Diplomacy & Crisis News

Ethen Kim Lieser

Delta Force,

"My hands were tingling from the rucksack straps cutting into my shoulders, pinching the nerves and arteries, and restricting the blood flow to my arms.”

The Delta Force, officially known as 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), is a U.S. special-missions unit that is primarily focused on counter-terrorism engagements.

Considered a tier-one counter-terrorist unit, it is specifically directed to kill or capture high-value units or dismantle terrorist cells. However, the Delta Force remains extremely flexible in its overall missions—having previously taken part in hostage rescues and covert missions working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency and even offering protective services for high-ranking officials.

Currently, the Delta Force receives its recruits from all across the Army, including many candidates from the Ranger Regiments and Special Forces Groups. To initially qualify, recruits must be enlisted in the Army, be male, have at least four years in service and two and a half years of service left on enlistment, and is within the rank of E4-E8. Keep in mind that there are no civilian-to-Delta enlistment programs available.

To get started, one must attend infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT), which combines Army Basic Training and Infantry AIT (Advanced Individual Training) in one fourteen-week course. This will give you the fundamental skills to make a successful transition from a civilian into a soldier. If you pass that, then you will attend Airborne Training at Fort Benning. Special Forces troopers who eventually want to join Delta Force must qualify for and complete this particular training.

Next up is the Special Operations Preparation Course (SOPC), which can take four weeks and typically leads up to the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) program. The SFAS must be passed before being admitted to Special Forces training.

If the boxes are all checked by now, then you will aim to pass the individual skills phase of training. During this period, soldiers are trained on specialized skills necessary to be successful in any Special Forces engagement. The training period is forty days long and covers land navigation, cross-country map exercise, and small unit tactics.

Taking up another sixty-five days is the Military Operational Specialty (MOS) training phase, which culminates with a mission planning cycle that will put your leadership skills to the test. Your experience, training, and specialty as a soldier will largely dictate what responsibilities you’ll have during MOS.

For the thirty-eight-day Collective Training Phase, soldiers are trained in Special Operations (SO) classes, Direct Action (DA) Isolation, Air Operations, Unconventional Warfare classes, and receive isolation training. This is considered one of the most mentally and physically challenging training one will have to go through in the U.S. military.

To offer some sense of what an individual must overcome to be admitted into the Delta Force, here’s what author Eric Haney had to say about one particular long-distance hike in his book Inside Delta Force.

“I had covered just slightly over thirty miles by now, but still had more than twenty to go. It was getting more and more difficult to do speed computations in my head. My hands were tingling from the rucksack straps cutting into my shoulders, pinching the nerves and arteries, and restricting the blood flow to my arms.”

He continued: “I was bent forward against the weight of the rucksack. It felt like I was dragging a train behind me, and my feet hurt all the way up to my knees. I don’t mean they were just sore, I mean they felt like I had been strapped to the rack and someone had beaten the balls of my feet with a bat. I tried to calculate the foot-pounds of energy my feet had absorbed so far today, but I had to give up the effort. I only knew that the accumulated tonnage of all those thousands of steps was immense. And it was only going to get worse.”

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Kris Osborn

Taiwan and China, Asia

The PLA will soon be able to airlift full-scale Chinese Main Battle Tanks.

Here's What You Need to Remember: An ability to transport a Type T99 main battle tank would be massively significant to any kind of ground war effort, especially since the U.S. Army M1Abrams tanks need to deploy overseas by boat. Air deployment of a massive tank exponentially decreases deployment attack timelines and would enable a heavy mechanized force to strike on a vastly different timetable. 

The People’s Liberation Army will soon be able to airlift full-scale Chinese Main Battle Tanks on board an upgraded Y-20 cargo plane, now being outfitted with a first-of-its-kind domestically built engine. 

The new WS-20 engine, which has not as of yet been formally announced as having integrated onto the Y-20, was reportedly seen flying on the aircraft according to multiple news reports cited in the Chinese government-backed Global Times newspaper. 

“The Xi'an Aircraft Industry (Group) Company Ltd under the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China, the maker of the Y-20, released a photo that showed a turbofan engine with a high bypass ratio that had never been seen before, Beijing-based Aerospace Knowledge magazine reported on Saturday,” the Global Times reports. 

A new WS-20 equipped Y-20 would, according to the paper, be able to operate with much more thrust and less fuel as well as be able to take off and land on shorter runways. An increased ability to operate in more austere circumstances certainly increases the tactical scenarios in which a Y-20 could help deploy troops, equipment, supplies, weapons and even large platforms such as tanks. 

An ability to transport a Type T99 main battle tank would be massively significant to any kind of ground war effort, especially since the U.S. Army M1Abrams tanks need to deploy overseas by boat. Air deployment of a massive tank exponentially decreases deployment attack timelines and would enable a heavy mechanized force to strike on a vastly different timetable. 

“With the domestically made engines, the Y-20 can become capable of long-range or intercontinental flight while carrying heavy equipment like main battle tanks without stopping at a transit airfield for refuelling,” the Global Times reports. 

The U.S. Army’s massive emphasis upon rapid reaction deployment possibilities, something which could be described as an ability to optimize expeditionary warfare, rests in large measure upon the logistical reality that heavy mechanized vehicles such as an Abrams simply cannot travel by air. This circumstance helps explain why the Army is fast-tracking an air-droppable Mobile Protected Firepower light tank vehicle. Should major threats or some kind of large scale land war quickly become urgently needed, getting armored forces to the fight would become an instant priority.

The development almost immediately brings Taiwan to mind, given that an ability to air-deploy Type T99 tanks could give attacking Chinese forces a rapid forcible entry option, and possibly be trail closely behind or accompany some kind of amphibious assault. Tank-carrying aircraft transiting from mainland China to Taiwan could of course travel much more quickly and much less visible than tank-transporting ships. This could even, quite possibly, be part of why the U.S. has been moving to sell Abrams tanks to Taiwan, a clear way to enable massive armored defense against a possible Chinese invasion.

Perhaps having Abrams tanks on the island of Taiwan could impede or slow up any Chinese ground invasion long enough to allow time for the U.S. military to intervene. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.  

Michael Rubin

Rwandan Genocide,

It is beyond dispute that Hutu militants carried out a deliberate, coordinated, and pre-planned assault to eliminate the Tutsi as a group.

Both Democratic and Republican administrations consistently condemn Holocaust and genocide denial. It is ironic, then, that beginning with the Obama administration and continuing through Trump’s term, the State Department appears to be driving revisionism about the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

That the 20th century witnessed numerous genocides against ethnic and religious communities is one of the darkest marks of the century. While genocide did not originate in the 20th century, the willingness of the world to confront and acknowledge such crimes with the hope to ensure they never happen again differentiates that century from those that came before.

The reality that Adolf Hitler killed six million Jews is not up for serious debate. Nor do scholars and diplomats allow the fact that the Nazis also targeted non-Jews—homosexuals, Roma, the mentally and physically handicapped, Jehovah’s witnesses, and those of African descent—obfuscate the fact that, for the Nazis, the desire to eradicate Jews everywhere was the Holocaust’s defining feature.

The same holds true for the Armenian genocide. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 296 by a margin of 405-11. The Resolution declared, “It is the policy of the United State to commemorate the Armenian Genocide through official recognition and remembrance; [and] reject efforts to enlist, engage, or otherwise associate the United States Government with denial of the Armenian Genocide or any other genocide….”

