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After the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a geopolitical gray zone emerged between Western organizations on the one side, and the Russia-dominated space on the other. This model was always fragile, did not help to solve the Transnistria problem in eastern Moldova or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in south-western Azerbaijan, and was shaken by the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It finally broke down with Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Against the background of these shocks, a partial solution to the security challenges of the current gray zone for all of the countries of Eastern Europe — whether in- or outside NATO and the EU — could be to revive the old concept of the Intermarium (land between seas). By cooperating and allying with each other, the states between the Baltic and Black Seas could bolster their security and in particular improve the balance of power against Russia, without immediate further Eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU.

Why would that be necessary? NATO’s 2008 Bucharest declaration promised Ukraine and Georgia a future inclusion into the Alliance, yet did not provide them with a Membership Action Plan. In 2013 and 2014, the European Union signed a “new generation” of especially comprehensive association agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, yet without an accession perspective attached. The European Union’s Eastern Partnership — established with six post-Soviet East European and South Caucasian states in 2009 — touches a wide array of political, economic, and cultural themes, yet fails to provide military security. Only Azerbaijan, among the Eastern Partnership countries, partly resolved its security issue by concluding a separate mutual aid treaty with Turkey in 2010, obtaining the promise of military help from a NATO member and relatively powerful country.

Remaining outside comprehensive military-help schemes, it is no wonder that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (as well as Azerbaijan before it had concluded its treaty with Turkey) became partially failed states that do not fully control their territories. Russia and its allies took advantage of the lacking international embeddedness of these four countries. Moscow supports separatism directly in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Donets Basin (and indirectly, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh). Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula was simply annexed to the Russian Federation in March 2014.

Neither the EU nor NATO will any time soon be able to fill the conspicuous security vacuum they have left with their hesitant and inconsistent enlargement policies in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Both organization have, in the past, amply demonstrated their inadequacy as strategically thinking and geopolitically resolute actors. Against this background, an increasing amount of post-Soviet politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals are starting to discuss alternative options to at least partially increase their countries’ security. The most prominent among these concepts is the Intermarium.

The Historical Roots of a Union of the Lands Between the Seas

The idea of an association or coalition that would encompass the lands of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, from Baltic to the Yugoslav nations, appeared first in the 19th century. Such an alliance would have been directed against the threats of Tsarist Russia in the east, as well as of, initially, Prussia and, later, the German Reich in the west. After World War I, the idea gained momentum in Poland, which strived to survive and strengthen itself within the ongoing European turmoil. Its first inter-war leader Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) re-introduced the 19th-century concept of a Slavic union called Międzymorze (Land between the Seas). The term became subsequently known under its Latinized form “Intermarium,” and referred to some sort of alliance of the Central-East and South-East European states located between the Baltic, Black, Adriatic, and/or Aegean seas.

Initially, Piłsudski sought to achieve such an East European union or even federation that would have included Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. The 1920 Warsaw Treaty, a military-economic coalition with the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic, could have become a first step toward such a coalition. Yet, the alliance did not prevent Ukraine’s and Belarus’s capture by the victorious Bolsheviks during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. It became clear that those East European lands which had fallen under control of the Soviet Union, founded in 1922, were no longer available for an Intermarium. Subsequently, Piłsudski sought to forge a confederation between about a dozen European states, including the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and Greece, that would have strengthened its members against both Soviet and German threats. However, the broad geographical scale of this project and differences in the interests of the possible member states prevented its realization, and thus could not prevent the Nazi-Soviet assault of September 1939.

In and after the World War II, Eastern and Central Europe suffered the very fate that Piłsudski’s Intermarium had been supposed to prevent. The small nations between the great powers became mere objects of contemporary European history. The years under fascist, Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other communist rule (as in Yugoslavia) added shared experiences to the lands of the Intermarium that had been already before tied to each other by various historic, linguistic, religious, and personal links. Now, some or all of these countries also experienced a short occupation by the Third Reich and its allies, and long-lasting Moscow-backed and/or Soviet-like governments, economic collectivization, totalitarian rule, international isolation, political indoctrination, etc.

