Diplomacy & Crisis News

Here’s what other countries can do to stop him.

The fiery electoral front-runner will be hemmed in on all sides if he wins.

/ Frontières, Histoire, Tunisie, Afrique du Nord, Maghreb - Afrique / Frontières, Histoire, Tunisie, Afrique du Nord, Maghreb - Afrique

Zimbabwe is signing up for China's surveillance state, but its citizens will pay the price.

/ Société, Internet, Éducation, Économie, Libye, Afrique du Nord - Afrique / Société, Internet, Éducation, Économie, Libye, Afrique du Nord - Afrique

Donald Trump’s message and views on Iran have been remarkably consistent throughout his time in the public sphere. Even immediately following the deal’s successful negotiation, Trump came out against it, hurling a line many would become very familiar with: “Never, ever, ever in my life have I seen any transaction as incompetently negotiated as our deal with Iran.” After being persuaded to comply with the terms of the deal in the short term, “hawkish” advisors Mike Pompeo (Secretary of State) and John R. Bolton (National Security Adviser) began wielding more influence in the White House. With less internal resistance stopping him, Trump was finally able to fulfill an old campaign promise and he withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in Early May.

The completion of the deal involved a long and arduous negotiation process. In the end, President Obama and US Secretary of State John Kerry were able to strike a deal with the Iranian government, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and five other countries (Russia, China, France, Germany, United Kingdom) to “ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful” in exchange for economic relief. Specifically, the deal, in its own words, would “produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.” Iran, on the other hand, agreed to a bevy of restrictions on their ability to enrich Uranium and obtain weapons grade Plutonium as well as gave international inspectors access to their nuclear sites. All reports indicated that Iran had been complying with the terms of the deal. In fact, the deal had other positive effects as well. Iran’s (slow) reintegration back into the Western world was certainly a factor in their more moderate foreign policy decisions. For example, Iran refrained from intervening in both Libya and Iraq following the signing of the deal. In fact, the Huffington Post reported that the government was actually encouraging diplomatic solutions to end the Libyan conflict.

Critics of the deal argued the United States was conceding too much economically for such a poor return from the Iranians. While those attacks are unfounded, as the deal without question significantly delayed Iran’s ability to obtain a nuclear weapon, they are also irrelevant. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal has created more detrimental impacts than even critics of the deal argued existed in the first place.

Part of the reason critics disapproved of the Iran deal was due to its front loaded nature. Essentially, Iran received many of the economic benefits it was promised before it completely fulfilled its end of the bargain. However, this very fact is one of the reasons why pulling out of the deal was especially miscalculated. Eric Lorber of the ForeignPolicy dot com reported in November of 2016 that “Iran [had] already received approximately $100 billion” in economic relief. The deal was lopsided when Trump pulled out because the United States had negotiated for long term benefits in stopping Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon. Trump never gave us the ability to see the benefits materialize. Abandoning the deal when Trump did provided Iran with significant economic concessions while only setting their nuclear program back two years.

Most notably, Trump made this decision on the heels of his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. It is downright absurd that the Trump administration thought it would be a good idea to back out of one nuclear agreement right before it went and tried to negotiate another. In fact, I’d argue the only reason the North Koreans did not back out of the summit immediately is because they believed it would be an opportunity to extract concessions from the Americans like they have in the past. In fact, North Korea has violated eight agreements since 1994 while gaining “concessions [like] being removed from the U.S. list of regimes that sponsor terrorism, shipments of food and fuel, the promise of light water plutonium reactors and the removal of crippling economic sanctions.” Indeed, the 2018 negotiations ended with Trump agreeing to stop US military exercises with South Korea for almost nothing in return, a decision that seemingly surprised South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

The long term implications of this decision are incredibly severe. Iran now has two realistic options. First, it can pivot harder to Russia and China, solidifying their alliance with those two global powers and rely on them for economic aid, as they had before the deal. In the meantime, they would continue to develop their nuclear weapon capabilities. In fact, Iran’s relationship with China has tightened since Trump’s withdrawal. China has been eager to work with Iran, some hypothesize, because of the access the country would give to Middle Eastern markets. East Asia Forum reported in June that “an ability to rapidly traverse the Iranian plateau lies at the heart of Beijing’s geostrategic and economic ambitions in the 21st century.”

