox (who would join the Lockheed team), John J McMullen Associates, and Textron Systems Marine & Land Operations.

The biggest surprise is the absence of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, who was working from an already-proven littoral corvette design by Sweden’s Kockums AB, and its German parent Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. Kockums designed and is building Sweden’s Visby Class littoral warfare corvettes, and Northrop Grumman planned to use the stealthy carbon fiber mono-hull as the baseline for its LCS program.

Preliminary design contracts

May 21/03: Lockheed Martin holds an Industry Day to solicit potential members for its LCS team. Its base design concept is then known as “Sea Blade.”

March 4/03: Lockheed lays foundation for LCS team. Lockheed Martin, naval architects Gibbs & Cox, Bollinger Shipyards and shipbuilders Marinette Marine formally partner on the LCS program. The Lockheed release contains details of their respective areas of responsibility and past work.

September 2002: Skjold. US Navy finishes studying Norway’s Skjold (“Shield”) Class air cushion catamaran littoral fast patrol boats. The ship completed a 13-month deployment in the USA, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea. The ship participated in a series of naval exercises and a number of tests with US Navy research establishments NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research.

March 25/02: Sea SLICE. Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel participates in naval exercise. The vessel participated as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons, as does this GlobalSecurity.org Sea SLICE profile.

Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets & Program Structures LCS 1, final construction
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In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed for PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last. Indeed, in August 2012 the Chief of Naval Operations added a council tasked to come up with a plan.

It is normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what the LCS program has done. Several times.

Early plans for much cheaper ships would have built them from 2005 – 2019, but the extent of the program’s timeline and budgetary issues can be inferred from the current production timeline: 2011-2040.

How the US Navy arrived at that plan is a very tangled, but very instructive, story of goals not met, budgets changed or not spent, and an acquisition plan that has now been changed several times.

The LCS program’s budget mess has reflected their yo-yoing underlying program structure. LCS budgets are not even suitable for inclusion as a table, because the program’s structure has changed repeatedly. For several of those years, program turmoil was so great that it prevented budgeted funds from being spent. As such, each year’s budget can only be understood in light of the program’s shifting plans.

Plan #1: 13 ships. Under the original vision, Team Lockheed and the General Dynamics/Austal consortium would each produce a number of fully operational, competing Flight 0 ships. The idea was that experience with these ships is the best teacher and evaluator, ensuring that the Navy selects the right winning team for the overall program. It would also begin an immediate expansion of the US Navy’s falling numbers, since all of the Flight 0 ships would be available after the testing phase was complete. The design approach for the winning team’s second generation Flight 1 LCS ships would be flexible, and was envisioned as changing somewhat in light of the experience gained with the Flight 0 designs. Initially, 4 Flight 0 ships and 9 Flight 1 ships were contemplated, along with a purchase of various mission modules.

In FY 2005, Congress approved the Navy’s plan to fund the construction of the first 2 competing LCS sea frames, funded LCS-1, required LCS-2 to be built to a different design when funded in FY 2006, and added other basic stipulations.

The FY 2006 budget was $1.054 billion ($470.3M procurement, $584.1M RDT&E). The Navy had initially asked for LCS-2, but shipbuilding supporters in Congress funded LCS 2-4. As the program progressed, however, new Navy shipbuilding standards, and other shifts in specifications, caused LCS ship prices to rise sharply. As ship costs doubled, and then continued to rise, political scrutiny grew. In response, legislators inserted an adjusted $220 million cost cap on LCS 5-6, and made that buy and any others contingent on Navy certification of a stable LCS design.

Plan #1a: The FY 2007 budget was $926.6 million ($597.2M for ships & mission modules, $329.4M RDT&E). Congress funded LCS-5 and LCS-6. Austal’s Dec 11/06 press release even implied that more early-build ships might enter US Navy plans:

“Recent Navy reports have speculated on an expanded acquisition strategy, from 4 to a possible 17, for the Flight 0 fleet of LCSs that also includes an alternate monohull ship design. Commenting in September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Dr Delores Etter, told Reuters, ‘The U.S. Navy hopes to finalize its acquisition strategy for a new class of shore-hugging combat ships by mid-December [2006].’ “

Plan #2: Bailing out. In March 2007, however, the US Navy canceled Team Lockheed’s LCS-3 due to cost growth. In November 2007 (technically, FY 2008), the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS-4 joined it. A Navy policy of requesting fixed-price contracts, coupled with specifications and designs they could keep changing at will, created a gap too large for negotiations to bridge. Contracts for LCS 5 & 6 were never issued.

Under the Navy’s revised approach, planned FY 2007-2008 procurements would be channeled into getting LCS 1 & 2 built, rather than buying additional ships. Instead of buying 3 more LCS ships in 2008, and then ramping up to 6 ships per year in 2009 – 2012, amended procurement plans proposed to buy 1 ship in 2008 and 2 ships in 2009. Under that Plan B, the 2 consortia would compete for orders, with 2 ships contracted to the winning builder and 1 for the loser. A down-select to 1 design would take place in 2010.

The FY 2008 request was set at $1.208 billion ($990.8M for 3 ships + 2 mission modules, $217.5M RDT&E); but the Navy’s cancelations and revised procurement strategy led to $337.1 million in funding for a single LCS – a contract the Navy never issued. Meanwhile, Congress had raised the per-ship cost cap to $460 million, and required fixed-price-type contracts for LCS ships bought from here on.

Where to now?
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Plan #3: Fog of war. The FY 2009 request was $920 million, for 2 LCS ships. The final 2009 defense bill increased that funding to $1 billion. Once again, however, the Navy’s LCS procurement plan changed. Now, it planned to buy 2 LCS ships in 2009, with an option for Phase II that could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships on the same terms in 2010. Those Phase II ships would likely be split between the contractors, but could be issued for just 1 design.

Congress added some relief by delaying the implementation of the LCS cost cap to FY2010, but contract negotiations must have been interesting. Neither manufacturing team had demonstrated the ability to deliver an LCS ship for $500 million, and the Navy was insisting on fixed-price contracts that transfer all risk to the shipbuilders. Both contracts (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were eventually signed in 2009, but the Navy decided that their terms needed to be kept secret.

That seems likely leave just 2 Flight 0 LCS ships in the water before the revised LCS program was supposed to pick one final design. Or not. Under terms that remained unclear.

Additional reports added even more uncertainty. First came reports that that final selection might even feature a design competition that would be separate from the build competition, which means the ship’s design team may not be the final builders. That kind of competition is called “build to print,” in which the government buys the blueprints and then contracts for construction separately. Of course, handing a new ship design to a firm that hasn’t built it before carries cost-inflation risks of its own. The question is whether the potential threat of switching suppliers creates enough added incentives to keep costs down, in order to justify the increased time, overhead, and added program risk inherent in running 2 serial competitions instead of 1.

The FY 2010 budget requested $1.877 billion ($1.38 billion for 3 more ships, $136.7M for mission modules, plus $360.5M RDT&E which includes $75.5 million to cover cost growth on LCS 1-2). The program ended up with $1.579 billion: $1,157 million for all procurement of 2 ships and mission modules, and $422.0 million for RDT&E.

Plan #4: 10 + 5. In September 2009, while the House and Senate were working on reconciling their FY 2010 defense bills, another major change to the program’s structure was announced. There would be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

Assuming that this program would remain intact, the FY 2011 request was for $1.819 billion with RDT&E would be $226.3 million, while $1.592 billion for procurement would fund 2 ships ($1.2 billion), advance orders for FY 2012-14 major hull and propulsion components ($280 million), and mission modules (remainder, about $112 million).

Plan #5: Dual-build 20. Naturally, the proposed procurement approach changed again. Upon examining the bids, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 ships for an advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts are underway. For better or for worse, the Navy finally has an approach that is actually buying ships.

The Navy’s FY 2011-15 plan called for 17 ships total in a 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4 sequence, though that may rise to 20 ships. The Navy’s longer-range shipbuilding plans would buy 3 LCS hulls per year from FY 2016-19, dropping to 2 per year from FY 2020-24, then dropping again to a 1-2-1-2 pattern for FY 2025-33. The program would finish up at 2 per year from FY 2034-40.

Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class.

Unless, of course, the entire acquisition plan changes again. The graph below shows how estimates of the total program cost have fluctuated as the Navy changed its procurement structure, again and again:

FY12 Forecast: US Navy Comptroller
No such data released in May 2009 document

The projected costs and cost/unit, include outfitting and post delivery costs, which explains why they’re above the widely-used Total Obligational Authority (TOA) numbers. At more than $1.3 billion over the life of the program, these extra costs are hardly pocket change

Additional Readings & Sources

The Littoral Combat Ships: Basic Program & Ship Background

U.S. Navy LCS site
FedBizOpps.GOV (Jan 27/10, #N0002410R2301) – 19–Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014 Littoral Combat Ship Construction. RFP for the current build cycle.
Naval-Technology.com – Littoral Combat Ship LCS High-Speed Surface Ship
GlobalSecurity.org – Littoral Combat Ship.
Information Dissemination (July 10/07) – The US Navy’s PF-109 “Patrol Frigate” Program. Which led to the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, as the low end of US surface combatant force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. Says the LCS program isn’t imitating the FFG-7’s successes. Then again, compare this contention with the CBO’s July 24/07 testimony, which compared the first-of-class ships of each type in FY 2008 dollars, and found that LCS was cheaper.
NDIA’s National Defense Magazine (March 2010) – Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All the Stops. Offers a good side-by-side comparison of the 2 ship types.
DID (March 19/07) – Cost Growth Puts the Brakes on the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship Program. And causes both cancellation of Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, and a revised LCS program plan. Not to mention a continued threat to the overall program, if costs remain near $400 million while weapon capabilities remain so limited and inflexible.
International Hydrofoil Society (Sept 23/04) – NAVSEA Presentation re: Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF format]. Includes visuals and information related to mission modules, program structure & timelines, and the two competing teams.
DefenseLINK (May 28/04) – Special Department of Defense Briefing re: Littoral Combat Ship Program. Good discussion of the program as a whole and procurement approach, as well as how the modules were envisioned to work.
US Naval Institute, Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix. By 2013, that warning had come true.

LCS 1 Freedom Class Monohull & Major Unique Items

Lockheed Martin – LCS Team. LCS mini-site.
Lockheed Martin – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-1 Freedom Class.
Rolls Royce – MT30 Marine gas turbine engine.
EADS Cassidian – TRS-3D/ 16-ES. Main radar.
Airbus Defense & Space – TRS-4D. AESA GaN radar with dramatic performance improvements, will be installed on LCS 17 and later.
Lockheed Martin – [LCS] Systems

LCS 2 Independence Class Trimaran & Major Unique Items

General Dynamics/ Austal – LCS mini-site.
Austal – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-2 Independence Class. There’s also a team site, but parts of that aren’t current.
Austal – Advanced Seaframes for Littoral Security [PDF].
GE Aviation – Model LM2500. Gas turbines.
Saab – Sea Giraffe AMB 3D Naval Surveillance Radar. Saab has touted a Sea Giraffe 4X AESA radar with about 3x-4x performance, but there’s no announcement of a swap-in yet.
General Dynamics AIS – Open CI. Covers electronics in general. The combat system is derived from Thales’ popular TACTICOS.

