Ideas on Europe Blog

Undertaking a research project is a pleasurable and yet sometimes solitary enterprise. You spend much of your time reflecting on your ideas, reading your way through libraries, writing down your conclusions and putting everything together in a single document. Researchers, even in collective projects, often do this process on their own. This is a style of working that I got used to since starting my PhD at the Université Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris in September 2021 and that I learned to enjoy intellectually.  

In the wide world of academia, there is another specific moment which I equally learned to adopt and enjoy: conferencing and in particular international conferencing. In that regard, UACES has been a great help. A few weeks after attending the Graduate Forum in Barcelona, UACES provided me with financial support via its Microgrant programme to participate in the 2023 European Consortium for Political Research General Conference. 

The ECPR General Conference brought together around 2,000 academics from around the world in Prague for a few days to discuss a variety of contemporary political science research topics. I was selected as a presenter for the panel ‘Parties under Pressure: Party Divisions and Party Change’ chaired by Kristina Weissenbach. My paper ‘Johnson and “Let’s Keep Brexit Done”: The Impact of Conservative Party Management on the UK’s Policy on Europe’ covered elements of my PhD and specifically dealt with one of the statecraft theory dimensions by Jim Bulpitt that underpins my theoretical framework. 

 

My participation at the conference enabled me to present parts of my PhD to an international audience. The feedback received at the panel and subsequent informal discussions provided input to guide the further reflection for this paper and more widely for my PhD. It greatly complemented comments already received at other academic events and helped to identify the strengths as well as the current weaknesses of my approach that still need to be addressed.   

On a more personal note, the participation at this conference also allowed me to discover Prague. It was my first time in the city, and in Czechia, but I was so impressed by the history, architecture, culinary scene, and lifestyle that I will gladly come back. My recent transfer to Berlin means that Prague is reachable by train in under 5 hours. The ability to combine work and leisure only made this conference more stimulating. 

For all these reasons, I am particularly grateful to UACES for this Microgrant that made my participation at the ECPR 2023 General Conference possible. The funds helped me to complement the logistical costs and allowed me to fully focus on participating in the event. As a PhD student, I am thankful for this opportunity and I am happy to be able to contribute to such international conferences. They are really intellectually, professionally, and personally a major perk of academic life. 

 

 

More about the Microgrant Scheme:

The UACES Microgrant scheme is aimed at supporting research for our Early-Career and Individual Members.

The microgrants scheme will provide grants of between £100 and £500 to UACES members to assist them to cover the costs of undertaking their research. The grants are designed to recognise the challenges facing researchers at this time.

 

 

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What can critical and postcolonial European Studies scholars learn from W.E.B. Du Bois’ sociological thought? And how can this contribute to the agenda of  ‘decolonising’ Europe? A UACES Microgrant report on the 53rd Annual European Studies Conference in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

A UACES Microgrant report by Joshua M. Makalintal.

 

 

Critical European Studies has gained some ground, particularly at the recent UACES Annual Conference that took place at Queen’s University Belfast in Northern Ireland earlier this month. Uniting 11 panels and over 30 contributions under the themed track entitled ‘(En)countering Europe as Global, Othered and Transperipheral Voices’ (EUROGLOT), this year’s event enabled a space to elevate pressing issues and critical works that have mostly been and are still usually marginalised within the field. The contributions under this themed track engaged in questions of how to approach Europe and its various historical legacies as well as its encounters with the broader social world.

For the EUROGLOT panel on ‘Theorising Europe, Otherwise’, I took the opportunity to present my working paper reassessing W.E.B. Du Bois’ immanent critique of Europe and empire. This paper forms part of a more comprehensive theoretical research project of mine that aims to reconstruct his ideology-critical and anti-disciplinary sociological work. My contribution in this context foregrounded an attempt to intervene in critical and postcolonial European Studies.

W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) was an Afro-American historian, sociologist, and a leading figure of the US civil rights and pan-African movements. While substantial debates within the social sciences have erupted intensively in recent years regarding Du Bois’ place in the classical canon, his disruptive scholarship has yet to be acknowledged in other disciplines. Indeed, Du Bois’ critique of European imperialism remains undervalued in both mainstream and critical European Studies; however, as I have argued in Belfast, his anti-imperial thought may offer us a vast array of crucial resources in problematising the myths that persist within contemporary imaginaries of the European project’s history and modern trajectory. This would consequently pave an alternative pathway towards more radical and reflexive understandings of modern Europe struggling to account for its colonial pasts.

For instance, I highlighted a key concept coined by Du Bois — the notion of the colour line, which depicted the global racialised structure of his era that had governed societal relations and practices, thus producing multiple patterns of subjugation, and in turn, various forms of resistance. Using the colour line as an analytical anchor and ideological resource, Du Bois reiterated an immanent critique of European subjugation — a domination “through political power built on the economic control of labour, income and ideas”, as he wrote in 1946. Excavating the inherent contradictions within such domineering practices, Du Bois underlined how these dynamic antagonisms would stimulate the critical consciousness necessary to trigger practical opportunities for resistance and social transformation.

Du Bois has long been one of the social sciences’ marginalised voices, and rectifying this epistemic neglect entails proactively recuperating his subversive scholarship. Reclaiming and re-applying his critical thought and practice in this sense would no doubt contribute to the project of ‘decolonising’ Europe by innovatively enabling us to uncover patterns of domination and forms of injustices that are otherwise unobtrusive. By further enriching critical European Studies scholarship through various transdisciplinary (and anti-disciplinary) perspectives, coupled with the aim of subverting the epistemic hegemonies that persist within the field, we as scholars would undoubtedly be better equipped to assess the current European societal conjuncture — prone to failures, crises, and various antagonisms. This entails confronting these contradictions, compelling us to understand their immanent inevitability and consequently prevail over them, thus further stretching the space for effective interventions in the broader social world.

I was able to share these insights at the 53rd Annual European Studies Conference in part thanks to the UACES Microgrant. I am grateful for the fact that there are academic associations that are determined to financially support students and scholars of all levels in their research pursuits. My participation in this conference provided me not only with valuable feedback, but also inspiration from the other panels that would certainly further broaden my knowledge in the rich interdisciplinary field of European Studies scholarship. I am also grateful to my fellow panellists as well as to the impressively attentive audience for the insightful discussions. It was great to be part of an important and long-overdue conversation on studying, theorising, and critiquing Europe otherwise, especially in such a compelling academic setting.

 

 

The post Theorising Europe from the Margins: A Reappraisal of W.E.B. Du Bois’ Critical Thought appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Still not very far away

We’re at a bit of a junction in EU-UK relations right now.

Having bumped back from the questions of good faith with February’s Windsor Framework, the two sides got to work on the next obvious target: Horizon membership.

Seven months later – and with enough discretion that I could record a podcast saying it wasn’t coming soon, two days before it came – we got a deal.

And now?

Well, now we appear to have slipped into a gap of some kind.

Certainly, there are things that need attention right now, like car batteries, but despite pressure on both sides to rework tariff schedules, the Commission seems not to want to play ball. On the UK side, joining the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention also looks a bit distant.

Outside the narrow confines of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the UK is also still working out how it handles the European Political Community (EPC) summit it’s supposed to host next summer (dates and location still TBC).

In short, there’s not much sign of things going on. Which is either because those things that are going on are being kept very far from the limelight, or because there aren’t things going on.

To be clear, there is a baseline of on-going contact and interaction, to service the various agreements, but that’s rather different from substantive work on opening out new areas.

If we assume that an absence of public comment is the best marker of in-camera activity, then Breton’s statement on car batteries looks like a signifier of inactivity, or impasse. And that’s for the most obvious next step in working together.

Which takes us back round to my title: are we in a holding pattern right now, and if so, what kind of holding pattern is it?

As I’ve argued before, Sunak has approached EU relations through a strong lens of his domestic political situation. Windsor made sense as a closing-off of an obvious problem (plus a clear differentiation from his predecessor but one), and Horizon was self-contained enough to be worth the effort, but getting into bigger resets looks like a hiding to nothing, either with his backbench or with voters that increasingly don’t rate the matter as that important.

So the British government is arguably in a fire-fighting mode for the rest of this administration.

But what about the EU?

Domestic factors obviously apply here too. We’re on the run-in to European elections next spring – witness Von Der Leyen’s State of the EU speech last week, with all its pitch – which means lots of people changing jobs, even if the underlying political balance doesn’t move very much.

Add to that all the other things the EU is concerned with, from rule of law to enlargement to post-Covid reconstruction, and it might be understandable if attention is elsewhere than the UK.

But at the same time, the Union has held a long-term position of deepening ties with its neighbourhood, especially with those bits of it that aren’t actively antagonistic. That’s an uneven track, but as a rule of thumb, there’s a clear preference to doing more together.

Perhaps the current hiatus is a temporary thing, a product of everyone waiting to clear the coming election year on both sides, so that everyone can pick up in late 2024 with a clearer sense of what’s what.

However, Windsor shouldn’t leave us thinking that we’re back to regular business. The scars of the Internal Market Bill and the Retained EU Law Bill and the noises off about ECHR membership are still there and still fresh in the minds of EU policymakers.

Even if there is a change of party in London next year, that will still leave issues.

Firstly, Labour have put so many fences around policy that there might not be scope for doing much. With dynamic alignment apparently also off the table, some in Brussels might be forgiven for thinking that a full and frank discussion in the UK of trade-offs might not be about to happen.

Secondly, even if Labour are willing to conclude new deals, then at least half an eye will be on the trajectory of the Conservatives in opposition. With the possible sole exception of Michael Heseltine, the general view is that the party will drift right under new leadership, given its membership. While that might make a second Labour term more likely, the past seven years will give enough pause for thought about What Britain’s Like. Is there risk in setting up more entanglements with Labour, if a returning Tory government is going to tear things up again?

Such views are understandable, but also come with the risk of setting up a new stasis.

As a case in point, look to Switzerland.

Here we have a much closer relationship, but one with significant issues, both political and institutional. Both sides bump along, sometimes making progress, but often not: we’re nearing a decade of to-and-fro on an institutional accord that still has no clear endpoint, even if the Swiss are moving once again to get things going.

In both the Swiss and the British case, the EU has arrangements that function acceptably, even if other opportunities are left on the table, so if there are more pressing issues to work on, why not just leave things as they are, on a semi-permanent basis?

