Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Gemessen an den erteilten Exportgenehmigungen werden auch 2020 arabische Staa­ten wieder zu den Hauptempfängern deutscher Rüstungslieferungen gehören. Damit setzt sich trotz des kürzlich verlängerten Exportstopps für Saudi-Arabien ein Trend fort, der sich seit den frühen 2000er Jahren, vor allem aber seit 2010 beobachten lässt. Angesichts der regionalen Entwicklungen ist dies problematisch. Denn in den vergan­genen Jahren hat sich die Außenpolitik der wichtigsten Abnehmerstaaten gewandelt. Sie sind weniger berechenbar und eher bereit, militärische Mittel zur Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen zu nutzen. Rüstungsexporte könnten somit dazu beitragen, die zahl­reichen zwischenstaatlichen Konflikte in Nahost und Nordafrika weiter eskalieren zu lassen, mit hohen Risiken für Deutschland und die EU. Auch vor dem Hintergrund der eigenen Exportrichtlinien ist daher für diese Länder ein Ausfuhrstopp anzuraten.

Im Rat der EU wird derzeit der Vorschlag einer Europäischen Gesundheitsunion dis­kutiert. Dabei ist vorgesehen, das Europäische Zentrum für die Prävention und die Kontrolle von Krankheiten (ECDC) zu stärken und sein Mandat auszuweiten. Vor diesem Hintergrund können sich das ECDC und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten für eine neue Rolle des ECDC stark­machen. Während das politische Gewicht der Mitgliedstaaten nötig ist, kann das ECDC seine regionalen und bilateralen Partnerschaften ausbauen, um über entwicklungspolitische Projekte Gesundheitssystemstärkung zu fördern. Dadurch böte sich dem ECDC die Möglichkeit, einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung und zur Agenda 2030 zu leisten.

Download the Report Download Case Studies: South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, and Darfur. *Outlined tools can be activated in exceptional circumstances Author

Namie Di Razza, Head of IPI’s Protection of Civilians

Namie Di Razza joined IPI as a post-doctoral fellow in October 2016. She works on UN peace operations and protection of civilians with IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations. Prior to…

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Email: dirazza@ipinst.org

Download Detailed Factsheets:
1. Force commander’s evaluation
2. OMA evaluation
3. Police evaluation
4. Risk premium
5. OPSP
6. Special investigation
7. OIOS
8. BOI
9. JPT/JAM/JET
10. Mission evaluation
11. CPAS
12. AAR
13. Medals
14. Conduct and discipline
15. Compact
16. e-Performance

Over the last two decades, UN peacekeeping operations have striven to protect civilians from physical violence. The protection of civilians (POC) is now based on a clear normative and policy framework, and its practical implementation relies on a number of innovative tools, tailored and multidimensional approaches, and the more proactive posture of peacekeepers. On a number of occasions, however, UN missions have failed to prevent or respond to threats despite being aware of the risk, receiving adequate warning of an attack, or being in the proximity when abuses were committed. Numerous reports and investigations into these incidents have highlighted shortcomings in performance and called for more accountability. Despite institutional ambitions, however, there is still limited accountability for the actors involved in protecting civilians.

To help address this challenge, IPI undertook a project to map how existing accountability mechanisms in the UN could be applied to peacekeeping missions with POC mandates. Through a combination of desk research and key informant interviews, IPI developed a set of tools to help guide the UN and its member states in building a robust, multi-actor, multilayer “system of accountability for POC.” These tools include:

• A policy paper analyzing the concept of accountability, identifying accountability mechanisms that exist and those that are needed, reviewing recent initiatives by the UN Secretariat and member states to strengthen accountability mechanisms for POC, and recommending steps that could be taken to strengthen these mechanisms further;
• An interactive graphic of the accountability mechanisms that can be or have been used to ensure accountability for the implementation of POC mandates by peacekeeping operations, with detailed fact sheets on each of these; and
• Case studies on how UN accountability tools have—or have not—been used in response to specific POC incidents in four different UN peacekeeping missions.

Collectively, these tools point to the need for a culture of active accountability for all actors, based on a shared willingness and commitment to assume responsibility and be answerable for the effective delivery of protection mandates. Toward this end, the policy paper offers the following recommendations:

• Working toward a more cohesive accountability structure by streamlining processes, improving coordination between accountability structures, broadening the scope of accountability tools to include all POC stakeholders, enhancing planning for POC, and tracking POC responses.
• Strengthening independent, dedicated, and transparent accountability tools by using more independent investigative teams, strengthening the role of the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, providing dedicated resources for POC accountability, and striking a balance between transparency and politics.
• Enforcing consequences by following up on shortcomings in performance and considering POC in the force generation and selection processes, as well as going beyond punitive measures by developing incentives.

