European Union

Saturday 19 September 2015

Visit to Egypt
11.30 Meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 

12.45 Joint press statement

 Sunday 20 September 2015

Visit to Jordan
12.00 Meeting with H.M. the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein

Visit of a refugee camp 

Tuesday 22 September 2015

13.00 Meeting with President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker 

15.00 Meeting with High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini

Wednesday 23 September 2015

15.00  European People's Party Summit (Stanhope Hotel) 

18.00  Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government

Thursday 24 September 2015

09.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron (photo opportunity)

11.45 Meeting with President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz (European Parliament)

Question for oral answer O-000103/2015
to the Council
Rule 128
Elena Valenciano, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The Council of the European Union,

1.           UNDERLINES the critical importance of the 2015 Paris Conference as a historic milestone for enhancing global collective action and accelerating the global transformation to a low-carbon and climate-resilient society. 

Urgency and need for global action

2.           NOTES with concern the findings contained in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); UNDERLINES that global warming is unequivocal and that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. 

3.           STRESSES that, consistent with recent IPCC findings, in order to stay below 2°C, global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 at the latest, be reduced by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 1990[1] and be near zero or below by 2100; in this context, WELCOMES the Leaders' declaration at the G7 Summit in June 2015 and EMPHASISES that all Parties should pursue transformative pathways towards a long-term vision of global and sustainable climate neutrality and climate resilience in the second half of this century; RECALLS the EU objective, in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990.

Paris outcome

4.           EMPHASISES the importance of agreeing at the Paris Conference: i) an ambitious and durable legally-binding agreement under the UNFCCC ("the Paris Agreement") applicable to all Parties and addressing in a balanced and cost-effective manner mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support and containing ambitious nationally determined mitigation commitments; ii) a comprehensive package of decisions to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to outline interim arrangements before its entry into force; and iii) a decision on enhancing global pre-2020 mitigation ambition, supported by the Lima Paris Action Agenda. 

5.           UNDERLINES that the Paris outcome should send a strong signal on finance in order to support poor and vulnerable countries and enable the transition to resilient, low greenhouse gas economies.  

Further process in 2015

6.           NOTES the considerable amount of work still ahead in order to reach the Paris outcome; CONCERNED about the lack of substantial progress on the negotiating text up to now; ENCOURAGES the co-Chairs of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to prepare a revised and concise negotiating text containing the main options, on the basis of the views expressed by Parties, with a view to a fruitful early ministerial engagement before the Paris Conference. 

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)

7.           WELCOMES the submission of INDCs so far; UNDERLINES that the EU and its Member States have submitted their INDC on 6 March 2015, which is a binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990; URGES all Parties which have not yet done so to come forward with fair and ambitious INDCs as soon as possible in the coming few weeks; in this context, WELCOMES opportunities for facilitative exchanges of views on the level of the aggregate effort towards the below 2°C objective, including through the forthcoming UNFCCC synthesis report and the INDC Forum in Rabat, Morocco, on 12-13 October 2015. 

Paris Agreement

8.           NOTES the Commission communication “The Paris Protocol - a blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020” as a contribution for articulating a vision by the EU and its Member States in view of the Paris Conference. 

9.           PROPOSES that the internationally legally-binding Paris Agreement: 

-        provide a long-term vision of the needed transformation towards low-emission and climate-resilient economies over the course of this century; 

-        enable the participation of all Parties and engagement of non-state actors; 

-        be in the form of a protocol in order to enshrine the strongest expression of political will and provide predictability and durability; 

-   enter into force after ratification by a significant number of Parties representing a significant level of emissions so as to ensure that the Paris Agreement is truly global and effective.         

Mitigation

10.        PROPOSES that the Paris Agreement: 

-   set out a long-term global mitigation goal in line with the below 2°C objective; 

-   contain fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments by all Parties, consistent with the UNFCCC's principles applied in light of different national circumstances and evolving economic realities and capabilities; 

-   provide that all Parties must have, maintain and implement such a mitigation commitment; 

-   contain a dynamic five-yearly mitigation ambition mechanism in which all Parties should be required to either submit new or updated commitments, without falling behind previous levels of commitment, or resubmit the existing ones; 

-   contain simplified procedures for the renewal and upward adjustment of mitigation commitments; 

-   include a compliance regime which promotes timely and effective implementation; 

-   provide flexibility for those countries with least capabilities. 