The EU’s built up a lot of experience and expertise in handling crises (you can read about this is in a couple of volumes (here and here) that I’ve contributed to), but we’re not in a crisis any more.

Regular governance doesn’t have the glamour of an emergency situation, but it still requires attention and effort. Not least because several of the crises the EU has faced have come out of the failings of that regular governance: Brexit is a case in point.

As a recovering historical institutionalist, I’ll end by noting that institutions are sticky: the arrangement you put in place in a hurry because you had to often end up sticking around for a very long time, even when they don’t really work so well. Again, the Swiss model is a good example.

Whether the UK is now locked into the TCA model remains to be seen, but the next year will give us a pretty good idea.

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Knowledge Politics and Policies Standing Group in Prague

The 2023 edition of the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) took place in Prague, 4-8 September. The section of our ECPR Standing Group Knowledge Politics and Policies included nine panels on politics and policy of academic mobility and diplomacy, universities, higher and vocational education, research, and Artificial Intelligence. This year our section on Knowledge Politics and Policies took place for the 12th time and was probably one of the biggest sections we have had so far. Our panels were so well attended that in some of them the audience had difficulties to find seats, as there was standing room only. This blog post provides insights from rich presentations and discussions in a number of our panels, written by the panel chairs.

 

Contemporary issues in shaping universities

As an open topic panel, “Contemporary issues in shaping universities” addressed diverse issues from student politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, over the construction of competitive higher education regions in China, to education to work transitions.

Andrea Kronstad Felde drawing on a case study of Makerere’s student union (Uganda), discussed the party influence on student politics and decision-making and how students aimed to reinstate and reinvigorate a representative body for the students. The presentation not only fills a void of decreasing research on student politics during the last decade but adds a much-needed non-Western case study. Adding to the non-Western perspective, Taixing Sheng’s presentation (with Tatiana Fumasoli) discussed the politico-cultural project of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA). Drawing on descriptive analysis, he mapped out the advances and challenges of artificially bringing together three highly diverse regions in China to establish a common competitive higher education area to rival long established global lighthouses such as the San Francisco Bay Area. In comparing the two, he provides valuable insights into utopian engineering of large cohesive economic powerhouse through metrics, cultural integration, and coercive cooperation.

Building on a collaborative chapter with colleagues from the University of Bath, Predrag Lazetic analysed political and media perceptions of students as future workers across Europe and contrasted them with student’s self-perceptions from Eurostudent data. While the public and policy discourse predominantly frames them in human capital terms as rationalist decision-makers and as an economic resource, students distanced themselves from such prescriptions, leaning towards credentialist or oppositional frames of Bildung or vocationalism. Finally, Alexander Mitterle addressed the increasing academization of work through the institutionalization of new degree programs without corresponding roots in the German labour market, namely Public Policy degrees. He shows organizational specificities, strategies and emerging field structures to which public policy schools adhere. Despite a lack of corresponding job positions, students overall find jobs according to their degree specialization and their positions.

 

Artificial Intelligence: power, politics & policy

Since 2020, a panel on AI politics, policy and power is a regular part of the Knowledge Politics and Policy section. This year’s panel started by launching a newly published special issue on Politics and policy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Inga Ulnicane and Tero Erkkilä. This special issue, published in Review of Policy Research, includes nine articles on topics such as access to public digital services, construction of food courier profiles, intersectional bias, gender equality, policy paradigms, narratives and sociotechnical imaginaries as well as global standards and rankings. Many of these articles have benefited from the discussions in previous ECPR General Conferences, which also helped to identify five overarching themes for this special issue: social and political co-shaping of AI, the role of ideas, power, continuity and change, and interactions among developments at local, national, regional and global levels.

The talk by Meng-Hsuan Chou was based on her special issue article, co-authored with Catherine Gomes on Politics of on-demand food delivery: Policy design and the power of algorithms. Their contribution contrasts social construction of food courier profiles in Melbourne and Singapore, highlighting the role of policy. The two following talks examined AI governance in the EU. Ville Aula and Tero Erkkilä presented their study on politics of transparency, based on analysis of public consultation on the EU AI Act. Ronit Justo-Hanani drew on her recent article on AI regulation in the EU to discuss political drivers behind it. She also highlighted similarities across governance of various emerging technologies, mentioning her forthcoming book on governing nanotechnology safety. Lively discussions during the panel on issues of regulation, power asymmetries and generative AI underlined the political salience of its topic.

 

Higher education and research facing unstable circumstances

A starting point for the panel “Higher education and unstable times” was that higher education and research sectors are increasingly facing unstable circumstances. This includes societal, political, technological instability where existing institutional structures and norms may become challenged. With this starting point, the panel examined various aspects concerning the role of higher education during crisis and instability.

In the first of three papers “Resisting Big Science: Why Local Opposition to the Thirty Meter Telescope Sustained Momentum”, Anna-Lena Rueland (University of Leiden), presented an analysis of how Native Hawaiians mobilized a remarkably long-term opposition towards the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) on Mauna Kea, Hawaiʻi Island. In the second paper, “Education reforms in Europe’s knowledge economies: The impact of technological change on higher education”, Doglas Nunes de Sousa (Europa-Universität Flensburg) explored the role of technological change on higher education, in particular exploring the intersection between technological change, higher education policies, and labor market in Ireland and Spain, focusing particularly on the regional level. In the third and final paper of the panel, Mari Elken & Peter Maassen (both University of Oslo) examined policy changes in Europe in the area of internationalization of higher education in the context of current geopolitical and social challenges.

 

Knowledge policies in a globalized world

Standing room only for the Knowledge policies panel

In the panel “Shaping knowledge policies in a globalized world – Actors, structures, and policymaking dynamics” the different contributions addressed the key question how knowledge policies in today’s globalized higher education world come about. In the first contribution Silje Svartefoss from the University of Oslo analyzed the policy process leading to the creation of two mission-oriented innovation policies in Norway. Focusing on coordination of different actors as a key challenge the presentation highlighted that the two mission-oriented policies encountered different levels of coordination challenges that can partly be traced back to the number and type of actors involved in the process.

The second contribution by Tim Seidenschnur from the University of Kassel and Leonie Buschkamp from the University of Hannover presented a theoretically well-grounded analysis of dynamics of competition in three distinct organizational fields, namely a company, higher education, and the arts. Using extensive empirical material from the three contexts, they manage to trace differences in the way competition materializes which they explain by specificities of the organizational fields under study.

The third contribution by Yiran Zhou from the University of Cambridge presented a detailed analysis of the Chinese Discipline Evaluation in higher education focusing on its specific Chinese characteristics. Her work highlights the fact that the lack of precision in defining what the term “Chinese characteristics” refers to in the context of this evaluation scheme is by no means a flaw of the system but rather a desired imprecision that provides more room to maneuver to the state agency that is in charge of conducting these evaluations. This can be explained as one tool in the toolbox that the Chinese state uses to ensure control over their higher education system.

In the final presentation Jens Jungblut from the University of Oslo presented the main findings of a recently published edited volume. This book presents a comprehensive assessment of the politics of higher education policy in Western Europe, the US and Canada along 5 key aspects of policymaking. Through multiple levels of comparison, the volume also traces differences and similarities across contexts, contributing to the conceptual debate between sociological and historical institutionalism.

 

European Universities initiative

The panel “European Universities Initiative – taking stock and looking forward” focused on one of the most recent EU flagship projects, which concerns the establishing of transnational alliances of universities. Developed rather quickly (in less than a year), it garnered significant EU-level support and funding despite (a) concerning an area in which the EU has only supporting competence and (b) the overall crisis of the European integration project. Five papers were presented, two focusing primarily on EU level developments, while the other three explored the impact of EUI on national and institutional levels.

A paper by Alina Felder and Martina Vukasovic covered the process leading to the launch of the first call of proposals and in particular the role of associations representing interests of higher education institutions. Nadia Manzoni explored the extent to which the European Universities Initiative triggered a new wave of institutional changes in the EU, in particular concerning emerging transnational governance structures.

Antonin Charret’s study put Member States’ positioning towards the EUI front and centre, both in relation to the EU level developments as well as in relation to the participation of their universities in various alliances. In her paper, Marina Cino Pagliarello analysed whether and how transnational alliances developed within the EUI framework act as informal diplomatic actors. Finally, Marco Cavallaro (in a paper co-authored with Agata Lambrechts) provided novel evidence concerning the extent to which the goal of relative balance between excellence and inclusiveness within the scheme has been achieved. This varied set of papers, each focusing on a different aspect of the EUI, provided ample material for discussion concerning the novelty of this flagship project, its impact on European, national and institutional levels and theoretical and methodological approaches suitable for studying it.

 

Standing Group affairs: excellent paper award and membership renewal

As every year, during the conference we held the business meeting of our Standing Group. The highlight of the meeting was the award ceremony for the winners of the latest edition of our excellent paper award for emerging scholars – Dr. Adrienn Nyircsák and Anke Reinhardt. Soon the call will be out for the next round of the excellent paper award – stay tuned.

Excellent Paper Award winners Dr. Adrienn Nyircsák and Anke Reinhardt

At the moment, one of the key items on the Standing Group’s agenda is membership renewal. If you are a member of the Standing Group, please log into your My ECPR profile, go to ‘My Groups’ and renew your membership by 30 September. If you are not a member yet but would like to join our group, you can join here, by following ‘Join Standing Group’. We would like to continue and expand our collaboration and see many of you in the 2024 edition of the ECPR General Conference in Dublin next August. We hope to have a bigger room!

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“European security screening of new investments is neither desirable nor feasible.”, Karel De Gucht (2012), European Commissioner for Trade

 

“We are not naïve free traders. Europe must always defend its strategic interests. This is why today we are proposing a new EU framework for investment screening.”, Jean-Claude Juncker (2017), President of the European Commission

 

The experience of the Covid pandemic, coupled with concerns about critical Chinese takeovers and technological transfers, has brought security threats to the forefront. Consequently, screening incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) for national security reasons has become a common practice. The traditional understanding that FDI exclusively boosts economic benefits has evolved into a more complex understanding. In the face of rising FDI from non-OECD countries, particularly in strategic sectors, concerns have emerged about the potential loss of technological edge and threats to European security. This shift in perspective is evident in the statements of Karel De Gucht in 2012 and Jean-Claude Juncker in 2017, which reflect the evolution of EU policy on investment screening. This blog post briefly analyses the FDI screening mechanisms within the EU, highlighting the different factors at play and their implications for member states.

