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This contribution to the Korean Development Institute's Knowledge Brief series contextualises and analyses the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-Operation and Development's reform plan, as published in January 2026.

This contribution to the Korean Development Institute's Knowledge Brief series contextualises and analyses the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-Operation and Development's reform plan, as published in January 2026.

Tehran, the capital of Iran. Credit: Unsplash/Hosein Charbaghi. Source: UN News

By Jacqueline Cabasso and John Burroughs
OAKLAND, California, Mar 4 2026 (IPS)

Operation “Epic Fury” manifests an epic tantrum by President Donald Trump, supported by his sycophantic minions, with dire consequences for the people in the region, peace and security worldwide, the global economy, and the post-World War II international legal order.

The United States/Israeli bombing of Iran clearly violates fundamental rules of international law. It violates the sovereignty of Iran, contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

There is no plausible case that the U.S. and Israel are acting in self-defense against an imminent attack. Nor is regime change an acceptable justification for use of force, as it runs directly counter to the injunction to respect the political independence of states.

Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider
UN Secretary-General António Guterres, briefing reporters outside the Security Council, described the United States’ bombing in Iran as a “dangerous escalation.”
“I am gravely alarmed by the use of force by the United States against Iran today,” said the UN chief, reiterating that there is no military solution. “This is a dangerous escalation in a region already on the edge – and a direct threat to international peace and security.”

It is striking that the Trump administration has made no real effort to use multilateral mechanisms or to invoke international law. Both by its action and by its contempt for international law, the administration is accelerating the erosion of basic rules relating to use of force that has been underway for nearly three decades following the end of the Cold War.

The erosion of the legal framework formally limiting the use of armed force has been a long process, punctuated in the 21st century by increasingly frequent shocks of large-scale wars launched by major powers with less and less regard for international law and institutions.

The first of these was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the stage set by the long, massive U.S. presence in and around Iraq in the 1990s and the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 2001. Unlike the Trump administration, the George W. Bush administration at least gestured toward providing an international law rationale for the invasion—but built its justifications for war on a foundation of lies.

Then came the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which both lacked any serious international law justification. There have been other instances of aggression in this century, such as the recent U.S. invasion of Venezuela to abduct its president. But U.S. actions in relation to Iraq, those of Russia in Ukraine, and the U.S./Israel bombing of Iran stand out as major developments in the erosion of rules on use of force.

Concerning Iran’s nuclear program, prior to the bombing it was not at a stage of development that provided any basis for a claim of self-defense. In general, it has appeared for many years that Iran had a uranium enrichment capability, in part in order to preserve the option of acquiring nuclear weapons at some point in the future, but had not made the acquisition decision.

And it was the United States, during the first Trump administration, that unilaterally withdrew from the painstakingly negotiated 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an international agreement that placed effective and verifiable restraints on Iran’s nuclear program.

Discussions of Iran’s program generally do not address the fact that Israel has a robust nuclear arsenal. In the long run it is not practical to allow some states to have nuclear weapons and to deny them to others. The most straightforward way to deal with problems posed by the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons, as in the case of North Korea, or their potential proliferation, as in the case of Iran, is to move expeditiously toward the global abolition of nuclear arms.

Another at least partial way is to build new regional nuclear weapons free zones. That approach has indeed been tried in the case of the Middle East. Both in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in the United Nations, there have been serious efforts to get negotiation of a Middle East zone underway, with Iran’s willing participation.

However, Israel and the United States have boycotted these efforts. This severely undercuts the legitimacy of their position as they claim to act to stop a menacing Iranian nuclear program.

What should be the response to these developments?

First, the invasion of Iran should be condemned as unlawful aggression, and the basic UN Charter rules should be defended, with the aim of at least preserving them for the future.

Second, it should be recognized that the world is undergoing a major transformation marked by the resurgence of authoritarian nationalism, with authoritarian ethno-nationalist factions in power or constituting significant political forces in many countries, including all of the nuclear-armed states.

There is a need for realism about the nature of the challenge, and for new thinking and innovative forms of advocacy and politics for a more fair, democratic, peaceful, and post-nationalist world.

