Ideas on Europe Blog

“Taking back control” from an anti-democratic EU is a central theme of the “leave campaign”. Even some of those advocating “stay” concede the EU needed to “reform” to become more democratic and accountable.

This response is puzzling given the existing opportunities to influence EU as well as critics’ vagueness and disagreement about how a more democratic EU should look like. The focus on allegedly undemocratic Brussels institutions misses that most of the problems as well as solutions to democracy can be found closer to home.

The most obvious way in which citizens can influence the EU is through the election of the Westminster parliament. Any transfer or sharing of new competences with the EU had to be agreed by national parliaments and the House of Commons has ratified each Treaty change since 1973 with solid majorities. Supranational law and its interpretation to the European Court of Justice only takes effect because this is what the people’s elected representatives legislated for.

Major changes to the EU such as Enlargement have been strongly advocated by successive British governments, whilst they have also blocked in the past more wide-ranging proposals for direct democracy fearing that more legitimacy for EU bodies will give them also greater power. National ministers appointed through general elections wield significant power over day-to-day legislation in the Council of Ministers and, for strategic direction, the European Council.

The UK retains exclusive competence in the areas most sensitive to UK citizens such as taxation, pensions, health, policing and remains exempt from legislation associated with the Schengen free-border or the Eurozone. The UK has consolidated its status as Eurozone outsider with guarantees that it will not be discriminated against, does not need to contribute to any bailouts and can keep its own financial supervision.

The previous government’s extensive audit of EU’s competences involving business and civil society was broadly supportive of the current distribution. It is true that the UK does not always have its way, but as my LSE colleagues have shown, British governments have voted in 97 percent of cases with the majority in the period 2004-2009 and 87 percent in 2009-2015 in the Council.

Hence, it is somewhat meaningless to measure which proportion of UK laws emanate from the EU. The widely cited study of the House of Common’s library arrived at figures of 6.8% for primary legislation and 14.1% for secondary legislation. Even these figures overestimate EU influence as the ‘degree of involvement varied from passing reference to explicit implementation’.

The second democratic channels are the elections to the European Parliament (EP). Not only has the EP acquired real power to block or change legislation in most policy areas, for instance, its rejection of the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

The EP has also increasing powers over the European Commission as a hybrid body combining the powers of a regulator with more political functions of proposing new legislation. The first function relies on having appropriate expertise and is typically-shielded from undue political influence in most countries. The second function no doubt requires political accountability and democratic responsiveness and the primary body to do this is the European Parliament.

In 1999, the EP brought about the resignation of the Santer-Commission after a transnational network of investigative journalists exposed cases of corruption and wrong-doing. This case also illustrated vividly that national-based media can hold supranational institutions to account and that pan-European debates are possible.

At the 2014 elections, the major European party groupings, Socialists and Democrats and the European People’s Party (EPP) campaigned with lead candidates for Commission president after a change in the Lisbon Treaty allowed for this personalisation. When the EPP emerged as the winner on a decent turnout of 42.6 percent, its candidate Jean-Claude Juncker became President against the opposition of the UK and Hungary.

The reason why this outcome appeared as a surprise to British voters in contrast to those of other countries was because Labour and Conservatives had pretended that the Treaty change was meaningless and most British media uncritically bought this line and thus gave the candidates hardly any publicity in contrast to, for instance, Germany as the LSE’s Simon Hix showed. Given this precedent, it is likely that next time more citizens will vote in European elections according to the candidates and policies on offer, not the popularity of the domestic government.

The last avenue of influence is the Citizens Initiative which obliges the European Commission to consider new legislation on a particular issue as long as it is backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of the 28 member states. Even though if it does not force the Commission to actually legislate, it is a powerful tool to put issues on the agenda.

Given the diversity of national systems and cultures, there is no ready-made blue-print available for democracy above the nation-state. The greatest potential lies not in protracted constitutional reforms involving governments with little interests to cede power, but in changing everyday democratic practice within and across member states.

There needs to be greater scrutiny of ministers’ actions in Brussels by the media to prevent them getting away with ‘saying one thing in Brussels, and another thing to the domestic audience’ (Boris Johnson). It has been argued that the House of Common’s scrutiny of European affairs has been weak and many MPs have lacked the motivation to invest time in this role as they feel this was not going be sufficiently visible in the media and appreciated by constituencies.

The media should also report more extensively and accurately about who takes what decisions with which consequences in the EU. And civil society organisations and citizens could use more fully the existing opportunities to influence the direction of the EU and campaign for the changes they want, both at home, and with citizens in other countries. A more democratic EU starts at home, but cannot stop there.

Christoph Meyer is Professor of European & International Politics, King’s College London

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Ahead of the University of Edinburgh’s free online course Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum and one month before the referendum, here are five things you need to know about the Brexit debate:

European Flag, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

1. We’ve been here before

In 1975, the UK held its first-ever nationwide referendum on whether to stay in the European Economic Community (the precursor to the EU). The result was a two-thirds majority in favour of remaining in the Common Market. That said, it’s very unusual for a country to hold a vote directly on the question of EU membership. Most past referendums on the EU in member states have been about ratifying new treaties.

2. The UK’s not so different

Over the years, the difficult relationship between the UK and the EU has become legendary. For instance, it has opt-outs from a number of European policies, like the euro or borderless travel (Schengen). This reputation can sometimes give the impression that the UK is particularly alone or different. However, that’s not really the case. In reality, every member has its own issues with the EU – some are just more obvious than others.

3. Global interest is high

Although the referendum will be decided by UK voters, many countries, along with companies and organisations around the world, have a substantial interest in the outcome. For this reason, a number have broken with the convention of not engaging in a country’s internal debates and have expressed their views on the UK’s EU membership. However, it’s not clear what impact these interventions actually have on public opinion.

4. The facts? It’s not as easy as that

The EU can be quite complicated and the referendum debate has featured topics such as the economy, migration, security and democracy. Many people will be looking for information before the vote. However, most of the questions around these issues come down to personal opinion, rather than factual answers. While facts and evidence do naturally exist, they can only inform. In the end, voters will have to make up their own minds on whether EU membership is worthwhile or not.

5. The referendum won’t end the debate

This June’s vote is just the latest landmark in the UK’s history with the European Union. Whatever the outcome on 23 June, the referendum won’t settle the issue. If the result is to leave, the negotiations that follow will focus on what kind of relationship the UK will have with the EU going forward. If the result is to remain, the debate on EU membership will continue and calls for a second referendum will likely materialise. Either way, the saga will carry on.

Find out more – join the free online course: 
Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum

This article was originally published on the FutureLearn blog.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/22

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Five Things You Need to Know About Brexit’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 24 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/22

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The EU debate is a minefield, with half-truths and whole-lies coming from both camps. The reason for this, as I understand it, is twofold. Firstly, it is impossible to know what will happen in the event that the UK leaves the EU, or indeed what will happen in five, ten or fifty years’ time if we vote to stay on 23 June. Ergo, objective fact is largely off the table from the get-go. Secondly, the notion of ‘truth’ is tricky in ideological discussions. I recently saw Peter Hitchins make a brief intervention on the EU debate and was struck by his point that the signatories of the Irish Proclamation did not stand on the steps of the General Post Office with a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the impact on the economic forecasts and trade balance of the country. They held an ideological belief and made an impassioned political decision. By the same measure, the reason that ‘facts’ aren’t working as well in this referendum debate as some (myself included) might like, is because it is not a decision that can be based solely on fact. Moreover, in most cases, there genuinely are (at least) two answers to the question at hand. Untangling the accumulation of myths, misnomers and soundbites which permeate the referendum narrative is a job for someone more intelligent (not to mention more patient) than myself. However, in the spirit of ‘have blog, will air musings’, I draw attention here to one incident which has stuck in my mind (and which I noted down at the time) as emblematic of the problem with the EU referendum campaign.

On 3 March, BBC Radio 4’s Today programme conducted an interview with Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin, a member of the board of the Vote Leave campaign. Today presenter Mishal Husain put to Mr Jenkin that Sir Peter Ricketts, a recently-retired former ambassador, has raised concerns that if Britain were to leave the EU, France might cease to conduct border checks on those seeking entrance to the UK. Unusually for an MP on the Today programme, Mr Jenkin went on to directly address Sir Ricketts’ point with an equally valid counter-argument, but before he did, he made the following remarks:

‘Find me a diplomat that’s anti-EU…one of the reasons we’re in the mess we’re in is because we have diplomats who have religiously and slavishly pursued the European integration policy…they all have a certain view…it’s interesting, as soon as they retire they turn out to have this very pro-European view. I’m afraid I think it rather discredits the idea that we’ve got an impartial diplomatic service.’

In the interest of brevity, I will side-step the wealth of nonsense which Mr Jenkin managed to pack around his perfectly reasonable point that the French government is a rational and responsible body and is unlikely to severe all agreements with the UK overnight should we vote to leave. I will also by-pass the irony that I agreed with this central point, and yet he managed to present it and its contribution to his broader position in a way that was so infuriatingly exaggerated, misleading and childish that, in the end, it served only to convince me that I don’t want to be on any team that he is a part of. Instead, I draw attention to Mr Jenkin’s utterly bizarre string of logic which led him to conclude that, since British diplomats are commonly pro-EU, they must have been harbouring this dirty secret for many years and are somehow damaging British interests with their partiality.

I don’t have much difficulty accepting the premise of Mr Jenkin’s concern – it seems quite likely that many British diplomats (and, I imagine, diplomats from most other member states too) are pro-EU. What I find confusing is why he thinks that this is an innate characteristic, a preference which exists and pre-existed in British diplomats independent of their professional or personal experience, as if he suspects that they all went to a secret boarding school where they were drilled in the values of ‘ever closer union’ and prepared for infiltration into the UK’s diplomatic corps, only revealing their true, traitorous identities upon retirement. To my mind, the trend that Mr Jenkin identifies can best, if not only, be interpreted as follows: British diplomats (to accept Mr Jenkin’s premise that they all hold the same view as Sir Ricketts), having spent many years living in and working with the EU, have reached the conclusion that it is a project worthy of our support and participation. Possessing what is probably the most direct experience and expertise in the matter that it is possible to have, British diplomats consider the UK’s membership of the EU to be highly valuable and have chosen to voice this view in the context of the referendum campaign. Essentially, an expert group has presented its arguments for why the UK should vote ‘remain’.