 

What is Investment Screening? Who is in the driving seat, member states or the EU?

Investment screening refers to the government’s systematic evaluation of incoming foreign investments based on predetermined criteria. It distinguishes itself from other approaches like prohibitions and ad hoc case reviews by establishing regulatory frameworks and procedures for evaluating investment proposals. Although the EU introduced Regulation 2019/452 in March 2019 to provide an EU-wide coordinating mechanism for information sharing and cooperation, it does not have a single direct screening authority. This is because the solid reference for national security keeps the member states in the driving seat for designing and governing their national mechanisms.

 

Is it new?

Most countries have had some domestic arrangements for decades to screen and address potential national security risks arising from specific FDI. However, for a considerable duration, such measures were not considered essential, as the adoption of neo-liberal policies during the 1980s led many countries to dismantle control restrictions, and FDI primarily occurred between developed nations or among members of the same security alliances. Consequently, the prominence of national security concerns was diminished.

Starting from the early 2000s, the landscape of investment screening shifted due to the rise of emerging economies and technological advancements. Developing countries’ investors, often lacking traditional security alliances and transparency, raised concerns about potential harm to critical infrastructure in developed economies. This concern intensified after the 2008 crisis and accelerated further with the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, prompting many countries to strengthen their screening mechanisms. Consequently, beyond conventional security, the scope of investment screening policies has expanded to cover other areas. Multisectoral or cross-sectoral investment screening mechanisms have been introduced by many member states, especially after 2010. Depending on this, intense policy-making activity has become the “norm rather than the exception” across the EU.

 

Understanding the Puzzle

The puzzle at the heart of EU member states’ commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based trade order lies in their approach to FDI screening. While emphasising the importance of safeguarding national security and public order, member states often utilise a rather ambiguous concept of “national security”, which opens the door to circumvent the principles of capital freedom. This situation is compounded by the broad spectrum of risk identification across countries, making it challenging to foresee the triggers for investment screening and their implications. As a result, the distinction between protectionist industrial policy and the protection of public order and national security becomes increasingly blurred.

Even though the investment screening is intended to ensure a level of economic playing field while addressing, the puzzle lies in maintaining this equilibrium without resorting to protectionist tactics, which could hinder free trade or adopting policies that might favour certain domestic industries over others.

The puzzle deepens when viewed from different angles. First, the timing of investment screening adds complexity, especially in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic when attracting FDI is crucial for economic recovery. Historically, attracting FDI has been a well-documented strategy for economic revival, which was witnessed following the 2008 financial crisis. Second, while the EU defines foreign investors as non-EU nationals or entities, this is not necessarily the case at the domestic level. In fact, investment screening might take place even between the member states due to the legal differences in their legislations. Third, the diverse screening practices in place have given rise to prolonged negotiations, multi-jurisdictions, and complex administrative procedures. The resultant ambiguity concerning the enforceability of legal rights and obligations has intensified concerns about legal uncertainty and corruption. This becomes particularly important in countries where governments have illiberal tendencies, which could potentially exploit screening requirements to secure personal economic or potential gains.

 

Conclusion

The FDI screening regulatory environment is complex because the elements that shape the member states’ policy designs intersect with various spheres ranging from economy, security, and law to sustainability. Moreover, the concepts of national security and/or public interest leave room for interpretation; they generally allow recipient governments to restrict foreign investment in certain situations. That’s why this broad discretion might also be misused for protectionist purposes. In other words, they might be weaponised. Therefore, how member states design their FDI policies might serve as a footprint on how they use the ambiguity of “national security” to balance their economic interest. Thus, screening mechanisms from a critical perspective might be a valuable attempt to demonstrate how political and economic choices operate, often implicitly.

 

 

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2023 (8-9 June, at IBEI, Barcelona).

 

Written by Elif Cemre Beşgür, PhD Student, University of Trento

 

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by Jan Pieter Beetz (Utrecht University)

On 15 September 2022, the vast majority of the Members of the European Parliament condemned Hungary’s Fidesz government for undermining European values. They proposed that Hungary has become an electoral autocracy. Further, they called for more forceful action against the Hungarian government by the EU.

What authority does the EU have to protect liberal democracy in its member states in the first place? Most empirical and normative studies assert that the EU has a right to act because of existing treaties. Empirically this is an uncontroversial claim, but these scholars do not offer a normative principle to justify this legal right. Militant democracy justifies democracies protecting themselves from anti-democratic forces by denying democratic rights, such as party bans. They assume that the EU has democratic authority, but again do not offer a normative justification. In my recent contribution for JCMS, I bolster the emerging normative case for EU democracy protection by developing a realistic political theory grounded in a democratic principle of EU political authority.

Shared Popular Sovereignty: A Realistic Principle of Democratic Authority

I propose that shared popular sovereignty is the most appropriate principle to theorise the EU’s normative political authority. This is transnational conceptualisation of a core democratic principle of authority: popular sovereignty. The traditional conception holds that a people is the fountain of all authority. Shared popular sovereignty entails that multiple peoples can share their sovereignty: A democratic people can authorize both its national democracy and, together with other democratic peoples, a transnational democracy.

Shared popular sovereignty is the most appropriate conception for the EU, because it aligns with the real-world preconditions: multiple democratic peoples without an EU equivalent, an integrated EU administration and a transnational democracy built atop national democracies.

Two fundamental conditions follow for the political authority of the EU: first, authorization by its democratic peoples and, second, transnational democratic decision-making between Europe’s peoples. The former requires Europe’s peoples to directly authorise the EU’s institutions. The latter aims to ensure that the peoples remain democratic equals in EU legislative processes.

The EU has a Duty to Protect Democracy

Democratic backsliding involves a member state government intentionally weakening core liberal and democratic institutions with the aim of consolidating and expending the ruling party’s power. Such democratic decay in a member state challenges both fundamental conditions of EU political authority.

The EU has a duty to protect democracy in its member states because its political authority is at stake. When backsliding in one country takes place, any EU citizen has sound normative reasons doubt the political authority of the EU. The EU should act against democratic backsliding within its borders to maintain its political authority: Inaction is not a legitimate option.

A crucial question is where to draw the line between diversity and decline in a pluralistic polity, such as the EU. A representative body of Europe’s peoples is the most realistic set-up. These representatives should judge whether democratic backsliding is taking place and whether action should thus be taken. In contrast to the current depoliticised set-up, I argue that the European Parliament is the most appropriate candidate to fulfil this role.

Legitimate interventions

The EU must ensure that its democracy protection measures do not undermine its political authority, and therefore, they should be compatible with the principle of shared popular sovereignty. From this principle, I submit, follows a substantive desideratum for evaluating the democratic legitimacy of EU measures: the protection of Europe’s democratic peoples. The goal of these measures should be to protect citizens and their democratic institutions rather than punish the backsliding government.

A normative assessment follows of widely discussed measures of EU democracy protection. Discursive interventions, such as naming and shaming, are democratically legitimate because they support Europe’s democratic peoples without harming them. Despite concerns about their effectiveness on changing the backsliding’s government mind, this type of measure can play normatively desirable role, such as rally citizens to the democratic cause or shame democratic actors supporting backsliding governments.

Economic measures require careful scrutiny. On the one hand, economic sanctions are often proposed, but they could harm pro-democratic actors. If economic sanctions could be formulated to punish a backsliding government without harming these actors, they would be democratically legitimate. Otherwise, these types of interventions give rise to normative trade-offs. On the other hand, financial support aimed at bolstering democratic resistance from within the suppressed citizenry is democratically legitimate, because it aims to protect suppressed elements of a European people. Moreover, they impose no democratic harm on the other peoples of the EU and even, to some extent, can re-establish the democratic preconditions of peoplehood by giving the opposition a voice.

Political actions might become necessary to maintain the EU’s democratic authority, especially when the backsliding government can no longer be considered a liberal democracy, but these types of measures often come with democratic costs. Isolating a backsliding government from EU decision-making, such as through the Article 7 procedure, is democratically legitimate, because it would protect Europe’s other democratic peoples from the influence of an undemocratic government in transnational legislative procedures. The measure does not hurt oppressed citizens because their democratic voice has already been silenced.

If a member state becomes and remains an electoral autocracy, then the rebooting of the EU becomes a democratically legitimate response. This measure in effect results in expulsion, hence it has many tragic consequences. Still, it protects Europe’s peoples from undemocratic forces undermining their transnational democratic order, while affirming their democratic sovereignty. Further, one might consider former EU citizens after such a move worthy of special consideration.

Conclusion

My realistic political theory bolsters the emerging normative case for the EU engaging in democracy protection. There may be good reasons to consider not pursuing democratically legitimate measures when having to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This might include the economic and human costs of measures or security concerns. Although I believe that political judgements should take such considerations into account when deciding how to protect democracy in the EU polity, I maintain that a democratic EU has the normative duty to protect its peoples.

Jan Pieter Beetz (he/him) is Assistant Professor in Political Theory and European Integration at the Utrecht University School of Governance. Jan Pieter is fascinated by the political authority of liberal democracies and the contemporary challenges to their legitimacy, in particular European integration and the rise of the administrative state. His realist philosophical research reflects and draws upon cutting-edge debates and insights in the human sciences, in particular EU-studies, political science and governance. In addition to his homepage, Beetz’ work can be followed on his Google Scholar pages.

The post Saving Popular Sovereignty from a Slow Death in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog post is a follow-up to the presentation “The Aspiration Towards Centrality in the European Research Area: The European Interest in Bringing the Southern Neighbourhood Into the Picture,” given on 11 September 2023, during the virtual panel 104 “The EU as an External Actor I” of the UACES 2023 Conference.