            Adaptation

11.        PROPOSES that adaptation must be a central part of a balanced Paris Agreement that: 

-        commits all Parties to plan, prepare for and respond to the adverse impacts of climate change, to integrate adaptation into national development processes and to communicate experiences in order to achieve climate-resilient sustainable development; 

-      calls on all Parties to strengthen monitoring, reporting, information-sharing and cooperation in order to increase effectiveness of adaptation actions; 

-      contains an iterative and dynamic approach to continuously enhance the effectiveness of adaptation measures and their implementation; 

-   contributes to assisting all countries, especially the poorest and particularly vulnerable ones, to achieve climate-resilient sustainable development; 

-   underlines that both ambitious action on mitigation and adaptation, including efficient disaster risk reduction, are essential to manage and reduce the risk of adverse impacts of climate change, including addressing the risk of loss and damage.   

12.        RECALLS the submission by the EU and its Member States on "European Union undertakings in adaptation planning". 

Use of markets

13.        STRESSES that the Paris Agreement should allow for the international use of markets, subject to the application of robust common accounting rules which ensure that the environmental integrity and the integrity of the mitigation commitments are maintained and double counting is avoided; and provide for market mechanisms which promote scaled-up and cost-effective mitigation action entailing a net contribution to global mitigation efforts and contributing to sustainable development. 

            Finance

14.        REAFFIRMS that the EU and its Member States have and remain committed to scaling up the mobilisation of climate finance in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation, in order to contribute their share of the developed countries' goal to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance; in this context, RECALLS its conclusions on climate finance of 7 November 2014; REITERATES its strong support for the Green Climate Fund and LOOKS FORWARD to early allocation of initial funding; UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement's provisions on climate finance need to be dynamic and able to adapt to changing realities and needs by reflecting Parties' evolving capabilities and responsibilities; furthermore, REFERS to its forthcoming conclusions on climate finance.            

Transparency and accountability

15.        UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement must provide for a robust common rules-based regime, including transparency and accountability rules applicable to all Parties, while recognising that their application will differ according to commitment types which reflect Parties' capabilities and national circumstances; STRESSES that this regime should provide for the use of common metrics, respect the most recent IPCC guidelines and build on experience gained under the UNFCCC. 

16.        HIGHLIGHTS that the Paris Agreement should provide for a transparent accounting and reporting framework for emissions and removals for the land-use sector for all Parties, which promote sustainable land management, building on existing relevant decisions under the UNFCCC. 

            Joint fulfilment

17.        CONFIRMS that the EU and its Member States intend to fulfil their commitments jointly under the Paris Agreement; WELCOMES Norway's and Iceland's intention to participate in this joint fulfilment.  

            Other issues

18.        STRESSES the importance of human rights, gender equality, a gender-sensitive approach, a just transition of the work force, decent jobs, education and awareness raising as well as ensuring food security in the context of climate action. 

Implementation of the Paris Agreement

19.        PROPOSES the adoption of a comprehensive package of substantive decisions, in addition to a technical work programme, at the Paris Conference to further develop rules, modalities and procedures on inter alia transparency and accountability of mitigation commitments, including for the land-use sector, and on the international use of markets, to be completed by 2017, in order to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 

Enhancing global pre-2020 ambition

20.        REITERATES that the EU and its Member States are already applying the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol; STRESSES the determination of the EU and its Member States to complete the process of ratification of the Doha amendment in the third quarter of 2015; and INVITES other Parties to do likewise in order to ensure its prompt entry into force; in this context, UNDERLINES the need for adopting at the Paris Conference the implementation rules for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol as agreed in Warsaw and Lima. 

21.        STRESSES that all Parties need to act in order to close the pre-2020 mitigation gap; RECALLS the progress made under the ADP in identifying opportunities to enhance pre‑2020 mitigation ambition in areas of high mitigation potential, in particular energy efficiency, renewable energy, REDD+, short-lived climate pollutants, upstream methane emissions, HFCs, export credits and fossil fuel subsidy reform; UNDERLINES the importance of multilateral cooperation, in particular through the Lima Paris Action Agenda, aimed at identifying and accelerating actions in these areas; in this context, STRESSES the importance of involvement of and cooperation with non-State actors; UNDERLINES the importance to continue and intensify work on enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition beyond the Paris Conference, and to ensure continuity in the political attention for high mitigation potential options by linking the technical examination of mitigation options with regular high-level events building on the Lima Paris Action Agenda.  