Jacqueline Cabasso is the Executive Director of Western States Legal Foundation in Oakland, California; John Burroughs is a member of the organization’s Board of Directors.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Civil society organizations (CSOs) are non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary entities formed by people to address social, political, or environmental issues.

By Gina Romero
BOGOTA, Colombia, Mar 4 2026 (IPS)

A year has passed since a 90-day freeze on U.S. foreign assistance signaled the deepening of a structural dismantling of international solidarity. Today, the “existential threat” to the freedom of association I warned of in my report to last year’s General Assembly (A/80/219) is no longer a warning; it is a lived reality.

Thousands of civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide have been reduced to their minimum or are completely vanishing, while others are forced into transformations that compromise their core missions. This is not only creating more victims of human rights violations but has also left prior victims alone.

For the freedom of association, the impact is devastating. The dismantling of USAID, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), and other dedicated funds from other countries has cut the lifelines for NGOs that served as democratic watchdogs worldwide (Refugees International).

Therefore, this is not merely a budgetary shift but a coordinated attack on the infrastructure of dissent. In the U.S., for example, foundations and nonprofits are facing “three overlapping crises” (Maecenata Stiftung, Refugees International, other):

• Policy Threats: Executive Orders targeting DEI and redefining “charitable” status to strip tax exemptions.

• Organizational Targeting: Explicit vilification of networks like the Open Society Foundations and investigative letters targeting major funders like the Gates and Ford Foundations.

• Mass Closings: Organizations are laying off up to 95% of staff, leading to a “generational funding collapse” of the humanitarian system.

In the meantime, worldwide we also see ultra-conservative anti-rights groups and autocratic regimes rushing to fill the vacuum left by established aid agencies. These groups are, among others, reshaping the global health landscape with actions that restrict reproductive rights and LGBTQI+ protections (The Guardian). In the Asia-Pacific region alone, 240 million young girls are facing a “coordinated global backlash” as programs focused on education and gender equality are the first to be cut (Women’s Agenda).

As I reported to the UN General Assembly last year, the right to association is an integral part of human nature. When states vilify aid as “criminal” or “corrupt,” they dismantle the lifelines that keep civic space alive (United Nations). We must restore a sustainable aid architecture that serves human dignity and the planet rather than private profit or political control.

But the impact on communities and individuals is far too grave. The data emerging in early 2026 is devastating. Since the 2025 freeze, researchers estimate the dismantling of U.S. foreign aid alone has already caused 750,000 deaths, over 60% of whom are children—a rate of 88 preventable deaths every hour (different sources).

Projections indicate that without restoration, 22.6 million people could die from preventable causes by 2030 (The Guardian).

The “hammer” thrown at the aid system has undone decades of progress:

• Access to justice: Deeply affected by terminated grants funding for community violence intervention programs, legal assistance for crime victims from underserved communities, court-appointed advocates for children in cases of abuse or neglect, services for victims of hate crimes, shutting down the safety net for domestic violence survivors and closing of shelters and hotlines, etc. (CIJ, LLF).

• Democracy and rule of law: Crisis in independent media and civil society reduces the critical voices that speak truth to the power and weakens checks and balances in democracies and hybrid regimes, while in authoritarian context the constraints of dissenting voices increases repression, especially against the most vulnerable groups (Global Democracy Coalition).

• Human rights: global and regional mechanisms of human rights protections have seen drastic cuts of funding, which jeopardize the human rights protections worldwide. The OHCHR received a 16% cut of its budget for 2026 and several Human Rights Council mandates are also being defunded, many tied to HHRR violations investigations in authoritarian states (ISHR).

• Global Health: Access to PrEP and life-saving HIV drugs has been halved for 80% of community organizations. Cholera deaths in the DRC alone surged by 361% in 2025 after essential water projects were halted (Oxfam).

• Education: The abrupt cancellation of nearly 400 USAID-funded education programs in 58 countries risks leaving millions of children—predominantly girls and refugees—without access to quality learning (ETF).

• Food Security: In West and Central Africa, 55 million people are expected to endure crisis levels of hunger, or worse by the end of the first semester of 2026, including over 13 million children are also expected to suffer from malnutrition during the year 2026 (WFP). In Afghanistan, monthly reach for emergency food aid plummeted from 5.6 million people to just 1 million (Refugees International).

