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Entre 1973 et 1978, au Pérou, le salaire réel a diminué de moitié. Aujourd'hui, le salaire minimum est de 1 dollar par jour. Au-dessous de ce seuil se trouvent les chômeurs et ceux que l'on appelle, par euphémisme, les « sous-employés » : ensemble, ils représentent déjà plus de 50 % de la population (...) / Pérou, Droits humains - 1980/03

Why Europe has an edge over America and China.

Prigozhin’s rebellion ended quickly, but it spells trouble for the Kremlin.

Dangerous illusions buy China time and cover for the execution of President Xi Jinping’s multi-faceted plan for global domination. China has already made such progress; the China threat is now so great that the Free World cannot afford dalliance, wishful thinking, or repose. U.S. efforts to keep communication channels with Chinese leaders open make sense, but optimism regarding the fruits of engagement and diplomacy with China is not warranted.

China’s expansionist drive and bullying of neighbors; subjection of Hong Kong and Tibet and scheme for overtaking Taiwan; extreme human rights violations and techno-totalitarian control; relentless espionage and interference campaigns in democracies; collusion with Russia, Iran and bad actors across the globe; tremendous influence and anti-American positions in international forums; massive military build-up and preparation for war; and recent aggressive moves against U.S. planes and ships in the South China Sea, simply must give U.S. policymakers and negotiators pause.

Rather than hold on to fading hope that engagement and diplomacy will appreciably soften China’s stance, the United States must rise to the current challenge. Only by facing the hard truths about Chinese revisionism can America form principled and wise China policy.

Before believing that China, unlike Russia, is amenable to reasonable relations with democratic states, consider the China-Russia relationship. At their February 2022 meeting in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced an “unlimited partnership,” which they said was aimed at countering U.S. influence. As he departed their March 2023 summit in Moscow, Xi told Putin, “Right now there are changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for one hundred years.” Echoing that note, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said any Ukraine peace talks should discuss “the principles on which the new world order will be based.”

Such statements sent a chill down many a foreign policy analyst’s spine because a new world order, or even a major war, no longer seems entirely out of the realm of possibility. This juncture calls for a conscious rejection of complacency.

Shortly after the Moscow summit, which expanded China and Russia’s economic and strategic ties, Chinese defense minister General Li Shangfu announced that China and Russia would increase military and military-technical cooperation and arms trade. Although China doesn’t overtly supply Russia weaponry for use in Ukraine, China provides dual-use rifles, body armor, drones, and financial support for Russia’s ferocious assault. Trade between China and Russia rose to $190 billion last year, and China’s imports of Russian energy have increased to $88 billion since February 2022. The only “peace” China wants in Ukraine will advantage Russia and increase Chinese influence over Europe.

The Pentagon has warned that Russia and China are producing space weapons to attack U.S. satellites and to evade U.S. missile defense systems and that Russia is providing highly enriched uranium for China’s nuclear program. China’s space, cyber, and bio-weapons capabilities, dramatic nuclear weapons ramp-up, and intercontinental and submarine ballistic missile production paint an alarming picture. Alerts by Microsoft confirmed by U.S. officials that a Chinese-sponsored hacking group targeted critical infrastructure in the United States, including Navy telecommunications systems in Guam that are key to Pacific defense, highlight China’s likely instigation of cyber war as part of a move on Taiwan.

Optimism in certain circles that China can become a responsible member of the international community if only the West keeps pursuing economic and diplomatic compromise is refuted by China’s cultural genocide of the Uyghur minority, violations of treaties and international norms, and close strategic and military ties with North Korea, a fanatical totalitarian state that relies on severe, omnipresent repression and nuclear proliferation and brinkmanship.

When weighing China’s real intentions, consider China, Russia, and Iran’s anti-Western front. The three countries capitalize on instances of American retreat, back each other in the UN, and engage in the subversion of democracies. They benefit from expansive trade, weapons, technology transfers, joint military exercises, and mutual sanctions breaches. They recently participated in their third trilateral military drill in the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea.

There is no mistaking China’s dramatically enhanced position in the Middle East. Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has announced that Iran’s “comprehensive strategic accord” with China is in effect. China provides technology for the repression of Iranian protestors and civilian life in general. Another dismal indicator of freedom’s trajectory came when Xi Jinping and Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman met in December and agreed on major energy, defense, infrastructure, and technology deals. Especially bad for human rights, Saudi-led Arab League states agreed to a statement endorsing China’s “efforts” and “position” in Hong Kong and “rejecting Taiwan’s independence in all its forms.” Subsequently, China managed to negotiate a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

For China, these developments constitute steps forward in replacing the U.S.-oriented world order. China’s trade with the Middle East now exceeds that of the United States.

China’s tremendous success in making Western countries dependent on Chinese goods and supply chains and its principal commercial agreements and loans on every continent have greatly augmented China’s power. Moreover, China has benefited from decades of aggressive espionage, influence campaigns, and intellectual property theft, especially in the United States. In addition to corporate and political infiltration, China altered American universities via Confucius Institutes, sinology programs, and joint scientific research, which served China’s ideological and military-strategic priorities. So too, in Europe, as China made significant infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications investments, it worked hard to steer media narratives and capture European academic, business, and policy elites.

In South America, China, Russia, and Iran have significantly increased their presence and leverage and support of oppressive anti-American dictatorships. Venezuela even hosted Russian war games, which included China, Iran, Cuba, and others, in 2022. China is establishing airports, seaports, space facilities, and Confucius Institutes in the region. Honduras’s decision to drop diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of China and Brazil’s enthusiasm for deepening ties with China are sobering reminders of China’s sway.