The presentation highlighted some of the main content lines of the forthcoming publication, which examines how research cooperation serves the goals of the European Southern Neighbourhood Policy and the European Research Area. This topic is addressed through the lens of the motivations and pursuits of Europe-based project managers. Following insight obtained from interviews with Europe-based managers funded by EU Framework Programmes, the presentation outlined that many Europe-based project coordinators welcomed Moroccan and Tunisian institutions to the consortium because this would enhance their position of centrality and point of expertise intersections in the European Research Area. Narrative analysis guides multifaceted conclusions. Agency strategies pursued through a scientific focus on the projects serve the overall goals of the European Research Area and the Southern Neighbourhood Policy. European project coordinators function as enablers of the EU’s structural diplomacy. The science diplomacy considerations are secondary and not unified across the examined projects.

Looking beyond this specific presentation, the multiple forms of EU actorness, actorship, and actorhood deserve more attention to acquire a more complete picture of the multiple ways in which the EU engages with the rest of the world. There are many blind spots waiting to be discovered and properly addressed in future research. The EU’s external action toolbox remains to be fully evaluated and its full resonance properly explained. A more in-depth study of several thus far neglected areas is instrumental to making EU engagement more purposeful and targeted and constructing complementarities with higher-value deliverables. This is not meant as a criticism of the existing policy planning, programming, and implementation practices. It is guided by an aspiration to never stop seeking room for improvement and to set even higher sights on research excellence.

Additionally, these follow-up remarks prove the topicality of the panel title “The EU as an External Actor”. This title will remain pertinent for the foreseeable future. The EU open access data repositories offer plenty of options to discover new patterns and less studied constellations of EU-supported encounters across the world that deserve to be more thoroughly examined and discussed during the forthcoming UACES conferences. The lively debate throughout the online session was an opportunity to introduce attendants to other recent scholarly publications addressing contemporary engagement of the EU with various domain-specific diplomacies, such as knowledge diplomacy and connectivity matters.

To conclude, the panel “The EU as an External Actor I” attests that several highly engaged scholars are working towards starting to fill this gap with promising theoretical, conceptual, and empirical choices. The study of perceptions of the EU is on the rise. The way the EU is perceived is of interest to early-career and senior researchers who study diverse regional and geopolitical heavyweight constellations.

 

Blog post author: Zane Šime

The post Aspiration Towards Centrality in the EU External Action Context appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EUHealthGov is delighted to have been involved in this week’s annual conference of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). We have hosted three panels at the event at Queen’s University Belfast on 4, 5 and 6 September. 

On Monday morning, we gathered for a panel on EU governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Mina Hosseini (University College Dublin, Ireland), introduced an evaluation of the EU’s use of advance purchase agreements (APAs) to procure COVID-19 vaccines. Utilising the lens of competition law, Mina’s work explores challenges to transparency and accountability in the APA process, and how the EU might use its wider Vaccine Strategy to address such challenges in future. Our second presenter, Francis Jacobs (also UCD), presented a paper on how the European Parliament responded, in its day-to-day functioning, to the challenges presented by the pandemic. This work explores how the Parliament adapted its rules of procedure and working methods to enable it to keep its legislative agenda moving, and how it is contributing to debates on how to increase the resilience of institutions. 

On Tuesday morning, we turned our attention to the European Health Union (EHU). Louise Bengtsson (Swedish Defence University, Sweden) opened the panel with her work on the securitisation of EU global health policy. Comparing the new global health initiatives published by the Commission as part of the EHU with the older, existing elements of EU global health policy, Louise’s work explores a shift in narrative framing and underlying logic. Next, Georgiana Ciceo (Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania) presented a paper that uses the experimentalist governance framework to assess changes in the EU’s cross border health threats legislation within the EHU. Georgiana argues that the EU has been able to expand its authority in public health by amending the high level goals and iterative feedback stages of the governance process in cross border threats. Finally, Mary Guy (Liverpool John Moores University, UK) introduced a new project mapping solidarity in European healthcare. In this panel Mary focused on the role and place of solidarity within the EU’s response to COVID-19, arguing that there remains potential for solidarity logics to inform the development of EU vaccine policy, fiscal governance and the EHU. 

On Wednesday morning, for our final panel, we gathered to discuss law-making and legislation in EU health governance. Hannah van Kolfschooten (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) presented a paper on the EU’s artificial intelligence (AI) legislation and its less-known implications for third countries. Drawing on a concept of ‘data colonialism’ and a comparison to clinical trials legislation, Hannah outlined some of the wider impacts of EU law and offered some early thoughts on how the EU might act to take account of these impacts. Second, Eleanor Brooks (University of Edinburgh, UK) presented a paper on the role of stakeholder consultation in the EU policy process. Using a case study from EU pharmaceutical law, Eleanor’s work examines the existence of participation bias in the consultation process, and explores the challenges in identifying, measuring and analysing such bias. Finally, Katrina Perehudoff (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) introduced a new project exploring the EU’s responsibilities towards low and middle income countries in the area of pharmaceuticals. Drawing inspiration from across international, EU and national legal frameworks, Katrina’s work seeks to develop a framework for EU action on global access to medicines, exploring the potential for positive duties towards health beyond the EU’s territorial borders. 

Between and across panels, we’ve had fruitful discussions about the scope and future of the EHU, the EU’s role in global health governance, and the potential of its legal frameworks to contribute to health equity. With thanks to all of our presenters, chairs, discussants and audience participants, as well to UACES for the invitation and financial support. Here’s looking forward to #UACES2024!

The post EUHealthGov at UACES 2023 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

Far from taking downtime, summer has been a busy period for the Graduate Forum. This short update contains important information about what we have been up to as a community in the past few months and all of our upcoming events.

A Successful Conference in Barcelona

In June, we gathered in Barcelona for our annual conference at the Institut Barcelona Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). It was fantastic to meet so many emerging scholars and delve into the research being undertaken in European studies. We are really grateful to the UACES staff for their help organising the conference, to IBEI for their support in hosting it, and to all the discussants and panelists who contributed their valuable time — a big thanks to all attendees who provided feedback, which we will incorporate into our future events.

Upcoming Doctoral Training Academy in Brussels

Behind the scenes, we have been planning our next event – the Doctoral Training Academy – in Brussels on 24 November. This year’s theme is professional skills, and we have sessions on publishing, engagement, and academic applications with leading scholars in European studies. Check out the schedule and sign up here!

Our Communications Strategy

With the grateful assistance of the UACES admin team and two graduate placement students, we have been refreshing our communications strategy and updating our brand identity. We have released two podcasts and published several short pieces from attendees at the conference on our Crossroads Europe blog. We have more to come shortly.

If you would like to highlight your research through our channels, on our blog or our podcast, get in touch with me at nrobb03(at)qub.ac.uk!

We have also launched an Instagram account and will shortly be starting a Telegram channel to make networking with other European Studies scholars easier!

UACES Conference in Belfast

If you’re coming to the UACES Conference in Belfast, add our panels on Careers Beyond Academia and Academic Careers to your conference agenda.

We are also going for drinks on Monday 4th September at The Sunflower Pub in Belfast at 8pm, following the drinks reception in Belfast City Hall. We look forward to seeing you there!

The post UACES Graduate Forum Committee – Summer Update appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Between April and June 2023, I had the chance to conduct the RENPET bursary at the ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo under the supervision of Dr. Helene Sjursen. As I began the first half of my second year, I was hoping that a stay at ARENA would allow me to establish the theoretical foundations of my research for the rest of my PhD while receiving some useful feedback from peers and more senior academics. My stay there was worth it since it allowed me to achieve these goals while also allowing me to get in contact with other researchers and practitioners residing in Oslo.

 

The Benefits for My Research

My PhD project tries to breach the traditionally established gap between the national and the international by considering under what conditions the actions that national actors (radical right populist parties) take affect the EU’s most international policy: its external action. While I stayed at ARENA, I was able to develop an elaborate framework for the concept of influence, which is key in my research. I built upon previous conceptualisations by ARENA scholar Guri Rosén to include elements from both the national and international levels while also considering approaches to influence from other disciplines such as lobby research. Coincidentally, I had the chance to listen to one of the leading authors in this field, Andreas Dür, in the first Tuesday Seminar I attended. These seminars proved to be highly beneficial for me since they put me in contact with realities beyond the ones a PhD candidate in the EU’s external action experiences. On the one hand, I was able to learn from peers working in other fields linked to the EU. On the other hand, I had the chance to see how bigger administrative projects, such as the establishment of a new research centre: the Research Centre on the European dimension of Norwegian Law (EurNorLaw). These experiences helped me understand the wider aspects of an academic career.

 

Oslo and its perks

My research went beyond the walls of the University of Oslo, and I conducted some interviews with other researchers and practitioners living in Oslo. These included researchers from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) which was particularly useful for the “China aspect” of my research as well as a former Norwegian minister. Similarly, I also had the chance to enjoy the city of Oslo itself and visit its fjord, its recently built National Museum, and witness the celebrations of the Norwegian Constitution Day on the 17th of May.

 

About RENPET

All in all, the RENPET bursary was an excellent opportunity to advance my research, learn from a network of more experienced academics, while discovering other realities and other ways of research. For that, I am grateful to the whole RENPET network that finances the bursary and, particularly, to Helene Sjursen and all the ARENA staff for providing academic guidance during my stay.

 

 

More about the author

Unai Gómez-Hernández is a second-year joint PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh and KU Leuven. His research revolves around under what conditions European radical right populist parties influence the EU’s external action vis-à-vis China. His fields of interest involve populism, EU foreign policy, as well as EU-China relations both widely and with a specific focus on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unai holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science (University of the Basque Country); a bachelor’s degree in International Relations (London School of Economic and Political Science), and a master’s in international relations and diplomacy of the European Union (College of Europe). Before beginning his PhD, he worked in the private and public sector, in the Basque Environmental Cluster as well as in the Delegation of the Basque Country to the EU.

 

 

 

The post RENPET Network Residency at ARENA Centre for European Studies (University of Oslo) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The sight of more heavy rain outside the window tells me it’s high summer. This means all the important people have gone on holiday to somewhere sunnier, leaving us hoi polloi to discuss politics.

As a result, I’m at my desk when Matt Goodwin’s latest Substack post arrives, heralded as a contribution to ‘silly season’.

The core argument is that talk of rejoining the EU is overblown, because there are lots of things that are problematic about membership.

Since Matt reminds me how many of us all subscribe to his Substack, I’ll assume you’ve read it.

As a first thought, this is classic eurosceptic messaging on the EU and European integration: it’s costly, it’s too intrusive but also not strong enough to sort things out, it’s lethargic and divided and it leaves the door open to millions of people coming here.

