Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership.

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.

Bonn, 7. Mai 2024. In den kommenden Wochen stehen die Mitgliedstaaten der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) kurz vor dem Abschluss der Verhandlungen über die bedeutendsten Reformen in der globalen Gesundheitspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte. Sie zielen auf die Finalisierung eines Pandemieabkommens sowie die Änderung der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften während der Versammlung der Weltgesundheitsversammlung (WHA) im Mai.

Scheitert die Einigung auf ein gerechtes Pandemieabkommen, könnte dies zu erheblichen Risiken für die öffentliche Gesundheit führen und das Vertrauen in die globalen Gesundheitseinrichtungen schwächen. Um die Verhandlungen erfolgreich abzuschließen, ist es wesentlich, aus den Erfahrungen der Corona-Krise zu lernen. Dazu gehört auch die Erkenntnis, dass globale Gesundheitssicherheit nur dann gewährleistet werden kann, wenn Prävention, Vorbereitung und Reaktion auf Pandemien (PPR) als globales Gemeingut angesehen werden. Die Beachtung von Dringlichkeit und Inklusivität während der Verhandlungen ist darüber hinaus gleichermaßen entscheidend. Das Ziel, sich noch in diesem Monat auf ein Abkommen zu einigen, erscheint jedoch derzeit alles andere als sicher. Dies liegt vor allem an den gegensätzlichen Positionen zwischen Ländern mit hohem Einkommen (HICs) und Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen (LMICs).

Wir gehen derzeit davon aus, dass es lediglich ein Rahmenabkommen für die Konsensbereiche geben wird. Strittige Klauseln wurden bereits aus den letzten Entwürfen des möglichen Abkommens gestrichen. Es bleibt nun abzuwarten, wie basierend auf diesem möglichen Rahmenabkommen die drängendsten Fragen in den kommenden Jahren adressiert und gelöst werden.

Zu den drängendsten Streitfragen zwischen HICs und LMICs gehört an erster Stelle das Zugangs- und Nutzungsverteilungssystem für Pathogene (PABS). Dieses System soll sicherstellen, dass Länder, die genetische Sequenzen und Proben von Pathogenen teilen, gerechten Anteil und Zugang zu den daraus hervorgehenden medizinischen Produkten (Impfstoffe usw.) erhalten. An zweiter Stelle stehen die Details der Implementierung eines One Health-Ansatzes als tiefgreifende Strategie zur Pandemieprävention, um die Gesundheit von Menschen, Tieren und Umwelt miteinander zu verbinden. Und schließlich wird sich die zukünftige Diskussion auf den Finanzierungsmechanismus konzentrieren, also darauf, wie die Länder zusätzliche finanzielle Mittel für die Pandemieprävention bereitstellen werden.

Der derzeitige PABS-Entwurf sieht vor, dass LMICs 20 % der Gesundheitsprodukte über die WHO erhalten (je 10 % als Spende und zu ermäßigten Preisen), die auf Grundlage geteilter Daten zu Erregern entwickelt wurden. Das ist ein Schritt nach vorn, reicht für einen gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jedoch nicht aus. Deutlich zielführender wäre ein globaler Mechanismus zur Teilung von Wissen und geistigen Eigentumsrechten, der dem globalen Gemeinwohl dient. Zu diesem Zweck bietet sich der Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) an, den die International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID) eingerichtet hat. Der MPP verbessert den Zugang zu Arzneimitteln durch Verhandlungen mit Pharmaunternehmen über die gemeinsame Nutzung ihrer Patente im Austausch gegen eine Gebühr oder den Zugang zu anderen Patenten innerhalb des Pools. Länder, in denen Impfstoffhersteller angesiedelt sind, die öffentliche Gelder erhalten haben (wie die 31,9 Mrd. US-Dollar für mRNA-COVID-19-Impfstoffe in den USA), sollten diese Unternehmen dazu aufrufen, im Rahmen eines weiter gefassteren Pandemieabkommens ihre Patente in den MPP einzubringen.

