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«Au-delà du populisme: la fin du pacte démocratique?». La chronique de Frédéric CharillonFrédéric Charillon 26 février 2019 à 12h45
Publié dans L'OpinionDans des Etats qui avaient pourtant connu une ouverture politique dans les années 1990, l’expérience démocratique a reculé. Et cette prolifération de démocraties sans démocrates touche même les rivages de l’Europe
Si la démocratie repose sur de nombreux principes (suffrage universel, citoyens éduqués…), les principaux penseurs politiques s’accordent à considérer que son moment de vérité réside dans le respect d’un pacte entre protagonistes, dit « pacte démocratique ». De quoi s’agit-il ? D’un double engagement de la part des acteurs de la future majorité et de la future opposition. Le vaincu d’une élection doit accepter sa défaite et, plutôt que de prendre les armes pour contester le résultat, attendre la prochaine échéance pour repartir pacifiquement à la conquête du pouvoir, et éventuellement prendre sa revanche. Le vainqueur doit, quant à lui, s’engager à remettre son mandat en jeu à l’échéance prévue sans chercher à confisquer définitivement le pouvoir. C’est là qu’aujourd’hui, de plus en plus, le bât blesse. Et cela a des conséquences politiques internationales fâcheuses. Des Etats où la démocratie a pu un temps s’installer, continuent de tenir des élections, mais leur pluralisme n’est plus qu’une chimère. Dans l’environnement politique européen, y compris au sein de l’UE, cette mode gagne du terrain. Faut-il alors imposer des mesures pour contrer cette tendance, et constituer un front démocratique exigeant sur ce point ?Elections sans retourDans des Etats qui avaient pourtant connu une ouverture politique dans les années 1990, l’expérience démocratique a reculé pour donner lieu à ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler des populismes. On oublie trop souvent que l’une des caractéristiques de ce populisme est de ne pas rendre le pouvoir. Après les espoirs post-soviétiques d’une libéralisation du jeu politique russe, Vladimir Poutine (à la tête du pays depuis maintenant presque vingt ans) a rapidement fait comprendre qu’il était là pour rester, et a innové pour maintenir les formes institutionnelles : son « alternance » avec Dmitri Medvedev, de 2008 à 2012, qui le vit rester quatre ans Premier ministre avant de reprendre la présidence, n’a pas suscité beaucoup de réactions au sein d’une communauté internationale qui a même fait mine de croire à l’autonomie de l’intérimaire. Depuis sa nomination comme Premier ministre en 2003 puis comme président en 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan n’a jamais perdu une élection. Ou plutôt, il a perdu celle de juin 2015 qu’il a fait rejouer en novembre pour retrouver la majorité absolue. Le régime « bolivarien » instauré par Hugo Chavez au Venezuela en 1999 et prolongé par Nicolas Maduro n’a pas non plus l’intention de respecter un résultat électoral qui aurait pu/dû être défavorable. Pas plus que les militaires au pouvoir en Thaïlande, qui viennent d’obtenir le retrait d’une candidate gênante au poste de Premier ministre à pourvoir le 24 mars prochain, en la personne de la princesse Ubolratana Rajakanya, sœur du roi. Combien, d’autres élections, demain, sans suspense et avec résultat obligatoire ? Le Parti Démocrate Progressiste (DPP) favorable à une entité nationale taïwanaise plus forte, par exemple, peut-il encore gagner à Taipei avec la pression de Pékin pour empêcher cette issue ?Fragilité de l’environnement européenCette prolifération de Démocraties sans démocrates, pour reprendre le titre d’un ouvrage de Ghassan Salamé (1994) à propos du monde arabe (un Ghassan Salamé devenu depuis émissaire des Nations Unies pour la Libye, c’est dire s’il doit être optimiste), a touché les rivages de l’Europe. Dans l’environnement stratégique immédiat, on a vu à quel point il était difficile d’instaurer une démocratie durable en Ukraine, comme on craint aujourd’hui une dérive de la Moldavie vers un pouvoir pro-russe qui ne se laissera pas déloger ensuite. Au sein de l’UE elle-même, l’offensive contre la séparation des pouvoirs ou contre les corps intermédiaires, de gouvernements comme celui des ultra-conservateurs polonais ou de Viktor Orban en Hongrie, est plus qu’inquiétante. En Bulgarie, Slovaquie ou ailleurs, l’influence russe, combinée à un terrain composé d’acteurs riches, douteux et populistes, fait craindre également des consultations électorales biaisées, des mainmises définitives ou l’avènement d’une longue nuit politique programmée. Cela pose plusieurs problèmes. 