This is an example of precisely the kind of rational contribution which should be being made in the referendum campaign. The view of Sir Ricketts and his colleagues, in light of their experience and expertise, carries value and voters should be exposed to it. This is not to say that it is wholly objective, of course it is not. British diplomats have particular experiences and, to that extent, their position is unavoidably biased. Furthermore, it would be impossible for me to say that I am certain that the argument they put forward is nothing but the unequivocal truth. These things are, incidentally, also true of any view aired by Mr Jenkin and his colleagues in the Vote Leave campaign, by those in the ‘remain’ camp, or by anyone else. However, by making his background known and ‘presenting his credentials’ to the British public, Sir Ricketts has made a valuable contribution which they can scrutinise and evaluate in the forming of their own judgements. Perhaps, rather than it being pro-EU campaigners who ‘lack confidence in this country’, as Mr Jenkin asserted later in his interview, it is those (on both sides of the issue) who exploit the inherently ideological nature of the referendum debate by framing informed opinion as inherent bias who lack confidence in British voters to decide for themselves.

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Having finally submitted my thesis and in light of the impending referendum, I digress in this post from health governance – please excuse the misleading platform.

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The UK’s referendum on EU membership is now firmly on the horizon. Referendum Day – 23 June – could well be remembered as a landmark in the UK’s relations with the rest of the world, as well as for its own constitutional settlement.

EU Grunge Flag, Nicolas Raymond, CC-BY-2.0

Campaigning has been in full swing for a number of weeks, with a plethora of claims and counterclaims from all sides on issues ranging from the economy and migration to democracy and sovereignty. Depending on the perspective, the debate has been characterised by too much information, too little, or perhaps not enough of the right kind. Many are looking for a clear explanation of the facts and an informed analysis of what’s going on.

In truth, the EU referendum has brought about a different kind of political debate in the UK. The European Union is a particularly complicated organisation, even to those of us who study it every day. Although important and worthwhile, it can be a real challenge to discuss each of the many policy areas connected with the EU in an informed and meaningful way.

In that sense, the referendum has produced a national conversation on a set of international (and often rather technical) issues. This reality makes it more difficult to have a thorough debate. It also risks demotivating those who are interested in the referendum but find the whole affair excessively complex.

This process is also a novelty for the EU. It is not the first time a country has seriously considered leaving – that was, of course, also the UK, with the 1975 Common Market Referendum (in which over two-thirds voted to stay). Nevertheless, it is out of the ordinary for a country to unilaterally seek a renegotiation of its own terms of EU membership, and then hold a referendum specifically on the question of staying in or leaving the EU.

More broadly, uncertainty has been a central feature of the debate. This is a consequence of the lack of precedent – no Member State has ever withdrawn from the EU – and the volume of issues that would need to be addressed in the event of exit. It is also a reflection of the bargaining and compromise-driven nature of the EU. Many of the questions to be answered would be decided by political leaders as they went along. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the variables at play.

Even if the UK stays, the EU will not be the same. The renegotiation would be implemented, which, if relatively limited in its reach, could still set the trend for a whole new kind of differentiation between how countries work in the EU. Beyond that, the EU is faced with a host of major challenges, each of which is and will continue to put pressure on it to adapt. This impetus may necessitate decisions on how far countries are willing to integrate.

Many are in search of facts and analysis on the EU referendum. To that end, the University of Edinburgh, in partnership with FutureLearn, is offering a free online course: Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum.

This three-week course, run by experts in the field, guides participants through the referendum – before and after the vote.

In the first two weeks, we look at the how the UK ended up having a referendum on EU membership, the campaign issues, public opinion and alternatives to being in the EU. In the final week, we reflect on the result and what it means for the UK and the rest of Europe. The course also serves as a forum to discuss the referendum as it happens with participants from around the world. It features resources to learn more about the issues and includes the opportunity to put questions to experts each week.

Whatever the result, the referendum will change the UK, and the EU as well. Join us as we explore one of the biggest decisions facing the UK in a generation: to remain in or to leave the European Union.

Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum, the free and open online course with Anthony Salamone, Laura Cram and Charlie Jeffery, begins on FutureLearn on 13 June 2016. The course is also on Twitter @EUrefMOOC and with the hashtag #EdinEUref.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/21

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 23 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/21

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The approaching referendum on the UK’s EU membership is set to be historic, whatever its outcome. It will either be only the second time in European history that the people of a Member State has specifically endorsed continued membership (the first also being the UK with the 1975 Common Market Referendum), or the first time such a people has explicitly opted to end membership.

Plenary Session in Strasbourg – Jan 2016, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

It is abundantly clear that either result would have implications for both the UK and the rest of the EU. However, knowable specifics are in short supply. This is particularly so for the option of exit from the EU, as it would by its very nature change the status quo. The high levels of uncertainty surrounding the consequences of the referendum options is partly a function of genuine unknowns of what would happen next and partly a product of the various objectives of the different campaigns.

One certainty is that this referendum will not settle the question of the UK’s relationship with the EU. In fact, it is quite likely that another EU referendum will take place in the UK in the short-to-medium term.

If the UK votes to leave the EU, the UK government will at some point afterwards notify the EU of its intent to withdraw and a process of negotiation will begin. The procedure is outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. However, the guidelines are relatively broad and leave a wide margin of manoeuvre for the negotiating parties to find an agreement on the shape of UK-EU relations. One point of clarity is that the negotiations can last up to two years – unless an extension is agreed by all parties – else the UK will automatically withdraw from the EU with no agreement.

As with many aspects of the post-vote, we cannot say how long negotiations would take (particularly if extended), what they would focus on or what the outcome would be. Consequently, the substance of an agreement could vary significantly, dependent upon the demands of the remaining EU Member States and the expectations of the (possibly reshuffled) UK government.

Separate from treaty ratification requirements, any UK-EU agreement will need to be legitimated at home in some way. Another referendum is a plausible option, for two principal reasons. First, the current referendum consults on membership, and not on alternatives to membership. The people will give an answer only on whether they wish to stay in or leave the EU, not what kind of relationship they would want in the event of exit.

Second, the shape of that relationship upon exit could vary so widely that it might necessitate the consent of the people. For instance, if significant numbers vote to leave because they want to limit EU migration to the UK, and the subsequent agreement continues to allow the free movement of people (as part of maintaining access to the single market), how could that be politically sustainable? Conversely, if the agreement takes away features of EU membership which people would prefer to retain, that could also create difficulties.

If the UK votes to stay in the EU, the question of EU membership will undoubtedly persist. With the recent precedent of holding a referendum on the issue, it will become easier to argue for a similar vote in future. Political motivations, from internal party politics to the impact of the fringe on the mainstream, could generate momentum for another referendum. It could well become a question of when rather than if the next referendum will be held.

Moreover, the UK government is obliged under the European Union Act 2011 to hold a referendum if it proposes a substantial further transfer of power to the EU. While EU treaty change is not an imminent prospect, it will happen at some point in the medium term, and it is possible that a referendum on the treaty would have to be held in the UK. Although such a vote would not be an explicit decision on staying or leaving, the result would nevertheless serve as an indirect judgement of the UK’s EU relationship.

All of these possibilities point to the prospect of another EU referendum in the UK in the foreseeable future. For a country not in the tradition of holding many (nationwide) referendums, the UK may well become more accustomed to them. Their success as a means of regulating the UK-EU relationship will depend on the turnout in the votes, how the results are interpreted and acted upon and whether they are deemed to ‘solve’ the questions that they ask.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘This June’s EU Referendum is Unlikely to be the UK’s Last’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 22 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/20

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Have you ever noticed how you never see Cameron and Flynn in the same place at the same time?

After what feels like a lifetime, we move into the final weeks of this EU referendum campaign. A quick peek at the calendar only gives us five weeks until the vote and all the talk of long campaigns and attention deficits feels pushed to one side, as we flip into rushes for the line, tales of thousands of miles covered and last minute surprises.

I exaggerate. But only a bit.

So far, the real mark of the referendum has been how predictable it has been. Neither side has produced a killer argument, neither side has given any hostages to fortune that weren’t already out there. Even this week’s excursus into “EU as fourth Reich” by Boris was notable more for having taken so long to come out than for its content: I recall Nigel Lawson saying something similar back in February and no-one really noticed/cared.

It’s not that no one’s tiring to make the debate come to life. Remain, in particular, have thrown a lot at the debate, from Obama to the IMF, with a cavalcade of foreign leaders and experts bringing their gravitas and research to present a pretty robust economic case.

However, like the famous Crimean engagement, it’s magnificent, but it’s not effective, or at least as far as the polling goes. Admittedly, there’s obviously some issue around polling, which effectively places everyone in a state of profound uncertainty about who’s where. Given that uncertainty, fighting as if you still had everything to play for makes sense.

Leave appear to be taking the path of keeping back on the big guns, assuming they have them to produce. If public opinion is hard to measure because few people are really engaged, then it makes sense to wait until it’s more pressing and engaging. Of course, this might be as good as it gets, in which case the last-mover advantage is weaker. Our work on social media campaigning suggests that if there is an uptick of interest it has been small so far.

If there is a dog that has yet to bark very loudly, then it’s immigration. Vote Leave, in particular, has not been willing to go too far down that route, but there is both opportunity and incentive, given the persistently high levels of public interest in the issue. Seen in this light, Turkey might find itself been encouraged not to pull the plug on the refugee deal just yet.

Whether things will change gear in these last weeks remains unclear. Part of the problem is that the arguments are all very well-rehearsed, so finding lines that cut through and engage is very difficult. Even Cameron’s ‘security’ framing has fallen to the wayside somewhat, despite the potential it displayed.

In addition, the scope for external events to play in the debate looks to be limited. Should the Turkey deal fall apart, it will still take some time for volume of refugees and migrants crossing to Greece to reach last summer’s levels. The postponing of any major EU policy initiative, and of most of the British government’s work, also takes some of the potential for heat. The apparent resolution of the doctors’ strike is a symptom of this wind-down, and part of the reason others are looking to make advantage in the next month.

However, while this might play to Remain’s advantage, there is a sting in the tail. Turnout looks to be a crucial factor, as Leavers are much more enthused about the referendum. If the government and Remain draw too much of the life from the debate – to avoid annoying people – then they might find they still lose. Moreover, Leave have every incentive to help them make this happen. Difficult choices all round.