These messages don’t just date back to 2016, but to the mid-1990s.

The messages have hung around for two main reasons.

Each of them taps into wider discontents and emotions about politics, about foreigners, about fairness that allow them to leverage more engagement from audiences. Politicians are the least trusted profession in the UK, you say? Well maybe it’s not going to hurt my cause (whatever it is) to trash-talk them then, right? Certainly I can think of would-be populists who rail against the failings of the ‘new elite’ in just this manner.

But the messages also persist because they have something to them.

If I were being sniffy about Matt’s list I could argue that there are various things that are rather particular readings of situations, but actually most of it isn’t that arch.

Let’s take the first of his ‘very good reasons’:

1. It will not be like it was before. The relationship will be harder and the terms will be worse. You will not get special opt-outs on things like Schengen, justice and home affairs. You will not get rebates. You will have to go all-in. And having already left once you will not be as influential as you were before.

“Fair enough” is my main response here.

The EU is in constant evolution, just like the UK, so to pretend one could just make like it’s 22 June 2016 and none of this ever happened is deeply naive. The opt-outs the UK secured during its membership came because it was there as new policy domains were developed: as a new member state it would have to cleave to what the EU already has in place.

And even more than influence is the question of whether the EU and its member states want to go around British involvement once again. If we can flip into increasing support in the few years since the referendum, then we can flop back in equally short order: a new membership wouldn’t settle things definitively, so why return to that psychodrama at all?

We might take from this that the EU is not the land of milk and honey, just as it also not the ‘end of a thousand years of history’: it’s a choice, and one with both costs and benefits.

Moreover, it should also remind us that this choice is not just for the UK alone: the EU has not only a voice but a vote, so for any kind of relationship beyond ignoring each other, there has to be common cause and agreement.

As such, Matt is right to argue that the polling is misleading and would tighten in any active debate on re-accession. Most people don’t actually know or care that much about the EU, so follow cues from others. If re-accession where to close in, then some of those people would discover costs or inconveniences that make them think again about the matter: it’s happened in every other accession to the EU and it’d happen here.

Of course, research on this matter picks up some interesting elements in this. So let’s explore and – to keep in fair – let’s use Matt’s own work here.

First up, Matt did some polling back at the start of this year, looking exactly at the impact on attitudes of reminding people about the kinds of costs he’s listed this week. If you’ve paid for his Substack, you can read the full piece, but the exchange below picks up a key point, namely that even when you do expose people there’s still a majority in favour of rejoining.

tbh, the most remarkable thing about your polling is that, even when made aware of just how tough the re-entry requirements might be, still a majority of respondents want to #rejoin

Looks like Bregret is firmly entrenched and the #Tory lies about #Brexit have been rumbled. pic.twitter.com/wm4mAXUAIH

— Jonny Brogdale (@Govtandpolitics) January 6, 2023

Of course, this is only one side of the equation. Matt (with co-authors) also found in 2020 that the British public had largely priced-in eurosceptic arguments about the EU, whereas pro-integration ideas seemed to have a more substantial effect. Put differently, precisely because everyone knows the old eurosceptic tunes they are less likely to nudge anyone’s views, while the same isn’t the case for their opponents.

This does, however, leave one not-inconsiderable issue: why haven’t pro-integrationists found their voices and their messages?

If the 2016 referendum campaign was striking for how Leave’s messaging was deeply familiar, then it was also striking for how Remain seemed to be casting around for anything equivalent. The same still broadly holds today.

The reasons aren’t entirely clear, but part of it is that pro-integrationists haven’t felt that they needed to make an active case until recently: the weight of the status quo bred a degree of complacency that facts and friction against change would be enough.

Even now, the focus on rationalist arguments about economic costs echo this position. They do not have the emotional heft that helped make eurosceptic ideas carry further.

Moreover, the numerous perceived failings of post-referendum government have bound up popular views with a set of contingent ideas: Brexit is unpopular because the government is unpopular (partly because its Brexit policy didn’t deliver), so what happens when you take the government out of the equation?

If pro-integrationists are to make any progress towards re-accession then they need to find ways of speaking that resonate with a wide constituency over an extended period of time. Whether they’ll secure is still to be seen, but certainly it’ll need longer than a season, silly or not.

The post Goodwin’s ’10 reasons why Britain will not rejoin the EU’: some thoughts appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Marko Stojić, Metropolitan University Prague

In recent years, the Western Balkans has experienced a significant decline in democracy. This has been especially pronounced in Serbia, a country that is no longer perceived as a functioning democracy but rather categorized as a partly free ‘electoral autocracy’. At the same time, Serbia has made some strides in its pursuit of EU membership, leading many observers to argue that the EU has become complicit in the erosion of democracy, supporting rather than discouraging this concerning trend.

More strikingly, the European Parliament (EP) – known for its commitment to upholding the EU’s fundamental values – and some transnational parties have also shown a disregard for the democratic decline, both within and beyond the Union. This has been particularly evident within the European People’s Party (EPP) which consistently shielded its former member, the Hungarian Fidesz, until 2021. In an article recently published in the Journal of Common Market Studies, I contend that the EPP has similarly turned a blind eye to the undemocratic practices of its Serbian affiliate, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

Namely, this transnational party did endorse progressively more critical EP resolutions on Serbia that, for instance, noted in 2023 that ‘the governing majority has steadily undermined some political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations’. However, a closer examination of the amendments tabled by the EPP group and their frequent motions for separate votes to exclude disapproving articles paints a different picture. The leading European party consistently sought to moderate the content of these politically important – although not legally binding – documents, aiming to shield its Serbian affiliate from severe criticism in the EP. The article, therefore, reinforced scholarly arguments that EU actors have considerably contributed to the rise of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in this region.

Protecting Serbia’s ruling party from criticism

The EPP frequently dismissed the arguments that there was a rollback of democracy in Serbia. It actively worked to remove from the 2021 EP resolution that ‘[The EP] regrets the lack of progress in many areas of Serbia’s reform agenda and the fact that there has even been backsliding on issues that are fundamental for EU accession’. The party vehemently contested articles that highlighted the role of the SNS in the erosion of democracy. For instance, it sought to eliminate references to ‘the ruling party’ from the article noting ‘monopolisation of the media landscape in the country by the ruling party’. Furthermore, the EPP opposed the inclusion of specific examples of high-level corruption, making unsuccessful attempts to vote down references to prominent and unsolved corruption cases involving senior SNS officials, such as ‘Krušik, Jovanjica, and Telekom Srbija’.

Likewise, the EPP’s narratives and official documents consistently overlooked the democratic decline. Party senior officials have rarely, if ever, publicly criticised the SNS for its illiberal practices. Instead, they emphasized Serbia’s readiness for changes and membership in the EU. While the 2021 EPP EU-Western Balkans declaration boasted that ‘we cannot compromise on values and rights’, it disregarded undemocratic tendencies in the countries governed by its affiliates. Its 2022 position paper on the Western Balkans thus praised the initiatives to ‘strengthen the independence and the efficacy of the judiciary’ and create ‘a better level playing field’ for the April 2022 election in Serbia. At the same time, it criticised the Socialist-led governments in Albania for democratic deterioration across three resolutions and called upon the EU to cross-check how democracy works in this country. The logic of partisan allegiance evidently shaped its contrasting approaches to countries led by EPP affiliates and those where EPP members were in the opposition.

When political and economic interests trump principles

Seeking a wider pan-European sway, the EPP strove to protect its Serbian member driven by strategic incentives. Viewing its non-EU allies as potential full members and valuable electoral assets in future EP elections, it had no incentives to excessively criticise the SNS. As one of the few ruling EPP members in this region and a dominant party in Serbia with a significant influence across the post-Yugoslav space, the SNS guaranteed an enduring presence of the EPP in the Western Balkans. An important factor contributing to this dynamic was the close personal relationship between SNS leader Aleksandar Vučić and former CDU leader Angela Merkel. Vučić consistently expressed unwavering admiration for Merkel, considering her as ‘the undisputed leader of Europe’. Crucially, he was a loyal partner in stemming the flow of migrants and preserving regional stability – two fundamental pillars of German Western Balkan policy.

Moreover, most EPP affiliates presumably lacked genuine interest in the issue of democracy in candidate states. Their positions were likely shaped by members more involved in Western Balkan matters – primarily the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union. Reflecting Germany’s vested political and economic interests, characterized by generous state subsidies, weak labour laws, and low wages, these EPP affiliates arguably aimed to downplay criticism of Serbian authorities. Moreover, the repeated attempts of the EPP rapporteur to remove critical remarks about ‘the dominant market position of (state-owned) Telekom Srbija’ and ‘the allegations that the ruling party is using it to increase its influence over the media market’ from the 2023 EP resolution exemplify how broader economic interests may influence the EPP’s lenient stance towards illiberal members.

Remarkable intra-party cohesion and few ideological outliers

The EPP displayed striking cohesion on votes pertaining to Serbian democracy. An overwhelming majority of EPP legislators systematically and consistently toed the party line. The observed voting pattern indicates that the positions of most EPP legislators on this matter were primarily influenced by strategic considerations driven by transnational partisan politics and the necessity to maintain cohesion. The EPP was interested in maintaining influence in the Western Balkans while avoiding alienation of the SNS. This approach took precedence over particular national interests, domestic electoral incentives, or ideological beliefs that might have otherwise inclined individual parties towards a more critical position.

At the same time, dissenting voices within the EPP constituted a small fraction, ranging from one to thirteen MEPs out of 177 legislators. Ideology seems to have predisposed their behaviour as their positions were fundamentally informed by contrasting normative commitments to liberal democratic principles. Notably, the parties that voted against nearly all provisions criticising Serbian authorities were illiberal national conservatives with close ties to Fidesz – the Hungarian Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. By contrast, most critical were two Dutch EPP Group members – the Christian Democratic Appeal and the Christian Union – committed to the EU as ‘a community of values’ sharing principles of freedom, the rule of law, and democracy.