Iran’s second option is cracking under the economic pressure. A letter from the Trump administration admitted that they will aim to put “unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime.” There is a scenario in which Iran returns to the table and agrees to a more favorable deal with the Trump administration to escape economic ruin. This outcome is certainly possible, with economic impacts in the country already being seen. But as was the case in North Korea and Iran, historically, economic sanctions hit the citizens the hardest while leaving high ranking government officials unaffected. The only real consequences will be to President Hassan Rouhani, whose pivot towards the West unquestionably backfired due to Trump’s election and who will inevitably be blamed for the country’s economic hardship. Furthermore, Trump’s antagonization of Iran makes it unlikely any member of the government wants to come to the table while Trump holds the oval office. Even more importantly, Trump’s hardline diplomacy tactics have already been undercut by European officials who promised to stay in the deal to their best of their abilities and tried to convince Trump not to enforce secondary sanctions (the administration declined to agree to that framework). Critically, Iran knows support of the JCPoA still exists.

The Trump administration has taken an incredible risk, hoping Iran’s hardliners will crack under the economic pressure. The far more likely outcome, however, is nuclear proliferation to strengthen Iran’s negotiating hand and a stronger alliance with Russia and China.

Nader Granmayeh is a senior at Horace Mann High School where he is the co-Student Body President. He is currently an intern with Foreign Policy Association blogs division and is working on Zephyr Teachout’s attorney general campaign.

The post On Trump’s Decision to Withdraw From The Iran Deal appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère
(n° 2/2018). Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de James Kelly Morningstar, Patton’s Way: A Radical Theory of War (Naval Institute Press, 2017, 352 pages).

Le général Patton est une personnalité contestée. Ses succès au combat sont nombreux, en particulier à la tête de la Troisième armée américaine pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Mais il est aussi régulièrement dépeint comme un chef caractériel et incontrôlable, dont les réussites ne s’expliqueraient que par des prises de risque inconsidérées. James Kelly Morningstar, officier de l’U.S. Army en retraite et professeur d’histoire militaire à l’université du Maryland, cherche dans ce livre à réhabiliter la pensée stratégique et tactique de Patton, et à montrer sa pertinence actuelle. Il appuie son propos sur de nombreuses sources primaires, notamment issues des archives personnelles du général.

Pour Morningstar, l’approche de Patton se caractérise par quatre principes de base : la priorité mise sur le choc pour détruire le moral de l’adversaire ; l’utilisation maximale du combat interarmes, et en particulier des unités blindées et mécanisées ; l’accent mis sur le commandement par objectif laissant une large part à l’initiative ; enfin, l’usage poussé du renseignement pour découvrir les points faibles du dispositif ennemi qui seront les points d’application de l’effort. L’auteur explique que la pratique de ces principes par Patton va à l’encontre de la doctrine de l’U.S. Army de l’époque. Cette dernière était en effet focalisée sur l’attrition beaucoup plus que sur la manœuvre, sur un commandement centralisé plutôt que sur l’initiative, et sur la puissance de feu davantage que sur la vitesse. Le caractère bien trempé de Patton est l’un des facteurs qui expliquent ses mauvaises relations avec ses supérieurs (Dwight Einsenhower et Omar Bradley), mais James Morningstar montre bien que l’opposition venait avant tout d’une profonde divergence quant à la façon de mener les combats.