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Τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η Κύπρος έγινε το τέταρτο από τα πέντε Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν οικονομική βοήθεια από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο (ΔΝΤ). Ολοκλήρωσε το πρόγραμμα του με το ΔΝΤ την 7η Μαρτίου και με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης (ΕΜΣ) την 31η Μαρτίου. Αυτό παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως ‘έξοδος από τα Μνημόνια’. Είναι όμως πραγματικά έτσι; Τι σημαίνει η ολοκλήρωση ενός προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας με την ΕΕ και το ΔΝΤ, και πότε επέρχεται η πραγματική έξοδος από το Μνημόνιο;

Τα προγράμματα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ αποτελούνται από δύο μέρη: (1) την δανειακή σύμβαση ή σύμβαση διευκόλυνσης, και (2) τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις υπό τον όρο ικανοποίησης των οποίων απελευθερώνονται οι δόσεις της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις αυτές περιλαμβάνονται στα διαβόητα πλέον Μνημόνια (Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs), τα οποία συνάπτονται μεταξύ του Κράτους-Μέλους που επωφελείται της οικονομικής βοήθειας, του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής (εκπροσωπώντας τον ΕΜΣ, μέλη του οποίου είναι τα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης). Η αξιολόγηση τήρησης των όρων του  Μνημονίου διεξάγεται από την λεγόμενη ‘Τρόικα’: Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα (ΕΚΤ) και ΔΝΤ.

Η εκτενής δυνατότητα της Τρόικα να επηρεάζει σχεδόν άμεσα ένα μεγάλο εύρος πολιτικών των Κρατών-Μελών υπό οικονομική βοήθεια, πολλές από τις οποίες θεωρούνται καίριες για ένα κράτος (π.χ. προϋπολογισμός, φορολογία, κλπ), όπως και η σημαντικά μειωμένη συμμετοχή αντιπροσωπευτικών θεσμών (π.χ. εθνικό Κοινοβούλιο),  έχουν εγείρει  ανησυχίες σχετικά με την επίπτωση της διαδικασίας αυτής στις αρχές και σωστή λειτουργία της δημοκρατίας. Η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως η πολύ-αναμενόμενη λύση των ανωτέρω προβλημάτων και η επαναφορά της κανονικότητας και ορθής λειτουργίας των δημοκρατικών διαδικασιών. Στην πραγματικότητα, όμως, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος δεν συνεπάγεται και έξοδο από τα Μνημόνια.

Όσον αφορά στο ΔΝΤ, μετά την λήξη του προγράμματος και εάν το επωφελούμενο κράτος χρωστάει περισσότερο από το ποσό βοήθειας που αντιστοιχεί στο 100% της ποσόστωσης του στο ΔΝΤ (ή εάν κριθεί αναγκαίο από το ΔΝΤ ανεξαρτήτως του οφειλόμενου ποσού), άρχεται η διαδικασία παρακολούθησης μετά το πρόγραμμα – το λεγόμενο Post-Programme Monitoring (PPM). Η διαδικασία περιλαμβάνει την παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών του επωφελούμενου κράτους, ώστε να  εντοπιστούν αυτές που θα έθεταν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα και πρόοδο του κράτους και, κατ’ επέκταση, την αποπληρωμή του ΔΝΤ. Το PPM διεξάγεται δύο φορές το χρόνο.

Όσον αφορά στην ΕΕ, έχει δημιουργηθεί μία παρόμοια διαδικασία παρακολούθησης, με την ονομασία Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS), σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 14 του Κανονισμού 472/2013. Η διαδικασία εφαρμόζεται μετά την ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας ενός Κράτους-Μέλους της Ευρωζώνης και έως ότου εξοφληθεί το 75% της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας που έχει ληφθεί (είτε από τον τωρινό και μόνιμο ΕΜΣ, είτε από προηγούμενους μηχανισμούς οικονομικής βοήθειας που είχαν συσταθεί παλαιότερα). Σύμφωνα με την διαδικασία του PPS, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ διενεργούν τακτικές αποστολές και επιθεωρήσεις στο Κράτος-Μέλος, για να εκτιμήσουν την οικονομική κατάσταση του. Σε περίπτωση διαπίστωσης πολιτικών που θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα, και συνεπώς την δυνατότητα αποπληρωμής της βοήθειας που έχει χορηγηθεί, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ συντάσσουν έκθεση σχετικά με τα διορθωτικά μέτρα που το Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών της ΕΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να ζητήσει να θεσπιστούν απο το Κράτος-Μέλος προς διόρθωση των αποκλίσεων. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η διαδικασία ψηφοφορίας της ανωτέρω έκθεσης στο Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών είναι η αντίστροφη ειδική πλειοψηφία ή Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV). Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η έκθεση της Επιτροπής θεωρείται ότι έχει εγκριθεί, εκτός εάν σχηματιστεί πλειοψηφία καταψήφισης της – δηλαδή είναι εύκολο η έκθεση να υιοθετεί και πιο δύσκολο να απορριφθεί.

Στην ουσία λοιπόν, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος, η οποία παρουσιάζεται συχνά και ως το τέλος των Μνημονίων, αφορά ουσιαστικά μόνο στην ικανότητα του επωφελούμενου Κράτους-Μέλους να δανειστεί από τις αγορές. Το μέρος του προγράμματος που αφορά στην παρακολούθηση πολιτικών του Κράτους-Μέλους παραμένει για ένα σημαντικό χρονικό διάστημα μετά τη λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Το ίδιο παραμένει και η επιτήρηση της Τρόικα.

Ως εκ τούτου, είναι πολύ σαφές ότι η Κύπρος είναι μακριά από την πραγματική έξοδο της από το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, όπως και τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν σχετική βοήθεια. Η Κύπρος είναι σε θέση να εξασφαλίσει οικονομικούς πόρους από τις αγορές και δεν λαμβάνει πλέον οικονομική βοήθεια. Παρά ταύτα, η επιτήρηση και αξιολόγηση των πολιτικών, ήτοι, επί της ουσίας το Μνημόνιο, θα παραμείνουν τουλάχιστον μέχρι το 2029 για την ΕΕ, δηλαδή 13 χρόνια μετά την λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας και, για το ΔΝΤ, έως ότου εξοφλήσει περισσότερα από €820 εκατομμύρια.

Οι δημοκρατικές επιπτώσεις των ανωτέρω είναι σημαντικές. Μέσω της διαδικασίας οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, η Κύπρος θα είναι υπό στενή παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών της επί τη ουσίας για σχεδόν 20 έτη. Και αυτό, δεδομένης της περιορισμένης οικονομικής βοήθειας που έλαβε η Κύπρος σε σύγκριση με άλλα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης, όπως π.χ. η Ελλάδα. Για τα κράτη αυτά, η περίοδος επιτήρησης των πολιτικών, ήτοι του Μνημονίου, θα είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη.

The post Πότε μία χώρα “βγαίνει από το Μνημόνιο” ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Political myths are a particular kind of narrative used to shape the legitimacy of a political system, writes Jeremy F. G. Moulton. He argues that, despite the difference between the academic and common usages of ‘myth’, political myth theory can generate important insights for political authority, and that it may prove useful in understanding questions around the EU’s legitimacy.

Flag of the European Union – Berlin 2012, Thomas Quine, CC-BY-2.0

Last week, I presented a paper at the 2016 UACES Student Forum Conference at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. The paper focused on EU climate action and its interpretation as political myth; that is, a story that is used to explain and justify political authority.

Like most in academia, I like to flatter myself that my chosen field of study is both interesting and important – the reaction from the other attendees at the conference at least gave me reason to believe that the former may well be true. The discussion following my presentation revealed that political myth is a subject that has the potential to be of great interest and to promote spirited discussion, but it also showed that, as of yet, it has a limited readership.

This did not come as a great surprise. Within the academic writing on political myth theory, it has been recognised that sparse attention is paid to the matter. Yet, there is reason to argue that this should be (and is) changing. Since JCMS’s special issue on the subject in the EU in early 2010, more overt attention has been given to the European project’s political myths. But misconceptions about what political myth is remain prevalent.

What a Political Myth Is

Political myths are narratives that become central to a polity’s, or other political authority’s, raison d’être. They are used both by those in political authority and the wider population in order to legitimate that political authority. A political myth is a story that must be widely accepted as true, though its veracity is not the central issue. In fact, the truth behind a myth may well be questionable. What matters is the dominant belief and acceptance of the story.

I think political myths are best understood as developing in four stages (an approach I’ve adapted from the work of Della Sala 2010 and Bouchard 2013).

1. Initial framing – in this stage, a potential myth is framed as a narrative – one would imagine by those acting within or in favour of a given polity or political authority.
2. Diffusion – here the narrative is told and spread. Two distinct roles emerge: storytellers and listeners. For a potential myth to be successful, initial listeners must become storytellers and further diffuse the story. According to Della Sala, aside from political actors, initial storytellers are likely to be ‘cultural elites, public intellectuals and academics’.
3. Ritualisation – in this stage, a narrative becomes part of normal life, it is widely accepted as fact and becomes a basis of political, social, cultural and collective action.
4. Sacralisation – in this final stage, the narrative becomes a central part of a polity’s mode of being and the two become inextricably linked.

There are a number of ways to classify and differentiate political myths, but one set, that of foundational and functional myths, is especially useful in relation to the EU.

Foundational myths are the stories that relate to the how and why of a polity’s formation. In the EU, foundational myths are of European peace, necessitated by two World Wars originating in Europe, and that of a united Europe being a prosperous Europe.

Functional myths are those that are used to justify a polity’s political authority and existence based on the functional benefits the polity provides. Of special interest to me is that of EU climate action, but other functional political myths in the EU include the EU as a sui generis international actor, as a protector of fundamental rights and as the Single Market and source of competitiveness.

What a Political Myth Isn’t

One of the queries that arose from the presentation of my paper was whether political myths were not simply narratives. In the political myth literature, one finds many references to narratives. Some who write on narratives also find it useful to conflate the two (e.g. Manners and Murray 2016).

However, there is an important analytical distinction between them. Political myths can be understood as extensions of narratives. One can state that a truly successful narrative is one that becomes a political myth – as Della Sala writes ‘political myths are sacred narratives’ – that is, narratives that have progressed through the stages of mythification to the point of become sacralised.