22.        EMPHASISES that the examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential continues to be relevant beyond 2020 and can serve as an input to the process to raise global ambition under the Paris Agreement over time. 

23.        RECOGNISES the need to foster the continuing implementation of existing decisions under the UNFCCC; in this context, WELCOMES the completion of the REDD+ negotiations.  

Other processes

24.        While noting that the Paris Agreement should address emissions across all sectors subject to regular review and that emissions accounting and reporting should remain under the UNFCCC, UNDERLINES that IMO, ICAO, and the Montreal Protocol should regulate as soon as possible in an effective manner and in line with the below 2°C objective greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping and aviation and the production and consumption of HFCs respectively. 

25.        WELCOMES the outcome of the Addis Ababa Conference that strengthens the framework to finance sustainable development and the means of implementation for the universal 2030 agenda for sustainable development; LOOKS FORWARD to the upcoming UN Summit that will adopt the agenda “Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development” in order to address the universal challenge of poverty eradication and sustainable development and that confirms the importance of tackling climate change as a key element in confronting that challenge.

 

[1]           See for example 14790/09 (paragraph 7) and 14747/14 (paragraph 2).

 

 

 

Committees meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Juncker, left, with Moscovici at Thursday's hearing, before he ducked out early

Ten months ago, amidst the recriminations of the LuxLeaks scandal, the prospect of Jean-Claude Juncker appearing before a European Parliament inquiry into whether the European Commission president acted improperly while Luxembourg’s premier may have seemed to promise high political theatre.

In the event, however, Juncker’s testimony on Thursday before MEPs probing hundreds of sweetheart tax deals handed down to multinational companies in Luxembourg during his 18-year tenure as the country’s prime minister was anything but.

It featured a round of applause for his opening statement, plenty of softball questions, and the sight of Juncker ducking out before the end, citing an overrunning timetable and other commitments. Pierre Moscovici, the political savvy EU commissioner in charge of tax policy, was left to field the second and last round of questions.

Read more

The Council adopted the decision on the creation of a market stability reserve (MSR) for the EU greenhouse gas emission trading scheme (EU ETS). This new reserve aims at tackling structural supply-demand imbalances in the EU ETS.

How it works

When in a given year the total of emission allowances exceeds a certain threshold, a percentage of allowances will be automatically withdrawn from the market and placed into the  reserve. In the opposite case, allowances will be returned from the reserve to the market.

Why it is needed

 In 2013, there was a significant surplus of allowances in the EU ETS, which was expected to grow over the following years. This  resulted from an imbalance between the supply and demand of allowances, since demand is flexible and affected, for instance, by economic cycles.

The presence of a large surplus lowers the prices of allowances and reduces the incentives for low-carbon investment. Therefore, if not addressed, the current market imbalance would affect the ability of the EU ETS to meet its targets in a cost effective manner in the future.

Main elements of the final text

• A market stability reserve will be established in 2018 and operational from 1 January 2019
• "Backloaded" allowances (the 900 million allowances whose auctioning was postposed from the years 2014-2016 until 2019-2020) will be placed in the reserve
• Unallocated allowances from phase 3 of the EU ETS will be placed in the reserve in 2020
• The MSR review will take into account the reserve's impact on growth, jobs, industrial competitiveness and the risk of carbon leakage.

Timeline

The Commission presented its proposal for a market stability reserve in January 2014, starting the legislative ordinary procedure. An informal agreement on a compromise text between the European Parliament and the Council was reached in May 2015. The Parliament endorsed the reform in July 2015. With the approval of the Council, the decision is now adopted in first reading.

The EU ETS

The EU ETS, launched in 2005, aims at delivering the EU's  greenhouse gas emission reduction goals in an economically efficient manner. It is based on the so-called "cap-and-trade" approach: each year the EU establishes a limit (cap) for overall emissions from power plants, energy-intensive industry and commercial airlines covered by the system.

