European Union

Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Florence was intended to move forward stalled Brexit negotiations. But as I argue in this post that first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog, Britain has found itself running into numerous problems with Brexit because its strategy for exiting the EU has been a textbook example of failed strategic thinking.

It’s said that in the First World War the Germans viewed the British troops and their generals as lions led by donkeys. One hundred years on, to much of the rest of Europe it is Britain’s national leaders, bereft of any coherent unified strategy for exiting the EU, who are donkeys misleading a great country.

If things continue as they have been, Britain’s approach to Brexit will be studied by generations of strategists as an example of flawed strategic thinking. The rest of Europe and Britain’s key allies such as the United States should lament this. As the Henry Jackson Society pointed out in a recent report, Britain remains a country of immense power and potential. It is not a dwarf and Brexit does not doom it to become one. The British people, like the troops of the First World War, will soldier on. But Brexit does pose the biggest political, administrative, and economic challenge Britain has faced in a long time. If it is handled badly, Britain will suffer unnecessary pain and losses. In facing such a challenge, the British people deserve to be led by leaders with a grasp of what it is they want to achieve and an ability to direct Britain towards it.

Strategy is a balanced combination of ends, ways, and means, which incorporates an assessment of risk and an opponent’s likely behaviour. Successful implementation and adaptation of strategy depends on having leaders who are able and willing to react and lead the struggle. Britain’s approach to Brexit has not lived up to this definition.

Before we open this up further let us be clear that Brexit is not a simple one-off event. It is a series of overlapping multifaceted, multi-levelled processes, negotiations, and debates involving multiple actors in Britain, the remaining EU, Europe, and the rest of the world. Its wide-ranging nature and complexity make it one of the most important and difficult political issues to define and analyse. Finding a way through it, for all involved, was never going to be easy. As I’ll touch on in a future blog post, the EU’s own approach has not been without problems. But Britain has so far gone about it in a particularly poor way.

Ends

Britain has made the fundamental strategic mistake of not knowing what end it seeks from Brexit. “Brexit means Brexit” said Theresa May. But Brexit is a process with no clearly defined destination. It’s like saying “War means war”. War, after all, is a means to an end. Britain’s leadership has been divided, unsure, and left shell-shocked by the Leave vote in a referendum in which most of them had campaigned for Remain. But in voting for Leave what the British people wanted Leave to mean – and therefore what end they want the UK government to deliver – has never been entirely settled. Its why British politics since 23 June 2016 has been defined by a battle to define the narrative of Brexit. It was the need for a mandate to define such a narrative that led Theresa May to trigger an unexpected general election. She hoped it would empower her to pursue the Brexit she outlined in January. Instead, the hung parliament that emerged has only confused things further.

That more than a year on from the vote British politicians are still arguing about the nature of a transition deal points to how far there is still to go before Britain knows what it wants from what Theresa May describes as a “deep and special partnership” with the EU. And it has not been just the governing Conservative party that has struggled. Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and other opposition parties have either fudged the issue or offered unrealistic ends as part of electoral manoeuvring rather than an assessment of what is possible or in the national interest. The inability of British politicians to know what they want and whether they can get it has led to calls for the EU to take the initiative by explaining to the UK what its options are.

Ways

With an unclear end, the UK has been in no position to assess or prepare the ways to get there. Given that no plan survives first contact, the need to constantly plan and adapt is one of the key requirements of any strategy. As Former U.S. President and U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “plans are worthless, but planning is everything”. It makes sense, therefore, to task the British civil service with planning for a range of possibilities, including a no-deal scenario. That sounds an ideal way towards a resilient strategy. But the planning only started a year ago, thanks to David Cameron’s refusal to contemplate a Leave vote in the run-up to the referendum. Since then, and as noticed by the EU’s negotiators, Britain’s negotiators have struggled to grasp the detail because there’s so much for them to do. This hasn’t stopped British Ministers from promising to achieve great things. They ignored that they lacked a way – and the time –to settle Brexit in the two-year timeframe provided by Article 50. They forgot that under-promising and over-delivering is a shining virtue; vice versa, a mortal sin.

Means

With no clear end and inadequate and confused ways, it should come as no surprise that Britain has been unable to prepare, configure, or effectively deploy the means it has available. The means are plentiful: staff, money (not least Britain’s budgetary contributions), legal positions, diplomatic support from allies, trade deals, military and security capabilities, the status of UK and EU citizens, Britain’s trade relationships with the rest of the EU, the power of the City of London, and so forth. One reason Britain has struggled is because its diplomatic means in Europe are not what they once were. Before the referendum, a great deal of EU business was conducted via Brussels. Large parts of Britain’s diplomatic resources throughout the rest of the EU were redirected towards areas of the world outside Europe, especially emerging powers. That now must be rebalanced.

