Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In light of the deflationary trends following the 2008/2009 financial crisis, as well as the return of inflation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, this book offers insights into price stability issues in various East Asian countries.

Konnektivität, besonders im Transportbereich, ist mit Blick auf den Südkaukasus während der letzten Jahre zu einem allgegenwärtigen Thema avanciert. Auch in der EU-Politik vis-à-vis der Region spielt Transportkonnektivität eine zentrale Rolle. Im Rahmen ihrer Global-Gateway-Initiative hat sich die EU dabei einem Engagement verschrieben, das gleichzeitig werte­basiert und geostrategisch ist. Um diesem Anspruch gerecht zu werden, sollte die EU die verschiedenen Dimensionen von Transportkonnektivität und ihre Implikationen auf mehreren Ebenen integriert betrachten. Vor allem der Verknüpfung von Konnektivität mit machtpolitischen Fragen sollte die EU Rechnung tragen. Bei der Etablierung genuin inklusiver und transparenter Multi-Stake­holder-Prozesse sowie unabhängiger projektbegleitender Moni­torings könnte die EU Unterstützung leisten. Dies könnte die Richtung zu einem eher holistisch gedachten Konnektivitätsansatz weisen. Die EU sollte ihr Konnektivitätsengagement auch kritisch auf mögliche Zielkonflikte abklopfen. Die Policy-Debatten in Berlin und Brüssel würden dabei von einem intensiveren Austausch mit der kritischen Logistik-, Infrastruktur- und Konnektivitätsforschung profitieren. Deren Erkenntnisse könnten zu einer nuancierteren Betrachtung von Transportkonnektivität und der damit verbundenen Komplexitäten und Ambivalenzen beitragen.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Die Abteilung Makroökonomie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Mit der »Zeitenwende« in der internationalen Politik geht die Notwendigkeit einher, strategisches Denken zu stärken und sich für künftige Herausforderungen besser zu wappnen. Deutschland tut dies bereits, indem es strategische Dokumente zur natio­nalen Sicherheit und zu den Beziehungen mit China vorbereitet. In Bezug auf Russ­land drängt sich eine ähnliche Vorgehensweise auf: Erstens weil Russlands Aggression gegen die Ukraine die Situation in Europa und darüber hinaus für längere Zeit wesent­lich verschlechtert hat. Zweitens weil die Konzeption einer Russlandpolitik, die auf den seit 2022 deklarierten Leitlinien basiert, eine Möglichkeit bietet, frühere Fehler zu korrigieren und Maßnahmen, die aus einer Krisensituation hervorgegangen sind, in eine langfristige Politik zu verwandeln.

Socio-ecological transitions need to address the pressing challenges of our time, namely climate change mitigation and social development – including poverty and inequality reduction – in a complementary manner. The importance of achieving resilient and sustainable societies has been made more evident by recent shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. As a consequence, national and international development policies need to foster links between social and environmental goals and policies.
One way to achieve such synergies is through environmental fiscal reforms, defined as the combination of carbon-pricing mechanisms and consequent revenue spending for environmental and socio-economic goals. Even though carbon pricing is just one of the instruments needed to achieve climate goals, it provides the complementary benefit of expanding revenues while incentivising a reduction in emissions though market signals. This paper discusses environmental fiscal reforms from the perspective of low- and middle-income countries and development cooperation, with a focus on how to improve the social outcomes of such reforms. While revenues can be recycled for different purposes – including compensating industries with high adaptation costs, further investments in environmental projects and research, and use for the general budget – the paper focusses on social spending. The revenue can be used to decrease poverty and inequality levels and to compensate the poorest for increases in prices by utilising social protection mechanisms. This is particularly important to garner broad societal support and to make environmental fiscal reforms and carbon pricing more socially acceptable and implementable at sufficient levels in more countries. The paper first presents the key features of different carbon-pricing policies and the revenues they can generate, especially for low- and middle-income countries that have limited fiscal space. It then shows how the revenue can be used to fund social protection mechanisms that can compensate the poorest and address distributional concerns. It underlines the gaps and limitations of current social protection programmes, especially in terms of low coverage of vulnerable populations. This also constrained the response to the war in Ukraine, as lower-income countries had to use price stabilisation mechanisms – which ultimately generated negative fiscal and environmental effects – to avoid inflicting greater burdens on the poor instead of providing targeted programmes. The paper also offers some design principles to best address distributional concerns, including sequencing and sectoral coverage. It then discusses the role that development cooperation can have in implementing environmental fiscal reforms in low- and middle-income countries. Overall, the paper suggests that environmental fiscal reforms can be used to achieve resilient societies and accelerate the fight against climate change, with the goal of building a more inclusive and sustainable future. Such reforms should become a priority of German development cooperation and a key lever for its strategic goals, instead of occupying a peripheral role, as it currently does. Most importantly, the analysis strongly underlines the case for environmental fiscal reforms rather than the current use of subsidies and price controls; this is true when considering both climate goals (as keeping prices low does not incentivise shifts in production and consumption) as well as social goals (e.g. cash transfers result in significantly greater levels of poverty and inequality reduction when compared to untargeted subsidies). Therefore, social protection investments are urgently needed, also in lower-income countries. The current energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic has made this clearer.