Detailed Factsheets for Selected Mechanisms (Click on each mechanism below for their detailed factsheet – desktop only)

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The effects of capital controls on international trade have not been thoroughly examined empirically. Using bilateral industry-level export data across a large number of countries, this paper evaluates how capital controls affect exports. We identify the effect of capital controls on export activities by exploiting the variation in capital controls across countries and variation in external finance dependence across industries. While we find that capital controls adversely affect total exports, analyses of the export margins indicate that the export distorting effect of capital controls works by deterring single and multiple export market entries by exporters, reducing export intensities of exporters, and the range of goods exporters can ship to each market destination. Further analysis in the paper reveals that the export distorting effects of capital controls is invariant of whether the restriction is on inward or outward capital controls, although the relative impact of inward capital control is higher. We also find that capital controls distort exports in OECD and non-OECD countries, although the effect is higher for non-OECD countries. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

The effects of capital controls on international trade have not been thoroughly examined empirically. Using bilateral industry-level export data across a large number of countries, this paper evaluates how capital controls affect exports. We identify the effect of capital controls on export activities by exploiting the variation in capital controls across countries and variation in external finance dependence across industries. While we find that capital controls adversely affect total exports, analyses of the export margins indicate that the export distorting effect of capital controls works by deterring single and multiple export market entries by exporters, reducing export intensities of exporters, and the range of goods exporters can ship to each market destination. Further analysis in the paper reveals that the export distorting effects of capital controls is invariant of whether the restriction is on inward or outward capital controls, although the relative impact of inward capital control is higher. We also find that capital controls distort exports in OECD and non-OECD countries, although the effect is higher for non-OECD countries. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

The effects of capital controls on international trade have not been thoroughly examined empirically. Using bilateral industry-level export data across a large number of countries, this paper evaluates how capital controls affect exports. We identify the effect of capital controls on export activities by exploiting the variation in capital controls across countries and variation in external finance dependence across industries. While we find that capital controls adversely affect total exports, analyses of the export margins indicate that the export distorting effect of capital controls works by deterring single and multiple export market entries by exporters, reducing export intensities of exporters, and the range of goods exporters can ship to each market destination. Further analysis in the paper reveals that the export distorting effects of capital controls is invariant of whether the restriction is on inward or outward capital controls, although the relative impact of inward capital control is higher. We also find that capital controls distort exports in OECD and non-OECD countries, although the effect is higher for non-OECD countries. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

Carbon taxes are an economically effective and efficient policy measure to address climate change mitigation. However, they can have severe adverse distributional effects. Recycling parts of the fiscal revenues to vulnerable, lower income households through cash transfers (social assistance) is an option to also overcome associated political difficulties. This paper simulates the distributional impacts of such a combined policy reform in Peru. In a first step, we assess the distributional impacts of varying carbon tax rates. In a second step, we evaluate different scenarios of recycling revenues through existing or expanded transfer schemes towards vulnerable households. The results indicate that a national carbon tax, without compensation, would increase poverty but have no significant impact on inequality. When tax revenues are recycled through transfer schemes, however, poverty would actually decrease. Depending on the amount to be redistributed and the design of the cash transfer scheme, our simulations show a proportional reduction in the poverty headcount of up to around 17%. In addition, the paper underlines how crucial it is to go beyond aggregate measures of poverty to better identify losers from such reform; and assure that the “leave no one behind” principle of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is addressed.

Carbon taxes are an economically effective and efficient policy measure to address climate change mitigation. However, they can have severe adverse distributional effects. Recycling parts of the fiscal revenues to vulnerable, lower income households through cash transfers (social assistance) is an option to also overcome associated political difficulties. This paper simulates the distributional impacts of such a combined policy reform in Peru. In a first step, we assess the distributional impacts of varying carbon tax rates. In a second step, we evaluate different scenarios of recycling revenues through existing or expanded transfer schemes towards vulnerable households. The results indicate that a national carbon tax, without compensation, would increase poverty but have no significant impact on inequality. When tax revenues are recycled through transfer schemes, however, poverty would actually decrease. Depending on the amount to be redistributed and the design of the cash transfer scheme, our simulations show a proportional reduction in the poverty headcount of up to around 17%. In addition, the paper underlines how crucial it is to go beyond aggregate measures of poverty to better identify losers from such reform; and assure that the “leave no one behind” principle of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is addressed.

Carbon taxes are an economically effective and efficient policy measure to address climate change mitigation. However, they can have severe adverse distributional effects. Recycling parts of the fiscal revenues to vulnerable, lower income households through cash transfers (social assistance) is an option to also overcome associated political difficulties. This paper simulates the distributional impacts of such a combined policy reform in Peru. In a first step, we assess the distributional impacts of varying carbon tax rates. In a second step, we evaluate different scenarios of recycling revenues through existing or expanded transfer schemes towards vulnerable households. The results indicate that a national carbon tax, without compensation, would increase poverty but have no significant impact on inequality. When tax revenues are recycled through transfer schemes, however, poverty would actually decrease. Depending on the amount to be redistributed and the design of the cash transfer scheme, our simulations show a proportional reduction in the poverty headcount of up to around 17%. In addition, the paper underlines how crucial it is to go beyond aggregate measures of poverty to better identify losers from such reform; and assure that the “leave no one behind” principle of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is addressed.