Within this limit, companies can buy and sell emission allowances. Each allowance gives the right to emit one tonne of CO2, the main greenhouse gas, or the equivalent of another greenhouse gas.

From 2013 to 2020, the cap is reduced annually by 1.74%. From 2021, the annual reduction will increase to 2.2%, reflecting the EU's new 2030 target for emission reductions.

EU ETS review

The establishment of the market stability reserve is the fist step of a wider review of the EU ETS proposed by the Commission this year.

DRAFT REPORT on the Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Cristian Dan Preda

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

OPINION on Towards a European Energy Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Francisco Assis

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

This post presents my research paper submitted within the framework of the Russian Politics course at KU Leuven (January 2015). Scenario thinking is based on the assumption of a possible political situation in year 2020.

Scenarios presented were created through the SWOT analysis which constitutes one of the most popular heuristic method of analysis, helping to sort the collected information. It allows to examine the internal and external factors affecting studied phenomenon. In my analysis, I have examined the possible scenarios for Russia and Eastern Partnership countries relations, which are part of EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (the ENP). The SWOT analysis has been examined and performed from the Russian perspective.

Both sides, the EU and Russia have a strong commitment and strategic interest in the Eastern region, which strongly influence their mutual contacts. Nevertheless, the future situation of this region is currently one of the most important issue on the foreign affairs agenda on both sides. Therefore, it is important to address the greatest importance of Russian future strategic scenarios towards Eastern Partnership countries- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, with the relation to EU’s Eastern policy.

The ENP was launched in 2004 with an aim to support partner countries in their political, economic and institutional reforms; to strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights along with economic modernization and liberalization. The main goal of the ENP is to establish a closer relation with non-EU countries and integrate them more with European market and EU sectoral programmes and policies[1]. Within the framework of the ENP, The Eastern Partnership project (the EaP) was launched in 2009 towards six post-Soviet countries, thus it is not hard to imagine that Russia do not support and agree with EU’s actions in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. These countries, countries of “strategic importance”, are part of Russian increasing assertive foreign policy, with Russian leaders and a Russian public opinion that wanted and strived to stop the Western influence and regain control over its “Near Abroad”[2].

Factors taken into account in the SWOT analysis for Russia were given the weight from - 3, which are the biggest threat and the weakest side, to 3 being the greatest opportunity and the strongest side of the Russian situation. I have removed 0 from the scale, because as a neutral result of studied phenomena, it has no effect on the assessment of the examined situation. Taking into consideration a page limit, the below table presents only part of the key internal and external factors, which were considered as the most relevant for Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations.

Strengths

Weaknesses

1)      Large country (1)

2)      Common historical and cultural heritage in the Eastern region (2)

3)      Geographical proximity (3)

4)      Energy dependency of Eastern and EU countries from Russia (3)

1)      Authoritarian government (-1)

2)      High rates of unemployment and poverty in many areas (-2)

3)      Crisis on the Russian financial market (-3)

4)      No influence on the EaP policy on the EU level (-1)

Opportunities

Threats

1)      Annexation of Crimea  (3)

2)      Russian minorities in Eastern countries (2)

3)      Economic instability of the EU and Eurozone (1)

4)      Eurasian Economic Union (3)

5)      Armenia and Ukraine did not initial association agreements with the EU (2)

1)      Dependence on oil and gas (-3)

2)      EU’s sanctions (-3)

3)      International conflict with West (-2)

4)      Organized crime and terrorism towards Russians from Eastern countries (-1)

5)      Georgia and Moldova had successfully negotiated Association agreements with the EU (-2)

 Table 1  SWOT analysis of Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations

Total result of included factors is positive (20-18=2), which means that there is more strengths and opportunities for Russia to develop its policy towards Eastern Partnership countries. It may also be a reason why Russia still intensively develop different incentives for Eastern countries.

The internal factors can be seen as strengths and weaknesses of the current situation and factors coming from outside the country are defining threats and opportunities. Hence we can create four strategies derived from four SWOT quadrants.