Socio-ecological transitions need to address the pressing challenges of our time, namely climate change mitigation and social development – including poverty and inequality reduction – in a complementary manner. The importance of achieving resilient and sustainable societies has been made more evident by recent shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. As a consequence, national and international development policies need to foster links between social and environmental goals and policies.
One way to achieve such synergies is through environmental fiscal reforms, defined as the combination of carbon-pricing mechanisms and consequent revenue spending for environmental and socio-economic goals. Even though carbon pricing is just one of the instruments needed to achieve climate goals, it provides the complementary benefit of expanding revenues while incentivising a reduction in emissions though market signals. This paper discusses environmental fiscal reforms from the perspective of low- and middle-income countries and development cooperation, with a focus on how to improve the social outcomes of such reforms. While revenues can be recycled for different purposes – including compensating industries with high adaptation costs, further investments in environmental projects and research, and use for the general budget – the paper focusses on social spending. The revenue can be used to decrease poverty and inequality levels and to compensate the poorest for increases in prices by utilising social protection mechanisms. This is particularly important to garner broad societal support and to make environmental fiscal reforms and carbon pricing more socially acceptable and implementable at sufficient levels in more countries. The paper first presents the key features of different carbon-pricing policies and the revenues they can generate, especially for low- and middle-income countries that have limited fiscal space. It then shows how the revenue can be used to fund social protection mechanisms that can compensate the poorest and address distributional concerns. It underlines the gaps and limitations of current social protection programmes, especially in terms of low coverage of vulnerable populations. This also constrained the response to the war in Ukraine, as lower-income countries had to use price stabilisation mechanisms – which ultimately generated negative fiscal and environmental effects – to avoid inflicting greater burdens on the poor instead of providing targeted programmes. The paper also offers some design principles to best address distributional concerns, including sequencing and sectoral coverage. It then discusses the role that development cooperation can have in implementing environmental fiscal reforms in low- and middle-income countries. Overall, the paper suggests that environmental fiscal reforms can be used to achieve resilient societies and accelerate the fight against climate change, with the goal of building a more inclusive and sustainable future. Such reforms should become a priority of German development cooperation and a key lever for its strategic goals, instead of occupying a peripheral role, as it currently does. Most importantly, the analysis strongly underlines the case for environmental fiscal reforms rather than the current use of subsidies and price controls; this is true when considering both climate goals (as keeping prices low does not incentivise shifts in production and consumption) as well as social goals (e.g. cash transfers result in significantly greater levels of poverty and inequality reduction when compared to untargeted subsidies). Therefore, social protection investments are urgently needed, also in lower-income countries. The current energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic has made this clearer.