EU credibility on the wane

The EPP’s reluctance to confront the democratic deterioration in Serbia proved to be detrimental to the EU’s enlargement policy as it further alienated pro-European parties and domestic stakeholders. A marked difference in how the European People’s Party – but also the Party of European Socialists – responded to similar autocratic tendencies in different candidate countries illustrates the lack of consistency among key EU players, damaging the Union’s already undermined credibility in the region. The article also points to transnational parties’ overall inability to be a driving force behind the ‘norm socialisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ of their affiliates. Finally, ignoring undemocratic tendencies within their ranks may eventually contribute to the decline of democratic norms in these party families themselves.

Marko Stojić works at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague. His work focuses on party politics in the European Union and the Western Balkans. He is the author of Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, Opposition or Defiance?.

The post Partners in Democratic Decline? The European People’s Party and the Serbian Progressive Party appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

International Shipping and Emissions: Background

 

Although international shipping accounts for approximately 3% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, its share of global emissions is projected to continue to rise in the coming decades.  

 

Accordingly, international shipping’s current trajectory is incompatible with the Paris Agreement and its 1.5° warming objective. At the 80th session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 80), members of the London-based UN agency finalised negotiations around a revised IMO strategy to reduce GHG emissions within international shipping. 

 

On 7 July 2023, the MEPC adopted the IMO 2023 Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. The strategy establishes the following targets: 

 

• Reduce emissions by 20% (compared to 2008 levels), striving for 30%, by 2030 
• Reduce emissions by 70%, striving for 80%, by 2040 
• Net-zero GHG emissions “by or around, i.e., close to, 2050” 

 

To get there, the IMO will employ a basket of economic and technical measures, leaving the door open for carbon pricing and other tools to be used. Although the 2023 IMO Strategy was not as ambitious as science and many states had called for, it was a multilateral compromise.  

 

Thanks to the UACES microgrant, I saw that compromise being reached firsthand.  

 

My Research Interest in Climate Diplomacy

 

As part of my PhD, I looked at the European Union’s (EU) climate diplomacy with respect to four multilateral negotiations, including the 2018 IMO Initial Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. For the Initial Strategy negotiation, EU member states supported Pacific Small Island Developing States in driving ambition within the IMO and in ultimately delivering the Initial Strategy. Since then, the EU has pushed forward on its own, with the inclusion of a shipping-related provision within the European Green Deal. Shipping will soon be included within the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS): a cap-and-trade mechanism aimed at reducing GHG emissions. Needless to say, I was very interested in seeing how these developments would shape the 2023 negotiations. 

 

Impact of The UACES Microgrant

 

When I began my PhD in 2019, I had every intention of conducting in-person interviews and participant observation as part of my data collection. Like many other PhD researchers, my plans were turned upside down with the COVID-19 pandemic. I relied heavily on WebEx and Microsoft Teams to speak with officials and diplomats. MEPC 80 was thus one of the first opportunities I had to observe a negotiation in person and interact with delegates. 

 

Going into MEPC 80, I was relatively confident – from an academic perspective – in my understanding of the IMO and multilateral negotiations. I quickly learned that practice and theory are very different things! It is one thing to read about the negotiation process, but observing in person how a compromise comes together is an entirely different matter. I feel privileged to have followed the process. To give a few examples, I observed impassioned interventions and unwavering efforts by Pacific Island States to increase ambition, diplomats huddled during coffee breaks in order to broker a deal on text, and an impressive spirit of camaraderie in the room when the 2023 Strategy was adopted.  

 

I am a much better scholar for having attended MEPC 80 as an academic observer and look forward to applying this rich data to my current research project. 

The post UACES Microgrant Report: Getting to the 2023 IMO Revised GHG Strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EUHealthGov held its third Practitioner Perspective on 19th July 2023. We were delighted to host Elizabeth Kuiper, Associate Director and Head of the Social Europe and Well-being programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) to discuss the evolving place of health on policy agendas between the COVID-19 pandemic and upcoming changes with a new Commission term and European Parliament elections in 2024.

Against the backdrop of current interconnected challenges spanning the geopolitical context and cost-of-living crises, the profile of health on EU-level agendas has gained more prominence. This has emerged not only via learnings from COVID-19 for public health and EU competence in health, but also via Commission President Von der Leyen’s greater ambitions for health from December 2019, where the previous Commission had seen health famously characterised as a “small thing”.

Elizabeth Kuiper’s experience of working in Brussels since 2010 has taken place alongside this evolving profile of health. Her work with the EPC on health has included highlighting the recent discussions about potential Treaty change and the contrasts between citizens’ calls for, and politicians’ equivocations regarding, more EU-level health competence in connection with marking 30 years of health as a Treaty competence in the Maastricht Treaty. The EPC have also engaged with the current evolutions regarding EU governance and the implications for health, issuing a bold proposal for an Executive Vice President for the Wellbeing Economy.

Elizabeth’s presentation also introduced the EPC’s recent work on examining what the European Health Union means – including as a narrowly-defined concept, or an aspiration. Bringing together a broad coalition of stakeholders (including academics and health representatives), the European Health Union Task Force has enabled the EPC to develop concrete recommendations which will be launched on 12th September 2023.

The EPC’s focus has been on extending the European Health Union beyond the now well-established pillars (including pandemic preparedness and the European Health Data Space) and questions of Treaty competence in recognition of attention this has received in other fora, notably the Conference on the Future of Europe. The directions indicated by this work include extending use of joint procurement to address inequalities and access, particularly for rare diseases; elevating HERA’s status to ensure more independence and autonomy in recognition that perspectives on health may change with the new Commission in 2024; highlighting the need for better implementation of recommendations for addressing the skills gap in the health workforce; and the need to explore more partnerships across the world and work more holistically at the global level in tackling health emergencies.

A recording of this event is available here.

The post Summary: Putting Health on the Agenda: Practitioner Perspectives from Elizabeth Kuiper appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

Between March and June 2023, I completed a RENPET-funded research stay at the KU Leuven Faculty of Social Sciences, within the Leuven International and European Studies department” (LINES). By embarking on this residency halfway through my PhD, I sought to get more acquainted with the top-tier research carried out at LINES and gain access to KU Leuven’s outstanding facilities all over Belgium, which include extensive bibliographic resources. 

 

During my stay, I took advantage of the institution’s proximity to Brussels: I conducted interviews with public officials from EU institutions and attended various international academic conferences and research seminars. My residency was very rewarding – and even surpassed my expectations. 

 

A Variety of Experiences

 

Additionally, I had the opportunity to experience KU Leuven’s dynamic academic life, including the Research Day of the Faculty of Social Sciences’ Doctoral Programme. I also delivered a guest lecture with bachelor students from American University, as part of a joint programme involving this institution and KU Leuven. My lecture addressed the evolution of global health governance and the EU’s interaction with it, paying particular attention to the effect of crises like COVID-19. This complemented the programme’s overall focus on the EU’s responses to external shocks.  

 

Closer to the end of my stay, I presented a draft of a book chapter – which will be one of the components of my PhD – at a “LINES session”, in which early-career scholars affiliated with the department discuss their work in progress in an informal setting. I also engaged with LINES researchers and other RENPET members at the 2nd RENPET annual conference, which took place at my home institution (IBEI) in late May-early June. This event allowed me to obtain additional feedback on my research.  

 

My RENPET residency at KU Leuven has been instrumental in propelling my PhD forward. During my stay, I finalized my first PhD article and submitted it to an academic journal, completed the first draft of a co-authored book chapter, and started working on the third component of my PhD – a journal article within a Special Issue to which other LINES and RENPET researchers will also contribute. In more formal terms, my three-month research stay in a prestigious university abroad will render me eligible for an International Mention, an honorary qualification awarded in the Spanish system that will add value to my PhD diploma. 

 

My gratitude goes to…

 

I am very grateful to Dr Kolja Raube (my host at the LINES department) and Dr Katja Biedenkopf (the coordinator of LINES) for warmly welcoming me and assisting me at every step, including in the months prior to my arrival. Special thanks also go out to Charlotte Debeuf (my wonderful office mate), Franziska Petri (my friendly office neighbour and fellow commuter from Brussels), and the rest of professors and colleagues from the LINES department. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Ingrid De Wachter, Greet Louw and Amin Mirabdollah for their kind and resourceful support in various capacities. Finally, I would like to thank UACES and RENPET for their generous sponsorship and for presenting early-career scholars with this valuable opportunity, among many others. 

 

More About the Author

 

Óscar Fernández is a PhD candidate in the program Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, under the supervision of Dr. Robert Kissack. He obtained a predoctoral contract from the H2020 research project ENGAGE (Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe). His fields of interest are the European Union’s external action, global health governance, international security, and conflict management. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Pompeu Fabra University, a Master’s degree in Advanced European and International Studies from the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and a Master’s degree in Internationalization from the University of Barcelona. Prior to joining IBEI, he was senior researcher at the EsadeGeo Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and junior researcher at the World Health Organization. 

 

 

The RENPET network invites applications from PhD students and Early-Career Researchers (within 5 years of their PhD) working in EU Foreign Policy, EU external relations or related fields to apply for bursaries to support an extended residency (2-3 months) at one of the network institutions. Find out more on the RENPET website. Apply for a residency via the UACES website.  

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A conversation with Scott Arthurson: For our podcast by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we welcome Scott Arthurson, doctoral student and politics tutor at the University of Melbourne, Australia. 

 

UACES Podcasts · Scott Arthurson on Populism and it’s definitional dilemmas Transcript of the interview is as follows:

 

 

This podcast is inspired by the research you presented at UACES’ Graduate Forum Research Conference in June 2023 and in your presentation, you discussed populism and its definitional dilemmas. One of the angles you explored was populism as an analytical category. For those of us who missed your presentation, could you tell us a bit more about this perspective?  

 

Of course! I borrow this term from Peter Worsley. I mean populism is mostly a category applied by intellectuals to divide up, categorize, and make sense of the world. It is something used to talk about and analyze.  

It’s rarely used as a rallying cry or term of self-identification: these days, it’s rare to find anyone claiming to be a populist, or calling for more populism, especially in Europe. When they do, they are often reacting to others calling them a populist, or criticizing mainstream rhetoric about populism. 

The term also isn’t very grounded in historical examples. There once was a party in the United States in the 1890s, that called themselves Populists. But most scholars of “populism” barely mention them. Instead, populism is used to compare various recent parties and politicians – even when they have very different political goals and methods.  