Britain also needs replacements for EU regulators, additional civil servants to undertake new work, new facilities at ports, new IT systems to address changes in how trade is handled, and much more. None of this is impossible and work has begun, but it’s still in the early phases. The rest of the EU knows this. Those who compare Brexit negotiations to a poker game overlook how both sides know exactly what the others hand is. Threatening to walk away from the EU when you won’t have the means in place to deliver a ‘hard Brexit’ in a way that doesn’t inflict real and lasting damage is a bluff the other side sees straight through.

Assessment of Risk

Britain’s assessment of the risks involved in Brexit has been lacking. In triggering Article 50 when she did, Theresa May made time an ally of the EU and increased the risk of Britain not having a settlement in time for an exit it wanted. The British government forgot what the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu argued in the 5th century BC: ‘The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory’. Having jumped headlong into Article 50 negotiations, Britain has come to realise over the past year that it needs to look for a way to victory.

Assessment of the EU

Assessment and understanding of the EU, the UK’s opponent in Brexit, has been limited. May’s speech in Florence was billed as a ‘re-engagement with Europe’. That will have perked up the ears of the rest of the EU, because, as the outgoing French ambassador in London recently noted, the UK has spent the past year talking to itself about Brexit. Leaders and decision makers elsewhere in the EU have routinely denounced talk such as ‘having your cake and eating it’, and done so to the point of ridicule. Yet with donkey-like stubbornness, some British ministers have continued to repeat and, even worse, believe their own rhetoric. Mrs May and the rest of the UK’s leadership need to recognize that the EU is changing and that Britain’s place in Europe will be shaped by this dynamic, and not only by its own hopes and plans for Brexit. Brexit is but one of several challenges and opportunities confronting the EU, among them the pressures facing the eurozone, Schengen, Russian relations, the future of NATO and ties with the U.S. How the EU responds to these pressures will determine its place in the world and frame its future relationship with Britain.

Does this mean Britain is doomed to lurch from one Brexit crisis to the next, resulting in catastrophic humiliation for Britain? Not necessarily. Britain might have over-reached in the first phase of Brexit negotiations, but it’s still too early to evaluate the full significance of Brexit and whether the old phrase holds that you can lose a battle but win the war. That, of course, depends on where Britain and the EU end up in the 2020s in terms of their relations and relative power in the world and in Europe. The rest of the EU has its own weaknesses. Strategies for saving the euro have sometimes been nothing more than glorified exercises in muddling through, with EU decision-makers often making donkeys of themselves. The only strategy that can realistically work is one based on mutual self-interest, where losses are minimised for both sides. However, it remains unclear whether Britain, or the EU, can find ways towards this.

This post first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog.

The post Britain’s Brexit Strategy: Lions Misled by Donkeys appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In view of the continuing instability and gravity of the situation in Libya, the Council has extended the duration of the sanctions against Libya, targeting three persons for a period of six months.

On 1 April 2016, the Council imposed restrictive measures against Libya on three persons: Agila Saleh, president of the Libyan Council of Deputies in the House of Representatives; Khalifa Ghweil, prime minister and defence minister of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress; and Nuri Abu Sahmain, president of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress. These persons are viewed as obstructing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of 17 December 2015 and the formation of a Government of National Accord in Libya.

The Council last adopted conclusions on Libya on 17 July 2017. The Council reiterated its firm support to the Libyan Political Agreement and to the Presidency Council and Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj established under it as the sole legitimate government authorities in the country. 

The Council reaffirmed its commitment to existing restrictive measures. It reiterated its readiness to repeal them if the conditions for their application are no longer met and to introduce new measures against individuals who threaten the peace, security or stability of the country by, for instance, impeding or undermining the successful completion of Libya's political transition. 

The EU called on all armed groups to refrain from violence, to commit to demobilisation and to recognise the authorities entrusted through the Libyan Political Agreement as the only authorities invested with the right to control Libya's defence and security forces. Violence threatens Libya's stability: the EU believes there is no solution to the Libyan crisis through the use of force.

The Council also warmly welcomed the appointment of Ghassan Salamé as the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, who will play a central mediation role helping to promote an inclusive political settlement based on the Libyan Political Agreement.

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The EU Digital Summit takes place on 29 September 2017 in Tallinn. It is focused on the essential topics of building a digital future for Europe: trust, security, e-government, industry, society and the economy.

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AMENDMENTS - Amendments 1 - 286
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The EU's Political and Security Committee has appointed Kauko Aaltomaa, a high-ranking official in the Finnish Ministry of Interior, as new Head of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). He will take up his duties on 1 October 2017.

EUPOL COPPS is a part of wider EU efforts in support of Palestinian state building in the context of working towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution. EUPOL COPPS has been assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future state of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice since January 2006. Through its contribution to security and justice sector reform, the mission supports efforts to increase the security of the Palestinian population and to reinforce the rule of law. EUPOL COPPS's current mandate runs until 30 June 2018. The headquarters of the mission are located in Ramallah.