LCS Exports

GDLCS – Multi-Mission Combatant. See also their more detailed international variant brochure [PDF], dating from when they were teamed up with Austal.
Lockheed Martin – Multi-Mission Combat Ship. LCS for export, but with real weapons and an improved radar. Comes in varying sizes: 85m (corvette), 118m (light frigate, like LCS), and 150m (full frigate). See also their older LCS-Israel brochure [PDF, 4.27 MB], offering a design that removes the Mk110 gun while adding a 30mm gun system like the Typhoon, Harpoon missiles, Barak anti-air missiles, and strike-length Mk41 vertical launch cells.
DID Spotlight – A Littoral Combat Frigate for Israel? The Israelis wanted a very different approach. No mission modules. Full fleet defense capabilities, including vertical launch cells and a SPY-1F AEGIS radar. Anti-ship missiles, and torpedo tubes. Problem was, the ship was too expensive for them.
Aviation Week Ares (Oct 18/08) – Lockheed Martin Pushes Export LCS. With a long list of offered and potential changes to armament, layout, and even propulsion. Market demand in the rest of the world appears to be delivering some design verdicts.

Official Reports

USN Undersecretary Robert Work (DRAFT was January 2013) – The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why. Scribd copy of the early draft.
GAO (Sept 25/14, #GAO-14-827) – Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery.
GAO (July 30/14, #GAO-14-749) – Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments.
GAO (July 8/14, #GAO-14-447) Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs.
SAR report (April 17/14) – SAR [PDF]. Deals with readiness, incl. notable combat system limitations.
Breaking Defense (April 4/14) – Sleepless In Singapore: LCS Is Undermanned & Overworked, Says GAO. Unpublished report on USS Freedom’s Singapore deployment – see July 8/14 for official release.
US Congressional Research Service (Feb 25/14 update, #RL33741) – Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Latest update is Aug 4/14, which focuses on the FY15 procurement cut and follow-on frigate.
House Armed Service Seapower hearings (July 25/13) – Acquisition and Development Challenges Associated with the Littoral Combat Ship, Part 1 and Part 2 [Video]. See also GAO testimony transcript.
US GAO (July 22/13) – Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.
USN OPNAV (July 2013 release) – “Perez Report”, Executive Summary [PDF].
DOTE – FY2011 Report: LCS [PDF].
US Congressional Budget Office (Dec 10/10) – Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships [PDF].
US GAO (#GAO-11-277T, Dec 14/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks.
US GAO (#GAO-11-249R, Dec 8/10) – Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program.
US GAO (#GAO-10-523, Aug 31/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (March 3/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. CSBA is one of Washington’s most respected think tanks, and lives up to its non-partisan billing.
US GAO (#GAO-10-257, Feb 2/10): “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.”
Information Disemination (Jan 11/10) – Streetfighter 2010: The New Navy Fighting Machine. See also full study GoogleDoc. NNFM is an ONA funded study in which 9 members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempted to develop a force structure that reflected the vision in the USA’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” by building an illustrative fleet on paper.
US Naval Postgraduate School, John P. Baggett Thesis (March 8/08) – http://web.archive.org/web/20131216222432/http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA479828 [PDF].
US GAO (#GAO-08-13, Oct 12/07) – Report to the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities” [PDF]
US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces (July 24/07) – Congressional Budget Office, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst: The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs [PDF format]
US GAO (#GAO-07-943T, July 24/07) – Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.
US GAO (#GAO-07-406SP, March 30/07) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. LCS is one, and this study is an annual release. Here is the March 30/06 version.
US GAO (#GAO-06-587T March 30/06) – Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plans

LCS Program: Analysis

Naval Technology – Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground.” Offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. Written in July 2008.
Harold Lee Wise – Inside the Danger Zone: the US Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. An excellent book that outlines the kind of situation LCS was supposedly built for. Unfortunately, gaps in the required mine warfare capabilities, low damage tolerance, and station/support capacities leave doubts concerning the LCS’ ability to handle the same situation with as much success as the less expensive cobbled-together solutions used at the time; esp. the very successful converted barge Hercules.
G2mil – Diesel Electric Corvettes. Highly critical of the LCS program. Core of the criticism: “The LCS is the size of modern frigate and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement… The US Navy should scrap the current LCS plan in favor of slower, smaller, and more capable DE [diesel-electric] corvettes based on the Visby class corvette design and supported by tenders [vid. Yellowstone Class AD-41]”
Information Dissemination – Evolving towards a 21st Century Surface Action Group. He suggests a set (LPD/LSD Mothership + DDG-51 + T-AKE + 2 frigates/ 4 corvettes + 2 LCS as support for the flotilla) derived in part from some of the principles laid down by Sir Julian Corbett. “Ultimately, I do not see the LCS as is capable of meeting the requirements the Navy is demanding from it. The LCS is too expensive to buy the number of littoral ships needed to dominate that battlespace. The LCS is too big to be risked in the littorals during wartime, not to mention having survivability problems if thought of or treated as a warship. The LCS is too small to deploy the number of unmanned vehicles necessary to be effective, and cannot repair those systems when they break. That does not make the LCS a poor addition to the flotilla, rather it would be a smart addition, if utilized in a way that supported a credible approach to littoral warfare.”
James Hasik (Nov 15/13) – Lasers will save us all. If they ever work. They would certainly help LCS, but the power levels needed for wide-area defense are prohibitive.
Wall Street Journal (Nov 12/13) – Navy Ship Plan Faces Pentagon Budget Cutters [subscription req’d]. The performance report from Singapore was “a little stunning” to Navy leaders – and not in a good way. Meanwhile, pressure grows to cap the buy at 32 ships. Or even 24.
USNI Proceedings magazine (Sept 2013) – Cede No Water: Strategy, Littorals and Flotillas [subscription req’d]. “The problem with the current discussion is that it mostly revolves around ship characteristics, with little or no thought given to the strategic issues involved…” Makes a good case for a similar but different force, based on naval history.
Information Dissemination (June 10/13) – The Littoral Combat Ship: Give it time. AS GAO later notes, however, the procurement program is structured so that by the time you give it time, tens of billions are already sunk costs and the ships are built.
Canadian Naval Review (Winter 2013, Vol.8 #4) – The Costs of 21st Century Shipbuilding: Lessons for Canada from the Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF]
WIRED Danger Room (Jan 4/11) – Navy’s New Warship: Bargain, Death Trap or Both?
US Naval Institute blog (Jan 2/11) – The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment… Also discusses the lessons of past naval littoral combats.
Gannett’s Navy Times (Dec 19/10) – Analysis: Navy mum on multiple LCS system issues. Refers to the combat systems.
James Hasik (Dec 10/10) – Is buying two types of littoral combat ship good for the US Navy?
Defense Tech (Sept 27/10) – Is LCS Dying a Slow Death?
Information Dissemination (Sept 9/10) – Red Flags Everywhere”
Information Dissemination (Sept 3/10) – What the GAO LCS Report Reveals. In his opinion, systemic and serious cultural problems in the Navy.
Lexington Institute (Sept 7/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: It’s The Mission Packages, Stupid:
Reuters (Jan 20/10) – Early tests show Lockheed LCS problems-report. The Pentagon’s testing reports say that neither LCS design will meet requirements for survivability in a combat environment. The report also details other class issues.
Defense News (Jan 17/10) – Failing the Littoral Challenge: LCS Capabilities, Cost Miss the Boat. By Charles W. Robinson. “To counter these limitations, we urge testing of a littoral mission unit (LMU) by activating a military transport, the Cape Mendocino, which, with minor modifications, could transport four or more Street Fighters to areas of threat. This vessel would also serve as their mother ship.”
Defense News (Jan 8/10) – Aluminum Glitters Inside 2nd Littoral Combat Ship Variant. Chris Cavas takes a tour.
US Naval Institute’s Proceedings Magazine (September 2009) – No Need for High Speed. Contends that over-emphasis on speed has gravely damaged the LCS’ ability to carry out several necessary missions.
Information Dissemination (Sept 29/09) – The Day the LCS Was Promoted to Warship With AEGIS ships sliding toward missile defense roles, but naval action groups needing protection, the current LCS leaves the US Navy with no in-between options that ca pick up the slack.
Information Dissemination (July 17/09) – May 10th, 2019: Missing Nelsons Cruisers. Scenario illustrates the hole in US Navy force planning.
Mobile, AL Press-Register (April 15/09) – LCS could be a pirate’s nightmare. But the article adds appropriate caveats.
WIRED Danger Room (Nov 9/08) – Rosy Future for Navy’s Troubled Shoreline Fighters? Based on conversations with CSBA’s Bob Work.
Armed Forces Journal – Think Small (see also noticarionnaval’s blog post). “A force of the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), when they enter service in the next decade, will not significantly increase the Navy’s capabilities in conducting littoral warfare. This bad situation can be changed by building or acquiring a force composed of multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft.”
Information Dissemination (Sept 13/07) – Littoral Combat Ship: 2 + 2 +3 – 4 = 2 plus 1.
National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral combat ship could slip behind schedule as price tag nears $500 million. “As Congress battles over the Defense Department’s budget, lawmakers have signaled their displeasure at LCS cost overruns and delays. The number of littoral combat ships that policymakers allow the sea service to buy in 2008 could portend whether the program uprights itself in the next few years, say analysts.”
Lexington Institute (Nov 28/06) – Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy [PDF]. Washington think-tank offers an in-depth look at the LCS as the Navy’s most transformational program, and the key program challenges that must be overcome in order for it to be successful.
National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral Combat Ship Troubles: Opportunity for Small Boat Companies? “The Navy’s really trying to think, ‘do we need a vessel in between the LCS and the riverine,’ and I think in the end, they’re going to say, yes they do,” says Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” The Stiletto experimental ships are cited as one likely gap-filler.
DID (April 12/06) – The Lion in Winter: Government, Industry, and US Naval Shipbuilding Challenges. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter discusses US shipbulding plans and challenges. The LCS is referenced as an important trend and exemplar.
The Fourth Rail (April 27/05) – Of Pirates and Terrorists
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (June – Sept 1992) – The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat

LCS Ancillaries & Auxilliaries

DID – It’s All in the Package: the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mission Modules
DID – LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development. Covers AMCM and the MIW package.
Anthony G Williams – Naval Armament: The MCG Problem. MCG = medium-caliber gun. There has been a global divergence of views re: what 55mm-155mm naval guns should be for, and therefore which characteristics should be stressed. BAE’s 57mm gun, which will equip the LCS, falls firmly on one side of this debate.
DID – Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles. The NLOS-LS replacement, with just a 3 nautical mile range. Has already been mounted on some Cyclone Class patrol boats.
DID – Cheap, Fast, Deadly: The NETFIRES “Missiles in a Box” Program (updated). DII FOCUS on NLOS-LS. Canaceled.
DID – RAM Missiles: Contracts & Events. Will provide the LCS’ primary defense against aircraft and missiles.

Related American and International Programs

Danish Navy – Flyvefisken Class (1989-), aka. Standard Flex 300
Naval Technology – Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi-Role Vessels, Denmark
Danish Navy – Absalom Class (2004-). These multi-role ships can act as frigates, minelayers, command ships, hospital ships, or even as small roll-on/ roll-off landing ships thanks to their “Flex-Deck” and other features.
YouTube – Discovery Channel Mighty Ships S02E06: HDMS Absalon
Naval Technology – Skjold (“Shield”) Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway. One of these air cushion catamaran ships completed a 13-month deployment in the USA before the LCS program got underway, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea.
Naval Technology – Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden
DID FOCUS – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward.
DID – US MSC Charters Westpac Express Catamaran. The success of Austal’s HSV 4676 has also helped to shape US military thinking about potential LCS designs, and led to JHSV. The article also discusses Austal’s new Mobile, AL facility, which will be a key participant in LCS construction for the General Dynamics team. HSV 4676 is expected to serve until mid-2015.
GlobalSecurity.org – HSV Program for high speed troop carrier vessels (incl. WestPac Express and TSV ships TSV-1X Spearhead and HSV-2 Swift). Given that “HSV-2” is also a designation for a variety of Herpes Simplex STD, it is possible that this designation will change to a TSV variant once the ship class is firmly established.
DID – Dead Aim, Or Dead End? The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program. FOCUS Article.
DID – Russia & China Building Littoral Warships. The 220t Chinese Type 022 wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft is a potential littoral opponent, with 8 full anti-ship missiles. The Russian Project 2038 Steregushchiy (“Guarding”) Class, on the other hand, may well represent a true export competitor.
DID (Nov 24/05) – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward.
DID (Sept 27/05) – UAVs, Blimps, and HSV-2, Oh My! It would not surprise us at all if the semi-autonomous, long-endurance ScanEagle surveillance UAV were to find itself added to the LCS’ onboard options in future. These UAVs are valued very highly by the US Marines as combat surveillance UAVs, and testing them on the HSV-2 seems explicitly designed to pave the way for LCS integration.
HowStuffWorks.com – How the FSF-1 Sea Fighter Works.
Navy Marine Corps News (June 4/05) – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel: Initial Deployment News Video [dead link].
Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel. The vessel participated in a US naval exercise as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike.