That it took the United States so long was the result both of Jewish interest groups which feared diluting the uniqueness of the Holocaust, historical ignorance about premeditated intent, and the strength of the Turkish lobby that fears Turkey might be held to account and forced to make reparations. Taken together, though, such reluctance was a black mark and compromised moral clarity. Turkish nationalists may bluster, but there is no denying the Armenian genocide as the first of the twentieth century. That anti-Turkish ethnic cleansing occurred in parts of the Balkans does not mitigate or excuse what Turks and their proxies did to Armenians.

That Turkey and Azerbaijan both launched a surprise attack on the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh on the 100th anniversary of Turkey’s invasion of independent Armenia and that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev engaged in racist, eliminationist rhetoric underlies the importance of not sweeping genocide under-the-rug; denying genocide only encourages its perpetrators to keep trying.

The State Department, however, appears not to learned its lesson when it comes to Rwanda. Beginning under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton but continuing through the Trump administration, the policy of the United States has been to refuse to recognize the 1994 Rwandan genocide as anti-Tutsi in nature. This is rooted both in the logic that others died in the violence and that the promise of a more clear accounting of genocide could be leverage to extract concessions from Rwanda.

Such a position is both extralegal and ahistorical. Article II of the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide defines genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” by engaging in acts such as “killing members of the group,” “causing serious bodily or mental harm” or “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

As for the 1994 violence, it is beyond dispute that Hutu militants carried out a deliberate, coordinated, and pre-planned assault to eliminate the Tutsi as a group. Certainly, Hutus also died in the violence, but these victims were those whom Hutu extremists saw as political obstacles or those who refused to cooperate in the killings. These Hutu were honorable, but they do not change the goals of the genocide. The fact that non-Jews (including many Germans) died in the Holocaust and that non-Armenians died in the Armenian genocide is not cause to dismiss the true intent of either.

Likewise, recognizing the reality that events in 1994 constituted an anti-Tutsi genocide does not erase the fact that some Tutsis in the Rwandan Patriotic Front may have committed war crimes. Most of these were individual in nature and of the sort that occurs in nearly every armed conflict rather than state or group policy. As J. Peter Pham, former U.S. special envoy for the Great Lakes Region, explained to me, “Even the most anti-Paul Kagame analyst – and there are quite a number of claimants to that title, especially in Europe – has never claimed that the future Rwandan President of the Rwandan Patriotic Front organized a genocide of the Hutus.” Subsequent developments in the region—be they Kagame’s consolidation of power, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Hollywood anger at the terrorism trial of Paul Rusesabagina—do not change what Hutu génocidaires planned and executed.

The refusal of the United States, however, to acknowledge the anti-Tutsi nature of genocide has real-world policy implications. It empowers the cynical moral equivalency of those like Brian Endless, director of the African studies and Africa diaspora program at Loyola University Chicago, for example, who claims absent any research conducted in Rwanda that more Hutus than Tutsis died in 1994 as a means to undermine the moral capital of Kagame’s administration.

In effect, such efforts to deny genocide to spite Kagame would be analogous to promoting Holocaust denial because of animosity toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or to suggest that Armenians killed more Turks in 1915 than vice versa out of frustration with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

The continued refusal by Washington to designate properly the genocide is problematic for three reasons: First, lack of moral clarity undermines U.S. diplomatic capital in the region. Second, it opens the United States to charges that its policy is inherently racist for diminishing deliberately a genocide perpetrated primarily against Africans. Lastly, it enables Hutu extremists such as those in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda to avoid the pariah status that Neo-Nazis and anti-Armenian Grey Wolves today share. To refuse to address the genocide with moral clarity only encourages deniers and revisionists who would turn to violence in pursuit of political power.

Perhaps diplomats fear that Kagame might seek political capital from formal genocide recognition. Historical accuracy, however, should trump handwringing about short-term politics. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have said they seek to return gravitas and morality to American foreign policy. Ending denial and revisionism about the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs would be a good place to start.

Dr. Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. He also regularly teaches classes at sea about Middle East conflicts, culture, terrorism, and the Horn of Africa to deployed US Navy and Marine units.

Kris Osborn

U.S. Army, Americas

The military wants remote-controlled robots that could carry anti-tank missiles into battle.

Key point: The Robotic Combat Vehicle could be a game-changer. Here is how the Army hopes to use them for more dangerous tasks.

Tank-killing robots, armed with Javelin Missiles, wireless remote firing technology, .50-cal machine guns and long-range infrared targeting sensors are now arriving to the Army as part of the service’s ambitious program to engineer a new class of light, medium, and heavy robots for war.

Technological advances with autonomy, weaponization, sensing, and manned-unmanned teaming are fast impacting the tactical equation, and informing the Army’s strategic approach to anticipated future conflict.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Forward-operating Robotic Combat Vehicle - Light platforms, for example, will be able to advance on enemy positions, send back real-time video sensor information and, if directed by a human, attack.

Several weapons-makers RCV-L vehicles are now starting to arrive, such as an armed robot made by QinetiQ and Pratt Miller Defense, a tracked, hybrid-electric unmanned ground system engineered with a remotely operated, wireless gun targeting system.

A statement from Qinetic said their delivered RCV-L is the first of four planned vehicle deliveries to the Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command Ground Vehicle Systems Center (GVSC).

“This unit is the first of four vehicles developed in support of the Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) Soldier Operational Experiment, planned for 2022. The GVSC team now plans to add Autonomous Mobility as well as Government Furnished Software for the Tethered UAS Multi-Mission Payload and CROWS-J Lethality package,” the QinetiQ statement reads.

Increasingly networked and autonomous tank-killing robots would certainly impact any kind of tactical ground war, given the technical maturation of drone-manned-vehicle networking. A small, fast, highly-mobile tracked robot, armed with Javelin anti-tank missiles could of course more safely conduct reconnaissance operations and, when directed by human commanders, open fire on enemy tanks while soldiers retain command and control at a safe stand-off distance. By itself, a Javelin anti-tank missile can hit ranges out to at least several miles, a circumstance which extends the attack envelope for well-networked ground forces.

A large part of this will also be cross-domain air-ground-sea drone coordination, given the Army’s evolving emphasis upon massively decreasing sensor to shooter time.

Ground robots are increasingly being configured to network with aerial drones, manned vehicles, command and control centers and even satellites with vastly improved range, speed, connectivity and data processing.

The fundamental premise of this kind of tactical approach was recently demonstrated in a large-scale Army live-fire experiment in September called Project Convergence at Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz. The exercise, succeeding in drastically reducing sensor-to-shooter time through the use of interconnected helicopters, drones, AI systems and armored ground vehicles. Several attack scenarios were entertained, including the use of mini-drones called air-launched effects, satellite networking and ground attack infantry carriers.

Through the live-fire event, the Army succeeded in decreasing sensor to shooter time from 20 minutes down to 20 seconds, advancing the concept that combat attack is no longer understood as a “kill-chain,” but rather, a vast, integrated “kill web.”

Kris Osborn is Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Rachel Bucchino

Joe Biden Taxes,

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is working with other countries on an agreement that would establish a global minimum tax on multinational corporations in efforts to find new streams of revenue to help fund President Joe Biden’s future legislative actions.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is working with other countries on an agreement that would establish a global minimum tax on multinational corporations in efforts to find new streams of revenue to help fund President Joe Biden’s future legislative actions.

If a deal is reached, the agreement could be one of Yellen’s biggest accomplishments in her Cabinet post, according to The Washington Post, and could be key to Biden’s term in the White House. The $1.9 trillion relief package that became law last week was financed through additional federal borrowing, which largely boosted the national deficit.

