Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Opinión - 24/11/2015
Carlos Malamud
El kirchnerismo como lo hemos conocido está próximo a su desaparición y es de esperar que con él también se acabe el sectarismo dominante en el país en la última década. El voto mayoritario de los argentinos fue por el cambio, que Mauricio Macri y su núcleo supieron valorar correctamente.

Im Zuge seiner territorialen Ausbreitung hat der Islamische Staat (IS) strategisch bedeutsame Wasserressourcen und weite Teile der Wasserinfrastruktur in Syrien und im Irak unter seine Kontrolle gebracht. Als Teil ihrer Expansionsstrategie eroberte die Miliz mehrere wichtige Staudämme an Euphrat und Tigris und hat vor allem seit 2014 Wasser auf unterschiedliche Weise als Waffe eingesetzt. Von außen lässt sich diese Praxis mit ihren fatalen Folgen kaum unterbinden. Allerdings ist der Handlungsspielraum auch für den IS beschränkt. Denn eine funktionierende Wasser- und Stromversorgung in den eroberten Gebieten ist für die Miliz von existentieller Bedeutung. Sollte das nach den Anschlägen von Paris verstärkte militärische Eingreifen der Anti-IS-Koalition die Miliz jedoch zum weiträumigen Rückzug zwingen, drohen dramatische und großflächige Überflutungen ganzer Regionen.

Ende Oktober 2014 trat der seit 27 Jahren amtierende Staatspräsident Blaise Compaoré nach massiven Protesten zurück. Auslöser der Revolte war eine von Compaoré geplante Verfassungsänderung, die ihm eine fünfte Amtszeit ermöglicht hätte. Im September 2015 vereitelte eine sozial und räumlich breit angelegte Protestbewegung den Putschversuch der Präsidentengarde gegen die zivile Übergangsregierung. Vor welch immensen Herausforderungen der westafrikanische Sahelstaat nach den Wahlen Ende November 2015 stehen wird, zeigt der Blick auf Gerichtsbarkeit, Parteienlandschaft und Rolle des Militärs. Wird die Diskrepanz zwischen einer relativ starken Zivilgesellschaft und schwachen demokratischen Institutionen nicht überwunden, ist eine demokratische Konsolidierung unwahrscheinlich. Es wird darauf ankommen, eine funktionierende parlamentarische Kontrolle über die Armee zu installieren und sozioökonomische Reformen durchzusetzen.

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United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan Nicholas Haysom told an IPI audience that the country faced three transitions—security, economic, and political—and must manage them all to survive. “It has no option,” he said. “It can’t do two out of three and pass. If it goes down on the economy or on the security, or politically unravels, all three would be terminal.”

Mr. Haysom, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said the country would face critical tests at upcoming donor conferences in Warsaw and Brussels.

“Afghanistan is aid dependent, and the challenges it faces requires at least the same level of aid in a context in which there are a number of other conflicts making demands for the donor community, and the international community generally, because already, many of the donor countries have agreed to take money to meet the demands arising out of the influx of migrants, out of the development aid budget,” he said.

“So Afghanistan faces these two events with the task of persuading the international community that it has so managed its transition that it is worth investing in.”

On the economic transition, he asserted that despite more than a decade of foreign aid, the level of poverty in the country is unchanged since 2001. Hopes for mineral wealth proved illusory, he said, and even the agricultural industry has suffered, with foods once exported for profit now being imported. The formerly booming transport and construction sectors have also crashed.

In the capital, there is pervasive joblessness. “What we have in Kabul might be described by some as a pre-Arab Spring moment, where youth with higher expectations are meeting a situation in which there are simply no jobs,” he said.

The year 2014 began a number of changes that complicated the security transition for Afghanistan, he said. A Government of National Unity was formed, including the newly elected President, Ashraf Ghani, and his onetime chief political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, as its Chief Executive. At the same time, the responsibility for combatting the Taliban was assumed by the Afghan National Security forces after the departure of international forces.

A key question facing the country’s future is whether the government, the Taliban, and the neighboring government in Pakistan recognize that the situation is ripe to make peace. “There are certainly pockets within the Taliban that appreciate that a future Afghanistan cannot be administered by one party, and who recognize that at the end of the day there needs to be a political solution,” he said.

