Diplomacy & Crisis News

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal stands as a model for combining the threat of sanctions and continued isolation with the hard work of negotiating, even between countries whose relationships are shaped by conflict and distrust. The Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the agreement has turned Iran into a nearly impossible problem for future U.S. governments. 

The decision is a blow to Ankara but could also complicate matters for Washington.

Good riddance to the so-called strategic relationship between Washington and Ankara.

Four strategies that other countries can use to deal with a suddenly unpredictable superpower.

The country’s strongman plans to step down, but the United States must tread carefully.

Qui oserait nier qu'en France la tentation et la peur de l'histoire existent simultanément ? De la tentation témoignent la multiplication des revues et bandes dessinées, le triomphe renouvelé de toutes les formes du roman historique, de Dumas à Zévaco, d' Angélique aux Rois maudits. De cette peur (...) / Histoire, Idées, France, Éducation, Audiovisuel, Médias - 1981/02

China is set to remake cyberspace in its own image. That will make the Internet less open and allow Beijing to reap vast economic, diplomatic, and security benefits that once flowed to Washington.

Not since the 1950s has the need for a unified European security framework been greater. Deteriorating relations between the United States and European nations, evidenced most recently by disagreements during the G7 Summit, reflect a divergence in foreign-policy interests between traditional cross-Atlantic partners —and the end of an era in which Europe can blindly count on the U.S. for security. As the United States continues to engage in diplomatic maneuvers that alienate even its closest allies, Europe must redirect its security efforts toward a self-reliant strategy aimed at improving coordination in key areas of counterterrorism, cyber, and logistics, while consolidating global peace operations. Reliance on the U.S. is no longer a guaranteed option. In the face of adversity, this is an opportunity for Europe to stand up on its own and respond to future challenges, like elections meddling, border tensions and nearby conflicts – each with the potential to escalate.

Drifting Apart

The United States has been drifting away from Europe in various domains, including diplomatic, economic and military issues, many of which though have security implications. In 2009, the Obama administration implemented policies intended to shift foreign-policy focus—and American resources—to the Asia-Pacific, where China’s rising power requires increasingly more attention. But never before has the retreat from Europe been so blunt, with several policy makers and analysts discussing whether the alliance is inevitably compromised.

In June, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing steel and aluminum tariffs on the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico over national security concerns—an “insulting” maneuver, in the words of Canada Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and one that undermines the mutual trust on which security alliances such as NATO rest.

Nor can the U.S. be viewed as a credible partner in negotiations concerning other issues. In May, it unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, disputing International Atomic Energy Agency reports that confirmed Iran’s compliance with the agreement, and effectively leaving Europe in a difficult position to uphold the deal. Such maneuvers impair American reliability in future negotiations and underscore the amount of caution with which Europe must enter multilateral agreements involving the U.S.

Established security institutions, too, are under fire. After denouncing NATO as “obsolete,” President Trump criticized members who had not reached 2 percent of GDP in defense spending, despite the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration calling only for members to “aim to move towards the two percent guideline within a decade.” Add this to the litany of issues with consequences on international security on which the U.S. and the EU disagree—including funding to UN peace operations, Palestine’s membership in UNESCO, and the U.S. embassy’s move from Israel to Jerusalem — and it becomes increasingly clear that the EU and U.S. are going their separate ways. The U.S. is moving towards a more isolationist direction, disregarding multilateral processes, in contrast with the common EU approach.

 

Europe’s Time to Stand Up on Its Own

After the failure of several European leaders’ attempts to find common ground with Washington, including President Emmanuel Macron’s and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visits to the White House in April, the EU can no longer count on its historic security partner expecting disagreements to be worked out respectfully. Nor can it count on the situation to sort itself out anytime soon, simply waiting for the next administration to change policies. If transatlantic relations do worsen, the EU must be able to stand up and provide for its own security.

Deteriorating relations with the U.S. provides a great opportunity for Europe to accelerate the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO), launched in late 2017. PESCO is moving in the right direction with many of its projects that address key EU strategic areas. Still, improvement is long overdue in sectors including cyber, coordination between forces, logistical capabilities, and research and development. By focusing on targeted missions, it is possible to achieve more without increasing spending.

For example, two PESCO projects that focus on cyber issues – the “Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform” and the “Rapid Response Force” – are both meant to put in place a system to cope with cyber incidents at the European level. “Military Mobility,” commonly known as “Military Schengen,” is the most well-received PESCO project, allowing units and equipment to travel throughout Europe more easily. The “Network of Logistic Hubs” facilitates the logistical coordination between forces from different countries, while the European Defense Industrial Development Programme set the groundwork for the “Europe Defense Fund,” which is aimed at supporting the necessary technological and industrial base.

At the same time, it is essential for the European External Action Service to establish a real foreign policy that goes hand-in-hand with security policy. Harmonizing foreign and security efforts among all EU members is the ultimate goal, but failure to do so cannot prevent Europe from taking necessary steps towards building a better security framework. If the United Nations and the African Union have managed to deploy thousands of soldiers in extremely complex peacekeeping operations throughout the past several decades, there are no valid reasons whereby Europe cannot do the same, other than political will.

 

Wake-Up Call

Developing a unified security framework would serve Europe’s long-term strategic interests. Moreover, it would send a strong and clear message across the Atlantic. Trust and mutually beneficial actions are fundamental for any multilateral alliance. Disregarding them in an attempt to pursue unilateral agendas risks damaging a meaningful relationship built on common history and values. The EU response will signal that the importance of allies and partners cannot be disregarded without facing some consequences. The improvement of the European security framework does not imply an ideologically confrontational stance towards the U.S. Europe will continue to uphold its principles and be open to collaboration with any reliable partner, but it will not allow the United States to take advantage of it. It istime for Europe to stand up on its own.