Yellen is participating in negotiations with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with more than 140 countries, with the intention to revise global tax rules to align with the digital economy. One goal is for countries to focus on a nonbinding global minimum tax.

But the Biden administration is already expected to implement tax hikes in its next major legislative package, such as the big-spending infrastructure and jobs bill currently in-the-works with Democrats.

On Biden’s presidential campaign trail, he proposed increasing the corporate tax rate from 21 percent to 28 percent, after former president Donald Trump sharply knocked it in 2017 from 35 percent to 21 percent.

Republican lawmakers and critics, however, have sounded the alarm over raising the rate, as it could interfere with U.S. competitiveness and trigger American countries to relocate overseas.

Several countries worldwide have recently followed the United States’ leadership in dropping tax rates, a movement that economists have dubbed a “race to the bottom.” On average, the tax rate stands at 24 percent among other countries, according to the Tax Foundation.

“It would be a mighty feat for Secretary Yellen to successfully cajole all our major trading partners to agree to a minimum corporate tax rate. It is both anti-competitive and not in self-interest of small, open economies to adopt a corporate tax system that discourages firms from doing business within their borders,” Alex Brill, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said. “Taxes are necessary, of course, to all these countries, but why insist on a tax that broadly discourages business activity and investment?”

But other economists have noted that American companies were already actively looking to move overseas prior to Trump’s 2017 tax cuts due to the lower rates in other countries.

“Before the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, there was strong anecdotal evidence that American corporations were actively moving operations overseas to take advantage of lower tax rates compared to the US. So now that the Biden Administration is looking for additional revenue sources, including increased corporate tax rates, it certainly stands to reason that they want to pursue, via Secretary Yellen, international coordination to harmonize tax policies internationally,” Peter Ireland, an economics professor at Boston College, said.

Ireland added that rallying support from other countries, as well as from members of Congress, to support an OECD agreement will likely be a “challenge.”

“Getting other countries to sign on is going to be a challenge, in the same way that getting members of Congress to sign on will be tough, when many are naturally concerned about the adverse effects of higher taxes on companies in their own districts,” he said.

Any agreement made by the Biden administration under the OECD regarding tax policy would likely need to be approved by Congress, an issue that will certainly see hurdles in chambers with razor-thin margins.

“But this [is] always the big challenge when it comes to fiscal policy: tax cuts and spending increases are hugely popular, tax increases much less so. President Biden and Secretary Yellen need to work against the political dynamics that would otherwise lead to spiraling federal deficits. It's going to be hard, but they have to try,” Ireland said.

Yellen addressed the concerns about boosting corporate taxes by referring to the Treasury Department's efforts in negotiating with the OECD. She said during her confirmation hearing, “A global minimum tax could stop the destructive global race to the bottom on corporate taxation and help discourage harmful profit-shifting.”

“It’s necessary for U.S. companies to be globally competitive, and that’s why these OECD negotiations are so important,” Yellen added.

Rachel Bucchino is a reporter at the National Interest. Her work has appeared in The Washington Post, U.S. News & World Report and The Hill.

Kris Osborn

H-20 Stealth Bomber, Asia

There's plenty of evidence, just to the naked eye, to demonstrate China’s overt “copycat” maneuver. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: It is not clear if the H-20 could succeed in rivaling a U.S. B-2 given the extent of upgrades and adaptations the Air Force has undertaken with the 1980s platform. The B-2 will soon have air-defense evading Defensive Management Systems sensors, a thousand-fold faster computer processor and weapons upgrades to include an ability to drop the B-61 Mod12 nuclear bomb.

China’s emerging “B-2 copycat” H-20 stealth bomber is expected to introduce an entirely new sphere of threat dynamics to the U.S., as it further cements China’s nuclear triad and massively extends its nuclear attack range to include major portions of the continental U.S. 

The new H-20 bomber,  likely to formally arrive in a matter of months, reportedly has a range of up to 7,500 miles according to the UK’s Sun, making it possible for a single sortie from mainland China to reach targets over the U.S. without needing to refuel. This is a substantial development, as refuelers can of course help reveal the position or presence of a stealth bomber, and uninterrupted stealth bomber attack missions with that kind of reach raise the possibility of undetected nuclear attack upon major U.S. targets.  

An essay in the Asia Times states the following:  “According to the South China Morning Post, which cited a London-based Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies report, the state-of-the-art H-20 can carry a massive weapons payload of 45 tonnes and fly great distances without mid-air refuelling.”

While the exact composition of its stealth properties or radar-signature reducing technologies may not be fully known, available photos and renderings reveal an aircraft which one could say seems in some respects to be indistinguishable from a U.S. B-2. There is nothing surprising about this, given China’s well known and well-documented habit of stealing or copying U.S. weapons designs, it seems particularly apparent in the case of the H-20. It features a similar rounded upper fuselage, blended wing body, curved upper air inlets and essentially no vertical structures.  There appears to be a fair amount of evidence, simply available to the naked eye, to demonstrate China’s overt “copycat” maneuver. 

The B-2 is known for its long-endurance flights as well; during Operation Enduring Freedom in the opening days of the Afghan war, U.S. B-2 flew 44-hour missions from Whiteman AFB, Miss., to Diego Garcia, a small island off of the Indian coastline. From there, B-2s flew bombing missions over Afghanistan in support of U.S. ground forces. 

While this mission likely required refueling, it does speak to the merits and tactical advantages of long-endurance bombing. 

It is also not clear if the H-20 could succeed in rivaling a U.S. B-2 given the extent of upgrades and adaptations the Air Force has undertaken with the 1980s platform. The B-2 will soon have air-defense evading Defensive Management Systems sensors, a thousand-fold faster computer processor and weapons upgrades to include an ability to drop the B-61 Mod12 nuclear bomb.  The B-2, which is expected to fly alongside the new B-21 until sufficient numbers of B-21s arrive, will be a much different plane in a few years when compared to its 1980s origins, as the Pentagon hopes to ensure the platform remains relevant and powerful for many years into the future. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.  

Image: xuehua.us.

Ahead of national elections in September, the CDU has to decide where to go from here.

Kris Osborn

Hypersonic Missiles, The Americas

Hypersonic weapons could soon fire from U.S. Navy destroyers and take off at speeds five times the speed of sound.

Here's What You Need to Remember: A high-speed hypersonic weapon could not only be used to destroy land targets such as fixed infrastructure  or force concentrations from safe standoff distances before an enemy can respond, but also possibly be used as a counter-air weapon able to hit fighter jets traveling themselves at speeds faster than the speed of sound. 

Hypersonic weapons could soon fire from U.S. Navy destroyers and take off at speeds five times the speed of sound from deck-mounted Vertical Launch Systems, fire from airborne bombers and shoot up from the ground near the boundaries of space. 

One particular program now approaching this kind of tactical ability is a DARPA/Air Force program called the Tactical Boost Glide program, a weapon DARPA data explains consists of a rocket accelerating to high speed and then separating from the payload which then “glides unpowered to its destination.” 

A September 2019 Congressional Research Service report described the TBG as “a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that ‘aims to develop and demonstrate technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.’”

DARPA also seeks to engineer a ground-launched hypersonic weapon able to “penetrate modern enemy air defenses,” the report - “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress” -- states.

Lockheed Martin’s emerging Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) offers an example of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle which is propelled up in to the air before relying upon its massive speed of descent to impact and destroy a target. The LRHW, which has now been revealed by Lockheed images, is engineered to travel 60-miles per minute up toward the outer layer of the earth’s atmosphere before gliding at hypersonic speeds to its target. 