Verbindliche One Health-Bestimmungen und eine effektive Prävention künftiger Pandemien sind der „Africa Group“ und den Mitgliedstaaten der „Group for Equity“ zufolge nur erreichbar, wenn LMICs Geld und Ressourcen für ihre Umsetzung erhalten. Dies entspricht dem Prinzip der gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung des Pariser Klimaabkommens, das jedoch aus dem aktuellen Entwurf des Pandemieabkommens gestrichen wurde. Für eine gerechte Unterstützung und wirksame Prävention sollte dieses Prinzip dringend wieder aufgenommen werden.

Zur Gesundheitsfinanzierung setzen EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf bestehende freiwillige globale Mechanismen, wie den Pandemiefonds oder die Impfallianz GAVI. LMICs fordern hingegen einen neuen, über das WHO-Pandemieabkommen geregelten Finanzierungsmechanismus und verpflichtende Beiträge für Mitgliedstaaten. Generell dürfte die Schaffung zusätzlicher Finanzierungsmechanismen mit ähnlichem Zweck eher schaden, da es Überschneidungen mit anderen Fonds gibt und die ohnehin schon knappen internationalen Mittel noch weniger gebündelt zum Einsatz kommen. Stattdessen sollte die Kapazität der bestehenden Finanzierungsmechanismen erhöht werden. Eine nachhaltige Lösung wäre es, den etablierten Pandemiefonds als Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Pandemievertrag zu nutzen, verbunden mit einer umfassenden Reform der globalen Gesundheitsfinanzierungsarchitektur. Diese Reform sollte einen „normativen Wandel“ von einer geberorientierten Politik hin zu einem auf den Menschen ausgerichteten Ansatz fördern, der regionale und nationale Kapazitäten stärkt.

Das Zeitfenster für die Einigung auf ein gerechtes internationales Pandemieabkommen könnte bald schließen. Es ist daher von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass die WHO-Mitgliedstaaten diesen kritischen Moment nutzen, um zeitnah ein umfassendes, inklusives und effektiv umsetzbares Abkommen zu erzielen.
 

Remco van de Pas ist Senior Research Associate am Centre for Planetary Health Policy (CPHP). Bevor er zum CPHP kam, war er als Forscher und Dozent für globale Gesundheitspolitik am Institut für Tropenmedizin in Antwerpen tätig.

Christoph Strupat ist Senior Researcher und Projektleiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainbility (IDOS). Als Gesundheitsökonom führt er Forschungen und Projekte in den Bereichen Globale Gesundheit, One Health und soziale Sicherung durch.

Virtual Policy Event
Re-considering international health data sharing rules for a new Pandemic Treaty.
Online, 14.05.2024

Bonn, 7. Mai 2024. In den kommenden Wochen stehen die Mitgliedstaaten der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) kurz vor dem Abschluss der Verhandlungen über die bedeutendsten Reformen in der globalen Gesundheitspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte. Sie zielen auf die Finalisierung eines Pandemieabkommens sowie die Änderung der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften während der Versammlung der Weltgesundheitsversammlung (WHA) im Mai.

Scheitert die Einigung auf ein gerechtes Pandemieabkommen, könnte dies zu erheblichen Risiken für die öffentliche Gesundheit führen und das Vertrauen in die globalen Gesundheitseinrichtungen schwächen. Um die Verhandlungen erfolgreich abzuschließen, ist es wesentlich, aus den Erfahrungen der Corona-Krise zu lernen. Dazu gehört auch die Erkenntnis, dass globale Gesundheitssicherheit nur dann gewährleistet werden kann, wenn Prävention, Vorbereitung und Reaktion auf Pandemien (PPR) als globales Gemeingut angesehen werden. Die Beachtung von Dringlichkeit und Inklusivität während der Verhandlungen ist darüber hinaus gleichermaßen entscheidend. Das Ziel, sich noch in diesem Monat auf ein Abkommen zu einigen, erscheint jedoch derzeit alles andere als sicher. Dies liegt vor allem an den gegensätzlichen Positionen zwischen Ländern mit hohem Einkommen (HICs) und Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen (LMICs).

Wir gehen derzeit davon aus, dass es lediglich ein Rahmenabkommen für die Konsensbereiche geben wird. Strittige Klauseln wurden bereits aus den letzten Entwürfen des möglichen Abkommens gestrichen. Es bleibt nun abzuwarten, wie basierend auf diesem möglichen Rahmenabkommen die drängendsten Fragen in den kommenden Jahren adressiert und gelöst werden.