Socio-ecological transitions need to address the pressing challenges of our time, namely climate change mitigation and social development – including poverty and inequality reduction – in a complementary manner. The importance of achieving resilient and sustainable societies has been made more evident by recent shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. As a consequence, national and international development policies need to foster links between social and environmental goals and policies.
One way to achieve such synergies is through environmental fiscal reforms, defined as the combination of carbon-pricing mechanisms and consequent revenue spending for environmental and socio-economic goals. Even though carbon pricing is just one of the instruments needed to achieve climate goals, it provides the complementary benefit of expanding revenues while incentivising a reduction in emissions though market signals. This paper discusses environmental fiscal reforms from the perspective of low- and middle-income countries and development cooperation, with a focus on how to improve the social outcomes of such reforms. While revenues can be recycled for different purposes – including compensating industries with high adaptation costs, further investments in environmental projects and research, and use for the general budget – the paper focusses on social spending. The revenue can be used to decrease poverty and inequality levels and to compensate the poorest for increases in prices by utilising social protection mechanisms. This is particularly important to garner broad societal support and to make environmental fiscal reforms and carbon pricing more socially acceptable and implementable at sufficient levels in more countries. The paper first presents the key features of different carbon-pricing policies and the revenues they can generate, especially for low- and middle-income countries that have limited fiscal space. It then shows how the revenue can be used to fund social protection mechanisms that can compensate the poorest and address distributional concerns. It underlines the gaps and limitations of current social protection programmes, especially in terms of low coverage of vulnerable populations. This also constrained the response to the war in Ukraine, as lower-income countries had to use price stabilisation mechanisms – which ultimately generated negative fiscal and environmental effects – to avoid inflicting greater burdens on the poor instead of providing targeted programmes. The paper also offers some design principles to best address distributional concerns, including sequencing and sectoral coverage. It then discusses the role that development cooperation can have in implementing environmental fiscal reforms in low- and middle-income countries. Overall, the paper suggests that environmental fiscal reforms can be used to achieve resilient societies and accelerate the fight against climate change, with the goal of building a more inclusive and sustainable future. Such reforms should become a priority of German development cooperation and a key lever for its strategic goals, instead of occupying a peripheral role, as it currently does. Most importantly, the analysis strongly underlines the case for environmental fiscal reforms rather than the current use of subsidies and price controls; this is true when considering both climate goals (as keeping prices low does not incentivise shifts in production and consumption) as well as social goals (e.g. cash transfers result in significantly greater levels of poverty and inequality reduction when compared to untargeted subsidies). Therefore, social protection investments are urgently needed, also in lower-income countries. The current energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic has made this clearer.

China has gradually emerged as an important player in the Eastern Mediterranean, where its economic power has allowed it to develop positive relations with virtually every regional country. In this interview, Daniel Schoolenberg asks Jens Bastian how China’s growing influence might affect the geopolitical dynamics currently at work in the region.

During the formulation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, many promoted policy coherence as a key tool to ensure achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a way that “leaves no one behind.” Their argument assumed that coherent policymaking contributes to more effective policies and supports over-arching efforts to reduce inequality. As the 2030 Agenda reaches the halfway point, however, countries are falling short on many SDGs, particularly SDG 10 (reduce inequality). This study revisits the basic assumptions about policy coherence underpinning the SDGs. We systematically screened the peer-reviewed literature to identify 40 studies that provide evidence about whether coherent policymaking contributes to more effective outcomes and helps to reduce inequality. We find that coherent policymaking did not help reduce inequality in a majority of cases and made it worse in several. Our findings challenge the narrative that coherence is a necessary pre-condition for progress on the SDGs for all people.

During the formulation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, many promoted policy coherence as a key tool to ensure achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a way that “leaves no one behind.” Their argument assumed that coherent policymaking contributes to more effective policies and supports over-arching efforts to reduce inequality. As the 2030 Agenda reaches the halfway point, however, countries are falling short on many SDGs, particularly SDG 10 (reduce inequality). This study revisits the basic assumptions about policy coherence underpinning the SDGs. We systematically screened the peer-reviewed literature to identify 40 studies that provide evidence about whether coherent policymaking contributes to more effective outcomes and helps to reduce inequality. We find that coherent policymaking did not help reduce inequality in a majority of cases and made it worse in several. Our findings challenge the narrative that coherence is a necessary pre-condition for progress on the SDGs for all people.

During the formulation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, many promoted policy coherence as a key tool to ensure achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a way that “leaves no one behind.” Their argument assumed that coherent policymaking contributes to more effective policies and supports over-arching efforts to reduce inequality. As the 2030 Agenda reaches the halfway point, however, countries are falling short on many SDGs, particularly SDG 10 (reduce inequality). This study revisits the basic assumptions about policy coherence underpinning the SDGs. We systematically screened the peer-reviewed literature to identify 40 studies that provide evidence about whether coherent policymaking contributes to more effective outcomes and helps to reduce inequality. We find that coherent policymaking did not help reduce inequality in a majority of cases and made it worse in several. Our findings challenge the narrative that coherence is a necessary pre-condition for progress on the SDGs for all people.