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Published in the fall of 1929, two weeks before the Wall Street crash, Alfred Döblin's Berlin Alexanderplatz is a classic of the turbulent late Weimar period, an era that provides a favorite point of comparison with the politics of our own day. The story of Franz Biberkopf, reissued now in a new edition, is a kind of morality tale. It shows a man who is repeatedly knocked down and gets up again, before he finally opens his eyes to what is happening around him. But the novel also presents a morality tale about the politics of resentment on the right and sectarian conflict on the left, and where they can lead.

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As U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un geared up for a historic face-to-face meeting in Singapore last June, one question loomed large: Would the two return to the bluster that had characterized their relationship in 2017? That year, a steady drumbeat of North Korean nuclear and missile tests had prompted the United States to talk of “bloody nose” military strikes to compel Kim to denuclearize.

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In Doha in late January, the United States and the Afghan Taliban agreed in principle to the contours of a peace deal. Under its terms, the Taliban would guarantee that Afghan territory will never be used by terrorists. The concession is critical to the United States, but while some commentators have heralded the Taliban’s promise as a major breakthrough, analysts have noted that the group has made, and failed to keep, similar assurances in the past. Questions remain about whether the Taliban is genuinely willing to break with al Qaeda—the very prospect at which the group balked back in 2001, prompting the United States to invade.

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Dr. Denis Mukwege (Photo From BBC)

In October of last year, the Nobel Committee awarded Dr. Denis Mukwege with the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Mukwege is a world-renowned gynecologist from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who established the Panzi Hospital, which practices a holistic approach to providing assistance to survivors of sexual assault. Congo has been deemed by the international community as the worst place in the world to be a woman, with 1100 women raped every day. Dr. Mukwege is one of only two doctors in Congo that can perform reconstruction surgeries after a woman has been raped, and his work has fundamentally changed access to health services in the country by making them more widespread and affordable. One of the programs the Panzi Hospital executes is focused on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, which has been a chronic  epidemic in the DRC. Despite this progress, the actual policies that the international community have implemented in the DRC have been lacking, excluding, and often counterproductive to survivors of rape who have contracted HIV/AIDS.

Rape is often employed as a devastating weapon of war in Congo. This tactic has fostered a clear link between conflict promulgation and AIDS transmission. Human Rights Watch estimates, approximately 60% of combatants in the DRC have AIDS. The spread of AIDS has been a significant issue in Congo for decades, officially declared a public health threat in 1983. The link between sexual violence and AIDS in Congo is apparent, as “an estimated 30% of survivors of rape in Congo are infected with HIV“. Virginie Supervie at the National Institute of Health conducted a study that statistically predicts the number of HIV/AIDS victims in relation to sexual violence relates in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her results are alarming, estimating that under extreme conditions, 10,000 women and girls in Congo who are victims of sexual violence could contract HIV/AIDS each year. She further argues that in order to effectively deal with the AIDS epidemic in Congo, victims of sexual violence are critical to take into account during policy formation, as they are often left out of the discourse around AIDS prevention and treatment.

In Congo, victims of sexual violence are often ostracized by their communities, forcing them to move.  This practice creates major obstacles to providing critical medical treatments. Jack Hyyombo explains in the Central African Journal of Public Health, that the most effective way to address this issue is a more targeted approach based on province should be implemented rather than blanket policies over the entirety of Congo. Different demographics in Congo have diverse needs. Creating targeted approaches based on province would allow the Congolese government to create a more tailored approach to meet the needs of different people living in different areas. From there, the government could concentrate specifically on areas where sexual violence occurs most often.

Congo has primarily used only blanket policies to address HIV/AIDS in the country. Joseph Kabila implemented a program headed by the Ministry of Health and the National AIDS Commission. This was supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN). Similarly, to many countries in the international community, the Congolese government expressed in 2015 that they aimed to eliminate HIV and AIDS as a public health threat by the year of 2030. In 2015, only 33% of known AIDS patients were taking antiretrovirals in the DRC. The government publically stated that “by April 2017, 34000 more people were on treatment which puts the country on track to reach the June 2018 target, which would see 73% of people living with HIV on treatment”. The fact that more Congolese citizens are receiving treatment is obviously a benefit, but victims of sexual assault are often not included. For example, “only 30% of female rape cases undergo prophylactic treatment against HIV in the DRC”. This is due to a top-down, homogenous approach by the UN and WHO. Blanket statements regarding progress on AIDS treatment and prevention in the Congo have unintended consequences. The woman who are often most at risk of the disease are forgotten about because there is a false sense that everyone is benefitting from the progress that has occurred.

