Diplomacy & Crisis News

The prominent Western commentator of post-Soviet affairs Taras Kuzio has recently come forward with a barrel of English-language attacks on Ukrainian opposition politician Yulia Tymoshenko – so far, the clear front-runner in Ukraine’s upcoming presidential elections in March 2019. Kuzio has placed several critical and partly denigrating texts about Tymoshenko in reputed analytical outlets, such as the web edition of the Polish journal New Eastern Europe and in the Ukraine Alert of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Kuzio insinuates that a Tymoshenko presidency may be on par with the rules of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, can mean a return to the multi-vector foreign policy of former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, or could even lead Ukraine to eventually succumb again to Russia.

 

Who is Mrs Tymoshenko?

Tymoshenko became first a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council, Ukraine’s parliament), two years before Petro Poroshenko, in 1996. Since then, she has had an illustrious political career in a transition country with exceptionally sudden upheavals and sharp turns. As a member of parliament, party leader, deputy prime-minister and twice prime-minister, as well as today as opposition leader, she has made numerous decisions, announcements and comments which are worth scrutinizing, discussing and criticizing. The Kyiv fact-checking project VoxCheck has singled out Tymoshenko and her speech-writers for biased statements that, according to these well-regarded analysts, do not pass closer scrutiny. The members of her faction in the Verkhovna Rada have repeatedly voted against or abstained from voting for government-proposed reform laws, justifying such actions or inaction with these laws’ alleged flaws. What should the West think and do about this?

If one follows Kuzio’s logic, the West would seem to have to prepare itself to a major political disruption or even course reversal in the foreign and domestic affairs of Ukraine, in the case that Tymoshenko becomes its new leader. Under President Tymoshenko, according to Kuzio’s warnings, Ukraine could follow the path of today’s Venezuela, and eventually end up in chaos or in Russia’s sphere of influence – or in both. With such a grim outlook, presumably, Western governmental and non-governmental organizations – not to mention Ukrainian democrats – should do everything they can to prevent such a sad future for Ukraine.

The problem with Kuzio’s gloomy predictions is not only and not so much that they are overdrawn, but that they hinder constructive thinking about future Western-Ukrainian relations. Whatever interested observers in the West may wish or aspire with regard to Ukraine’s future leadership, Tymoshenko as a presidential candidate and her party “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland) as a contender in the autumn 2019 parliamentary elections currently lead the polls, with a significant margin. Many Western observers would, perhaps, prefer a relatively young president from the famous Euro-Optimists group in parliament, or from such new parties as the Democratic Alliance or Power of the People. Some are enchanted with the popular singer Sviatoslav Vakarchuk who has recently become interested in politics, started to study social sciences at Stanford University, and could still announce his candidacy. Yet, as of November 2018, a likely scenario for the year 2019 is that Tymoshenko will become the next president and that her party’s share in parliament will significantly increase – independently of what Ukraine’s friends in Washington, Brussels or Berlin may dream of or plan for.

As of today, the only plausible alternative to a President Tymoshenko is, in fact, not the rise of a young reformer, but the continuation of Petro Poroshenko’s rule until 2024. Given the many contradictions in the public announcements and political decisions of both of these veteran politicians over the last 20-something years, Western observers find it difficult to judge what would be better for Ukraine. Continuity or change?

While few serious observers go as far as Kuzio in his statements, many are skeptical of Tymoshenko because of her strident rhetoric, unrealistic promises and demonstrative opposition to the government, during the last four-and-a-half years. Against the background of this experience, some Western observers, like Kuzio, support a prolongation of Poroshenko’s presidency. The problem is that, according to opinion polls, Ukrainian voters are, as of late November 2018, of a clearly different opinion. So far, Poroshenko’s negative rating – i.e. the percentage of those who would not vote for the candidate under any circumstances – is, with 51.4%, exceptionally high and significantly above that of Tymoshenko who has also a relatively high negative rating of 27.5%. Many Ukrainian civil society activists, moreover, are as (or more) critical of Poroshenko as (than) of Tymoshenko who is also disliked by numerous journalists, experts and diplomats in Ukraine and the West.

In any way, as of late 2018, a fundamental change of power in Kyiv during 2019 looks – reminiscent of the results of most earlier national elections in Ukraine – more likely than a continuation of Poroshenko’s rule. And it seems that this change will be to the benefit of Tymoshenko and Batkivhshchyna rather than any new pro-Western force. What exactly will happen, if the former prime-minister, her party and their allies indeed take over next year the presidency, parliament or/and government, is difficult to predict. But the West should already now get ready for that option.

Such a preparation should not only entail identifying, dissecting and pointing out inconsistencies in Tymoshenko’s current behavior in parliament and speeches in public – a process certainly and urgently needed. Being the most probable scenario so far, a prospective ascendancy of Tymoshenko can and should – in spite of some black points in her biography – also be seen as a chance for a new start, improved relations and progressive development. Certain arguably positive aspects of her possible rise could serve as starting points for such a forward-looking approach.