Zu den drängendsten Streitfragen zwischen HICs und LMICs gehört an erster Stelle das Zugangs- und Nutzungsverteilungssystem für Pathogene (PABS). Dieses System soll sicherstellen, dass Länder, die genetische Sequenzen und Proben von Pathogenen teilen, gerechten Anteil und Zugang zu den daraus hervorgehenden medizinischen Produkten (Impfstoffe usw.) erhalten. An zweiter Stelle stehen die Details der Implementierung eines One Health-Ansatzes als tiefgreifende Strategie zur Pandemieprävention, um die Gesundheit von Menschen, Tieren und Umwelt miteinander zu verbinden. Und schließlich wird sich die zukünftige Diskussion auf den Finanzierungsmechanismus konzentrieren, also darauf, wie die Länder zusätzliche finanzielle Mittel für die Pandemieprävention bereitstellen werden.

Der derzeitige PABS-Entwurf sieht vor, dass LMICs 20 % der Gesundheitsprodukte über die WHO erhalten (je 10 % als Spende und zu ermäßigten Preisen), die auf Grundlage geteilter Daten zu Erregern entwickelt wurden. Das ist ein Schritt nach vorn, reicht für einen gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jedoch nicht aus. Deutlich zielführender wäre ein globaler Mechanismus zur Teilung von Wissen und geistigen Eigentumsrechten, der dem globalen Gemeinwohl dient. Zu diesem Zweck bietet sich der Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) an, den die International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID) eingerichtet hat. Der MPP verbessert den Zugang zu Arzneimitteln durch Verhandlungen mit Pharmaunternehmen über die gemeinsame Nutzung ihrer Patente im Austausch gegen eine Gebühr oder den Zugang zu anderen Patenten innerhalb des Pools. Länder, in denen Impfstoffhersteller angesiedelt sind, die öffentliche Gelder erhalten haben (wie die 31,9 Mrd. US-Dollar für mRNA-COVID-19-Impfstoffe in den USA), sollten diese Unternehmen dazu aufrufen, im Rahmen eines weiter gefassteren Pandemieabkommens ihre Patente in den MPP einzubringen.

Verbindliche One Health-Bestimmungen und eine effektive Prävention künftiger Pandemien sind der „Africa Group“ und den Mitgliedstaaten der „Group for Equity“ zufolge nur erreichbar, wenn LMICs Geld und Ressourcen für ihre Umsetzung erhalten. Dies entspricht dem Prinzip der gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung des Pariser Klimaabkommens, das jedoch aus dem aktuellen Entwurf des Pandemieabkommens gestrichen wurde. Für eine gerechte Unterstützung und wirksame Prävention sollte dieses Prinzip dringend wieder aufgenommen werden.

Zur Gesundheitsfinanzierung setzen EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf bestehende freiwillige globale Mechanismen, wie den Pandemiefonds oder die Impfallianz GAVI. LMICs fordern hingegen einen neuen, über das WHO-Pandemieabkommen geregelten Finanzierungsmechanismus und verpflichtende Beiträge für Mitgliedstaaten. Generell dürfte die Schaffung zusätzlicher Finanzierungsmechanismen mit ähnlichem Zweck eher schaden, da es Überschneidungen mit anderen Fonds gibt und die ohnehin schon knappen internationalen Mittel noch weniger gebündelt zum Einsatz kommen. Stattdessen sollte die Kapazität der bestehenden Finanzierungsmechanismen erhöht werden. Eine nachhaltige Lösung wäre es, den etablierten Pandemiefonds als Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Pandemievertrag zu nutzen, verbunden mit einer umfassenden Reform der globalen Gesundheitsfinanzierungsarchitektur. Diese Reform sollte einen „normativen Wandel“ von einer geberorientierten Politik hin zu einem auf den Menschen ausgerichteten Ansatz fördern, der regionale und nationale Kapazitäten stärkt.

Das Zeitfenster für die Einigung auf ein gerechtes internationales Pandemieabkommen könnte bald schließen. Es ist daher von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass die WHO-Mitgliedstaaten diesen kritischen Moment nutzen, um zeitnah ein umfassendes, inklusives und effektiv umsetzbares Abkommen zu erzielen.
 