China has spent about $1 trillion on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Despite setbacks, the BRI has advanced China’s imperialistic drive, leading not only to new security agreements and docks for China’s navy but also to the insidious expansion of Chinese information and surveillance technology. Among the deals that actuate Xi’s claim that “the East is rising and the West is declining” is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, with which China is carving a path to the Indian Ocean, Cambodia’s Ream military base, which is becoming a base for Chinese operations, and China’s massive Pinglu Canal project, with which China seeks closer connectivity with Southeast Asia.

All of the above facilitates the worldwide reach of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system and propaganda, including its quest for technological supremacy and control of the world’s data, rare earth minerals, and energy assets.

In international organizations, China energetically pursues predominance. From corrupting the UN, the WHO, and the World Bank, to realigning the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, to attempting to turn BRICS into an anti-U.S. coalition, China never lets up. Although the United States and ASEAN are enduring partners, it is notable that ASEAN’s Secretary General recently completed a four-day “working visit” to China, meeting many high-level officials, including China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi. When China hosted a summit with Central Asian countries this May, seeking to broaden China’s role in the region’s economies and security, Chinese diplomats derided President Joe Biden’s efforts to smooth relations and the G7’s supposed “bloc confrontation.”

Xi’s redefinition of the world order goes hand in hand with his redefinition of words; he insists China will free the world from U.S. “unilateralism” and lead the progress of “equity” and “justice.” But the mendacity of this rhetoric is revealed by China’s severe human rights violations against Uyghurs and Tibetans and the persecution of Christians, Falun Gong adherents, dissidents, and democracy advocates. U.S. leaders should stress to non-aligned countries the dire implications for their citizens if they align with the CCP. The “National Security Law” stamping out freedom in Hong Kong is the real face of the globalization of the Chinese Communist Party.

Having focused more on mutually profitable economic interaction than on the meteoric rise of China’s hard and soft power, democracies face a China formidable and emboldened enough to parade its ambitions. China is on a trajectory to surpass the United States in military might; U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the military balance is becoming unfavorable to the United States and our allies.” In addition to a spy balloon traversing America, brazen provocations and island-building in the South China Sea, territorial encroachments on neighbors, and major military air and sea exercises “encircling Taiwan,” China now issues explicit threats. Xi says China is preparing for war. Foreign Minister Qin Lang warns there will be “conflicts and confrontation” unless the United States stops “containment.”

The Biden administration’s recent engagement efforts and search for “guardrails” in the U.S.-China relationship—which include emphasizing economic relations while downplaying defense and human rights concerns, requests (often rebuffed) for high-level meetings, and pledges to “de-risk” rather than “de-couple”—have too many costs relative to hypothetical benefits. A June 14 letter from House Foreign Affairs chair Michael McCaul (R-TX) to Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted reports that the administration had “held back human rights related sanctions, export controls, and other sensitive actions to try to limit damage to the U.S.-China relationship.” Moreover, the letter complained that the State Department “refuses to provide answers on these issues to Congress as Secretary Blinken prepares to depart for a trip to China.” For his part, after raising concerns about China’s “provocative actions” in the Taiwan Strait, Blinken walked back, offering: “We do not support Taiwan independence.”

Recalling the futility of threatening Russia with major consequences “if” it “invaded” Ukraine, the United States and its allies should prioritize military spending and outline potential sanctions for egregious aggression. They should do all possible to preempt war while at the same time demonstrating a willingness to fight for Taiwan if necessary. A Chinese conquest of Taiwan would put the Indo-Pacific region into vulnerable disarray. The world would see that the Free World cannot prevent China from forcing its will on the Taiwanese people and ending their vibrant democracy.

It should be impossible to downplay China’s drive for global dominance by now. It would be unwise not to craft alliances and deterrence proportionate to China’s military buildup and expansionism. It would be unprincipled not to speak out against and penalize China’s terrible repression and backing of brutal dictatorships. It is both necessary and proper to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains and sever academic and technological relationships that advance China’s weapons and surveillance systems.

In a world saturated with Chinese and Russian propaganda, America should renovate Voice of America-type programs for the digital age. The United States should step up its game in regional and international trade, organizations, and relationships in a world redefined by China's economic and geopolitical influence. America should project a generous, reliable, compelling presence in the world.

The scale and reach of the China threat are breathtaking and game-changing. Complacency, wishful thinking, and procrastination in dealing with it are luxuries the United States and its allies cannot afford.

Anne R. Pierce is an author of books and articles on American presidents, American foreign policy, and American society. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is an appointed member of Princeton University’s James Madison Society, and was a Political Science Series Editor for Transaction Publishers. Follow her @AnneRPierce.

Image: Shutterstock.

Iranian-made Shahed drones have caused mass destruction in Ukraine. With their Volkswagen-style engines, they can fly undetected for about 120 kilometers and deliver an explosive power of 40 kilograms. The components to make this drone? A mere estimated $20,000. Yet to shoot them down, Ukrainians are using American-made NASAM missiles that cost about… $400,000 per drone taken down. One can hardly blame the Ukrainians for resorting to using 1960s German Gepard anti-aircraft guns instead.

The lessons of the awful Ukraine war so far are many and varied. But something that has struck most observers is that while the Russians have been outmaneuvered, they have been holding their own against modern Western military equipment by using old tanks and artillery. In particular, American gear, while technologically advanced, is either not always the best choice on the battlefield, prohibitively expensive, or both.

