Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Les 6 et 7 mai, la ville d'Aarhus au Danemark accueille le Spot Festival. Ce festival de musique permet de découvrir de nouveaux talents et d'assister à des concerts d'artistes connus. Le festival organise également des conférences et débats sur l'industrie de la musique en Scandinavie.

Du 4 mai au 5 septembre, le musée Reina Sofia de Madrid présente l'exposition "Jardin des mélanges : Tentatives de faire une place, 1995 -...", consacrée au travail d'Alejandra Riera. L'artiste crée des parterres appelés "Jardins des mélanges", qui permettent de revitaliser le sol de cet espace, de le transformer collectivement dans une perspective écologique, et d'en faire un lieu de rencontre.

Jusqu'au 14 août, l'Église nouvelle d'Amsterdam accueille une exposition des photographies du concours annuel World Press Photo sur l'actualité et les grands thèmes de notre époque.

De nombreux événements organisés dans le cadre de la Journée de l'Europe autour du 9 mai seront en soutien à l'Ukraine. A Paris le 7 mai se déroulera un dialogue sur les droits fondamentaux et un d"bat sur l'Europe face à la guerre en Ukraine. L'Allemagne et la Pologne, dans la villede Guben/Gubin, le 7 mai, organisent un festival avec des artistes allemands, polonais et ukrainiens. En Espagne, le gouvernement d'Olivella organise un festival d'art pour promouvoir la paix le 7 mai. A Bruxelles , Promote Ukraine organise le le 8 mai un concert caritatif accompagné d'une dégustation de plats traditionnels ukrainiens. Le 9 mai, la délégation de l'union européenne en Nouvelle Zélande organise un concert pour la paix en Ukraine.

Eine Verlängerung der Ertüchtigungsmission EUTM empfiehlt sich in der bisherigen Form nicht, die UN-Mission MINUSMA könnte dagegen wichtiger werden.

While the wide-ranging impacts of COVID-19 are being felt in all countries and communities, the pandemic is having a disproportionately large impact on vulnerable populations, such as people living in areas affected by fragility, conflict, and violence. Vaccines hold enormous promise to mitigate these impacts, but the complications inherent to armed conflict make accessing vaccines especially challenging. Even when countries do receive vaccines, they often face challenges in rolling out vaccination programs, whether because they lack adequate capacity or because the doses are set to expire or are not acceptable to the communities set to receive them.

This issue brief focuses on the challenges of equitably distributing COVID-19 vaccines to populations in conflict-affected areas. It begins by looking at general issues related to the development, approval, production, procurement, and distribution of vaccines. It then examines the particular challenges to distributing vaccines in conflict-affected areas both before and during the vaccine rollout.

The report concludes with several recommendations for stakeholders and policymakers to improve the delivery of vaccines in conflict-affected areas:

• Redistribute global resources to increase the supply of vaccines to conflict-affected countries;
• Increase the transparency and predictability of global vaccine supplies;
• Enhance cooperation and coordination at the national and local levels to deliver vaccines to conflict-affected areas through existing humanitarian response mechanisms; and
• Ensure that vaccination campaigns in conflict-affected areas adhere to humanitarian principles.

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Deutschland hat sich entschieden, schwere Waffen an die Ukraine zu liefern, denn Russland greift das Land mit unverminderter Härte an. Zivilisten sterben, Städte werden zerstört und Berichte über mögliche Kriegsverbrechen russischer Truppen häufen sich. Doch auch ukrainische Gegenschläge können Zivilisten in Gefahr bringen. Welche Gewalt ist im Krieg legitim?

Despite what looked like tremendous efforts by the West to deter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin started a full-scale military invasion across the Ukrainian border from the north, east, and south. Clarifying why these deterrence efforts did not work as expected could provide useful insights for building more effective strat­egies to stop Russia’s aggression. It would also allow for adjusting future policies of deterrence against Russia. The EU and NATO should consider their misperceptions about Russia that undermined their ability to politically and militarily discourage Rus­sia’s aggression. They also should consider what actions have fuelled Russia’s mis­perceptions about the West and emboldened the Kremlin to launch its military invasion of Ukraine.