Yet another common experience for the countries of East-Central Europe in the 20th century was Western discriminatory discourse on them, which “sliced” the history of these nations away from Europe’s past and memory, an imagination of the European continent sharply criticized by, among others, Norman Davies and Tony Judt.[1] In this discourse, what was thought of as “real” Europe was its western or, at most, central part. For many Westerners, the nations controlled by the (pro-)Soviet regimes seemed to be too foreign and strange to be considered properly Western. This view remained prevalent throughout the 1990s, and, to some degree, even after most formerly communist states had become full members of NATO and the EU.

The Intermarium’s Relevance Today

The creation of a full-scale Central and Eastern European union or federation, as once envisaged by Piłsudski, is not any longer feasible or necessary today. That is because the majority of countries in this region have either already acceded to the EU, are expecting to do so soon, or have concluded far-reaching association agreements that will gradually make them parts of the Union’s economic and legal sphere. The Intermarium’s nations are thereby already closely connected and integrating with each other.

This is also why some initiatives within the EU — like the Visegrad group, Three Seas Initiative, and Via Carpatia transport corridor — are so far of only marginal relevance to Eastern Europe’s security. To be sure, these initiatives have also political dimensions and thus remind of the inter-war Intermarium idea. Yet they are mere additions to the regular integration process within the EU and its Eastern Partnership. They thus lack larger geopolitical clout and remain essentially intra-Union lobbying projects. The Adriatic Charter association, created by the United States, Albania, Croatia, and Republic of Macedonia in 2003, and joined by Montenegro as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2008, is a step towards solving the security dilemma in Europe’s post-Cold War south-east. Yet there is no such project for the “grey zone” states between the EU and Russia, which today are in a somewhat similar situation to interwar East-Central Europe.

In fact, immediately after the break-up of the Soviet bloc and Union, the Intermarium briefly reappeared in its original form in Poland, under the label “NATO-bis” which would have been a separate security organization of Europe’s post-communist countries. That project was driven by fears of Russian neo-imperialism, similar to those of Piłsudski 70 years before. The idea of such a regional security coalition was also championed by non-Polish political leaders in East-Central Europe ranging from Algirdas Brazauskas (1932-2010) in Lithuania to Zianon Pazniak (b. 1944) in Belarus, as well as regional political experts. Yet, most of the states of the presumed pos-Cold War Intermarium alliance soon received membership invitations from the EU and NATO. As a result, for Eastern Europe’s new EU and NATO candidate and later member states, the added value of creating a new regional security organization declined rapidly.

Still, in view of continuing threats and risks in Eastern Europe, the Intermarium concept has, since 1991, constantly remained in the air throughout the region. It has also become a vehicle for promoting the interests of Eastern EU members within the union. The term has thus experienced a double revival, as both an enhanced regional cooperation project and as a transregional security concept. When the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party won the 2015 elections, it announced a more active stance by Warsaw in Central-East European political affairs in both of these regards. Initially, PiS wanted not only closer cooperation within the Visegrad Group members, but also stronger attention toward Ukraine as well as the other Eastern Partnership countries.

Poland’s new focus on the V4, Intermarium, and, briefly, Ukraine had, however, an ambivalent intention. It went along with the new PiS government’s increasing criticism toward Germany and France, who, in the eyes of the Polish conservative party’s speakers, are allegedly using the EU to exploit weaker states and further the liberal anti-traditionalist agenda of their mainstream parties. Manipulating anti-Russian and anti-German sentiments among PiS supporters, the new Polish president Andzej Duda (b. 1972) has re-utilized the concept of Intermarium as an East European cooperation scheme not only directed against Russia, but also presenting it as an alternative to the dominant Western countries within the EU. Somewhat similar motives may have been behind the activities of the new Croatian president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (b. 1968), to intensify regional political, economic, and security cooperation of the EU member states between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas.