A number of examples ought to be considered.

Which is the “Best” Tank?

The news that Germany and the United States agreed to supply Ukraine with Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks created quite a stir. Both tanks, which are superior to their Russian counterparts, are similar in size and firepower. The American Abrams in particular is known to be battle-proven and virtually indestructible.

Yet there are a few issues with the Abrams tank. For one, an Abrams weighs up to seven tons more than the Leopard, which could easily get stuck in Ukraine’s muddy fields or bring down some of its light bridges. Another issue is that the latest version of the Abrams is optimized to run on jet fuel, which is understandably hard to replenish on the battlefield. Even more problematic, however, is that on-field repairs aren’t always possible for an Abrams. In fact, some logistical considerations make the prospect seem like a living hell. For example, a frontline battalion cannot fix an Abrams with broken optics. Replacing these requires pulling out entire subsystems and shipping them to a depot—potentially hundreds of miles away—while also ordering replacement subsystems. Finally, there is the cost dimension: producing an Abrams can top $10 million per unit, while the latest Leopard 2 costs around $6 million.

All things considered, the German Leopard 2 is a better choice in Ukraine over the American M1 Abrams. In fact, because of existing availability, the Leopard 2s have entered service, mainly via Poland and Canada, months ahead of the Abrams.

Airpower Isn’t Cheap

The United States, along with other NATO members, was initially reluctant to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter planes; Washington took the view that doing so could escalate the conflict. The F-16 is, after all, a battle-proven jet with fifth-generation stealth technology. It is more than a match for any Russian fighter jet and can carry a vast array of air-to-ground missiles and loitering munitions.

However, the Swedish government has offered Ukraine its Saab JAS 39 Gripen plane. The Gripen (Griffin in English) is a fourth-generation fighter jet that can land on small runways and highways, and has highly effective sensors and electronic jamming equipment. While not battle-proven like the F-16, the Gripen has consistently scored highly in air-to-air war games. The result has been something of a lobbying battle over which jet to procure.

Yet despite Kyiv’s open preference for F-16s, a number of Ukranian pilots concede —in private—skepticism of whether such is the best choice.

Consider the costs. According to industry group Aviatia, the Gripen cost $7,800 per hour to fly, while the F-16 cost $12,000 per hour. Gripen maintenance is also much cheaper: while SAAB (which makes the Gripen) and Lockheed Martin (which produces F-16s) do not advertise the yearly maintenance cost of their fighter jets, practically all commentators agree the F-16 is more expensive. Executiveflyers.com estimates that an F-16’s maintenance comes at about $10 million per year. Yes, the Gripen is more expensive to produce than the F-16, as it sells for $17 million more per plane, but this is due to the existing scale: the F-16 has been produced and exported since the mid-1970s.

There is also a sizeable gap in terms of training. Swedish pilots and maintenance recruits are trained for twelve months to operate the Gripen. The F-16, by comparison, takes at least thirty-six months.

Finally, there are on-the-ground conditions to consider. As noted recently in The Economist:

Soviet runways were built like floor tiling: panels of concrete blocks with sealant in between. That allows them to withstand the expansion and contraction from extreme heat and cold. It also means that moss, stones and other debris accumulates in between. The Gripen, with smaller air intakes that sit higher up on the fuselage, would cope with this far better than the F-16 [...] Ukraine could resurface some airfields, but that would only invite Russian missiles. And while the F-16 can land on roads in a pinch, its lighter undercarriage is not as well suited to the stresses of short runway…

Don’t be surprised if Ukraine provisionally decides to buy Gripens as well as F-16s.

Yet regardless of which plane is chosen, the war in Ukraine has provided another valuable lesson. Air superiority, so valuable in all twentieth-century wars right up to Desert Storm, may no longer be achieved by manned aircraft alone. Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles make the airspace dangerous. Both Ukraine and Russia have hundreds of S-300 missile batteries. Ukraine has also recently obtained the Patriot battery system. All these systems are battle-tested and very effective against manned aircraft.

As a consequence, the combat duties of fighter aircraft have transformed; jets are now primarily used as short-flight, air-to-ground missile launchers. Dogfights are extremely rare. Downed aircraft by friendly fire is not uncommon—Ukrainians have taken to crudely inpainting the underside of their fighters with the national colors of blue and yellow.

The alternative to manned aircraft is the use of drones. The Ukrainians have been ingeniously making thousands of inexpensive “suicide” drones. Comprised of cheap electronic parts, some made with 3D printers, they only have to last long enough to deliver their deadly cargo. American-made aircraft, including drones, now face additional competition that often delivers far more bang for the buck.

Do You Want to Ride into Combat in a Deathtrap?

Delivering combat infantry to and from the battlefield is a challenge in and of itself, and often requires a specialized vehicle. In Ukraine, there is the choice between the Australian Bushmaster—a smelly, powerful, loud, and heavily armored fighting vehicle—and the American Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle, which is of similar size, and power.