What would it mean for a Navy ship to have this kind of range and strategic attack envelope? Surely such a weapons system would change the tactical equation for maritime warfare as it would enable surface warships to destroy enemy land, sea and air targets operating at otherwise unreachable distances or traveling at speed quite difficult to track. 

A high-speed hypersonic weapon could not only be used to destroy land targets such as fixed infrastructure  or force concentrations from safe standoff distances before an enemy can respond, but also possibly be used as a counter-air weapon able to hit fighter jets traveling themselves at speeds faster than the speed of sound. In this respect, an otherwise “hard to target” platform such as an enemy stealth fighter might be vulnerable to attack. This expands the operational scope of Navy ships and of course favors the possibility of successful disaggregated tactical attacks wherein approaching offensive platforms can network in a successful way and integrate coordinated strikes while safer from enemy fire. 

Ship-launched hypersonic weapons could also support ballistic missile defense weapons such as an SM-3 or SM-6 by adding new dimensions to a protective envelope. Vertical Launch Systems might need to be reconfigured to incorporate new kinds of propulsion technology or rocket systems to fire off hypersonics at the needed speeds. Also, a hypersonics could bring a huge defensive advantage to Navy ships by working to intercept attacking enemy anti-ship missiles. 

Kris Osborn is the new Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Kris Osborn

U.S. Navy, Asia

This drone helicopter is an important asset and that is why China has made their own version.

Key point: This drone can take off from a destroyer to scout ahead or deal with a sea mine. It can also launch its own missiles.

Once again, a Chinese weapons platform looks nearly identical to a U.S. system built several years prior. While the particular technological inspiration, specs of design engineering of China’s new unmanned helicopter may not be known, any quick look at the aircraft immediately reveals that it looks almost identical to the U.S. Navy’s FireScout drone. 

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

A Chinese-government backed newspaper is reporting that China’s AR-500C prototype unmanned helicopter completed its first flight, reaching a record-breaking elevation. 

“During the 15-minute flight, the drone completed a series of tests including climbing, hovering, rotating and other operations maneuvers, before steadily landing,” the Global Times states. 

The AR-500C is a rounded helicopter with a sensor beneath the nose, a horizontal structure on the tail and a single rotor blade on the top. These characteristics appear nearly identical to the configuration of the U.S. FireScout drone. The Chinese paper adds that the high altitude drone will be able to perform risky missions in the mountainous regions along the China-India border. The AR-500C can carry a payload of 80 kilograms and deliver supplies in high-risk, high altitude areas, according to the report. 

However, an external resemblance, while significant, suggests little or nothing about the mission scope, networking or sensor capabilities of the Chinese prototype, raising questions as to whether there are any ways in which it might prove comparable to the FireScout in terms of performance. 

The U.S. Navy FireScout is a vertical-take-off-and-landing maritime drone able to launch from a Littoral Combat Ship or DDG 51 destroyer. Not only does the U.S. FireScout conduct forward targeting and surveillance, but the platform has also been configured with special surface-oriented countermine technologies. 

The Fire Scout has been both deploying and conducting training missions onboard Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) for several years. LCS’ Fire Scout drone is an indispensable part of the ship’s surface, countermine and anti-submarine warfare missions; it is equipped with advanced mine-hunting sensors, aerial surface scanners and target-locating EO/IR cameras. The networking is intended to expand not just to ship command and control but other nodes involved in maritime warfare scenarios such as other surface ships, aircraft or even small unmanned surface vehicles. 

The Fire Scout is also now operating with an advanced mine-hunting sensor, designed for combat and surveillance missions in littoral waters, called the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis, or COBRA.

Given that the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship is engineered to use its shallow draft, speed and maneuverability to conduct combat operations in littoral waters near enemy coastlines, having an improved technological capacity to find and detect enemy mines and submarines near the surface expands its mission envelope and provides needed protection for offensive ship operations.The 31-foot long Fire Scout can fly at airspeeds up to 110 knots and reach altitudes of 20,000 feet; the aircraft weighs 3,150 pounds at its maximum take-off weight and is powered by one Rolls-Royce heavy fuel turboshaft engine, Navy officials said.

The Fire Scout has an electro-optical/infrared sensor called Bright Star 2, which has laser range-finding and laser designation, Navy developers said. The MQ-8B Fire Scout can stay up on a mission for up to five hours and also uses Automatic Identification System, or AIS, technology to help locate and identify ships. The Navy has also been integrating a new maritime search radar to its larger Fire Scout variant—the MQ-8C—in order to extend its ISR capacity and provide better targeting support to nearby offensive operations. The existing electro-optical and infrared cameras on the Fire Scout have a range of six-to-ten miles.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

U.S. Air Force, Americas

The question is how many will the Air Force buy?

Key point: The B-21 will help America take out enemy targets that are highly defended. Here is how the B-21 would work alongside the F-35.

Former Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is calling for the Pentagon to buy more new B-21 Raider Long Range Bombers as part of a broader argument that the Air Force is in need of massive, fast-paced modernization. 

“We should welcome the arrival of the B-21 Raider, a long-range bomber under development that is designed to thwart advanced air defenses,” Clinton wrote in a Foreign Affairs essay several months ago.

Clinton is by no means alone. In fact, many senior Air Force leaders have been hoping to increase the number of acquired B-21s above the currently projected 100 planes planned. 

An essay in Air Force Magazine, as cited by Military.com, quotes Global Strike Commander Timothy Ray calling for more than 200 bombers. 

“We’ve said publicly that we think we need 220 bombers overall—75 B-52s and the rest B-21s, longterm,” Ray told Air Force Magazine earlier this year. 

Clinton also makes the argument that the Pentagon should acquire fewer tactical fighter jets in favor of adding more bombers. However, many in the Air Force would also like to see both. 

“The U.S. Air Force will have to focus less on short-range tactical fighter planes and more on long-range capabilities,” Clinton writes. By extension, Clinton says the U.S. should acquire fewer F-35s. 

Upon examination, while many are in agreement that more B-21s are needed, Clinton’s reasoning seems somewhat flawed. B-21s, and especially stealth fighter jets such as the F-35, are needed for both longer range and “closer-in” short-range attacks. 

Interestingly, despite the necessary and much-discussed technical emphasis now placed upon developing long-range, precision-guided “Stand-Off” weapons, “Stand-In” operations for “Direct Attack” are still very much in need, given the set of specific advantages they provide, according to a recent study released by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. 

The report, called “Long-Range Strike: Resetting the Balance of Stand-in and Stand-off Forces,” makes a specific and decided point of stating that a carefully calibrated mix of both approaches is what a fast-evolving modern Air Force needs. The study points to a series of significant variables with which to make this point, such as size, shape, scope and timing of attacks. 

For instance, long range attacks can lack the needed immediacy or short-response time necessary for combat operations, and larger numbers of closer-in attack platforms are vital to increasing dwell time over targets. Needless to say, a larger number of bombers can also carry a larger number of bombs. More bombs might also be important when it comes to attacking heavily defended areas with many countermeasures expected to thwart, disable or intercept attacking weapons. Hitting penetrating targets, also, can be a tactical advantage somewhat specific to Stand-in weapons attacks conducted by stealthy, penetrating aircraft, the study explains. 

“B-2s can deliver 5,000-pound direct attack “bunker buster” weapons and even the 30,000-pound GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator on hardened targets,” the study states.