In Syria, the immediate effects of the war in Ukraine have made an already difficult humanitarian situation even worse. Protracted violence in Ukraine or an expansion of the Ukraine war into a larger NATO-Russia confrontation would endanger multilateral cooperation on conflict management, conflict resolution and humanitarian issues in Syria. Protracted conflict in Ukraine could also disrupt the volatile status quo in Syria, potentially endangering ceasefire agreements, tilting the power balance in favour of Iran and thereby increasing the risk of military escalation between Iran and its an­tago­nists, complicating the fight against ISIS, and endangering cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries. Europeans should attempt to insulate the war in Ukraine from Syria as much as possible, double down on efforts to renew the UN Security Council resolution that allows for humanitarian access to northwest Syria and contribute to the long-term objective of an inclusive regional security architecture.

Megatrends have become ubiquitous phenomena in public policy debates. A thorough understanding of what this concept entails is often missing. We address this gap by unpacking the notion “megatrend” and tracing the significance it has for understanding the transformation of African societies.

Megatrends have become ubiquitous phenomena in public policy debates. A thorough understanding of what this concept entails is often missing. We address this gap by unpacking the notion “megatrend” and tracing the significance it has for understanding the transformation of African societies.

Megatrends have become ubiquitous phenomena in public policy debates. A thorough understanding of what this concept entails is often missing. We address this gap by unpacking the notion “megatrend” and tracing the significance it has for understanding the transformation of African societies.

The proposal by the European Union (EU) to build a “Global Gateway” to the world is potentially an important juncture in EU foreign relations. Since its official launch in December 2021, most attention has been put on the initiative’s geo­strategic implications and whether the EU can compete with China. Less attention has been paid to the Global Gateway’s implications for EU development policy in terms of strategic objectives, decision-making, thematic focus and financing. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first is whether the Global Gateway is a serious proposal that can deliver on its headline promises to massively increase European infrastructure financing in developing countries, provide partners with an alternative economic and political model to that being offered by China, and make a meaningful contribution to their efforts to realise the 2030 Agenda. The EU’s announcement that the Global Gateway will generate up to EUR 300 billion in investment by 2027 grabbed headlines, many of them sceptical. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the initiative will be adequately financed. Although the planning for the EU’s international aid budget for 2021-2027 has mostly been completed, a significant proportion remains flexible and could be spent on Global Gateway projects. As for the EU’s implementing capacity, the Gateway’s financial toolbox draws on the EU’s recent experiences with the Juncker Investment Plan and the External Investment Plan, which have both been utilised by development banks and private investors. The second aspect is whether the Global Gateway heralds a change in the EU’s motivations, objectives and modalities for cooperation with developing countries and regions. On the surface, the Global Gateway does not seem to change much. There are many thematic overlaps with existing strategic frameworks for engaging with Africa and the EU’s Neighbourhood. There is even a sense that the Global Gateway turns back the clock to the days when the EU focussed aid spending on infrastructure and emphasised its “political neutrality”. The geopolitical context in which the EU finds itself is, however, being transformed by pandemic, wars and multipolarity. The impacts of epochal events such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still playing out. The Global Gateway signals a major adjustment in the EU’s response to these transformations, particularly regarding its engagement with the “Global South”. This will create a new paradigm for EU development policy, defined by strategic interests. It is likely that the new geostrategic framework will weaken the EU’s commitment to, and observance of, core develop­ment policy principles, especially the focus on poverty, partner country ownership, open governance and the “do no harm” principle. The Global Gateway’s use of aid to cata­lyse commercial investment risks further instrumentalising EU development policy. Specific measures are therefore needed to safeguard and promote the principles that the EU and its member states have committed themselves to.