In contrast, for Ukrainians, the idea of Intermarium is primarily related to their national security concerns, as Ukraine struggles to survive in its ongoing hybrid war with Russia. In Kyiv, the Intermarium is seen as complementary, rather than antagonistic, to other integration schemes. Kyiv already has — within the logic of an Intermarium — developed special ties with other Central-East European states, albeit in the loose forms of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (known under its acronym GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and the Community of Democratic Choice. Later on, Ukraine started certain military cooperation with Lithuania and Poland, and established a common military brigade with them. Lithuania and Poland have for many years been those countries that Ukrainians, according to polls, favor strongly. These and similar developments are an expression of the sense of common interests, perceptions, threats, and, partially, even identity among Moscow’s former colonies in East-Central Europe. Yet, none of the Intermarium-related projects have yet led to the creation of potent security alliance in Eastern Europe.

Worse, the Intermarium as a security concept is becoming increasingly corrupted by narrow interests of Warsaw’s new traditionalistic leadership. What Poland seemingly today wants is to create an alternative center of influence inside the EU to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis Western states. Suspiciousness toward Germany’s ardent Europeanism, desire to regain some of their sovereignty and to protect “traditional values” are now leading to a counter-reaction by Central-East European nations. This has manifested itself in strong opposition against the EU’s refugee distribution quotas by the governments of the V4 countries and Slovenia. (In Kyiv, there has emerged an even more radically anti-Western interpretation of the Intermarium idea by a minor far right party National Corps that has recently grown out of the notorious Azov Regiment, a volunteer National Guard unit, founded in 2014 by a small group of Ukrainian racist ultra-nationalists.)

Yet another cooperation reminiscent of the Intermarium, the already mentioned Three Seas (Adriatic — Baltic — Black Sea) or Trimarium Initiative (TSI), has infrastructure development as its main focal point. It fosters energy cooperation to reduce East-Central Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. While not being a member of the TSI, non-EU countries such as Ukraine may, in the future, benefit from these plans too. US President Trump attended a TSI summit in July 2017.

So far, however, none of the various above projects revives the original Intermarium’s intentions to join forces of smaller Central-East European nations against a geopolitically and militarily more powerful enemy. Today, an Intermarium could stretch from Narva in the north to Batumi in the south. Significant parts of the populations and the majority of foreign affairs experts of the countries between the Baltic and Black seas view Putin’s Russia as their biggest threat. Inside NATO, the political mainstreams of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania regard Russia as a major security problem. The same can be said of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova outside NATO. These states could thus form the core of an East-Central European and South Caucasian defense coalition. Further European countries within, or close to, the “land between the seas” — from the Scandinavian to the Western Balkan nations — might be willing to support, join, or associate themselves with such an alliance.

With regard to its legal set-up, the mentioned 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan could function as a model treaty for a security arrangement between certain eastern NATO states on the one side, and some post-Soviet non-NATO countries on the other. As in Article 2 of the ratified Turkish-Azeri alliance, the exact modus of action, in case of an aggression, could be left open to each treaty party. The pact could simply state an obligation that, if confronted with an attack, the parties would “mutually assist each other”, while the exact contents of the support would be agreed upon once a military infringement has happened. It should thus not conflict with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but would still constitute a warning to the Kremlin that new Russian military adventures will be costlier than Moscow’s low-risk interventions in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. While such a coalition of non-nuclear-weapons states cannot be a comprehensive solution to the post-Soviet security dilemma, it would constitute an enormous improvement for Zwischeneuropa (in-between-Europe).

However, paralleling the course of events after 1918 in East-Central Europe, since 1991 the Intermarium idea so far remains within the realm of speculation. The resulting non-inclusion of the gray zone countries continues to leave the perceived costs of further Russian aggression in the region low. Even after 2014, coalition-building in Eastern Europe has not gotten off the ground. The three associated Eastern Partnership countries now receive more political, economic, and also military support from NATO and the EU. Yet, they are still left on their own, by the West and their Central-East European neighbors, in their military confrontations with the Kremlin. The obvious lesson from both the inter-war and early post-Soviet periods is that this is not a sustainable state of affairs for the international relations of Eastern Europe.