Cristian Tracci is an MIA candidate at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where he specializes in International Security Policy and Conflict Resolution. Cristian currently serves as a board member of SIPA’s Progressive Security Working Group. He was previously a graduate consultant for the Eurasia Group and the UN Mission in Kosovo.

The post Security Woes: Why Europe Must Develop Its Own Security Framework appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

L'innovation technologique est-elle en mesure de fournir un nouveau souffle au véhicule automobile ? La question n'est pas neuve. La prise de conscience par la population des problèmes d'environnement a largement contribué à poser les problèmes de l'avenir technique de l'automobile. Celle-ci (...) / Écologie, Économie, Industrie, Technologie, Transports, Environnement - 1975/10

Catch up on everything you need to know about Trump’s Space Force, the impact of powerful new White House sanctions on Russia, Turkey and Iran, an interview with U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Joseph Votel, and more.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Helin Karaman propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Dominique Lorrain, Métropoles en Méditerranée. Gouverner par les rentes (Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 320 pages).

Cet ouvrage est issu d’un projet de recherche coordonné par Dominique Lorrain, qui s’est intéressé aux modes de gouvernement des métropoles des pays dits du Sud. Comme dans un précédent volume (qui traitait de Shanghai, Mumbai, Le Cap et Santiago du Chili), il s’agit de montrer que les quatre grandes métropoles du sud de la Méditerranée étudiées, Beyrouth, Le Caire, Alger et Istanbul, à la croissance urbaine rapide, aux institutions souvent jugées défaillantes, ne sont pas pour autant ingouvernables et en proie au chaos. La méthode est identique : appréhender le fait métropolitain par l’analyse de ses institutions et de ses réseaux techniques.

Rédigés par un spécialiste de la ville en question (Éric Verdeil pour Beyrouth, Pierre-Arnaud Barthel pour Le Caire, Taoufik Souami pour Alger, Jean-François Pérouse pour Istanbul), les quatre chapitres valident des hypothèses communes. Première hypothèse, dire que les métropoles du Sud ne sont pas gouvernées est faux, car les réponses apportées par les habitants à certains problèmes collectifs (tels le logement ou l’accès aux services) et la mise en place de réseaux techniques constituent des « gouvernements de fait ». Sur ce point, Beyrouth joue le rôle de contre-exemple et justifie ainsi sa place dans l’ouvrage, alors que son statut de grande métropole est discutable. Deuxième hypothèse, l’idée que ces métropoles sont soumises au néolibéralisme global est à nuancer, car même si la rhétorique est similaire, le foncier et le secteur de la construction restent aux mains des acteurs locaux. Dernière hypothèse, et apport principal de cet ouvrage par rapport au précédent, les villes du sud de la Méditerranée présentent deux spécificités. La fabrique urbaine, c’est-à-dire la production du cadre bâti, qui regroupe les réseaux techniques et les activités de construction (bureaux, commerces, logement), est la principale activité économique d’Alger, de Beyrouth, du Caire et, dans une moindre mesure, d’Istanbul. L’autre spécificité mise en évidence, la violence intrinsèque au Moyen-Orient, convainc cependant un peu moins lorsqu’elle est envisagée comme facteur commun.

Enfin, il faut comprendre le titre « gouverner par les rentes » comme une proposition d’explication des mécanismes de pouvoir à l’œuvre dans ces métropoles sud-méditerranéennes. Des coalitions d’élus, de propriétaires fonciers, d’agences publiques, et de petites ou grandes entreprises du BTP s’y partagent les rentes foncières ou urbaines, selon des processus similaires de transformation urbaine à forte valeur ajoutée, que ce soit l’étalement urbain à Istanbul, la politique des villes nouvelles au Caire, ou l’urbanisation des terrains agricoles périphériques et des petits bourgs à Alger et à Beyrouth. Si ce système perdure malgré son iniquité apparente, c’est parce qu’il permet de fournir des emplois et du logement à beaucoup parmi les couches plus modestes. À la suite des travaux récents sur le Global South, cet ouvrage affirme des arguments nécessaires pour envisager le sud de la Méditerranée comme une région développant ses propres modèles et des solutions adaptées à son contexte urbain, loin des bonnes pratiques occidentales en termes de gouvernance et d’aménagement urbain que certains voudraient y exporter.

Helin Karaman

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

The true story of 2008 forces a question about the future of financial globalization: How will a multipolar world that has moved beyond the transatlantic structures of the last century cope with the next crisis?

Sixty days since the Singapore summit, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals and has played its diplomatic hand brilliantly. 

The rise of right-wing populism in the West is primarily a story of culture and identity, in particular the fear among white voters across the West that their cultures and identities are under threat. Both the left and the right, however, have colluded in propping up the falsehood that populism is mostly about disparities of wealth and power.

Les investisseurs étrangers détiennent 70 % de la dette grecque. Une situation qui place la politique du pays sous tutelle des institutions financières. Pour s'affranchir du pouvoir de bailleurs abusifs, il faut... renationaliser la dette. / Grèce, Japon, Dette, Économie, Finance, Mondialisation - (...) / Grèce, Japon, Dette, Économie, Finance, Mondialisation - 2010/05

On our podcast: Journalist Jason Rezaian recalls life in Iran under sanctions.

Kushner hopes cuts will pressure Palestinians to accept a U.S. peace plan.

Netanyahu has antagonized Israel’s most loyal Arab allies and opened a new front in the country’s culture wars.

With Central African countries beset by ongoing terrorist activity, instability and the effects of climate change, the Security Council has asked the United Nations Secretary-General to review the work of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and recommend areas for improvement.

Can a series of far-flung, high-level conferences bring peace to the Middle East by applying lessons from 17th-century Europe?