News & Views

The Diplomat (March 7/14) – US, Japan to Jointly Develop Littoral Combat Ship. Likely to be smaller than the American LCS, with an emphasis on useful weaponry.
Real Clear Defense (March 6/14) – Bring on the Frigate: LCS Is Outgunned, Outclassed. “Adversaries and Allies Are Building Better Ships Cheaper.”
War on the Rocks (May 6/13) – Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS vs Iver Huitfeldt-Class. The Danish ship is a full frigate, with lesser modular capabilities.
Boston Globe (April 19/09) – The (smaller, faster, cheaper) future of sea power. Which may be significantly smaller and cheaper than the LCS.
DID (March 4/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is forcing doctrinal changes, as well as new technology programs. Quite a few of these new programs will find their way onto the LCS, or interface with it.
Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, via DTIC (Dec 2003) – “Sea Swat”: A Littoral Combat Ship for Sea Base Defense.
Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine (November 2003) – Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII – Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet [subscription req’d]. Gives good background re: the releationship of the links that follow to the LCS program, and how that kind of effort fits in with the US Navy’s new naval doctrine.
Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix. By 2013, that warning had come true.
Melana Zyla Vickers at FOXNews (Oct 14/03) – High Seas Robbery. Covers the need for the LCS program.

Tag: LCSFOCUS

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

MDA Adds Boeing to Kill Vehicle Competition | Navy Awards Contracts for C4ISR; JHMCS | Portugal F-16s Get NG LITENING Upgrade

Fri, 14/08/2015 - 02:11

Americas

The Navy is reportedly considering reducing the number of F-35C fighters it plans to procure, alluding to budgetary concerns. The Navy is also less enthused by the Joint Strike Fighter compared to the Marines and Air Force because of the Service operating more modern aircraft, including new and upgraded Super Hornets
The Air Force has alluded to future development of a replacement for the A-10 as the Service’s primary Close Air Support platform, according to the Air Combat Strategy 2015 report released earlier this week, citing a requirement to ‘explore opportunities for a future CAS platform’. With the Air Force pushing the line that the A-10 has no place in future combat, as well as making a dubious financial case for the aircraft’s retirement, the report’s call for a new CAS platform appears to run counter to the Air Force’s plan to use the F-35 for tactical CAS operations, despite embarrassing setbacks.
On Thursday the Navy handed M. C. Dean Inc and Honeywell Technology Solutions two multiple-award contracts totalling $1.66 billion for the installation and certification of C4ISR systems, while Rockwell Collins-ESA Vision Systems was handed a $20.9 million contract for 120 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) Night Vision Cueing and Display (NVCD) systems.
Meanwhile Boeing was awarded a $9.8 million contract by the Missile Defense Agency for the development of the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, following similar contracts awarded to Raytheon and Lockheed Martin earlier this week totalling $9.8 million and $9.6 million respectively. The MDA is reportedly planning a move to proof-of-concept prototype development by the end of the decade.

Europe

Belarus is buying four more Yak-130 combat jet trainers, according to local press reports [Russian]. The country ordered the first four aircraft in December 2012, with deliveries beginning this April.
Portugal is planning to upgrade the targeting and navigation pods equipping its fleet of F-16s. The Northrop Grumman-manufactured Litening Advanced Targeting pods will be upgraded to the G4 standard, with this $22.7 million contract reportedly scheduled for completion by 2022. Denmark ordered this variant in June 2012, with India also a major operator of the G4 variant.
The Polish Defense Ministry has responded to claims that its selection of the Airbus H225M Caracal helicopter in April broke procurement law. Accusations in the Polish media that the selection of the Airbus bid over AgustaWestland’s AW149 and Sikorsky’s S-70i Black Hawk/S-70B Seahawk saw a legal challenge from AgustaWestland subsidiary PZL Swidnik in June, with negotiations over the final contract between the defense ministry and Airbus ongoing. The Polish opposition Law and Justice Party has also criticized the incumbent Civic Platform administration for selecting a foreign bid over a domestic supplier.
US and British military trainers in Ukraine are learning lessons from their students, with their experience of the highly kinetic fighting in Eastern Ukraine providing a useful insight into the type of ‘hybrid’ war for which the Pentagon is now practising.
The Royal Navy’s third Astute-class submarine has begun sea trials. HMS Artful is the third of seven Astute-class boats, with HMS Astute and HMS Ambush, the first two subs in class already in service with the Royal Navy. Artful is slated to join the fleet toward the end of this year.

Asia

India is planning to dry-dock its INS Vikramaditya carrier next year, with the ship’s maintenance and repair operation set to be the largest of its type to have taken place in India. The vessel reportedly requires dry-docking every eighteen months, recently departing from Karwar in July after being fitted with new ship defense equipment, including the Barak-1 missile system.
The Indian Defense Ministry is considering excluding private firms undergoing corporate debt restructuring from tendering for defense contracts. The proposal would bar these companies from competing for projects under the “Make in India” procurement category, which sees the Indian government fund the majority of prototype development (80%) and the company filling the remaining 20%, with some of the country’s most expensive projects falling into this category.
Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) has completed testing of scramjet engines in Norway as part of the joint Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program, in collaboration with the US Air Force Research Laboratory, Boeing and the University of Queensland. Dating back to 2009, the project is seeking to develop understanding of hypersonic flight, with the Air Force recently restarting development of a hypersonic test vehicle, with a view to field the new vehicle for testing by 2023.

Today’s Video

HMS Artful’s first dive in October:

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Astute Buy? Britain Spends Big on its Next Fast Submarines

Fri, 14/08/2015 - 02:10

Astute, pre-launch
(click to view full)

Britain retired its nuclear-powered 4,900t SSN Swiftsure Class fast attack boats in 2010, and has begun phasing out its follow-on 5,300t SSN Trafalgar Class, before the effects of the ocean’s constant squeezing and release start making them dangerous to use. The last Trafalgar Class boat is expected to retire by 2022, and replacements were required. Submarines are considered to be a strategic industry in Britain, which remains committed to nuclear-powered submarines for their entire fleet. As such, there was never any question of whether they’d design their own. The new SSN Astute Class were designed to be stealthier than the Trafalgars, despite having 39% more displacement at 7,400t submerged.

Britain’s 6 Swiftsure and 7 Trafalgar Class boats will eventually find themselves replaced by 7 of the new Astute Class. The new submarine class has had its share of delays and difficulties, but the program continues to move forward with GBP 2.75 billion in contracts over the past week.

The New Astute Class SSNs Astute Class concept
(click to view full)

Nuclear weapons are reserved for Britain’s 4 SSBN Vanguard Class boats, but the Royal Navy’s SSNs have a unique role of their own in their fleet. They’re the only platforms used to launch long-range UGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, in order to deliver conventional strikes against land targets. Other navies also use surface ships for this role, but Britain chose not to.

The Astute Class will offer the novel feature of a bunk for each submariner, at the cost of more cramped layouts, and is the 1st British submarine to use an optronic day/night periscope that doesn’t pierce the hull. That periscope may allow the British to move the attack center control room in later boats of class from the top level Deck 1, to a roomier section in Deck 2 and a bit aft. In either case, they’ll be using a common base computing environment for critical systems. The attack center will have more to control, too. Torpedo tubes go from 5 to 6, and a larger weapons room roughly doubles capacity to 36-38 UGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV cruise missiles and Spearfish heavyweight torpedoes. Another weapon will be launched from the large lockout chamber aft of the fin, which allows SBS commandos to exit the sub underwater into a dry deck shelter. A mini-submarine can be mated to the DDS for added mobility.

Astute Class boats have worked to add stealth enhancements via rafted sections throughout, plus new coatings, exterior tiles, and paints. On the listening end, a new 2076 Stage 5 sonar system combines arrays all over the submarine, and it reportedly surprised the US Navy during qualification exercises against a Viginia Class boat. As usual for modern submarines, the Astute Class will also carry advanced electronic eavesdropping gear for quiet above-water snooping. High-bandwidth communications round out key electronics improvements, and allow fast transmission of intercepted signals to Royal Navy vessels or agencies like GCHQ.

A new reactor design won’t require refueling during the submarine’s operating life, which saves hundreds of millions of pounds. It’s mated to a new control system that includes independent diving plane controls handled by a new, complex autopilot system. The control system has been praised by its commanders, but the submarine won’t be able to reach its advertised top speed.

Building the SSNs
click for video

The first 3 Astute Class boats cost about GBP 1.22 billion each (about $2.4 billion in 2008), a price tag that’s very similar to the USA’s new 7,300t Virginia Class.

After HMS Astute has come S120 Ambush, with S121 Artful, S122 Audacious, S123 Anson, S124 Agamemnon, and S125 Ajax in various stages of planning, construction, and testing. All Astute Class submarines will be based at HM Naval Base Clyde, where a GBP 150 million state-of-the-art jetty was built for them.

Contracts & Key Events, 2007 – Present 2015

August 14/15: The Royal Navy’s third Astute-class submarine has begun sea trials. HMS Artful is the third of seven Astute-class boats, with HMS Astute and HMS Ambush, the first two subs in class already in service with the Royal Navy. Artful is slated to join the fleet toward the end of this year.

2014

Control room
(click to view full)

Nov 24/14: Basing. Britain moves a step closer to making HMNB Clyde home to all of its submarines. The Trafalgar Class fast attack boats HMS Torbay and HMS Trenchant will be decommissioned at their current base in Devonport in 2017 and 2019, respectively, since it makes no financial sense to move them now. By 2020, HMS Talent and HMS Triumph will have moved from HMNB Devonport to Scotland, and that will be the end of HMNB Devonport as a submarine base.

This single-base approach offers financial efficiencies, but there’s a real price in terms of strategic vulnerability. Sources: UK MoD, “Ministry of Defence confirms future submarine basing plan”.

Nov 18/14: Sub-contractors. Cohort plc subsidiary SEA Communications receives a GBP 23 million (about $37.5 million) contract from BAE Systems to deliver their “Project Aurora” external communications systems (ECS) for integration into the UK Royal Navy’s submarine fleet, including the Astute Class. It builds on their Coherency for Submarines (CCSM) system, which already serves on upgraded Trafalgar Class SSNs.

ECS’ biggest selling feature is that it works to make the hardware an independent consideration, allowing a simpler and cheaper approach to upgrades. This is Phase 1 of a 2-phase program, and SEA expects another significant order in 2015. Sources: SEA, “Case Study: Submarine External Communication System (ECS) ‘Project Aurora'” [PDF] | SEA, “SEA secures £23m deal to enhance submarine communications”.