Risks and Gains of an Intermarium Today

Our first publication of this assessment in 2017[2] triggered a swift response from MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Poland’s first Minister for European Integration.[3] He acknowledged that regional strategic cooperation is beneficial for all parties involved and for Europe as a whole – but he rejected the idea of a military alliance. Saryusz-Wolski argued that such an alliance would provoke Russia to test the Intermarium’s seriousness. If no “serious action” from members of both the Intermarium and NATO to a Russian challenged followed, the new alliance would be exposed “as a paper tiger.” Conversely, if the Intermarium’s NATO members were to engage actively in confronting Russia, this could undermine the protection provided by the Washington Treaty’s Article 5. Saryusz-Wolski concludes that a “military Intermarium” would erode “the deterrent effect of the [Atlantic] alliance.”

It is true that Russia likes to test reactions of its foes, as, for example, Moscow’s testing of Ukraine’s defenses in Mar’inka in summer 2015 showed. Yet, while Russia wants to portray itself as an unpredictable power capable of an all-out attack, in reality it has preferred hybrid methods and avoided open military confrontation. Even in the turmoil of early 2014, Russia used “little green men” without insignia to occupy Crimea – a scenario also considered by Estonia, but not tried by Moscow.

Russia still does not admit its military presence in Donbas and continues to claim that its soldiers spotted there are mere “volunteers.” The Kremlin behaves in this way as the West would likely view an open military attack as a “red line” making “business as usual” with Russia impossible. Against this background, the primary goal of an Intermarium would be, for the member countries, to deal jointly with hybrid threats. The limited nature of such threats would make it for NATO’s hypothetical Intermarium member states relatively easy to respond. Such engagement is unlikely to mean participation in a conventional war, and a subsequent erosion of the deterrent effect of NATO. In any way, a loosely formulated alliance treaty can leave it up to each party to decide which exact means – military or non-military – it chooses for fulfilling its alignment obligations. The formulation “military Intermarium” is Saryusz-Wolski’s, and not ours.

Saryusz-Wolski also claims that EU member states skeptical of the Eastern Neighborhood Policy will deny “association or membership benefits to Eastern European states, citing their Intermarium membership as sufficient enough.” We cannot follow such the reasoning behind such a speculation. Saryusz-Wolski’s estimates that “however suboptimal the current situation may be, it is still preferable to the institutionalization of parallel security structures.” He advises using “economic means to achieve the political goal of peace and stability.” Such conclusions let us suspect that he does not see or does not want to fully acknowledge the direct security challenges that will remain for the “gray zone” states in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus, as well as the indirect risks for their Western neighbors who made it into NATO and the EU.

Kostiantyn Fedorenko is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and frequent commentator on current Ukrainian affairs for various European media outlets.

Dr. Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press at Stuttgart and distributed by Columbia University Press at New York.

NOTES

[1] E.g.: Tony Judt. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Penguin Books, 2006.

[2] Kostiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland, “How to Solve Ukraine’s Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe,” War on the Rocks, August 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/.

[3] Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, “In Between Security Arrangements: The Trojan Horse of Military Intermarium,” War on the Rocks, October 13, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/in-between-security-arrangements-the-trojan-horse-of-military-intermarium/.

The post How to Solve Ukraine’s, Molodova’s and Georgia’s Security Dilemma? The Idea of a Post-Soviet Intermarium Coalition appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Dès la création du conseil israélien pour la paix israélo-palestinienne en 1975, ses membres fondateurs furent dénoncés dans leur propre pays par les annexionnistes comme « antisionistes », accusés d'« intelligence avec l'ennemi », voire de « haute trahison ». L'un des plus éminents, le général (...) / Israël, Palestine, Conflit israélo-palestinien - 1984/07

Bien avant le drame de Munich, une discussion curieuse, inhabituelle, s'était amorcée en Israël. Une discussion qui porte à la fois sur la politique socio-économique et sur la politique arabe du gouvernement de Mme Golda Meïr. Il est significatif que les événements du mois dernier n'y ont pas mis fin. (...) / Israël, Proche-Orient, Conflit israélo-arabe, Politique, Autodétermination des peuples - 1972/10

Créée en 1936, Politique étrangère est la plus ancienne revue française dans le domaine des relations internationales. Chaque vendredi, découvrez « l’archive de la semaine ».