The central difficulty with political myth is the terminology. ‘Myth’ is a term that has such a clear definition in the vernacular that, without background reading on political myth theory, one naturally approaches the term thinking it denotes a fiction. This is something that Flood has written on, saying:

Studies of myth almost invariably open with the caveat that the reader should not confuse the popular, pejorative term myth as a synonym for falsehood, distortion, or delusion with the scholarly usage which stresses that myths have unquestioned validity within the belief systems of the social groups which cherish them.

I would temper Flood’s certainty that the scholarly term identifies narratives of ‘unquestioned validity’ with the addition of ‘largely’, as every story has its disbelievers. With that aside, the quote from Flood necessarily establishes the two separate uses of the term.

Whilst it might appear desirable to create a new, academic term for ‘myth’ that steers away from any confusion, I would maintain that this is not the best course. It would mean, at least, partial divorce from the rich body of political myth literature that exists to date and would represent something of a disruption to the field and its theoretical development.

Instead, in academic texts, the term should be defined clearly, with the alternative meaning addressed. In less academic, more public-facing discussions of the subject, I would suggest that alternatively terminology is used. Perhaps Della Sala’s ‘sacred narratives’ would be suitable.

Myths and the European Union

The future of the EU is dependent on the Union finding narratives that resonate with European citizens to the point of becoming sacralised. It should be remembered that political myths can be used to both bolster the legitimacy of a polity and undermine it. As Aning and Nsiah have written, if leaders fail to provide a new myth, then ‘any passionate fringe group will fashion a political myth – positive or negative – for the state’.

In the context of EU crisis and raised levels of Euroscepticism, I believe that political myth theory allows for EU scholars to ask important questions on European unity and can provide insight into possible pathways for the future of a unified Europe.

Academics have a role to play in the establishment, diffusion and interpretation of these potential myths. For example, scholarly investigations into the negative myths that have developed around the EU, such as the democratic deficit, would make fascinating additions to a field which has largely focused on positive myths to date. I certainly look forward to the development of the field in the coming years, and hope to see others sharing my enthusiasm for it.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Jeremy F. G. Moulton | @JFMoulton
University of Hull

Jeremy F. G. Moulton is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Hull. His research focuses on EU climate action, political myth and multi-level governance.

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On March 2016, Cyprus became the fourth out of the five Eurozone Member States under European Union (EU) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to end its program – a so called ‘exit’ (IMF on the 7th). Despite appearances and terminology, however, this is actually not a whole-out, true program exit. What does it really mean to end an EU-IMF program, and is it really an ‘exit’?

Cyprus requested financial assistance on 25th of June 2012.  The request came amid growing problems within the Cypriot banking sector, primarily due to its exposure to Greek debt and Private Sector Involvement (PSI) Greek bond ‘haircut’ process. However, the program was entered into almost a year after (29th of April 2013), on account of differences that arose during the negotiations between the Troika and the Cypriot government. Because of the prolonged negotiating period and the consequent increasing flight of capital from Cypriot banks, a bank holiday was imposed for almost two weeks and ensuing capital controls continued for two years until April 2015. Cyprus borrowed a total of up to €10 bln from the EU-IMF financial assistance: €9 bln from ESM and €1 bln from IMF (equal to 563 per cent of Cyprus’ IMF quota).

What of the process of EU-IMF financial assistance? The financial assistance program consists of two parts: (1) the financial assistance or loan agreement, and (2) the policy adjustment that this assistance is conditional upon, outlined in the now infamous Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). This policy conditionality is monitored by the so-called Troika: The European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. The MoUs, as well as the intrusive monitoring capacity that the Troika has in the Member States under this policy conditionality framework that cover an extensive amount of policies that are key to a State (e.g. budget or taxation), have raised concerns in terms of the democratic process. The end of the program is often portrayed as the long awaited remedy and redemption of democratic process. But is this really the case?

The process of ending a financial assistance program is similar for the EU and the IMF. For the IMF, after the program concludes, and provided that the State concerned owes more than the amount of the assistance equivalent to 100 per cent of its IMF quota (or should it be deemed necessary by the IMF regardless of the amount owed), the process of Post-Program Monitoring (PPM) is initiated. The process was introduced in 2000 and is provisioned under the IMF’s operating principles. PPM aims at ensuring that the State concerned returns the amount owed to the IMF regularly and on time, by monitoring policies and circumstances of that State in order to identify and address risks that could jeopardize its progress to external viability and thus impair repayment of the IMF.  PPM is conducted normally twice a year.

For the EU, there has been a similar process instituted, termed Post-Program Surveillance (PPS), under Article 14 of Regulation 472/2013. PPS applies as long as the Eurozone Member State concerned has repaid less than 75% of the financial assistance under the ESM (or the previous EFSM and EFSF SA). Under PPS, the EC and ECB conduct regular review missions to the State concerned to assess its economic situation and, where applicable, report on corrective measures, which the Council can then request be adopted by that State. It is also worth noting that the voting procedure in the Council is reverse qualified majority (RQMV), i.e. the Commission’s report is deemed adopted unless a blocking majority is formed, making it easier to adopt the report and harder to reject it.

In essence, then, the ending of the program only refers to the ability of the State concerned to procure capital through the markets on its own. The policy monitoring and conditionality aspects remain very much in place for a substantial amount of time after financial assistance has ended, as does the Troika monitoring and supervision.

As such, it is clear that Cyprus is a long way from actually exiting its EU-IMF program, as are the rest of the Eurozone Member States that received assistance. While Cyprus is able to procure financial resources on its own, policy conditionality and monitoring is still in place, and will be for a substantial amount of time. The EU’s PPS will last at least until 2029, i.e. 13 years from now, while the IMF’s PPM will last until Cyprus has repaid more than €820 mln to the IMF.

The democratic repercussions of this in the political realm are considerable. Through the EU-IMF financial assistance process, Cyprus will have been under close policy monitoring and conditionality effectively for close to 20 years! And this is considering Cyprus’ limited financial assistance; consider, for example, the rest of the Eurozone Member States which have received considerably more assistance (e.g. Greece through the EU).

The post When does a Eurozone Member State actually exit its EU-IMF bailout? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Boris Johnson has spoken out against holding a referendum on whether the UK should remain part of the European Union.

The Guardian reported that Mr Johnson’s intervention would help the prime minister, David Cameron.

Mr Johnson told BBC Radio Five Live, “Whether you have an in/out referendum now, I can’t quite see why it would be necessary.”

He added that the prospect of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU would not “appeal”.

Mr Johnson asked, “Suppose Britain voted tomorrow to come out: what would actually happen?”

He continued:

“We’d still have huge numbers of staff trying to monitor what was going on in the community, only we wouldn’t be able to sit in the council of ministers, we wouldn’t have any vote at all. Now I don’t think that’s a prospect that’s likely to appeal.”

It should be noted that this report was from 25 November 2012.

On February 21 this year, Mr Johnson stunned Prime Minister, David Cameron, by announcing he was joining the referendum campaign for Britain to leave the European Union.

Winston Churchill’s grandson, Sir Nicholas Soames, immediately Tweeted:

“Whatever my great friend Boris decides to do I know that he is NOT an outer.”

Just two weeks previously, Mr Johnson had written in his Telegraph column:

“It is also true that the single market is of considerable value to many UK companies and consumers, and that leaving would cause at least some business uncertainty, while embroiling the Government for several years in a fiddly process of negotiating new arrangements, so diverting energy from the real problems of this country – low skills, low social mobility, low investment etc – that have nothing to do with Europe.”

A spokesman for the ‘Remain’ campaign commented, “Everybody in Westminster knows that Boris doesn’t really believe in Out. He’s putting his personal ambition before the national interest.”

Yesterday (11 May 2016) Mr Johnson was quizzed by BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ presenter, John Humphrys, on whether he had been close to backing Britain to remain in the EU.

Asked Mr Humphrys, “Did you, as the rumour goes, have two columns written, for the Telegraph that is, one for either side of the argument?

“Only at the last minute did you decide to run with the column that said actually, I’m in favour of Brexit, not on staying in. Is that true or is that not true?”

Replied Mr Johnson, “I’ve written all sorts of things”.

Mr Humphrys interjected, “Is that true what I just said?”

Mr Johnson didn’t deny the rumour about two columns, but said instead, “It is perfectly true to say I have thought long and hard about this decision.”

Did Boris back the wrong campaign? We’ll know on 24 June.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• Boris Johnson’s big bluder
• The EU accounts ARE signed off
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

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- New Blog Post by Alexandros Kyriakidis: “Is the IMF necessary for the 3rd Greek Program?“

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Inga Ulnicane

‘Crisis should not be wasted’. Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008, this idea has been repeated many times suggesting that crisis should rather be used as an opportunity for innovative solutions and necessary reforms. One of such potential changes emphasized by European institutions has been prioritization of research and innovation as sources of sustainable growth and a way to avoid similar crisis in future.  What actually happened to research and innovation policies in Europe during the times of crisis? Which measures have European institutions taken to facilitate research and innovation? Has the crisis been used as an opportunity to facilitate research and innovation? These are some of the questions I address in my recent article ‘Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis’ (Ulnicane 2016). The article is part of a special issue ‘EU policies in times of crisis’ comparing the impact of crisis on nine EU policies, e.g. energy, migration, and health.

The article primarily analyses EU research and innovation policy which during the recent decades has considerably expanded (see e.g. Chou and Gornitzka 2014; Chou and Ulnicane 2015; Metz 2015) and combines a number of funding and coordination instruments. However, as research and innovation policy is a shared competence between the EU and national level and most research and innovation funding is allocated nationally, it is also important to look at developments at national level.

 

Increasing expectations vs. decreasing or stagnating budgets

While expectations that research and innovation will help to solve major societal and economic challenges increased during the crisis, funding for research and innovation at the same time decreased or stagnated in a number of countries. Although according to Eurostat data overall share of research and development funding within the European Union increased from 1.85% of GDP in 2008 to 2.03% in 2014 (which nevertheless is still far from declared target of investing 3% of GDP in research and development by 2020), there are huge differences across European countries. The table below shows the data from the Public Funding Observatory 2015 (page 11) of the European University Association. According to these data, during the times of crisis from 2008-2014 public funding for universities continued to increase considerable in Norway, Sweden, and Germany, where it also was part of economic stimulus package. In some other countries like in Austria the increase in funding continued but at a slower pace than before the crisis. At the same time, in many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe public funding for universities has experienced smaller or larger cuts. This has led to growing concerns about increasing innovation divide in Europe among leading and catching-up countries. However, in recent months austerity measures have also affected universities in leading innovation countries – Finland and Denmark.