Oct 10/14: #2. HMS Ambush returns to HMNB Clyde after a successful maiden mission that lasted about 4 months. The boat left Falsane on July 4/14 to visit Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, before heading for the North Atlantic and the United States. Sources: Royal Navy, “HMS Ambush returns to Clyde after international deployment”.

Oct 7/14: #1: HMS Astute returns to HMNB Clyde after an 8-month deployment. The submarine’s Lady Sponsor, Her Royal Highness The Duchess of Rothesay (The Duchess of Cornwall), joins senior naval officers and over 150 friends and family to welcome her return at a special ceremony at Faslane.

That’s the kind of sponsor you want for your vessel! Sources: Royal Navy, “Happy Homecoming for HMS Astute”.

May 19/14: #3. The 97m long Artful is launched into the water at Barrow-in-Furness. She is scheduled to begin sea trials in 2015. Sources: Royal Navy, “Artful enters the water as latest hunter killer submarine is launched”.

March 26/14: Recognition. Northrop Grumman announces that they’ve received the Customer Focus Award from BAE Systems Maritime-Submarines, in recognition of the role Sperry Marine has played in supplying the Astute Class platform management system (PMS) for the U.K. Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Astute nuclear-powered submarine program. Sources: NGC, “Northrop Grumman Wins Supplier Award for Role in Royal Navy’s Astute Submarine Programme”.

March 23/14: Mini-sub. British media spot HMS Astute moored off of Gibraltar with a new mini-sub attached to the dry-deck shelter (q.v. Dec 3/12). The mini-sub can reportedly carry 8 Special Boat Service Commandos in full assault gear:

“Before it was mounted to the top of the HMS Astute, the miniature submarine had to be airlifted by helicopter to seas near its destination…. The miniature submarine, codenamed ‘Project Chalfont’, has been tested since it was installed in 2012, but this is the first time it will reach active service…. The miniature submarine’s main duties are for counter intelligence, as it allows for incredibly covert ops from discreet locations, and will now be able to deploy while hidden underwater, rather than having to travel by helicopter, which runs the risk of revealing its position.”

The dry-deck shelter can also be used in simple swim-out mode, without a mini-submarine. Sources: Daily Mail, “Britain’s super-sub: Navy unveils James Bond-style mini submarine carried on board HMS Astute which can launch from under water”.

2013

NAO Report; Failure at Devonport dockyard raises concern over nuclear responsibility; Radiation leak highlights aging submarines issue; Sub-contracts for boats #6-7. HMS Astute &
HMS Dauntless
(click to view full)

Oct 6/13: Not good. The Independent newspaper reports that a 90-minute breakdown of all reactor coolant supply at Devonport dockyard’s Tidal X-Berths in Plymouth, UK nearly led to a major nuclear incident. Based on a heavily redacted report from the Ministry of Defence’s Site Event Report Committee (SERC), both the electrical power for coolant supply to docked nuclear submarines, and the diesel back-up generators, failed at the dockyard on July 29/12. That failure followed a similar failure involving HMS Talent in 2009, and a partial failure involving HMS Trafalgar in 2011.

The newspaper adds that an internal Babcock investigation blamed the incident on the central nuclear switchboard, but added a note of concern about “inability to learn from previous incidents and to implement the recommendations from previous event reports.” This will not help existing uneasiness over the next generation of nuclear submarines, and “Nuclear scare at Navy submarine base after ‘unbelievable’ failures” adds that:

“Its own “stress test” on Devonport safety, launched after the Fukushima disaster, said that in the event of the failure of both power supplies, heat levels in reactors could be controlled by emergency portable water pumps, and added that such a failure had occurred a “number of times” previously.”

Dockyard failure

Sept 20/13: #3 named. The 3rd Astute Class submarine is formally named “Artful” in a ceremony. The ship’s crew also picks a mascot, in keeping with the ship crest chosen in 1945 by the Admiralty Advisor on Heraldry. “Artful” is a ten-month-old baby ring-tailed lemur at South Lakes Wild Animal Park. While it isn’t a monkey, it is a prosimian primate, and lemurs are generally threatened or endangered throughout their homes in Madagascar. No word on whether the ship’s motto will change to the Latin translation of “We like to move it!” Sources: UK MoD release, Sept 20/13 | Royal Navy release, Sept 20/13.

Sept 10/13: Sub-contractors. DCNS signs their latest contract with BAE Systems for high-efficiency heat exchangers. This one covers 4 sets, for Astute Class boats 6 and 7. The last one will be delivered in mid-2016. Sources: DCNS, Sept 10/13 release.

Sept 10/13: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman’s Sperry subsidiary has supplied the final batch of Platform Management System hardware for the S123 Anson (#5), and remains under contract for submarines 4, 6, and 7. The systems do pretty much what you’d expect: control and monitor most of the submarine’s machinery and onboard systems. Sources: NGC, Sept 10/13 release.

July 18/13: #6. Keel laid for Agamemnon at BAE’s Barrow-in-Furness facility. Sources: Royal Navy, July 18/13 release.

May 28/13: SSOP. Thales UK signs a 10-year, GBP 600 million Sensor Support Optimisation Project (SSOP) with the Ministry of Defence. It extends the 2003 Contractor Logistics Support deal that covered electronic warfare/ ESM and sonar system support on an array of submarines and surface ships. Coverage on the Astute Class includes all electronic warfare and ESM sensors, the sonar, and the optronic mast. Read “SSOP: Britain Extends Contracting Innovations into Naval Sensors” for full coverage.

May 25/13: Sub-contractors. Applied Integration in Stokesley, North Yorkshire wins a “multi-million pound” deal to design “visual mechanisms allowing Royal Navy operators and sailors to manage conditions” on S124 Agamemnon and S125 Ajax. Sounds like they’re building touch displays that integrate with platform management and other systems.

This is the firm’s 3rd nuclear submarine contract, and the small firm has consistently delivered beyond its contracts while winning business against larger firms. Co-founder Lee Raywood says something we don’t see often enough in releases and reports: “Our senior engineers are truly exceptional and our staff deserve great credit for our success.” That attitude might have something to do with the fact that their teams win. Sources: The Northern Echo, “Applied Integration, in Stokesley, North Yorkshire, wins contract to supply control systems for HMS Agamemnon and HMS Ajax”.

May 20/13: Bernard Gray, the UK MoD’s Chief of Defence Materiel, talks about the Astute program experience during a Public Accounts Committee hearing concerning carrier strike. Excerpts:

“While I appreciate that the defence industry will quite often say that it wishes to be left alone, thank you very much, my experience is that that is not on the whole a good idea. It is fair to say that on most occasions when I have pushed on specific issues, they are not as well covered off as they should be. If I just let a contract and walked away and invited defence contractor A to get on with it and “Do just please drop by and deliver the equipment at the end of it and I’ll write you a cheque”, I am unlikely to get that equipment.

….If I can take you back to the most salient example of this, in the Astute programme we did what you suggested. It was a disaster. From 1996 to 2003 we let them get on with it. We had a contract and that is what we cared about. In 2003, it almost broke BAE Systems. It cost them hundreds of millions of pounds. We then had to step back in, reformulate the programme and effectively recuperate the whole of our submarine-building activity, which is something that is only beginning to come right some 10 years after that disaster…. My point is that the happy-go-lucky world of us writing out a contract and then allowing industry to get on with it is not one that I live in.”

Sources: HC 113 Public Accounts Committee Session 2013-14, “Public Accounts Committee – Minutes of Evidence.”

May 8/13: HMS Ambush. Without mentioning its April breakdown, the Royal Navy describes its “raft up” exercise to moor alongside RFA Diligence at sea, “assisted by a cluster of tugs”. RFA Diligence is the Royal Navy’s sole vessel for submarine support. They’re still talking about “early 2014″ as the submarine’s operational date. Sources: Royal Navy, May 8/13 release.

HMS Ambush sea trials

April 11/13: Schedule. Without ever mentioning HMS Ambush’s breakdown the previous day, the Royal Navy puts out a press release that says HMS Astute will be operational in 2013, after hot weather trials and operational sea training. S119 Astute was commissioned on Aug 27/10.

HMS Ambush [S120] will go through the same trials and training and “be ready to deploy in early 2014.” It remains to be seen what effect yesterday’s breakdown will have on that schedule. Royal Navy.

April 10/13: HMS Ambush. HMS Ambush is towed back to the Faslane naval base after coming to an unexpected halt in the middle of Gare Loch. Crew members are seen by local anti-nuclear protesters standing on top of the vessel, which was venting steam and surrounded by 3 tugs. The exact problem still isn’t clear, as the MoD would say only that:

“Following HMS Ambush’s maintenance period, undertaken at HM’s Naval Base Clyde, an issue with a non-nuclear system was identified. A decision was taken to return it to the base to allow remedial action to take place.”

See: Herald Scotland | The Scotsman.

HMS Ambush breaks down

March 10/13: Aging fleet. Britain’s Daily Express says that Britain’s submarine fleet is now finding it difficult to maintain patrols around the Falkland Islands, even as Argentina becomes more aggressive:

“THE Navy is finding it “increasingly difficult” to deploy a nuclear hunter-killer submarine to patrol British waters around the Falkland Islands. Senior sources made the warning last night, three weeks after the Sunday Express reported exclusively that the forced return of HMS Tireless [due to a reactor leak] means that just one of Britain’s five Trafalgar-class submarines is fully operational and even that is about to undergo a brief period of maintenance after duties in the Middle East…. HMS Torbay is undergoing maintenance, HMS Trenchant will need servicing after its deployment in the Middle East, HMS Talent is awaiting decommissioning and HMS Triumph, which should have been decommissioned last year, is being used for training.

HMS Astute, the first of our new £1.2billion Astute class submarines, is still not fully operational.”

Aging fleet

March 1/13: S120. A formal commissioning ceremony takes place at Naval Base Clyde for the 2nd boat in the class, though its sea trials aren’t finished yet. There ceremony comes fully 2 1/2 years after the commissioning of HMS Astute.

In January 2013, BAE Systems was granted a Certificate of Acceptance for Ambush, formalizing the transfer from the builder to the Ministry. UK MoD

HMS Ambush commissioned

Feb 25/13: Sub-contractors. Thales announces a contract from BAE for the last 2 Sonar 2076 systems in the Astute program, to equip Agammemnon and Ajax as long-lead buys. Those are the last submarines in the program.

A complete sonar system includes both inboard and outboard of the bow, fin, intercept and flank arrays, and the associated inboard processing. The cost of this contract isn’t announced, but based on past contracts, it’s more than GBP 60 million.

Feb 22/13: BAE’s overall results were down in 2012, but the submarine yard in Barrow is one of the bright spots, thanks to work on the Astute SSN program and the Successor Class next-generation SSBN. North-West Evening Mail.

Feb 17/13: Radiation Leak. The Trafalgar Class fast attack boat HMS Tireless experiences a small reactor coolant leak. It’s contained within the sealed reactor compartment, but the submarine will be out of action for 10 months in drydock. The boat was launched in 1984, had experienced a previous radiation leak off of Gibraltar in 2000, and was due for decommissioning in 2013. The only reason this wasn’t the end of her career is the Astute program’s delays, which led to Navy to extend her planned service to 2017.

The incident underscores the issues involved in operating submarines beyond their expected lifetimes. It also underscores issues with British force structure. Right now, the Royal Navy has 7 SSNs, but HMS Tireless is out of action, HMS Astute still isn’t fully operational after running aground in 2010, and a 3rd boat is in maintenance. That leaves just 4 operational submarines, instead of the recommended 7 + 1 spare. Scottish Express.