Kauko Aaltomaa succeeds Rodolphe Mauget (of French nationality) who had held the post since 17 February 2015.

The Council has transposed into legal acts the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), which allows sanctions to be imposed on those actively stymieing progress in implementing the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015.

The targeted individuals and entities will be designated, where appropriate, by the United Nations Security Council or Sanctions Committee as being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali.

In particular, that may cover engaging in hostilities in violation of the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali or in attacks against the Malian institutions and security and defence forces as well as against international presences, including United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) joint force, European Union missions and French forces.

It also includes obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, engaging in human rights abuses, and the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the conflict in Mali.

Sanctions against designated parties will include restrictions on admission of targeted individuals (ban on entry to the European Union) and the freezing of assets in the EU belonging to the targeted individuals or entities, in addition to prohibiting persons or entities established within the EU from making funds available to them.

The provisions can be found in full in the legal acts which will be published in the Official Journal on 29 September 2017. The legal acts were adopted by written procedure.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 232 - Draft report Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

I feel cautiously optimistic about the constructive and more realistic tone of the Prime Minister's speech in Florence and of our discussion today. This shows that the philosophy of "having a cake and eating it" is finally coming to an end, or at least I hope so. And that's good news. But of course no-one will ever tell me that Brexit is a good thing because, as I have always said, in fact Brexit is only about damage control, and I didn't change my opinion.

As you know, we will discuss our future relations with the United Kingdom once there is so-called "sufficient progress". The two sides are working hard at it. But if you asked me and if today Member States asked me, I would say there is no "sufficient progress" yet. But we will work on it.

will take place on Wednesday 11 October, 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 and Thursday 12 October, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Review by the Court of Auditors of the management system of cases brought before the Court of Justice and General Court of the European Union

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

Although little evidence supports the existence of welfare tourism, the EU’s Court of Justice has increasingly adopted this economic rationale in its rulings, writes Charles O’Sullivan. He argues that the court, having departed from its original legal test for social assistance claims in several decisions, is bowing to political pressure on access to welfare support.

Jobcenter Berlin Mitte, Manfred Wassmann, CC-BY-SA-2.0

The ‘welfare tourist’, despite a lack of evidence to support its existence, is considered to be a migrant who moves to another state with the specific intention of taking advantage of its more generous welfare system. The European Parliamentary Research Service however believed that the current invocation of this category of migrants has little to do with them.

Rather, it is the economically-inactive generally as well as the current rules supporting free movement that critics oppose, despite EU law mandating that EU citizens do not become an ‘undue burden’ on the national social assistance system. Yet the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has begun to utilise this language both directly and indirectly within its own judgements in recent years with greater frequency.

The ‘Undue Burden’ in Directive 2004/38/EC

Directive 2004/38/EC regulates the right to residence and social assistance for EU citizens regardless of their economic activity. The right to move and reside freely is contained in Articles 6, 7 and 16 of the directive, and outlining the conditions applied to residence in a host state for less than three months, between three months and five years and over five years, respectively.

Article 7 in particular makes clear that those resident in a Member State between three months and five years cannot become an ‘undue burden’, and must ensure that they possess adequate financial resources and health insurance. Where they are capable of being deemed as such, they may lose their right to reside and, in some circumstances, can be removed on this basis. Article 14 does underline that an EU citizen cannot automatically be deemed an undue burden and removed simply by attempting to access the national social assistance system.

The Brey Test

It was not until the Brey case that the CJEU specifically adopted a set of criteria a Member State should apply to the economically-inactive making a social assistance claim who does not retain worker status. The court made clear that, before a social assistance claim is refused, the relevant welfare authority within a Member State must consider:  if it is merely a temporary difficulty; the applicant’s length of residence; any relevant personal circumstances; the amount that would be paid to them; and how many others would be in the same position (Paras 64 and 78).

For a small subset of individuals, this would have granted them a presumptive right to access social assistance, albeit one which was still a very limited right and one which would place their residency in a degree of jeopardy. It was still possible for such persons to be considered an undue burden once they had been granted access and their limited period of access had elapsed.

Dano as ‘Evidence of Welfare Tourism’

A short time later, the decision in Dano confirmed that the court had significantly reassessed the Brey decision and was adopting the ‘welfare tourist’ as a specific exception to this rule. The case involved a Romanian national who, along with her son, lived with and was cared for by her sister in Germany. She was subsequently refused a social assistance payment which as a secondary purpose facilitated access to the labour market and argued that this was discriminatory under EU law as EU citizens were not entitled to it.