Remco van de Pas ist Senior Research Associate am Centre for Planetary Health Policy (CPHP). Bevor er zum CPHP kam, war er als Forscher und Dozent für globale Gesundheitspolitik am Institut für Tropenmedizin in Antwerpen tätig.

Christoph Strupat ist Senior Researcher und Projektleiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainbility (IDOS). Als Gesundheitsökonom führt er Forschungen und Projekte in den Bereichen Globale Gesundheit, One Health und soziale Sicherung durch.

Virtual Policy Event
Re-considering international health data sharing rules for a new Pandemic Treaty.
Online, 14.05.2024

Bonn, 7. Mai 2024. In den kommenden Wochen stehen die Mitgliedstaaten der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) kurz vor dem Abschluss der Verhandlungen über die bedeutendsten Reformen in der globalen Gesundheitspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte. Sie zielen auf die Finalisierung eines Pandemieabkommens sowie die Änderung der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften während der Versammlung der Weltgesundheitsversammlung (WHA) im Mai.

Scheitert die Einigung auf ein gerechtes Pandemieabkommen, könnte dies zu erheblichen Risiken für die öffentliche Gesundheit führen und das Vertrauen in die globalen Gesundheitseinrichtungen schwächen. Um die Verhandlungen erfolgreich abzuschließen, ist es wesentlich, aus den Erfahrungen der Corona-Krise zu lernen. Dazu gehört auch die Erkenntnis, dass globale Gesundheitssicherheit nur dann gewährleistet werden kann, wenn Prävention, Vorbereitung und Reaktion auf Pandemien (PPR) als globales Gemeingut angesehen werden. Die Beachtung von Dringlichkeit und Inklusivität während der Verhandlungen ist darüber hinaus gleichermaßen entscheidend. Das Ziel, sich noch in diesem Monat auf ein Abkommen zu einigen, erscheint jedoch derzeit alles andere als sicher. Dies liegt vor allem an den gegensätzlichen Positionen zwischen Ländern mit hohem Einkommen (HICs) und Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen (LMICs).

Wir gehen derzeit davon aus, dass es lediglich ein Rahmenabkommen für die Konsensbereiche geben wird. Strittige Klauseln wurden bereits aus den letzten Entwürfen des möglichen Abkommens gestrichen. Es bleibt nun abzuwarten, wie basierend auf diesem möglichen Rahmenabkommen die drängendsten Fragen in den kommenden Jahren adressiert und gelöst werden.

Zu den drängendsten Streitfragen zwischen HICs und LMICs gehört an erster Stelle das Zugangs- und Nutzungsverteilungssystem für Pathogene (PABS). Dieses System soll sicherstellen, dass Länder, die genetische Sequenzen und Proben von Pathogenen teilen, gerechten Anteil und Zugang zu den daraus hervorgehenden medizinischen Produkten (Impfstoffe usw.) erhalten. An zweiter Stelle stehen die Details der Implementierung eines One Health-Ansatzes als tiefgreifende Strategie zur Pandemieprävention, um die Gesundheit von Menschen, Tieren und Umwelt miteinander zu verbinden. Und schließlich wird sich die zukünftige Diskussion auf den Finanzierungsmechanismus konzentrieren, also darauf, wie die Länder zusätzliche finanzielle Mittel für die Pandemieprävention bereitstellen werden.

Der derzeitige PABS-Entwurf sieht vor, dass LMICs 20 % der Gesundheitsprodukte über die WHO erhalten (je 10 % als Spende und zu ermäßigten Preisen), die auf Grundlage geteilter Daten zu Erregern entwickelt wurden. Das ist ein Schritt nach vorn, reicht für einen gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jedoch nicht aus. Deutlich zielführender wäre ein globaler Mechanismus zur Teilung von Wissen und geistigen Eigentumsrechten, der dem globalen Gemeinwohl dient. Zu diesem Zweck bietet sich der Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) an, den die International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID) eingerichtet hat. Der MPP verbessert den Zugang zu Arzneimitteln durch Verhandlungen mit Pharmaunternehmen über die gemeinsame Nutzung ihrer Patente im Austausch gegen eine Gebühr oder den Zugang zu anderen Patenten innerhalb des Pools. Länder, in denen Impfstoffhersteller angesiedelt sind, die öffentliche Gelder erhalten haben (wie die 31,9 Mrd. US-Dollar für mRNA-COVID-19-Impfstoffe in den USA), sollten diese Unternehmen dazu aufrufen, im Rahmen eines weiter gefassteren Pandemieabkommens ihre Patente in den MPP einzubringen.