Le style de Patton est ensuite illustré par deux chapitres sur la percée de 1944 en Normandie. L’auteur souligne bien l’absence de vision opérative d’Omar Bradley et Bernard Montgomery. La prudence de leurs manœuvres n’a en rien permis de limiter les pertes ou de gagner du terrain. Patton est l’inspirateur de la percée qui a finalement mis fin à cette impasse sanglante, mais il est aussi le chef d’orchestre de l’exploitation de plus de 1 100 km qui a lieu dans la foulée. Les unités de Patton ne s’arrêteront qu’à 70 km de la frontière allemande – au grand dam de leur chef –, le ravitaillement en carburant faisant défaut.

Les deux derniers chapitres sont consacrés à l’héritage intellectuel de Patton dans les armées américaines. La guerre froide, avec sa focalisation sur l’arme nucléaire, n’est pas propice à une diffusion de ses idées. Mais les années 1970 font évoluer les choses avec l’introduction de la doctrine Air Land Battle, où l’on retrouve en particulier l’importance de la vitesse pour vaincre. L’auteur n’omet pas de souligner que la pensée de Patton n’est véritablement adaptée qu’au combat de haute intensité, pas à la contre-insurrection.

En somme, le livre de James Morningstar replace avec brio la pensée de Patton dans l’évolution des concepts stratégiques et tactiques américains. Il regorge de réflexions sur la guerre et la manœuvre particulièrement pertinentes, alors que les armées occidentales cherchent à réinventer leurs modes d’action pour le combat conventionnel de haute intensité. Cet ouvrage est à conseiller à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à la stratégie et à la tactique.

Rémy Hémez

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

 

The fast-approaching deadline for agreeing to the conditions for the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU and to move to the transitional phase of Brexit have placed a time bomb under the May government.

En 1993, un grand nombre d'experts ont élaboré en commun un livre-manifeste intitulé The Great Ape Project : Equality Beyond Humanity [Le Projet Grands singes. l'égalité au-delà de l'humanité] . Ce livre servait de support à un document, la Déclaration sur les grands singes anthropoïdes, à laquelle ont (...) / Animal, Idées, Science - 2007/02 Peut-on ne pas croire ?

Nous adorons nos chiens et nos chats domestiques, raffolons des dessins animés ou des films animaliers, et cependant notre comportement à l'égard des animaux en général prouve notre insensibilité et notre complicité passive devant leur immense souffrance. Tant que l'animal continuera d'être une (...) / Alimentation, Animal, Idées, Industrie, Violence - 2006/08 Refuser la fatalité

President Trump’s pronouncements always generate froth, by his words and in the reporting and recrimination that follows.  But in Brussels, before his Helsinki meeting with Putin, he did, again, call NATO obsolete. Once any President raises it, the question takes on a life of its own.  And if NATO’s value is in doubt, who should be our allies?  That in turn raises the question: just what do we need for security?  While the President’s view about NATO is unsettling, raising the question should lead policy makers to examine their assumptions, and answer based on something beyond historical inertia.  The public deserves a considered discussion about NATO, alliances, and security, starting from the ground up.

Security is hard to define: so many developments in the world might pose threats.  The cyber realm can by itself transmit destruction; it also carries information and disinformation that can amount to attacks.  Aside from that infinity of hazard, who might take to terrorism against us, and what collapsed states might house them?  Which rising powers might overtake us, and will they employ military, economic, cyber, cultural, or some as-yet unimagined effort?  What about my job, and what about climate change?

Amid all the fears people seek security against, public discourse says little about what we need security for.  Absent an answer to that question, anything at all could pose a security hazard, and countering everything requires infinite resources.

Possible answers, after excluding everyone’s laundry lists of motherhood and apple pie, will range widely.  Americans might need only physical safety and equal market access throughout the world.  Some would hope to protect man’s capacity to find nirvana.

Presumably, most definitions would give democracy and other liberal principles high priority. Hopefully, most Americans would list living by our founding creed, the “self evident” truths over which the signers of the Declaration of Independence divorced their ethnic motherland — unalienable rights equally imbued in all, and government created to secure those rights.

