Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one can easily get lost in the amount of information available. Hundreds of projects and nearly a trillion dollars’ worth of investments currently exist in over 60 countries. A serious analysis of each project must take into account a variety of factors, including funding sources, implementing partners, budget estimates, progress reports, as well as local needs and concerns.
However, the BRI is much more than an investment plan aimed at improving connectivity among countries. The most important effect of the BRI regards how China’ is stepping up its effort to shape a narrative about itself – telling the China story. In this regard, the Chinese leadership is deeply aware of the importance of public diplomacy and institution building to improve its soft power. While the idea of a China story has been around since 2004, President Xi picked it up in 2013 and has been referring to it in various speeches ever since, urging Chinese leaders to play their role. From international summits to cultural associations, examples abound of different entities contributing to the development of a China story. Through the BRI, China has stepped up its reputation-building effort in an unprecedented way that will have long-lasting consequences on the world stage.
In comparison with another widely common slogan, the Chinese Dream, there remains a subtle, but clear distinction. The Chinese Dream attempts to guarantee high living condition to every Chinese citizen, based on a flourishing and harmonious society. The China story instead refers to the ability to of designing China’s own narrative about its values and history to be projected outward to the rest of the world. Even though the Chinese Dream and the China story are related to a certain extent, the BRI remains an international initiative whose effects regard the narrative presented to other countries.
China’s Public Diplomacy
At the 19th Congress, President Xi Jinping expressed the intent to “improve capacity for engaging in international communication so as to tell China’s stories well, [and] present a true, multi-dimensional, and panoramic view of China.” The BRI is one the most ambitious expressions of this objective, undertaken to influence the perception of China on a global scale. President Xi in fact argued that the BRI and affiliated institutions contribute to “a further rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape.” As defined decades ago by J. Nye, soft power enables one to attract and shape other actors’ preferences through culture, values or policies, as opposed to hard power, which entails coercive impositions based on economic or military might.
Furthermore, by facilitating economic agreements and partnerships, China is advancing “cultural soft power and the international influence of Chinese culture.” Indeed, despite the difficulty of quantifying its influence, the BRI has already succeeded in generating interest among academic, business, and political circles.
The response has not been entirely positive. In some countries, the BRI has received negative reactions from the public or government officials. Twenty-seven EU ambassadors recently drafted a report raising concerns about the unilateral nature of the initiative. Nevertheless, constructing projects is perhaps not as important in the short-term, as is conveying a clear narrative about China’s leading status on the world stage.
Thanks to its historical reference to the Silk Road, the BRI has become a brand name, particularly in the eyes of foreign nations. While other countries had promoted similar strategies to foster development and connectivity, none had managed to build a narrative around it. Even if the TTIP or the TPP are sometimes considered the economic equivalents of the BRI, their names (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership) certainly did not help building an attracting narrative around them. Likewise, previous outward-looking policies devised by China itself to promote investments abroad like the “Go Out Policy” always lacked a soft-power component.
BRI’s Soft Power in Reality
The scope of the BRI surpasses political and economic frameworks. Cultural initiatives that fall under the Silk Road umbrella keep increasing. In 2015, the Silk Road Research Institute of Beijing Foreign Studies University was founded to highlight “thematic studies to tell China stories, spread China voices and take Chinese culture to the world.” That same year, the University Alliance of the Silk Road, which consists of approximately 100 universities from 22 countries, was established to foster “institutional exchanges, talent training, joint research, and cultural communication.”
In 2016, the Cultural Silk Road was launched first in China and then replicated the following year in Lyon, France. During the same year, the Silk Road Music Industry Alliance that consists of 18 different countries was created to “develop and expand the music, film/movie, entertainment, digital media and culture industries in China.” This later initiated the Silk Road Music Festivals, which already counts two editions in China and the first international edition in fall 2018.
In Thailand, the BRI even led to a Thai-Chinese Health Promotion Association, meant to assist Chinese tourists abroad. According to Lu Jian, Chinese Ambassador to Thailand, Confucius Institutes in Thailand are growing faster than in any other Asian country. Confucius Institutes have in fact already been indicated as a fundamental means in support of the BRI, holding dedicated lectures and events on the Silk Road. At the Joint Conference of Asian Confucius Institutes along the BRI, it was pointed out that 51 countries participating in the BRI had established 135 Confucius Institutes.