Verbindliche One Health-Bestimmungen und eine effektive Prävention künftiger Pandemien sind der „Africa Group“ und den Mitgliedstaaten der „Group for Equity“ zufolge nur erreichbar, wenn LMICs Geld und Ressourcen für ihre Umsetzung erhalten. Dies entspricht dem Prinzip der gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung des Pariser Klimaabkommens, das jedoch aus dem aktuellen Entwurf des Pandemieabkommens gestrichen wurde. Für eine gerechte Unterstützung und wirksame Prävention sollte dieses Prinzip dringend wieder aufgenommen werden.

Zur Gesundheitsfinanzierung setzen EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf bestehende freiwillige globale Mechanismen, wie den Pandemiefonds oder die Impfallianz GAVI. LMICs fordern hingegen einen neuen, über das WHO-Pandemieabkommen geregelten Finanzierungsmechanismus und verpflichtende Beiträge für Mitgliedstaaten. Generell dürfte die Schaffung zusätzlicher Finanzierungsmechanismen mit ähnlichem Zweck eher schaden, da es Überschneidungen mit anderen Fonds gibt und die ohnehin schon knappen internationalen Mittel noch weniger gebündelt zum Einsatz kommen. Stattdessen sollte die Kapazität der bestehenden Finanzierungsmechanismen erhöht werden. Eine nachhaltige Lösung wäre es, den etablierten Pandemiefonds als Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Pandemievertrag zu nutzen, verbunden mit einer umfassenden Reform der globalen Gesundheitsfinanzierungsarchitektur. Diese Reform sollte einen „normativen Wandel“ von einer geberorientierten Politik hin zu einem auf den Menschen ausgerichteten Ansatz fördern, der regionale und nationale Kapazitäten stärkt.

Das Zeitfenster für die Einigung auf ein gerechtes internationales Pandemieabkommen könnte bald schließen. Es ist daher von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass die WHO-Mitgliedstaaten diesen kritischen Moment nutzen, um zeitnah ein umfassendes, inklusives und effektiv umsetzbares Abkommen zu erzielen.
 

Remco van de Pas ist Senior Research Associate am Centre for Planetary Health Policy (CPHP). Bevor er zum CPHP kam, war er als Forscher und Dozent für globale Gesundheitspolitik am Institut für Tropenmedizin in Antwerpen tätig.

Christoph Strupat ist Senior Researcher und Projektleiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainbility (IDOS). Als Gesundheitsökonom führt er Forschungen und Projekte in den Bereichen Globale Gesundheit, One Health und soziale Sicherung durch.

Virtual Policy Event
Re-considering international health data sharing rules for a new Pandemic Treaty.
Online, 14.05.2024

Gender norms and biases affect many aspects of day-to-day life. However, they take on a specific importance for migrants, influencing their migration experience to the extent that migration has been described as a gendered phenomenon. Alongside a range of other overlapping factors such as age, race, ethnicity, nationality, disability, health and socioeconomic status, gender impacts the different opportunities migrants may have and the various obstacles and risks they may face in pursuing them. By setting out different roles and expectations for migrants of specific genders, the social norms of countries of origin, transit and destination may influence, for instance, who can stay and migrate in a household, the motivations and options for migration, the preferred destination countries, the type and means of migration, the goal and objective of migration, the sector of employment or the disciplines studied, the status afforded by legislations of countries, including in terms of rights and benefits, and the list goes on. These gender dimensions of migration in turn impact societies in countries of origin, transit and destination. Similarly, in displacement contexts, gender considerations underpin individuals’ trajectories, experiences and protection, and even their very decision to flee when related to gender-based discrimination and violence that may, in some countries, lead to international protection, including refugee status.