A nation defined by a principle depends for its existence on validation of that principle.  Validation of our creed includes the traditional security that allows a free society to stay free, but also requires that measures to protect society comport with its principles.

What defense and diplomatic policies would serve this type of security need?  A range of configurations might work.  Anna Simons of the Naval Post Graduate School advocates a minimalist foreign policy, butting out of other nations’ sovereignty while punishing any transgression of ours.  John Ikenberry would revive the current Liberal World Order, as the best expression of America’s values.  Barry Posen of the Naval War College would revamp force structures to limit our commitments to certain key needs.  Zalmay Khalilzad sees room to make NATO more viable for the 21st Century.

A concern that has not been addressed is that today’s communications technology makes it possible actually to attack a country’s national narrative.  Narrative is not only the words expressing your values.  It includes actions and arrangements that fit your claims, and your ability to keep to them.  Security for America, and the shape of alliances, must reinforce America’s national narrative.

NATO membership includes many of the world’s firmly democratic nations, but a few that are moving toward authoritarian government.  It also excludes a number of deeply liberal democracies, most of them friendly to the U.S. and some formally allied but outside of NATO.  The premises of all those alliances are diverse, but none names the common commitment to liberal democracy.  Yet this is the basis for alliances that would fit our national narrative.  NATO itself may not — but, combing out the most egregious backsliders from liberal values, and asking the other liberal democracies to join, it could form the heart of a fitting alliance structure.

The grouping would likely comprise NATO members minus Turkey and Hungary, plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland and perhaps Chile.  It could only be assembled in a strategically defensive orientation, protecting the needs of members’ liberal lifestyles and limiting its geopolitical power projection.  The group should encourage other nations to develop toward deeper liberalism, and tighten relations with any that do.  Countries that become deeply compatible, as, say, Indonesia, Ghana, or Brazil might in coming decades, should be offered membership.

Any arrangement of this sort is hypothetical and speculative.  But reflections of this nature are needed now, to look through fresh eyes at basic questions we already face.  Those questions will not abate, and enduring answers will require that we take them up with open minds.  But those answers should, in this new and disorienting age, start from our founding principles.

 

 

 

The post What If NATO Really IS Obsolete? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Jolyon Howorth, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Thierry de Montbrial, fondateur et président de l’Ifri, Vivre le temps des troubles (Albin Michel, 2017, 176 pages).

Thierry de Montbrial relève ici un défi « modeste et ambitieux » : celui d’une réflexion sur la perspective, dans un XXIe siècle mal parti, d’une progression empirique vers la « gouvernance mondiale ». Dans un vaste tour d’horizon, il étudie, en trois chapitres denses, foisonnants, l’intersection entre « la présence du futur », « l’empreinte du passé » et « le choc du présent ». On pense immanquablement à Antonio Gramsci : « La crise consiste justement en ce que l’ancien meurt quand le nouveau ne peut pas naître. »

Le futur est là. Voici la visite guidée et savamment critique de notre anthropocène (Paul Cruzen), où certains voient la perspective d’une énergie propre illimitée à un coût marginal (Jeremy Rifkin), d’autres une combinaison entre intelligence artificielle et percées médicales, laissant poindre l’immortalité (la « singularité » de Ray Kurzweil). Thierry de Montbrial ne se laisse pas séduire par les prophètes de l’avenir : la conscience l’emportera toujours sur l’intelligence artificielle ; les religions font de nouveau irruption sur la scène internationale et « expriment aussi bien le futur que le passé » ; le robot le plus intelligent sera incapable d’engendrer une éthique. Nous vivons donc « le temps des troubles ».