Essentially, there will remain a clear and pressing need for attacking forces to retain an ability to penetrate heavily fortified and defended areas from both closer-in and longer ranges to successfully optimize offensive operations. This fundamental concept is why attack plans often follow a certain logical sequence, typically starting with stand-off weapons to soften air defenses, to be followed by stealth bombers intended to achieve air supremacy to open a crucial “air corridor” through which less stealthy, fast-maneuvering fighters can attack. There may be circumstances wherein close-in attack tactics are needed to assess shifting targets or track fast-changing combat circumstances. 

Air-to-air engagements, especially when it comes to the prospect of any kind of great-power war, would doubtless be necessary as well, a circumstance underscoring the importance of having larger numbers of fighter jets such as the F-35 in the force. 

Kris Osborn is the new Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Ten years after entering Syria’s civil war, Tehran is using religion to make its influence there permanent.

Ethen Kim Lieser

U.S. Navy SEAL,

Be aware, though, that out of roughly a thousand candidates who start the Navy SEAL training program each year, only about a quarter succeed.

If you think you have what it takes to be a Navy SEAL, all you have to do is sign up and prove it.

Be aware, though, that out of roughly a thousand candidates who start the Navy SEAL training program each year, only about a quarter succeed. And know that all roads to becoming a Navy SEAL end at BUD/S—Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training. There are several avenues to reach that point, but you must finish BUD/S before you can call yourself a SEAL.

One of the more popular options in attaining your lifelong goal is to join the Navy by enlisting. During Boot Camp, you will be required to take and pass the Special Warfare/Operations PST. If you pass the camp, then you are officially in the pre-training community, which means that you will eventually receive orders to attend BUD/S. In the Pre-Training Phase, you will learn about the Special Warfare Communities in addition to beginning your physical training program for the next month and a half to two months. Don’t forget about the PTRR—Physical Training Rehabilitation and Remediation—which you will have to endure for a few weeks.

If you do reach the Phases 1, 2, and 3 at BUD/S, this is when it gets really serious—and where many students quit or even get injured.

Here, you will regularly confront challenges like four-mile timed beach runs, two-mile ocean swims, BUD/S obstacle course, log PT, hundreds of reps of pushups, pullups, and ab exercises. Then there is drown-proofing, life-saving, and underwater knot-tying to keep your anxiety at sky-high levels. 

And don’t forget about Hell Week. At this point in training, you will only get about four hours of sleep in total during a five-and-a-half-day period. The days are long, as much as twenty hours at a time, and you’ll have to push yourself to run, swim, and paddle more than two hundred miles. However, if you do make it past this week, you’ll more than likely have what it takes to become a Navy SEAL.

More specifically for Phase 2, you should have a basic understanding of SCUBA diving prior to attending. You’ll be required to use algebra to solve diving math problems as well as diving physics, with the most important laws being Boyle’s Law and Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressure. One particular test will gauge your ability to remain calm in the event of an emergency situation underwater.

For Phase 3, it is all about land warfare. Here, you will be immersed in shooting, learning, navigating land, and using demolitions, as well as patrolling, shooting, and moving. During this phase, you should be able to run ten to fifteen miles, swim three to four miles, and ruck twenty miles.

If you’re still on your feet, you have finished BUD/S but your SEAL training is not over. After BUD/S graduation, you go to SQT—SEAL Qualification Training. This advanced training program takes those who graduated and forms a TEAM that can operate in water, underwater, from planes and helicopters, ropes and parachutes, boats, and on foot.

After that, you will head to the SEAL Team that selected you to become the next “rookie.” Here, you will have to prove yourself all over again to the veterans while waiting for your first combat deployment.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Josh Hammer

Israeli Election, Middle East

Netanyahu has established himself as a transformative leader. He has overseen both unprecedented diplomatic success overseas and tremendous economic growth and technological innovation at home.

The oft-cited philosophical principle of “Occam’s razor” translates to the notion that the simplest explanation for a causal phenomenon is, more often than not, the correct one. In the context of electoral politics, a natural corollary of “Occam’s razor” is the adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”

Applying this principle to Israel’s March 2021 national election, the Jewish state’s fourth in just two years, the best option for American conservatives, Zionists, and friends of Israel becomes clear: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should remain in his power, and his Likud must be again tasked with forming a stable governing coalition. From an American conservative, nationalist, and Zionist perspective, there is—for better or worse—no viable alternative.

The March elections will be held in the not-too-distant wake of President Joe Biden’s succession of former President Donald Trump, a true friend of Israel (and the Jewish people), and possibly the country’s best ally in the history of modern Zionism. Together, Trump and Netanyahu worked hand in hand to forge a new Middle East consensus that rejected the sclerotic pieties of the past and advanced an assertively pro-America, pro-Israel vision for the region. 

It would be cumbersome to list all of the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine’s myriad advancements on behalf of the Jewish state, but, among other accomplishments, the forty-fifth president: meaningfully undercut Iran’s harrowing path to nuclear weaponry, delivered a decisive blow to the Middle East’s ever-festering Sunni jihadism, defiantly stood up for Israel at the infamously anti-Semitic United Nations, and took numerous concrete steps to bolster Israel’s territorial integrity and physical durability—the moving of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and the State Department’s dramatic proclamation that “settlements” in Judea and Samaria are not per se illegal, among other moves. 

But the biggest changes of all under the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine were those pertaining to the so-called “peace process” with the recalcitrant Palestinian-Arabs, as well as those touching upon the so-called “Arab-Israeli conflict” more broadly. By affirming the international legality of Jewish life past the 1948 armistice line, shutting down the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Washington, D.C. mission, signing into law the Taylor Force Act, and introducing the most pro-Israel plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace ever suggested by an American president, Trump—and the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine, more broadly—firmly communicated to the Palestinians that their obstinacy, intransigence, jihad glorification, and intergenerational inculcation of anti-Semitism would finally come at a price.  

It was the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine’s fortification of Israel’s strategic, legal, and physical position, combined with the overhanging Iranian threat, that found its ultimate manifestation in the landmark Abraham Accords rapprochement—the most important paradigm shift and debunking of the failed “land for peace” diplomatic consensus in modern Middle East history. The Trump-Netanyahu legacy is thus a doctrine showcasing the virtues of the foreign policy axiom of “peace through strength”—and a vindication of the tangible strategic and geopolitical benefits, for each of America, Israel, and the Middle East, of an emboldened Zionism and a tight-knit U.S.-Israel alliance. 

That legacy is also a resounding defeat for those, like former Secretary of State (and current U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate) John Kerry, who have so long peddled the banality that broader Arab-Israeli reconciliation is impossible without mass Israeli territorial concessions to the Palestinian Authority. The outmoded “inside-out” diplomatic approach in the Middle East was indeed dealt a grievous blow by Trump and Netanyahu, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently endorsed the hackneyed “two-state solution” framework nonetheless. It remains to be seen how much, if at all, the new administration may be able to simultaneously advance the Abraham Accords’ “outside-in” approach while simultaneously pushing such discredited “inside-out” diplomatic claptrap. What is certain is that all early indications, such as the administration's intensive courting of the terrorist Iranian regime, its reopening of the United States’ Palestinian-specific consulate in Jerusalem, and its restoring of U.S. aid to the anti-Semitic UN Relief and Works Agency augur poorly and suggest a noxious reprise of the Obama era. 

For American friends of Israel buoyed by both the intrinsic moral dignity of an enhanced Israeli alliance and that alliance’s concrete national security benefits in repelling both Iranian hegemony and Sunni jihad, the thought experiment as to who ought to next lead Israel amounts to the following: “Which candidate for prime minister would be best in sustaining Israel’s marked geopolitical and diplomatic progress, centered around but hardly limited to the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine of Middle East peace, amidst the headwinds of what promises to be an anti-Israel administration redolent of the Barack Obama presidency?” 