(Photo From
The New York Times)

At first glance, it looks as if the United Nations is taking a hardline, effective approach to combating AIDS stigmatization and sexual violence. In 2010, the first ever offensive peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, was deployed in Congo. This mission was the first of its kind, as UN peacekeepers usually have to wait until conflict comes to them, while MONUSCO can be the aggressor against the groups it is trying to eradicate in order to protect the population. There is also a designated Sexual Violence Unit in MONUSCO. However, though the United Nations says that MONUSCO is helping, there are many points of contention surrounding the mission.

The implications of MONUSCO on the debate about responses to rape victims with AIDS is substantial. The rhetoric around MONUSCO makes it seem very beneficial, while in reality, peacekeepers often exacerbate existing issues. In only the first three months of 2017, five peacekeepers had already been accused of raping Congolese women. This is not limited to peacekeepers in the DRC. The Associated Press reported that “between 2004 and 2016, the United Nations received about 2,000 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against its peacekeepers”. Over 700 of those allegations occurred in Congo and number is assumed to be much higher as victims are often silenced or discouraged from coming forward.

There are many implications of peacekeepers contributing to sexual violence. One of the main consequences is that it promotes a mistrust of foreign actors. This is detrimental when worldwide policies are being developed to address both AIDS and sexual violence. Multilateral and transregional approaches are necessary when trying to tackle epidemics that span across the world because they provide resources. Furthermore, the perpetrators of these violent acts are often not held responsible, promoting an environment in which rapists are greeted with impunity.

There is no doubt that Dr. Mukwege is an extraordinary hero well deserving of the Nobel Prize. Resources are critically required to invest in other doctors to expand medical practice in Congo as well. This is the only way rape victims who have HIV/AIDS will no longer be left out of the dialogue of progress. While Dr. Mukwege’s awarding  of the Nobel Peace Prize has brought more attention to sexual health in the DRC, international responses to treat rape victims who have contracted HIV/AIDS have been lacking and often counterproductive. Broad statements about progress, and human rights abuses committed by those who are supposed to be there to help contribute to an environment where rape victims with AIDS are left out of the discourse about access to health infrastructure. Women are essential to include in these discussions as they often experience the worst parts of conflict. Only when rape victims and AIDS patients are advocated for, will comprehensive policies be effectively implemented to benefit all citizens in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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In pledging to prevent terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, the Taliban is making a promise that it will struggle to keep. 

Yazidis fleeing Sinjar, Iraq, in 2014 after forces loyal to the Islamic State took the town. Kurdish and Yazidi fighters retook it last fall.CreditRodi Said/Reuters

The generation that inherited the world right after the fall of Nazi Germany were in a unique position to teach future generations about how we should address justice after thousands of families lost their relatives during the war. While many former members of Hitler’s government were put on trial at Nuremberg, prosecuted and given their due sentences, many other perpetrators of genocide escaped the precedent setting trial. A case that stood out was that of Klaus Barbie, who organised the murder of thousands of Jewish people and resistance fighters from France during the war. While there was a warrant to arrest him, he was safely living in Latin America, even after he was convicted in absentia and for Crimes Against Humanity in the French legal system.

It was not an easy task to find Barbie and bring him to trial, but the Klarsfelds who spent their life seeking justice for their fallen family members and neighbours dedicated their lives to justice. Unfortunately, people who fought for those lost to genocide have left us over time, but the governments that turn a blind eye to human rights atrocities are still in place.

The current debate should be framed in what had occurred in Iraq and Syria to many minority groups living there since 2014. Over 6000 dead had been discovered buried in mass graves not long ago, and every few weeks leads to the discovery of more mass graves as survivors try to earn a place as a refugee from those atrocities. Survivors of genocide still are living in refugee camps, with no direct aid coming to them. There are still many girls and women missing and presumed dead or captured, all enslaved and all likely to be killed in the most brutal of ways, but no one speaks about them. When discussing those targeted groups in the region, no one addressed justice towards them or their murdered family members. The ones that escape are even threatened in safe countries overseas, with more incidences being revealed over time. In one instance, it was even suggested that focusing on minority groups from the region is “disgusting” and discriminatory, despite the fact that they are targeted specifically because of their race and religion to be killed, something that the French court in the Barbie case would call Crimes Against Humanity.

