Diplomacy & Crisis News

L'histoire universelle a toujours eu plus d'une ruse dans son sac. Aussi a-t-elle confié l'expansion du principe Amérique à ce qui était supposé lui faire vis-à-vis et, pour certains, concurrence : les États-Unis d'Europe. Tel est le miracle de l'hégémonie : pouvoir faire remplir son agenda par un (...) / États-Unis, Europe, Capitalisme, Culture, État, Histoire, Idées, Identité culturelle, Idéologie, Langue, Mondialisation - 2017/08

Qui n'a jamais rêvé, quand la chaleur devient étouffante, de brancher le climatiseur pour profiter d'une brise de fraîcheur ? Alimentée par les canicules à répétition, cette tentation n'a rien d'anodin : l'air conditionné change les modes de vie des pays où il s'implante. / États-Unis, Écologie, (...) / États-Unis, Écologie, Histoire, Industrie, Société, Urbanisme, Ville, Commerce, Climat, Environnement - 2017/08

The recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine was taken by many Central and Eastern European countries as a sign of drastic change in a part of the world that had not experienced such a transformation in a generation. The annexation of Crimea was not met with much of a response beyond limited sanctions in 2014, and the war in the East of Ukraine received little long term attention outside of the region, even after an airliner was shot down by a BUK missile system. Recent rapid advances on Kyiv put countries like Poland on intense alert, and assured that their actions in seeking modern Western weapons systems was a reasonable and essential policy direction for the country. Poland is planning to reform its military, and is likely going to become one of the most advanced militaries in Central Europe.

Policies that have come out of the recent conflict in Ukraine ensured large amounts weapons being sent in support of Ukraine as well as historic levels of assistance given to Ukraine and countries bordering the former Soviet Union. In order to give the Ukrainian forces the ability to respond rapidly to Russian advances, weapons systems similar to those that are used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces were sought over more modern Western weapons systems that would have required additional training, time and support. Older Soviet systems like the T-72 and MiG-29 were dedicated or given to Ukraine with an agreement with the US or Germany to displace the older systems with more modern German and American tanks and weapons systems. Central European powers that were using modernised equipment from the Cold War era are now able to obtain many NATO weapons systems if they sent their Cold War era equipment to Ukraine. Those systems are increasingly being seen in videos of the conflict and are already having an effect with Polish made tanks being seen on the field, advancing in the Kherson region and region around Kharkiv.

The weapons displacement program has met some hurdles, but the intent and policy approach has two major benefits. Besides supporting Ukraine with already active equipment, the displacement of the equipment with advanced systems like Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and M1A2 tanks from the US gives countries bordering Russia and Belarus a distinct advantage. Modernising Central European countries with NATO weapons also brings that region closer to the West, and pulls them further from the influence of Russia and their government. Outside of the direct policy approach, the actions and support of Ukraine’s Armed Forces will blunt the ability of Russia to pose a serious threat using conventional arms to former Warsaw Pact nations that have spent much of their post-Cold War freedom pulling away from Russian influence.

While support and weapons from the West and NATO have had a major impact on Russian equipment and morale, it is important not to take recent victories with a grain of salt by pushing polices too widely or aggressively. Like with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, policies that tie NATO long term to a conflict or a specific region may end up causing more strife and end in a long term loss for the West. If done more rapidly, putting Russia in a corner may illicit and overreaction by Russia if they feel they have fewer options in ensuring their own national security. What already seems to be occurring is that support for one conflict may add fuel to the fire towards other conflicts in other parts of the world, creating long term problems outside of Eastern Europe. A holistic and well thought out policy direction is essential, the absence of one is already a catalyst for the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Après les Finlandais qui, à une large majorité, viennent de dire « oui » à l'Union européenne, et avant les Norvégiens, les Suédois auront à se prononcer, le 13 novembre, sur l'adhésion de leur pays. Profondément divisés sur la question, les sociaux-démocrates, revenus aux affaires au sein d'un gouvernement (...) / Europe, Démocratie, État, Société, Suède - 1994/11

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine threatens the existing system of international relations and creates the preconditions for regional conflicts in Europe. In Ukraine, Putin has tested and created a new tool for blurring borders and separating the territories of neighboring countries by creating so-called “gray zones” or “gray enclaves”, the classic examples of which are the “DNR” and “LNR”(“Donetsk and Luhansk People Republics”).