This makes it different from other contested political concepts like democracy, socialism, liberalism, freedom, equality, or conservatism. While people argue over what these words mean, the argument is more grounded either in movements laying claim to the concepts or in concrete historical examples. 

In contrast, populism is a bit of a catchall label to identify some political illness or pathology. 

Several scholars noted these problems early on – Peter Worsley in 1969, for instance, or Margaret Canovan in 1981. As they said, there’s never been a Populist International. Populism is not an identity, a rallying cry, or a brute fact in the world. It’s something we project onto it. It’s very open to interpretation. That’s what Peter Worsley meant when he called it a purely analytical category. 

Similarly, Canovan points out that the meaning of populism fluctuates depending on who is interpreting it – which is mostly intellectuals, academics, journalists, and so on. 

Even if the concept of populism turns out to be a useful analytical category, it has powerful rhetorical effects and shapes how we think about various political divides in Europe today, such as the tensions between the EU and popular democracy. It is often used to posit lots of different political actors as an Other, as a threat to the existing order.   

 

 

 Part of your research paper outlines how narrow definitions of populism can be problematic. Can you detail why this is? 

 

Good question. The concept of populism has been applied to many different political actors and accumulated a lot of different connotations. It’s been applied to Third World anti-imperial movements, McCarthyism, popular politics and economic policy in Latin America, Margaret Thatcher, Nazism and communism, radical right parties in Europe since the 1980s, and anti-austerity left politics like Occupy Wall Street, Syriza, Bernie Sanders and Podemos. 

It’s been defined as a political strategy manipulating the masses to gain power, as the ideology of the middle class, as a counter-hegemonic discourse, as illiberal democracy, as a thin ideology counterposing a virtuous people to a bad elite, as the endorsement of the cultural-political low over the high, and so on and so on. 

One logical response to this chaos is to narrow down the term’s connotations, to arrive at a definition that accommodates all the different cases. This is what you’d call a minimal definition. On the upside, you get a definition that fits the cases. But there are problems. 

First, you might come to something so narrow that it doesn’t say much. 

The only thing shared by almost all things called populism is they’re some kind of appeal to the popular as a source of value or legitimacy. But this applies to most democratic politics. Yet, strangely, we don’t call it all populist. 

This brings us to the second problem: the things in common between the cases may not be the real reason they bear the same label. Supposing we defined populism as any popular appeal against an elite. 

Now, someone might label something populist partly due to other connotations they associate with the term – for example, that it is dangerous, or anti-pluralist –  even if they can just justify the labelling on the basis of the official definition. 

Worse, the reason may lie mostly outside of the populists themselves. For example, they might all have a similar relationship to the interpreter. Supposing you heard a group of friends calling other groups “enemies”, and you wanted to define what an “enemy” is. Now, you might be able to find some things all these enemies have in common. But the real reason for the label here is the relationship these groups have with their interpreters.

Alternatively, you can define populism by including more necessary connotations but narrowing the cases it applies to. So you might say, like Jan-Werner Muller does, that appealing to the people against an elite is not enough to constitute populism. Rather, populism entails a claim to exclusively represent the people, while really only standing for a fraction of them. Therefore it is not just anti-elitist, but anti-pluralist, anti-democratic, and deceptive. Any so-called populists who don’t meet this definition aren’t really populists at all. 

But this creates new problems. First, it can be arbitrary, and at odds with normal usage. Muller is pretty vague in some of his work about whether the original U.S. Populists are populists at all or the status of a number of left-wing populists. You see this even more with Kurt Weyland’s definition, which excludes some of the most famous cases of populism in Europe. 

Further, such definitions reinforce very specific connotations which in practice get ascribed to anyone people commonly think of as a populist. 

So either way, you aren’t capturing the real usage of the term. You either suppress important connotations, which nonetheless persist in how people think of populism. Or you cut off important cases of populism, which people will keep calling populism anyway. 

 

 

 

You make interesting points there. Building upon this, can you explain why research about populism matters?

 

Narrow definitions are a way of simplifying the world, and imposing particular ideological perspectives.  If our goal is clarification and understanding of a term’s usage, it makes more sense to me to map the various ways it is used, rather than drawing strict boundaries around its meaning. 

This mapping also provides resources for critique – once we understand how a term is really used, we are in a better to assess this usage, it’s effects, and how we might prefer to define it if we do wish to enter the ideological fray. 

In my case, I propose a definition of populism which has a very broad criterion for what all cases of populism have in common, but I combine this with an open-textured criterion relating to how intellectuals fill out the meaning of the term. 

 

 

 

At the Graduate Forum Conference in June, you discussed your research on a panel with two other academics with different specialisms. Did you find presenting your research in this environment particularly useful? Were any insights from the other PhD researchers interesting to you and your research?  

 

I enjoyed it! I thought the other panellists’ papers were really fascinating – and while they were looking at very different subject matter, they crossed over with mine in some interesting and unexpected ways. One paper on abortion laws and women’s rights in Poland, for instance, ended up addressing issues with contested concepts, including democracy, which is something pretty central to my own work. Such crossovers were eye-opening as to how certain problems I need to unpack in my own work are not unique to it, but occur in different ways in different contexts. 

Above all, it was great to have a chance to discuss our work afterwards, share our thoughts and ideas, and share some quite specific feedback on the papers themselves – I think having read each other’s papers was helpful for this. 

 

 

 

Good to hear that you had a good time! You also came quite a long way to the event in Barcelona, as you’re based at the University of Melbourne in Australia. How did you find out about our Graduate Forum Research Conference and did you find it useful for networking? 

 

I was searching online for conferences in Europe relevant to my studies. I wanted to get over to Europe, partly to meet more academics in my field, and to spend more time in the European context, since it’s the main focus for parts of my thesis. The UACES was one of two conferences I attended on this trip. I also took the opportunity to do some further travelling and see some people I know here. 

It’s always good to meet people in your field. Part of this is making professional contacts and meeting future collaborators. But what I value most is the chance for intellectual discussions and relationships with people interested in similar questions and topics. That helps to challenge, refine, and reshape your ideas and how you express them – and to bring them back to a shared frame of reference. Ultimately, if we’re studying politics or European Studies we want our ideas to connect to real issues, and I think dialogue helps us to do this. 

I met some lovely people, learnt a lot, and had some great discussions at the conference. I hope to stay in touch with some of the other researchers I met there. 

 

 

 

Thank you so much, Scott, for telling us more about your research and the conference. It was a pleasure meeting you. I recall you are a doctoral student and politics tutor at the University of Melbourne, Australia. 

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I am incredibly grateful to have been awarded the prestigious UACES scholarship. As a Ph.D. candidate in political science, this incredible opportunity has allowed me to embark on an exciting journey to the heart of European politics to conduct fieldwork research.

The capital of Belgium and the de-facto capital of the European Union, Brussels served as an ideal setting for my research. I was immediately struck by the rich history and cosmopolitan atmosphere of the vibrant city. With its numerous EU institutions, policymakers, and international organizations, conducting fieldwork in Brussels presented a unique opportunity to explore the captivating realm of European politics.

With the support of the UACES scholarship, I spent 7 weeks researching in Brussels from the 27th of March to the 14th of May 2023. The scholarship covered my transport, accommodation, and food expenses, providing me with a remarkable opportunity to conduct research for my thesis on the European Union’s capacity as an autonomous actor in international affairs, with a particular focus on its involvement in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

 

The Why of This Trip

The primary objective of my research trip was to conduct in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and experts within EU institutions. Engaging in direct conversations with policymakers, advisors, and scholars allowed me to gain a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s strategies, positions, and interactions with other international actors in the context of international conflict resolution. These interviews form the cornerstone of my thesis and provide invaluable firsthand insights into the EU’s role, actions, and decision-making processes during the Iranian nuclear crisis.

 

Conducting Interviews and Networking

Thanks to the UACES scholarship, I had the privilege of conducting interviews with EU officials in prominent institutions, including the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament. These enlightening conversations offered unique perspectives on the EU’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear crisis, providing a crucial empirical foundation for my thesis. Analyzing the rich data collected during my interviews, I hope to contribute to the academic discourse on the EU’s international actorness and autonomy.

Moreover, this research trip facilitated valuable collaborations and networking opportunities. I was honored to be a visiting researcher at both Kent University’s Brussels School of International Studies and at the Université libre de Bruxelles. These research stays not only provided me with essential resources such as libraries, internet facilities, and academic working spaces, but also connected me with respected researchers and experts specializing in the Iranian nuclear crisis and European politics. The guidance and support from these esteemed host institutions significantly enhanced the quality and depth of my research, fostering an environment of intellectual exchange and interdisciplinary engagement

 

Concluding the Benefits

As my fieldwork research in Brussels drew to a close, I felt a deep sense of gratitude and accomplishment. The UACES scholarship not only provided the means for me to conduct in-depth interviews but also enabled me to immerse myself in the vibrant political landscape of the European Union. The knowledge and insights gained from this research trip will undoubtedly shape my future academic pursuits and significantly contribute to my thesis research, shedding light on the EU’s role in the Iranian nuclear crisis and its broader actorness in international affairs.

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A UACES Microgrant Report

 

Europe has been facing a decade of crises. From the financial and refugee crises of the early and mid-2010s, to the Covid pandemic opening the new decade and the looming threat of climate change. These are some of the recurrent topics at the CES 29th International Conference of Europeanists, hosted by the University of Iceland in Reykjavik. The theme of the event, Europe’s Past, Present and Future: Utopias and Dystopias, invited multidisciplinary reflections about the successes and failures of European integration, as well as finding a way forward.

 

Hungary and Poland and their stance toward Russia

Arguably, Europe finds itself at a crossroads. Democracy has been in steady decline in multiple countries, nationalist and populist narratives have been dominating the political discourse and shifting priorities on pan-continental cooperation, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again brought war on European soil. My research focuses on the European Union, and in the paper I presented at the conference, I discussed the effect of democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland on the EU’s response to Russia’s war of aggression. Analysing the diverging responses of these two member states’ governments highlights the pitfalls and contradictions of their ideologies. Hungary, for example, has remained aligned with Russia, spreading Russian disinformation and validating narratives of a perceived Western responsibility in the conflict, despite itself being a NATO and EU member. Poland, on the contrary, has staunchly condemned Russia and provided an unmatched level of aid to Ukraine, urging its Western allies to up their efforts accordingly. Nevertheless, the leading PiS party and government continue to erode democracy at home and have instrumentalised the conflict to claim that EU institutions are weak and serving Russian interests in an attempt to justify their rejection of supranational oversight.