 

Why Tymoshenko may not be that bad

First and foremost, Tymoshenko would be the first female president – after she had already been the first female prime-minister in 2005 – in the Eastern Slavic world. This will, by itself, be a noteworthy achievement in the context of the traditionalist culture of Orthodox Christian civilization as well as neo-Soviet behavioral patterns that are both, to put it mildly, unsupportive of female power and proper emancipation. A Tymoshenko presidency would be a large step forward in terms of sexual equality in the entire post-Soviet world. It would help to encourage not only female Ukrainians, but also girls and women in other successor states of the USSR to seek political careers. A critical issue in Tymoshenko’s possible presidency and/or government will be whether she uses her increased executive and informal power to try raising the share of women in the highest echelons of power to the generally recommended minimum level of 30% — or, perhaps, to an even higher percentage.

Second, whereas Poroshenko was once co-founder of the thoroughly discredited Party of Regions (Yanukovych’s former political machine), Tymoshenko has managed to build, over the last 20 years, a relatively pro-Western party called Batkivshchyna. Creating this organization is by itself an accomplishment and good for Ukrainian democracy – independently of what one thinks about Tymoshenko. The few other more or less real political parties in Ukraine, such as the pro-Russian Communist Party or ultra-nationalist Union Svoboda (Freedom), have tended to be, in terms of their ideologies, explicitly or implicitly anti-Western.

Unlike most other political projects in Ukraine, Batkivshchyna possesses functioning regional as well as local branches. It has been present with a faction in Ukraine’s parliament for relatively many years now (since 2002). It is more or less evenly spread over Ukraine’s territory, and popular not only because of Tymoshenko’s personality, but also because of its socio-economic initiatives. In other words, it is a phenomenon closer, than other such Ukrainian groups, to a Western political party than to a post-Soviet “political-technological” project or pseudo-party of which Ukraine had many since 1991.

Moreover, Batkivshchyna is an official partner of the European People’s Party, the large family of Christian-Democratic parties in the European Union. Its parliamentary faction includes such veteran pro-Western diplomats as Borys Tarasyuk (b. 1949), Ukraine’s Foreign Minister in 1998-2000 and 2005-2007, and Hryhoriy Nemyria (b. 1960), Ukraine’s Deputy Prime-Minister for European and International Integration in 2007-2010. To be sure, Batkivshchyna is – like many previous parties in Ukraine – so far clearly a leader-centered network dominated by and associated with its prominent head. Yet, its relatively long existence as a parliamentary force and developed institutional structure give hope that this initiative could transform into a meaningful political organization outliving its charismatic founder.

Third, it is true that Tymoshenko belongs, along with presidents Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko, to the old cohort of appointees of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s longest serving president in 1994-2005. Still, Tymoshenko may still be a politician different from them – not only because she is a woman. Tymoshenko was a minister under Kuchma, but she was also briefly incarcerated under her initial patron, in 2001. While Poroshenko was a minister under Yanukovych in 2011-2012, she was, during that time, again in prison from 2011 to 2014.

These detentions are by themselves not necessarily a recommendation. Yet, they indicate that Tymoshenko may not be quite of the same material as Kuchma, Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Poroshenko – none of whom was ever arrested during their political careers (Yanukovych had been imprisoned for ordinary crimes, during Soviet times). Arguably, Tymoshenko’s two arrests as an opposition politician testify to the fear, among her opponents, of her resoluteness rather than to any exceptional misbehavior, in the Ukrainian context. Whether those qualities that led Kuchma’s and Yanukovych’s administrations to put her temporarily behind bars will be to the benefit of Ukraine, once she becomes president, remains to be seen.

Last but not least, during the last months, Tymoshenko and her party have become engaged in a series of well-organized programmatic, so-called “New Course” conferences that allowed wide participation and pluralistic discussion. The relative openness of these large events was illustrated by bizarre incidents caused by unscheduled speakers taking spontaneously and embarrassingly the floor without any hindrance. What is more, these meetings featured content-rich speeches and interactive debates containing a large array of more or less innovative (if, sometimes, half-baked) approaches as well as involving a whole number of activists and specialists not belonging to Batkivshchyna. In fact, the “New Course” conferences introduced so many novel plans that they are, in their entirety, difficult to digest even for seasoned political experts.

One may question, to be sure, the seriousness, realism and wisdom of some of the political, economic and institutional innovations proposed by Tymoshenko and her team. The Batkivshchyna team has, for instance, extensively, angrily and with much detail reacted to a scathing critique of the economic part of Tymoshenko’s “New Course” program by some of VoxUkraine’s editorial board members. Yet, the mere fact that numerous concrete and detailed ideas for Ukraine’s future domestic and foreign affairs were timely developed, extensively presented, openly debated and already criticized is remarkable. This focus on political substance rather than mere propaganda slogans distinguishes Tymoshenko’s campaign – whatever one may think about its contents – advantageously from those of her substantively less ambitious, elaborate and clear competitors (and let me myself briefly participate in one such debate in Kyiv, in autumn 2018).

None of these circumstances is a guarantee for a good Tymoshenko presidency, and I am not campaigning here for her. Yet, given that alternatives to her victory are currently less likely, the above aspects of Tymoshenko’s biography can serve as starting points for a constructive discussion between her as well as her team, on the one side, and Ukrainian civil society as well as Western actors, on the other – if she indeed becomes president. Arguably, Ukraine’s person on the top will, in any way, not be quite that important any more, as in earlier times. Ukraine’s formal political system has become more balanced, and its informal mechanisms have become somewhat less patronalistic than before 2014. The ongoing decentralization reform is gradually devolving power away from the center to local communities and municipalities making Ukraine thereby, with every passing month, less and less post- or neo-Soviet.