In 2014, the Russian Federation used the tactics of “biting off small pieces” from Ukraine, de facto occupying a significant part of the Ukrainian Donbas. Russia has applied similar schemes in other countries. For example, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, armed conflicts began in Moldova and Georgia: in 1992 in Transnistria and Abkhazia, and this was largely due to the indirect influence of Russia, which in every possible way supported the separatist movements in the post-Soviet space, spreading its influence through them.

But in Ukraine, Russia is testing and scaling up a technology that is extremely dangerous for Europe to form “gray zones” of instability, which, like cancerous metastases, tend to expand and appear in other countries, even those not adjacent to Russia. This tactic is part of the toolkit of the so-called hybrid aggression – a complex, predominantly non-military confrontation with an asymmetrically stronger or numerically stronger enemy, a direct military clash with which is undesirable.

Putin sees the West as such an adversary, which he considers a civilizational enemy. At the moment, for the first time since 1991, Russia poses a direct threat to Europe by creating “gray zones” in Ukraine, where the issue of the continued existence of Western civilization is being decided.

By invading Ukraine on February 24, Putin opened a geopolitical Pandora’s Box, setting off a chain of irreversible processes within the system of international relations. An attempt to occupy a sovereign state is a denial of the principles of the inviolability of borders that were formed after the Second World War, which means the leveling of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which made it possible to effectively eliminate the prerequisites for the emergence of interstate conflicts in post-war Europe. Putin has disrupted the stability of the existing system of international relations and created global geopolitical turbulence.

The analysis of the mechanism of hybrid aggression, tested by Putin in Ukraine, makes it possible to understand what an unprecedented threat Europe is facing. At the initial level, this hybrid strategy is based on separatist sentiments, which are especially strong in the Balkans, if we talk about the European continent. To reinforce such tendencies, the Kremlin uses its agents of influence and funding so that the proxies sponsored by it not only declare themselves as potentially independent players but also weaken and destabilize the country as much as possible, posing a threat to its integrity and sovereignty.

The tactics of such aggression are quite flexible: if in the case of the Ukrainian Donbas, Russia tried to consolidate its political, economic, and military presence as much as possible, then, for example, in the case of Serbia, which is currently destabilizing the Balkans, unquestioning implementation of the Kremlin’s political instructions is sufficient.

Russian influence can be indirect: it is not necessary to use military force, as happened in 2014 in the Donbas. In the case of Europe, it is enough to have agents of influence who will undermine the socio-political situation within a country or region. The Kremlin’s goal is to destabilize and deplete the object of the hybrid attack, demoralize the population, and create unbearable conditions for life with parallel rampant crime, corruption, etc. As a rule, Russia does not need such “gray zones” as territorial acquisitions. They serve as an instrument of influence. It is precisely the game of separatism that can turn into the presence of Russia anywhere on the continent, and at the moment, seeing that the military arsenal of the Russian Federation is incomparable with NATO, Putin begins to actively apply the tactics of creating “gray zones” in Europe, starting with Ukraine.

Hybrid aggression is carried out mainly by non-military methods, but it cannot exist without a strong army. Therefore, Ukraine is a bulwark of defense of the eastern borders of Europe. And the outcome of this confrontation depends on the full support of Kyiv, the Ukrainian army, which defends not only its country but the whole of Europe from Russian aggression. Ukraine needs Western weapons capable of exhausting and weakening the Russian army that threatens Europe.

Mykola Volkivskyi is an international public figure, fellow of the Lane Kirkland Scholarship, Founder of the Foundation for the Development of Ukraine in Poland, and the IGR in Kyiv.

Le nouveau film de Jean-Luc Godard, « Eloge de l'amour », sort le mercredi 16 mai. C'est une cantate dont les personnages chantent la Résistance, la mémoire et le cinéma. Une nouvelle occasion de découvrir l'originalité et la pertinence de ce réalisateur unique pour qui le cinéma est, en premier lieu, (...) / Art, Cinéma, Culture - 2001/05

« Ton image, c'est toi ou c'est quelqu'un d'autre ? »... Dans l'ombre, comme à l'affût, il y a une voix. En face, remplissant le cadre, un enfant s'étonne, s'interroge, se tait ou essaye de répondre. Un enfant réagit à cette voix. La voix est toujours là, une voix lente, entêtante, têtue, insistante. (...) / France, Audiovisuel, Cinéma, Communication, Enfance, Idées, Personnalités - 1979/05

Roman noir, roman de mœurs, récit picaresque, c'est tout cela ensemble, cette Double Vie de Jesús dont la trame plonge dans le Mexique contemporain comme dans un chaudron bouillonnant. Jesús Pastrana est un fonctionnaire municipal modèle. À la quarantaine, après vingt ans de bons et loyaux services, (...) / Mexique, Criminalité, Culture, Narcotrafic, Femmes, Littérature, Violence, Amérique centrale, Drogue, Corruption, Sexualité - 2017/08

On n'en finit pas de redécouvrir Jerome Charyn, écrivain américain majeur pourtant plus célébré en Europe que chez lui. Connu surtout pour ses romans mettant en scène le superpolicier juif new-yorkais Isaac Sidel (Zyeux-Bleus, Marilyn la Dingue, Isaac le mystérieux…, publiés par Gallimard en « Série (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Vietnam, Armée, Culture, Guerre du Vietnam 1959-1975, Jeunes, Littérature, Ville, Drogue - 2017/08

Toute la presse a donné les menus des réceptions offertes pour la reine Elizabeth. Il y aurait beaucoup à dire, et pas toujours du meilleur. On aurait voulu voir présenter à notre auguste visiteuse les plus sincères échantillons d'une cuisine qui a tout de même autre chose à présenter que des truites (...) / France, Royaume-Uni, Alimentation, Société - 1957/05

With the death of Queen Elizabeth II, the United Kingdom now has its first King since George VI more than seven decades ago. Saturday September 10, 2022 is recorded in history as the day Prince Charles was proclaimed as King Charles III. Aside from the challenge of having to (ceremonially) lead a country that is undergoing political and economic turmoil with a Prime Minister—Liz Truss—who has less than  a week of experience in her top executive position, the new king comes with a mixed bag of goodwill and controversy. An international media and tabloid feeding frenzy is already underway.

In his previous role as The Prince of Wales and a monarch of wide international fame, the new King is accused of using his influences to advance UK’s weapons industry deals with his personal friends. He has held dozens of meetings with rulers of repressive regimes in the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011. He has “played a key role in promoting £14.5-billion worth of UK arms exports to these regimes.” According to UK Declassified, there is no question that he was a royalty-level salesman for UK arms makers during said period.

The ‘Barack Hussein’ Effect

At the heart of the controversy surrounding the new King is his stance on Islam and Muslims. His affinity with Islam and vision to improve the relationship between the Western and the Islamic world extend for decades. In his speech Islam and the West that was delivered at Oxford in 1993, he said:

“I believe wholeheartedly that the links between these two worlds matter more today than ever before, because the degree of misunderstanding between the Islamic and Western worlds remains dangerously high, and because the need for the two to live and work together in our increasingly interdependent world has never been greater.”

In his previous role, the new King has also taken positions that opposed UK foreign policy. The most notables are: His opposition to the Iraq war and the neocon foreign policy adventures; his disagreement with the notion that those cartoonists who flagrantly offended Prophet Muhammad were merely exercising the democratic value of freedom of expression. Also, his disagreement with the burqa and hijab ban in Europe.

Moreover, the new King is sympathetic to the Palestinian people’s right to an independent state. Granted, as a King, his leadership is ceremonial and his political views must be shelved in his royal bedroom closet, but that will not be enough to tame the usual suspects—Islamophobes and Zionists of all shades—who are determined to ferociously come after the new King to make him an unpopular King by accusing him of being a Muslim in disguise.

In his previous role, the new King has offended some when it became public that he learned Arabic, studies the Quran, and believes that “Christianity can learn from Islam.” Unlike most of the Western leaders, he had no problem offering a counter-narrative to Islamophobia. He refused to accept the so-called clash of civilization thesis popularized by the neocons. “I do not accept the argument that they (the Western and Islamic cultures) are on a course to clash in a new era of antagonism. I am utterly convinced that our two worlds have much to offer each other. We have much to do together. I am delighted that the dialogue has begun, both in Britain and elsewhere.”

And in a speech he delivered in Saudi Arabia 2006, he said: “We need to recover the depth, the subtlety, the generosity of imagination, the respect for wisdom that so marked Islam in its great ages …”

These sympathetic public statements at an era of glorified jingoism and ruthless Islamophobia made then Prince Charles a target. In 2003, two months before President George W. Bush appointed him to sit on the board of United states Institute for Peace, the notorious Islamophobe Daniel Pipes has published a long dossier to implicate Prince Charles as a Muslim in disguise.

King Charles III is set to become UK’s Barack Hussein Obama, at least in being projected as an alien leader. Each, on his own, has undergone an up close and personal experience that inspired him to form his own perspective and narrative on Islam and Muslims. And their respective narratives, needless to say, flies in the face of the traditional aristocrats, the political elite, and the ideologically-driven media.

To bulwark against political demonization, the new King may have to dominate the headlines by taking the moral stance that his late mother—Queen Elizabeth II—failed to take: offer an official apology to all of the countries that suffered exploitation and oppression under the British colonial enterprise. His first step should be that which could be his legacy.

Meanwhile, in a country that virtually drifted away from its religious identity: ‘So what if he is a Muslim?’  

An old ideology rears its head but offers little for the present age.

An outright win for Kyiv now looks possible.

This week in FP’s international news quiz: Britain loses a queen, gains a prime minister, and retains its feline figurehead.

Al Qaeda once again has a safe haven in Afghanistan, endangering Americans.

A conservative message isn’t selling well on the Russian homefront.

Tehran’s program is far more advanced than in 2015. Only a credible threat of force will stop the regime from crossing the threshold.

A pair of August elections in Africa produced clear winners, while also sending mixed messages about the strength of each country’s democracy. Meanwhile, two contests in Europe provide potential inroads for right-wing parties.

Kenya 

In Kenya’s August 9 election, Deputy President William Ruto defeated opposition leader Raila Odinga by approximately 233,000 votes, 51–49 percent. 65 percent of registered voters turned out, down from 80 percent in 2017 — and a 15-year low.

Ruto fashioned himself as an anti-establishment “hustler” on the campaign trail, in a populist appeal to Kenya’s disaffected young population. While Ruto is, in reality, an immensely wealthy politician, this outsider branding contrasted him against Odinga (a five-time presidential candidate, former prime minister, and son of Kenya’s first vice president) as well as Odinga’s A-list stump speaker, Uhuru Kenyatta (the outgoing president and son of Kenya’s first president).  

Political dynamics between Kenya’s ethnic groups also played a role. Odinga had hoped to leverage Kenyatta’s influence as an ethnic Kikuyu to gain the backing of Kikuyu voters, the largest bloc in the country. But Odinga is an ethnic Luo, a rival group to the Kikuyu. This derailed Odinga’s plan, as the Kikuyu vote split partially for Ruto, an ethnic Kalenjin, further expanding the deputy president’s base of support. 

This shift in sentiment was partially captured in pre-election polling. On top of the tight topline margins, surveys taken a week before the vote even showed Odinga with a slight lead.

The days following the election, though tense, were markedly less turbulent than the aftermath of other recent contests. In the wake of the 2007 campaign, violence escalated into a months-long ethnic conflict that claimed over a thousand lives. Unrest and frustration erupted again in 2017, when the initial election was annulled and a redo was ordered. But this year, when the Kenyan Supreme Court found no credible evidence of election tampering following a challenge from Odinga, the opposition leader accepted the court’s decision. 

Although there are still concerns about Ruto’s checkered past on human rights, the results of Kenya’s election are, in some ways, an encouraging step for the country. Kenyatta has already promised a smooth transition of power. What’s more, the decisiveness of the court’s ruling could also restore some faith in the functionality, transparency, and independence of Kenya’s democratic institutions.

Angola

Two weeks after Kenyans took to the polls, so too did voters in Angola, a country whose democratic norms are comparatively younger and weaker. For that reason, it can be difficult to draw direct comparisons between the two elections.

The August 24 vote saw President João Lourenço secure a second term after his party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), defeated the main opposition, Adalberto Costa Júnior and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 51–44 percent. 

The 7-point margin makes this one of the closest elections in Angola’s history and marks a record-low showing for the MPLA, which has been in power since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Notably, the party’s vote share has steadily declined in all four post-civil war elections: it received 82 percent in 2008, 72 percent in 2012, and 61 percent in 2017. 

Most recently, the MPLA’s popularity has waned due to economic concerns and dissatisfaction with Lourenço’s handling of corruption. Indeed, pre-election polling painted a tight race, as young voters in particular seemed to move toward UNITA. Surveys taken throughout the summer varied widely, suggesting everything from a 29-point MPLA win to a 26-point UNITA win, often with large shares of respondents not selecting either party.

Overall, the MPLA’s majority in the 220-seat National Assembly fell by 26 seats to 124. UNITA picked up 39 seats, bringing its total to 90. Three other parties — the Social Renewal Party (PRS), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and the Humanist Party of Angola (PHA) — each won two seats. Voter turnout was recorded at 45 percent, down from 76 percent in 2017.

The final results were contested by UNITA, who alleged irregularities in the vote count, but their challenge was swiftly struck down by Angola’s constitutional court. Four of the 16 members of the Angolan National Electoral Commission also refused to sign off on the returns.

Challenges to election results — and concerns over vote tampering — are neither unwarranted nor uncommon in Angola. The ruthless rule of former President José Eduardo dos Santos, Lourenço’s predecessor and Angola’s autocratic leader of 38 years, was defined by the suppression of basic freedoms and the violation of human rights. 

Although dos Santos left office in 2017 and died in July, Angola today remains far from free. The MPLA still has a large amount of control over the electoral process and state media. When it comes to political and civil liberties, Freedom House gives the country a rating of 30 out of 100; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index scores it one point lower at 29. 

Sweden and Italy

Looking ahead, there are two major European elections in September.

Sweden voted on September 11.

The Social Democrats, led by Magdalena Andersson after the resignation of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven last summer, were looking to maintain control in the Riksdag. Entering the home stretch, pre-election polls showed the Social Democrats ahead by an average of 9 points in a close contest with the conservative Moderate Party, led by Ulf Kristersson, as well as the far-right Sweden Democrats, led by Jimmie Åkesson. In the 2018 election, the Social Democrats outperformed polling expectations by 4 points to win with a 28 percent plurality — the party’s worst electoral showing in over a century.

The election is still too close to call, as of September 12.  With approximately 95 percent of votes counted, the Social Democrats led with 31 percent, the Sweden Democrats earned 21 percent, and the Moderates had 19 percent. This means that no bloc currently possesses an obvious governing majority of 175 seats: the parties supporting the Moderates won a total of 175 seats, while the parties supporting the Social Democrats won 174 seats.

Italy votes on September 25.

Following a falling-out with the left-populist Five Star Movement, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s unity government collapsed last month, prompting September’s snap elections. The current polling leader is Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing Brothers of Italy, which appears to have enough support from other parties to govern if victorious. Enrico Letta’s center-left Democratic Party is polling in second. Letta would likely continue the current government’s policies, but a right-wing coalition would almost surely ditch Draghi’s direction.

A full summary of both contests will appear in October’s election round-up.

It’s back to the drawing board for the country—and President Gabriel Boric.

Framing geopolitics in terms of democracy and autocracy won’t necessarily help bring peace.