 

Evolution   of public funding for universities 2008-14 (adjusted for inflation) Countries   Between 20% and 40% increase Germany, Norway, Sweden Between 10% and 20% increase Austria, Belgium, Denmark,   Poland Between 5% increase and 5%   decrease France, Netherlands, Portugal Between 5% and 10% decrease Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia Between 10% and 20% decrease Czech Republic, Serbia, Spain,   Iceland, Italy Between 20% and 40% decrease Ireland, Lithuania, United   Kingdom More than 40% decrease Greece, Hungary, Latvia

 

At times when national public funding is cut, universities are increasingly looking for other sources of funding either from industry or from international programs such as EU Structural Funds or Horizon 2020. Although an overall EU budget for 2014-2020 was cut for the first time, funding for Horizon 2020 program increased for 30% in comparison to the previous Framework Program 7 and reached almost 80 billion euros (which is less than 10% of the overall EU budget). Since then some funding has been redirected to the European Fund for Strategic Investments. First predictions about the next post-2020 EU Framework Program do not foresee a big increase in budget.

Since World War II research and innovation funding and system has expanded tremendously in many European countries. Might the prolonged and predicted stagnation in many European countries and potentially also at EU level imply that in future expansion of research and innovation activities in Europe will slow down? Would expansion of knowledge-based activities move to other world regions like Asia?

 

Reinforced focus on fast and quantifiable impact

In times of austerity, idea of doing ‘more with less’ became more popular expecting research and innovation system to become more efficient and deliver more economic and societal impact with limited resources. Representatives of European research and innovation stakeholder organizations interviewed (Ulnicane 2016) recognize importance of impact but also pointed out challenges of quantifying it and choosing appropriate time horizons for evaluating it. While idea of research impact has been widespread also before the crisis, experts have experienced that during the times of crisis focus on impact increases. One of them explains: ‘Pressure to have to demonstrate that your research is going to produce that many euros in return, it comes and goes but during the times of crisis this is very strongly present.’ A leader of a stakeholder organization tells that research and innovation organizations increasingly have to prove their impact using quantitative indicators:

‘You have to prove your value even tougher in the environment where the budgets are lower. Am I paying for research which may bring something back in years or am I paying for health care? The national governments and politicians have to answer. If you are going to pay money which is long-term and not helping cohesion of society today, you need to prove your impact much more. So research organizations are even more scrutinized by the national governments with very strong knowledge indicators. And reporting on institutional funding they get is getting more and more detailed every year: How many patent applications? How many cooperations you developed with industry? How many contracts you get from industry? How many researchers go to the industry? [...] They have to give numbers. When I talk about impact, it is real economic impact. And how do you show that in research? It is tough. It is not an easy question. And they are asked to prove that more and more.’

Moreover, times of crisis, fast solutions are expected. An expert explains: ‘Science is expected to deliver next iPhone or innovation that creates jobs, that strengthens industry. Science can do all this but this is a long-term investment [...]. There would not be tangible results tomorrow. And in times of crisis this is a thinking that disappears completely, everyone wants a quick solution.’ Focus on impact and efficiency priotizes applied research and puts fundamental science under more pressure. There might be some good opportunities to increase effiency of existing research and innovation systems but at some point there might also be limits how much more can be done with less.

 

Old tension in Europe of Knowledge: excellence vs. cohesion

Crisis reinforced one of the long-standing tensions in the Europe of Knowledge, namely, between excellence and cohesion. Since the early EU Framework Programs in the 1980s and 1990s, major share of highly competitive and excellence oriented Framework Program funding has gone to the Northern countries, while catching-up countries (at that time Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) mostly benefited from research and innovation support within the EU Structural Funds allocated to less developed regions. Similarly, in the EU budget 2014-2020 the Horizon 2020 provides competitive funding primarily based on excellence, while a considerable share – 83 billion Euros – of Structural Funds goes to research and innovation and small and medium size enterprises in less developed regions. When 12 more recent EU member states released a common position that Horizon 2020 should address the needs of all member states, a specific objective of ‘spreading excellence and widening participation’ was added to the Horizon 2020.

Taking into account that this division – the Framework Program funds go mainly to the northern countries (share of FP funds in national budgets can be higher in catching-up countries because their overall research budgets are lower), while the EU Structural Funds support research and innovation predominantly in catching-up countries – is some 20 or 30 years old, some questions can be asked: Is this a productive division, does it work, and what might be alternative approaches? Have the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation helped to build capacities in southern member states and are they now more successful participants in the competitive Framework Program?  Can there be any lessons drawn from the experience of southern members (e.g. under which conditions Structural Funds help to build research and innovation capacities) that can be applied to ‘new’ members? What are the first results of the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation in eastern member states which have been receiving them for twelve years since 2004? Do new features of the Structural Funds such as ex-ante conditionality of implementing country specific recommendations from the European Semester before receiving the Funds help to increase their role in reforming research and innovation systems in catching-up regions?

 

New paradigms or gradual change?

Although crises are seen as good moments to carry out radical transformations and paradigm changes, developments in EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis can be characterized as incremental and path-dependent. New priorities and funding and coordination instruments largely built on earlier Framework Programs and the Lisbon strategy. Does it mean that crisis has been wasted? Is there a need for radical changes and new paradigms in EU research and innovation policy or is gradual change a more productive way for improving it? What would these new paradigms be? – More considerable shifts of EU funding from agriculture to research and innovation or of competences from national to EU level? Are there any innovative ideas for solving excellence vs. cohesion tension? Will ongoing discussions on Open Science and the European Innovation Council lead to radical or incremental changes?

The study of EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis suggest a number of academic and policy-relevant questions for further investigation including new developments in multi-level governance (e.g. conditionality, European Semester) and their effects; the role and interests of and interactions among the main actors and institutions (European Commission, Parliament, national governments, and stakeholder organizations); and implementation of new and revised policy priorities and instruments. The special issue on EU policies in times of crisis demonstrates that comparison of changes across different policy fields is a powerful approach with a great potential for deepening understanding of recent developments in European integration. I am looking forward to engaging with others interested in these questions also in future and creating novel spaces and forums for addressing them.

 

Dr. Inga Ulnicane is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for European Integration Research, University of Vienna (Austria), where she undertakes research and teaching on European and international knowledge policies and governance. Her recent research on the role of ideas in European science, technology and innovation policy, European integration in research and innovation policy, and international research collaboration has appeared in Journal of European Integration, Journal of Contemporary European Research, and Science and Public Policy. She is one of conveners of the ECPR European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation’ which at the moment has more than 200 members from around the world.

 

References:

Chou, M.-H. and A.Gornitzka (eds) 2014 Building the Knowledge Economy in Europe. New Constellations in European Research and Higher Education Governance  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Chou, M.-H. and I.Ulnicane (eds) 2015 New Horizons in the Europe of Knowledge. Special issue.  Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 1-152.

Metz, J. 2015 The European Commission, Expert groups, and the Policy Process. Demystifying Technocratic Governance Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ulnicane, I 2016 Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis Journal of European Integration 38(3): 327-41. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1140155

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Tensions have been growing between Greece and the IMF, including a highly controversial Wikileaks leaked conversation between the IMF Mission Chief for Greece and the Head of IMF’s European Department that raised issues at the highest level, with letters being exchanged between IMF’s Managing Director Cristine Lagarde and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. Amongst these concerns, the Greek Prime Minister has questioned both the demands of the IMF, but also, indirectly, whether its participation in the 3rd Greek program is necessary or even desirable.

A brief background: The Greek Prime Minister is the leader of the Party SYRIZA, which won the majority in the January 2015 Greek elections – the first left-based, anti-austerity Party to be elected into government across the EU since the beginning of the crisis. Its electoral mandate was to renegotiate the financial assistance (loan) agreements, to sharply reshape the austerity-based conditionality of this assistance (so-called Memorandums of Understanding or MoUs), and to not accept the supervision of the programs by the so-called Troika, i.e. the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. There were long and arduous negotiations and a Greek referendum (6 July 2015) with an outcome against further austerity measures but of questionable outcome value. On the eve of the referendum (30 June 2015), the Greek PM requested a new, 3rd Greek financial assistance program and an accompanying MoU, officially initiated in August 2015, in a somewhat dramatic policy drift from the electoral mandate of this government. Despite such drift, SYRIZA obtained a majority again in the September 2015 snap elections following through with the 3rd program.

Why, all the fuss in relation to the IMF? As opposed to the previous two Greek programs, in which the IMF participated through corresponding funding, this 3rd one was agreed only with the Eurozone Member State-based, international assistance mechanism ESM, and did not involve the IMF (the last IMF program for Greece expired on January 2016). However, the IMF participated in the drafting of the MoU with a view of providing financial assistance in the future upon satisfaction of two conditions:  (1) a detailed fiscal package that provides a sustainable economic trajectory (focus on pension reform), and (2) the provision of “significant debt relief, well beyond what has been considered so far,” since “Greece’s debt has become unsustainable and that Greece cannot restore debt sustainability solely through actions on its own.”

It is clear that none of the two aforementioned conditions have been fully met. On the structural adjustment side, the Greek government is unwilling to implement even more austerity measures, especially in relation to a further reduction of pensions, after almost 6 years of consolidation. On the debt relief side, the Eurozone Member States, and particularly some such as Germany, essentially oppose any debt relief (which has been reiterated as a necessary action by the IMF), least of all any that would go further than what has already been considered (i.e. a mediocre extension of Greek debt maturities). In the meantime, the IMF considers the targets set by the Greek program as unachievable for the medium to long terms to achieve a sustainable fiscal position.

Is IMF participation then really necessary? It is worth noting on a theoretical level that IMF participation in the Eurozone in the beginning was considered unthinkable and amounting to a testament of the Eurozone’s failure, among others because of the Eurozone’s levels of growth (IMF interventions focused mostly on developing nations), as well as their antagonistic presence (in monetary/finance terms) to the USA /USA dollar. This, however, has long been abandoned as a taboo.