BRI’s Snowballing Effect
Born as a massive investment plan to improve connectivity around over 60 countries in the world, the BRI is clearly not only about building infrastructure and developing cities. The BRI has been a powerful leverage to boost China’s soft power through public diplomacy and institution building. Citizens and leaders around the world are eager to participate in events, conferences and associations to foster exchanges between different communities.
The aforementioned cases show how the BRI is promoting initiatives that have a magnifying effect for China’s reputation and set the stage to tell the China story. By enhancing the soft power of this network, China has an opportunity to counter foreign narratives that securitize the role of Confucius Institutes and Chinese activities abroad. No other country has ever embarked on such a broad based plan with the same potential to shape its narrative – despite the common comparison with the Marshall Plan, their size remains significantly different. This will certainly remain the first chapter of the China story.
Cristian Tracci is an MIA candidate at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where he specializes in International Security Policy and Conflict Resolution. He was previously a graduate consultant for the Eurasia Group and the UN Mission in Kosovo. While pursuing his undergraduate degree in International Affairs and Philosophy at John Cabot University in Rome, Cristian also studied abroad in Japan and Korea.
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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Anne de Tinguy propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, La Russie de Poutine en 100 questions (Tallandier, 2018, 352 pages).
Alliant une excellente connaissance de son pays d’origine à une grande rigueur, Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean propose ici une analyse fine, sans concession mais sans polémique, des évolutions russes post-soviétiques. Destiné à un large public, cet ouvrage intéressera aussi le chercheur qui y trouvera des pistes de réflexion sur les mutations et dynamiques en cours, et sur l’articulation entre affaires intérieures et extérieures.
Une grande partie des Russes – 48 % des jeunes – pensent que leur pays va dans la bonne direction et soutiennent Vladimir Poutine. Ils saluent la hausse du niveau de vie des années 2000, le rétablissement de l’autorité de l’État après les désordres des années 1990 et plus récemment le retour de la puissance russe sur la scène internationale. Ils considèrent que le régime politique « semi-autoritaire » mis en place par Vladimir Poutine correspond à la voie spécifique dont leur pays a besoin, et soulignent les capacités de résilience dont celui-ci fait preuve depuis 1991. Cahin-caha, la Russie a en effet résisté à plusieurs crises économiques. Grâce à la modernisation de son outil militaire, elle a retrouvé dans le monde une crédibilité. Dans certains secteurs, comme le spatial et le nucléaire civil, elle reste un acteur majeur. Quant à l’annexion de la Crimée, elle est quasi unanimement perçue comme « un juste retour des choses après l’humiliation des années de transition ».
Au fil des pages et de statistiques qui sont, pour certaines, « impitoyables », le lecteur comprend que l’analyse ne peut s’arrêter là. Il découvre un pays qui continue à être en quête d’identité et qui peine à relever les immenses défis auxquels il est confronté. La modernisation apparaît comme l’un des plus sérieux. La Russie n’a toujours pas mené à bien les réformes structurelles nécessaires à la diversification de son économie : elle reste une économie de rente faiblement productive. Les investissements sont insuffisants ; les disparités régionales (économiques, sociales, démographiques) bousculent la cohésion territoriale ; dans le domaine scientifique et technologique, le pays est en perte de vitesse. Ces vulnérabilités sont aggravées par les évolutions démographiques. Dans le domaine social, les inégalités sont « criantes » et représentent « probablement l’un des plus grands échecs » de Vladimir Poutine. Dans moult domaines, les fragilités apparaissent ainsi patentes et les réformes ne se font pas, ou peu.
Pourquoi cette inertie ? La nature du régime est une clé d’explication. Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean met en cause un pouvoir hanté par une éventuelle révolution de couleur, qui redoute de s’engager dans une voie risquant de le dépasser et de l’emporter, comme ce fut le cas lors de la perestroïka gorbatchévienne. Elle dénonce une corruption qui est d’autant plus forte que la justice n’est pas indépendante. Le rapport à l’Occident est un autre défi majeur. L’auteur évoque une « véritable hystérie anti-occidentale, abondamment alimentée par la propagande » qui encourage l’idée de forteresse assiégée. Pourtant, les liens avec l’Occident continuent à être structurants, et l’Asie, de fait, n’est que partiellement une alternative, d’autant que le différentiel de puissance économique et financière avec la Chine ne cesse d’augmenter.
En dépit des atouts de cet État-continent, les tendances sont, on le voit, contradictoires. Ce que découvre ici le lecteur, c’est une Russie paradoxale dont l’avenir est incertain.