Feb 13/13: Reactors. The UK MoD signs a 10-year, GBP 800 million (then about $1.2 billion) contract with Rolls Royce, financing the Submarines Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP) envisioned in the 2010 SDSR. The goal is to consolidate costs under one contract with consistent incentives, and improve operational efficiency in the infrastructure that delivers and supports the UK’s naval nuclear propulsion systems. They’re hoping for a GBP 200 million saving over this 10 years. Time will tell.

SEPP isn’t technically part of any one program. Contracts for products and services to deliver and support the submarine programs themselves will continue in parallel. Royal Navy | Rolls Royce.

Feb 1/13: Sub-contractors. Babcock announces a contract to supply its weapon handling and launch system (WHLS) for the 6th and 7th Astute class submarines, with a total value around GBP 55 million.

The WHLS and its combat system interfaces were developed to handle the complicated task of loading, moving, and readying large weapons like heavy torpedoes, missiles, mines, etc. within the confined space of a submarine. Babcock’s Weapons Handling Equipment (WHE) sub-system uses a semi-automated and modular approach to maximize storage, and a “unique” method of shock mounting that offers adaptable protection according to the number of weapons stored on each stowage tier. Babcock’s programmable firing valve (PFV) technology allows the system to match the launch requirements precisely to a range of variables including weapon type, boat speed and depth, using less air and making less noise.

Babcock WHLS systems are used in Britain’s Astute Class, and a variant will also be featured in Spain’s diesel-electric S-80 boats.

Jan 13/13: NAO Report. Britain’s National Audit Office releases their 2012 Major Projects Report [PDF]. The Astute Class is featured, and the table of planned vs. actual cost, time, and performance for various milestones on pg. 39 is interesting, but most of the program’s major dislocations lie in the past. They do offer a quick update regarding the fleet’s progress.

The Astute Class Training Service (ACTS) has provided training for the ships companies of both HMS Astute and Ambush, and delivered its 1st Submariner Qualification course for the Royal Navy.

S120 Ambush, launched in January 2011, has finished fitting out and is in trials and testing, following her first test dive in the shipyard’s basin in early October 2011.

S121 Arful continues construction in the Devonshire Dock Hall at Barrow, and “is making good progress”. Diesel Generator Trials successfully completed in August 2011.

S122 Audacious has had all hull and casing units moved to the Devonshire Dock Hall.

S123 Anson recently got underway with manufacturing, following her October 2011 keel-laying.

2011 – 2012

Main contract for boat #4 Audacious; Grouped long-lead work for boats #5-7; Common Combat System coming for boats #3-7; Various sub-contracts; #2 Ambush goes to trials; #5 Ansom keel-laying. Ambush, pre-trials
(click to view full)

Dec 10/12: #5-7 lead ins. The UK Ministry of Defence awards BAE a GBP 1.5 billion contract to begin early build work on S123 Anson, and begin long-lead time buys of supplies like nuclear reactors for boats #6 Agamemnon & #7 Ajax. The Ministry of Defence touts these contracts as safeguarding 3,000 skilled jobs at Barrow-in-Furness in Cumbria.

Anson is named after after Admiral of the Fleet George Anson, who died in 1762 at the age of 65. Agamemnon & Ajax are 2 famous Greek heroes of the Trojan War. UK MoD.

Long-lead items and work on S123 – S125

Dec 10/12: #4. The UK Ministry of Defence awards BAE a GBP 1.2 billion contract to finish building S122 Audacious, the 4th of 7 planned Astute Class attack submarines. This brings total announced contracts to GBP 1.4 billion (q.v. May 21/07 entry), which is around $2.25 billion at current conversions. The boat is about half way through its build process, and subsequent NAO reports estimate her commissioning in January 2018. The Guardian is less than impressed, pointing out that:

“HMS Astute cannot reach the top speed the MoD boasted it could, sprang a leak that required it to perform an emergency surfacing, and was fitted with electrical circuit boards that failed the navy’s safety standards. A lead-lined water jacket, which surrounds the submarine’s nuclear reactor, was also constructed with metal of the wrong quality. And the living quarters for the 98-strong crew are also more cramped than those on submarines made more than 50 years ago… However, the navy is adamant the vessel can overcome the difficulties.”

Despite its launch in 2007 and commissioning in 2010, HMS Astute is still undergoing sea trials. These have included deep dive trials, and the successful firing of Tomahawk land attack missiles and Spearfish torpedoes. The 2nd submarine, Ambush, is also in sea trials that have tested diving, propulsion, and torpedoes. The 3rd boat, Artful, is reaching the final stages of her construction at Barrow shipyard. UK MoD | BAE Systems | The Guardian.

S122 Audacious main contract

Dec 6/12: Common Combat System. Britain’s Ministry of Defence issues BAE Systems Maritime – Submarines a GBP 46 million contract to create a common combat & navigation system baseline for use in all of the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarines.

“The Royal Navy operates three classes of submarine, totalling 10 vessels, which are used to safeguard the UK’s interests around the world. Currently, different combat systems are used across the fleet. This new contract will help drive adoption of a common combat system across all current and future Royal Navy submarines, with considerable benefits to training, maintenance and updating costs.”

S122 Audacious will introduce a shared computing environment for the combat, navigation, and sonar systems, mounted in common consoles and cabinets, and using “commercial off the shelf” computing electronics. These changes are due to be implemented on the remaining submarines in the class, and have been back-fitted to S121 Artful. The eventual aim is to back-fit the “Common Combat System” to HMS Astute and Ambush, and progressively to the remaining SSN Trafalgar Class and SSBN Vanguard Class boats. The CCS would also implicitly cover Britain’s SSBN Successor submarines, currently in the initial design stages at BAE. UK MoD | BAE.

Dec 3/12: Mini-Sub. HMS Astute has been fitted with an underwater dry-deck shelter (q.v. Dec 5/11) from which Special Boat Service (SBS) commandos could launch a midget submarine designed and built under Project Chalfont. From Strategic Defence Intelligence, “INSIGHT – Astute submarines fitted with Special Forces mini-sub dock”:

“According to a report in The Sunday Times, HMS Astute has sailed from Faslane naval base on the River Clyde with the dock, known as a Special Forces payload bay, fitted behind the conning tower to carry out trials…. the dock is a portable fixture that can be fitted to whichever of the Astute fleet is heading towards a crisis zone…. The SBS currently launch their midget submarines from surface warships or helicopters, risking discovery.”

Nov 15/12: Submarine problems. The Guardian publishes a report concerning issues with the Astute Class. A number can be described as teething problems, but a couple are potentially serious. The “teething problems” category includes a recent episode of leakage during a dive, computer circuit boards that didn’t meet safety standards, questions about the quality of installation of some equipment, and lack of trust in the boat’s new optronic periscope.

More serious problems include corrosion in a new boat, “…the instruments monitoring the nuclear reactor because the wrong type of lead was used [in the shielding]”, and an apparent mismatch between the nuclear reactor and the steam turbine sets:

“At the moment, the boat, heralded as the most sophisticated submarine ever built for the navy, cannot sprint to emergencies or away from an attack – an essential requirement for a hunter-killer boat. It would also be incapable of keeping pace with the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers, which will be able to travel at more than 30 knots and need the submarines to protect them.”

Sources: The Guardian, “Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain’s £10bn submarine beset by design flaws”.

Sept 14/12: #2 trials. The Royal Navy announces that S120 Ambush is ready to depart the shipyard and begin sea trials, 9 years after she was laid down and 18 months since she was launched.

June 18/12: Reactors. Britain’s Ministry of Defense signs a GBP 1.1 billion contract with Rolls Royce for submarine nuclear reactor cores, (GBP 600 million) and industrial investment in the Raynesway plant that manufactures them (GBP 500 million). The contracts will secure 300 jobs at Rolls-Royce.

The nuclear reactor cores will be used to power the 7th and final SSN Astute Class fast attack submarine, and the 1st of the Royal Navy’s next generation of SSBN nuclear deterrent submarines, currently known as the Successor Class.

Rolls Royce is the sole Technical Authority for the UK Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, whose reactors have powered British nuclear-powered submarines for the past 50 years. The GBP 500 million infrastructure contract aims extend the operating life of the Rayneway plant in Derby, UK, by more than 40 years. Rolls-Royce will continue to maintain and operate its existing reactor core manufacturing facility, while undertaking a parallel phased rebuild and modernization of buildings on site. UK MoD | Rolls Royce | The Telegraph.

Feb 6/12: Sub-contractors. Thales UK announces a GBP 30+ million sub-contract from BAE Systems Submarine Solutions, to supply S123 Anson’s full Sonar 2076 Phase 5 system. Deliverables will include arrays both inboard and outboard of the bow, plus fin, intercept and flank arrays, and the associated inboard processing.

Thales UK is a major sub-contractor for the program as a whole. Beyond the sonar system, they also supply each Astute Class submarine with its 2 non-hull penetrating CM010 optronic masts, the mast’s UAP4 electronic support measures (ESM) system for gathering, classifying, and locating communications and radar emissions, the ECB680 communications and SEEPIRB emergency beacon buoys, and the UHF satellite communications antenna. Thales.

Dec 5/11: An interview with HMS Astute’s commander highlights some of its features. Among other things:

[HMS Astute commanding officer Cmdr. Iain] Breckenridge ticked off a list of new features aboard the sub…. features a large lockout chamber aft of the fin, or sail, and can carry a drydeck shelter…. “That was a real design driver for the boat, and that’s why we’ve got a big sail,” he explained. “The shapes and curves [of the hull] help the dry deck shelter sit in the right place”…. The captain was especially proud of the sub’s maneuvering and hovering capabilities…. In my situation, I’ve got a much wider operating envelope because, if the stern plane does fail to dive, it’s probably only going to be one of them, and I can immediately correct it by slowing down and putting the noncasualty plane to rise. It gives us a much broader operating envelope.”

Sources: Defense News, “‘Trail-blazing’ U.K. Attack Sub Proves Itself in U.S.”

Oct 13/11: #5. S123 Anson’s keel is formally laid – vertically. The submarine’s “keel” is actually an 11m long x 7m diameter, 190t hull ring that will house the control center for Anson’s propulsion plants, and the diesel generator module. It’s also one of the most sophisticated and technically-challenging parts of the boat, and it’s laid vertically because that position makes the work easier. Royal Navy.

S123 Anson keel laying

Sept 15/11: #5. Astute submarine #5 will take the name HMS Anson when she is commissioned. The 2012 NAO report suggests that this will be in August 2020. BFBS.

Feb 16/11: #4. BAE Systems delivers S122 Audacious’ final hull segment by public road through the town of Barrow-in-Furness, to the huge the Devonshire Dock Hall (DDH). It’s the 270 tonne forward dome.

The boat is still a long way from done. The process of installing all of the machinery in these framework units, and then beginning to join hull pieces, is quite long and exacting. BAE Systems.

Jan 6/11: #2 launched. S120 Ambush is launched. The submarine will still have a fitting-out period before it can even start contractor trials. Royal Navy.

2007 – 2010

1st of class HMS Astute commissioned; Sonar upgrades for S119 – S121. S119 control room
(click to view full)

Aug 27/10: HMS Astute. The 1st-of-class submarine S119 Astute is commissioned into the Royal Navy, and becomes “Her Majesty’s Ship Astute.” UK MoD.

HMS Astute

Feb 12/10: Sonar 2076 upgrade. Thales UK announces the ‘Stage 5 Inboard Replacement’ (Stage 5 IR) contract from BAE Systems. They’ll upgrade 3 Trafalgar Class boats, and the first 3 Astute Class submarines, to Sonar 2076 Stage 5 system. Once all of the work is completed, 2076 Stage 5 will be fully deployed across the Royal Navy’s (RN’s) nuclear-powered attack (SSN) submarine fleet.