Perhaps most alarming is the collapse of data collection systems. As USAID programs disappeared, so did the reporting requirements that tracked disease, death, and human rights violations (The Japan Times). We are entering a period where the true scale of suffering and needs may never be fully known (Refugees International).

Besides the cut of funding, the existential threat is also related to the reduction of possibilities of civil society organizations to collect new funding due to the increase of mis/disinformation about CSO work that lead to lack of trust in communities and therefore increases the shrinking civic space, already heavily affected by anti-NGO laws and persecution (Global aid freeze tracker).

We cannot allow a world without civil society. It is a world without hope, where the most vulnerable are left alone to face the most pressing human crises and wars. The international community must move beyond “business as usual” to restore a sustainable and just aid architecture that empowers civic engagement rather than advancing its suppression.

Gina Romero is UN Special Rapporteur, Freedom of Assembly and of Association.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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SOEP-Befragung zu sozialen Medien: Rund 90 Prozent sehen Risiken für Kinder und Jugendliche – Nutzungsverbot wird aber nur bis zwölf Jahre befürwortet, nicht bis 16 Jahre – Große Unterstützung für mehr Medienkompetenz, elterliche Begleitung und Plattformregulierung Eine große Mehrheit der ...

Trois mois après la fermeture du site, une mission d'évaluation de l'ONU dépêchée mardi 3 mars à Amee, territoire de Mahagi (Ituri) dresse un constat encourageant. Elle a constaté la consolidation de la cohabitation entre les communautés Alur et Lendu et la reprise de l'activité économique.

Revue de presse de ce mercredi 4 mars 2026

L’annonce de nouvelles sanctions américaines contre le Rwanda liées à la guerre dans l’Est de la RDC et les réactions qui s’en suivent en RDC font la Une des médias congolais ce mercredi 4 mars 2026.

L’Alliance des démocrates congolais (ADECO) estime que la Constitution actuelle est devenue obsolète et nécessite une révision approfondie.

Dans une déclaration faite le mardi 3 mars à Kinshasa, le président de ce parti politique, Alain Mbaya, a proposé la mise en place d’une commission de réflexion et de rédaction d’une nouvelle loi fondamentale, adaptée aux réalités sociopolitiques du moment.

Dans un communiqué officiel publié ce mardi 3 mars 2026 à Kinshasa, le ministre de la Justice et garde des sceaux, Guillaume Ngefa, a instruit les procureurs généraux de renforcer les poursuites judiciaires contre les abus constatés dans le cyberespace congolais. Le Gouvernement entend mettre fin à l'impunité sur des plateformes telles que TikTok, Facebook, X ou WhatsApp, tout en rappelant le caractère sacré de la liberté d’expression. 

The perils for the region—and the alliance.

Iran’s favorite proxy is down but not out.

And really compete with China.

Digital and artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems now shape all phases of inter­national migration – from the pre-screening of applications and profiles to border management and the integration of migrants. States, international organisations, and private providers use digital platforms, biometric systems, and algorithmic processes to manage migration in a more targeted way. At the same time, migrants themselves use digital tools to obtain information, prepare decisions, and secure access to work or support. This development is changing migration not only operationally but also structurally: It enables new forms of digital labour mobility, shifts power relations and dependencies, and embeds migration into a global data economy. For Germany and the European Union (EU), the question arises as to how digitalisation and AI can be shaped in terms of migration, foreign, and development policy so as to deliver effi­ciency gains in administration and procedures, without undermining data protection, equal treatment, and human-rights standards.

Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons

By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

 
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.

Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.

A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan

In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.

Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.

Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.

The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty

Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.

In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.

At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.

A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads

Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”

The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.

Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.

Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.

Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos

Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Les commerçants et entrepreneurs de la ville de Kabinda, dans la province de Lomami, se disent prêts à s'acquitter de leurs obligations fiscales, mais exigent en contrepartie, une amélioration visible des services publics et des infrastructures de base.

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IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, co-hosted a public discussion on “Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace” on March 3rd.