While the Afghan and Pakistani governments have gone on the record to state their ultimate ambition is a negotiated solution, this has not translated into action by President Ghani yet. “The government is yet to establish its architecture for engaging in a peace process,” he said.

As for progress for engagement with the Taliban, the governmental body tasked with doing so since 2010, the High Peace Council, “has been in stasis for over a year,” he said. This, he said, is because the “government has recognized that there is limited space domestically for it to engage in a peace process.”

Summarizing his recommendations for the economic, political, and security transitions, Mr. Haysom said, “Viability for Afghanistan requires success over the transition, requires a Government of National Unity to stay together, requires Afghan National Security Forces to hold the ground, requires the economy not to suffer a major default, and it requires the international community to be forthcoming in Warsaw and Brussels.”

He also said that donors would want to see progress in constructing and improving a system for elections before pledging funds to Afghanistan in 2016. The international community “will not be forthcoming in Warsaw and Brussels unless there is demonstrable progress, in the reforms, notably the anti-corruption reforms inside Afghanistan, and one thing we haven’t mentioned, the donor countries, if only for their own domestic constituents, will want to see proof of further democratization in Afghanistan.”

Asked if the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had made inroads into the country, he said the extent of their presence is still unclear, but that the UN does not “take it lightly.”

He said that this non-state actor presents a unique challenge for the UN, an organization of states. “We believe that whereas the Taliban generally have some respect to [the] humanitarian framework, humanitarian workers, UN in general, ISIS doesn’t, and that our staff would be targets, for both abduction and symbolic attacks, and it really does effect” UN planning, he said.

For UNAMA, “as a mission with 13 field offices across the country, we have to have as good a reading as we can of the ISIS presence, and threats to our staff and operations.”

He also added that Afghans had become the second most populous refugee group, behind those fleeing the Syrian civil war. “We don’t underestimate the number of Afghans,” he said. “They are clearly #2 just after Syrians and in some cases surpassing even Syrians, according to my European colleagues in Kabul.”

He said he considers part of his job encouraging the Taliban to speak with the government of Afghanistan. “My own position with them, that I shared with them, is that there can be no progress towards peace if you don’t engage with the government because that is the only way in which you can strike real bargains, reach compromises, or at the minimum reach agreements that would serve as the basis for arrangements by which Afghans live in peace together.”

The event was held as part of IPI’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) series.

Warren Hoge, IPI Senior Adviser for External Relations, moderated the discussion.

Watch event:

La France a subi en janvier et en novembre 2015 deux séries d’attentats abjectes sur son territoire. Ce ne sont malheureusement pas les premiers qui touchent notre pays et il serait naïf de croire qu’ils pourraient être les derniers...

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The United Nations (UN) climate summit (COP 21) in Paris is the most important opportunity for years to come to organise effective collective action at the international level to stabilise global warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius (°C), or at least limit it to a maximum of 2°C; facilitate the transition towards a zero-carbon economy; and mobilise significant financial resources to adapt to climate change, particularly in the most vulnerable countries. The European Union (EU) is in a unique position to contribute decisively to these ends.
With its climate pledge from March 2015, the EU has made explicit what it considers to be a fair offer, in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, to further an ambitious and fair deal, the EU should be prepared to offer even more in the key negotiating fora, especially regarding adaptation and finance.
With the negotiations towards COP 21 in full swing and the EU’s negotiation mandate fixed, however, the real work will begin after Paris. Five building blocks will be of particular importance to demonstrate European leader-ship: (1) mitigation, (2) adaptation, including the issue of loss and damage (L&D), (3) climate finance, (4) a framework for non-state climate actions and (5) the building of ambitious alliances.
1. Mitigation: The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of the EU and its member states represents an important step in the right direction, but it is not ambitious enough to really make the EU a climate leader. The INDC target of 40 per cent emission reductions by 2030 is based on a scenario of 80 per cent decarbonisation by 2050. This puts the EU at the lower end of its long-term goal of 80–95 per cent by mid-century. Attaining the 40 per cent target by 2030 does not necessarily enable the EU to reach a goal of 80 per cent by 2050, even if it were on track to reach its 40 per cent target in 2030 – which it is not.
2. Adaptation and L&D: The international community has waited too long and acted too weakly to fully avoid dangerous climate change, meaning more vulnerable countries and populations will be increasingly affected by severe impacts of climate change. Action on adaptation as well as L&D is therefore crucial for COP 21 and beyond, and the EU should be seen as treating these issues with the same priority and urgency as mitigation.
3. Climate finance: Climate finance is the most straight-forward way to demonstrate an international commitment to fight climate change and its impacts. To demonstrate resolve and credibility, the EU’s contributions for mitigation and adaptation will need to be made in addition to its conventional development finance.
4. A framework for non-state climate actions: The EU has been a frontrunner in promoting greater engagement of non-state and subnational actors in global climate policy. It should thus support a long-term action agenda and policy framework to facilitate and galvanise bottom-up climate actions.
5. Ambitious alliances: Since 2011, the EU has made considerable efforts to revitalise its external climate action and related diplomacy. Paris will be a vantage point to capitalise on new opportunities.