The question practically answers itself. Of course, Netanyahu is best-suited to continue leading Israel at the present moment. 

Netanyahu’s now-decade-plus second stint as prime minister largely overlapped with the most anti-Israel U.S. administration in the Jewish state’s history, that of former President Barrack Obama. Netanyahu proved himself admirably adroit and courageous during those tumultuous years, developing a knack for when to strategically appease Obama (for example, the ten-month “settlement” freeze of 2010), mustering the fortitude to loudly confront him when need be (for example, Netanyahu’s spellbinding March 2015 speech before Congress, in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal), and prudently hedging his nation’s decades-long wager on the U.S.-Israel alliance by advancing the Jewish state’s diplomatic interests across Asia, Africa, and Central and South America to hitherto unforeseen heights. Netanyahu, in short, has already weathered the storm of an anti-Israel Democratic presidency without suffering serious blows to Israel’s geopolitical clout, and there is no reason to think he cannot ably do so again. 

But the greatest diplomatic breakthrough for Israel over the last four decades, and quite possibly over the course of its national history, was undoubtedly the signing of the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Those peace agreements would not have been possible without the vision and leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu, whose skill in selling Israel’s value as a diplomatic, geopolitical, and military ally on the world stage helped land the Jewish state not merely closer defense ties with New Delhi or a new Guatemalan embassy in Jerusalem, but affirmative normalization agreements (and all the beautiful accouterments such agreements necessarily entail) with the very heart of the Arab world itself. 

Netanyahu has established himself as a transformative leader. He has overseen both unprecedented diplomatic success overseas and tremendous economic growth and technological innovation at home. In the annals of Israeli political history, he is surpassed by no one other than perhaps preeminent founding father David Ben-Gurion himself. That is not to say Netanyahu is flawless; on the contrary, despite his resoluteness on the Iranian threat, he has too often lacked the courage of his convictions as it pertains to Palestinian-related issues, such as sovereignty in Judea and Samaria and the perennial thorn in the side of the modern Jewish state that is the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. There have been missed opportunities, from a conservative Zionist perspective.

But there is simply no feasible alternative at the present moment. Some conservative Zionists and longtime supporters of Netanyahu’s, frustrated with the inherent political instability that comes with four national elections in just two years and the reality of Netanyahu’s legal travails at the behest of an opportunistic legal fraternity, have urged Netanyahu that now is the right time to finally step aside. But even ignoring the largely frivolous nature of Netanyahu’s specific legal troubles, to say nothing of the fact that it is puerile to necessarily expect awe-inspiring personal virtue from our political leaders, such speculation falls flat when one considers a blunt but crucial reality: There is simply no one else who can take Netanyahu’s place.  

Yair Lapid would be far too accommodationist toward the Biden presidency, and it is not at all obvious in any event that he possesses anything near Netanyahu’s gravitas and statesmanship. Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s most recent putative rival, is now a near non-factor, hovering around the electoral viability threshold in polling. Naftali Bennett, the one-time hardliner on Judea and Samaria and Palestinian statehood, has seemingly sold out in courting leftist voters. Avigdor Lieberman is far too factional and pugnacious. Gideon Sa’ar, the Likud expatriate and founder of New Hope, beclowned himself by bringing onboard Lincoln Project hooligans before having to sever ties due to the Lincoln Project’s sordid scandal involving the discredited operative John Weaver, thus undermining any claim he might otherwise have to prudence and sound political judgment. The blunt reality is that, for better or for worse, the “NeverNetanyahu” Israeli Right is best understood right now as a distraction. We true Eretz Yisrael-believing American Zionists might hope for someone even more aggressive or assertive than Netanyahu, but in this Israeli election, there is no mathematical possibility for an alternative, non-Likud-led right-religious coalition that also excludes the dangerous Lapid. The choice between Netanyahu and Lapid appears to be binary—and stark. 

Two and a half decades after the travesty of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Left is probably on its last legs as a political force. Good riddance. But as frustrating as it may be for those on the Right who seek change for the mere sake of change, or for those who think a shift in leadership at the top will finally bring an end to Israel’s multiyear cycle of electoral drama, the fact remains that there is only one logical path forward: that which, yet again, runs through Netanyahu and Likud. Their success is certainly the outcome that American conservatives and Zionists ought to be hoping for. 

Josh Hammer, a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, is also opinion editor of Newsweek and a research fellow with the Edmund Burke Foundation. Twitter: @josh_hammer. 

Image: Reuters

As the Syrian war reaches its grim decade-long milestone, the UN envoy for the country told the Security Council on Monday that it will “go down as one of the darkest chapters in recent history” referring to the Syrian people as among “the greatest victims of this century”. 

Kris Osborn

Chinese Air Force, Asia

All the major powers are engaging in a major arms race to get hypersonic standoff weapons.

Key point: Although not too many details are known, it appears that China does want a bomber-launched hypersonic missile. This would be similar to U.S. efforts with the ARRW missile for the B-52.

A newly emerged image of a Chinese H-6N bomber (see above, from Weibo) appears to show what looks like a hypersonic missile mounted beneath the fuselage, raising new questions about what kind of threat it may present. 

The photograph shows an elongated missile aligned in a parallel fashion beneath the side of the aircraft, revealing what an article in The Drive says could be a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle similar to that which sits on top of the Chinese DF-17 missile. 

An air-fired boost-glide hypersonic weapon would change the tactical threat envelope presented by China in several key respects, as it could bring new dimensions of mobility to attack options. Not only does the speed of hypersonic weapons make them very difficult to track, but an air-moving launch would complicate efforts to identify a point of origin for the attack. 

If a heat signature of the attack can be detected from any kind of a fixed location, a radar track can be identified more quickly. However, given the speed at which a hypersonic missile could transit from one radar field of view to another, making its flight trajectory and intended target difficult for various defenses to discern. 

Further, a nuclear-armed hypersonic missile might present alarming first-strike possibilities for an adversary such as China which could use air-leveraged positioning to hold large areas at risk quickly. 

When it comes to the prospect of tracking or defending a weapon of this kind, of course, should it be mature enough to present a serious near-term threat, it would seem to rely greatly upon the sophistication of space-based sensors. Boost glide vehicles would typically skim along the upper boundary of the earth’s atmosphere, using the speed of descent to inflict a massive, destructive kinetic energy collision upon impact. 

Detection, therefore, would hinge greatly upon the ability of satellite-based sensors and ground-based radar to quickly coordinate track loop data and pass flight path information from one envelope or field of view to another to generate a continuous or “seamless” track upon the threat.

There are other kinds of emerging defenses against hypersonic weapons to include the possibility of laser interceptors or newer kinds of technologies designed to disrupt the airflow, and therefore the flight path, of an approaching hypersonic weapon. Traveling at the speed of light, laser weapons might be one of the few weapons fast enough to take out a hypersonic projectile. 

The more effectively a weapon moving at that speed can be tracked, the better the prospect of launching some kind of interceptor weapon to knock out or destroy the attacking missile. The prospect of this kind of defensive posture raises interesting questions about the kinds of interceptors which might be fast and accurate enough to succeed in stopping or derailing the hypersonic weapon. This could mean a need to create some kind of hypersonic-to-hypersonic air collision, as perhaps only something traveling at comparable speeds might be able to succeed in stopping a hypersonic missile. 