Gender norms and biases affect many aspects of day-to-day life. However, they take on a specific importance for migrants, influencing their migration experience to the extent that migration has been described as a gendered phenomenon. Alongside a range of other overlapping factors such as age, race, ethnicity, nationality, disability, health and socioeconomic status, gender impacts the different opportunities migrants may have and the various obstacles and risks they may face in pursuing them. By setting out different roles and expectations for migrants of specific genders, the social norms of countries of origin, transit and destination may influence, for instance, who can stay and migrate in a household, the motivations and options for migration, the preferred destination countries, the type and means of migration, the goal and objective of migration, the sector of employment or the disciplines studied, the status afforded by legislations of countries, including in terms of rights and benefits, and the list goes on. These gender dimensions of migration in turn impact societies in countries of origin, transit and destination. Similarly, in displacement contexts, gender considerations underpin individuals’ trajectories, experiences and protection, and even their very decision to flee when related to gender-based discrimination and violence that may, in some countries, lead to international protection, including refugee status.

Gender norms and biases affect many aspects of day-to-day life. However, they take on a specific importance for migrants, influencing their migration experience to the extent that migration has been described as a gendered phenomenon. Alongside a range of other overlapping factors such as age, race, ethnicity, nationality, disability, health and socioeconomic status, gender impacts the different opportunities migrants may have and the various obstacles and risks they may face in pursuing them. By setting out different roles and expectations for migrants of specific genders, the social norms of countries of origin, transit and destination may influence, for instance, who can stay and migrate in a household, the motivations and options for migration, the preferred destination countries, the type and means of migration, the goal and objective of migration, the sector of employment or the disciplines studied, the status afforded by legislations of countries, including in terms of rights and benefits, and the list goes on. These gender dimensions of migration in turn impact societies in countries of origin, transit and destination. Similarly, in displacement contexts, gender considerations underpin individuals’ trajectories, experiences and protection, and even their very decision to flee when related to gender-based discrimination and violence that may, in some countries, lead to international protection, including refugee status.

In this report we perform an enhanced global external debt sustainability analysis to estimate the extent to which EMDEs can mobilize the G20 independent Expert Group recommended levels of external financing without jeopardizing debt sustainability. We find that among 66 of the most economically vulnerable countries, 47 countries with a total population of over 1.11 billion people will face insolvency problems in the next five years as they seek to ramp up investment to meet climate and development goals. Debt relief must be administered for these countries to stand a chance to invest in a climate-resilient future and achieve their development aspirations.

In this report we perform an enhanced global external debt sustainability analysis to estimate the extent to which EMDEs can mobilize the G20 independent Expert Group recommended levels of external financing without jeopardizing debt sustainability. We find that among 66 of the most economically vulnerable countries, 47 countries with a total population of over 1.11 billion people will face insolvency problems in the next five years as they seek to ramp up investment to meet climate and development goals. Debt relief must be administered for these countries to stand a chance to invest in a climate-resilient future and achieve their development aspirations.

In this report we perform an enhanced global external debt sustainability analysis to estimate the extent to which EMDEs can mobilize the G20 independent Expert Group recommended levels of external financing without jeopardizing debt sustainability. We find that among 66 of the most economically vulnerable countries, 47 countries with a total population of over 1.11 billion people will face insolvency problems in the next five years as they seek to ramp up investment to meet climate and development goals. Debt relief must be administered for these countries to stand a chance to invest in a climate-resilient future and achieve their development aspirations.