Mission transitions represent an important opportunity for the UN to reconfigure its presence and strategy to support peacebuilding objectives, as articulated in Resolution 2594, adopted unanimously in 2021. Well-planned and integrated transition processes that place peacebuilding at the center require strong coordination and coherence between host governments, missions, resident coordinators, country teams, and civil society. In addition, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can play valuable roles in supporting national and inclusive ownership in transition processes. To that end, the twin resolutions adopted in November 2025 on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture encourage the secretary-general to consider how the PBF can further enhance its support to countries undergoing transitions from peace operations and to strengthen cooperation between the Security Council and the PBC on transition processes.

Over the past two decades, the Secretariat has developed policies and guidance aimed at promoting more effective transitions that support peacebuilding objectives. However, many transitions take place amid political and security challenges that make it difficult to implement the good practices outlined in the guidance. Against this backdrop, IPI and the Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN hosted a panel discussion on how peacebuilding gains can be sustained during and after mission transitions.

Overall, the discussion identified ways to strengthen coordination and coherence between partners on transition processes, both within and outside the UN, to bridge gaps between humanitarian, development, and peace activities. Panelists also explored opportunities to enhance the roles of the PBC and the PBF in supporting effective UN transitions.

Several speakers discussed the critical importance of ensuring that peacebuilding processes are inclusive, consultative, and nationally owned. Noting the ambiguity of the term “national ownership,” one speaker shared their view of the essential elements that constitute nationally owned peacebuilding, highlighting the centrality of a social contract that narrows the gap between legitimacy and legality, strong national capacity, a locally determined definition of a successful peace process, and financial resources, including national resource mobilization. Others echoed this point, underscoring the importance of integrating lived experiences in decision-making and recognizing that institutional reforms alone cannot sustain peace.

During the discussion, speakers also addressed the UN’s capacity to support transitions. In a context of limited resources, speakers emphasized the need to enhance planning and coordination to more effectively sustain peacebuilding gains during and after UN mission transitions. Many highlighted the role of UN agencies, funds, and programs, which often leverage greater in-country capacity to support peacebuilding efforts before, during, and after transitions. There was also broad consensus on the importance of leveraging the UN peacebuilding architecture, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office. Encouraging the PBC to hold more regular dialogue on transition contexts, speakers and participants stressed the need to integrate the peacebuilding architecture into UN mission mandates from their inception. While pointing to these different UN instruments, some highlighted the need to develop a common operational framework to advance work on the ground in a coherent manner.

Welcoming Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Yamazaki Kazuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN

Panelists:
Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Turhan Saleh, Deputy Director, Crisis Bureau, UN Development Programme
Robert Pulver, Chief, Justice and Corrections Service Branch, UN Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office
Ai Kihara-Hunt, Professor at the Graduate Program on Human Security and Deputy Director of the Research Center for Sustainable Peace, University of Tokyo (VTC)
Cedric de Coning, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (VTC)

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

The post Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Dans un contexte de recomposition des équilibres géopolitiques et de priorisation accrue des dépenses sécuritaires et militaires, comment l’UNICEF analyse-t-il la marginalisation progressive des droits de l’enfant dans les stratégies d’aide internationale des États donateurs ? Face à l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs influents de l’aide (pays du Sud, puissances régionales, financements conditionnés), comment l’UNICEF préserve-t-il l’universalité et l’indivisibilité des droits de l’enfant, sans les subordonner à des intérêts géopolitiques ou diplomatiques ? Un an après les coupes de l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) et la baisse significative des financements européens, comment l’UNICEF adapte-t-il sa stratégie pour continuer à défendre les droits de l’enfant sans sacrifier les programmes essentiels ? Face à la concurrence accrue entre crises humanitaires, comment l’UNICEF hiérarchise-t-il ses interventions tout en garantissant le respect des droits fondamentaux des enfants, notamment dans les pays les plus fragiles ? Enfin, quel rôle peuvent jouer la société civile, le secteur privé et les citoyens pour compenser la baisse des financements publics et contribuer à remettre les droits de l’enfant au cœur de l’agenda international ?

Entretien avec Aïda Ndiaye, chargée plaidoyer et programmes internationaux à UNICEF France.

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L’article Les droits de l’enfant : comment en faire une priorité de l’aide internationale dans un contexte de baisse des financements ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.