The resting excuse to not apply justice for those lost in Syria and Iraq is because there are no witnesses, but it has become evident in a few cases that Yazidi refugees in places like Canada and Germany have seen their ISIS torturers living in their area after they were resettled. Authorities do wish to seek justice even when they have those witnesses they claim do not exist living and being threatened as refugees in Canada and Germany. In a normal legal situation, if you commit a crime in another country or region, you are subject to the local laws of that region. So in the case where a non-Syrian or non-Iraqi would commit a murder in those countries, the local laws would be applied. We cannot simply take the murder of one person in a Western country as one individual murdering another and apply full justice to a trial, while claiming that the murder of 6000 Yazidis and Kurds is a statistic that cannot have justice applied, just because they are in Syria or Iraq. We should not set a precedent where if you kill all the lawyers and judges and burn the court to the ground while destroying a city, that you are able to simply return to your country of origin and leave Syria and Iraq with the aftermath of a genocide created by a murderer and fellow foreign nationals. Allowing citizens from a Western country to go abroad and commit genocide should have the most severe of punishments, and in some cases they are barely questioned. There should be money and funds set up to re-established a judicial system in those affected parts of Syria and Iraq, and trials should commence for all accused. It is clear that they committed Crimes Against Humanity, any justice minister and government that tries to hide that fact or shame victims are ignorant to the concept of justice themselves.

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The local governance reform that Kyiv started in 2014 will, if successful, have cross-border repercussions by way of making the Ukrainian state more resilient, compatible with the EU, and a model for other post-Soviet republics.

The currently ongoing decentralization reform in Ukraine leads to beneficial effects for the everyday life of citizens. Public administration becomes more rational, flexible, visible and interactive. State-society relations strengthen, and democratic accountability increases. As transparency of resource allocation increases, opportunities for realizing corrupt practices are gradually reduced. Economic activity in, and cross-regional rivalry of, local communities are facilitated. Cities, towns and villages can easier cooperate with each other, but also compete for direct investment, touristic visitors, project funding, qualified personnel, and public resources. Talented youth in provincial regions can better self-realize at home. Patriotic energy is redirected from mythologizing imagined to improving real communities. Civic activism is encouraged and utilized for the public good.  Grass-roots initiatives can faster transform into efficacious public policies and become templates for nation-wide innovation.

In Ukraine, these and
similar positive effects of decentralization, in general, gain additional
weight in view of the country’s significance as one of Europe’s territorially
largest nations, civilizational frontier states, crucial post-Soviet republics,
and geopolitical pivot countries. Whatever course Ukraine takes in its domestic
affairs has, because of the country’s international emanation, larger
implications. The fate of the Ukrainian transformation, not the least of the
local governance reform, will deeply affect pan-European security and stability,
post-communist socio-economic development, as well as East European
liberalization and democratization.

Decentralization
increases resilience

First and foremost,
decentralization makes Ukraine as a state and nation more resilient. Along with
other reforms, it reduces, suppresses or contains various post-Soviet
pathologies of public administration and local development. This effect, in
turn, is not only of municipal, regional or national, but also – in view of
Ukraine’s geopolitical role – of international relevance.

Ukrainian
decentralization devolves power to a level lower on, and to communities smaller
than those in, which most of the old informal networks operate. This makes
state-capture by private interest not impossible. But it complicates the
subversion of the public sphere by private interests. It is true that
decentralization sometimes simply transfers the locus of a corrupt network from
the national or regional to the local level. In certain cases, it can even
benefit clans that have been hitherto functioning within a municipal context.

On the whole, however,
decentralization in Ukraine – like everywhere else in the world – strengthens
rather than weakens democratic accountability, and promotes economic
development. Newly empowered self-governing bodies are more exposed to public
scrutiny and responsibility by their local communities than Ukraine’s byzantine
administrative organs inherited from the Soviet system. When ambitious
entrepreneurs encounter a local – rather than regional or national – political
framework, their industriousness is more likely to turn into political and
developmental rather than informal and extractive activity. On average,
Ukraine’s novel Amalgamated Territorial Communities (ATCs) are thus less
susceptible to subversion by semi-secretive networks and rapacious rent-seeking
than the old oblast (regional) and rayon (county) administrations and councils.
The new ATCs are – more than the older, far less powerful and smaller communes
– motivated to engage in competition with other ATCs for attracting investment,
charming tourists, providing services, and gaining fame.

Decentralization thus
makes the Ukrainian state more stable, functional and effective. Ukraine’s
increased resilience and greater dynamism supports its general modernization.
Whatever makes the largely pluralistic and liberal Ukrainian state stronger –
rationalization, Europeanization, decentralization, privatization, deregulation
etc. – undermines, in turn, the legitimacy of the klepto- and autocratic orders
of other post-Soviet state. By strengthening Ukraine’s democracy and economy,
its decentralization helps – because of Ukraine’s size and role in Eastern
Europe – changing the entire post-Soviet area for the better.