Thales’ Sonar 2076 is said to have 13,000 hydrophones spread between its inboard and outboard bow, flank, fin, and towed arrays. Stage 5 IR adds new hardware, new software functionality and new algorithms, while moving the sonar system to open architecture electronics. The UK MoD’s long term vision involves the evolution of a common sonar and combat system across their entire submarine flotilla, and an open architecture sonar system is an important milestone along that path. Thales | Aviation Week.

May 21/07: #4 lead-in. The UK MoD has announces a GBP 200 million contract (about $395 million) to begin preparing for construction of the 4th boat at the BAE Systems shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness in Cumbria.

This initial contract for S122 runs to March 2008, and covers initial build work only. The MoD aims to contract for the whole boat by late 2008, and detailed terms and conditions will be agreed over the intervening period.

Additional Readings The Astute Class

Royal Navy – Astute Class
BAE Systems – Astute Class
BAE Systems, via WayBack – The Astute Launch
Naval Technology – SSN Astute Class Nuclear Submarine, United Kingdom
Royal Navy Info – Astute-class Submarine. Unofficial site.

Ancillaries

RUSI (October 2008) – Evolutionary Trends In UK Sonar [PDF]
Royal Navy – Spearfish Torpedo. Range is just 14-30 miles, significantly below peers like Atlas Elektronik’s new Seahakes. British SSNs are a bit unusual in the modern era, in that they don’t carry anti-ship missiles as an option to accompany their torpedoes.
DID – Tomahawk’s Chops: xGM-109 Block IV Cruise Missiles
DID – New Nukes: Britain’s Next-Gen Missile Submarines. The SSBN Successor project, which would carry Britain’s future nuclear deterrent.

News & Views

The Guardian (Nov 15/12) – Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain’s £10bn submarine beset by design flaws.
Dougie Coull Photography (Sept 29/12) – HMS Astute – Departing Faslane Naval Base. Note the mounted Dry Deck Shelter.
Defence Management (March 6/12) – US ‘taken aback’ by HMS Astute. At least the Virginia Class boat USS New Mexico [SSN 779] was.
Defense News (Dec 5/11) – ‘Trail-blazing’ U.K. Attack Sub Proves Itself in U.S. The captain discusses several features of the boat, while pointing out its first-of-class status.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Portugal Selects LITENING AT Pods for Its F-16s

Fri, 14/08/2015 - 02:08

FAP’s F-16AMs
(click to view full)

Portugal currently owns 45 F-16s as the backbone of its air force: 20-25 fly with 201 Sqn as F-16A/B Block 15s, while another 20 were upgraded via the Mid-Life Upgrade program to F-16AM status for 301 Sqn. The F-16AMs add considerable air-ground capabilities via improved radars, and compatibility with modern laser and GPS-guided precision weapons. In order to use any of those weapons, however, targets must still be found and marked.

These days, many countries are buying small surveillance and targeting pods, as a bolt-on addition that gives their fighters full surveillance, designation, and precision strike capabilities. At present, the 2 main competitors in the global market are Lockheed Martin’s Sniper ATP, and Northrop Grumman/RAFAEL’s LITENING.

On July 31/08, the Portuguese Air Force announced a program to buy 12 LITENING AT pods from Northrop Grumman Corporation, as the winning candidate in their F-16 Advanced Targeting Pod upgrade program. Deliveries will begin in 2008, and finish in 2009. Note that the LITENING has been integrated on F-16 Block 15 aircraft, widening the number of Portuguese aircraft that might be given access to its surveillance and strike-enhancing capabilities. NGC release.

Update

August 13/15 Portugal is planning to upgrade the targeting and navigation pods equipping its fleet of F-16s. The Northrop Grumman-manufactured Litening Advanced Targeting pods will be upgraded to the G4 standard, with this $22.7 million contract reportedly scheduled for completion by 2022. Denmark ordered this variant in June 2012, with India also a major operator of the G4 variant.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Russia’s Yak-130 Trainer & Light Attack Jets

Fri, 14/08/2015 - 02:07

Yak-130
(click to view full)

Russia’s air force (VVS) aged badly in the wake of the Cold War, and the recapitalization drought soon made itself felt in all areas. One of those areas involved advanced jet trainers, which form the last rung on the ladder before assignment to fighters. Russia’s Czech-made L-29 and L-39 trainers were left with questionable access to spare parts, and a competition that began in the 1990s finally saw Yakolev’s Yak-130 collaboration with Italy’s Finmeccanica beat the MiG-AT in 2002. Unfortunately, Russian budget realities allowed orders for just a dozen early production Yak-130s, even as the VVS’s L-39 fleet dwindled drastically.

The Yak-130’s multi-mission capabilities in training, air policing, and counterinsurgency make it an attractive option for some customers beyond Russia. Initial export successes helped keep Yak-130 production going in those early years, mostly via a confirmed order from Algeria (16). In December 2011, however, Russia finally placed a significant order that got production started in earnest. Russia continues to promote the aircraft abroad, and now that the plane’s future is secure, interest and orders are picking up…

The Yak-130 Yak-130

The Czech L-39 is the world’s most widely sold jet trainer, but many of those Soviet-era aircraft will need replacement soon. With Aero Vodochody barely hanging on in the modern jet trainer market, Russia’s Yak has an opportunity. MiG dropped the MiG-AT project in 2009, but that still leaves competition from Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 counterpart from the “AEM-130″ program, China’s similar L-15 (developed with help from Yakolev), BAE’s ubiquitous Hawk family of trainers and light attack jets, and Korean Aerospace’s supersonic T-50 family of trainers and lightweight fighters.

Yak-130 customers currently include Russia (67), Algeria (16), Bangladesh (24), Belarus (4), and Syria (36). A deal with Libya (6) was canceled by the regime’s fall, and the planes may have been sold to Kazakhstan. There are unconfirmed rumors of sales to Vietnam (8) and Mongolia (?).

Yak-130, MAKS 2009
(click to view full)

Design: Compared to the Yak-130D developmental prototypes, the Yak-130 production aircraft reportedly features lower weight, a more rounded nose to accommodate a radar, a shorter fuselage length, and a lower wing area. Kevlar armor protection is fitted to the engines, cockpit and avionics compartment. In typical Russian fashion, the Yak-130 is built to operate from unpaved runways and unprepared airfields, as long as they’re 1,000 meters in size or larger.

The plane is designed for flight at high nose-up angles of attack, which is a common feature of many modern fighters, and of Russian designs in particular. The layout of its forward wing extensions and air intakes layout reportedly enables steady controllable flight at up to 40 degrees AoA. The sustained maneuvering limit at 15,000 feet is 5.2g, while its recommended limits are +8g/ -3g for immediate maneuvers. Note that these maneuvering G-force limits may not be true at full weapon loads.

Refueling in the air isn’t an option yet, but the Yakolev bureau is reportedly working to add a refueling probe.

Thrust & Weight: The Yak-130 is powered by a pair of 2,500 kg thrust Progress AI-222-25s, or 2,200 kg thrust Slovakian Povazske Strojarne DV-2SM turbofans. The AI-222s are the standard fit, and generate about a total of about 5,000 kg/ 11,000 pounds thrust.

Normal aircraft takeoff weight is around 5,700 kg, with a maximum of 1,750 kg of fuel in its internal tanks. Weapons etc. can push maximum takeoff weight to 9,000 kg.

Yak-130
(click to view full)

Electronics: The production Yak-130 is the first Russian aircraft with an all-digital avionics suite. The suite is night-vision compatible, uses GLONASS/NAVSTAR positioning for navigation, and includes 3 multifunction 6″ x 8″ LCD color displays. A Hemlet Mounted Display can also be used.

The Yak is a fly-by-wire aircraft, though this aspect gave the project a lot of trouble during development. Avionica’s fly-by-wire flight control system can reportedly be used to adjust the plane’s flying characteristics, in order to simulate different aircraft.

The open architecture avionics suite includes 2 computers and a 3-channel multiplexer, and the plane is reportedly MIL-STD-1553 compatible if a customer wants to integrate Western equipment like AIM-9 air-air missiles, or the AGM-65 Maverick short range strike missile.

Its NIIP Zhukovsky Osa radar offers adequate performance, with an effective range out to about 65 km. Some reports cite an alternative fit using Phazotron’s Kopyo radar, which has been used in some MiG-21 upgrades. Yakolev is reportedly considering a radar modernization that would either switch in a new nose radar to add targeting-grade ground scans, or add an externally-mounted radar targeting pod.

Weapons: Standard integration involves Russian weapons. Wing stores can include unguided bombs and rockets, plus KAB-500Kr TV-guided bombs, and R-73/AA-11 short range air-to-air missiles. Gun options involve a podded GSh-23 twin-barrel 23mm cannon (probably the 30 degree traversable SPPU-22), or a step up to the heavier single-barrel 9A4273 pod with a 30mm GSh-301 cannon. A Yekaterinburg UOMZ Platan electro-optical guidance pod can reportedly be installed under the fuselage to add onboard TV and laser designation.

Weapons mentioned in conjunction with the Yak-130 but not yet confirmed here include 9A4172/ AT-16 Vikhr laser-guided anti-armor missiles, and Kh-25ML/ AS-10 laser-guided strike missiles. More progress may follow on these fronts, once the Platan pod is integrated. If a ground-capable radar is added, options will expand again. Irkut VP Komstantin Popovich has said that the Yak-130 design is stable and powerful enough to carry even a supersonic Kh-31/ AS-17 cruise missile, which would make the Yak-130 a far more dangerous plane.

Contracts & Key Events 2015

August 14/15: Belarus is buying four more Yak-130 combat jet trainers, according to local press reports [Russian]. The country ordered the first four aircraft in December 2012, with deliveries beginning this April.

2014

Official vid [in Russian]

May 5/14: Syria. Russian media report that Russia plans to send an initial batch of 9 Yak-130 jet trainers to Syria by the end of 2014, then finish the order by delivering 12 in 2015 and 15 in 2016. Kommersant reportedly cited “a source close to Russian arms exporter Rosoboronexport,” and says that the decision follows a $100 million advance payment in June 2013, covering the first 6.

The fact that Assad’s regime and Hezbollah are widely seen as winning the civil war probably helps some, and Russia seems a lot less interested in what America or Europe think of them. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russia to Provide Syria with First Batch of Jet Trainers until End of Year”.

Jan 28/14: Bangladesh. Kommersant reports that Bangladesh ordered 24 Russian Yak-130 light fighter jets in the final quarter of 2013. Rosoboronexport’s director reports that the deal was financed with a Russian loan (q.v. Nov 15/12, March 27/13), but the $800 million purchase price comes from unnamed defense industry sources.

The planes will reportedly be fitted with English-language cockpits. They will replace the existing Chinese FT-6 (MiG-19 trainer) and Czech L-39s, provide a lead-in to the air force’s handful of Chinese J-7 (MiG-21) and Russian MiG-29 aircraft, and offer light attack counterinsurgency capabilities that are better than anything currently in inventory. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Bangladesh Buys Russian Combat Training Jets Worth $800M”.

Bangladesh: 24

2012 – 2013

Syrian contract?; Interest from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Vietnam; Flight at Farnborough; New ordnance loads for the Yak. Yak-130, Farnborough
(click to view full)

Dec 25/13: Russia. Russian Air Force Commander in Chief Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev praises Irkut for being ahead of schedule in its Yak-130 deliveries, including 2 aircraft from the 2014 orders that are almost ready for shipment. They’d be added to the 18 Yak-130s delivered to the VVS’ Borisoglesk Aviation Training Center in 2013. Bondarev adds that new contracts for Su-30SM (Su-30MKM) fighters and Yak-130 trainers are expected soon, and says that:

“We just came from Domna [Su-30SM base, 14 delivered in 2013]… Observed the assimilation of new aircraft. I want to note: great aircraft – pilots are glad. And it is very pleasing…. After all, for many years we have blamed the industry for late deliveries and poor quality products. On the example of Irkut it is clear that the situation is changing for the better: the industry provides high quality products and what is very important not by the end of the year, but quarterly. Whereby pilots are constantly flying and training. The job of Irkutsk Aviation Plant is a good example for other enterprises”.