 

Reforming Ukraine with the old guys 

Many reforms under Poroshenko have, to be sure, been driven not only and so much by Ukrainian politicians than by joint pressure, on parliament and government, from national non-governmental and international governmental organizations, such as the IMF and EU. This so-called “sandwich model” of reform initiation and implementation, in which the still corrupt state is sandwiched between closely cooperating civic activists (principally organized under the umbrella of the so-called “Reanimation Package of Reforms” grouping), and foreign donors, will have to be also used in the future – independently of who becomes the next president. That should be especially so in the likely case that Ukraine’s law on parliamentary elections will not be changed to apply already in 2019.

In such a case, the coming autumn proportional and majoritarian elections to the Verkhovna Rada will happen under the old electoral law adopted under Yanukovych and designed to facilitate political corruption. Certain positions on the closed lists of the competing parties will be sold to the highest bidder. In single-member districts, affluent candidates can purchase so-called “nets” of groups of voters ready to sell their votes. As a result, private interests will again heavily infiltrate law making and governmental processes. One wonders where the enormous amounts that Tymoshenko is currently spending on her electoral campaign come from, and what they will mean for her possible future presidency as well as Batkivshchyna’s likely participation in government.

It would still make sense for both Western diplomats and Ukrainian activists to explore already now whether and how much a possible future presidential administration and/or cabinet under Tymoshenko will be willing to support pushing reforms through an oligarchically subverted parliament, corruption-plagued government, and reform-adverse bureaucracy. One of Tymoshenko’s most consequential actions as newly appointed Prime-Minister in 2005 was the reversal of the flawed privatization and transparent re-privatization of Ukraine’s largest steel-mill “Krivorizhstal’” which, as a result, became “ArcelorMittal Krivyi Rih.” While skepticism is always advisable, this publicly televised action 13 years ago could, in principle, also mean that Tymoshenko may be more serious about reducing oligarchic influence in Ukraine than Poroshenko has been since 2014.

Kuzio’s various articles seem to, instead, suggest that the West should shun or even stigmatize and isolate Tymoshenko because of her current left-wing populist stance, unrealistic social plans and seemingly unconstructive behavior in parliament. Yet, vociferous anti-governmental rhetoric, public resistance to unpopular austerity measures, and hyperbolic promises of quick future improvements are also not unheard-of behavior among Western opposition parties – as long as they are not in government. It is likely that Tymoshenko and her team will, in the same way Western parties adapt to reality after electoral successes, significantly adjust their positions once they have obtained executive power. Given the narrow corridor of action any Ukrainian government currently has and, in the future, will have, Tymoshenko & Co. will probably more productively cooperate with the IMF and EU as well as other donor organizations than their current unrealistic electoral rhetoric suggests.

For the case of such a positive turn, Western national governments and international organizations should not waste a possibly opening new window of opportunity. They should start studying Tymoshenko’s program, and reaching out to her team via, for instance, the European People’s Party channel. How exactly a Tymoshenko presidency and government will look like is difficult to predict, even against the background of her previous two terms as cabinet head during Yushchenko’s presidency. Too many variables have changed since the end of her last term as the prime-minister in early 2010. Yet, given the above peculiarities of Tymoshenko’s political career and her ambitious “New Course” agenda, there could be the prospect of a new wave of substantive political and economic changes that accelerate rather than hinder the transformation process. Ukraine is too important for Europe and the West to not pay attention.

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[An excerpt from this article was earlier published with the Ukraine Alert of the Atlantic Council of the US in Washington, DC. The present text was, in Kyiv, first published by VoxUkraine whose editors Rostyslav Averchuk and Oleksandr Zholud kindly helped improving the text. For all remaining imprecisions and misinterpretations, the author alone is responsible.]

The post As Good as It Gets: Why the West Should Start Preparing Itself to a Ukraine under President Tymoshenko appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Dans le sillage de la révolution mexicaine du début du XXe siècle, des artistes s'unissent afin de créer des œuvres qui rendent sensibles ses causes et ses aspirations. / Amérique latine, Mexique, Art, Culture, Socialisme, Mouvement de libération, Peinture - (...) / Amérique latine, Mexique, Art, Culture, Socialisme, Mouvement de libération, Peinture - 2014/02

En mars et en mai, des élections municipales puis européennes vont permettre de tester la popularité des socialistes français. Le verdict s'annonce sévère, tant la situation économique du pays est dégradée et le pouvoir sans ambition. / Europe, France, Économie, Extrême droite, Finance, Fiscalité, (...) / Europe, France, Économie, Extrême droite, Finance, Fiscalité, Inégalités, Monnaie, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Politique, Protection sociale, Social-démocratie, Travail, Chômage, Crise économique, Néolibéralisme - 2014/01

Dans les vingt-deux pays membres de la Ligue arabe, les femmes sont les plus lésées par les codes de la nationalité. Au terme de longues négociations et de campagnes de sensibilisation transnationales, certaines législations ont évolué. / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, Liban, Maroc, (...) / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, Liban, Maroc, Proche-Orient, Citoyenneté, Droit, Enfance, Femmes, Immigrés, Inégalités, Migrations, Minorité nationale, Droits des femmes - 2014/01

Russia dwindled from its superpower status on the world stage following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ever since, Russia has been embroiled in a battle with the Western world to restore its global image as a superpower. On several fronts, Russia has been pursuing both domestic and foreign policies to restore its international presence to compete with the Western world.