Decentralization
improves cohesion

Second, in addition to
making Ukraine’s state more solid, in general, many Ukrainian politicians have
come to also see decentralization as a peculiar antidote to Russia’s hybrid
warfare, in particular. Not only does deeper involvement of ordinary Ukrainians
in governmental affairs via decentralization support the national cohesion of
Ukraine’s population and civic spirit of her citizenry. The currently ongoing
devolution of power to the local level in Ukraine deprives Russia’s various
hybrid warriors of customary institutional frames and critical entry points for
seditious action. A decentralization that is not a federalization complicates
the targeting and planning of irredentist operations similar to those in
Simferopol, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014. As regional capitals and governments
gradually lose political relevance, it becomes more difficult for the Kremlin
to clearly delineate territories where it may want to support a secession
or/and prepare an annexation.

These anti-separatist
effects of Ukraine’s decentralization have, in turn, not only a national, but
also an international dimension. To the degree that local governance reforms –
along with other ongoing transformations, in Ukraine – help to support Kyiv’s
independence and to stabilize the Ukrainian state, they undermine Russian
revanchism. The stronger Ukraine, the less plausible looks Moscow’s
neo-imperial project and the Kremlin’s hegemonic pretense in the former Tsarist
or Soviet space. As Zbigniew Brzezinski quipped famously in 1997, “without
Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”

Decentralization
supports Europeanization

A third geopolitical
aspect of Ukraine’s decentralization is that it supports Ukraine’s ongoing
integration into the EU’s political and legal space in connection with the
Eastern Partnership program started in 2009, and Association Agreement signed
in 2014. Decentralization helps preparing Kyiv’s forthcoming application for,
and eventual acquisition of, full membership in the Union. In a certain way,
Ukraine’s decentralization is a more fundamental aspect of Ukraine’s gradual
Europeanization than other dimensions of this process partially influenced from
outside.

Being a Ukrainian project
inspired by, but not modelled on any one foreign example, and not following any
pre-defined Western recipe, decentralization is in two ways significant. First,
it is a visible manifestation of Ukraine’s turn-away from the Tsarist and
Soviet centralist traditions of its past, within the former Russian empire. The
very idea and start of the Ukrainian decentralization reforms documents the
“European” character of Ukraine. It is practical proof of the civil, pluralist
and open character of Ukraine’s political tradition and culture.

Second, the ongoing
transition’s accumulating results are making Ukraine more and more compatible
with the Union. The member countries of the EU are, in general, more or less
decentralized. To one degree or another, many continue to further decentralize.  They, moreover, follow the well-known
subsidiarity principle in their relations with both Brussels and their own
regions as well as municipalities. The more deconcentrated and subsidiary
Ukraine becomes, the more similar it will thus look to other European nations,
and the better she will later be prepared for full accession to the EU.

The national origins and
Europeanizing effects of Ukraine’s decentralization are not only important in
terms of the spread of Western values and principles. They have also a larger
geopolitical dimension. In as far as Kyiv’s local governance reform expresses
and advances the “European” character of Ukraine, it demonstrates her belonging
to the Western normative and cultural hemisphere. That, in turn, makes
Ukraine’s ambition to enter the EU and NATO a more natural affair than it may
have otherwise been.

Decentralization
provides a model

A final – and, so far,
speculative – geopolitical aspect of the ongoing transformation of Ukrainian
self-governance concerns its cross-national diffusion potential.
Decentralization in Ukraine can, in the future, provide policy directions and
institutional templates ready for use by other, so far, highly centralized
post-Soviet states in their forthcoming reform efforts. This concerns not only,
but above all Russia herself for which a decentralization along the Ukrainian
localist rather than the older Russian federalist paradigm may one day become
relevant.

As time goes by, each of
the post-Soviet republics will become affected by gradual social modernization,
cross-national norm dispersion, democratizing intra-elite divisions as well as
international economic integration. These processes will more and more change
all, so far, politically underdeveloped and culturally regressive post-communist
countries. When governmental crises, competitive disadvantages, and general
backwardness create sufficient pressure for deep reform in Russia, Belarus,
Armenia, Azerbaijan or/and Central Asian, their nations will be looking for
ideas and experiences that may help them to reconstitute their immobile
societies and remake their inefficient states.

The possibility or even
intention of cross-border diffusion is, of course, something im- or explicitly
entailed in many reform concepts and efforts around the world. The Ukrainian
local governance reform may, however, be of an even larger geopolitical
salience because of its above-mentioned nation-building and anti-secessionist
effects. The Ukrainian type of decentralization is not only an instrument for improving
state-society relations. It can also function as a tool to stabilize regionally
divided states threatened by separatist tendencies. In the same way that
devolving power to local and municipal levels helps Ukraine to hold its
territory together, an application of her decentralization model may one day
also support other post-Soviet states to remain unified. This concerns not the
least Russia whose sheer size and multi-ethnic character make her especially
vulnerable to autonomism and secessionism.