* * *

L’article « Pression démographique et expansion économique en Asie orientale » a été écrit par le spécialiste de l’Asie Étienne Gilbert dans le numéro 4/1957 de Politique étrangère.

Durant les premiers mois de 1956, la question d’une participation plus active à l’expansion économique de l’Asie retenait l’attention des hommes d’état européens et nord-américains. Un certain éveil se manifestait dans l’opinion publique occidentale qui commençait à s’intéresser à l’aide aux pays sous-développés.

La réaction en chaîne déclenchée par les événements d’Égypte et la répression de la révolution hongroise sont autant d’éléments qui ont brouillé les cartes économiques.

Les problèmes politiques ont repris plus que jamais le dessus et, comble d’infortune, les événements ont pris une tournure telle qu’ils ne profitent ni aux Asiatiques, dont l’avenir économique est inquiétant, ni aux Occidentaux qui n’ont pas intérêt à voir plus de la moitié du globe vivre dans des conditions d’extrême pauvreté.

Il est donc opportun de revenir aux réalités économiques, de passer en revue les possibilités de progrès en Asie ainsi que les obstacles en présence. Pour ce faire nous devons aborder de front démographie et économie. Elles sont à tel point liées que seule leur confrontation donnera une image des problèmes.

Le problème démographique

Ne sommes-nous pas en train de répéter l’erreur de Malthus quand nous nous alarmons de la pression démographique qui sévit dans la plupart des pays sous-développés ? En dépit de ses sombres pronostics, l’Europe a connu un prodigieux essor économique, pourquoi n’en serait-il pas de même en Asie ?

La situation des pays asiatiques en 1957 est hélas ! très différente de celle de l’Europe au temps de Malthus.

Déséquilibre entre économie et démographie

Dans plusieurs pays asiatiques et africains, économie et démographie n’ont pas évolué parallèlement au cours des cent cinquante dernières années : la seconde étant allée beaucoup plus vite que la première.

Ce phénomène est particulièrement net dans les pays qui ont été soumis au régime colonial. Faisant régner la paix intérieure, dotant le pays d’une bonne administration capable d’enrayer les catastrophes naturelles (famines et épidémies), améliorant l’hygiène publique, l’autorité étrangère a fait baisser le taux de mortalité, tandis que la natalité restait élevée.

A Java, la population a passé de 12,4 millions en 1860 à 51 millions en 1950, la densité par kilomètre carré croissant de 94 habitants à 385. Les progrès de l’agriculture sous les Hollandais n’ont pas suffi à maintenir l’équilibre et l’effort d’industrialisation a été très mince.

Les autres îles indonésiennes, où la colonisation hollandaise a été beaucoup moins poussée, sont restées peu peuplées jusqu’à maintenant. L’idéal serait de faire émigrer une partie des Javanais à Bornéo, Célèbes, Sumatra, îles riches qui manquent de main-d’œuvre. Des transferts de populations sont entrepris par le gouvernement, mais pour alléger les densités javanaises, il faudrait évacuer des millions de paysans, opération extrêmement coûteuse qui drainerait le plus clair des ressources indonésiennes.

En Inde, le facteur démographique n’est pas moins perturbateur. La population a triplé depuis le début du XIXe siècle pour être aujourd’hui de 390 millions d’âmes. Les Britanniques n’ont pas été inactifs : l’Inde leur doit un important réseau ferroviaire et routier, de beaux travaux d’irrigation. Pourtant l’économique est resté loin derrière le démographique.

De 1920 à 1941, la population augmente de 27 %, la surface cultivée de 8 %. Vers 1880, l’empire britannique des Indes (non compris la Birmanie) exporte en moyenne 1,2 million de tonnes de céréales par an. Dès 1920, les exportations cessent, l’Inde doit importer toujours plus de riz et de blé pour nourrir sa population.

A côté de son incidence sur le niveau de l’alimentation, le mouvement démographique exerce des effets désastreux sur le domaine de l’emploi. L’Inde compte plus de 5 millions de chômeurs complets et des dizaines de millions de paysans ne travaillent que cent cinquante à deux cents jours par an.