In international relations certain states exercise greater leverage than others, due to their exceptional power status. Such a distinction may arise through being labelled a ‘superpower’ which requires for a state to be resolute along four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural. In recent times, Russian strategy has been to bolster these sectors to reclaim its status as a global superpower, which was lost following the Cold War.

To better understand how Russia plans to reclaim its superpower title, it’s worth individually exploring how Russia is solidifying its position on all four fronts.

Military

With a defence budget of $44.6 billion, Russia is second only to the USA in the list of most powerful militaries in the world. Russia has long maintained its image as a militarily advanced state, capable of protecting its interests both at home and abroad. Over the last few year, unrelenting Russian military efforts across the world have been making the case for Russia’s worthiness of superpower status.

Russian involvement in Syria has been a contributing factor in exacerbating the ongoing civil war. Russia has equipped President Bashar Al Assad’s autocratic regime with new anti-aircraft missiles; just two weeks after a Russian aircraft was shot down. This rapidity displays Russia’s aptitude to adapt to world affairs to advance its militaristic ventures. This Russian expeditiousness has gradually been unnerving the western-led coalition, that is propping up forces against the Assad regime.

As with the invasion of Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated to the world Russia’s ability to advance personal goals by exercising military might.  The hostile invasion of Ukraine was a signal to the western world that Russia will not be pressured by international condemnation or sanctions while protecting its interests. Following the events in Ukraine, Putin’s popularity picked up again showing public support in Putin’s vision to boost patriotism for the motherland. Stressing how under the leadership of Putin, a more aggressive militaristic approach is being accepted, to pave the way for the revival of Russian superpower status.

Economic

According to US President Donald Trump, Germany is totally controlled by Russia because they’re getting between 60 to 70% energy from Russia. Though this figure may be inflated, Russia dominates gas imports in Europe through providing 37% of natural gas to the EU with $22.7 billion of monthly imports.  Enjoying the largest amount of natural gas reserves in the world, Russia is able to generate substantial wealth from importing gas, keeping its competitors at bay.

With Brexit in near view, Russia will seek to capitilise on the uncertainty, disruption and disorder it has been and will continue to cause. Russia will be able to seize the opportunity to use uncertainty from investors and businesses to create new business opportunities for themselves. As was seen with the allegations of Russian diplomats and even the Russian Ambassador influencing a key figure leading the Brexit campaign, with international business offers.

Political

The special counsel investigation into the alleged collusion of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 presidential elections is ongoing with multiple guilty pleas, including the indictment of Trump’s former campaign manager and of 13 Russian nationals. This case of Russia’s blatant interference in foreign elections, with the goal of weakening the health and credibility of democratic regimes elucidates the Russian objective to clamber to the top of the international community. Russia can only succeed in becoming a great superpower if it creates a sense of hostility and disorder in the international community – which will pave its way to dominate on the world stage.

In another show of political defiance, the Russian government has been found to ‘almost certainly’ orchestrated the poisoning of a former Russian military intelligence officer in the United Kingdom. The British Prime Minister Theresa May said that the perpetrators of the attack were from Russia’s military intelligence service, and likely approved at the senior state level. The expedition is one of insolence and gamesmanship as demonstrated by the Kremlin’s following actions.

The Kremlin sought to sow discord in the UK by undermining the authorities, by flagrantly disobeying international law and simultaneously displaying the UK as weak and incompetent. The actions, however, provoked a huge international backlash with more than 100 Russian diplomats expelled from Western countries. Russia, nevertheless, maintained its staunch and aggressive stature by expelling diplomats from 23 countries all the while denying the allegations.

What’s more is that Russia’s intelligence service allegedly attempted to target the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with a cyber attack. The OPCW is investigating the poisoning of the spy in Salisbury – highlighting Russia’s insistence to continue pushing its political agenda, using clandestine and hostile techniques.

Cultural

As with the other axes, Russia has escalated its quest for supremacy by supercharging its global PR campaign to restore its image to the outside world through displaying Russia’s cultural impact on the world. Distancing from its image as a hostile and autocratic state, the Russian government has spent billions of dollars to host major cultural events –  despite them being mired with allegations of corruption. In 2018 Russia hosted the FIFA World Cup at a cost of somewhere between $26-30.8 billion, which Russian officials claimed would have a significant economic impact. Russia also hosted the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014 in which new roads, railways, hotels and leisure facilities helped to attract more tourists.

To keep up with western competitors Russia has been investing heavily into its cultural landscape through launching initiatives such as opening the first cultural institution in Russia specifically dedicated to design. Russian creativity and culture is publicised trough huge infrastructural project, such as the Moscow Metro which is Europe’s biggest mass transport system. As the world’s largest nation, Russian culture displays its diverse heritage through its architecture and colourful domes, ballet companies and nesting dolls – exhibiting to the outside world the deep-rooted cultural values of the Motherland.