Anne de Tinguy
As consumer debt in the UK reaches pre-2008 financial crisis levels within a new low interest rate austerity dynamic, we examine whether there is reasonable cause for concern and how the Government and Bank of England mitigate the risk.
Consumer debt is an individual form of debt which is composed primarily of credit card, household, and car leasing expenditure. Mortgages and student loans are not included as they are generally seen as investments. Consumer debt is not productive, it is simply for consumption. In moderation, consumer debt is encouraged as it increases spending into the economy and incites growth. When debt levels climb at a constant pace, growth can continue to flourish. However, as soon as the market is spooked and business falters or unemployment rises, widespread debt can easily escalate a small treatable market blip.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the Bank of England’s data on consumer debt in the UK was recorded at £2.08 trillion. As the crisis spread and markets were in turmoil, the first 4 months saw £200 billion of credit vanish. With the continuous real wage rate decline and rise in unemployment, total consumer debt dropped to £1.5 trillion in 2012.
In January 2018, the UK’s consumer debt has reached pre-crisis levels and, as of April 2018, stands at £2.1 trillion. Although the figure matches pre-crisis levels, the reasons for the build-up are largely different.
To remediate the effects of the crisis and recession, the Bank of England, among other stimulus packages, lowered interest rates to encourage spending and investment – which in turn would fuel growth. Individual borrowers saw this as a great opportunity to get their hands on ‘cheap’ money. Independently, the Bank of England’s interest rate policy follows sound economic theory, however, the Government took a contrasting approach which has led to this unique situation.
Austerity vs Stimulus Dynamic
The Bank of England’s technocratic approach was semi-countered by Government’s ideologically-driven austerity plan. On the individual level, a problematic scenario emerges: Cheap debt and tight Government fiscal policy. In the UK, figures from February 2018 show that 44.8% of the population are either financially struggling (low income, benefit dependent, social housed, median savings of £50) or squeezed (low income, private renters, one shock away from problems, median savings of £580). These people, whose financial situations are worsened by tight fiscal policy, are given a lifeline from the artificially low interest rates – leaving some core issues unresolved and a mountain of debt rising. The higher consumer debt piles up the more damaging potential it has. As the boom and bust cycle of economics will indefinitely continue, solving fundamental consumer debt behaviour can lessen the impact
Mitigation Efforts
The Bank of England’s interest rate is managed in a fashion that allows markets to predict rate changes to reduce unnecessary market fluctuations. A rise of bank interest rates will have the effect of slowing a debt build-up, as borrowing money will become more expensive. This idea has already been floated by Monetary Policy Committee member Gertjan Vlieghe specifically in response to ever-rising consumer debt. The UK Government’s austerity plan will eventually end with a fiscal loosening that can be an effective tool countering any economic blips.
On a societal level, the topic of indebtedness has increased its salience. A recent cross-party effort led by MP George Freeman and MP Liam Byrne demonstrates the presence of political will to tackle this epidemic. The wider social cost of consumer debt is estimated to be £8.3 billion. Badly managed debt, as a social problem, must be tackled on a societal level. The MP’s campaign could help encourage a more responsible approach to debt.
Is it really that bad?
Research by staff at the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority recently suggest that the rise in total consumer debt is actually attributed to an increase in safe borrowers taking on more debt. Those with above average incomes are likely to have good credit ratings and opportunities to leverage higher.
The Brexit referendum result and the depreciation of the sterling currency did not lead to disaster for the UK economy. The organised timeline given in the negotiation stages of the Brexit process allows time for the markets to create solutions to whichever direction the negotiations go. It is unlikely there will be an outcome drastic enough to jolt markets and plunge the UK into a recession. In the unlikely event that no deal is made with the EU and UK prospects dwindle, the Government and the Bank of England will certainly use their vast resources and experience to maintain a level of stability.
To effectively control the rise of consumer debt, a lead at the societal level to promote reasonable behaviour and control towards consumer debt should be encouraged. The Government, as always, should have contingency plans for shocks to the market but it will do well in taming the epidemic levels of debt not just for the next shock, but indefinitely, through the boom and bust cycles we will continue to experience.
This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Fabian Bak.
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>> Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « Géopolitique de la cyber-conflictualité », écrit par Julien Nocetti, chercheur au Centre Russie/NEI et spécialiste des questions liées au numérique et au cyber, dans le numéro d’été 2018 de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). <<