Le cas de la Chine est moins facile à expliquer en l’absence de données statistiques. Le premier recensement complet a eu lieu le 30 juin 1953 et a dénombré 582 603 417 habitants sur le territoire de la république populaire. Ce chiffre a surpris plusieurs démographes étrangers par son ampleur. En 1946, on estimait officiellement la population chinoise à 456 millions d’âmes. D’aucuns se sont demandé si, pour des raisons de prestige, le gouvernement n’avait pas grossi ses chiffres. Il nous semble que l’on doit faire confiance au recensement chinois. Grâce à leur administration et à leur organisation, les communistes ont été en mesure de dénombrer assez exactement leur population et ils auraient été eux-mêmes surpris du résultat.

L’estimation de 456 millions donnée plus haut est sujette à caution si on la compare à d’autres antérieures : en 1925, les services postaux chinois (une bonne administration) donnaient le chiffre de 485 millions. En 1918/1919, un gros travail fait par des missionnaires indiquait 452 millions. Sur de telles bases, il paraît plausible que les Chinois aient été près de 600 millions en 1953.

L’absence de statistiques sûres nous empêche également de préciser si le phénomène de déséquilibre enregistré à Java et en Inde se répète en Chine, mais un point ne fait pas de doute : au moment où la Chine se lance dans le planisme économique elle se trouve gênée par une démographie excessive. Pour l’instant sa population se trouve globalement moins mal nourrie que celle de l’Inde. […] Qu’en sera-t-il dans dix ou vingt ans ? Dangereuse pour l’alimentation générale, cette population trop lourde pose, comme nous le verrons plus bas, des problèmes très délicats sur le plan économique.

A côté de ces formes de déséquilibre économico-démographique, le Japon et l’Afghanistan illustrent deux cas d’équilibre relatif.

Après un timide début entre les deux guerres, le second a commencé à se moderniser d’une manière plus active après 1945. N’ayant pas subi de régime colonial, ce pays a conservé une sorte de balance naturelle entre économie et population : cette dernière est suffisamment nourrie, au moins en quantité, elle trouve à s’occuper dans l’agriculture, l’élevage, l’artisanat et les industries naissantes. Il n’existe pas de problèmes insurmontables. Économie et démographie ont commencé à évoluer parallèlement. Si l’effort agricole et industriel est assez vigoureux, il n’y a pas de raison pour que l’Afghanistan n’arrive pas en vingt ou trente ans à de sensibles progrès économiques par habitant.

A l’opposé, le Japon est le premier pays d’Asie à se moderniser, et il le fait en toute liberté : le mouvement inauguré en 1868 a suscité une forte augmentation de la population. Celle-ci ayant progressé de pair avec un énorme effort industriel et agricole, le Japon a réussi à atteindre un niveau de vie sensiblement supérieur au reste de l’Asie. Entre 1885 et 1925 seulement, le revenu par habitant actif a plus que triplé. […]

Les exemples que nous avons cités montrent que les principaux pays d’Asie commencent à intensifier leur modernisation au moment où ils sont déjà entravés par une démographie trop lourde. A cet obstacle vient s’en ajouter un autre encore plus alarmant, c’est l’accélération du processus démographique. […]

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Over the past four months, the Nicaraguan government, much as it did under Somoza, has declared war on its people.

The Russian public was quiet about Manafort and Cohen, but in the halls of power, debate about Trump’s usefulness rages.

Amid external uncertainty and volatility, the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean will grow by an average of 1.5 per cent this year, thanks to a rebound in private consumption and a slight increase in investment, according to a United Nations flagship report issued on Thursday.

The Pentagon says the United States is winning the war, but after 17 years, there’s still no end in sight.

By urging self-reliance at home while demanding aid from abroad, Amman has painted itself into a corner.

But how long will it last?

On this 20th anniversary of the International Day for Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition, the United Nations is inviting the world to reflect on the legacy of slavery and remember to guard against racial prejudices, which continue to fuel everyday discrimination against people of African descent.

The young woman belonged to a political group whose members may have been entrapped by a police informant.

As hundreds of Venezuelans continue to pour into neighbouring countries due to social and political upheaval at home, the heads of the United Nations refugee and migration agencies called for greater international support to meet the most basic needs of the displaced.