With a view of poking at the issues and insecurities of the western world, Russia is running a secret yet highly effective campaign to weaken its opponents and supplement its growth as a superpower.

Though we exist under an anarchical system, the world is very much still governed by power politics, in which Russia is an integral force. With a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, Russia has a great deal of influence on the international community – and is only seeking to augment that presence. Russian economic, military, political and cultural policies are shaped to showcase to the international community the exceptional power Russia possesses to influence global affairs.

Under Putin’s leadership Russia has found a renewed sense of patriotism and is increasing its velocity on all fronts to continue its efforts to once again take pole position at the world stage. With a view of poking at the issues and insecurities of the western world, Russia is running a secret yet highly effective campaign to weaken its opponents and supplement its growth as a superpower. The bold statesmanship of Putin is helping craft a new legacy for Russia to reclaim its status as a global superpower – and if continued to be unchallenged it may just become reality.

The post The return of Russia as a superpower appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Le « ras-le-bol fiscal » apparu au cours de ces dernières années résulte d'un cocktail singulier : de réelles difficultés financières pour une partie des ménages, dans un contexte d'austérité prolongée ; une hausse de l'impôt sur le revenu et du nombre de foyers imposables ; et enfin le sentiment de plus en (...) / France, Dette, Écologie, Économie, Finance, Fiscalité, Inégalités, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Presse - 2013/12

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère
(n° 4/2018). Krzysztof Soloch propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jan Cienski, Start-Up Poland: The People Who Transformed an Economy (University Press of Chicago, 2018, 272 pages).

En 2019, la Pologne fêtera 30 ans de liberté. Les Polonais salueront le formidable décollage économique qui a accompagné cette tranche d’histoire. Le livre de Jan Cienski arrive à point nommé. Durant plus de dix ans, comme responsable du bureau polonais du prestigieux Financial Times, il fut un témoin direct des changements économiques exceptionnels qui ont permis à la Pologne non seulement de doubler son produit intérieur brut, mais surtout d’échapper à la récession en 2009, et de devenir le seul pays d’Europe à enregistrer une croissance continue depuis 1992.

Bien que nombre d’analyses économiques aient déjà été consacrées à la Pologne de cette période, l’ouvrage de Jan Cienski a le mérite d’aborder la question de la transition économique en s’écartant des sentiers battus. Le lecteur n’est pas inondé de données statistiques, mais découvre la naissance du capitalisme polonais à travers des histoires personnelles de pionniers polonais qui ont pris le risque de développer leurs propres affaires dans le contexte particulier d’une économie post-communiste dévastée.

Le livre s’ouvre sur le passage douloureux d’une République populaire à la Troisième République. Les réformes économiques mises en place par le premier gouvernement de Tadeusz Mazowiecki sont racontées par des entrepreneurs qui soulignent eux-mêmes que rien n’était gagné d’avance, et que l’impopularité de ces réformes aurait pu être utilisée par les communistes pour détourner la Pologne du chemin menant vers un système libéral. Le lecteur découvre alors qu’à la fin des années 1980, 75 % de l’économie polonaise était sous monopole d’État ; seule la campagne était relativement épargnée. Les communistes n’ont en effet jamais réussi à soumettre la campagne polonaise – idée aussi absurde, commente l’auteur, que de tenter de mettre une selle à une vache, comme disait Staline. Dans le même temps, Jan Cienski explique comment, à la fin de la période communiste, les Polonais ont appris à se débrouiller. Leur esprit d’entreprise les a servis après la chute du communisme.

Dans les chapitres suivants, l’auteur met en lumière l’évolution très dynamique du secteur privé en Pologne au début des années 1990 – une caractéristique de la transition polonaise. Ce dynamisme était inconnu dans d’autres pays de l’ancien bloc communiste.

Le côté novateur de l’ouvrage mérite d’être souligné. Le lecteur plonge dès les premières pages dans la vie personnelle d’entrepreneurs qui ont dû faire face à l’absence de banques modernes, à des impôts très élevés, à des problèmes de visas, à des douanes et des administrations mal préparées pour les accompagner. Grâce à ces récits, le lecteur saisit l’importance de ce secteur privé qui a majoritairement contribué au succès de la transition économique polonaise. Certaines comparaisons peuvent être jugées hasardeuses, notamment lorsque l’auteur parle d’« oligarques polonais » en décrivant les investisseurs les plus fortunés de Pologne. Or il est difficile de comparer les entrepreneurs polonais aux oligarques de Russie ou d’Ukraine, dont la fortune provient souvent de transactions peu transparentes.

Sans conteste, cet ouvrage, qui peut se lire d’une seule traite, est d’une grande utilité pour comprendre l’un des aspects du succès de la transition économique polonaise.