The major difference is that whereas the Bushmaster will stay and fight with infantry, the Stryker will deliver and leave. This is just as well, given that the Stryker is lightly armored and vulnerable to any gun more powerful than a machine gun. It has been described as “a deathtrap.” When used by U.S. forces, it usually enters battle alongside the powerful and well-protected Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a tank in all but name. That may not be an option in Ukraine. The Stryker also suffers from a variety of technical issues, as recounted in Responsible Statecraft: “the armor shielding it was fitted with proved largely ineffective and weighty, mud spattered from its rubber wheels into the engine during deployments caused innumerable maintenance problems, computer command displays inside the vehicle didn’t always work, soldiers in battle gear were being killed in rollover incidents because their seatbelts didn’t fit and (crucially), the bottom or the vehicle was thinly armored.” On top of all this, the Stryker is notoriously difficult and expensive to maintain.

The Bushmaster, in contrast, can sustain itself in the field for three days, has withstood Russian attacks, and costs $1.57 million per unit compared to the Stryker’s $4.9 million per unit. For a cash-strapped, war-time government like Ukraine that requires both effectiveness and low costs, it isn’t hard to see which vehicle is preferable.

Bang for Your Buck

It is worth repeating that all the systems mentioned above are not like-for-like, and offer different capabilities depending on the terrain and fighting conditions. Similarly, all the listed (estimated) unit prices do not take into account bulk-buying discounts (but also, crucially, the often costs of ongoing maintenance). It is also worth recognizing that American equipment often—but not always—utilizes super technology, and the price tag may reflect the expense that went into research and development.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict delivers a clear warning to U.S. arms suppliers of the need to rationalize and simplify production and maintenance costs, along with system complexity. And this is without factoring in concerns that some arms suppliers are engaging in price gouging.

Ultimately, though a particular platform may be “the best,” that does not mean much if a particular platform isn’t sustainably usable on the battlefield, either because of its complexity, its costs, or because of the particular environment in which it has been deployed. Foreign, non-Western buyers may not—and often do not—have Western budgets, and will be looking for simpler and less expensive, yet as-effective, options. Policymakers in Washington—many of which come from electoral districts that play host to arms suppliers and employ constituents—ought to take note of this.

Patrick Drennan is a journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

Les océans font l'objet d'une exploitation si intense qu'elle met en péril la reproduction de nombreuses espèces. L'accaparement des eaux poissonneuses de l'Afrique par les chalutiers industriels français, espagnols, chinois, coréens, japonais ou russes menace la sécurité alimentaire du continent. / (...) / Afrique, Pêche, Mer, Commerce, Botswana, Mauritanie, Sénégal, Relations Nord-Sud, Impérialisme, Criminalité - 2018/05

Délaissées au profit des métropoles, les villes moyennes comptent leurs plaies : isolement, faibles ressources, exil des jeunes et des diplômés, chômage, pauvreté. Pour leurs élus, l'égalité des territoires prévue par la Constitution n'est plus qu'un souvenir. Comme à Montluçon, où le combat pour une (...) / France, Intégration sociale, Pauvreté, Région, Service public, Transports, Ville, Chômage - 2018/05

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have been two of the quickest countries in the Middle East to take full advantage of the new multipolar world in which they have found themselves. Both nations have been able to successfully exploit all sides of conflicts to pursue their own interests. Riyadh in particular has forcefully and blatantly used its new and more powerful standing in the changing geopolitical environment to press its demands on superpowers with crude disregard for a quickly vanishing global hegemonic pecking order. In one of the most recent examples of this, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly threatened “major economic consequences for Washington” if it retaliated against Riyadh’s oil cuts. Similarly, Abu Dhabi has felt emboldened enough to withdraw from a U.S.-led maritime coalition based in Bahrain due to frustration at the United States for not doing enough to deter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

In stark contrast to the aggressive posturing by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Cairo sits idly by, fumbling its way through this new reality. This difficulty is for a variety of reasons; the most prominent of which is its rapidly sinking economy. This situation, however, affords the United States a unique opportunity to assist Egypt in improving the distressed state of its people, thereby regaining much of the goodwill Washington has lost over the past few years.

Back and Forth

One of the earliest signs of Egypt’s struggle to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment came when it was revealed that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ordered up to 40,000 rockets to be covertly shipped to Russia. This leaked intelligence was rejected shortly thereafter by Egypt. Later, it was reported that, instead, the sale of this artillery ammunition to the United States for transfer to Ukraine was approved. But although Egypt came out strongly against the veracity of the report regarding this supposed transfer of weapons to Russia, pundits and experts in Moscow and elsewhere seemed to believe that this transfer of weapons had been a real possibility. The lack of commitment and wavering to such a sale, even before the leaks were revealed, was manifested through the canceled “Bridge of Friendship” joint naval exercise between the nations scheduled for July 2022.

This behavior differs greatly from the UAE’s, whose president Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia’s largest and most important business/economic summit. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to MBZ, described the latter’s attendance as a “positive calculated risk” within the UAE’s policy of de-escalation and dialogue. Similarly, Russian interior minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev—a top Russian official who is sanctioned by the West—visited Riyadh and held meetings with his counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud. While diplomatic engagement on the one hand and selling weaponry on the other are not in the same class, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s cavalier attitude and ruthlessness in pursuing their own interests above all else, while giving themselves enough wiggle room and flexibility to not marry themselves to one side over the other, is evident.

Egypt, on the other hand, seems hesitant and indecisive about its own self-interest, alternating between marrying and divorcing one side over another ad infinitum. Consider that the cancelation of military exercises with Russia comes in conjunction with a strengthening of Egypt’s maritime partnership with the United States, as the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command transferred three patrol craft to the Egyptian Navy on March 21 during a ceremony in Alexandria. Yet this is also taking place while Egypt plans to drop the U.S. dollar in favor of local currencies in bilateral trade with India, China, and Russia, and amid reports that Cairo has formally applied to join BRICS.