Ukraine and its international partners are faced with an unprecedented task: advancing recovery efforts and the EU accession process while also providing critically important military and financial support to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty against Russian military aggression. Uncertainty over when and how the war will end makes planning for recovery and EU membership even more complex, but also underlines the need for their integration. Given a shared focus on a transformative modernisation, both processes can reinforce each other.
Along this line of thinking, the EU has adopted the Ukraine Facility to provide reliable funding to Ukraine up to 2027, with the aim of supporting recovery and key institutional and administrative reforms required for Ukraine’s EU accession. The main roadmap for implementation of both is the Ukrainian government’s so-called Ukraine Plan. However, recovery and EU accession will not automatically create synergies, and may, at worst, overstretch Ukrainian government and private-sector capacities as well as societal support. To maximise synergies between the processes, policymakers should consider the following recommendations:
● Set priorities that address short-term demands and have long-term ambitions. Recovery measures should be prioritised that improve security, meet the basic needs of the people and are crucial to the functioning of the Ukrainian economy. In EU accession negotiations, the “fundamentals” and chapters that stimulate economic growth and competitiveness should be prioritised, because utilising the accession process to stimulate economic growth today can directly contribute to transformative rebuilding and vice versa.
● Ensure society-wide ownership of the Ukraine Plan. The German and Ukrainian governments, as co-hosts of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in June 2024, should make sure that the URC is the starting point for institutionalising an inclusive approach in the
implementation of the Ukraine Plan. This can be achieved through the promotion of issue-specific coalitions of different actors across multiple levels of governance in Ukraine beyond this year’s URC.
● Engage international donors in supporting the Ukraine Plan and leveraging recovery to accelerate Ukraine’s EU accession path. Germany, as an EU and G7 member state, could serve as an important bridge-builder between EU and non-EU supporters of Ukraine’s recovery. EU member states should align their bilateral assistance to Ukraine with the Ukraine Plan.
● Tailor technical assistance and capacity building. An asset map, developed jointly by Ukrainian and international actors, should identify and systematise strengths and unused potential (e.g. regarding infrastructure, public finance and industrial and commercial activities) in specific regions and municipalities, and in the private sector, taking into account the different development strategies that have evolved at different levels of governance over the past months. The Ukrainian diaspora in EU countries should be incentivised to actively engage in these processes without predicating their involvement on unrealistic expectations of a quick and large-scale return.
● Prepare for intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession. The German government should continue to advance the debate between EU institutions and member states about intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession before formal membership, including Ukraine’s progressive integration into the EU single market.
● Adopt open and transparent communication. Building on open and transparent dialogue, both the Ukrainian government and the EU will need to develop an effective communication strategy towards the Ukrainian people to uphold their support for EU accession. Effective communication within the EU is required to limit the political space of veto players.

Ukraine and its international partners are faced with an unprecedented task: advancing recovery efforts and the EU accession process while also providing critically important military and financial support to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty against Russian military aggression. Uncertainty over when and how the war will end makes planning for recovery and EU membership even more complex, but also underlines the need for their integration. Given a shared focus on a transformative modernisation, both processes can reinforce each other.
Along this line of thinking, the EU has adopted the Ukraine Facility to provide reliable funding to Ukraine up to 2027, with the aim of supporting recovery and key institutional and administrative reforms required for Ukraine’s EU accession. The main roadmap for implementation of both is the Ukrainian government’s so-called Ukraine Plan. However, recovery and EU accession will not automatically create synergies, and may, at worst, overstretch Ukrainian government and private-sector capacities as well as societal support. To maximise synergies between the processes, policymakers should consider the following recommendations:
● Set priorities that address short-term demands and have long-term ambitions. Recovery measures should be prioritised that improve security, meet the basic needs of the people and are crucial to the functioning of the Ukrainian economy. In EU accession negotiations, the “fundamentals” and chapters that stimulate economic growth and competitiveness should be prioritised, because utilising the accession process to stimulate economic growth today can directly contribute to transformative rebuilding and vice versa.
● Ensure society-wide ownership of the Ukraine Plan. The German and Ukrainian governments, as co-hosts of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in June 2024, should make sure that the URC is the starting point for institutionalising an inclusive approach in the
implementation of the Ukraine Plan. This can be achieved through the promotion of issue-specific coalitions of different actors across multiple levels of governance in Ukraine beyond this year’s URC.
● Engage international donors in supporting the Ukraine Plan and leveraging recovery to accelerate Ukraine’s EU accession path. Germany, as an EU and G7 member state, could serve as an important bridge-builder between EU and non-EU supporters of Ukraine’s recovery. EU member states should align their bilateral assistance to Ukraine with the Ukraine Plan.
● Tailor technical assistance and capacity building. An asset map, developed jointly by Ukrainian and international actors, should identify and systematise strengths and unused potential (e.g. regarding infrastructure, public finance and industrial and commercial activities) in specific regions and municipalities, and in the private sector, taking into account the different development strategies that have evolved at different levels of governance over the past months. The Ukrainian diaspora in EU countries should be incentivised to actively engage in these processes without predicating their involvement on unrealistic expectations of a quick and large-scale return.
● Prepare for intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession. The German government should continue to advance the debate between EU institutions and member states about intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession before formal membership, including Ukraine’s progressive integration into the EU single market.
● Adopt open and transparent communication. Building on open and transparent dialogue, both the Ukrainian government and the EU will need to develop an effective communication strategy towards the Ukrainian people to uphold their support for EU accession. Effective communication within the EU is required to limit the political space of veto players.