 

“In Europe, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit”

These are only some of the paradoxes of nationalism as seen in Hungary, Poland, Russia, and on the rise in other European countries, which was itself a central theme of the CES conference. In the opening keynote speech, the President of Iceland Guðni Th. Jóhannesson offered some enlightening remarks on the topic “In Europe, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit. Presidents and Academics, Nationalism and Objectivity.” As an academic turned head of state, President Jóhannesson provided his personal account about the need to reconcile national interests, unity and pride, with the objectivity of academic rigour and both the freedom and duty to be critical of past mistakes.

 

UACES Microgrant

Thanks to the UACES microgrant, I was able to attend three days of panels and discussion which greatly nurtured my own research, as well as being able to present my paper and receive feedback from esteemed academics and fellow early-career researchers. With both, the invasion of Ukraine and the rule of law crisis being popular topics across multiple disciplines, this was an exceptional opportunity that would not have been possible without the support of UACES. I am confident that what I have learned and the connections I have made will enrich my research and will help inform my future teaching endeavours. For that I am very grateful.

 

 

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Andrew Gunn

The UK Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) has returned following revisions, but how has it changed? Are we any nearer to solving the wicked problem of measuring university teaching? And why did England, which already has mature quality assurance arrangements, need to introduce the TEF in the first place?

 

New Framework

This September will see universities in England receive new Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) ratings. The TEF is a national scheme designed to assess universities for ‘excellence’ in teaching, learning and student outcomes for undergraduate level education.  It confers Olympic-medal-inspired awards of gold, silver, or bronze— which the UK government sees as a way of incentivising universities to deliver excellence in the areas that matter most to students.

For the last few years, the TEF – which produced its first set of results seven years ago – has been on hiatus. During this time, the framework has been revised and methodological work has been undertaken to develop new ways of measuring university teaching.

With this work complete, in January, all higher education providers with over 500 students were required to enter the scheme. This involves a written submission which is considered alongside a set of indicators, which includes responses to the National Student Survey and metrics on student continuation and completion. This evidence is assessed by TEF panels, comprised of academics with leadership responsibilities and students with experience of representing their peers.

New features for this round of the TEF include an independent student submission, designed to provide insights into what it is like to be a student at a particular provider. Although this component is optional, 204 student submissions from 228 participating institutions were received.

Another change is a clearer distinction between student experience and student outcomes in the framework. To reflect this, in addition to all providers receiving one overall Olympic-medal style award they will also receive two underpinning ratings – one for student outcomes and another for student experience – to signal where a provider excels in one aspect.

 

Time for Transparency

The TEF can be seen as a response to a range of calls for universities to be subject to greater transparency. What if quality assurance is not enough? What if we don’t just want to assure or enhance quality but measure performance and compare a university with another? These drivers account for the UK government’s decision to introduce the TEF, and its continued commitment to the scheme in the face of sustained criticism. The TEF can therefore be viewed as more of a transparency tool than a quality assessment.

We can see a movement in the last two decades calling for more information on how well universities perform. Rather than assuring quality, this is about assessing and comparing performance. We need to know how things are, not what we think they should be. In other words, we need to know how well universities perform in the game, not what the rules of the game are.

This trend can be seen in the work of Dirk Van Damme, then Head of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation at the OECD, who wrote in 2009 about the need for new ‘transparency-enhancing regulatory systems’.

Reflecting on the effects of the Bologna Process at that time, Van Damme talked of the need for:

“a system which provides information on the essential dimensions of programme and institutional diversity in higher education, not driven by ex ante types of regulatory divisions, but on evidence-based ex post documentation. The number of dimensions should be sufficient to allow for a fair assessment of institutions and programmes, but not too many, allowing easy consumption of the information and avoiding information overload.” (Van Damme, 2009 p. 51)

Greater transparency was required, Van Damme argued, as quality assurance and accreditation systems “cannot fully satisfy the demand for transparency” as they do not present information to the public in a single format they can easily absorb.

 

Teaching and Transparency

Signally the quality of universities is, of course, a role now fulfilled by the rankings that are widely reported in the media. However, even if we set aside the methodological issues, there is a problem with using rankings – they are largely concerned with research. The absence of teaching in rankings creates a rationale for new transparency tools focusing on university teaching. And if we want to know about university teaching, do we also need to measure learning and student outcomes?

However, as van der Wende and Westerheijden (2009) point out, we are immediately confronted with the longstanding problem: “there are, in fact, no widely accepted methods for measuring teaching quality” and it “is even more difficult, it seems, to generate data based on measures of the value added during the educational process”.

Over the last two decades work has been undertaken to address this problem. Those following European endeavours in this area will recall the OECD’s abandoned Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes (AHELO) project. The failure of this project reminds us that measuring what students have ‘learned’ or ‘gained’ is no easier than measuring teaching quality.

 

The TEF and Transparency

The TEF can been seen as an English response to the calls for greater transparency, and an attempt to address the ‘wicked problem’ of measuring university teaching and learning. As my book Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism identifies, comparisons can be drawn between the difficulties encountered by AHELO and the development of ‘Learning Gain’ metrics for the TEF.

The book charts the development of the TEF from its announcement in 2015, through its various revisions, to its current iteration. This story provides insights into the methodological work undertaken to measure university teaching. Several new metrics were developed and piloted, including: graduate earnings, teaching intensity to measure contact time, and learning gain to assess the ‘journey travelled’ by students. Of note is why some of the new metrics did not make the grade and do not feature in the revised scheme.

Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism also looks at the role of the TEF in providing information to applicants in the more liberalised market. Here, the UK government originally envisaged the TEF as helping consumers to make an informed choice on where to study. For example, universities rated gold would attract more students.

However, as the book explores, the limitations of the TEF as a measure of teaching quality also hamper its ability to inform choice. Moreover, reducing the performance of a whole university to one medal rating is questionable, and comparing institutions – even within one country with the same quality arrangements – is difficult.

The story of the TEF is of value as it contributes to the debate on how to measure teaching and learning in higher education. The lessons learnt from the TEF, including the aspects that did not work, provide a benchmark for scholars and other systems to learn from.

 

Andrew Gunn is a Lecturer at the University of Manchester (UK) and the author of Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism published by SAGE.

 

References:

Van Damme, D. (2009). The search for transparency: Convergence and diversity in the Bologna Process. In van Vught, F. (Ed.). Mapping the higher education landscape. Towards a European classification on higher education, (pp.39-55), Springer.

Van der Wende, M., & Westerheijden, D. (2009). Rankings and classifications: The need for a multidimensional approach. In van Vught, F. (Ed.). Mapping the higher education landscape. Towards a European classification of higher education, (pp.71-86), Springer.

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A mild detour for me before the summer holidays kick in: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Part of the wider logic of ‘taking back control’ was the need to unshackle the UK from other constraints on its freedom to do as it will, in order to address situations it faces. Just as leaving the EU was framed as becoming a more nimble and flexible international partner, so too has the status of the ECHR long been a sore point when it comes to managing migration, asylum and deportations.

The long saga of the Rwanda policy (Note to self: must make a graphic to try an unpick the logic) has only reinvigorated this latter point. Tory backbenchers talk about ‘leaving the ECHR’ now, just as they have done for some time, to allow the government to implement its democratically-agreed policy.

The graphic below takes such comments at face value. It explains how a state ‘leaves the ECHR’ (basically, you write a letter and wait six months), but also the various consequences.

The aim here is to highlight the interconnected nature of laws and of treaties: obligations towards the ECHR aren’t only found in the ECHR treaty itself.

None of what’s here is particularly new: Steve Peers wrote extensively about this within weeks of the TCA’s sign-off in early 2021, for example.

“That’s not what they meant”

When I posted this yesterday, the response was interesting, in that various people came back to argue that none of this was really about ‘leaving the ECHR’ (despite that being literally what was being said), but about ‘leaving the Court’.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is created by the ECHR Convention to adjudicate on cases relating to provisions (Article 19, fact fans). A simple explanation would be that the ECtHR is the ECHR equivalent of the European Court of Justice in the EU, i.e. the final arbiter of the relevant provisions. That means those resident within ECHR signatories can ultimately take their cases up to Strasbourg for a ruling, which national courts then have to abide by.

In the UK case, there was a long period when that was pretty much the only way people could rely on ECHR provisions, because successive British governments hadn’t wanted to incorporate the Convention into domestic law. You still had the protection of the various provisions, but you had to make a lot of effort to enforce them.

This changed with the Human Rights Act 1998, which essentially gave people access to ECHR remedies from domestic courts. But doesn’t change the basic nature of British membership of the ECHR.

Which brings us back to the critique mentioned.

Maybe backbenchers want to bin the Human Rights Act. That they can certainly do, but it wouldn’t stop those pesky activists securing remedies and rulings from the ECtHR, so it’s not really a solution to their basic problem.

Maybe, as one person argued, it’s literally about the UK not being part of the ECtHR, while still being in the ECHR.

Without wanting to go all Donald Tusk, this is cherry-picking in its purest form.

The ECHR Convention only provides for complete denunciation (Article 58): you leave a bit, you leave completely. If the UK wanted to try for not having the ECtHR provisions apply to it, then it would have to secure a formal renegotiation of the Convention and the approval of the other members.

[Spoiler: those members aren’t going to agree to this]

In short, none of these paths are viable: being in the ECHR is like being pregnant – you either are or you aren’t.

Rule Britannia

The underlying tone in all of this debate is very much akin to that found in the Brexit debates: why can’t we just do what we want to?

The notion of the UK as a great nation, not to be told what to do, is a strong and pervasive one. But it also leads us to think that just because we want to do things in a particular way, others must let us.

One of the big takeaways I have from the past decade has been that international politics is about the clash of what everybody wants and that no one gets to decide things by themselves.

You want to make international arrangements? You need to get your international partners to agree.

You want to make a choice about something with an international dimension? You need to accept that others will react to that.

Which isn’t to say that ECHR membership is good or bad; just that it requires us to understand what that means and how it works.

PDF: bit.ly/UshGraphic122

 

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