All these dealings and heavy-footed maneuvering must be understood within the context of Egypt’s faltering economy. It was reported in late May that, due to a shortage of foreign hard currency, Egypt’s state grains buyer has deferred opening letters of credit to pay for its wheat purchases. Not much later on June 6, details emerged that Egypt has been struggling to raise cash for foreign debt repayments after it quadrupled its external borrowing over the past eight years. These repayments, which Egypt owes to the International Monetary Fund and foreign bondholders—mostly in the Gulf—amount to about $4.5 billion; more than half the annual revenue that comes in from the Suez Canal. On June 13 it came to light that Egypt is allocating $4.14 billion for its food subsidy program, which has been facing serious struggles since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the start of the war, Egypt’s currency has depreciated by nearly half, and foreign investors have pulled more than $20 billion out of the country.

In short, whereas its Gulf neighbors can act with fluidity between great superpower rivals without fear of serious reprisal, Egypt is forced to go all in and move with less flexibility because of its dire economic straits. Cairo’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy allows for a middle road to be taken, but that can only work if the government is flexible enough to not fully commit one side over the other. A lumbering and heavy-footed state being pulled down by its economic troubles lacks such maneuverability.

Washington to the Rescue?

Up until this point, the United States has sought to pressure Egypt to act in certain ways by withholding military aid to Cairo. This policy would be effective if America were still the hegemon of a unipolar world. But in today’s multipolar world, aid can come from elsewhere, like China, with much greater ease. Multipolarity lends itself more to the carrot than the stick.

Cairo’s current troubles, however, present an opening. Sisi is already attempting to hold talks with whatever remains of his political opposition—a sign that he realizes the difficult position his country is in. Washington should take this opportunity to offer Sisi economic aid for improving the state of the Egyptian people, rather than simply threatening to withhold military aid. By helping Cairo get Egypt’s economy back on track, the United States can leverage the current moment to its advantage, rather than eventually seeing Egypt do as the Gulf states are doing, to Washington’s ultimate disadvantage.

U.S. policymakers ought to therefore consider doing so. A generous economic relief package specifically earmarked for the Egyptian people, rather than the military, along with a well-run PR campaign would not only be a major diplomatic win but would also help ensure that Cairo continues to seek assistance from the United States. Multipolarity may open up other options for countries, but it does not preclude remaining with a prior benefactor.

Sam Fouad is a Middle East analyst, editor, and a PhD candidate at The Catholic University of America. He has previously worked in communications, on political campaigns, and in a Senator’s office. His work has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, Newsweek, The New Arab, Inkstick Media, The Atlantic Council, The Globe Post, and Al Jazeera Arabic, among others. Sam holds a bachelor’s degree from Boston University and a master’s degree in international relations from UMass Boston.

Recently, Japan unveiled new export control measures for chipmaking equipment, encompassing twenty-three items across six categories, including lithography, etching, cleaning, deposition, and masking. While the specific targets of these measures were not explicitly mentioned, it is evident that China, being the largest importer of chipmaking equipment since 2020 and accounting for close to 40 percent of Japanese chipmaking equipment exports in 2021, is likely one of the intended targets.

The actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as a strategic alignment with the U.S.-led “Chip-4 Alliance,” aiming to curb China’s semiconductor industry. An important question emerges: Will these measures effectively contain China, enabling the U.S.-led chip alliances to maintain their strategic advantages, or will they trigger a new crisis for the chip industry by inadvertently providing China with an opportunity to accelerate its collective efforts toward achieving chip self-sufficiency?

Chips are pivotal to a nation’s economic growth, societal advancement, and national security, acting as the “brains” or controlling units of modern society. They are especially critical for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analytics, which are key determinants of a country’s future technological competitiveness. Moreover, chips embody military-civil fusion technologies that can be employed in the development of advanced weaponry. Consequently, mastery over chipmaking supply chains has emerged as a central point of contention in the intense competition between the United States and China, two global powerhouses in a race for technological supremacy. 

The U.S.-led restrictions on China have prompted a shift in priorities within the semiconductor industry. National security is now taking precedence over economic efficiency, which was based on the global production network in chipmaking. These restrictions, which began under the Trump administration and have been reinforced by the Biden administration, include technological sanctions and export controls that prevent Chinese tech firms from acquiring advanced chips and restrict China’s access to key technologies and personnel in chipmaking. Amid escalating economic nationalism and in response to the 2021 supply chain disruptions in the automotive industry, the U.S.-led semiconductor alliances have enacted industrial policies to ensure the security of their chip supply chains. Such steps underscore the escalating concerns not just about safeguarding but fortifying national security as nations aim to preserve their sovereignty in an uncertain global landscape where trust and compliance with a rules-based order are on the decline. The fundamental premise here is that advanced technologies and equipment in chipmaking should not be supplied to countries that could potentially employ them to challenge the democratic world.

How Far Is China from Self-Sufficiency?

Following these restrictions, China is grappling with significant “chokepoints” that are stymieing its advancement in the semiconductor industry. As a relative latecomer to the field, China is at risk of falling further behind, particularly in next-generation technologies, if these chokepoints stay in place. This “chokepoint strategy”—akin to a kung fu master quickly executing a single sword move to sever their adversary’s throat—can readily be employed in warfare or geopolitical disputes. Here, a country or organization can identify and exploit vital points or bottlenecks—like a critical resource, transport route, or technology—in the competitor’s value chain. This metaphor vividly illustrates the risk of China being stifled or strangled, thereby hindering its ability to effectively compete and keep pace with the industry leaders in semiconductors.

The crux of the chokepoint strategy is that the party employing this strategy—in the case of semiconductors the United States and its allies—has monopolistic control over these chokepoints. By exercising this control, the United States and its allies can potentially disrupt the progress of China in chipmaking.

China has recognized the threat of chokepoints in its industrial capabilities. In 2018, the nation identified thirty-five technologies/products that could be subject to chokepoints. Advanced chipmaking tools and materials were included on this list. Fast forward five years, and with the United States and its allies having tightened their control over the chokepoints in China’s chipmaking, how prepared is China for self-sufficiency?

A simple response is “not much,” despite China having made certain strides in the domestic supply chain. Chinese start-ups span nearly all subsectors, from design software and databases to manufacturing equipment and semiconductor materials. However, regarding domestic substitution, the readiness is below 5 percent in most areas so far.

To upgrade its capacity for mature processing mode chipmaking, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) has invested in four additional foundries in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen since 2021. Although SMIC asserts that it can theoretically produce advanced 14nm chips using its existing DUV lithography systems, it is a considerable distance from reaching mass production. In the capital- and technology-intensive chipmaking industry, achieving mass production at a high yield rate is critical, as it can effectively lower the cost per chip. Transitioning to mass production and reaching a high yield rate requires significant time, manpower, and capital investment, provided the necessary equipment and tools are accessible.

The advanced lithography machine is a significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking capability. In this area, domestic substitution is currently less than 1 percent. ASML, based in the Netherlands, remains the sole supplier of EUV lithography machines, which are vital for advanced chipmaking. Immersion DUV lithography machines, produced by both ASML and Nikon from Japan, are likely to be added to the export restriction list, which could trigger a significant upheaval in China’s chipmaking capability. Shanghai Microelectronics, a domestic competitor, can currently manufacture lithography machines that only support mass production of chips using a 90nm or larger processing mode.

China has made notable progress in the field of etching machines, achieving about 10 percent domestic substitution. China’s Advanced Micro Fabrication Equipment Company is the first in the country to produce etching machines for advanced chipmaking. With the use of domestically produced lithography and etching machines, and through multiple exposures, it is feasible for China to manufacture chips with a 65nm processing mode or smaller at a large scale with high yield rates. These domestically produced machines can meet the production needs of most chips used in military applications, power management, LCDs, Wi-Fi, automobiles, and a wide array of consumer electronic systems.

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools represent another significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking endeavors. Under the influence of U.S. sanctions, Huawei has found itself unable to update its EDA software, despite holding permanent EDA licenses. There have been reports of Huawei developing its own EDA tool, yet its efficacy and market acceptance remain uncertain.

Semiconductor materials could potentially become chokepoints if Japan implements export control measures. Out of the nineteen core semiconductor materials, Japanese companies command a market share of over 50 percent in fourteen. For instance, Japanese companies dominate the worldwide supply of photoresist used in lithography, holding over 85 percent of the market share. Amid the Japan-Korea trade dispute in 2019, Japan, by restricting the export of three types of materials to South Korea, instigated a disruption throughout the entire semiconductor value chain. China has progressed in low-end photoresist production, but still heavily depends on Japanese imports for almost all high-end photoresists. Due to these reasons, Japan’s export control measures are interpreted as targeting China in a more systemic and precise fashion than the U.S.-imposed sanctions.

A Chaotic Future?

While these restrictions may hinder China’s progress in chipmaking, their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. Chips are highly complex products that require deep technical expertise in both hardware and software, and they rely on a tightly woven global production network.

The sophistication of chipmaking is evident in the significant investment in research and development. In 2021 alone, the industry invested a total of $71 billion in research and development (R&D), which overshadowed the total investment by China’s “Big Fund” of $51 billion since 2014. The R&D investment has been fuelled by the global innovation ecosystem, where customer demand for high-performance chips has been a driving force behind advancements in chip design and manufacturing. Nvidia, as an example, initially focused on providing GPUs (graphics processing units) for the gaming industry but has expanded its applications to other areas. Its growth has been propelled by increasing user demand in graphics-intensive gaming, bitcoin mining data analytics, and AI training and inference tasks. The CEO of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, has expressed concerns that being unable to access the Chinese market would significantly limit their opportunities for growth as China remains its largest market in gaming and data centers.

The global production network in chipmaking is constantly evolving, with companies striving to enhance their positions by acquiring new capabilities and engaging in higher value-added activities. Throughout history, there have been three major shifts in the chipmaking industry, each involving the relocation of lower value-added segments of the value chain to emerging economies or regions. In the first shift, chip manufacturing was transferred from the United States to Japan, while the United States maintained its dominance in chip design and intellectual property. The second shift witnessed Japan retaining higher value-added segments in materials and equipment, while manufacturing and packaging were transferred to South Korea and Taiwan. In the third shift, South Korea solidified its position in memory and display semiconductors, Taiwan specialized in foundries, and China took on the lower value-added packaging and manufacturing of chips of mature process mode. Each of these shifts not only led to industry restructuring but also redefined the structure of the value chain, creating opportunities for latecomers to bridge the gap. However, it should be noted that each of these shifts was generously supported by their respective governments in terms of policy and capital.