Krzysztof Soloch

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D'où vient cette pratique consistant à attribuer à la nature une valeur économique fondée sur l'utilisation de ses bienfaits par l'homme ? / Capitalisme, Écologie, Économie, Finance, Monnaie, Climat, Environnement, Crise économique, Néolibéralisme - (...) / Capitalisme, Écologie, Économie, Finance, Monnaie, Climat, Environnement, Crise économique, Néolibéralisme - 2013/12

La crise alimentaire de 2008 a déclenché un mouvement d'accaparement des terres arables : 60 à 80 millions d'hectares parmi les plus fertiles ont été arrachés aux petits agriculteurs par des puissances agroalimentaires ou financières. Exemple en Ethiopie. / Afrique, Corne de l'Afrique, Éthiopie, (...) / Afrique, Corne de l'Afrique, Éthiopie, Agroalimentaire, Alimentation, Faim, Inégalités, Mouvement de contestation, Environnement, Répression - 2013/12

Yellow jacket “gilets jaunes” protesters in the streets of France.

It is an anachronism in today’s society that anyone in a developed country would rightly claim that there is no path to warm shelter, food and employment for most in a community. But the effect of added taxes in a policy to reduce carbon emissions is exactly what lead a father in Ontario, Canada to take to rap in protest of high energy prices for his family. Eventually there was a change in government in that province of Canada, and now it seems as if many large Canadian provincial leaders are fighting Justin Trudeau’s new federal Carbon Tax to take effect in 2019. With a government in Ontario that recently fell hard because of high energy prices, it is questionable on how Canada will apply a tax that recently sent French citizens to the streets in historic protests, postponing the application of the new tax by the will of the people clad is fluorescent yellow by way of their gilets jaunes.

Despite the claims that all money taxed will be put back in the pockets of citizens, and that the current government was elected to put in a carbon tax, the protest vote in Canada seems to have come in regional elections for Provincial governments. Canadians often do not spontaneously take to the streets to protest many issues, not to the same degree that has taken place in France. Even when there are large rallies they are often organised by Unions or other political action groups, that is common in Canada and is very common in France and many parts of the EU. The recent protests seemed to be organic in nature, taking on the character or historic French protests that brought down royal families, or more akin to 1% rallies that grouped masses of people in disdain of general inequality in society.

What seems to be clear is that middle income Canadian and middle income French citizens have a common goal, to be able to use enough of their earned money for their family, and not for added taxes, carbon or otherwise. When someone like Macron, who is a symbol of elite French banking executives is seen as being detached from everyday people, there is a natural motivation to challenge that sort of power. While there is an outlet for protest via the regional governments in Canada that are challenging the Federal Government, the French people did not see many effective alternatives for their dislike of the new policy, symbolically wearing brightly coloured vests so they could be seen by those in power. Adding carbon taxes is now seen as a more of a tool in where the least middle class people in a country’s democratic history can alter the lives of everyday citizens to such a degree that they no longer can provide an expected healthy living for their families. With the cost of living in France already one of the highest in the EU and Canadians set to pay up to $400.00 more a year for their food next year, a loss of a job combined with increased costs of living makes carbon taxes an unacceptable burden in those situations. Governments often forget that it is their duty to listen to the people, even if they do not understand them.

The post The Increased Cost of Living is the Fuel for Protests appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

/ Religion, Pakistan, Islam, Conflit - Asie / Religion, Pakistan, Islam, Conflit - Asie

Les pays de l'Union africaine ont demandé la suspension des actions intentées contre des chefs d'Etat en exercice devant la Cour pénale internationale. Motivée par la situation du Kenya, cette demande révèle les contradictions inhérentes à ce tribunal. / Afrique, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Droit (...) / Afrique, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Droit international, Relations Nord-Sud, Justice internationale - 2013/11

In recent days, a series of articles have been published, emphasizing that India should be supporting Sheikh Hasina in the upcoming Bangladeshi elections. According to the Weekly Blitz, Sheikh Hasina is opposed to Jamat e-Islami. Furthermore, a Chinese news website argued that she should be supported because under her leadership, the UN reported that the literacy rate for women increased, the life expectancy of babies went up and the number of children enrolled in schools has improved. However, what these articles fail to realize is that Sheikh Hasina is a dictator who has been slowly ethnically cleansing Hindus and other minorities from the country.

On a daily basis, Hindus are being murdered, raped, abducted and forcefully converted to Islam. Their lands are being seized from them, their holy places are being desecrated and their homes are being destroyed. Forces loyal to the Sheikh Hasina government are doing everything in their power in order to make Bangladesh to be a minority-free country. Routinely, Hindus within the country face systematic pressure and threats merely so that they will be compelled to move to India and to leave behind their ancestral homeland. Just recently, a Hindu girl was stabbed to death in Manikganj and a number of Hindu opposition activists were arrested.

However, the minorities are not the only ones suffering under the present ruling Awami League government. In his recently published memoir titled A Broken Dream: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Democracy, Surendra Kumar Sinha, a former Hindu Bangladeshi Chief Justice who was forced into exile due to his support for protecting Bangladeshi democracy, proclaimed that Sheikh Hasina is not a democratic leader as the 2014 sham elections highlighted and that India should not be supporting her for this reason alone: “People cannot be ruled with the help of security forces consistently violating the civil rights of the citizens. No autocratic government can rule the country for an indefinite period. Unless democracy and rule of law are established, the sentiments of the people will keep rising against the tyrannical government and it will go against India as well because India is seen to be propping up an autocratic government for its own interest.”