Decentralization
as an under-estimated reform agenda

The above list does not mean that local governance reform is a panacea for Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Yet, its Europeanizing, anti-separatist and diffusion potential makes it an especially salient, interesting and consequential aspect of Ukraine’s ongoing socio-political transformation. Within the context of some specifically post-Soviet political challenges, the empire-subverting and state-supporting dimension of decentralization bestow this particular reform in Ukraine with a larger meaning than other substantively similar processes of devolution of power from the national and regional to the municipal and local levels have in other parts of the world. Neither the overcoming of the Tsarist-Communist empire nor the formation of new nation states are yet finished businesses, in the post-Soviet area. Decentralization may do the trick or, at least, be one of the main instruments to effectively meet both of these daunting challenges.

——————————————————————————

A longer version of this article is forthcoming, and has benefited from advice by Dr. Valentyna Romanova (National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv). Responsibility for remaining imprecision lies, however, solely with the author

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In October 2016, British Prime Minister Theresa May made her first speech to a Conservative conference as party leader. Evidently seeking to capture the populist spirit of the Brexit vote that brought down her predecessor, she spoke of “a sense—deep, profound, and, let’s face it, often justified—that many people have today that the world works well for a privileged few, but not for them.” What was needed to challenge this, May argued, was a “spirit of citizenship” lacking among the business elites that made up one strand of her party’s base. Citizenship, she said, “means a commitment to the men and women who live around you, who work for you, who buy the goods and services you sell.” She continued:

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The quarter century following the Cold War was the most peaceful in modern history. The world’s strongest powers did not fight one another or even think much about doing so. They did not, on the whole, prepare for war, anticipate war, or conduct negotiations and political maneuvers with the prospect of war looming in the background. As U.S. global military hegemony persisted, the possibility of developed nations fighting one another seemed ever more remote.

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Since the French Revolution, nationalism—the idea that state borders should coincide with national communities—has constituted the core source of political legitimacy around the world. As nationalism spread from western Europe in the early nineteenth century, it became increasingly ethnic in nature. In places where the state and the nation did not match up, such as Germany, Italy, and most of eastern Europe, the nation tended to be defined in terms of ethnicity, which led to violent processes of unification or secession. At the beginning of the twentieth century, ethnic nationalism came to disrupt political borders even more, leading to the breakup of multiethnic empires, including the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian ones. By changing the size of Europe’s political units, this undermined the balance of power and contributed to two world wars.

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It was late in the afternoon on a cold winter day. Light snow had covered Tehran the night before, and I was spending the day in the production office of a small film unit of the Basij paramilitary militia. I was researching cultural producers in the Islamic Republic’s military and paramilitary organizations, and the young men who worked in this film unit had agreed to talk to me on the condition of anonymity.

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At the end of 2013, Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s president, postponed signing an association agreement with the European Union, choosing instead to pursue closer ties with Russia. Protesters began massing on Kiev’s central square, known as the Maidan. Weeks of tension spilling into violence culminated with Yanukovych’s ouster on February 22.

Russian President Vladimir Putin looked on with anger and alarm. Suppose that what had happened on the Maidan sparked similar protests in Russia?

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In 1986, the Pulitzer Prize–winning, bowtie-wearing Stanford historian Carl Degler delivered something other than the usual pipe-smoking, scotch-on-the-rocks, after-dinner disquisition that had plagued the evening program of the annual meeting of the American Historical Association for nearly all of its centurylong history. Instead, Degler, a gentle and quietly heroic man, accused his colleagues of nothing short of dereliction of duty: appalled by nationalism, they had abandoned the study of the nation.

“We can write history that implicitly denies or ignores the nation-state, but it would be a history that flew in the face of what people who live in a nation-state require and demand,” Degler said that night in Chicago. He issued a warning: “If we historians fail to provide a nationally defined history, others less critical and less informed will take over the job for us.”

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère
(n° 4/2018). Rémy Hémez, ancien collaborateur du Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Philippe Chapleau et Jean-Marc Marill, Dictionnaire des opérations extérieures de l’armée française. De 1963 à nos jours (Nouveau Monde Éditions, 2018, 456 pages).

Les opérations extérieures (OPEX) structurent les armées françaises depuis la fin de la guerre d’Algérie. Une « nouvelle génération du feu » – plus de 250 000 militaires – a servi à l’extérieur de nos frontières au prix de 700 morts et plus de 6 000 blessés. Ces dernières années, les écrits de militaires se sont multipliés, mais ils sont le plus souvent des témoignages, et les analyses historiques les complétant sont encore rares.

Pendant longtemps, les seules références exhaustives sur le sujet ont été des travaux officiels, en particulier ceux du Centre de doctrine de l’armée de Terre, avec, par exemple, le « Répertoire typologique des opérations ». Le présent dictionnaire dirigé par Philippe Chapleau, journaliste spécialisé dans les questions de défense, et Jean-Marc Marill, ancien directeur du Centre historique des archives de la défense, vient donc combler un vide en cherchant à dresser un bilan – non exhaustif – des opérations extérieures menées par les armées françaises depuis 1963 (les auteurs en recensent 119).