 

  Opportunities Threats Strengths Aggressive strategy Conservative strategy Weaknesses Competitive strategy Defensive strategy

Table 2 Four SWOT strategies. Source: http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analiza_SWOT

 

Because of the positive result of SWOT analysis, it seems that Russia would most probably use aggressive strategy towards Eastern Partnership countries and undermine EU’s policy towards this region. Aggressive strategy is a strategy of strong expansion and development of both factors, strengths and opportunities. It is not without significance that Crimea issue is the strongest factor of Russian external factors within opportunities quadrant. The success in the Ukraine conflict and Russia’s annexation reinforced belief that countries of the “strategic importance” would not be easily given up by Putin. Moreover, Russian previous conflicts with Chechnya, Georgia and now with Ukraine can be counted among Russian successes. Putin tries to soothe the loss of Empire and this strategy seems to work at this moment. Hard power versus EU’s soft power in the long-term is the insufficient protection for Georgia’s and Moldova’s frozen conflicts with Russia. According to Raik, “the Eastern Partnership reflects the general tendency of the EU to play down issues of hard security and geopolitics and pursue economic integration as an instrument for enhancing stability and peace[3].” Russia will do not stop with its efforts to attract Eastern countries with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s project is based on common legislation and supranational institutions, in which it resembles European integration. Russia will offer member countries various benefits, mainly of an economic nature, including easier access to the Russian market, financial support and preferential prices for energy resources[4]. The Eastern countries depend on Russian energy, their governments currently more and more decide on some subservience toward Russia: Azerbaijan’s recent article[5], Moldova’s last parliamentary election, Georgian authorities’ new policy and recent events within the government[6], Armenia’s threat of its energy security and joined the Eurasian Economic Union, Belarus pro-Russian approach. Hence, Russia will not be threaten by EU’s policy and will continue with an invasion in Eastern countries. Frozen conflicts, unsolved problems with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, will be used to achieve Russian interests and gain necessary support from pro-Russian population. The necessary support would be given also for domestic governments- Russia will propose deeper and more comprehensive Eurasian Union’s economic agreements, than the free trade agreements that the EU has already negotiated. The Eastern Partnership countries will not confront themselves with the Russian army and risk their energy and human security. The Ukraine crisis show them that Western countries were not able to hold back Putin, and it is better to join Kremlin, than reject closer integration.

Russia still continues to define the post-Soviet area as its sphere of influence. The main objectives of this policy is to maintain the status of the Kremlin’s power confronted with the growing power of China and a stable position of the US as a world leader. The confrontation with the EU on the disputed East area is inevitable, but on the other hand, Russia cannot afford EU’s sanctions and to back out from the economic and modernization cooperation with the EU. Through well-defined economic incentives Putin will go toward Eastern countries and undermine the EU’s policy using state-controlled media not only to deliver messages, but rather to spread rumours and create confusion.

Conservative strategy- the studied subject is not able to develop intensively in the existing external environment, because the strengths factors do not correspond with the opportunities of the external environment, thus it is necessary to wait for the improvement in external conditions. This strategy was true before Putin’s first presidential elections. Currently, Russia does not want to wait for the improvement of external affairs, but to create them.

Competitive strategy in case of Russia is not a perfect solution. This strategy comes up when there is an advantage of weaknesses over strengths, but the studied subject acts in a friendly environment, which allows him to maintain his position. Competitive strategy should in that case focus on the elimination of internal weaknesses and use opportunities from the external environment. But Putin does not see any weaknesses in Russia. Russian identity and civilization are the greatest value in the society, and Russia is exceptional because it is not coming from the West. Vladimir Putin wrote in 2012 in a government newspaper, that Russia is not just an ordinary country but a unique “state civilization”, bound together by the ethnic Russians who form its “cultural nucleus”[7]. He will not cooperate with the external West environment which do not understand and tolerate Russian identity. In Putin’s view, it is the West’s intention to interfere with Russia’s historic mission and to thwart the rightful “integration of the Eurasian space”[8].

Defensive strategy: weaknesses are strongly linked to external threats, there is a high risk of state’s collapse. This strategy is focused on the internally and externally survival. Russia is not a state which would collapse, so this strategy can be rejected. Although, if economic and demographic problems will prevail, Russia as a result of the increasing difficulty of administering such a large territory and a lack of adequate resources for investment, slowly begins to give up its colonial heritage in the east of the Urals and the Caucasus.