Russia ordered 55 Yak-130s on Dec 12/11, out of 65 that had been envisioned in the 2011-2020 armaments plan. Another 10 orders wouldn’t keep production going for even 1 year at current rates, so it’s safe to assume that the next contract will be larger than that. Sources: Irkut, “Russian Air Force Commander In Chief Viktor Bondarev Highly Appreciated Aircraft Of Irkut Corporation” | RIA Novosti, “Russian Military Plans to Order More Yak-130 Combat Trainers”.

Dec 12/13: Marketing. Domestic marketing got a nice boost as of April 2013, and the Aviation Press Club gave the First National Aviation Video Award for Best Full Length InfoVideo to Russia 2 TV, for their “Polygon” show covering the Yak-130. American readers in particular know how these shows go, but the use of advanced CGI plus real-life experience with a weapon is a new thing in Russia, and the show was quite well done. In this case, Yakolev Design Bureau Chief test pilot and Hero of Russia Oleg Kononenko was personally at the controls for the filmed flight, and footage included the Irkutsk Aviation Plant and Zhukovsky Flight Test complex.

Viewer and social media response was very positive. Now, isn’t that better than executing people who try to tell others about your gear? Russia 2 TV’s Polygon Episode [incl. video] | Irkut, “Movie About Yak-130 By The Russia 2 Tv Channel Announced Winner Of The First National Aviation Video Award”.

Aug 26-31/13: Syria. It’s a Rashomon-style global improv performance, as Syrian President Bashar Assad and various Russian sources talk about their arms exports. On Aug 26/13, Assad tells Izvestia that all military contracts with Russia are being implemented “meticulously”, contradicting reports that the Yak-130s are delayed pending a political decision (q.v. Feb 13/13 entry). On Aug 30/13, Rosoboronexport Deputy CEO Viktor Komardin adds to the uncertainty by saying that they’re implementing Syrian contracts “signed prior to 2011,” which would exclude the 2011 deal for advanced S-300 air defense missiles, as well as the 2012 Yak-130 deal.

Finally, toward the end of the week, Russia’s Kommersant newspaper gives failure to pay as the reason for delivery delays involving 12 MiG-29M2 fighters (just 30% paid, now 2016-17 delivery), that “S-300 are out of question until we see real money” (otherwise delivery slips from July 2014 to 2015-16), and that only 6 Yak-130s will be shipped because that’s all Syria has paid for. This is a curious excuse, because it’s common global practice to make just a partial down-payment, with the rest paid only on delivery/ acceptance. Payment in advance would represent very unusual terms. What is clear, amidst all this murk, is that Russia isn’t interested in delivering these weapons any time soon. Sources: RIA Novosti, “All Contracts with Russia ‘on Track’ – Syria’s Assad” | “Kremlin Unaware of Syrian S-300 Missile Contract Payment – Aide” | “Russia Delays Arms Supplies to Syria over Money – Paper”.

April 2013: Russia’s VVS begins to use Yak-130s for preparatory and solo flights of cadet pilots in the Borisoglebvsk training Center, located in central Russia. Deliveries to Borisoglebvsk began in Fall 2012. Source: Yakolev DB, “Russian Air Force starts operation of Yak-130″.

Operational in Russia

Aug 27/13: What’s next. AS Yakolev Design Bureau hails the operational status of their Yak-130s in the Russian VVS (q.v. April 2013), and offers confirmation regarding some past upgrade reports (q.v. July 17/12):

“Dr. Oleg Demchenko, President of IRKUT Corp, believes that the main focus in the further development of the Yak-130 Program will be on increasing of its combat performances….. integrate an opto-electronic system into the plane’s avionics, which provides targets’ detection and their effective homing for guided weaponry at night. A next phase of the Yak’s development is related to installation of on-board radar in a stationary version as well as one of container type [in the nose and as a Leninets pod]…. Besides, it is being considered to use Yak-130 for carrying on its board Kh-31 and Kh-38 air-to-surface missiles…. IRKUT representatives opine that the augmented combat performances of Yak-130 will its market perspectives much better…. Among potential buyers are being mentioned the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam as well a few CIS countries. There were in news that the Yak-130’s proposals were formed up for India…. Russia is certain to promote Yak-130 in Brazil…”

Finally, a Russian aerobatic team will be formed using a dedicated Yak-130 variant. Aerobatic modifications tend to strip unneeded items and weight in order to maximize performance, while adding attachments and systems for things like cameras, smoke generators, etc. Sources: Yakolev DB, “Russian Air Force starts operation of Yak-130″.

March 27/13: Bangladesh. Rosoboronexport Deputy Chief Viktor Komardin tells RIA Novosti that:

“Bangladesh has a whole list of arms it wants [under a $1 billion credit agreement with Russia], but so far that is a state secret. I will reveal one little secret: The purchase of Yak-130 warplanes is a very significant subject of negotiations between Russia and Bangladesh.”

Bangladesh currently flies 7 L-39s in the training role. Its fighter inventory of Chinese designs is aging out, but a 2010 stopgap buy of 16 J-7BGIs (improved MiG-21 copies) will be around for a while. A small fleet of 8 Russian MiG-29s are being upgraded, which makes the Yak-130 a better lead-in than China’s J-15. Their interest has reportedly risen to 24 Yak-130s, which could serve as multi-role trainers with secondary attack and air policing capabilities.

Feb 13/13: Syria. Anatoly Isaikin, the director of Rosoboronexport, tells Associated Press that no new Russian combat planes or helicopters have been delivered to Syria, and confirmed that they hadn’t yet shipped any of the Yak-130 jets Syria had ordered.

Syria’s remaining L-39 Albatros fleet of advanced jet trainer/ light strike aircraft have seen considerable use during that country’s civil war, which began in April 2011. Russia has not embargoed Syria, but shipments of weapons have been slow.

Dec 18/12: Belarus. Irkut Corp.:

“In accordance with the Agreement on the development of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus dated December 10, 2009, today in Minsk the contract on 4 Yak-130 combat-trainers delivery in 2015 was signed by the Belarusian Defence Ministry and IRKUT Corporation (a part of United Aircraft Corporation).”

See Irkut | RIA Novosti.

Belarus: 4

Late 2012: Exports. Moscow Defence Brief takes an in-depth look at the Yak-130 program, and says that the sale to Syria hasn’t gone through. Meanwhile, it has this to say about potential international sales:

“It has been reported that Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms exports near-monopoly, and Irkut’s parent company, OAK, are negotiating possible Yak 130 contracts with several new foreign customers, including Poland, Venezuela, Uruguay, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Malaysia. In late 2011 it was reported that a 550m-dollar contract for 36 Yak 130s had been signed with Syria – but according to the latest available information, the contract has not yet entered into force because the Russian government has yet to give the final go-ahead. Finally, it has been reported that Belarus also plans to buy several Yak 130s.”

Russia may have talked to Poland, but they aren’t going to buy a Russian trainer, period. As for the Philippines, their choice became official in August 2012: South Korea’s supersonic TA-50. It’s questionable whether the Yak-130 was ever a serious contender.

Nov 15/12: Bangladesh. Rosoboronexport’s Sergey Kornev is interviewed by Voice of Russia at the Zhuhai Airshow 2012:

“Kornev added that Russia will grant a loan to Bangladesh to buy 12 Yak-130 planes and Su-27 jet fighters. He did not mention the sum of the loan. “As far as I know the loan has been approved. Within its amount Bangladesh can choose the number of planes it will buy and their modifications”, he said.”

The cheaper Yaks make far more sense as a replacement to the BBB’s FT-6 (MiG-19) and L-39 trainers, and a ground attack companion to its Chinese J-7 (MiG-21) and Russian MiG-29 fighters. In contrast, buying just 4-6 SU-27s just creates maintenance headaches. Still, one should never underestimate the role of ego in these decisions.

Nov 14/12: Exports. RIA Novosti quotes “a source in the Russian delegation at the Air China aerospace show”, who says that reports that Malaysia and Vietnam are interested in buying Yak-130s. Vietnam is something of an uncertain case, with some reports that a contract for 8 was signed in April 2010, and others saying there has been no final contract. Beyond Vietnam, Malaysia operates SU-30MKMs, and:

“Malaysia will need new combat trainers in the near future to replace the outdated Italian-made M-339 aircraft,” the source said.”

Malaysia also has a good relationship with the British, however, and their neighbors in Indonesia fly a lot of Hawk aircraft.

July 18/12: Syria. Irkut head Alexei Fedorov tells RIA Novosti that they’re willing to deliver Syria’s contract for 36 planes, “when we get an indication from the government.” The paper continues:

“Last week, on the sidelines of the Farnborough Air Show in Britain, the deputy head of Russia’s military-technicial cooperation commission, Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, said Russia had decided to suspend the Yak-130 contract to Syria while the country was in a state of internal conflict. “Until the situation stabilizes, we will not deliver any new weapons [to Syria],” he said.”

First Libya, then Syria. This is certainly a new behavior for the Russians.

July 17/12: Irkut arming Yak-130s. the Russian military may not be interested in developing a Yak-131 light attack version, but Irkut thinks there’s a market for the existing Yak-130, and is working to give it a full strike fighter’s array. At present, the Yak-130’s 3,000 kg/ 6,600 pounds of payload can includes AA-11/R-73 short range air-to-air missiles for defense, and KAB-500 guided bombs, in addition to unguided bombs, rockets and 23mm gun pods.

Irkut VP Komstantin Popovich told Aviation Week that work on in-flight refueling capability, and efforts to add an optronic surveillance and targeting pod, are expected to be complete in 2013. That would give the Yak-130 the ability to laser-designate its own targets, which is especially useful in counterinsurgency operations. It may also help in designating targets for TV, infrared, and laser guided versions of the Kh-38 family of short-medium range strike missiles, and Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) short-range heavy strike missile.

The next step would involve a radar capable of ground scans and targeting. This would let the plane work with radar-guided missiles like the Kh-29MP, or even heavy strike missiles like the supersonic Kh-31 (AS-17 Krypton). The VVS hasn’t requested precision strike missiles, but Popovich says that the aircraft’s inherent stability allows the plane to carry even heavy loads like the Kh-31. A Yak-130 that could fire such missiles would become a much more dangerous threat to defended targets, and greatly expand the plane’s versatility beyond counter-insurgency.

The enabling radar could come from Phazotron-NIIR (“FK-130″) or their competitor Tikhomirov-NIIP, or it could even arrive as a radar pod from St. Petersburg’s Leninetz. Irkut expects to pick a design by the end of 2012, with development continuing into 2014. Aviation Week.

July 4/12: Farnborough. The Yak-130 will fly at Farnborough 2012, as part of the Russian exhibit. It’s the 1st time the trainer has taken part in the #1 international air show. RIA Novosti.

May 21/12: No armed Yak-131. The Yak-130 can be armed, and its combination of visibility, speed, and good handling characteristics could make it an attractive light attack aircraft. There was even said to be some consideration of making it a substitute for the heavily-armored SU-25 close support jet, which may need to start some production lines to keep its upgraded variants in good shape. Unfortunately, Flight International reports that the Russian air force won’t be fielding it in that role:

“The Russian military has abandoned plans to develop a light attack aircraft based on the Yak-130, as Zelin says a prototype dubbed the Yak-131 did not demonstrate a high enough level of protection for its pilot.”