Ukraine and its international partners are faced with an unprecedented task: advancing recovery efforts and the EU accession process while also providing critically important military and financial support to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty against Russian military aggression. Uncertainty over when and how the war will end makes planning for recovery and EU membership even more complex, but also underlines the need for their integration. Given a shared focus on a transformative modernisation, both processes can reinforce each other.
Along this line of thinking, the EU has adopted the Ukraine Facility to provide reliable funding to Ukraine up to 2027, with the aim of supporting recovery and key institutional and administrative reforms required for Ukraine’s EU accession. The main roadmap for implementation of both is the Ukrainian government’s so-called Ukraine Plan. However, recovery and EU accession will not automatically create synergies, and may, at worst, overstretch Ukrainian government and private-sector capacities as well as societal support. To maximise synergies between the processes, policymakers should consider the following recommendations:
● Set priorities that address short-term demands and have long-term ambitions. Recovery measures should be prioritised that improve security, meet the basic needs of the people and are crucial to the functioning of the Ukrainian economy. In EU accession negotiations, the “fundamentals” and chapters that stimulate economic growth and competitiveness should be prioritised, because utilising the accession process to stimulate economic growth today can directly contribute to transformative rebuilding and vice versa.
● Ensure society-wide ownership of the Ukraine Plan. The German and Ukrainian governments, as co-hosts of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in June 2024, should make sure that the URC is the starting point for institutionalising an inclusive approach in the
implementation of the Ukraine Plan. This can be achieved through the promotion of issue-specific coalitions of different actors across multiple levels of governance in Ukraine beyond this year’s URC.
● Engage international donors in supporting the Ukraine Plan and leveraging recovery to accelerate Ukraine’s EU accession path. Germany, as an EU and G7 member state, could serve as an important bridge-builder between EU and non-EU supporters of Ukraine’s recovery. EU member states should align their bilateral assistance to Ukraine with the Ukraine Plan.
● Tailor technical assistance and capacity building. An asset map, developed jointly by Ukrainian and international actors, should identify and systematise strengths and unused potential (e.g. regarding infrastructure, public finance and industrial and commercial activities) in specific regions and municipalities, and in the private sector, taking into account the different development strategies that have evolved at different levels of governance over the past months. The Ukrainian diaspora in EU countries should be incentivised to actively engage in these processes without predicating their involvement on unrealistic expectations of a quick and large-scale return.
● Prepare for intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession. The German government should continue to advance the debate between EU institutions and member states about intermediate steps in Ukraine’s EU accession before formal membership, including Ukraine’s progressive integration into the EU single market.
● Adopt open and transparent communication. Building on open and transparent dialogue, both the Ukrainian government and the EU will need to develop an effective communication strategy towards the Ukrainian people to uphold their support for EU accession. Effective communication within the EU is required to limit the political space of veto players.

Using bilateral trade and aid for trade (AfT) data for a sample of 155 countries over the period 2002-2019, this paper uses a gravity analysis to assess whether bilateral aggregate AfT and various AfT categories have stimulated exports of AfT-recipient countries to donors, and to examine if the institutional distance between recipients and donor countries affected the efficacy of AfT in promoting the former's bilateral exports. The results suggest that AfT flows tend to foster exports of recipients, both at the extensive margin and intensive margin. However, the trade-stimulating effect of AfT for trade policy and regulation is more pronounced than that of other AfT flows. Finally, institutional disparities between trading partners dampen the effectiveness of AfT in promoting exports at both margins of trade; and certain regions and income-based groups have managed to benefit more than others from AfT. Increasing the amount of disbursed aid flows is likely to speed-up the insertion of developing countries into world markets; strengthening governance in AfT-beneficiary countries and closing their institutional gap with donors would enhance the effect of AfT on their exports; and tying AfT flows to governance-related reforms in recipients can be an option to consider by donors.