Much like a space-operating kill vehicle such as those now built into Ground-Based Interceptors for missile defense, a hypersonic interceptor would need to have some kind of seeker or sensor to discriminate an actual hypersonic attack. However, perhaps it could be guided by various kinds of satellite-mounted sensors that would have to operate with an ability to track the heat signature and flight trajectory of a hypersonic vehicle while in flight and not just at a launch point. An advanced interceptor would not only have to have the requisite, precision-capable sensors but also be able to travel fast enough to achieve an actual intercept or kill against a hypersonic weapon moving at five-times the speed of sound. 

Kris Osborn is defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.  This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

North Korea,

According to Daily NK, which cited a source in Yanggang Province, North Korea has increased the number of Ministry of State Security (MSS) officials in the region, in order to cut down on smuggling and illegal border crossings.

North Korea, while it’s been denying for much of the last year that it has any coronavirus pandemic at all, has nevertheless strongly enforced its border with the country where the pandemic began, China. Back in January, North Korea reportedly shut the border with China for another 30 days, after two people were arrested for smuggling condiments, sugar, and soybean oil across the Chinese border.

At the start of February, North Korea reportedly closed the bridges to China in North Hamgyong Province, although it left one bridge, in Saebyul County, open for emergencies. Another such lockdown followed early in March.

Now, there’s a report that North Korea has clamped down even further on its border- and this time, it’s once again about smuggling.

According to Daily NK, which cited a source in Yanggang Province, North Korea has increased the number of Ministry of State Security (MSS) officials in the region, in order to cut down on smuggling and illegal border crossings. Those officials have reportedly ordered the neighborhood watch-like organizations known as the inminban to "provide them with information about recent trends regarding locals.”

The Kim Jong-un regime has stated repeatedly throughout the pandemic that North Korea does not have any cases of the pandemic. But that hasn’t stopped North Korea’s government from accepting vaccines, including from the COVAX Facility. The country has also closed schools and also imposed drastic social distancing measures.

UPI had reported in early March, citing South Korea’s Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, that North Korea had been preparing to resume low-level trade with China. That indicated that the regime might re-open borders for trade at some point between April and June.

"After North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong Un put 'people first' during the Eighth Party Congress, it is expected imports of consumer goods including food, medicine and detergents could take place," KIEP said in its report.

In early March, PRI reported that North Korea would be reopening its borders in order to receive the COVAX Facility’s vaccines.

“AstraZeneca is probably the vaccine that they can handle most easily,” Jerome Kim of the International Vaccine Institute, told PRI in that report, in part because it only requires a single shot and does not need to be frozen before it’s administered. “It's a much more robust system from a public health perspective.”

Also in March, a U.N. expert stated that North Korea’s anti-coronavirus efforts have likely made matters worse for the population there.

“The further isolation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the outside world during the COVID-19 pandemic appears to exacerbate entrenched human rights violations,” Tomas Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in the country, said, per Reuters.

 Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Mark Episkopos

China Aircraft Carrier, Americas

Beijing plans to employ nuclear propulsion technology for the project.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is making major strides toward its ambitious aircraft carrier procurement goals.

Two military insider sources told the South China Morning Post that China’s defense industry is ramping up its efforts to build a fourth aircraft carrier. “Shipbuilders and ship propulsion engineers are keen on making a significant breakthrough with the construction of the fourth carrier,” said one of the sources. “It will be a technological leap for the shipbuilding industry . . . but construction may take longer than for its sister ship due to the different propulsion systems,” the source noted.

A second source added that China’s Central Military Commission is reviewing a proposal from the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) to employ nuclear propulsion technology for the project.

The CSSC said several years ago that a nuclear-powered aircraft would be a major milestone toward its goal to “realise its strategic transformation and combat-readiness capability in deep waters and open oceans by 2025.” In more concrete terms, nuclear-powered propulsion would better support certain high-energy weapon types like lasers and railguns and potentially leave more room for additional aircraft fuel or weapons. Nuclear propulsion offers other logistical benefits, making ships less dependent on fuel supply lines; this can potentially improve response times and enhance the carrier’s operational flexibility.

PLAN currently operates two aircraft carriers. Type 001 Liaoning was built from the hulk of the Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft cruiser Riga that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998. Liaoning was extensively refitted between 2011 and 2018, re-entering service in China’s Navy in the late 2010s. The conventionally powered Shandong is China’s first domestically-built aircraft carrier, commissioned in 2019 on the heels of at least nine sea trials. China’s third, yet-unnamed aircraft carrier is unlikely to be nuclear-powered. The vessel may, instead, feature an integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system that is more fuel-efficient and can offer better response times than the conventional steam turbine system of its Shandong counterpart. The inclusion of an IEP system will enable the use of electromagnetic (EM) launch catapults, one of the core design features outlined by PLAN for its next aircraft carrier.

The third aircraft carrier, unofficially referred to as the Type 003, is slated to be launched this year. Earlier reports suggested that the aircraft carrier will be launched by July 1 to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, but it remains unclear if China’s defense sector can feasibly meet this ambitious timeline.  

PLAN seeks to operate as many as six carrier strike groups by 2035, with other sources adding that China aims to procure a total of ten aircraft carriers—a combination of nuclear and conventionally-powered vessels—by 2049. China’s rush to become an aircraft carrier superpower is a core component of its far-reaching naval modernization program, further reflected by its expanding roster of nuclear-powered submarines and specialized destroyers. A large, modern aircraft carrier fleet stands to greatly enhance China’s power projection capabilities in the East and South China Seas. This is where Beijing is locked in military competition with the United States and faces mounting challenges from India and various neighboring Pacific states.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Desmond Lachman

U.S. Economy Bubble, Americas

America’s massive monetary and fiscal policy experiment is being conducted against the backdrop of a so-called everything asset and credit price bubble, which is very much larger and more pervasive than the earlier U.S. housing and credit market bubble. 

It has long been said that when America, still the world’s largest economy, catches a cold, the rest of the world economy catches pneumonia. With America now engaged in a budget and monetary policy stimulus experiment of epic proportions, the rest of the world is soon to find out what happens to the global economy when America succumbs to an inflationary fever.

Unfortunately, there is good reason to fear that the results will not be pretty. This would especially seem to be the case considering the fact that the American economic policy experiment is occurring at a time that we are in the midst of a global “everything” asset price and credit market bubble.

In the wake of the September 2008 Lehman bankruptcy, it was clear that troubles in the U.S. economy had serious ramifications for the rest of the global economy. Indeed, the bursting of a U.S. housing and credit bubble had ripple effects throughout world financial markets, which precipitated what economists now call the Great Economic Recession.

Fast forward to 2021. Now, America’s massive monetary and fiscal policy experiment is being conducted against the backdrop of a so-called everything asset and credit price bubble, which is very much larger and more pervasive than the earlier U.S. housing and credit market bubble. 

It is not simply that U.S. equity valuations are at the lofty levels last experienced on the eve of the 1929 stock market crash. Nor is it that the dubious Bitcoin market now has a valuation in excess of $1 trillion. Rather it is also that very risky borrowers, especially in the highly leveraged loan market and in the emerging-market economies, can raise money at interest rates not much higher than those at which the U.S. government can borrow.

Today’s everything bubble has been inflated by the extraordinarily low interest rates produced by the massive amount of central bank money printing in response to the coronavirus pandemic. This raises the question as to what happens when the pleasant easy money music stops and interest rates start to rise. Past experience would suggest that when that happens, bubbles will start bursting and the emerging market economies will run into serious trouble as money is repatriated to the United States.