Le livre est organisé en deux grandes parties. La première est consacrée aux opérations qui sont chacune présentées dans une notice de longueur variable. On y retrouve bien entendu les OPEX les plus emblématiques comme « Limousin » au Tchad de 1969 à 1972 et
« Épervier » dans ce même pays de 1986 à 2014, la participation à la Force de protection des Nations unies (FORPRONU) en Bosnie et en Croatie de 1992 à 1995, « Trident » au Kosovo de 1998 à 2014, « Licorne » en Côte d’Ivoire de 2002 à 2012, « Pamir » en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2014, « Serval » au Mali de 2013 à 2014 ; mais aussi les OPEX qui se déroulent encore aujourd’hui telles que « Barkhane » (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Tchad, Mauritanie) ou « Chammal » (Irak).

Ces opérations recouvrent des réalités extrêmement diverses : missions d’intervention ou d’interposition, évacuation de ressortissants, acheminement d’aide humanitaire, contre-insurrection, lutte contre le terrorisme ou la piraterie, accompagnement ou entraînement d’armées locales, menées dans le cadre d’une force de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU), en multilatéral ou unilatéralement, etc.

La deuxième partie du dictionnaire – « Moyens et environnement » – se compose de notices thématiques. On y retrouve d’abord une approche capacitaire (appui aérien, ciblage, opération amphibie, etc.), puis des articles sur le cadre national et international (mandat, diplomatie navale), où l’on découvre notamment que 25 % des OPEX ont été menées au titre des accords de défense ou d’assistance, et 31 % sous le commandement de l’ONU. Cette seconde partie aborde aussi les questions de l’environnement des opérations (actions psychologiques, action humanitaire, communication, etc.), de l’organisation des forces (bases pré-positionnées, réserves, prévôté, etc.) et du soutien (surcoût des OPEX, logistique, etc.). En fin d’ouvrage, on retrouve une utile chronologie.

Ce dictionnaire réunit quelques-uns des meilleurs spécialistes des armées françaises et trouve un bel équilibre entre contributeurs militaires et civils. Il constitue un très bon outil de travail pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’histoire militaire française contemporaine.

Rémy Hémez

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Identity Politics Strengthens Democracy

Stacey Y. Abrams

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère
(n° 4/2018). Rémy Hémez, ancien collaborateur du Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jeffrey Lewis, The  2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks against the United States: A Speculative Novel (Houghton Mifflin Hartcourt, 2018, 304 pages).

Les œuvres de fiction peuvent être fécondes pour l’étude des relations internationales et de la stratégie. Jeffrey Lewis – chercheur au Middlebury Institute of International Studies et fondateur du blog Arms Control Wonk, référence en matière de désarmement, contrôle des armements et non-prolifération – nous en offre un bel exemple.

Son récit prend la forme d’un rapport rendu en mai 2023 par la « Commission 2020 » mise en place pour faire la lumière sur des événements dramatiques qui se sont déroulés le 22 et 24 mars 2020 : une attaque nucléaire nord-coréenne visant la Corée du Sud, le Japon (1,4 million de morts et 5 millions de blessés au total) et les États-Unis (1,4 million de morts et 8 millions de blessés).

Ce rapport-fiction est riche en enseignements. D’abord, il met l’accent sur le fait que la guerre nucléaire est loin d’avoir disparu du champ des possibles. Ensuite, il souligne la complexité de la gestion de l’escalade lors de crises internationales majeures. Il met aussi en relief la très grande difficulté à comprendre la psychologie de « l’autre », et à interpréter ses actes. Enfin, la part incompressible du hasard est parfaitement mise en lumière.

L’enchaînement des faits déclenchant la crise nucléaire est symptomatique. Dans un contexte de tensions après l’échec de négociations sur le désarmement nucléaire, la destruction du vol BX411 de la compagnie sud-coréenne Air Busan par deux missiles KN-06 nord-coréens déclenche un engrenage funeste. Cet acte résulte lui-même de problèmes techniques qui ont touché l’avion et poussé l’équipage à emprunter une route très proche de celle des bombardiers américains engagés depuis des mois dans des tests systématiques des défenses anti-aériennes nord-coréennes.

