In Latin America, Mexico (2020), Chile (2022) and Colombia (2022) have all officially committed to a feminist foreign policy (FFP). The introduction of a feminist approach to foreign policy should be seen in the context of a growing awareness of gender issues in international, regional and national politics. In comparison with their European counterparts, the Latin American approaches to FFP exhibit a stronger focus on the domestic dimension, on internal problems. This is especially clear in the case of Mexico, while Chile’s FFP emphasises the feminist perspective in foreign trade and Colombia’s FFP defines itself as pacifist. These countries’ FFPs have not brought about a fundamental political change, but they do inject new momentum into existing gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming. They expand women’s participation and representation and enhance the visibility of women’s contribution to foreign policy. Mexico, Chile and Colombia are important partners for Germany and the EU in matters concerning the global gender and human rights agenda. As these Latin American countries are intensifying their cooperation in these areas, they are also worthwhile partners for the expansion of trilateral cooperation. As the German Federal Foreign Office has dropped its FFP, while the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is continuing its feminist development policy and the future of Chile’s FFP is uncertain due to the change of power, it will make sense to pursue cooperation on human rights, inclusion and gender issues through variable formats and terminological framing. Germany should also benefit from learning processes, and strengthen bi-regional dialogue and exchange, including between feminist and women’s organisations.
Germany is facing a security policy Zeitenwende whose industrial dimension has not yet been sufficiently addressed. The war in Ukraine, rising military threats in Europe, and the long-term underfunding of the German Armed Forces have exposed the limits of existing defence industrial capacity, while the reliability of the United States (US) as a security guarantor is increasingly uncertain. This creates a strategic need for Germany to quickly rebuild its defence industrial base. Yet, despite the increased demand and funding, German defence industries are struggling to scale production quickly, exposing capability gaps that endanger both national defence and NATO commitments. In this context, cooperation with South Korea gains strategic relevance, as plans for localised production by Korean defence firms in Germany could ease bottlenecks, shorten supply chains, and enhance operational readiness without creating new strategic dependencies.
Große Internetplattformen prägen Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft in der EU, stellen den Binnenmarkt vor neue Herausforderungen und sind wegen ihrer überwiegenden US-amerikanischen Herkunft auch zunehmend ein geopolitisches Konfliktthema. Online-Plattformen haben ambivalente Effekte: Sie fördern Integration, Innovation und Digitalisierung des Binnenmarkts, bergen aber zugleich Risiken wie Marktmachtmissbrauch, Desinformation und intransparente algorithmische Steuerung. Die EU hat ihren Regulierungsansatz deutlich verschärft, insbesondere mit den beiden Verordnungen DSA und DMA. Sie steht bei der Durchsetzung jedoch vor einer Reihe von Hürden: der nicht eindeutigen Rechtsklarheit, der asymmetrischen Ressourcenverteilung zwischen Regulierungsbehörden und großen digitalen Plattformen und der unzureichenden Verpflichtung zu algorithmischer Transparenz. Zur Stärkung der digitalen Souveränität wird die Einrichtung einer unabhängigen europäischen Digitalaufsicht empfohlen. Sie könnte darauf hinwirken, dass nationale Vollzugsdefizite und regulatorische Fragmentierung überwunden und Vorschriften einheitlich durchgesetzt werden. Digitale Regulierung allein reicht nicht aus: Sie muss durch eine umfassende industrie- und wettbewerbspolitische Strategie ergänzt werden, die das Wachstum europäischer Technologieunternehmen im globalen Wettbewerb fördert.
With the entry into force of the United Nations treaty for the protection of the high seas on 17 January, an important step has been taken towards the protection of “biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction” (BBNJ). The so-called BBNJ Agreement aims to promote the transparent and diverse exchange of knowledge about the high seas in order to strengthen environmental standards. However, against the backdrop of a geopolitical environment in which knowledge itself is increasingly politicised, the question arises as to how this knowledge diversity can be secured over the long term.
The Clearing-House Mechanism: Technical Tool or Political Lever?At the centre of this debate lies an instrument with an unassuming name: the so-called BBNJ Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM). It is intended to become a freely accessible platform on which information about activities on the high seas is collected, analysed, and shared. Its objectives include enhancing transparency among State Parties and relevant stakeholders, as well as facilitating international cooperation, particularly in scientific matters. Although the goals and basic structure of the CHM are defined in the treaty text, its concrete design remains the subject of ongoing negotiation – and it is precisely this element that makes the mechanism politically contested.
The treaty text explicitly opens the possibility of incorporating different forms of knowledge into decision-making processes through the CHM. In particular, diverse knowledge systems could be systematically integrated within the framework put forward for mandatory environmental impact assessments. States would be required not only to assess potential environmental impacts, but also to consider the economic, social, cultural, health-related, and cumulative effects of planned activities that take place in or affect the high seas. Such a comprehensive assessment of impacts necessitates contributions from a range of scientific disciplines as well as the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
A further opportunity for the practical implementation of knowledge pluralism is found in the provisions concerning the composition of the Scientific and Technical Body (STB). The relevant wording in the agreement suggests that this body should go beyond purely natural scientific expertise and incorporate a broader spectrum of local, traditional, and Indigenous knowledge related to the marine environment. Since the STB can issue recommendations about activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction on the basis of information provided through the CHM, this represents a key lever for translating the knowledge diversity promised in the treaty text into practice. This depends, however, on whether the STB is in fact constituted in a way that ensures adequate representation of different knowledge systems.
Political Conflicts Delay the Implementation of the AgreementDespite the treaty’s promising language, the concrete design of the CHM remains politically contentious. Within the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which is tasked with operationalising the agreement, this issue has emerged as one of the central points of conflict. At a PrepCom meeting in August 2025, Parties were unable to reach agreement on the composition of an informal expert group intended to develop the technical aspects of the CHM. The selection process for this informal group is of strategic importance, as it could set a precedent for the composition of other BBNJ bodies. Whereas some states are advocating for the broad inclusion of a range of knowledge holders, others seek to reduce the CHM to a purely natural scientific and technical function guided exclusively by academic expertise. Critics warn that such an approach could privilege natural scientific knowledge from the Global North and marginalise social scientific, local, or traditional forms of knowledge.
Against the background of recent attempts by individual states, including the United States, to restrict access to marine data, it becomes clear that knowledge about the oceans is itself increasingly becoming an object of political contestation. Germany and the EU have repeatedly spoken out during international forums in favour of the freedom and diversity of science. In the context of the ongoing negotiations on the operationalisation of the BBNJ Agreement, they should therefore make targeted efforts to ensure that knowledge diversity within the agreement is not merely recognised normatively, but institutionally safeguarded as well. This is primarily about preventing the privileging of certain forms of knowledge within BBNJ bodies, such as the Scientific and Technical Body. At the same time, the CHM platform itself must be designed in such a way that different knowledge types can be made equally accessible.