The proposal by the European Union (EU) to build a “Global Gateway” to the world is potentially an important juncture in EU foreign relations. Since its official launch in December 2021, most attention has been put on the initiative’s geo­strategic implications and whether the EU can compete with China. Less attention has been paid to the Global Gateway’s implications for EU development policy in terms of strategic objectives, decision-making, thematic focus and financing. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first is whether the Global Gateway is a serious proposal that can deliver on its headline promises to massively increase European infrastructure financing in developing countries, provide partners with an alternative economic and political model to that being offered by China, and make a meaningful contribution to their efforts to realise the 2030 Agenda. The EU’s announcement that the Global Gateway will generate up to EUR 300 billion in investment by 2027 grabbed headlines, many of them sceptical. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the initiative will be adequately financed. Although the planning for the EU’s international aid budget for 2021-2027 has mostly been completed, a significant proportion remains flexible and could be spent on Global Gateway projects. As for the EU’s implementing capacity, the Gateway’s financial toolbox draws on the EU’s recent experiences with the Juncker Investment Plan and the External Investment Plan, which have both been utilised by development banks and private investors. The second aspect is whether the Global Gateway heralds a change in the EU’s motivations, objectives and modalities for cooperation with developing countries and regions. On the surface, the Global Gateway does not seem to change much. There are many thematic overlaps with existing strategic frameworks for engaging with Africa and the EU’s Neighbourhood. There is even a sense that the Global Gateway turns back the clock to the days when the EU focussed aid spending on infrastructure and emphasised its “political neutrality”. The geopolitical context in which the EU finds itself is, however, being transformed by pandemic, wars and multipolarity. The impacts of epochal events such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still playing out. The Global Gateway signals a major adjustment in the EU’s response to these transformations, particularly regarding its engagement with the “Global South”. This will create a new paradigm for EU development policy, defined by strategic interests. It is likely that the new geostrategic framework will weaken the EU’s commitment to, and observance of, core develop­ment policy principles, especially the focus on poverty, partner country ownership, open governance and the “do no harm” principle. The Global Gateway’s use of aid to cata­lyse commercial investment risks further instrumentalising EU development policy. Specific measures are therefore needed to safeguard and promote the principles that the EU and its member states have committed themselves to.

The proposal by the European Union (EU) to build a “Global Gateway” to the world is potentially an important juncture in EU foreign relations. Since its official launch in December 2021, most attention has been put on the initiative’s geo­strategic implications and whether the EU can compete with China. Less attention has been paid to the Global Gateway’s implications for EU development policy in terms of strategic objectives, decision-making, thematic focus and financing. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first is whether the Global Gateway is a serious proposal that can deliver on its headline promises to massively increase European infrastructure financing in developing countries, provide partners with an alternative economic and political model to that being offered by China, and make a meaningful contribution to their efforts to realise the 2030 Agenda. The EU’s announcement that the Global Gateway will generate up to EUR 300 billion in investment by 2027 grabbed headlines, many of them sceptical. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the initiative will be adequately financed. Although the planning for the EU’s international aid budget for 2021-2027 has mostly been completed, a significant proportion remains flexible and could be spent on Global Gateway projects. As for the EU’s implementing capacity, the Gateway’s financial toolbox draws on the EU’s recent experiences with the Juncker Investment Plan and the External Investment Plan, which have both been utilised by development banks and private investors. The second aspect is whether the Global Gateway heralds a change in the EU’s motivations, objectives and modalities for cooperation with developing countries and regions. On the surface, the Global Gateway does not seem to change much. There are many thematic overlaps with existing strategic frameworks for engaging with Africa and the EU’s Neighbourhood. There is even a sense that the Global Gateway turns back the clock to the days when the EU focussed aid spending on infrastructure and emphasised its “political neutrality”. The geopolitical context in which the EU finds itself is, however, being transformed by pandemic, wars and multipolarity. The impacts of epochal events such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still playing out. The Global Gateway signals a major adjustment in the EU’s response to these transformations, particularly regarding its engagement with the “Global South”. This will create a new paradigm for EU development policy, defined by strategic interests. It is likely that the new geostrategic framework will weaken the EU’s commitment to, and observance of, core develop­ment policy principles, especially the focus on poverty, partner country ownership, open governance and the “do no harm” principle. The Global Gateway’s use of aid to cata­lyse commercial investment risks further instrumentalising EU development policy. Specific measures are therefore needed to safeguard and promote the principles that the EU and its member states have committed themselves to.