China frequently comes under criticism for its use of industrial policy and subsidies to support its domestic technology sector. However, despite these measures, China has been unsuccessful in significantly enhancing its semiconductor sector using its industrial policy.

Reflecting on the situation, several factors have hindered China’s progress in chipmaking. Apart from a deficiency in capital and talent within the industry, the largest barrier to China’s advancement is the absence of effective synergy among its upstream and downstream players in the value chain. Chips function as intermediate goods in the production of electronic and electric devices, a sector where China has a significant global presence. To maintain their competitiveness, Chinese downstream manufacturers have favored imported chips, which are cheaper, more powerful, and more energy-efficient than their domestically produced counterparts. Similarly, design tools struggle to secure orders from local chip designers; and domestic design software and IP, equipment, and materials face obstacles in being adopted by local foundries, as they often prefer superior imported alternatives. This lack of industry-level coordination stunts technological progress and results in disjointed industrial development.

The current structure of the semiconductor value chain is highly interdependent, though value distribution is uneven. The United States holds the largest market share (47 percent), primarily in chip design and core IP. It’s followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China (as of 2021). Specialized equipment manufacturers, who operate within a niche but highly protected market, can only survive within this global network. For instance, ASML has investments from several downstream companies within the network. Despite its monopoly, ASML only garnered about 6.5 billion euros in 2022, making up less than 2 percent of the total semiconductor industry revenue. This structure of the value chain presents formidable barriers to latecomers, such as China, who are seeking to gain a foothold in the market.

Now, technology sanctions and export controls have inadvertently opened a window of opportunity for Chinese firms to catch up. In response to the chokepoint strategy, the Chinese semiconductor industry is forced to strive for self-sufficiency by fostering interdependent relationships within the ecosystem. The timing also works in favor of Chinese enterprises. Had the sanctions been imposed a decade ago, Chinese companies would have had limited technological accumulation to enable catching up. Over the past ten years, however, China’s investments in nearly every subsector of chipmaking have witnessed rapid generational upgrades within closed feedback loops, bolstered by collective investment from a wide array of players such as the government, tech companies, digital platforms, and downstream manufacturers. Thus, China is poised to stimulate a catch-up in chipmaking.

Reflections

Predicting a specific timeframe for China’s catch-up in semiconductors is challenging. However, a complete stifling of progress is unlikely. Geopolitical disruptions, coupled with technological upheavals, have led to reduced stability and predictability. Indeed, the “chokepoint strategy” carries its own set of challenges and risks. It may inhibit global cooperation and innovation and stall the overall growth of the semiconductor industry, potentially affecting Western participants. Moreover, it could provoke retaliatory actions from targeted adversaries, further destabilizing global supply chains, and potentially leading to escalating conflicts or even warfare.

For China, maintaining an open mindset in chipmaking is vital. The sector stands to benefit from the diverse inputs of all stakeholders. Furthermore, China needs to strike a delicate balance between competition and cooperation with its foreign competitors whenever possible. Regrettably, self-sufficiency often runs the risk of leading to self-isolation.

For Japan, the export control measures could potentially impact bilateral relations and may escalate trade tensions, especially considering the historical conflicts between Japan and China. Japan is a significant trading partner for China, and the Chinese market remains vital for Japanese manufacturers in semiconductors. In retaliation to Japan’s alignment with the United States in curbing China’s chipmaking, Beijing could consider restricting the export of critical minerals to Japan and Chinese consumers could potentially organize boycotts of Japanese products, as they have during previous bilateral conflicts.

Worst of all, an intensification of the chip wars could potentially lead to a complete decoupling in technology. Such technological decoupling entails not just the separation of supply chains, but also the establishment of different technological standards, innovation ecosystems, and markets by the disconnected parties. This could bear significant economic and social repercussions.

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney. Marina’s research interests cover China’s innovation policy and practice, emerging technologies, and network effects in digital transformation. She is the author of three books, including Demystifying China’s Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

For a moment, it seemed as though the Russian government would fall. On June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the thuggish leader of Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, raged against the Russian military and threatened retaliation after it allegedly bombed a Wagner training camp. The Kremlin denied the incident—and opened a criminal case against Prigozhin for attempting to incite an armed rebellion. In response, Prigozhin launched an open war against Russia’s military leaders, seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don and vowing to march on Moscow to remove them from power.

Chaos ensued. Wagner advanced. Vladimir Putin’s plane departed from Moscow; the Kremlin’s press service insisted that the president remained behind. The roads to the capital were blocked. The Russian internet was censored. Russian military units between Prigozhin and Moscow offered little resistance, and rumors of defections flew. The vast majority of soldiers remained stationed along the battle lines in Ukraine, even as the rogue mercenary group drove by behind them. Chechen fighters loyal to pro-Putin strongman Ramzan Kadyrov appeared ready to enter the fight from the south.

Then Prigozhin blinked. He issued a statement backpedaling—declaring that he had not sought to overthrow Putin, only to “march for justice,” and claiming that he would not attack Moscow to avoid spilling Russian blood. (By this point, more than a dozen Russian soldiers had been killed during the push north, though it is clear that the offensive could have been far more violent.) Through the mediation of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a deal was reached whereby Prigozhin would leave the country and enter exile in Belarus. Wagner units would return to their posts in occupied Ukraine. The crisis was defused. Putin survived. The “end of history” was once again averted.