A basic problem with the Biden $1.9 trillion budget stimulus package is that it risks creating precisely such a scenario of rising U.S. interest rates that will burst the global everything bubble. It does so by risking a serious overheating of the U.S. economy.

At a time that the U.S. economy is still receiving extraordinary monetary policy support and at a time that it is characterized by considerable household pent-up demand due to the earlier coronavirus lockdown, the Biden stimulus will imply that the U.S. economy will receive fiscal support that would amount to a staggering 13 percent of the size of the U.S. economy. Being more than three times the size of the 2009 Obama budget stimulus, it is difficult to see how the Biden stimulus will not lead to a booming U.S. economy later this year that, in turn, will lead to overheating.

While Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell keeps assuring us that the Biden budget stimulus does not risk higher inflation, the bond vigilantes evidently do not share his view. Since the start of the year, they have driven up the key ten-year U.S. Treasury bond rate from below 1 percent to over 1.6 percent. There is the real risk that if the Federal Reserve remains in inflation denial, the bond vigilantes could drive U.S. long-term interest rates ever higher on the expectation of yet higher inflation.

In late 2008, Queen Elizabeth II famously asked her advisors why no one had warned her about the bursting of the U.S. housing and credit market bubble. Following that recent experience, today’s policymakers have no excuse for not anticipating the real risk that a bursting of an even larger bubble could wreak havoc on the global economy. One can only hope that when the global everything bubble does burst, they do not get caught as flatfooted as economic policymakers in 2008 by the bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble.

Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was formerly a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department and the chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney. 

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

DARPA,

Jetpacks are a concept mostly associated with science fiction, and other fictional movies and TV shows set in the future or in a galaxy far, far away. But DARPA has some ideas about the future. 

Jetpacks are a concept mostly associated with science fiction, and other fictional movies and TV shows set in the future or in a galaxy far, far away. There are a couple of companies that build jetpacks for private usage, and last year, there were multiple reports of a man in a jetpack being spotted by airplanes in the Los Angeles area. The consensus seems to have been established that those jetpacks were actually drones, meant to look like a man in a jetpack.

Now, jetpacks are in the news for another reason- the possible use of them for military applications.

Task and Purpose reported this week that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently asked for ideas for a “portable personal air mobility system,” one that could be used for (per the report) special operations, search and rescue, urban combat, maritime interdiction, and even logistics missions.

The official description asks for proposals for “submissions of innovative research concepts in the technical domain(s) of Air Platform, Ground/Sea Vehicles. In particular, DARPA is interested in understanding the feasibility of a portable personal air mobility system.” The request will remain open through April 20.

It won’t necessarily be only jetpacks, but other applications of such technology, such as “powered gliders, powered wingsuit, and powered parafoils,” Task and Purpose said. The report noted, however, that the U.S. military using Iron Man/Boba Fett-style jetpack setups is likely something that’s a long way off.

However, The Naval Institute said in a tweet last October that the British Royal Navy is also in the process of testing “Jet Suit assault teams,” which “could be used to rapidly swarm and board ships.” The same report said that the U.S. Special Forces Command was also “evaluating a jetpack that can reach speeds of more than 200 mph.”

There had been some reports about the U.S. military pursuing jetpack technologies going as far back as 2016. Back then, The Wall Street Journal reported that Jetpack Aviation, the Los Angeles-based jetpack company, was in talks with the special forces to develop a military jetpack and that the company had reached a “research and development agreement” with U.S. Special Operations Command, which futurism.com described as “a four-turbine jetpack that will lift twice the weight as current models, and require twice the fuel.”

Jetpack Aviation’s website currently features a pair of military products, including the Military Speeder and Cargo Speeder.

“The smallest, fastest and safest way to transport paramedics, medevac the injured, move life-saving suppliers, and insert/extract personnel. When time counts, the Speeder will save lives. It will also be possible to fly a de-rated version recreationally,” the company said. “The Speeder can either be piloted or flown fully autonomously. It can transform from a pilot carrying craft to cargo craft in less than 10 minutes by sliding off the pilot seat and sliding on the cargo pod or litter basket.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Jacob Heilbrunn

European Politics, Europe

Two state elections this past Sunday suggest that chancellor Angela Merkel’s final bequest to Germany may have been to prepare the path for the Green party to run it.

After sixteen years in power, Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) may be facing its own Dunkirk. In two regional elections, Merkel’s party suffered two decisive defeats on Sunday in the run-up to federal elections in September that will decide the next chancellor of Germany. Not only Merkel will step down in September, but her party may also find itself ousted from power.

The state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate suggest that a traffic-light—or red, green, yellow—coalition could emerge at the federal level between the Social Democrats, the Green party, and the Free Democrats. The CDU’s share of the vote declined by 3.6 in the former state and 4.6 percent in the latter. “It is possible to govern Germany without the CDU/CSU being in government. That message is now firmly in place,” said Social Democrat leader Olaf Scholz on Sunday. For the first time in German history, the Greens, who have eclipsed the Social Democrats, could occupy the chancellery. The Greens currently participate in coalition governments in eleven out of sixteen states. Both the Greens and the liberal Free Democrats scored well in the state elections. For the Free Democrats, who were left for dead after they failed to make the 5 percent hurdle in federal elections in 2013, the opportunity to once again play kingmaker, as they have for decades, would likely be irresistible. The last time the Free Democrats made common cause with the Social Democrats was with the doughty Helmut Schmidt, whom they abandoned in 1982 during the crisis over the Euro-missiles. The result was that the Free Democrats governed together with Helmut Kohl. In a coalition with the Greens and the Social Democrats, the classically liberal Free Democrats would be the most conservative party in the American sense, pushing for low tax rates and personal freedoms.

For the Christian Democrats, the Bundestag election in September could hardly look more daunting. A squabble is breaking out in the party over whether Armin Laschet, who was newly anointed the leader of the party, should also be its candidate for chancellor or if it should look elsewhere. The head of the sister party of the CDU, the Bavarian Christian Social Union, has its own possible candidate—Markus Soeder, the minister-president of Bavaria. Andreas Klurth contends that “Soeder, unlike Laschet, has a knack for being likable and jocular while also getting confrontational when the occasion calls for it. As a campaigner and politician he’s the tougher and wittier of the two.” The problem is that history is against Soeder. The last two candidates from Bavaria, Franz-Josef Strauss and Edmund Stoiber, both flopped at the national level. At a moment when Germany appears to be moving left, a candidate from Bavaria might compound rather than ease the difficulties that the Christian Democrats are currently experiencing.

Indeed, the twin state elections suggest that moving to the right would not serve as an elixir for the CDU’s ailments. The far-right Alternative for Germany also scored quite badly in both elections. In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the party’s share of the vote declined by 5 percent and 4.1 percent in Rhineland-Palatinate. The party has been wracked by infighting between its various political wings, not to mention the subsidence of the immigration issue. Instead, it is the coronavirus pandemic that has created fresh upheaval in German politics as the failure of the Christian Democrats to prevent, or even mitigate, a third wave has badly dented their popularity.

It increasingly looks as though Merkel, who remains personally popular in Germany, has timed her exit perfectly. The former East German scientist who rose to power as a protégé of Kohl before turning on him has all along displayed an uncanny ability to promote her own fortunes. But her own political party? Not so much.

Merkel not only jettisoned one conservative principle after another in her quest to remain in office, but also repeatedly destroyed any potential rivals. Now, as Merkel prepares to say auf Wiedersehen to the political scene, her once-proud party is descending into feuding, backbiting and intrigue. Merkel’s final bequest to Germany may have been to pave the path for the Green party to run it.

 Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest.

Image: Reuters.