But Sheikh Hasina is not just a dictator. She is a dictator who is empowering radical Islam within her country. In an exclusive interview with The Wire, Sinha claimed that 40% of Pakistan is under the control of terrorist groups and that under the Sheikh Hasina government, Bangladesh is heading in that direction: “This present government is patronizing Hefazat. Terrorism and fanaticism is spreading across the country through mosques and madrasas controlled by Hefazat.” While Sinha noted that the Sheikh Hasina government is opposed to Jaamat e-Islami, he claimed that Hefazat is even more fanatical than them.

In fact, Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, noted that while the opposition BNP Party is tied to Jamaat e-Islami, who has terribly persecuted the Hindu minority, the Awami League is tied to not only Hefazat but also the Olama League, who pose a threat not only to the local Hindu population in Bangladesh but also to India and the entire free world. In addition, under the Sheikh Hasina government, ISIS has established a base in Bangladesh, the country went from being a secular state to an Islamic state and Sheikh Hasina now seeks for it to become a criminal offense to criticize the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslim faith. Even before this announcement was made, there are already hundreds of cases filed against Hindus for hurting religious sentiment. There are also reports that the school textbooks in the country are increasingly encouraging fundamentalist Islamic thought and inciting against the minorities.

In conclusion, Basu declared: “We understand that there is a security problem along the Indian-Bangladeshi border. The Indian government thinks that if Sheikh Hasina does not come to power again, then terrorists can illegally infiltrate into India and then their country would be in a more dangerous security situation.” However, he believes that this mentality is misguided for both the Awami League and the BNP are responsible for implementing minority violence and supporting terror: “During the reign of these two parties, the Hindus and other minorities have suffered from massive human rights abuses.” However, with the rapid increase in the number of Hindus involved in the Bangladeshi opposition, Basu thinks it will be different now for it is not just the BNP against the Awami League but a coalition of groups against the Awami League: “At this moment, if a new government can be formed in Bangladesh, it will be loyal to India and the minorities will be in a better position. In addition, India won’t have any security risks.”

The post Op-Ed: Why India should not support the Sheikh Hasina government appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Excédés par la présence croissante de la publicité dans les programmes de télévision, un grand nombre de téléspectateurs approuvent la volonté du gouvernement français de réduire la part de la réclame dans le budget des chaînes publiques. Les chaînes privées ne se plaignent pas, elles espèrent ainsi (...) / Médias, Publicité, Communication, Information, Presse - 1998/12

La revue Politique étrangère est présente sur Cairn, le portail de revues francophones, depuis plusieurs années maintenant. Merci à vous chers Lecteurs de nous lire tout au long de l’année !

Découvrez en exclusivité la liste des 10 articles les plus lus sur Cairn en 2018,
et profitez-en pour (re)lire ceux qui vous auraient échappé !

1ère place : Pierre Vimont, « L’ordre international face à l’Amérique de Trump »
(PE n° 4/2017)

2e place : Pierre de Senarclens, « Théories et pratiques des relations internationales depuis la fin de la guerre froide » (PE n° 4/2006)

3e place : David M. Faris, « La révolte en réseau : le ‘printemps arabe’ et les médias sociaux » (PE n° 1/2012)

4e place : Pierre Jacquet, « Les enjeux de l’aide publique au développement »
(PE n° 4/2006)

5e place : Nadège Rolland, « La nouvelle Route de la soie. Les ambitions chinoises en Eurasie » (PE n° 3/2015)

6e place : Asiem El Difraoui et Milena Uhlmann, « Prévention de la radicalisation et déradicalisation : les modèles allemand, britannique et danois » (PE n° 4/2015)

7e place : Ian Storey, « Discordes en mer de Chine méridionale : les eaux troubles du Sud-Est asiatique » (PE n° 3/2014)

8e place : Antoine Bondaz, « Corée du Nord/États-Unis : jusqu’où ira la confrontation ? » (PE n° 4/2017)

9e place : Sabine Saurugger, « Crise de l’Union européenne ou crises de la démocratie ? » (PE n° 1/2017)

10e place : Stanley Hoffmann, « Raymond Aron et la théorie des relations internationales » (PE n° 4/2006)

* * *

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Aux Etats-Unis, le secteur pénitentiaire représente un enjeu économique important, en particulier dans les régions rurales, où les shérifs sont encouragés à remplir les cellules de leurs prisons. / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Économie, Prison, Privatisation - (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Économie, Prison, Privatisation - 2013/11

Devant l'horreur soulevée par les images des morts infligées par leurs armées dans le cadre d'opérations de guerre moderne (maintien de la paix, sécurité, etc.), les Occidentaux se sont lancés dans le développement d'armes nouvelles, destinées à paralyser l'adversaire plutôt qu'à le détruire. En dépit de (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Armement, Stratégie, Répression, Armée, État, Police, Conflit, Violence, Société - 1999/12

According to prosecutors, the trial of Patrick Ho was simply business. The Chinese financier, found guilty of orchestrating a multi-million dollar bribery scheme in Africa, wasn’t the victim of a US smear campaign as his defense claimed. No, he was simply brought to justice for violating US laws while working for an US-based organization.

Yet no matter what the prosecution says, it’s impossible to ignore the wider significance of the affair. By jailing one of China’s key international promoters for his role in the country’s ‘Belt and Road’ trade strategy, the US has shown its concerns at the shady practices Beijing is using to secure an advantage overseas. While Ho’s dealings appear to have posed little threat to the US, they epitomize a ruthless global strategy which, in many parts of the developing world, challenges US hegemony and is now forcing Washington to act.