Le XIVe congrès officiel du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, qui s'est tenu du 25 au 29 mai dernier, a achevé le processus de « normalisation », autrement dit la liquidation des conquêtes et des réformes qui ont marqué le « printemps de Prague ». M. Husak, le secrétaire général du parti, a pu affirmer (...) / URSS, Censure, Communisme, Parti politique, Police, Socialisme, Tchécoslovaquie 1918-1992 - 1971/07

The Trump team has been pushing false rhetoric regarding immigrants since the moment Trump announced his candidacy in 2015. Starting with his infamous “they’re rapists” comment at his candidacy announcement speech to his call for a “complete and total shutdown of all Muslims entering the United States,” Trump has made it abundantly clear that one of the core parts of his platform was going to be cracking down on illegal and legal immigration.

The latter issue he went after with the “travel” ban. The original ban most notably prohibited people from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia from entering the United States for 90 days while also placing new restrictions on the US’s ability to accept refugees. The ban’s stated purpose and title was “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” The lunacy of the Supreme Court decision to uphold a watered down version of the ban a year later (ignoring the ridiculous conflict of interest in the case as Neil Gorsuch, who voted for Trump, was appointed by the petitioner himself) and the flawed logic of the original ban is clear. Two studies done by the CATO Institute serve as great evidence to this end. First, they found that the vetting process of citizens from the Middle East trying to travel to the United States was already incredible thorough and “robust” including thorough background checks, several rounds of interviews, and fingerprinting. Second, they reported that “Foreigners from [the] seven nations [in the original ban] have killed zero Americans in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and the end of 2015.” In fact, between 1975-2015, terrorists originating from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon have accounted for far more deaths than any other country in the world. Terrorists from the fifth country on the list, Kuwait, have only accounted for six deaths in the time frame while the top four are all in the triple digits and above. None of those countries were on any iteration of Trump’s travel bans. Trump’s cries for national security fall well short.

As far as the Supreme Court goes, it’s more than obvious that the intention behind the travel ban was maligned. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor writes in Trump v Hawaii, “Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus … The majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.” Trump did exactly what he told the voters he would do: he stopped Muslims from entering the United States to the best of his abilities, through a thinly veiled attempt to cry national security.

Not only does the ban fail to actually protect the United States against potential terrorists, the ban actually has harmful, negative impacts. Specifically, it exacerbates the problem of radicalization, arms extremist groups with unlimited recruitment publicity, and jeopardizes our relationship with critical foreign governments. The same CATO report that explored the US’s “robust” vetting processes cited a Department of Homeland Security draft intelligence assessment which found that “most foreign-born, US-based violent extremists likely radicalized several years after their entry into the United States.” Critically, Trump’s ban makes the problem much worse. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former senior director for counterterrorism and deputy legal adviser at the National Security Council Joshua A. Geltzer, and former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matthew G. Olsen published an article for CNN explaining their scathing opposition to the ban in which they write: “The ban is so obviously, palpably, indeed explicitly anti-Muslim in nature that it has — understandably — offended Muslim-American communities around the world, including in the United States. Yet those are precisely the communities that can prove critical for identifying and responding to individuals becoming radicalized by groups like ISIS and al Qaeda.” Furthermore, Clapper et co explain that “effective counterterrorism relies heavily on robust intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign governments.” Restricting a country’s citizens from entering the United States is a “surefire way to offend that country’s government and impede intelligence-sharing, rather than enhancing the flow of information about terrorist threats as effective counterterrorism requires.” In fact, after Chad was included in an iteration of the travel ban, they pulled their troops out of Niger where they had been aiding in a counterterrorism fight against Boko Haram. Despite their removal from Trump’s next ban, “there’s been no indication of when, if ever, Chad’s troops will return to Niger. It’s usually not easy to soothe an offended partner.”

Conclusively, Trump’s travel ban does nothing to improve national security, while subjecting “countless families and individuals … pain and suffering” and arming extremists groups with recruitment materials. Nevermind the justification is essentially to punish citizens of foreign countries because the government believes a few individuals from their country pose a threat to national security. Trump’s Muslim ban is incredibly dangerous and blatantly unconstitutional.