In 2020 we cannot excluded that the Eastern Partnership Policy may change its current shape and Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan would withdraw from the cooperation with the EaP. The EU is not able to forbidden Eastern countries to resign from this policy. Moscow, without strong pressure from the West, strengthens the cooperation with China in Central Asia. Also puts bigger effort on the cooperation in the BRIC group. In fulfilling this scenario, I assume that Moscow will seek to restore its sphere of the influence in the Eastern Europe (Caucasus, Belarus, Moldova), and even head to recover some impact on countries in the Central Europe. Even because of economic problems, Putin will not change his course in the Eastern region and the EU’s widespread condemnation would not change his mind. Instead of military actions, which constitute the last possible option of Russian influence, the economic incentives will gradually undermined the strategic planning in Eastern countries.

[1] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 251.

[2] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 260.

[3] Raik, Kristi (2013). “Eastern Partnership as Differentiated Integration: The challenges of EaP Association Agreements.” The Post-Vilnius Challenges of the Eastern Partnership in The Eastern Partnership Review No. 15.

[4] Sadowski, Rafał (2013). “Partnership in Times of Crisis. Challenges for the Eastern European countries’ integration with Europe.” Point of view No. 36. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. pp. 44-45.

[5] On 3 December the Azerbaijani media published an article, by Ramiz Mekhtiyev, the head of the presidential administration and de facto the second most important person in the state. Among other statements, Mekhtiyev blamed the USA and the EU for trying to create a fifth column in Azerbaijan and stoking a desire to cause a ‘colour revolution’, and also specifically named individuals and organisations supported by the West. The article promotes the idea of a multipolar world consistent with the Russian vision, and emphasises the right of sovereign Azerbaijan to conduct a foreign policy which focuses on the development of bilateral relations. Source: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-10/azerbaijan-closer-to-russia-further-west

[6] Some Georgian politicians stress that Prime Minister Irakly Garibashvili is dismissing some ministers due to politically motivated reasons and is trying to undermine supporters for better relations with the West.

[7] Aron, Leon (2014). “Why Putin Says Russia Is Exceptional.” The Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-putin-says-russia-is-exceptional-1401473667.

[8] Ibidem.

The post Scenario thinking: Russia-Eastern Partnership countries appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Margrethe Vestager, the EU's antitrust chief

Margrethe Vestager seems to be preparing for a marathon court battle.

At a parliamentary committee on Thursday, she gave a clear sign that she had the political will to issue tough landmark decisions on the sweetheart tax deals that EU countries have been issuing to multinationals.

But she also gave away a tell-tale clue that her officials are steeling themselves for a firestorm of litigation in what will become some of the defining cases of the Juncker commission. She won’t be rushed into a verdict before she has a “quality” case, she told the committee.

The Danish commissioner was appearing before the Brussels parliamentarians to give an update on four landmark tax investigations – Apple in Ireland, Starbucks in the Netherlands and Fiat and Amazon in Luxembourg.

Most critically, she robustly defended the commission’s revolutionary approach of treating “comfort letters” as state aid – effectively defining the letters (which are pre-emptive tax rulings, intended to reassure multinationals about whether their corporate structures aimed at to avoiding high tax bills are legal) as illegal subsidies.

Read more

On 18 September 2015, the Council appointed the members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) for the period from 21 September 2015 to 20 September 2020. 

The EESC is the European Union body which represents employers, workers and other groups and associations of civil society, notably in socio-economic, civic, professional and cultural areas. 

The Committee has 350 members from the 28 EU countries. 

Members are nominated by national governments and appointed by the Council for a renewable 5-year term of office. The latest renewal was in October 2010 for the mandate 2010-2015.

"The current system of corporate tax rules is unfit for purpose and unjust. Some companies are losing out, whereas others win by hiding behind a variety of national rules", Commission President Jean Claude Juncker told MEPs at a joint meeting of the committees for Tax Rulings and for Economic and Monetary Affairs on Thursday. "We need a better insight into how multinational companies behave and how they make use of the differences between countries. Then we should create some order!", he added.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

"The current system of corporate tax rules is unfit for purpose and unjust. Some companies are losing out, whereas others win by hiding behind a variety of national rules", Commission President Jean Claude Juncker told MEPs at a joint meeting of the committees for Tax Rulings and for Economic and Monetary Affairs on Thursday. "We need a better insight into how multinational companies behave and how they make use of the differences between countries. Then we should create some order!", he added.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP