Diplomacy & Crisis News

Michael Peck

Espionage, World

A collection of documents compiled by the nonprofit National Security Archive shows just how extensive America's campaign was to obtain the latest Russian gear.

Here's What You Need to Know: Washington went to great lengths to steal Soviet technology.

Sometimes the Cold War seemed like one big treasure hunt. When one side came out with a new weapon, the other side made every effort to get their hands on a copy to analyze, reverse-engineer or give it to guerrillas fighting the opposition.

The United States termed this Foreign Military Exploitation (FME). A collection of documents compiled by the nonprofit National Security Archive shows just how extensive America's campaign was to obtain the latest Russian gear.

For example, a 1951 U.S. Air Force intelligence report described how America got the chance to examine a MiG-15, the Soviet jet fighter that shocked U.S. pilots over Korea. After a dogfight northwest of Pyongyang on July 9, 1951, a MiG-15 pilot was seen bailing out before his fighter crashed in shallow water off the west coast of Korea. British aircraft found the wreckage, but a U.S. Air Force recovery team was unable to retrieve it.

In late July 1951, a combined U.S.-British naval and air task force tried again. Despite fire from Communist forces—which also attempted their own retrieval operation—the Anglo-American force was able to recover virtually the entire aircraft, which was then shipped to the United States for analysis. Other wrecked Soviet aircraft proved a goldmine, such as the Yak-28 Firebar interceptor that crashed in West Berlin in April 1966.

Perhaps the most famous case of grabbing Soviet technology came in the early 1960s, when the CIA "borrowed" and photographed a Soviet Luna satellite on display in Mexico. In 1965, the CIA arranged to get a new Soviet Mi-8 transport helicopter, and also requested $100,000 to obtain a Soviet Minsk-2 digital computer (no mention if the operation was successful).

The constantly shifting alliances of the Cold War meant that weapons given to a Third World ally would end up being given to the opposing superpower once that ally changed sides. Hence, in 1966 the CIA acquired Soviet antiaircraft weapons supplied to Ghana, which then offered them to the United States (likewise, the Soviets probably got a look at the F-14 and other American weapons supplied to Iran after the Islamic revolution took power).

The problem with intelligence operations is that it is often not clear whether the results justify the effort. But the declassified documents make clear that getting hands-on with Soviet equipment and technical manuals bore fruit, particularly for the U.S. Air Force.

Take the July 1966 memo sent by the Air Force to the CIA regarding the Soviet SA-2 antiaircraft missile. "You are undoubtedly aware that our Navy and Air Force pilots have been having considerable success in avoiding losses to the SA-2 system in North Vietnam," wrote Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll. "A part of this success is attributable to the manuals and other information which were secured by your Agency and turned over to DoD for study."

However, the Air Force memo also lamented that the United States had not yet obtained an actual SA-2 system to study. That opportunity arose after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel captured some from Egypt.

Indeed, America's best source for review copies of Soviet weapons was Israel, which collected a vast arsenal of Russian weaponry courtesy of the Arab armies in 1967, 1973 and 1982. But that relationship was less than smooth. For example, a June 1967 memo said that much of the equipment captured in the Six-Day War "is critically needed by the Department of Defense for intelligence exploitation." However, a September 1967 Air Force memo complained that while Israel had granted the United States access to much equipment, the Israelis had displayed "marked hesitancy" in allowing inspection of high-priority items, especially the SA-2 missile (the Air Force suggested the Israelis were aiming to trade access in return for American arms).

Nonetheless, the United States eventually gained full access to the captured Soviet equipment, including SA-2 missiles and their Fan Song radar (which the Americans desperately wanted to examine for jamming purposes), antiaircraft guns, radios and tanks. "This overall exploitation effort is expected to fill many U.S. intelligence and research and development gaps, some of which are directly associated with the Southeast Asian conflict," the Air Force said. These insights spanned Soviet "design criteria, production quality control and research and development philosophy."

Soviet weapons were desired for more than their intelligence value. Those arms could be supplied to groups fighting the Soviets and their allies, notably Afghan rebels battling the Soviet occupation. Again, Israel was seen as a source after it captured vast stocks of Soviet equipment during the 1982 Lebanon War. Though that conflict caused tensions between America and Israel, it also gave the Pentagon priceless information on advanced Soviet weapons such as the MiG-23 fighter and T-72 tank.

Ironically, the Washington thought it should receive the goodies from Israel as a freebie (or as a thank-you for U.S. aid). "While we recognize our current bargaining position with the Israelis is very low," CIA Director William Casey wrote Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, we nevertheless request your assistance… to apply the leverage necessary to acquire these weapons at little or no cost to the U.S. government."

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in February 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Caleb Larson

Supersonic Jets, Americas

Introducing quiet supersonic-travel by Lockheed Martin and NASA

Here's What You Need to Remember: The X-59's cruising speed will be around Mach 1.4, and is estimated to produce a mere 75 decibels or sound, roughly comparable to a home vacuum cleaner.

Commercial travel at supersonic speeds has been something of a wild goose chase. There are a number of technically challenging engineering obstacles that have to be overcome in order for a supersonic jet airliner to be both just possible—and importantly, commercially viable. Though difficult, there have been several supersonic jet airliners built, though they enjoyed varying degrees of success.

Back in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union was the first in the supersonic airliner field. Beginning with their Tu-144 jet, built by the venerable Tupolev design bureau, the Soviets owned the skies—for a very short time. The Tu-144 was based on the Anglo-French developed Concorde jet, as evidenced by their strikingly similar geometry.

Though first, the Tu-144 was not the best. It suffered from high weight, thanks in part to a larger landing gear design. It further suffered from high fuel consumption due to the high-output jet engines it needed to keep it airborne. The Tu-144 flew just a paltry 102 commercial flights, only about half of which carried any passengers—making it a commercial failure. The rival it was modeled on, the Concorde, was considerably more successful.

Anglo-French Cooperation

The European venture into the supersonic airline industry was the pride of the French and the Brits. They couldn’t match the United States’ nor the Soviet Union’s space programs—but they could build a supersonic passenger jet. So they did.

The Concorde flew for about a quarter of a century, not exactly a star compared to other commercial jet designs like the 474, but it was at the top of the supersonic pack. It was lighter, and somewhat smaller than the Soviet copycat. It offered quick service between western Europe and the East Coast, though exclusively for the luxury air travel crowd.

One of the Concorde’s drawbacks, like the Tu-144, was its loud sonic boom. To reduce disturbances to residents on the ground, the Concorde’s throttle was restricted over land, taking advantage of its supersonic top speed only over the ocean. This obviously hampered its utility.

The Americans Return

Like their Soviet rivals, the United States’ original foray into supersonic air transport was a disaster—worse even than the Soviets. The American jet didn’t make it past the mockup stage, as testing in the mid-1960s revealed that public opinion was deeply opposed to sonic booms, which were jarring to residents. For this reason, the American supersonic project was abandoned. It has recently made a comeback, however.

NASA is back in the supersonic passenger jet game. In tandem with Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division, research is being done into lowering sonic boom decibel levels. The test airframe, the X-59 Quiet SuperSonic Technology jet is “on a mission to achieve supersonic speeds over land that create no more than a sonic “thump” to those below.”

An X-59 project manager described the project’s ultimate goal, “The X-59 is designed so that, as it flies faster than sound, any sonic booms that reach the ground are so quiet they can barely be heard—if at all.”

In order to achieve this goal, NASA and Lockheed Martin built a pretty strange-looking plane. Its cruising speed will be around Mach 1.4, and is estimated to produce a mere 75 decibels or sound, roughly comparable to a home vacuum cleaner.

This optimistic sound estimate is hope to be achieved through the X-59’s long and narrow fuselage, and two forward canard wings, which are designed to prevent or disperse shock waves that cause a sonic boom. Initial flight tests are scheduled for sometime in 2021. Is this the future of commercial aviation?

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and Defense Writer with The National Interest. He lives in Berlin and covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Flickr.

Michael Peck

Hypersonic Missiles, Americas

Intercepting a ballistic missile with an anti-missile has been likened to "hitting a bullet with a bullet."

Here's What You Need to Know: A leak-proof shield that can reliably stop a massed salvo of hypersonic glide vehicles seems doomed to failure. But is it?

DARPA calls it "counter-hypersonics."

The rest of us would call it a way -- or a prayer -- to stop nuclear warheads coming down on our heads at 20 times the speed of sound.

DARPA, the Pentagon's pet research agency, wants an interceptor that can stop weapons that are hypersonic (travel faster than Mach 5). The agency has begun soliciting proposals for Glide Breaker , its project to stop boost-glide vehicles that are lofted high into the atmosphere atop a ballistic missile, and then glide down to Earth. The current exemplar is Russia's Avangard, touted by President Vladimir Putin as unstoppable by anti-missile defenses. The Avangard is lofted by a giant RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, and then glides down to its target at Mach 20. But China and the U.S. are also developing boost-glide vehicles.

DARPA seeks to "develop and demonstrate a technology that is critical for enabling an advanced interceptor capable of engaging maneuvering hypersonic threats in the upper atmosphere." And it wants this technology in a hurry: Glide Breaker should be tested in 2020.  Meanwhile, the Missile Defense Agency -- the Pentagon organization charged with stopping ballistic missiles -- also has its program to develop defenses against hypersonic weapons.

There's a reason for the rush. Hypersonic weapons may be able to penetrate U.S. missile defenses or streak past the defenses of U.S. aircraft carriers. Even more worrisome, they might be armed with conventional warheads to destroy targets -- notably ICBMs in hardened silos -- once thought invulnerable to anything but nuclear weapons.

DARPA's solicitation is light on unclassified details, though it says it wants "innovative solutions" to stop boost-glide vehicles. That's putting it mildly. If shooting down ballistic missiles is hard, then boost-glide vehicles, also known as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), is even harder.

For starters, the gliders don't traverse outer space like an ICBM, but instead soar through the thin upper atmosphere, where they can achieve extremely high speeds while flying too low to be easily detected by early warning radars designed to track ballistic missiles arcing through outer space. For another, while an ICBM warhead follows a predictable (and Mach 23) path as it descends through the atmosphere, a boost-glide vehicle -- like a hobby glider -- can maneuver, which make it much harder to an interceptor to hit.

Intercepting a ballistic missile with an anti-missile has been likened to "hitting a bullet with a bullet." Imagine if the bullet were taking evasive action.

Or put another way, counter-hypersonics encounters all the difficulties of ballistic missile defense against ICBMs, and then some. "The most obvious challenge is the maneuverability of HGVs, which makes it very difficult to maintain track on the vehicle and plan an intercept course using our current capabilities," George Nacouzi, an engineer at the RAND Corp. think tank, told the National Interest . "Flight altitude is also challenging for our current systems. The HGV may fly too high for many endo-atmospheric interceptors and too low to be detected and tracked early by long range radars."

Nacouzi believes there are ways to shoot down HGVs, "but they would involve using a nearly ubiquitous surveillance and tracking system accompanied by strategically positioned very high performance interceptors or, possibly in the future, directed energy weapons." The U.S. is developing these solutions for intercepting ballistic missiles, but they all have drawbacks: directed energy weapons such as lasers can be affected by weather, while having armed drones or aircraft constantly hovering over North Korean missile sites could trigger a war.

James Acton, an arms control expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that despite their speed, hypersonic weapons can be destroyed by some ballistic missile defense systems such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The problem is that THAAD is a point-defense weapon designed to protect a small area: covering the entire United States with THAAD-like defenses would be prohibitively expensive.

So, given current technology, a leak-proof shield that can reliably stop a massed salvo of hypersonic glide vehicles seems doomed to failure.

But maybe the value of counter-hypersonics isn't shooting down these lethal gliders?

DARPA may have captured the real value of counter-hypersonic defenses in a notice for a July 2018 Proposer's Day , where industry had a chance to learn about the project. The notice stated that "a key figure of merit is deterrence: the ability to create large uncertainty for the adversary’s projected probability of mission success and effective raid size."

Note the significance of that phrasing: anti-hypersonic defense is successful not by necessarily destroying every incoming boost-glide vehicle, but by making a potential adversary uncertain of which hypersonic vehicles will get through. It's the equivalent of body armor that will stop only 50 percent of bullets fired at it -- but the attacker can't be sure of whether a particular bullet aimed at a vital spot will hit its target.

That's been the whole basis of nuclear deterrence since the early days of the Cold War. Even if a first strike could destroy much of the enemy's nuclear missiles and bombers, an attacker couldn't be sure that enough nukes would be left over to mount a devastating retaliation.

However, the Achilles heel of ballistic missile defense has been that it's cheaper for an attacker to build an overwhelming mass of missiles and warheads than it is for the defender to build interceptors to stop them. It remains to be seen whether the economics of hypersonic missile defense will be the same.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in January 2019.

Image: REUTERS/Steve Dipaola

Robert Farley

Navy, Asia-Pacific

Political obstacles and allies make the issue a moot point for the Japanese.

Here's What You Need to Know: The only serious obstacles to Japan’s construction of fleet carriers are political. But political obstacles are still obstacles, and the appearance of Shokaku and Zuikaku would have significant repercussions at home and abroad.

Japan decided to refit its Izumo-class light carriers to operate the F-35B stealth fighter. So modified, the Izumos will carry about a dozen F-35Bs each, giving the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force a small but significant aviation combat capability.

The question now is “what comes next?”

Japan and China

In 2006 Japan laid down the first of two fourteen-thousand-ton Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers at IHI Marine United Yokohama Shipyard. In 2012, Japan laid down the twenty-thousand-ton Izumo, a light carrier in all but name, followed shortly by her sister Kaga. While the Hyugas could conceivably operate the F-35B, there is no indication thus far that the JMSDF intends to retrofit them.

During the same period, China (Japan’s most likely strategic competitor) acquired and refurbished an old Soviet STOBAR carrier, and then built another STOBAR carrier to a modified design. The sixty-thousand-ton Chinese carriers can carry more aircraft than the Izumos, but of older vintage than the F-35B. Between them, Liaoning and her as-yet-unnamed sister can carry some sixty J-15 “Flying Shark” fighters, in addition to helicopters and support aircraft. China’s future plans remain somewhat murky, but it is widely believed that the PLAN intends to build one or two ships to an advanced, conventional CATOBAR design, and then potentially move on to nuclear-propelled supercarriers. J-31 stealth fighters may eventually fly from the decks of these ships.

Long story short, the retrofit of the Izumos represents a real increase in capability for the JMSDF. Nonetheless, China is now several years ahead of Japan, not only in terms of the availability of platforms, but also in the development of naval aviation experience. Japan does not need to compete directly with China over the number of jets launched from flight decks, but China’s increasingly formidable naval aviation force seems to have had some influence on Japanese thinking. So, will Japan decide to compete?

Japan’s Options

Japan is an exceedingly wealthy country with a large, robust, and technologically sophisticated shipbuilding industry. If it wants to supersede the Izumos with larger, more capable carriers then it can do so; the only obstacles are political.

The main questions are what such ships (which for the sake of convenience we will call “Shokaku” and “Zuikaku”) might look like. Japan is unlikely to order a large carrier from a foreign yard, and not just because very few countries can build such ships. Rather, Japan would want to develop and retain the expertise associated with the construction of large, modern aircraft carriers, a project that it has already begun with the Hyugas and Izumos.

Something like the sixty-five-thousand-ton Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier is not at all beyond Japanese shipbuilding capabilities. With the F-35B, such a ship would immediately be competitive with, and indeed likely superior to, China’s Liaoning-class aircraft carriers. However, the dependence on the F-35B would limit Japan’s options down the road. Unless Japan decided to develop its F-3 stealth fighter as a STOVL aircraft, the F-35B would be the only plausible shipborne fighter for the operational lifespan of Shokaku and Zuikaku. However, these ships could still operate an array of advanced unmanned aircraft, as well as any F-35B replacements developed by the United States. Experience gained by operating the F-35B with the Izumos would feed directly into a “Queen Elizabeth” style ship. Pilots and crew will develop invaluable experience with landings, takeoffs, and shipboard maintenance that Japan has lacked since 1945.

But unlike China, Japan enjoys the benefit of extensive military and industrial relationships with countries that currently operate aircraft carriers, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, Japan does not necessarily need to take the kind of slow, methodical approach to carrier development that China has taken. Instead, Japan could build Shokaku and Zuikaku as full CATOBAR carriers. It can license or acquire the necessary technology (presumably EMALS launch systems) from the United States, and it could utilize the decks of USN supercarriers to develop the cadre of pilots and aircrew it would need to populate such carriers. If Japan decides to go the CATOBAR route, Shokaku and Zuikaku could become some of the world’s most formidable warships, outside of the Nimitz and Ford class supercarriers.

Although the ships would benefit from the range and power-generation capacity offered by nuclear propulsion, Japan lacks any experience with nuclear warships, even at the submarine level. But the United States operated conventional supercarriers for a very long time, under more demanding global requirements than a Japanese carrier would face. Moreover, a CATOBAR carrier would have the option of flying the F-35C or any other carrier-launched aircraft that Japan could develop or acquire in the future. This would give Shokaku and Zuikaku longer range and heavier punch than a Queen Elizabeth style STOBAR carrier.

Parting Thoughts

To repeat: the only serious obstacles to Japan’s construction of fleet carriers are political. But political obstacles are still obstacles, and the appearance of Shokaku and Zuikaku would have significant repercussions at home and abroad. Indeed, the existence of such obstacles would seem to demand a gradual approach. Still, the decision to refit the Izumos to fly modern stealth attack aircraft suggests that the current Japanese government is willing to run some risks. There can be little doubt at this point that Japan will someday build a successor class to the Izumo; the only questions are when, and what those ships will look like.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

This article first appeared in February 2019.

Image: U.S. Navy Flickr

Kris Osborn

MADL F-35, Americas

MADL is essential for the growing multinational role of the F-35 program. It gives NATO and other allied countries that fly the jets an opportunity to conduct synchronized operations and explore previously unprecedented missions.

The F-35 fighter is well known for its fleet-wide, secure Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL), which connects many of the fifth-generation stealth fighters together. This datalink expands the type of missions that F-35 jets can conduct and enables the real-time sharing of targeting data between aircraft in warfare operations. 

All About the MADL: What Is It? 

MADL is essential for the growing multinational role of the F-35 program. It gives NATO and other allied countries that fly the jets an opportunity to conduct synchronized operations and explore previously unprecedented missions.

MADL, when operated in conjunction with other F-35 sensors, can achieve the much sought-after goal of sharing threat data and helping the jet find and destroy enemy targets from ranges where it remains undetected. This ability, shown in several wargames in recent years, is something that F-35 pilots point to as a defining reason for its superiority. 

“Having sensor fusion and MADL (Multifunction Advanced Datalink), all of those potential dogfighting engagements can be avoided before we ever even get within visual range, let alone actually have to dogfight in the air, whatever the opponent is,” Monessa “Siren” Balzhiser, F-35 Production and Training Pilot, Lockheed Martin, told the National Interest. “The tactical scenario, more often than not, is going to be solved much further out, which is going to give us the advantage.”

Why It Matters 

It is unsurprising that the Air Force and other F-35 operating services, such as the Navy and Marine Corps, have in recent years been working on additional communications technologies for the F-35 jet to expand its operations. The MADL-like ability will be included on F-22 Raptors and fourth-generation aircraft too. 

“It's not just fighting against fourth-generation threats where the F-35 stands out, but also integrating with other U.S. military platforms and other NATO platforms to meet a strategic objective,” Balzhiser said. 

While MADL and the F-35 sensors and computers are, of course, fundamental to any offensive attack operation. Pilots explain that more recent innovations are increasing the jet’s ability to share information with fourth-generation fighters and even other platforms.   

“[The F-35] is not just good fighting against fourth-generation [aircraft] and it’s not just about all the capabilities we have against fourth-generation [aircraft], it’s also about integrating with fourth-generation fighters,” Tony “Brick” Wilson, the chief of Fighter Flight Operations for Lockheed Martin, told The National Interest. “I’ve gotten to fly the F-16 in a number of large force exercises with F-35s and F-22s and we were all embedded in one strategic goal for the entire ‘war.’”

The Comms Revolution

These efforts, ongoing now for several years, have taken many forms. For instance, the F-35 jet can now engage in two-day connectivity with F-22 Raptors using LINK 16 as a result of certain modifications. Building upon this effort, the Air Force is working with industry partner Northrop Grumman to test a new software-programmable radio prototype designed to enable F-35 jets to connect with F-22 Raptors while preserving “stealth mode.”  

The Freedom 550, as its called, works by sending Internet Protocol (IP) packets of data through waveforms to transmit combat-relevant information. Colin Phan, the director of Strategy and Tech Communications for Northrop Grumman, told the National Interest earlier this year that there can be one multi-function box that does as many as twenty-five different functions. Stealth mode is sustained by using a smaller number of modules to connect the two data links together through a converter, Phan explained. Fewer modules help preserve stealthy communications by virtue of decreasing the emissions of an omnidirectional antenna which is more likely to be detected. The broader the signal and the wider the emission, the larger the potentially detectable electronic signature, something which can of course present a risk of being detected.

LINK 16 advances and the Freedom 550 radio are a few of the efforts to support the F-35 jet’s “flying computer” role as a data manager or aerial quarterback in the sky. This fortifies and improves what is already an advantage built into the F-35 jet, which is the ability to organize and streamline data to reduce the need for extraneous data exchange. 

“Targeting assignments can be seen and checked by flight leads to make sure that everyone is targeting appropriately,” Chris “Worm” Spinelli, an F-35 fest pilot for Lockheed Martin, said. “There’s a vast amount of information that the jet is able to absorb, process, and present to not only the pilot in his or her aircraft but his or her wingman via datalink that significantly cuts the amount of comms required, which again, allows that pilot to become a true tactician.”

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Air Force

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit, United States

The expanded child tax credits approved under President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan appear to have done a remarkable job in feeding the nation’s hungriest families.

The expanded child tax credits approved under President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan appear to have done a remarkable job in feeding the nation’s hungriest families.

Since the child tax credit payments began rolling out in mid-July, the number of adults living in households with children that reported not having enough to eat has plummeted by 3.3 million—a total reduction of about one-third, according to data compiled from the latest Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey.

“A key reason these payments likely reduce hardships like food insecurity is that the American Rescue Plan’s expansion of the Child Tax Credit made children in the lowest-income families eligible for the full credit for the first time. Previously, some twenty-seven million children received only a partial Child Tax Credit or no credit at all because their family’s incomes were too low,” wrote Claire Zippel, senior research analyst at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and author of a recent report on the topic.

“Congress should make it a top priority to extend the monthly payments and ensure that the full credit remains permanently available to children in families with the lowest incomes,” she continued.

Due to the president’s ambitious stimulus bill passed last spring, eligible parents are now able to receive as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen. Broken down, this means that a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be direct deposited each month through the end of the year.

Helping the Hardest Hit

Zippel added that these timely credits have been especially beneficial to Black and Latino households, who’ve often suffered the most due to the ongoing pandemic.

“The improvement has been dramatic for all racial and ethnic groups but particularly for Black and Latino people,” she noted.

“The number of Black, Latino, and white adults with children in households where someone didn’t get enough food has each fallen between one-fourth and one-third since early July. These declines are especially important among Black and Latino people, whose food hardship rates were—and remain—about double the white rate,” she continued.

Lifeline to Low-Income Households

The survey also revealed that the most common way parents with household incomes below $25,000 used the credit payments was for food, followed by utilities, clothing, rent or mortgage, and education-related costs.

“Households with incomes above $25,000 also spent a sizable portion of the credit on these kinds of necessities but less than lower-income families, which face more difficulties affording the basics,” Zippel said.

“Compared with those with less income, the households with incomes above $25,000 were, for example, more likely to pay down debt or save the funds for later use,” she added.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Caleb Larson

X-44 MANTA, Americas

Like the F-22 on which the X-44 was based, it would have been highly stealthy and may have even been stealthier than its F-22 parent.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The X-44 was one of a number of designs that Lockheed Martin designed and pitched to the U.S. Air Force as a way to augment the branch’s stealthily airframes, though this particular design may be the only one that was tailless. With F-22 production lines long since shuttered, it is unlikely we’ll ever get to see the X-44 MANTA in flight.

The X-44 MANTA, which stands for Multi-Axis No Tail Aircraft, was a futuristic-looking derivative of Lockheed Martin’s iconic F-22 design. According to Air Force Magazine, Lockheed Martin may have designed up to six different airframes similar to the F-22 Raptor that were offered to the Air Force. Though none of them were picked up, this particular design is said to have drawn the interest of NASA as a research platform with which to test controlling tailless designs using thrust vectoring. Meet the X-44 MANTA.

Stealthy by Design

Like the F-22 on which the X-44 was based on, it would have been highly stealthy and may have even been stealthier than its F-22 parent. Renderings of the X-44 concept indicate that it would have carried over the F-22’s air intake inlets that are designed to diffuse enemy radar inside of them rather than reflecting radar outwards.

Like the iconic B-2 stealth bomber, the X-44 design was tailless. Sans tail, these tailless designs are inherently stealthier than other tailed airframes—the X-44 would have had a very low radar signature. Instead of using standard control surfaces to maneuver while in flight, the MANTA maneuvered using thrust vectoring, in which the dual engine’s exhaust nozzles could direct exhaust in various directions.

Though innovative, thrust vectoring designs are nothing new. One successful Russian design in service with the Indian Air Force, a variant of the Sukhoi Su-30, benefits from very high maneuverability thanks to its thrust vectoring engine nozzles.

The modified delta wing design also had a couple of benefits over its predecessor. By design, delta wings have more surface area internally and externally than traditional swept wings and can, therefore, hold more fuel. Using so-called wet wings, also known as integral fuel tanks, a greater volume of fuel could be stored internal in the plane’s wings.

This kind of fuel storage is relatively common and allows for a large amount of fuel to be carried. In addition to higher fuel capacity, the X-44 would have benefited from a more aerodynamic airframe, resulting in lower drag while in flight.

Postscript

The X-44 was one of a number of designs that Lockheed Martin designed and pitched to the U.S. Air Force as a way to augment the branch’s stealthily airframes, though this particular design may be the only one that was tailless. With F-22 production lines long since shuttered, it is unlikely we’ll ever get to see the X-44 MANTA in flight.

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and Defense Writer with The National Interest. He lives in Berlin and covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

World War II, Europe

Five lessons from the failed operation.

Here's What You Need to Know: The operation will always be a great "what-if" of history.

(This article first appeared in October 2019.)

On the afternoon of September 17, 1944, the death blow to Hitler’s Germany seemed to blossom in the skies over Holland.

It was 75 years ago when two American and one British airborne division landed in a carpet of parachutes that stretched 60 miles from Eindhoven in southern Holland north to Arnhem on the Rhine River. Instead of the chaos that afflicted the early night airborne landings in Sicily and Normandy, the landings on that warm Sunday went remarkably smoothly, with the troops landing on their drop zones smoothly with light losses.

It was an auspicious beginning to what the Allies hoped would be the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. Just three months ago, the American, British and Canadian armies had been stuck in Normandy, penned in by hedgerows and panzer divisions. But in August, the Germans had broken apart and the Allies had broken out, in an advance that took them 500 miles into Germany itself. The once-invincible Wehrmacht, already being hammered in the East by the Soviet juggernaut, seemed to be falling apart.

But guarding Western Germany like a moat was the mighty Rhine River. Once sheltered behind it, the battered German columns fleeing France could rest and regroup. But what if the Allies could bounce the Rhine in one quick, audacious advance? Once across the waterway, they could race across the North German plain to seize the industrial heartland of the Ruhr – and then on to Berlin. Perhaps the war in Europe would end by Christmas!

The problem was how to quickly cross the numerous rivers and canals that crisscross the Netherlands, This was where the 35,000 paratroopers of the First Allied Airborne Army came in: they would swoop down to seize several bridges across the Netherlands, creating an corridor that would let the tanks race the Dutch polder (land protected from the water by dykes) until they reached the British 1st Airborne Division securing the bridge across the Nederrijn at Arnhem.

Yet just eight days later, the last exhausted survivors of the 1st Airborne Division – that had triumphantly seized the bridge across the Rhine at Arnhem -- paddled back across the river. Instead of a highway to the Reich, the Allies had achieved a 60-mile corridor to nowhere.

Operation Market-Garden will always be a great what-if. Had it succeeded, it would have gone down as one of the most brilliant audacious operations in history. But it didn’t succeed, and the reasons why still matter today.

Here are some lessons of an operation that was “a bridge too far:”

Don’t assume a defeated enemy will stay defeated: 

Buoyed by their sizzling advance across France and Belgium, the Allies were so confident of German collapse in autumn 1944 that they became complacent. Market-Garden was essentially a British operation. And if anyone should have known better, it was the British, who had painfully learned how skillful the Germans were at improving during a crisis. There was no excuse for assuming that the Wehrmacht would not find the resources and willpower to resist a 60-mile thrust into their lines. The same wishful thinking can be seen in U.S. assessments that there was “light at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam just before Tet Offensive, or the assumption that capturing Baghdad in 2003 would mean the end of the Iraq War.

Details matter:

The same planners who meticulously worked out every detail of D-Day – the largest amphibious invasion in history – failed to consider basic details such as coordinating ground and air operations. British commander disregarded aerial reconnaissance and Dutch Resistance reports that two SS panzer divisions that had sent spotted near Arnhem. The 1st Airborne seized the Arnhem bridge, but couldn’t receive reinforcements, supplies or even air support because their radios had been sent to the wrong frequencies. Then again, the U.S. Army and Marines couldn’t communicate with the Navy and Air Force during the 1982 invasion of Grenada.

What can go wrong, will go wrong:

When the 19th Century German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz spoke of the inevitable “friction of war,” he must have had a clairvoyant vision of Market-Garden. As soon as the operation began, it began to unravel. The paratroopers mostly secured their objectives on the first day, but shortages of transport aircraft and bad weather hindered aerial reinforcement and resupply. The Germans recovered the complete Market-Garden plan from the body of a dead Allied officer. The British armored advance was confined to a single road (“Hell’s Highway”) on a narrow causeway above flooded terrain continually blocked by German counterattacks. Napoleon Bonaparte, who might have won at Waterloo had it not rained, would have sympathized.

Use the right army for the right job:

America and Britain fielded different armies in World War II. The Americans were more willing to take risks. But short of manpower after five years of war, and scarred by the slaughter of an entire generation in the First World War, the British tended to favor methodical offensives designed to minimize casualties. Though Operation Market-Garden relied on a rapid ground advance to relieve the lightly armed paratroopers at Arnhem, the British armored columns were criticized for moving too cautiously. It would be 20 years later, in Vietnam, when it would be the American military’s turn to fight a war it was unsuited for.

Don’t bite off more than you can chew:

“I think we may be going a bridge too far,” one British commander is reported to have said about the plan for Market-Garden. Relying on paratroopers to seize multiple bridges across a 60-mile corridor would have been an ambitious endeavor under the best of conditions. However, Hitler also took too big a bite when he tried to conquer Russia. He paid the price.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in October 2019.

Image: An aerial view of the bridge across the Waal River at Nijmegen, September 1944 / Wikimedia Commons

Andrew Doran

War on Terror, Middle East

The present humiliation should be borne by foreign policy elites, the generals, the best and the brightest, not by the American people—and especially not by those who served, though they doubtless feel it more viscerally than the hawkish elites who counseled war.

War invariably falls hardest on common people, but until recent decades, senior officials were often held to account for failure. Statesmen and generals might pay for disaster with exile or even execution; at a minimum, they were forced to leave office in disgrace. Modern warfare is often harsher for soldiers and civilians alike but is somehow easier for elites. After Vietnam, a disgraced figure such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara could go on an apology tour and reclaim some measure of respectability. Today, there is no accountability at all.

Foreign policy elites with careers unblemished by success live in comfort far from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, and die in their beds while thousands of Marines and soldiers followed such American Bourbons to humiliating defeat, only to end up in humble graves in parts of America as alien to ruling elites as Afghanistan is to troops from Appalachia. Thousands more live with physical and psychological wounds. It is long since time to hold the foreign policy elites and generals who failed America to account.

Historian Charles Norris Cochrane described the Peloponnesian War as, “a terrifying record of human energy and resources dissipated to no profitable end.” Future historians may give a similar assessment of the last two decades of U.S. failure in the Middle East.

Where did the United States go wrong? Much has been written and much more will be written, but a few general trends emerge. First, the enemy, “terror,” was an abstraction, and it’s impossible to wage war on an abstraction. Second, we didn’t understand the nature of Afghanistan—or of Iraq, or Syria, or Libya. America was successful at rebuilding post-tribal, modern societies like Germany and Japan, but not premodern societies. No one thought to ask whether the democratic institutions that emerge in high-trust societies can be replicated in societies with traditions of religious and ideological extremism, literacy rates below one-third, or consanguineous marriage rates of nearly fifty percent—a strong indicator of low social trust. Third, we possessed neither concrete objectives, nor a coherent strategy, nor a definite timeline. Essentially tactical approaches like counterinsurgency and counterterrorism served as substitutes for strategy, and few elites took notice. Then, as is often the case in the region, militaries that cohere around a religious identity proved stronger than those that cohere around a national identity. Perhaps above all, there was a misplaced confidence in the tools of the state and of statecraft. As many have noted, America is itself in need of nation-building and is in no position to lecture others.

The hubris of U.S. foreign policy elites over the past twenty years followed in large part from the misapplication of the lessons of World War II to the Global War on Terror. America was the only real victor of World War II, while the other great powers were devastated. So, we inferred that war could solve more problems than it actually can. Nevertheless, the last two decades of failed policy in the Middle East have produced several victors: China and Russia, Iran, and perhaps also Turkey. And arguably the Taliban, and even Al Qaeda and its outgrowths.

The reckoning for U.S. foreign policy elites—politicians, policymakers, generals, diplomats, think tanks that had access and influence—is long overdue. It’s time for a painstaking inquiry into what went wrong to ensure that it doesn’t happen again in the era of great power competition. One model for accountability could be the Church Committee hearings of 1975, which exposed abuses by the intelligence community and federal law enforcement that so shocked Americans that some agencies were nearly shut down altogether. Americans today would likely be similarly outraged as they learn that senior officials were aware not only of the impossibility of victory but also of rampant bacha bazi (pedophilia), bribery, and corruption, and other scandalous conduct in Afghanistan.

In 1992, U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf wrote, “I am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit—we would still be there, and we, not the United Nations, would be bearing the costs of that occupation.” There will be other tar pits to avoid in the decades ahead. Terrorist attacks will occur, terrorists may flourish, but the United States must remain focused on national security priorities, starting with great power competition.

For its part, the Biden administration and its glittering Ivy League elites now stand over the wreckage of the failure in Afghanistan like the French nobles at Agincourt. The present humiliation should be borne by foreign policy elites, the generals, the best and the brightest, not by the American people—and especially not by those who served, though they doubtless feel it more viscerally than the hawkish elites who counseled war.

The Afghanistan failure has a thousand fathers. The hubris, naïve optimism, and overextension that has long been plain to most Americans have yet to be fully grasped by some foreign policy elites. It is these elites, rather than the heroes who served there, who should go cap-in-hand and live the rest of their days as base panders—in shame, and eternal shame.

Andrew Doran is a senior research fellow at the Philos Project. From 2018-21, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

Weapons, Americas

So why buy American weapons?

Here's What You Need to Know: American weapons remain the world's best.

The U.S. government has a message for those nations that would buy Russian and Chinese weapons: buyer beware.

“We have come a long way since the AK-47 became the ubiquitous symbol of Soviet-backed insurgencies from Southeast Asia to Africa,” R. Clarke Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, said during a speech at the Meridian International Center.  “Today, Russia is working hard to foist variants of its S-400 air defense system around the world, while China is supplying everything from armored personnel carriers to armed drones.  To quote another Latin phrase – caveat emptor! – Buyer, beware.  We have seen countries around the world leap at the chance to obtain high-tech, low cost defensive capabilities, only to see their significant investments crumble and rust in their hands.”

Cooper cited examples where Chinese weapons haven’t lived up their sales pitches. “In Africa, Cameroon procured four Harbin Z-9 attack helicopters in 2015: one crashed shortly after being handed over.  Kenya invested in Norinco VN4 armored personnel carriers – vehicles that China’s own sales representative declined to sit inside during a test firing.”

“And similarly, amongst our partners in the Middle East, we’ve seen instances in which countries that have procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones have found them to be inoperable within months, and are now turning around to get rid of them,” he added. “Caveat emptor!”

Cooper’s sales pitch for U.S. weapons comes as U.S. weapons have taken a bit of a black eye. The recent drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabian oilfields, launched by Iran or its Houthi allies, led to criticisms that Saudi Arabia’s array of American-made Patriot air defense missiles had failed to detect and destroy the hostile munitions. Naturally, Russia hasn’t missed the opportunity to tout its S-400 air defense system as the better option.

Significantly, Cooper mentioned the S-400 twice in his speech.

Curiously, Cooper did not offer specific instances of Russian weapons failures, though there have been no lack of examples in conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli wars. Instead, he accused Russia of aggressive sales tactics. “Through the targeted marketing of systems like the S-400, Russia seeks to exploit the genuine security requirements of partners to create challenges in our ability – legal and technological – to provide them with the most advanced defensive capabilities.  And through a combination of cut-price systems such as unmanned aerial systems, predatory financing mechanisms, and sometimes outright bribery, China is using arms transfers as a means of getting its foot in the door – a door that, once opened, China quickly exploits both to exert influence and to gather intelligence.”

Cooper also took aim at Chinese training of foreign soldiers. “Foreign trainees may be wooed by the offer of unit-scale training in China, but on arrival they are disappointed to find themselves not spread among the elite Chinese training academies, but are lumped together with forces from around the world of significantly varying quality in China’s International Military Education Exchange Center – a facility whose lackadaisical approach to military education is well below the standard China provides to its own officers. Caveat emptor!”

The American view is that Russia and China can make arms sales because they have few scruples about whom they sell weapons to. Yet Cooper acknowledged that there are concerns about the reliability of the U.S. as an arms supplier, for which he blamed the U.S. Congress, which enacted a block on arms sales to Saudi Arabia that was only overturned by a veto by President Trump.

So why buy American weapons? Cooper said there are three reasons: quality, transparency, and accountability.

“The U.S. defense industry produces the best defensive equipment on the planet,” he claimed. In addition, U.S. arms export policy is not hidden. “Unlike the determinations made in Beijing or Moscow, our major foreign military and direct commercial sales are managed via a process whose policies are clear and transparent, and whose approvals are public.”

Ironically, while blasting Russian and Chinese arms sales, Cooper said the U.S. had sweetened its own Foreign Military Sales program. “We made the foreign military sales process faster and cheaper, reducing the time it takes from receipt of a partner’s request to making an offer by nine percent, while reducing the overhead fees captured by the FMS Admin surcharge from 3.5 percent to 3.2 percent and lowering several FMS Transportation rates by between one percent and 7.5 percent, saving foreign partners approximately $180 million in the past year alone.”

“When you buy FMS you obtain the same pricing as the U.S. military services; you participate in a system that is resistant to corruption; and, you get the total package approach: not just a defense article, but a defense capability, from the training required to use, maintain, and integrate it into your doctrine and operations, to the parts and components required for long-term maintenance and support.”

Whether this argument will be persuasive enough to induce other nations to buy American weapons remains to be seen.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in November 2019.

Image: REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

Peter Suciu

Guns, Americas

This Arms Trade Treaty could require all firearms purchased by Americans to be tracked, and guns registered to ensure compliance with the treaty. 

The United Nations was created to help maintain peace and stability, but in recent years critics of the organization have argued that it often engages in considerable overreach in its efforts. This is especially true in how certain aspects of its efforts to reduce conflict around the globe could violate the rights of American citizens. This is most evident in the Second Amendment and the UN’s attempts to regulate the sale of firearms. 

At the center of the issue is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. It has been in effect since 2014 and while it was meant to regulate the sales and transfers of tanks, military aircraft and other military hardware, its critics—including the National Rifle Association (NRA) and National Shooting Sports Foundation—have warned that it could impact U.S. gun owners by limiting the availability of commercially-made firearms and parts. 

To date, 110 nations have ratified the treaty, while 32 have signed but not ratified it. Among those latter nations is the United States. In fact, two years ago then President Donald Trump withdrew from the treaty and in a statement at the time said, “We will never surrender America's sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy.”

Biden Reverses Course 

Just as it was expected that the Trump administration would withdraw from the treaty, it has been expected that the Biden administration would seek to rejoin, and even push for ratification.  

“I have come from Washington, D.C., this week to take the floor on the agenda item Treaty Universalization to underscore the continuing commitment of the United States to responsible international trade in conventional arms,” William Malzahn, deputy director for Conventional Arms Threat Reduction in the Department of State, said at the 7th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. 

“The United States has long supported strong and effective national controls on the international transfer of conventional arms, and the Arms Trade Treaty is an important tool [for] promoting those controls internationally,” Malzahn added. “The new CAT Policy will better frame the intent and priorities of the Biden/Harris administration and formalize the approach of the administration as adopted on arms transfer decisions that have been in effect since President Biden entered the White House in January.”

Gun Registration Plan? 

The Arms Trade Treaty could go further than reducing conflict, warned critics. The NRA has said that it could require all firearms purchased by Americans to be tracked, and guns registered to ensure compliance with the treaty. 

“ATT has consequences for American gun owners,” the NRA said in a statement via its official social media account on Twitter. “If the UN gets its way, its deliberately undefined & loose terminology will be used to mandate the provision of personal info related to any American that purchases a firearm manufactured overseas to the origin country’s govt.”

“This is the first step towards creating a global firearms registry,” the group added.

Since taking office in January, President Joe Biden has pushed for gun control, including calling for enhanced background checks, banning the sale of parts that can allow individuals to build their own firearms and even calling for a ban on many popular semi-automatic rifles. The president also has sought to overturn a law that would allow firearms companies to be sued when their products are used in illegal activities. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

En quelques années, un supposé pragmatisme a balayé le plurilinguisme de l'Union au profit de l'anglais obligatoire. Dans la société tout entière, cette mutation amorcée depuis le milieu du XXe siècle connaît une phénoménale accélération sous l'influence d'Internet. / États-Unis, Europe, Russie, Internet, (...) / États-Unis, Europe, Russie, Internet, Langue, Médias, Mutation, Presse, Francophonie - 2016/06

Michael Peck

World War II, Asia

When the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation.

Here's What You Need to Know: Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.

America had broken Tokyo's codes and was able to prepare an ambush.

This time, the target wasn’t a terrorist. It was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor operation. But the motive was the same: payback for a sneak attack on the United States.

In early 1943, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, was one of the most hated men in America. He was seen as the Asian Devil in naval dress, the fiend who treacherously struck peaceful, sleeping America. And when the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation. Hence a code name unmistakable in its intent: Operation Vengeance.

As with today’s drone strikes, the operation began with an intercepted message. Except it wasn’t a call from a cell phone, but rather a routine military radio signal. In the spring of 1943, Japan was in trouble: the Americans had captured Guadalcanal despite a terrible sacrifice of Japanese ships and aircraft. Stung by criticism that senior commanders were not visiting the front to ascertain the situation, Yamamoto resolved to visit naval air units on the South Pacific island of Bougainville.

As was customary, a coded signal was sent on April 13, 1943, to the various Japanese commands in the area, listing the admiral’s itinerary as well as the number of transport planes and fighter escorts in his party. But American codebreakers had been reading Japanese diplomatic and military messages for years, including those in the JN-25 code, used in various forms by the Imperial Navy throughout World War II. The Yamamoto signal was sent in the new JN-25D variant, but that didn’t stop American cryptanalysts from deciphering it in less than a day.

Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. With typical spleen, Pacific Fleet commander William “Bull” Halsey issued his own unambiguous message: “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”

Yet getting Yamamoto was easier said than done. Navy and Marine fighters like the F4F Wildcat and F4U Corsair didn’t have the range to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft over Bougainville, four hundred miles from the nearest American air base on Guadalcanal. The only fighter with long enough legs was the U.S. Army Air Forces’ twin-engined Lockheed P-38G Lightning.

But even the P-38s faced a difficult task. To avoid detection, American planners wanted them to fly “at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at fifty feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation,” according to a history of the Thirteenth Fighter Command, the parent organization of the 339th Fighter Squadron that flew the mission.

Even worse, the Lightnings had no AWACS radar aircraft or land-based radar to guide them to the target, or even to tell them where Yamamoto’s plane was. Nor could the U.S. aircraft loiter over Bougainville in the midst of numerous Japanese fighter bases. They would essentially have to intercept Yamamoto where and when he was scheduled to be.

However, by calculating the speed of the Japanese G4M Betty bomber that would carry Yamamoto, probable wind speed, the enemy’s probable flight path, and assuming that Yamamoto would be as punctual as he was reputed to be, American planners estimated the intercept would occur at 9:35 a.m.

The Americans assigned eighteen P-38s for the mission, of which a flight of four would pounce on Yamamoto’s plane, while the remainder would climb above as top cover against Japanese fighters. Two Lightnings aborted on the way to Bougainville, leaving just sixteen to perform the mission.

That the Americans arrived just a minute early, at 9:34, was remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the Japanese appeared on time a minute later. Flying at 4,500 feet were two Betty bombers, one carrying Yamamoto and the other his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. They were escorted by six A6M Zero fighters keeping watch 1,500 feet above them.

Still undetected, twelve Lightnings climbed to eighteen thousand feet. The remaining four attacked the Bettys, with the first pair, flown by Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. and Lt. Rex Barber, closing in for the kill. As the two bombers dived to evade the interceptors, the American pilots couldn’t even be sure which one carried Yamamoto.

Lanphier engaged the escorts while Barber pursued the two bombers. Barber’s cannon shells and bullets slammed into the first Betty, an aircraft model notorious for being fragile and flammable. With its left engine damaged, it slammed into the jungle. Then the second Betty, attacked by three of the P-38s, crashed into the water. The Americans had lucked out again: the Betty that crashed into the jungle, killing its crew and passengers, had carried Yamamoto. From the Betty that hit the water, Admiral Ugaki survived (hours after Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Ugaki took off in a kamikaze and was never heard from again).

A Japanese search party hacked through the jungle until they found Yamamoto’s plane. “Afterward the Admiral’s body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes,” recounts the Thirteenth Fighter Command history. “His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war.”

Yamamoto’s remains were returned to Japan aboard the super battleship Musashi in May 1943 for a state funeral that drew a million mourners. For the Americans, euphoria and satisfaction were dogged by postwar controversy that lasted for sixty years over who actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane: Barber and Lanphier were credited with a half kill apiece, though many critics said Barber should have received full credit.

The irony was that Yamamoto was not the worst of America’s enemies. He was no pacifist, but nor was he as militaristic as the hard-core Japanese hard-liners. Yamamoto opposed the 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany, which he feared would drag Japan into a ruinous war. While he didn’t oppose war as a means of saving Japan from a crippling U.S. oil embargo in 1941 (his depiction as a peacemonger in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! is wrong), he did warn Japanese leaders that “in the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”

Did Yamamoto’s death affect the war? His Pearl Harbor operation was audacious and brilliant, but his poor strategy at Midway six months later destroyed Japan’s elite aircraft carrier force (ironically, it was also U.S. codebreaking that set the stage for the Midway disaster). By 1943, he was a sick and exhausted man. Perhaps he might have come up with a better late-war naval strategy than the disastrous battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Yet not even the architect of Pearl Harbor could save Japan from defeat.

Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft. This is nothing new. In 1942, British commandos unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Rommel, and modern militaries devote great efforts to locating enemy headquarters to kill commanders and staffs.

But what’s really interesting is that compared with the controversy over today’s targeted assassinations, there was remarkably little fuss made over the decision to kill Yamamoto. The U.S. military treated it as a purely military matter that didn’t need civilian approval. Admiral Nimitz authorized the interception, and the orders were passed down the military chain of command. There was no presidential decision nor Justice Department review. It’s hard to imagine that the killing of a top Al Qaeda leader, let alone a top Russian, Chinese or North Korean commander, would be treated so routinely.

Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in September 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

May 12, 2018 marked NORAD’s 60th anniversary.

Pursuant to last February’s Biden–Trudeau virtual summit, defense heads from the US and Canada reaffirmed on August 14th that NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) modernization is an integral part of North American homeland defense. In coping against the growly complex security threats posed by strategic competitors’ technologically advanced weapons, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, the two neighboring nations put forward stronger “coordinated investments” in upgrading the early warning and surveillance capabilities of the North Warning System (NWS). In particular, the upgrade plan prioritizes the installation of next-generation over-the-horizon radar and an all-domain multi-layered sensor network for enhanced “situational awareness.” These priorities will essentially be accompanied by the installation of efficient data-processing tools and a resilient communication network system, paving the path for “modernized joint command and control systems.” The two neighboring nations’ commitment to NORAD modernization promises a brighter future of “maintaining North America as a secure base for active engagement around the world,” especially in the upcoming era of constructively inevitable great power competition.

Bolstering U.S.–Canada security cooperation through NORAD modernization was one of the cornerstone agendas discussed in the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.–Canada Partnership, which was the fruitful product of the Biden–Trudeau virtual bilateral summit last February. What lies at the crux of the revitalization of the 63-year-old defense pact in a timely manner is the operational concepts of SHIELD (Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense). The strategic initiative focuses on cultivating a new generation defense ‘ecosystem’ of continental defense in areas of ‘domain awareness,’ ‘Joint All-Domain Command and Control(JADC2),’ and ‘defeat mechanism.’ Domain awareness proposes to integrate data from both existing NSW/maritime sensors and new sensors into a central repository of a multi-layered sensor network, instead of letting each sensor type gather data in a single platform. The multi-layered aspect of the system allows the augmentation of its detection and surveillance capabilities by adding layers of a globally operating sensor network, such as a space-based radar sensor network. Through ‘JADC2,’ integrated data are then processed with boosted global interconnection and interoperability among all military domain (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, Space Force and Cyber Command) in the form of a cloud-connected platform, providing real-time cloud-based/AI-powered data analytics critical to key decision-makers’ optimal decision-making capability, or ‘decision superiority.’ Finally, the defeat mechanism takes a cost-effective approach to prevent the unnecessary field allocation of global forces by focusing on key areas of North American continental defense. Simply put, hardening the SHIELD means strengthening detection, deterrence, and defeat capabilities by equipping key decision-makers with cutting-edge threat/risk assessment capacities through a globally interconnected/interoperable all domain ‘single pane of glass.’ In this way, key decision makers can strategically think of situationally feasible deterrence/de-escalation/defeat options ahead of their adversaries. SHIELD aligns with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s recent call for the Department of Defense’s renewed concept of deterrence, ‘Integrated Deterrence,’ which aims to enhance the security readiness and resiliency of the Alliance in coping against systematic security challenges posed by strategic competitors. The basic logic of integrated deterrence is to elevate cold-war era ‘deterrence by denial’ to a new level by “denying adversaries the ability to threaten the global connectivity on which we all rely on.”

NORAD Modernization Means a Vast Array of New Opportunities for Canada

Despite its costly price tag, if met with the right, and futuristic, PPP (Public Private Partnership) solutions, NORAD modernization can provide Canada with a vast array of new opportunities. It will not only nourish related defense technologies, notably quantum computing, machine learning, data analytics, and AI, in which Canada is already one of the global leaders. But its side-benefits will also politico-economically leverage Canada’s global engagement practices, especially in the Arctic. Indeed, it was mentioned in the defense head joint agreement that NORAD modernization includes “investments to upgrade and modernize the infrastructure required to support robust NORAD operations, including in our Arctic and northern regions.” When it come to the Arctic in the upcoming era of great power competition, Canada needs stronger North American Arctic leadership to facilitate incrementally sustainable development of the Arctic (which meets the indigenous populations’ and locals’ politico-economic demands). Under the current political climate, it could probably start from rare earth mineral development and accrued Artic fleets to secure the supply chain routes.

Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh

Afghanistan, Middle East

While Americans are concerned about their military equipment left in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, Iran may benefit from the equipment for research purposes or other goals. 

Back when American officials thought Iran would remain an important ally, Iran bought sophisticated arms and defense equipment from the United States for both political and economic reasons. In fact, Iran was the largest single purchaser of U.S. military equipment before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and U.S. military sales to Iran increased dramatically between 1972 and 1976. But since the Islamic revolution, Iran has been sanctioned by major powers and has not purchased modern equipment from the West.

Some analysts believe that the collapse of the Afghan government, the Taliban takeover, and the U.S. withdrawal have created an opportunity for Iran to pursue its regional goals in Afghanistan.

Recently, some controversial pictures published on social media appear to show a convoy of trailer trucks allegedly transporting U.S. military equipment taken from Afghanistan into Iran.

Based on unofficial reports, Iran purchased Humvees and MRAPs (light armored vehicles) from the Taliban for research and reverse engineering.

President Joe Biden has faced sharp criticism after pictures surfaced showing U.S. defense materials in Taliban hands.

Days before reports of Iran’s alleged purchase emerged, Representative James Comer (R-KY) and Representative Glenn Grothman (R-WI) wrote a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin requesting information on the Pentagon's plans to recover American weapons left in Afghanistan.

“We are left wondering if the Biden Administration has a plan to prevent the Taliban from using our weapons against the U.S. or its allies, or selling them to foreign adversaries, like China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea,” the lawmakers wrote.

In addition, former President Donald Trump stated that “all equipment should be demanded to be immediately returned to the United States, and that includes every penny of the $85 billion dollars in cost.”

While Iranian and American authorities have not yet commented on the images, it is clear that they amount to a new blow for Biden.

Bismillah Mohammadi, Afghanistan’s defense minister before the Taliban takeover, tweeted one of the images circulating online, calling Iran a “bad neighbor.” “Afghanistan’s bad days won’t last forever,” Mohammadi added in the same tweet.

Some observers believe that the Taliban will need an influx of foreign money to boost the war-torn Afghan economy. Selling off some of their new trophies and assets could provide the Taliban with the funds necessary to run Afghanistan’s public sectors and rebuild the country’s infrastructure.

“Iran probably made deals with the Taliban to buy some of these vehicles and equipment for research and reproduction purposes. So if American helicopter and airplane parts get into the hands of the Iranian government, it will be life-changing for military aircraft development,” wrote Goran Kesic, an intelligence analyst, in a social media post.

Although the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Kenneth Franklin McKenzie, Jr., asserts that U.S. aircraft left in Afghanistan are inoperable and will never fly again, they could still be useful for reverse engineering by Iran or other American adversaries.

Months before the collapse of the Afghanistan government, Iran ramped up its diplomatic outreach to the Taliban. Some reports assert that Iran has provided military support to the Taliban in a bid to accelerate America’s withdrawal from the country. Tehran has denied such claims.

“Iran has provided the Taliban with financial support and training,” said a senior defense intelligence official during a Pentagon news briefing about a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on Iran.

Some reports suggest that in recent years, Iran and the Taliban have worked together and independently against their common American enemy. If this cooperation continues, it should be expected that some U.S. military equipment, rendered useless or not, will be delivered to Iran for reverse engineering.

According to Taliban officials, 2,000 armored vehicles, including U.S. Humvees, and up to forty aircraft—potentially including Black Hawk helicopters, scout attack helicopters, and military drones—are under the extremist group's control.

However, it remains to be seen if American weapons will fall into the hands of other armed groups such as Al Qaeda—the terrorist nemesis of the United States—and if the Biden administration has a plan to prevent these weapons from being used to harm U.S. national interests.

Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh is a journalist and analyst in international affairs and foreign policy. He has written many articles for digital publications worldwide, such as The Free Press, Khabar Online News Agency, Foreign Policy News, SNA of Japan, The Levant News, Eastern Herald, Modern Diplomacy, Menafn, MilliChronicle, and South Front. Also, He is an English translator for Iranian newspapers and news agencies. He has translated tens of articles from English to Persian for media in Iran such as Shahrvand Newspaper, Mardom Salarinewspaper, Etemad newspaper, Hamdeli newspaper, etc.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Israel, Israel

Israel has little indigenous aircraft manufacturing but still outpaces all its geographic peers.

Here's What You Need to Know: Israel’s current aerospace strategy depends on the health of its relationship with the United States. This is true both in terms of the availability of platforms, and in ongoing mutual technological development.

Since the 1960s, the air arm of the Israel Defense Forces (colloquially the IAF) has played a central role in the country’s defense. The ability of the Israeli Air Force to secure the battlefield and the civilian population from enemy air attack has enabled the IDF to fight at a huge advantage. At the same time, the IAF has demonstrated strategic reach, attacking critical targets at considerable distance.

The dominance of the IAF has come about through effective training, the weakness of its foes, and a flexible approach to design and procurement. Over the years, the Israelis have tried various strategies for filling their air force with fighters, including buying from France, buying from the United States and building the planes themselves. They seem to have settled on a combination of the last two, with great effect.

Israel’s Early Technological Base

In its early years, Israel took what weapons it could from what buyers it could find. This meant that the IDF often operated with equipment of a variety of vintages, mostly secured from European producers. By the late 1950s, however, Israel had secured arms transfer relationships with several countries, most notably the United Kingdom and France. The relationship with France eventually blossomed, resulting in the transfer of high-technology military equipment, including Mirage fighters (and also significant technical assistance for Israel’s nuclear program). These Mirage fighters formed the core of the IAF in the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel largely destroyed its neighbors’ air forces in the first hours of the conflict.

In 1967, however, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel, which left Tel Aviv in a quandary. The IDF needed more fighters, and also sought capabilities that the Mirage could not provide, including medium-range ground strike. Under these conditions, the Israelis adopted the time-honored strategy of simply stealing what they needed. To complement their existing airframes, the Israelis acquired technical blueprints of the Mirage through espionage (possibly with the tolerance of some French authorities). The project resulted in two fighters, the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Nesher and the IAI Kfir. The second employed more powerful American designed engines, and for a time served as the primary fighter of the IDF’s air arm. Both aircraft enjoyed export success, with the Nesher serving in Argentina and the Kfir flying for Colombia, Ecuador and Sri Lanka.

This investment helped drive the development of Israel’s aerospace sector, with big implications for the rest of Israel’s economy. Heavy state investment in military technological development does not always drive broader innovations in civilian technology. In this case, however, state investment provided a key pillar for the early development of Israel’s civilian technology sector. To many, the success of the Kfir suggested that Israel could stand on its own in aerospace technology, eliminating the need to rely on a foreign sponsor.

Nevertheless, Israel continued to invest heavily in foreign aircraft. The IDF began acquiring F-4 Phantoms in the late 1960s, and F-15 Eagles in the mid-1970s. The arrival of the latter in Israel inadvertently sparked a political crisis, as the first four aircraft landed after the beginning of the Sabbath. The ensuing controversy eventually brought down the first premiership of Yitzhak Rabin. But many in Israel, still buoyed by the relative success of the Kfir and hopeful about further developing Israel’s high-tech sector, believed that the country could aspire to develop its own fighter aircraft.

Enter the Lavi. Like its counterparts in both the USSR and the United States, the IDF air arm believed that a high/low mix of fighters best served its needs. This led to the development of the Lavi, a light multirole fighter that could complement the F-15 Eagles that Israel continued to acquire from the United States. The Lavi filled the niche that the F-16 Viper would eventually come to dominate. It included some systems licensed by the United States, and visually resembled an F-16 with a different wing configuration.

But the military-technological environment had changed. Developing the Lavi from scratch (or virtually from scratch) required an enormous state investment for an aircraft that had marginal, if any, advantages over an off-the-shelf F-16. Moreover, the United States took export controls much more seriously than France, and had a much more dangerous toolkit for enforcing compliance. Despite initial optimism about the export prospects of the Lavi, it soon became apparent to Israelis that the United States would not allow the wide export of a fighter that included significant American components. That the Lavi would have competed directly against the F-16 only exacerbated the problem.

In August 1987, the Israeli cabinet killed the Lavi, which caused protests from IAI and the workers associated with the project. Nevertheless, a political effort to revive the plane failed, and Israel eventually acquired a large number of F-16s. In its afterlife, however, the Lavi helped kill the export prospects of the F-22 Raptor; out of concern that Israel had shared Lavi (and thus F-16) technology with the Chinese (leading to the J-10), the U.S. Congress prohibited any export of the F-22. This decision prevented Israel and several other interested buyers from acquiring the Raptor, and undoubtedly cut short its overall production life.

Alternatives

Instead of pursuing its own fighters, Israel has lately preferred to extensively modify the aircraft it buys from the United States. The F-15I “Thunder” and the F-16I “Storm” have both received major upgrades to optimize them for Israeli service. Both planes have increased range and improved avionics, enabling the IDF to fight effectively at great distance from its bases. The F-15I, a variant of the F-15E Strike Eagle, is the IAF’s most important long-range strike platform. The IAF has already undertaken steps to make the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter more suitable for Israeli service, including advanced software modifications.

IAI has continued to see great success, despite the lack of a major fighter project. IAI has thrived on developing and exporting components for domestic as well as export use, including munitions and avionics. IAI has also gone big into the UAV market, with major success both within Israel and abroad. And despite the failure of the Lavi, Israel’s high-tech defense sector has done well, will considerable spillover into the civilian economy. Israeli state industrial policy focuses on exactly this goal: supplying investment for high-tech innovation that facilitates both national defense and economic growth.

Israel’s current aerospace strategy depends on the health of its relationship with the United States. This is true both in terms of the availability of platforms, and in ongoing mutual technological development. Fortunately for Israel, there is little reason to believe that this aspect of the U.S.-Israel alliance will decay anytime soon. Concern over the security of the F-22 stopped export of the Raptor, but didn’t dent the overall relationship. And even if the unimaginable occurred, and Israel needed to look elsewhere from the United States, the proficiency of Israeli industry in developing components and support systems means that it would not lack long for a partner.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money. 

This article first appeared in 2016.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

Stealth Fighters, Americas

The endless race between stealth technology and the sensors that seek to penetrate its veil continues.

Here's What You Need to Know: Stealth may have hit a brick wall.

Did the Pentagon admit that stealth technology may not work anymore? Or that America must be ready to face a future where its airpower doesn't control the skies?

DARPA, the Pentagon's cutting-edge research agency, has quietly raised these possibilities as it searches for future technology to fight the next war. And stealth technology may not be the answer.

“Platform stealth may be approaching physical limits,” says DARPA.

The agency also admits that “our acquisition system is finding it difficult to respond on relevant timescales to adversary progress, which has made the search for next-generation capabilities at once more urgent and more futile.”

If that’s the case, then the next generation of aircraft—the designs that will eventually replace the F-22, F-35 and B-2 stealth aircraft—may not be any stealthier than their predecessors. Or, in the endless race between stealth technology and the sensors that seek to penetrate its veil, stealth may have hit a brick wall.

Thus, DARPA has to ask a question that America has never really had to contemplate before. “Are there acceptable alternatives to air dominance?” DARPA asks. “Is it possible to achieve Joint Force objectives without clearing the skies of enemy fighters and bombers, and eliminating all surface-based threats? Can this be achieved without placing a high-value, sophisticated platform and crew at risk—reducing leverage potential adversaries currently hold over the U.S.?”

DARPA says it wants to see if it's possible to “go beyond evolutionary advances in stealth technology and disrupt traditional doctrines of air dominance/air supremacy?”

But the traditional U.S. way of war since 1941 has been to seek control of the skies: though there have been rough patches, such as the Pacific War in 1941 and the Bomber Offensive over Germany in 1943–44, America has largely succeeded in clearing the skies of enemy planes and filling them with its own. Few Americans alive today have ever been bombed by aircraft, which is more than America’s enemies can say.

But those days are gone, as Russia and now China are developing stealth aircraft and lethal anti-aircraft missiles.

Now, DARPA is looking for other ways that U.S airpower can accomplish its objectives even without air superiority, such as “lethality through a combination of overwhelming performance (e.g. hypersonics) and overwhelming numbers (e.g. swarming low-cost weapons).”

Indeed, the Pentagon's pet research agency seems to be taking a swipe at the concept of small numbers of expensive aircraft like the F-35 stealth fighter and B-2 stealth bomber when it calls for “reduced reliance on increasingly complex, monolithic platforms.”

Similarly, “how can we reduce reliance on large, expensive, and increasingly vulnerable carrier strike group platforms?” DARPA asks.

It sees one possible solution as “small, inexpensive, massively-networked vessels derived from commercial designs.” That same approach also applies to space, as the United States moves away from “monolithic, high-value space assets and instruments” in favor of smaller, simpler and cheaper satellites and launch vehicles.

On land, DARPA suggests the future of war will be smaller and more lethal ground units operating without the immense infrastructure of forward operating bases and long supply lines. The agency envisions autonomous “terranets” (presumably AI-controlled) that will coordinate the activities of brigade-sized formations of manned and unmanned units, as they battle in the darkness of the emerging domain of subterranean warfare.

Interestingly, the example of future ground combat that DARPA cites is “Starship Troopers,” the legendary sci-fi novel and movies of troops in powered armor. But Robert Heinlein’s novel was really Iwo Jima and Okinawa in space.

Whether DARPA’s vision is prophetic or just premature remains to be seen.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in July 2018.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. John Tetrault

Robert Farley

Navy, Europe

The canceled Lions would have had no trouble facing any competing German or Italian designs.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Even after the completion of Anson and Howe, the demands of other ships (including aircraft carriers) took priority over the Lions. Work continued only on HMS Vanguard, which became the final British battleship completed.

The five battleships of the King George V class served the Royal Navy honorably during the war, participating in the destruction of the battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst along with an array of other missions. HMS Vanguard, the last battleship ever built by the United Kingdom, did not enter service until after the war. Neither of these classes, however, were the apogee of British battleship design. Instead, the Lion class—a group of six ships of advanced design and high capabilities—were initially intended to lead the battlefleet of the Royal Navy in its next war. But the war came too soon, and the Lions never saw service.

Post-Treaty

The Royal Navy entered the mid-1930s with an odd assortment of capital ships, including the two intermediate ships of the Nelson class and a variety of modernized and unmodernized battleships and battlecruisers. Reconstruction of HMS Hood, the Renown class battlecruisers, and the Queen Elizabeth class battleships was hoped to bring these ships up to modern standards, but the Navy still required new vessels. The five ships of the King George V class, while excellent ships, remained creatures of the interwar Treaty system. Bound to 35,000 tons, they carried 14” weapons in part because of a desire to adhere to the Second London Naval Treaty, and in part out of other design requirements. When it became clear that Japan would unbind itself from the terms of the London Naval Treaty, the restrictions on battleship designs eased considerably.

Initial design work for the Lions, the first post-Treaty British battleships, began in 1938 and envisioned a ship of 45,000-ton full load, armed with nine 16” guns in three triple turrets. The secondary armament and armor scheme would have been similar to the King George V class, with dual-purpose 5.25” guns. The ships would have made 28 knots, roughly the same speed at the King George Vs but somewhat slower than extant British aircraft carriers, and considerably slower than the American Iowa class. The Lions also remedied the short range of the King George Vs, which proved an operational as well as a strategic drawback. The ships would have taken on classic Royal Navy capital ship names, including Lion, Temeraire, Conqueror and Thunderer. Two other ships were projected, but never received names. Lion and Temeraire were laid down in 1939, while Conqueror and Thunderer were projected for 1940 and 1941.

Redesign

As was the case in World War I, however, the advent of war delayed the construction of the large battleships. Anticipating the need for smaller vessels (especially in the anti-submarine campaign), the British government decided to abandon the new battleships, proceeding only with the construction of HMS Vanguard, a unique vessel intended for service in the Pacific, and the completion of Anson and Howe, the last two ships of the King George V class. Construction on Lion and Temeraire ceased completely in 1940.

The delay gave the Royal Navy time to reconsider the design and incorporate war-time lessons. A 1942 modification of the design made the Lions a bit beamier in order to remedy concerns over torpedo protection. Horizontal protection against bombs also improved, in part because of the destruction of HMS Prince of Wales off Malaya in December 1941.

However, time did not ease the demands on British shipbuilding. Even after the completion of Anson and Howe, the demands of other ships (including aircraft carriers) took priority over the Lions. Work continued only on HMS Vanguard. This further delay gave the Royal Navy additional time to rethink the design of the Lions, and a variety of proposals for larger and smaller ships (including, at one point, a hybrid battleship-aircraft carrier) were considered and rejected. No further battleships would be laid down during the war.

Postwar Thinking

Even late in the war, the Admiralty had not completely given up on the idea of battleships. The Iowa class seemed to offer a useful template for battleships in a peacetime navy, and even HMS Vanguard served capably in a “showing the flag” role. The Soviets, for whatever reason, also persisted in battleship design, at least as long as Stalin lived. But it became clear that the existing fleet was sufficient for whatever the Royal Navy might need in terms of battleships, and that there was little to be gained from constructing new 16” gunned ships.

Parting Shots

In most configurations, the Lions would have been somewhat smaller, somewhat slower, slightly better protected Iowas, more effective than the U.S. North Carolina and South Dakota classes. Lion likely would have had little trouble with the latest German or Italian battleships, in part because of the latter’s fiscal inability to compete with the Royal Navy, and the former’s habitual inability to competently design battleships. Of course, they would have suffered badly under the guns of the Japanese Yamatos, but then they were far less expensive and in many ways more useful than those behemoths.

That the design process continued as long as it did is a testament both to the longevity of Great Britain imperial pretensions, and to the belief that battleships would remain an important factor in naval warfare. The late 1940s, which combined the increasing lethality of shipborne aircraft with the financial inability of the Royal Navy to maintain its existing fleet, disabused Britain of both these notions.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005.  He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004.  Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect.  Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

This article first appeared in August 2019. It is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

economy, Americas

The agency had previously reported that it still has more than thirty-five million individual and business tax returns to process—a massive backlog that is four times bigger compared to the end of the 2019 filing season. 

Over the past several months, the Internal Revenue Service has worked tirelessly to promptly issue tens of millions of $1,400 stimulus checks and the monthly expanded child tax credits—not to mention the traditional tax refunds from federal returns.  

Largely due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and staffing shortages, the agency had previously reported that it still has more than thirty-five million individual and business tax returns to process—a massive backlog that is four times bigger compared to the end of the 2019 filing season. Also, due to the stimulus checks sent out over the past year and a half, the IRS has been adding to that backlog by mailing out millions of “math-error” notices to taxpayers saying that they owe more money.  

Delays All-Around 

Against this concerning backdrop, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) recently pinpointed an array of logistical problems that have caused major delays for its team of advocates, who are tasked with assisting the nation’s taxpayers resolve IRS-related issues.  

“I am painfully aware that taxpayers are experiencing more delays with the IRS this year than usual,” national taxpayer advocate Erin Collins, wrote in a blog post.  

“Our advocates have been handling unusually high levels of inventory for the last year,” she said in the blog post. “The past two filing seasons have been particularly difficult. On top of dealing with personal, medical, and financial challenges brought on by COVID-19, taxpayers have struggled to get advice and answers from the IRS, and millions of refunds are still pending.”

Collins added that taxpayers are being forced to wait an average of eighty minutes when they call the TAS for assistance. Moreover, “courtesy disconnects”—or getting hung up on—have become increasingly common.  

“The IRS’s level of service on its toll-free telephone lines has been at all-time lows, paper correspondence and paper returns have added other complexities and delays throughout the year, and many taxpayers are still waiting for their returns to be processed or their refunds to be paid,” Collins wrote, adding that the office is expecting two hundred fifty-three thousand cases this year, up from a hundred sixty-seven thousand in 2017.  

“Due to the high volume of calls and cases we have been receiving, we have struggled to meet our own deadlines and expectations,” she added. “Our seventy-nine local office telephone lines are receiving over twenty thousand calls each week.”  

Calls for More Funding 

Not surprisingly, Collins is recommending that Congress provide more funding.  

“As Congress focuses on the IRS’s budget, it should continue to allocate appropriate funds to protect taxpayer rights, including the right to quality service,” Collins wrote.  

“As taxpayer challenges continue to increase, I believe it is also critical that Congress and the IRS adequately fund and staff TAS, which serves (or is intended to serve) as the ‘safety net’ for taxpayers who face immediate financial hardship or fall through the cracks of IRS bureaucracy, so we can provide timely assistance,” she continued.  

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.  

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

Submarines, Asia

The country's most recent efforts have used high-tech methods, such as magnets and lasers, rather than improving traditional sonar.

Here's What You Need to Know: The U.S.-China rivalry is moving underwater.

China is making great efforts to detect U.S. submarines.

Scientists at a Chinese research institute say they developed an airborne laser that might eventually detect hostile subs even at great depths.

Meanwhile, scientists at another institute also claim to have developed a magnetic detection device that might spot subs.

Researchers at the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics say they have tested lasers that can detect objects more than 160 meters (525 feet) beneath the water, or twice as deep as current equipment.

“The Shanghai team used a beam generated by green and blue lasers,” according to the South China Morning Post. “As light – even laser, a pure, coherent form of light – scatters faster in water than in air, the beam must be very powerful to go deep. Laser devices generate an energized beam of light of a single color, or frequency. Green and blue beams can penetrate water with relative ease.

“Chen’s team also developed a highly sensitive detector that can pick up a single photon reflected from a target, allowing the device to detect bright objects close to the surface as well as targets hidden in the deep.”

A team at the Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics say they have devised a magnetic detection sensor that can fit into a capsule the size of a bean. “The device can pick up signals as weak as 20 femtotesla, or about one-fifth the strength of the magnetic field generated by a human brain,” explained the South China Morning Post.

“Although other devices known as magnetic anomaly detectors are much more sensitive, they are bulkier and can only be mounted on planes or helicopters,” the Post added. “Magnetic anomaly detectors used in anti-submarine warfare must operate at temperatures near absolute zero and require lasers, power supplies and gas chambers to achieve high sensitivity.”

In 2018, Chinese scientists said they were developing a laser-equipped satellite that could detect submarines. The idea is to use laser beams of various colors that can detect disturbances in the water caused by a moving submarine.

The question is what will make these devices successful when previous efforts have fizzled. For example, in 2010, DARPA's Deep Sea Operations program sought to develop blue-light lasers for undersea  communications and hunting subs. The problem is that orbital laser beams can be affected by clouds, murky water and fish, as well as being scattered in the water.

The new blue-green lasers devised by the Shanghai team reportedly have been tested at lower altitudes, from aircraft flying between 1,500 and 3,000 feet. But aircraft-mounted lasers tend to be low-powered, so it remains to be seen whether the new lasers will be successful in locating deep-diving subs.

As for the Wuhan team’s new magnetic detection sensor, a bean-sized device far smaller than the magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) sensors flown by anti-submarine aircraft would seem to face limitations in power and range.  Even some Chinese scientists contacted by the Post were dubious that the magnetic sensor could be useful without further development.

However, such a bite-sized device could be mounted in unmanned aircraft, raising the possibility of swarms of drones hunting subs. Of course, the U.S. is working on its own sub-hunting solutions, including a yacht-sized robot ship that tracks enemy vessels.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in October 2019.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James Kimber