The post Dismantling Trump’s Immigration Lies: The Travel Ban appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A la lumière de contacts récemment pris en Israël, Jean Lacouture évoque ci-dessous l'action de quelques groupes, organisations ou tendances qui jouent un rôle en Israël dans la recherche de la paix, ou simplement dans l'acceptation des procédures pacifiques devant y mener. La paix est-elle possible (...) / Israël, Idéologie, Pacifisme, Politique, Extrême gauche - 1970/09

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Rachid Chaker propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Christophe Jaffrelot et Laurence Louër, Pan-Islamic Connections: Transnational Networks between South Asia and the Gulf (Hurst, 2018, 288 pages).

Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux États-Unis, et l’intervention internationale en Afghanistan qui a suivi, ont braqué les projecteurs sur une région jusqu’alors peu connue du grand public occidental. Les populations d’Europe découvrirent alors sur leurs écrans les madrasas pakistanaises et afghanes, où des jeunes enfants apprenaient dès leurs premières années la langue arabe et la récitation du Coran. Ces lieux d’apprentissage furent perçus comme le vecteur de transmission de la radicalisation religieuse, conduisant à l’adoption de doctrines rigoristes débouchant parfois sur la violence. Dans ce contexte, le rôle des monarchies du Golfe, et de l’Arabie Saoudite en particulier, dans le financement de ces structures et la propagation du wahhabisme en Asie du Sud, a été pointé du doigt.

L’ouvrage dirigé par Christophe Jaffrelot et Laurence Louër réunit des contributions de spécialistes internationaux sur les liens entre les pays du Golfe et l’Asie du Sud, notamment l’Inde et le Pakistan. On y apprend notamment que, bien qu’existantes, les relations entre musulmans du Golfe et d’Asie du Sud furent peu développées avant le XIXe siècle, le rigorisme religieux du Moyen-Orient ne convenant guère aux populations des Indes, plus proches d’un soufisme qui se voulait ouvert et tolérant. Toutefois, l’ouverture du canal de Suez, la répression qui suivit la mutinerie de 1857 aux Indes, et la proclamation du Califat ottoman vont permettre la naissance de fortes interactions, avec influences religieuses réciproques.

La naissance du Pakistan en 1947, qui se voulait un État islamique, et la volonté des dirigeants Bhutto puis Zia d’obtenir des financements pour leur programme nucléaire, vont progressivement rapprocher le Pakistan de l’Arabie Saoudite, qui verra dès lors d’un mauvais œil l’influence iranienne dans la région. La guerre d’Afghanistan (1979-1989) fut un accélérateur. Soucieux de combattre l’envahisseur soviétique, le Pakistan, via ses services de renseignement dont l’Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), fera transiter des armes et des fonds, en provenance notamment du Golfe, renforçant ainsi le poids des groupes religieux armés dont le régime des talibans sera une émanation quelques années plus tard, et ce avec la bénédiction des dignitaires religieux saoudiens, dont le grand mufti Ibn Baz.

L’Arabie Saoudite n’est pas le seul État du Golfe à s’être intéressé à cette partie de l’Asie. On apprend dans cet ouvrage que les Émirats Arabes unis ont de longue date entretenu des liens forts avec des groupes talibans afghans : Jalaluddin Haqqani aurait en effet autrefois visité les Émirats, et y aurait rencontré les plus hauts dignitaires du pays. Le Qatar n’est pas en reste. La volonté du petit émirat de peser sur la scène internationale l’a poussé à s’impliquer dans le processus de réconciliation afghan, bousculant parfois son rival et voisin saoudien. La question des financements privés du Golfe à destination de l’Asie du Sud est également abordée, tout comme le rôle de l’Iran dans cette partie du monde.

Cet ouvrage riche et complet retrace avec précision l’historique des connexions entre ces deux sous-régions asiatiques que sont le Golfe et l’Asie du Sud, leur état actuel, en offrant au lecteur des clés essentielles pour comprendre les enjeux géopolitiques liés à ces complexes régions.

Rachid Chaker

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

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