In the current situation, a Eurozone Member State seeking ESM assistance has to request IMF assistance too. Legally, there are two legislative instruments on the EU’s side that govern the request of financial assistance from a Eurozone Member State: the ESM Treaty, upon which the ESM is based, and the Two-Pack EU Regulation 472/2013, laying down the EU-based process relevant to a Eurozone Member State receiving financial assistance. The ESM Treaty, an international treaty concluded outside the EU legal framework, stipulates that not only is the ESM to cooperate with the IMF very closely, with the latter participating both at a financial and technical level, but also that “a euro area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF” (Recital 8). Similar provisions are included in Article 13(2)(b) of the Treaty. In addition, the Troika, i.e. wherever possible the IMF as well, is formally tasked with drafting the policy conditionality outlined in the MoU and monitoring its implementation (ESM Treaty Article 13). Similar are the provisions of Regulation 472/2013, whereby a Eurozone Member State requesting financial assistance either from the ESM or the IMF is subject to Troika supervision (Recital 12, Article 7).

Pursuant to the above legal observations, there was also a clear political commitment in the Eurosummit of July 2015 (where the 3rd Greek program was agreed upon) that Greece would request a new IMF financial assistance, to run parallel to the ESM program, stipulating that “Greece will request continued IMF support (monitoring and financing) from March 2016” (emphasis added by author).

So is it necessary for the IMF to partake in the Greek program? For the IMF itself, certainly not. The legal provisions do not contain any type of reciprocity clause, and do not commit the IMF to accepting the request of the Eurozone Member State concerned; in this case Greece. However, on the EU’s side, it seems necessary for a Eurozone Member State that receives financial assistance through the ESM – such as Greece – to request similar assistance from the IMF. In either case, Greece already committed at the highest level (Eurosummit) to requesting IMF assistance and is, therefore, restrained in perceiving a request for IMF participation as optional, especially considering the importance that some Eurozone Member States, such as Germany, place on the IMF’s participation as a guarantor for the program’s efficiency and success. This is, after all, the reason for the close cooperation between the ESM and the IMF as outlined above. However, in the case that the IMF denies the provision of assistance, then there is no stipulation as to how the process unfolds, although it would seem logical that the ESM-based program would continue. What happens remains to be seen. However, clear legal limitations exist as to the options of the Greek government to reject or not apply for IMF participation.

First published on April 20, 2016 at EUI Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law

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A straightforward comparison between Britain remaining in the EU and leaving isn’t possible.

That’s because we know what ‘Remain’ in the EU means – it’s the status quo and we’ve experienced it for four decades.

But Leave?

Nobody knows; nobody can say for sure. Even those campaigning for Britain to leave the European Union cannot agree with each other on their different visions of Brexit.

And even if the ‘Leave’ campaigners could agree with each other, none of them can promise to deliver.

They are not in power, and even if they were in power, their (different) dreams of Brexit would require the agreement of over 50 countries, which would take years to negotiate, with no guarantee of the outcome.

With the exception of Russia, no major country in the world backs Britain to leave the EU.

On his visit to Britain, USA President Obama said that the EU Single Market “brings extraordinary economic benefits to the United Kingdom.” He added that being in the EU “magnifies” British influence.

If Britain left the EU, however, the President warned that it could take up to ten years to negotiate a new trade agreement between the USA and  Britain.

These sentiments were echoed by US Presidential hopeful Hilary Clinton, whose spokesman told The Observer newspaper today that, “She has always valued a strong United Kingdom in a strong European Union. And she values a strong British voice in the EU.”

There are many lists showing the benefits of Britain remaining in the EU that are credible and evidence-based.  That’s because we’ve been a member of the EU (previously called the EEC) for 43 years. We know what we get in the EU. We already have it.

But any lists of the benefits of Brexit have to be entirely hypothetical. Nobody knows for sure. No member state has ever left the EU.

The only honest answer is that there would be years of disruption and uncertainty before we discovered for sure what would be the advantages, if any, of Britain outside of the EU.

And now that the official Vote Leave campaign has indicated that it also wants other countries to leave, how would Britain’s Brexit negotiations fare with the EU?  Our former European allies would know that Brexiters didn’t just want to close a deal with them, but to close the EU itself. (See my other article, ‘What they really want: End of the EU’)

The benefits of Britain in the EU are extensive. Here’s a summary of just some of them:

Free trade

Top of the list is that it’s only because of EU membership that Britain enjoys full free trading status with all the other member states – representing the world’s most lucrative market place, and by far our most important trading partner. As such, almost half of our exports go to the EU, and over half of our imports come from the EU.

The EU has an iron tariff wall against non-members; so would we really want to be on the wrong side of that wall as an ex-member? Even non-European countries that have negotiated ‘free trade’ agreements with the EU don’t enjoy full free trade access to Europe’s internal market, as Britain does now.

Could Britain continue to participate in full free trade if we left the EU?

We don’t know for sure, but it’s less likely.

Unless, like Norway, we were accepted as a member of EFTA/EEA. However, like Norway, we would still have to obey the rules of the EU single market (including free movement of people) and we would still have to pay an annual contribution to the EU.

And like Norway, we would have no say in those rules or the size of our annual contribution to the EU. Would there be any point to leave the EU for that?

A say in Europe

Next on the list is that as a leading member of the EU, we have a say – and votes – on the rules, laws and future direction of our continent, Europe.

Would we have that as a non-EU member?

No non-EU member has a say or vote in those rules, so it’s highly unlikely that an exception would be made for Britain. Otherwise, what would be the point of an exclusive club offering exclusive benefits for members?

Living in the EU

The right to live, work, study or retire across our continent is  a precious membership benefit that around two million Britons already enjoy.

Would that right continue if we left the EU? Nobody really knows, but it’s unlikely.

The residence and other rights of Britons already living across the rest of Europe, and citizens from the rest of Europe already living in Britain, would be thrown into doubt and confusion if ‘Leave’ wins the referendum vote.

Free health care whilst travelling on business or holiday in Europe is another cherished benefit of Britain’s EU membership – that would be unlikely to continue on Brexit.

EU protection

EU laws protecting the rights of workers, consumers and travellers across the continent are probably among the most important reasons for Britain to remain an EU member.

For example, 4-weeks paid holiday a year; the 48 hour working week; anti-discrimination law; guaranteed rights for agency workers; guaranteed worker consultation – all of these protections exist because of the EU.

Would we retain those rights if Britain left the EU?

We don’t know, but it’s unlikely.

If we took away the strong armour of EU employment law, workers’ rights would be at the mercy of a Conservative government. Anyone who believes they would then be in safe hands might be in for a rude shock upon Brexit.

Consumer and traveller protection laws are also arguably much stronger as a result of EU laws than we would have enjoyed under national legislation alone.

In any event, how can a national government assure safety and protection across a continent?

The simple fact is that it can’t – it needs the reach of a pan-European intergovernmental organisation to achieve that (albeit with the democratic consensus of member states).

For example, comprehensive passenger compensation when, say, an Icelandic volcano seriously disrupts air travel – such compensation is only possible because of EU law, not national law.

Abolishing exorbitant mobile-roaming charges across Europe was also only possible because of EU law – no nation state alone could have achieved that. Europe-wide consumer protections, such as when buying products online or by phone, came about because of EU law rather than national law.

Negotiating power

Because the EU is the world’s richest, biggest market-place, and the world’s biggest exporter and importer of manufactured goods and services, it can negotiate the best trade deals with other countries.

It’s often said that when negotiating, you get better deals if you’re the same size or bigger than your opposite number. The EU is the biggest economy – bigger than the USA, bigger than China, bigger than Japan. It has the muscle to negotiate extremely favourable trading terms with the world’s countries.

Could Britain, being considerably smaller and less important than the EU, achieve similarly good trade agreements with the world’s countries?

It’s unlikely, but in any event, it would take many years to find out after we had left the EU.

Collaborations

There are many collaborations that take place between scientists, doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc, between EU member states that are made much easier and more effective because we’re all in the same club.

Could that continue on the same level if Britain left the EU?

Who knows..?

And of course, because of agreements and directives agreed between member states, there is considerable Europe-wide sharing of intelligence, information and practical collaboration in the fields of policing, security, defence and the prevention and combat of crime.

On BBC’s Andrew Marr show today, Home Secretary Theresa May confirmed that Britain doesn’t have open borders, not even to EU citizens. She said:

“We check people at our borders, but what matters at our borders is that  you have the information about people that enables you to make that decision about whether somebody should be allowed into the UK or not.

“We are more likely to have that information if we’re inside the European Union.”

Could that co-operation continue with our EU allies if Britain left the EU? Again, nobody knows – it might, but at this stage, nobody can guarantee that it would.

Is the British electorate likely choose Brexit and all the uncertainties that option offers?

Anything is possible. However, in all the referendums so far in Britain, the electorate has never voted against the status quo.

What will be important is that everybody who can vote in the referendum does vote. That way, at least the decision about Britain’s future will be decisive. 

__________________________________________________

Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• They want their country back, not yours
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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The mandate and budget of Frontex has consistently been enhanced since its inception in 2004. Since the Agency’s role under EU law has expanded, the capacity of Frontex to deal with possible violations of fundamental rights should be strengthened as well. In this regard, the European Ombudsman and the Parliament recommended that Frontex introduced an individual complaint mechanism to handle violations of fundamental rights alleged to have occurred in the course of its operations. Moreover, the European Commission’s proposal of 15 December 2015, designing a European Border and Coast Guard System, included such a complaint instrument. Consequently, this paper analyzes to what extent the individual complaint mechanism guarantees the protection of fundamental rights and ensures that potential incidents are effectively handled by Frontex. Particularly, the strategy and instruments designed by the Regulation nº 1168/2011 of Frontex to promote the protection of fundamental rights is firstly examined. While these instruments promote respect for fundamental rights in all activities of the Agency, they do not provide individuals with an effective remedy to file a complaint against Frontex should they believe their rights have been violated. Secondly, this paper analyzes the degree to which the creation of a complaint mechanism would strengthen control of Frontex operations, given the current limitations of immigrants and asylum seekers to seek judicial redress at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Lastly, the complaint mechanism introduced in the European Border and Coast Guard System is studied as well as the limitations it presents.

–

See, David Fernandez Rojo, “The Introduction of an Individual Complaint Mechanism within Frontex: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”, Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, forthcoming. This paper will be presented in the doctoral conference named “Democratic legitimacy without Parliament: fact or fiction?” on May 20, 2016 in the University of Antwerp.For more information and the program, see website. For more information on the authors and TBP’s special edition, see www.legalworld.be

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So now the truth is out. The ‘Leave’ campaign don’t just want Brexit – they want to see the end of the European Union.

Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, said as much in his keynote speech this week for Vote Leave, the official campaign which he leads, fighting for Brexit in Britain’s EU referendum.