In der Politik wird wenig so gefürchtet wie ein Großereignis, auf das die Verantwortlichen konzeptionell und operativ schlecht vorbereitet sind. Trotz mangelnder Planungen oder Instrumente müssen die zuständigen Stellen reagieren. Damit setzen unerwartete Ereignisse die Entscheidungsträger dem Risiko aus, unter Bedingungen erheblicher Unsicherheit womöglich weitreichende Beschlüsse treffen zu müssen – und das meist auch noch zeitnah, so dass wenig Raum für Reflektion, Analyse und Beratung bleibt.

Nun gilt für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik mit ihrer Vielzahl an Akteur/innen, Interessen und Einflussfaktoren in besonderem Maße: Ungeplant ist der Normalfall (vgl. SWP-Foresight-Studien 2011 und 2013). Revolutionäre Umbrüche oder machtpolitische Manöver vollziehen sich außerhalb der Tagesordnungen, die den ordentlichen politischen Prozess prägen. Beispielhaft dafür stehen die Entwicklung in Nahost und Nordafrika seit 2011 oder die Reaktion Russlands auf den Machtwechsel in der Ukraine Anfang 2014.

Bei der nachträglichen Analyse unerwarteter Ereignisse stellt sich regelmäßig heraus, dass es im Vorfeld durchaus Warnsignale gab. Diese wurden meist auch rechtzeitig erkannt, aber nicht so gedeutet, wie es hinsichtlich ihrer späteren Relevanz angemessen gewesen wäre. Im Bewusstsein dieser Problematik setzen sich die Autorinnen und Autoren der dritten SWP-Foresight-Studie auf Basis wissenschaftlich angeleiteter Vorausschau mit möglichen Zukunftsszenarien auseinander, die bereits jetzt mehr politische Beachtung verdienen. Gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt der Beiträge ist, dass die geschilderten Situationen die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik vor gravierende Herausforderungen stellen würden – unabhängig davon, ob die jeweiligen Ereignisse eher krisenhaften oder chancenreichen Charakter hätten.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Lars Brozus
Einleitung: Der Nutzen wissenschaftlich angeleiteter Vorausschau
S. 5

Johannes Thimm / Lars Brozus
Mississippi Blues: Staatskrise in den USA
S. 11

Christian Becker / Hanns Günther Hilpert / Hanns W. Maull / Alexandra Sakaki
Asien-Pazifik: Ein Erdbeben erschüttert das geopolitische Gleichgewicht
S. 17

Oliver Meier / Marcel Dickow
Der Ukraine-Konflikt und die Gefahr nuklearer Zwischenfälle
S. 21

Sabine Fischer / Margarete Klein / Alexander Libman
Vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2018: Autonomiekonflikt im russischen Fernen Osten
S. 27

Bettina Rudloff / Nils Simon
Kleine Ursache, große Wirkung: Bienensterben in Nordafrika gefährdet eine labile Region
S. 34

Steffen Angenendt / Anne Koch / Amrei Meier
2020 – Wie Deutschland und die EU die größte Flüchtlingskrise der Nachkriegszeit bewältigten
S. 40

Ronja Kempin / Barbara Lippert
2025 – Das Auswärtige Amt verschwindet, das Europäische Außenministerium übernimmt
S. 46

Dušan Reljic
Foresight-Rückschau: »Ein Land – ein Volk – ein Traum«. Die Albaner schaffen die Grenzen zwischen ihren Territorien ab
S. 53

Verzeichnis der Abkürzungen
S. 58

Verzeichnis der Autorinnen und Autoren
S. 59

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