Le projet du plan de relance post-Covid et le budget européen 2021-2027, qui conditionne l’octroi de fonds européens au respect de l’État de droit, a provoqué les foudres de la Pologne et de la Hongrie. Le fond du débat renvoie à l’essence même du modèle illibéral, incarné aujourd’hui en Europe par ces deux pays. 

L’Europe centrale et orientale, un espace en recomposition 

…

Pretoria, 12 February 2024: During a ceremony, the German Minister of Health and his South African counterpart sign the “Together We Care” agreement on the training and assignment to Germany of 20,000 South African nurses. “Together We Care” is part of a comprehensive cooperation agreement. Training centres for medical per­sonnel are to be set up in several South African cities. The agreement also contains commitments to support a vocational training system and the facilitation of visas. The event has received extensive media coverage and a predominantly positive recep­tion. The German weekly newspaper FAZ publishes a front page article with the head­line “Germany can hold its own in global competition”, and the weekly taz welcomes the agreement with an article entitled “Germany remains a country of immigration”.

In Großbritannien sind die Unsicherheiten über die Höhe der Steuerausfälle und der zu zahlenden Hilfen wegen des Brexits und der Covid-19-Pandemie groß. Dennoch er­hielt das britische Militär eine Zusage vom Finanzministerium über 4 Milliarden Pfund zusätzlich, jedes Jahr, für die nächsten vier Jahre. Das Vereinigte Königreich unterstreicht damit seine Bestrebungen nach sicherheitspolitischer Unabhängigkeit und will sich, insbesondere den USA gegenüber, als verlässlicher Partner erweisen. Es erkauft sich mit der Erfüllung des 2-Prozent-Ziels der Nato auch Freiheiten für seine »Global Britain«-Agenda. Großbritanniens Fokussierung auf eine weltweite Einsetzbarkeit seiner Kräfte und neue Technologien macht Streichungen an anderen Stellen wahrscheinlich. Die dann entstehenden (Fähigkeits-)Lücken müssten von Alliierten gefüllt werden.

Nature : Stage rémunéré,
Lieu : Paris 8ème,
Domaine : Événementiel / Communication,
Début : À partir de janvier 2021 pour une durée de 4 à 6 mois.

Missions de l’assistant(e) de projet événementiel :

Rattaché(e) au pôle adhérents de la direction du marketing et de la communication, vous rejoignez une équipe…

Suite à son échange du lundi 14 décembre avec les citoyens de la Convention pour le climat, le président de la République a annoncé qu’il souhaitait apporter une modification de l'article premier en passant par un référendum. Qu’implique cette proposition de réforme constitutionnelle ? Quels enseignements tirer de notre histoire récente ? Quelles sont les chances de succès de cette révision ? Le point avec Olivier Duhamel, professeur émérite de droit…

Iliana Olivié. 15/12/2020

La crisis del COVID-19 tiene un efecto desglobalizador en las relaciones internacionales, posiblemente mayor del que supuso la Gran Recesión. Además, las relaciones “blandas”, que han liderado la globalización en los últimos años, se están viendo particularmente afectadas por las restricciones a los movimientos internacionales de personas.

L'immolation par le feu de Mohamed Bouazizi, un vendeur de légumes tunisien, en décembre 2010, déclenchait une vague de révoltes, puis d'espoirs de libéralisation dans les pays arabes. Mais les portes de la démocratie, à peine entrouvertes, se sont refermées, constate Dominique Moïsi. Comment en est-on arrivé là ?

Il y a dix ans, presque jour pour jour, le 17 décembre 2010, un petit vendeur de fruits et de légumes…

Zusammenfassung:

Das erneute Aufflammen der Corona-Pandemie setzt dem Wirtschaftsaufschwung in Deutschland zum Jahreswechsel ein Ende. Die rasant steigenden Infektionszahlen haben Bund und Länder veranlasst, den bisherigen „Lockdown light“ zu verschärfen und drastische Maßnahmen eines harten Lockdowns zu vereinbaren, um die zweite Infektionswelle zu stoppen. Dies dürfte Berechnungen des DIW Berlin zufolge das Wachstum in diesem und im kommenden Jahr erheblich belasten. Wahrscheinlich ist, dass die Maßnahmen über den 10. Januar hinaus weitergeführt werden müssen, um die Infektionszahlen weiter zu senken. Das DIW Berlin rechnet damit, dass der Lockdown bis Ende Januar andauern muss. In diesem Szenario wird es kurzfristig zu einem erheblichen Rückgang des Bruttoinlandsprodukts kommen. Statt um 5,3 Prozent dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2021 lediglich um 3,5 Prozent wachsen.