To critics of President Xi Jinping’s regime, Ho summed up their ruthless attempts at economic imperialism. The former Hong Kong politician’s trial heard that, while working for a think tank funded by Shanghai-based CEPC China Energy, he offered $2.9 million in bribes to political leaders in Chad and Uganda to secure oil and development rights. Senegalese politician Cheikh Gadio, the prosecution’s key witness, claimed this included a gift-wrapped $2 million presented to Chadian President Idriss Deby in a rural village.

The case offered an insight into how China is building influence in Africa and Asia through Belt and Road, a $4 trillion funding program that has been likened to ‘WTO 2.0’. The program has long been the subject of rumor and innuendo, particularly in Africa, where Chinese businesses are routinely accused of buying contracts with kickbacks. A McKinsey report published last year found that nearly 90% of Chinese companies were using bribes in some African countries.

These reports, often accompanied by tales of bullying and the humiliation of local workers, are troubling enough. Yet they are mirrored by the Chinese government’s own coercive strategy, which, critics claim, is fundamental to Belt and Road.

Debt diplomacy

Chinese banks have lent money to developing countries at a furious rate – around $20 billion has been extended since last summer alone. The money is typically provided with attractive repayment rates and little scrutiny, perfect for unscrupulous regimes. But the evidence suggests China is simply laying a series of debt traps, which could be used to snare prime strategic assets in regions which previously fell under US control.

A prime example is Sri Lanka, where China provided the money for former president Mahinda Rajapaksa to build the huge port of Hambantota, widely derided as a personal vanity project. The port proved a disaster (in 2012 it attracted only 34 ships) and the financial arrears proved too much for Rajapaksa’s government, which surrendered Hambantota to Beijing on a 99-year-lease. Although the terms specifically forbid the military use of Hambantota, fears are mounting that this condition could be loosened in exchange for further debt relief.

The strategic importance of Hambantota to the US appears relatively low, but nonetheless it’s a headache Washington could do without. American strategists are already worried about China’s maritime buildup, and the ongoing US activity in the Middle East means the Indian Ocean, which has harbored a significant American presence since World War II, is a key artery. China has already invested heavily in the region through its economic corridor with Pakistan – prompting the Trump Administration to show its concern by imploring South Asian nations not to follow Sri Lanka’s lead by surrendering their sovereignty.

Meanwhile, 4,000 kilometers away, fears are growing that China will repeat the Hambantota trick in an area far more important to the US; the Horn of Africa. Beijing has already established a military base in Djibouti, near America’s monolithic Camp Lemonnier, and now appears poised to accept the neighboring Doraleh container terminal as a gift. With his country’s debt to China pushing 90% of GDP, President Ismail Guelleh has already ejected Doraleh’s previous operator, Dubai’s DP World, and allowed China to build a free trade zone.

Xi’s officials would doubtless claim that Doraleh, perched alongside one of the world’s busiest sea lines, is vital to the Maritime Silk Road, the aquatic branch of Belt and Road. Yet for the US, which uses Djibouti as a jump-off for operations against groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, there’s a clear military significance, heightened by evidence that Guelleh’s regime is abetting weapons smuggling between Yemen and Somalia. The decision to pick a fight with Beijing in May, after claiming Chinese forces pointed lasers at US planes in Djibouti’s skies, demonstrates how much China’s incursion has rattled decision-makers in Washington.

As Belt and Road expands, so new countries will become pawns in China’s push for global supremacy. In the Indo-Pacific region, for example, Beijing pledged $4 billion to a cluster of islands including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu just last year. Like Djibouti and Sri Lanka, the islands are plagued by corruption and weak government. According to Australia, previously the region’s top donor (and a key US ally), China’s loans have been wasted on “roads to nowhere”, echoing the folly of Hambantota.

Although the populations of these islands typically fall below 1 million, their location makes them strategic. The Indo-Pacific is not only vital in maintaining sea lines between East and West, it is close to the South China Sea, where the US and China have been locked in a regional struggle for years, both building new bases in a prolonged game of one-upmanship. Reports in April that China is planning a base in Vanuatu were hastily denied – but Beijing will surely have noted with interest the discomfort they caused.

Against this backdrop, it’s easy to see why the US was so keen to jail Ho. His activity was straight from the Belt and Road playbook, which arguably poses the greatest threat to US global superiority since the fall of the Soviet Union, and his American connection allowed the Department of Justice to land a blow. Prosecutors may claim there was nothing political about it, but when it comes to China and America, nearly everything is.

The post New York trial casts new scrutiny on China’s Belt and Road Initiative appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Destinée à « protéger les civils », l'intervention de 2011 en Libye a forcé à l'exode nombre d'Africains qui y vivaient. Certains ont échoué à Montreuil, près de Paris, où les autorités refusent de les accueillir. / France, Libye, Conflit, Droits humains, Logement, Migrations, Pauvreté, Ville, Mali - (...) / France, Libye, Conflit, Droits humains, Logement, Migrations, Pauvreté, Ville, Mali - 2013/11

Whatever the outcome, Brexit has triggered an irreversible collapse of Britain's political, legal, and social order.