Les membres du G7, en se réunissant à Hiroshima au Japon, avaient deux objectifs. Le premier, réaffirmer solennellement l’engagement et leur soutien à l’Ukraine. Le second, élaborer une stratégie commune face au défi chinois sans trop envenimer leur relation avec Pékin.

Au service de ces deux objectifs, ils avaient une stratégie : associer les pays du « Sud global » pour éviter que le clivage the West versus the Rest, déjà franc, ne s’élargisse encore plus. Ce n’est certes pas la première fois que le G7 invite d’autres États à participer à ses travaux, mais rarement l’objectif a été aussi visible et précis. Ont donc été invités l’Australie, très proche des Occidentaux, mais également le Brésil, les Comores, la Corée du Sud, l’Inde, l’Indonésie, les îles Cook et le Vietnam.

Il y a eu également un invité surprise, Volodymyr Zelensky, venu plaider sa cause, se rendant au Japon par un avion de la République française. Les pays occidentaux, en effet, déplorent que les pays du « Sud global » renvoient peu ou prou dos à dos la Russie et l’Ukraine et ne se montrent pas suffisamment solidaires de la cause ukrainienne.

Si l’objectif était de montrer qu’y compris après 15 mois de conflit, les pays occidentaux continuent de soutenir sans restriction l’Ukraine, il a été atteint. De nouvelles promesses d’aide militaire ont été formulées et Joe Biden a accepté que des pilotes ukrainiens puissent être entraînés sur des avions américains F16.

Mais sur la question ukrainienne, le fossé the West versus the Rest n’a en rien été comblé. Si Volodymyr Zelensky a bien pu avoir un entretien en tête à tête avec le Premier ministre indien Narendra Modi, celui-ci s’est contenté d’un vague engagement d’aide humanitaire. Il n’a pu rencontrer ni le président brésilien ni le président indonésien. Ces deux pays ont certainement pensé que les membres du G7 voulaient leur forcer la main et ils n’ont pas forcément apprécié la démarche. Leur position n’a donc pas changé. Les pays membres du G7 ont fait preuve d’ouverture en voulant associer des grandes démocraties du « Sud global », mais ils ont voulu le faire à leurs conditions et à celle du président ukrainien, sans tenir compte des sensibilités de ces États.

On sait que, s’agissant de la Chine, il y a une divergence d’attitude entre les pays européens et les États-Unis. Ceux-ci voudraient mettre en place une politique d’endiguement à l’égard de Pékin comparable à celle mise en place avec succès du temps de la guerre froide contre l’Union soviétique. Mais il y a un petit changement néanmoins. Il y avait entre l’URSS et les États-Unis deux milliards de dollars d’échanges économiques par an ; ce sont deux milliards par jour désormais entre la Chine et les États-Unis, et les échanges sont aussi très fournis entre l’Europe et la Chine. Un compromis semble avoir été trouvé. On ne parle plus de découpler les économies chinoises et occidentales, mais de se diriger vers une stratégie d’éviter les risques, notamment d’une dépendance trop importante.

Mais dans un passage enfoui à la fin du communiqué final, néanmoins très visible, les Occidentaux, tout en disant qu’ils ne voulaient pas mettre en cause le développement de la Chine, lui ont exprimé un nombre de reproches relativement important sur son attitude en mer de Chine, sur les pressions économiques – l’accusant de coercition – qu’elle peut exercer envers les pays concernés par son projet des « Nouvelles routes de la soie », mais également sur Taiwan, sur les droits de l’homme… Ils lui ont également demandé de faire pression sur la Russie pour parvenir à une paix en Ukraine, sous-entendu aux conditions de l’Ukraine.

Il y a une certaine ironie de la part des pays occidentaux à dénoncer la coercition économique chinoise, au regard de la législation extraterritoriale des États-Unis et la logique des sanctions qu’ils mettent en place assez fréquemment.

Comment ces pays occidentaux auraient-ils réagi si la Chine, après un sommet international, avait formulé des exigences aussi nettes à l’égard de leur politique ? Quoi qu’il en soit, la réaction ne s’est pas fait attendre et le G7 débouche sur une crispation supplémentaire entre les Occidentaux et la Chine.

Les Occidentaux ont montré qu’ils prennent conscience de cette division avec les pays du « Sud global », mais s’ils continuent à penser qu’il suffit de quelques consultations pour que les pays du Sud se rallient à leurs positions, ils se trompent d’époque.