Mr Gove said:

“Britain voting to leave will be the beginning of something potentially even more exciting – the democratic liberation of a whole continent.”

He described Britain’s departure from the EU as “a contagion” that could spread across Europe.

Reporting on Mr Gove’s speech, the BBC stated:

“Leaving the EU could also encourage others to follow suit, said Mr Gove.”

Commenting after the speech, a senior aide for the Leave campaign indicated to the Herald Scotsman that Mr Gove would be, ‘happy if Britain’s in-out referendum sparked similar polls across Europe.’

The Herald Scotsman reporter asked if Brexit would lead to the break-up of the EU as we knew it and the aide replied, “Yes.” When asked if the Out campaign hoped that it would trigger “the end of the Brussels block” the aide replied, “Certainly.”

In his speech, Mr Gove suggested that far from being the exception if Britain left the EU, it would become the norm as most other EU member states would choose to govern themselves. It was membership of the EU that was the anomaly, argued Mr Gove.

The Guardian headline was:

‘Brexit could spark democratic liberation of continent, says Gove’

The Telegraph headline:

‘Michael Gove urges EU referendum voters to trigger ‘the democratic liberation of a whole continent’

The Express headline:

‘BREXIT WILL BREAK-UP EU: Leave vote to spark domino effect across bloc, says Gove’

The Bloomberg headline:

‘U.K. Brexit Vote Would Be End of EU as We Know It, Gove Says’

The Irish Times headline:

‘Michael Gove says other EU states may leave EU’

The right-wing of the Conservative Party, which makes up the biggest support for the Vote Leave campaign, is now in tune with UKIP’s long-held ambition to see the end of the European Union.

On Talk Radio in Spain three years ago, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said that he not only wanted Britain to leave the European Union, he also wanted to see “Europe out of the European Union” – in other words, the complete disintegration of the European Single Market.

This week, Mr Farage shared a Brexit rally platform with Conservative cabinet minister, Chris Grayling, who backed Mr Farage’s chant of, “We want our country back.”

The battle lines are now starkly clear. Britain’s EU referendum is not just about whether Britain should remain in the European Union. It’s now a referendum about whether the European Union itself should continue to exist.

This is no doubt going to wake up all pro-EU supporters across the continent. What happens in Britain on 23 June could result in Brexit and EU breakup.

Britain chose not to be one of the founding members on the Union back in 1957 but joined later, in 1973.

Now Britain might be the first member state to leave the Union, with the open aspiration of the ‘Leave’ campaigners that some or all of the other EU members will follow to the EU exit.

It now seems impossible for ‘Leave’ campaigners to continue with their rhetoric that Britain could negotiate a ‘good deal’ with the European Union if the referendum results in Brexit.

EU leaders will no doubt be in a state of heightened alarm that not only could Britain’s departure from the EU trigger the downfall of the EU, but that this is actually the stated aim of Brexit campaign leaders.

For all of us who cherish the European Union as one of the most successful post-war projects, this is now a battle to ensure that Britain’s EU referendum doesn’t result in either Brexit or the end of the EU.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• Can’t vote or don’t vote?
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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Isn’t it strange how history sometimes seems to repeat itself? Not always in exactly the same way, but in ways to make it seem uncanny.

Take the remarkable resemblances between the referendum of 1975 and the one we’re having now, both regarding Britain’s future in Europe.

Back in 1974 Labour leader, Harold Wilson, won a general election with a very slim majority.

One year earlier Britain joined the European Economic Community (later to be called the European Union) under a Conservative government led by Edward Heath.

Prime Minister Wilson promised to re-negotiate the terms of Britain’s membership and then to hold a referendum on whether to remain in the EEC.

The Labour government was in favour of Britain’s continued membership. But the cabinet was split. So Mr Wilson suspended Cabinet collective responsibility. Cabinet members were allowed to publicly campaign against each other.

In total, seven of the twenty-three members of the Labour cabinet opposed EEC membership, mostly the left-wing stalwarts of the Labour Party, such as Michael Foot, Tony Benn and Barbara Castle.

In some ways, the 1975 referendum was a mirror image of today.

Unlike today, in 1975 the Labour Party and the TUC were against Britain’s membership of what was then nicknamed the Common Market. Indeed, the Labour Party conference voted 2-to-1 against continued membership.

Also unlike today, in 1975 all main British newspapers were in favour of Britain’s continued membership.

And unlike today, Conservative Party members in 1975 were mostly in favour of Britain’s membership. Indeed, the then leader of the Conservative Party and the Opposition, Margaret Thatcher, fervently campaigned for Britain to stay a member.

Some of the same language was used in the 1975 referendum as today. When Labour cabinet minister, Tony Benn, claimed that Britain had lost half-a-million jobs as a result of membership of the EEC, the Daily Mirror responded by calling him, “The Minister of fear.”

Although many Eurosceptics today claim that, in 1975, they were only told that the European Economic Community was to do with free trade, that wasn’t reflected in the campaign literature of the time. In the ‘No’ campaign brochure voters were warned about Common Market membership:

• To end a thousand years of British freedom and independent nationhood is an unheard of constitutional change.

• Do you want us to be a self-governing nation, or to be a province of Europe?

• Do we want self-government as a great independent nation, or do we want to be governed as a province of the EEC by Commissioners and a Council of Ministers, predominantly foreign, in Brussels?

• Do we want to lose the whole of our individual influence as a nation, which is still great, in order to enhance the status of Europe, which would then function largely outside our control?

David Cameron also only won the General Election in 2015 with a very slim majority.

Just as Prime Minister Harold Wilson had promised in 1974, Prime Minister David Cameron also promised in 2015 that he would renegotiate Britain’s membership of the European Union and then hold a referendum.

Just as detractors in 1975 described Mr Wilson’s reforms of Britain’s membership as ‘cosmetic’, so have Eurosceptics today similarly described Mr Cameron’s reforms.

Just as Harold Wilson’s Labour government was in favour of Britain’s continued membership, so is David Cameron’s Conservative government.

Just as the Labour Party membership was mostly against EEC membership in 1975, in 2016 most Conservative Party members are against Britain’s membership of the European Union.

And just as Harold Wilson allowed his Cabinet Ministers in 1975 to campaign against each other on the question of Britain’s future membership, so has David Cameron in 2016 allowed his Cabinet Ministers to campaign against each other.

Just as in Harold Wilson’s Labour government of 1975, a total of seven of David Cameron’s 22 Cabinet Ministers are campaigning for Britain to leave the European Union.

They are mostly the right-wing stalwarts of the Conservative Party including Michael Gove, Chris Grayling and Iain Duncan-Smith (who recently resigned as a Cabinet Minister).

In June 1975, the electorate voted overwhelmingly – two-to-one – in favour of Britain remaining a member of the European Economic Community.

However, the Labour Party was never the same again.

Nine months after the referendum, Prime Minister Harold Wilson resigned.

Four senior Labour Party members later split from the party and formed the Social Democrats in 1981, later to be merged with the Liberal Party.

The 1974 Labour victory wasn’t to be repeated again for 23 years, when Tony Blair won the General Election for Labour in 1997.

Of course, to what extent, if any, the 1975 referendum was responsible for the change in Labour’s fortunes is difficult to prove, and there were many other factors.

However, it’s interesting to compare the striking similarities between Britain’s referendum of 1975 and the one we are about to have in ten weeks time.

Britain’s second referendum campaign on the question of our membership of the European Community has now officially begun. The vote will take place on 23 June, and we will know the result on 24 June.

Will there be any other similarities to the 1975 referendum? We will have to wait and see..

__________________________________________________

Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• Can’t vote or don’t vote?
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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• Share and join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

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The opening of the official campaign on the EU referendum hasn’t been all fireworks; instead, it’s been mostly more of the same. Each side trading consequences and perils, questioning the other side’s competence or intent. In particular, we’ve been lacking vision.

The vision thing is an easy one of trash: too many overtones of Tony Blair, too much of a hostage to fortune. But vision matters: when no one seems to agree about the state we’re in, speaking instead of the state we might achieve looks less problematic.

This is particularly true for Leave. Saying that the status quo isn’t good will only get you so far, whereas a vision of the brighter, better future might well draw in more people. As Sunder Katwala noted some time ago, without that positive construct, Leave lacks a focus to its energies. While that might be a painful process, the potential value of a pre-agreed plan to a Leave side that won the vote would be immense, not least in the Article 50 negotiations that followed.

Again, the problems here are legion. Leave covers a huge array of ideological and party political positions that barely agree on what’s wrong with the EU, let alone what’s to be done. Any attempt to push a plan is thus likely to meet with internal resistance, since it will implicitly favour one worldview or another. As such, it might push away as many as it attracts.

All of which makes Michael Gove’s speech this week all the more interesting.

Gove is one of the more thoughtful figures in the Leave camp, in the sense of working through the implications of different decisions and being grounded in the politics of the situation. However, on this occasion, that thoughtfulness seems to have led him to a strange destination (thanks to whoever on Twitter reminded me of this on the confusion of opinion and action).

Gove’s argument is that the UK will be able to move out of the EU’s control but still maintain full access to its markets. He talks of a free trade area stretching across the European continent, which the UK – by virtue of its size and importance – could almost not help be part of. Moreover, the sheer success of the UK in this new position would start a contagion of democracy and would presage the collapse of the EU itself.

This ‘Goveland‘  obviously suffers a number of problems, as commentators (and Remain) were all too happy to point out. Yes, the UK is a large market for the EU, but not nearly as large as the EU market is to the UK. Coupled to the lack of incentive for other member states to give a generous deal to the UK – which would only raise further demands from domestic eurosceptics – and this ‘Albanian model’ looks not only less appealing but also less likely. Finally, as Pawel Swidlicki rightly pointed out, how could the UK negotiate access to an EU that was falling apart?

If the mechanics of the proposal are dubious, then the politics is less so. This speech has been one of the few big moments so far in the debate, where someone has tried to move things on. The absence of a clear leader of Leave means that there is opportunity for Gove to take up the reins, which might serve him well in the future, whatever the outcome. In addition, Gove’s proposal is open enough/lacking enough detail that it could act as an umbrella for many Leavers, at least in the broadest terms.

Gove’s speech matters not for its plan, but for its projection of a strong, independent and confident Britain. It taps into many of the themes that Leave have pushed over recent months, about not doing down the UK and about holding up our heads. For many voters that might be enough to convince them that Leave is the ‘right thing to do’, and we’ll work out the details as we go.