The VVS will continue to use modernized SU-25 SM close air support planes for this role, and eventually plans to order a total of 80 upgrades. They’re also talking about designing and fielding a successor aircraft to the heavily-armored SU-25 fleet, but that’s a project for 2020 at the earliest.

Jan 23/12: Syria. Russian media are reporting that Syria has signed a $550-million contract with Russia’s state-owned Rosoboronexport arms export agency, involving 36 Yak-130 trainer and light attack jets. The deal was reportedly struck in December 2011, with the Yakolev Design Bureau as the type owner, Irkut as the builder, and jets to be supplied once Syria makes a pre-payment.

That could be very useful to the Assad regime, which is receiving open Russian support against strong domestic unrest – if, and only if, the regime survives long enough to take delivery.

Neighboring Turkey has quietly but firmly placed itself on the other side of that bet, partly as a form of payback for Syria’s long support of Kurdish PKK insurgents. Russian analyst Ruslan Pukhov is correct that this situation introduces a strong element of risk for Russia, but he is less correct when he says that counterinsurgency (COIN) support is a job for cheaper planes. In terms of sellers willing to deal with Syria, the Yak-130 is the low-budget, low-risk fixed-wing COIN alternative, which also patches a potentially serious training hole that could deliver a coup de grace to the existing Syrian Air Force. See also: Russia’s RIA Novosti | Saudi Arabia’s Arab News | Israel’s Arutz Sheva | Bloomberg | CNN | Turkey’s Zaman.

Syria: 36

2010 – 2011

Big Russian order; Libya makes deal, then falls; Libyan Yaks to Kazakhstan?; Losses in Indonesia, India; Guided weapon tests; Crash stalls program for a year. Yak-130
(click to view full)

Dec 12/11: Russia. Irkut announces a big order from Russia: 55 aircraft by 2015, out of 65 Yak-130s envisaged in the current 2011-2020 armaments plans. This is a big deal for Irkut, whose customers for the last 2 decades have been export clients.

Other reports suggest that Russia may eventually place orders for as many as 300 of the planes, which can also become heavily-armed counter-insurgency and light attack planes. ITAR-TASS | Irkut Corp..

Russia: 55

Nov 8/11: JSC Irkut announces that Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief Col. Gen. Alexander Zelin has promised a contract for full production of Yak-130 trainers, during a visit to its Irkutsk aviation plant. The visit was apparently something of an inspection, and Col. Gen. Zelin is quoted as saying that (per Irkut’s translation):

“There is no problem with the fulfillment of state defense order. We understand that there is no other company that could produce Yak-130 with such level of quality. It’s encouraging that the company entered the foreign market with the product. I think IRKUT has good prospects…. Yak-130 contracting is currently being finalized. Price terms were basically approved.”

Irkut has been delivering a very limited number of Yak-130s to the VVS since February 2010, and estimates an overall market for about 250 of the aircraft by 2015. Most of those will be Russian orders, which will apparently include a new aerobatic group to fly alongside the Russian Knights’ Su-27s and the Swifts’ MiG-29s.

Autumn 2011: Russia begins guided weapon tests with the Yak-130. Source.

Sept 1/11: Yak-130. Algerian pilots training at the Irkutsk Aviation Plant’s airfield perform their 1st first solo flights, following 3 months of training and over 100 flights with Irkut crews. Irkut says they’ve also been training Algerian engineers and technicians on the Yak-130 aircraft, as Algeria prepared to induct the planes. JSC Irkut.

Aug 5/11: Kazakhstan? China Daily reports that Russia is looking to redirect Libya’s order for 6 Yak-130 trainer and light attack aircraft:

“Another deal will be for six Yak-130 light attack aircraft originally intended for Libya before the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Tripoli, cutting Moscow off from $2 billion in signed deals and another $2 billion in potential contracts. The top customer for the light attack aircraft is Kazakhstan which is trying to boost its regional clout, [CAST think-tank director] Pukhov said, citing defense industry sources.”

May 5/11: Indonesia. The Yak-130 is out of the picture, as Indonesia signs a deal with South Korea for 16 T-50i armed trainers. The Yak-130 was actually eliminated on April 12/11, when Indonesia designated the T-50 as its preferred plane.

Read “Indonesia’s New Trainer & Attack Aircraft” for full coverage.

Indonesia loss

2010: Vietnam. Sketchy reports have Vietnam signing a contract for 8 Yak-130s. Source.

Confirmation is weak. Subsequent reports talk about Vietnam considering the aircraft, but don’t make it clear whether or not the initial buy has gone through. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 doesn’t list any serving Yak-130s in the VPAF, just 26 L-39Cs in stock. Scramble’s Orbat states that “[8] Yak-130UBS trainers are expected to replace the L-39 in the 2015-2025 timeframe, although no order has been signed yet.”

Vietnam: 8???

Aug 9/10: Indonesia. Air Forces Monthly reports that Indonesia’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration has narrowed its 16 plane advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft order to the Czech Aero L-159B, South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle, and Russia’s Yak-130.

That leaves both Alenia’s M346 Master and China’s JL-9/FTC-2000 out in the cold. Interestingly, the common denominator for the 2 eliminated types is poor secondary ground attack capabilities.

July 28/10: India. BAE Systems announces a new GBP 500 million (about $773 million) order to supply India with another 57 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) aircraft, to be built under licence in India for the Indian Air Force (40) and Indian Navy (17).

It isn’t clear if their international competition really was serious. Read “Hawks Fly Away With India’s Jet Trainer v2 Competition” for more.

India loss

May 29/10: Crash. One of the Yak-130s from Russia’s initial production order for 12 (q.v. Late 2002) crashes near Lipetsk. The crew survive, but fly-by-wire system is reportedly a problem again.

The Yak-130s fleet is grounded for a year, and deliveries are suspended. Source.

Crash grounds fleet, suspends deliveries

Feb 15/10: Libya. Russia’s Yakovlev Design Bureau offers initial specifics concerning the deal with Libya. Note that the language becomes much vaguer once it moves away from Yakovlev’s jets, and an order for tanks, which suggests that the SU-30 family and air defense purchases are still under discussion:

“Tripoli signed a $1.8-billion purchase agreement that includes acquisition of six YAK-130 advanced jet trainers for delivery in 2011-12, in addition to tanks. Libya has also expressed interest in acquiring 12 Su-35s, the latest Sukhoi fighter in production; four Su-30MK2s, as well as the advanced S-300PMU2 air-defense system.”

Yak-130s can serve as advanced trainers, or light attack aircraft. Yakovlev DB via defense aerospace | VITINFO [in Vietnamese].

Jan 30/10: Libya. Reports surface that Russia has signed a $2 billion arms deal with Libya. There is no official release, and details are largely absent, except for a quote from Vladimir Putin, who said the deal was “not only for small arms and light weapons.”

The regime falls before the deal can go through. Moscow Times | CNN.

Libya: 6

1998 – 2009

From requirement to selection; Joint venture with Italy’s Aermacchi; Russia orders 12, finishes testing; Algeria orders 16; Irkut rips production from Sokol; Crash delays program for 2 years. Yak-130, early design
(click to view full)

Dec 25/09: The Yak-130 successfully completes all Russian tests under the development contract. Source.

Development testing complete

Dec 22/09: Algeria. Irkut Corporation announces in passing that “The Irkut Corporation concluded the contract with Algeria on delivery of Yak-130 and carrying out its contractual obligations.”

March 17/09: India. The Press Trust of India reports that supply delays to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which is supposed to assemble a number of the Hawks in India, have resulted in an international competition for India’s follow-on order of up to 57 Lead-In Fighter Trainers.

The RFP was reportedly sent to the Czech Republic’s Aero Vodochody (L-159), Italy’s Alenia (M-346), BAE (Hawk, but it would be a more advanced variant), Korea’s KAI (T-50s), and Russia (either the YAK-130 variant of the M346 joint project, or the MiG AT). PTI News | Indian Express | Flight International.

2008: Irkut manages to lobby all Yak-130 production into its facilities. They were originally slated to produce the export versions, while Sokol in Nizhniy Novgorod was supposed to make the Russian planes. The move ends Sokol’s production after just 16 units, including prototypes. Source.

Irkut-only

June 26/06: The 3rd Yak-130 prototype off the line is lost in a crash at the Zhukovskiy airfield, and the causes are traced to the fly-by-wire system’s software. Nobody is killed.

Work to correct the problem reportedly delays the program by almost 2 years. The 4th prototype doesn’t fly until mid-2008. Source.

Crash delays program

March 14/06: Algeria. Russia and Algeria sign a deal that includes 16 Yak-130s, for a total of $200 million. That number of planes is later confirmed by Air International News at Farnborough in July 2006. Moscow Defense Brief added that there’s an option for 14-16 more Yak-130 trainers.

The Yak-130s will complement/ replace Algeria’s older L-39 ZA Albatros aircraft from Czechoslovakia.

Algeria: 16

May 30/04: First Yak-130 production prototype is rolled out at the Sokol plant. Source.

Late 2002: Initial Russian contract for 12 Yak-130s. Source.

Russia: 12

April 10/02: Russia officially picks the Yak-130 over the MiG-AT as its future trainer, following a flyoff. The Yak’s more polished engine design is reportedly a factor in its selection.

Under the contract, the Yak-130 was supposed to reach completed state testing by 2006. It actually takes until Dec 25/09. Source.

Russia picks Yak-130

April 25/96: 1st flight of a Yak-130D prototype. Source.

October 1993: Yakolev signs an agreement with Italy’s Aermacchi to jointly develop the Yak/AEM-130 advanced trainer. The Soviet Union has collapsed by this point, and defense funding is in a deep freeze, so Italian financing becomes critical to the program. Source.

JV with Alenia

1988: The Soviet Air Force announces a competition for a future trainer jet to replace the (Czech) Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatros.

Yakolev’s design faced off against RAC MiG’s MiG-AT, Sukhoi’s S-54, and the Myasishchev bureau’s M-200. The S-54 and M-200 are eliminated in the 1st downselect. Source.

Additional Readings

A.S. Yakolev Design Bureau – Yak-130
Airforce Technology – Yak-130 Combat Trainer, Russian Federation
Moscow Defence Brief (#3, 2012) – Yak-130: New Russia’s Most Successful Aircraft. It adds: “Another “blood relative” of the Yak 130 is the Chinese L-15 trainer developed by Hongdu Aviation Industries Group. The Yakovlev design bureau helped the Chinese with the design; as a result the L-15 is essentially a version of the Yak 130. The aircraft also uses the Ukrainian-made AI 222 25 engines.”
AIN (Dec 7/12) – L-15, Yak-130 Jet Trainers Compete for Asian Buyers
News.MN – Report [in Mongolian]. Reportedly involves a limited Yak-130 purchase, but DID cannot translate it.

Key Competitors

BAE – Hawk Advanced Jet Training System. The world’s leading in-production jet trainer.
Wikipedia – BAE Systems Hawk. Shows the full breadth of the Hawk family.
Airforce Technology – JL-9 (JianLian-9 ) Trainer / Light Attack Aircraft, China. Derived at long remove from the JJ-7 MiG-21 trainer.
Airforce Technology – Hongdu L-15 Supersonic Trainer / Attack Aircraft, China.
Sinodefence – L-15 Advanced Jet Trainer. N.B. Not certain how a plane with a very similar design to the Yak-130, the same engines, and a slightly heavier takeoff weight is supposed to be so much faster, and hit Mach 1.4.
DID – Czech L-159s: Cheap to Good Home
DID FOCUS – Finmeccanica’s M-346 AJT: Who’s the Master Now?
DID FOCUS – Korea’s T-50 Family Spreads Its Wings

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