L’empreinte du passé demeure lourde. L’histoire sert trop souvent des intérêts étroitement nationaux, quand la méconnaissance de l’histoire des autres est source d’erreurs graves, à l’intérieur (réactions à la crise de l’immigration), à l’extérieur (les interventions « humanitaires » qui, le plus souvent, aggravent les crises régionales). Le XXe siècle nous a pourtant légué des révolutions scientifiques en tous domaines – relativité, mécanique quantique, logique mathématique, biologie moléculaire, informatique et intelligence artificielle… – qui suggèrent que la mondialisation relève de l’inévitable. Le « secret de la vie » serait à notre porte. Et pourtant, souligne l’auteur, au XXIe siècle la passion semble l’emporter sur la raison. « Les groupes humains, peuples et nations, ne se dissolvent pas dans l’océan de la technologie », et ils réagissent de manières très différentes à ces mutations.

Que signifie dès lors le concept de « progrès » ? Dans le domaine de la connaissance « pure », il est inéluctable. Mais quid des révolutions nucléaire et numérique ? Sait-on se doter d’institutions améliorant les relations sociales et politiques ? Le référendum améliore-t-il la démocratie ? On peut en douter. Surtout, l’erreur cardinale pour qui cherche le chemin de la gouvernance globale, est la tentation de considérer comme « universelles » les valeurs… de l’Occident. « Si avant-gardiste qu’un peuple puisse se considérer, au nom de quoi pourrait-il s’arroger le droit d’imposer ses vues sur d’autres peuples ? »

Quant au présent, il réinvente le rapport entre populations et territoires. Les conflits d’aujourd’hui traduisent le clash entre projets géopolitiques structurés par des phénomènes identitaires. Les belles avancées institutionnelles (ONU) ou conceptuelles (sécurité collective, « communauté internationale ») ont tourné en mythes, qui gomment les véritables leçons de l’entre-deux-guerres : la relation entre économie et politique, l’impuissance du droit à régler seul les différends entre États, et la pertinence, plus lourde que jamais, de l’équilibre des forces (« balance of power »).

L’auteur clôt sa réflexion sur six propositions. Les Américains ne sauraient gouverner le monde – ils défendent leurs intérêts nationaux. Les Chinois naviguent entre une ambition démesurée et le désir concomitant de stabiliser leur environnement international. L’interdépendance de fait se heurte au retour du nationalisme économique. La sortie de la guerre froide a été ratée par l’arrogance des Occidentaux. L’Union européenne, en dépit de ses multiples crises, offre un modèle positif de gouvernance internationale. Le système international est infiniment fragile – ce qui rend obligatoire la recherche de la gouvernance mondiale, un travail « de très longue haleine » et qui « ne pourra se mettre en place que par approximations successives, essais et erreurs ». Thierry de Montbrial a le mérite considérable d’en dessiner, dans ce livre important, quelques balises essentielles.

Jolyon Howorth

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

Voicing deep concern over the latest flare-up of violence around Gaza, the United Nations chief on Saturday urged all sides to “step back from the brink of another devastating conflict”.

Celebrating the holding of the first session of a new Congress in Colombia, the United Nations has said that the inclusion of former rebels in the legislative body marked their transition “from weapons to politics”.

Le Brésil et l'Amérique latine n'ont pas l'exclusivité des paysans « sans terre ». Ce phénomène d'exclusion touche des pays comme l'Afrique du Sud et le Zimbabwe — où il a provoqué une crise lorsque le gouvernement a confisqué leurs propriétés à des fermiers blancs. En Asie, l'Inde, les Philippines et (...) / Asie du Sud-Est, Cambodge, Agriculture, Exclusion sociale, Inégalités, Pauvreté, Travail - 2004/09 Mirages

Vladimir Putin achieved his goal of embarrassing the United States. But Russians are already bracing for the backlash.

E-governance plays a critical role in building inclusive, resilient societies both before and in response to disasters, according to a United Nations report issued this week.

On the podcast: Masih Alinejad took off her headscarf and started a movement.

Millions of small-scale farmers will be better equipped to withstand the negative impacts of climate change while at the same time improving livelihoods, thanks to a new global push by the United Nations agriculture agency announced during World Forest Week.

Former U.S. diplomat Thomas Pickering on Trump, Putin, and the world after Helsinki.