However, this doesn’t happen in a vacuum. There has been something of a swing towards Remain in the past week or so, which might be down to the government leaflet, or to the numerous statements about economic uncertainty caused by the potential of Brexit. While Remain has even less of a vision of the future than Leave – essentially, they’re relying on “it’ll be like it is now” – that doesn’t hurt them in the same way. Thus it falls to Leave to make their case stick better in the coming weeks.

The post Leave’s painful choices appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Two years ago, the European Union had its first true electoral campaign held in public for the selection of the EU’s chief administrator, the President of the European Commission. Now, although within a different institutional context, we witness a similar process in the United Nations: the first open nomination procedure for the next chief administrator of the UN, its Secretary-General.

Is Helen Clark a UN Spitzenkandidat(in)? (Screenshot from the hearings live stream, 14 April 2016)

The so-called Spitzenkandidaten-process (‘Spitzenkandidat’ means ‘top candidate’ in German) in 2014 was basically a power-struggle between the European Parliament, especially the main European political parties represented therein, and the European Council, the representation of all 28 heads of state and government in the EU. I  blogged occasionally about this process here, and I followed the process professionally while working at Transparency International.

By now, there’s also ton of research discussing the Spitzenkandidaten-process and how to interpret it. Most arguing it was a win of the European Parliament, but others disagree. The question is whether there is any resemblance to the UN’s (s)election procedure for the next Secretary-General.

With this week’s public hearings of the (first) nine candidates for the post of UN Secretary-General, the UN is also entering a new period that will require a lot of interpretation once the process is over. At UNdispatch, where the hearings and the social media reactions have been nicely covered, Mark L. Goldberg and Richard Gowen have discussed the hearings and how to interpret them in a 30-minute podcast episode well worth listening to.

Interestingly, some elements of the UN Spitzenkandidaten-process are pretty similar to that of the EU’s:

1. Just like the EP asserted the power of de-facto nomination from the European Council, so did the UN General Assembly when proposing in April 2015 to have a more transparent nomination process and now imposing the hearings upon the Security Council.
2. Just like the United Kingdom (and some other European Council members) disagreed with the parliamentary (s)election process and has tried to stop it, Russia and China do not seem to be big fans of the open nomination process. As Goldberg and Gowen discussed in the podcast, Russia was the only permanent member of Security Council not asking questions to the candidates and China only was represented through the G77 representative.
3. Similar to the EU’s Spitzenkandidaten, the ones who have come forward so far include a former prime minister with extensive UN experience – i.e. Helen Clark, kind of the Jean-Claude Juncker of the UN process – or with previous experience as presidents of the UN’s General Assembly – making Vuk Jeremic and Srgjan Kerim the Martin Schulzes of the process.
4. The UN candidates are not just present and visible in the formal hearings, but they are actually campaigning publicly, by touring around the world and (some) use social media campaigns to be visible to a wider public (as did the EU Spitzenkandidaten), although the UN’s public are rather diplomats and political leaders around the world.

There are some other elements that are relevant in both arenas, such as geographical balance, in the UN a rotation between the different regional groups, in the EU a geographical and political balance between the various top posts (European Parliament and Commission presidents, High Representative and European Council president).

The big different is the institutional setting: first, the UN General Assembly is a member state body, whereas the European Parliament is a directly elected assembly. Thus, whereas the Spitzenkandidaten-process in the EU can be seen as a struggle between (supranational) parliamentary forces and (intergovernmental) executive forces, the transparency-process in the UN is rather a struggle between the “Big Five” and the 188 other countries, or, as suggested by the absence of Russia and China in the hearings, a geopolitical fight between public policy making of the “West” and the politics of backroom diplomacy in search of traditional stability by the “East”.

There is a second difference: in the European Council, the United Kingdom could be outvoted thanks to the voting procedures for the nomination of a candidate. In the UN Security Council, each of the Big Five has a veto. In his 2015 article “The Secretary-General We Deserve?” (Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 21:4), Simon Chesterman suggests that this could lead to a situation in which there is an institutional deadlock:

If the favourite candidate(s) of the General Assembly emerging from the open hearings is (are) blocked by one of the five permanent members, a potential compromise candidate of the Security Council might be blocked by the General Assembly. A similar situation was considered possible after the 2014 European elections, when it was still unclear whether the European Council would ultimately nominate the candidate of the European People’s Party, Jean-Claude Juncker, or some other name.

The majority in the European Parliament pretty much threatened to refuse any other candidate, and in the end won this fight. However, different to the General Assembly, candidates were actually put forward by wider political groups which, in the end, could claim to be legitimised by a popular vote, no matter how invisible the Spitzenkandidaten-process had been in most countries. There is no such legitimising force in the UN General Assembly, and so it will be interesting to see how this plays out when the end of the year comes closer and the term of Ban Ki-Moon comes to an end.

In summary, whereas the two recent or ongoing (s)election procedures for the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of the European Council share some common dynamics and elements that make them look similar in some sense, the institutional setting and the geopolitical dimension of the (s)election of the UN Secretary-General makes this process a much different beast to the EU’s recent process. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to see whether the UN’s General Assembly manages to impose its transparent process onto the Security Council, just like the European Parliament did on the European Council.

The post (S)electing the next Secretary-General of the United Nation: similar to the EU’s Spitzenkandidaten-process? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As the debate about Britain’s place in Europe intensifies ahead of June’s referendum on EU membership, the role of the press has come under close scrutiny. Alastair Campbell, who was director of communications to the former British prime minister, Tony Blair, recently attacked the majority of the UK press for having “totally given up on properly informing the public”.
Meanwhile, writing on the coverage of the referendum in March 2016, Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee said the referendum was “a battle of strength, a war to the death” between the government and press owners Paul Dacre and Rupert Murdoch about “who rules the country”.
While it is easy to exaggerate the short-term impact of newspaper coverage, it is true that a large proportion of British voters feels ill-equipped when asked to decide about continued membership of the EU. Research conducted in 2013 by the independent UK Electoral Commission to test different referendum questions found “low-levels of contextual understanding of the EU, with some participants having no knowledge of the European Union, or the status of UK membership of the EU, at all”.
More importantly, this research showed that participants themselves felt under-informed – and some told the survey staff they had changed their voting intentions as they “became more aware of their lack of knowledge, or thought more in depth about what being a member of the European Union means”.
It would be worrying for a thriving democracy if citizens’ knowledge of the EU remained so low come June 23 that they could not confidently connect their personal preference with the voting choice. It is also worrying because British citizens are the least well-informed in Europe, according to analysis of Eurobarometer survey data by the LSE’s Simon Hix.
The survey contained three simple questions with true-and-false answers such as whether Switzerland is member of the EU or not. Nearly a quarter of British respondents got this question wrong (only Greek Cypriots scored lower here) and only 28% could answer all three questions accurately (just above Latvia).
Sound and fury
So why is public knowledge so low? The electoral commission study considered the media a crucial source of individuals’ knowledge about the EU. Single issues gleaned from it, or from personal experiences, influenced initial voting intentions.
But not all media types are trusted equally. A representative European survey in September 2015 shows that 73% of people in the UK “do not tend to trust” the printed press – the highest figure among all EU member states and a staggering 23% higher than the EU average. The “do not tend to trust” figure for UK television, meanwhile, is 46% – in line with the EU average.
Yet the press is a major source of information about the EU and often sets the agenda for television, which is why many researchers worry about some of the longstanding traits of UK press coverage of the EU.
One very basic issue is accuracy of reporting about how decisions and laws are made in the EU. Press coverage frequently depicts the European Commission as if it had the same powers as a conventional government backed by a majority in parliament and able to have its proposals ratified and implemented. This is inaccurate as the overwhelming majority of legislation can be amended and potentially rejected by the European Parliament as well as by national ministers in the Council, who in turn are accountable to their own parliaments.
Getting it wrong
On the same day that The Sun published its controversial claim that the “Queen Backs Brexit”, the paper also acknowledged that it had confused an opinion by an advocate-general of the European Court of Justice with an actual ruling of the “euro judges”. It is a seemingly trivial example, but part of a broader picture of many press stories containing false alarms about alleged regulatory frenzy against larger condoms and prawn cocktail flavour crisps. Some of these stories are plain wrong, others result from unnecessary national “goldplating” of EU directives as Boris Johnson conceded when giving evidence before the Commons Treasury Select committee.
Another example of deficient press coverage were the 2014 European Parliament elections. Large parts of the press failed to explain to their readers and voters that a change in the Lisbon Treaty meant that one of the candidates nominated by the two large party groupings had a good chance of becoming Commission president. As Simon Hix shows, this resulted in large differences in British and German media coverage of Schulz and Juncker, which also partially explains why Britain ended up in a minority of two (against 26) when opposing the winner of the parliamentary elections as Commission president.
In turn, this misjudgement on the part of the press was partly the result of its overreliance on the government for interpretation of EU issues. In the past this has often translated into a rather one-sided picture of what actually happens behind closed doors at the Council and a failure to appreciate that genuine government victories are much rarer than compromises.
The ‘battle of Brussels’
However, as press attention on the EU has fluctuated strongly depending on the influence of eurosceptics on government majorities, readers can easily miss out on coverage of EU initiatives that are important in their own right and potentially far-reaching consequences, for better or worse. And the familiarity of UK journalists with Westminster’s confrontational culture leads many journalists to cover “Brussels” as a battle of national interests between member states, thus missing the equally important left-right conflict within the various groupings in the EU institutions.
Claims that media coverage of the EU is biased are naturally contested and are difficult to measure accurately. However, a representative survey conducted in November 2015 asked British respondents about how their country’s press presented the EU. British respondents were much more likely to identify negative bias against the EU (23%) than the EU average (11%). British television was seen as more objective (46%) in its EU coverage than the press (37%), but even here the perception of negative bias was ten percentage points higher than the EU average.
It is to be welcomed that some papers, prominent among them The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, have recognised the problem and try to provide their readers with essential and usually accurate information about the EU and what British membership means in practice, not just different opinions. However, as more newspapers enter campaigning mode, this switch may intensify some of the problems described, and further damage – rather than enhance – readers’ trust in the press.

Christoph Meyer is Professor of European and International Politics at King’s College London.

*this is a slightly longer revised version of a piece first published on The Conversation and the ESRC UK in a Changing Europe Initiative

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