Les arcanes du pouvoir sud-coréen sont bien décrits. Le livre présente, par exemple, les difficultés pratiques liées à la configuration du complexe présidentiel, qui obligent les conseillers à marcher au moins dix minutes dans des souterrains avant de pouvoir rejoindre la salle de crise et donc à perdre un temps précieux. La stratégie, les plans et les moyens mis en œuvre par Séoul dans le cadre d’une riposte (avec en particulier la place centrale des missiles balistiques) sont aussi très bien exposés. Les développements techniques de Jeffrey Lewis sur la défense anti-missile américaine – incapable, dans le récit, d’intercepter les 13 missiles intercontinentaux nord-coréens – et sur la campagne aérienne américaine pour détruire les missiles de Pyongyang avant leur lancement sont convaincants. Un Donald Trump réaliste est au cœur du récit. L’auteur ne manque pas d’humour à son propos, mais il met surtout en avant les grandes difficultés qu’éprouve l’entourage du président pour le « gérer », et les problèmes que cela pose au cours de la crise. Enfin, l’auteur nous rappelle à la réalité d’une guerre nucléaire en décrivant l’ampleur des destructions causées et, surtout, en adaptant dans sa narration des témoignages poignants de victimes d’Hiroshima.

Jeffrey Lewis signe une excellente fiction se lisant comme un roman et qui est très instructive sur de nombreux sujets. Sa lecture est chaudement recommandée à tous ceux qui étudient les relations internationales, les questions nucléaires ou encore les enjeux stratégiques autour de la péninsule coréenne.

Rémy Hémez

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère
(n° 4/2018). Norbert Gaillard propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Eric A. Posner, Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts (University of Chicago Press, 2018, 272 pages).

Eric Posner, professeur à l’université de Chicago, étudie ici les renflouements (bailouts) engagés par les autorités publiques américaines lors de la crise de 2008-2009. Il montre que le Trésor, la Federal Reserve et les principaux régulateurs ont alors été contraints de violer la loi pour empêcher l’effondrement du système financier.

Les exemples avancés sont légion. L’assureur AIG a été sauvé grâce à un prêt de la banque centrale mais a dû céder en contrepartie 80 % de son capital, ce qui s’apparente à une expropriation. Lors du renflouement des deux spécialistes du crédit hypothécaire, Fannie Mae et Freddie Mac, l’administration américaine a outrepassé ses prérogatives. L’Exchange Stabilization Fund, créé sous le New Deal pour stabiliser la valeur du dollar, a servi à soutenir les fonds mutuels.

L’auteur sous-entend ensuite que les bailouts ont été en partie inspirés par des considérations extra-financières. Il émet des doutes sur l’insolvabilité présumée de la banque Lehman Brothers – volontairement abandonnée par Washington –, et estime que les pouvoirs publics se sont montrés excessivement conciliants avec les grandes banques de Wall Street parce qu’il était indispensable qu’elles prêtent aux constructeurs automobiles au bord de la faillite. Pour étayer son analyse, le juriste rappelle que, contrairement aux plans de secours en faveur d’AIG, de Fannie Mae et Freddie Mac, les renflouements des constructeurs automobiles ont fait perdre de l’argent à l’État américain. Les priorités étaient alors de préserver les emplois et les systèmes de retraite.

Enfin, Eric Posner présente ce que devrait être le cadre juridique adéquat pour que les autorités publiques puissent, à l’avenir, contenir une crise systémique de façon efficace en toute légalité. Il juge que la notion de « prêteur en dernier ressort » (PDR) est obsolète, et qu’il est temps de passer à celle de « faiseur de marché en dernier ressort » (market maker of last resort). Prenant le contre-pied des dispositions de la loi Dodd-Frank de 2010, il plaide pour un élargissement des prérogatives des divers régulateurs susceptibles d’intervenir en tant que PDR. Par exemple, ils devraient être habilités à acheter un très large éventail d’actifs, à garantir la dette des institutions financières, et à leur prêter en acceptant, si nécessaire, des collatéraux de piètre qualité. Les prêts d’urgence devraient être accordés à des taux à peine supérieurs à ceux en vigueur sur le marché afin de convaincre les établissements en difficulté de recourir à un PDR le moins tard possible. En revanche, le nouveau régime juridique devrait permettre de corriger tout favoritisme ou abus de pouvoir commis durant la période de stress financier.

Cet ouvrage est passionnant, mais la thèse défendue demeure très discutable. En remettant en cause trois des quatre grands principes qui devraient guider un PDR – à savoir la nécessité de prêter à des entités solvables disposant de bons collatéraux à des taux d’intérêt élevés –, Eric Posner encourage inévitablement l’aléa moral. Il en est conscient et compte sur des réglementations ex ante draconiennes (comme les exigences en capital) pour contenir le problème. On reste cependant sceptique quand on connaît la capacité des banques américaines à contourner les régulations. On regrette aussi que la question du too big to fail soit éludée.

Norbert Gaillard

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