Rather than focusing on this question, the CJEU emphasised that Ms Dano had no intention of working, and was a ‘fairly blatant’ example of welfare tourism. Very little was made of the fact that she had been resident in Germany for some time, had been granted an unrestricted right to residence, and was already in receipt of other social assistance payments. Nor did the court consider that she was low-skilled, and had a low level of spoken and written German comprehension. Due to her lack of economic activity, the court distinguished it from the criteria set out in Brey as well as overruling the German authorities by saying that she would no longer have a right of residence under EU law.

Subtle Restatement in Alimanovic

In Alimanovic, the German state sought to clarify whether or not it had acted justly in cutting off a Swedish jobseeker from the same broad category of payment at issue in Dano once the applicant’s statutory entitlement had elapsed. In finding in favour of the German authorities, the CJEU held that, whilst Ms Alimanovic would not herself constitute an undue burden on the state, to limit a Member State’s authority in this area could lead to unreasonable demands being made on its welfare system (Para 62).

The applicant’s surrounding personal circumstances were again not considered, and the court made several mentions of the Dano decision before concluding that Brey was not applicable, despite it being unlikely that her continued receipt of this payment would be more than temporary. The broader argument concerning the sanctity of the national welfare system and need to limit the access of others to social assistance, a tacit reference to welfare tourism, superseded her personal circumstances.

Limited Rights for All?

The most recent and perhaps the most worrying continuation of this trend took place in Commission v UK, which dealt with social security for the economically-active, a statutory right. Yet the CJEU allowed conditions not present in the rules governing access to social security, but included in Directive 2004/38/EC, could be applied by Member States in order to protect the financial security of their welfare systems and to verify entitlements (Para 80).

In justifying this approach, the CJEU invoked both Dano and Brey, and signalled that further changes targeted directly and indirectly at the spectre of welfare tourism remain all too present in this area. From this we can see that economic arguments are now being adopted as a general rule in all areas of EU welfare law due to external political pressures from, as well as within, the Member States.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2ypwR6U

Charles O’Sullivan | @oscharles
Maynooth University

Charles O’Sullivan is PhD Candidate in Law at Maynooth University. His research focuses on access to social welfare in Ireland for different types of migrants under EU and Irish law.
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The post The Spectre of the ‘Welfare Tourist’ within the Judgements of the CJEU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 199 - Draft report Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2016 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 25 September 2017 to discuss in an EU 27 format the state of play of Brexit negotiations and the annotated draft agenda for October's European Council (Art.50).

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EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 25 September 2017 to start the preparation of the October European Council and to discuss the Commission's letter of intent on its work programme for 2018.

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Two years later, we look back on how the EU migration crisis unfolded through 2015, and how the EU developed its response. This is the "inside story", as told by key witnesses from the Council of the EU and the European Commission. It is an attempt to explain the complexities of one of the biggest crises the EU is experiencing. It covers 9 months of crisis in 2015, and is available in 24 EU languages.  

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On 25 September, the Council adopted a regulation establishing a European fund for sustainable development (EFSD). The fund will be setup on 28 September.   

The EFSD is the main instrument for the implementation of the European external investment plan (EIP) which supports investments in African and neighbourhood countries. The main objective of the plan is to contribute to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals of the Agenda 2030 through boosting jobs and growth, while addressing the root causes of migration.

With an initial budget of 3 350 million euros, the fund is intended to trigger up to 44 billion euro of investments. This amount could be doubled if member states and other donors match EU contributions. The fund will contribute to financing projects in a wide range of sectors, such as energy, transport, social infrastructure, digital economy, sustainable use of natural resources, agriculture and local services. 

The EFSD will encourage the private sector to invest in countries or sectors where it otherwise would not do so, such as fragile or conflict-affected countries. Similarly to the European Fund for Strategic Investment that will support investments within the EU, the fund will offer guarantees and support the use of blending mechanisms to support more risky projects. It will operate as a "one-stop shop", receiving financing proposals from financial institutions and public or private investors and delivering a wide range of financial support to eligible investments. 

The Parliament adopted the text on 6 July. The regulation will be published in the Official Journal on 27 September. On 28 September, the EFSD strategic board will hold its first meeting to discuss the overall strategy and investment priorities for the fund.  

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Tuesday 26 September 2017
09.00 Meeting with Brexit EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier
London
(local time)
12.30 Meeting with Prime Minister Theresa May

Thursday 28 September 2017
13.30 Phone call with Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem
Tallinn
(local time)
21.00 Informal dinner with EU Heads of State or Government

Friday 29 September 2017
Tallinn Digital Summit
(local time)
10.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov
11.00 Arrival and welcome by Prime Minister Jüri Ratas at the Tallinn Creative Hub
11.10 Meeting with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković
11.30 Meeting with President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid
12.00 Opening address by President Kersti Kaljulaid
12.30 Session 1: working lunch on the Future of Governments
15.00 Family photo
15.15 Meeting with German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel
15.45 Session 2 on the Future of Economy and Society
18.15 Press conference