The eleventh-hour deal came as a surprise to many Western observers, who noted that the Kremlin’s early statements seemed to reject the possibility of a compromise. Putin, who had a decades-long relationship with Prigozhin and had supported him throughout the war, could have extended an olive branch. Instead, he gave a televised address condemning Prigozhin and his followers as traitors—seemingly giving the Wagner leader no choice but to seize Moscow and overthrow the government. The agreement gives both sides an alternative.

Prigozhin’s terse statement—released on his Telegram channel—has been his explanation for why he chose to accept Lukashenko’s proposal. The reasons it lays out are entirely selfless: Prigozhin, a patriot, wished to avoid the needless loss of Russian life. It is far more likely, though, that his acceptance of the terms—even with his army on Moscow’s doorstep—was in recognition of the futility of the mission he had taken upon himself to carry out. A report from The Telegraph hinted at other motivations, including threats made against Prigozhin’s family.

In a narrow sense, Prigozhin might have succeeded in his objectives. He ended his offensive within Moscow Oblast, less than 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the capital. Russian troops remained garrisoned within the city, but their defenses would have been gravely inadequate against Wagner’s hardened and well-equipped veterans. Absent outside interference, Prigozhin could have captured Moscow in short order.

But then what? The rogue warlord’s next move would not have been at all clear. Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Army Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, and any other Russian leaders of importance would have fled the city before Prigozhin could capture them. The Russian state has famously abandoned Moscow before; the city’s fall would not cause the collapse of the government. Even if he had wanted to extend his northern march to St. Petersburg, Prigozhin would not have had the strength. While he nominally had a total of 25,000 troops at his disposal, the convoy traveling north only contained around 5,000—hardly enough to hold Moscow, a city of 13 million, even if the population had been totally compliant. If Russian troops had arrived in greater numbers from the front lines in Ukraine, Prigozhin could not possibly have held the city, even with additional Wagner reinforcements.

More importantly, by shooting his way into the Russian capital—and then fighting to defend it against the military—Prigozhin could have caused thousands of deaths, both among the soldiers on both sides and the civilians caught in the crossfire. In doing so, he would have abandoned any pretense of acting on behalf of the Russian people, or of having the country’s best interests in mind. One of the reasons that Wagner troops were able to travel north so quickly was the lack of opposition from the Russian military or police units between them and Moscow. The military’s inaction bodes poorly for Putin, but it also gave both sides a critical opening to defuse the crisis before it escalated further. If Prigozhin had fought an open battle in Moscow—or even a battle with Kadyrov’s troops near Rostov-on-Don—a deal between the two sides would have been much more difficult to reach.

In no conceivable universe would the crisis have ended with the installation of “President Prigozhin” in the Kremlin. Putin would never have voluntarily surrendered power, and if a civil war had erupted, one side would have had two million troops of various stripes and the other would have had 25,000. It is unclear how exactly this would have proceeded, but sooner or later, it would have inevitably ended in Prigozhin’s death. Even now, as Putin reasserts his grip on the country, the Wagner leader’s ultimate fate is unclear. In the past, Putin has said that he could never forgive betrayal—a term he applied to Prigozhin’s actions on the 24th. Even in his relative safety in Belarus, Prigozhin may wish to avoid open windows for the foreseeable future.

While the Kremlin has remained tight-lipped on the Prigozhin incident, the Lukashenko deal was clearly in Putin’s interests as well. Prigozhin would not have succeeded in toppling the Russian strongman in the short run, but he has already done incalculable damage to his position. By accepting the deal, Putin has cut his losses, gained an opportunity to reassert his authority within Russia, headed off prospective challenges to his leadership, and ultimately avoided a far greater tragedy.

The most enduring consequence of Prigozhin’s actions will likely be the shattering of Putin’s carefully cultivated image of invulnerability. Russia’s state-controlled TV channels cut off coverage of the attack immediately after it began, and pro-Wagner websites were swiftly censored, but the people of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh—two major cities with more than one million inhabitants each—watched with their own eyes as Prigozhin’s troops seized control of city military installations. Worryingly, the two cities’ inhabitants welcomed the attackers, giving them food and water and cheering for them as they passed through. As Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don for exile in Belarus on the night of June 24, he was thronged by civilian supporters, and Russian police re-entering the city after the mercenaries’ departure were blocked by an angry crowd chanting pro-Wagner slogans. If Putin’s position remains that the Wagnerites committed an act of treason, a number of Russians appear to be comfortable with treason.

Perhaps more ominously still, Russian civilians’ sympathies for Prigozhin and the Wagner Group appeared to be shared by some Russian military units during their drive north. Elements of “Storm-Z,” a second Russian mercenary company formed by Putin allies to rival Prigozhin, spoke in support of his campaign against the “rats in the rear.” Rumors that various Russian units had joined with the Wagner Group appear to be false, but these units did nothing to stop the mercenaries’ advance, either. Ordinary Russian conscripts seem unwilling to die for Putin—a development with uncomfortable parallels in Russia’s past.

Total fealty to the ruler has long been a feature of Russian military history. The Tsar’s army experienced mutinies and desertions during the First World War, but it never attempted to overthrow him. Joseph Stalin executed dozens of high-ranking officers during his purges, and for decades afterward, the Soviet military remained totally subservient to the Communist Party; one of the reasons for the failure of the 1991 coup attempt was its leaders’ reluctance to escalate the situation after Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin simply refused to meet their demands. Putin has sought to maintain this principle. Whatever their performance issues, Gerasimov and Shoigu have been unquestionably, unflinchingly loyal, even as their troops have not.

Ironically, the prioritization of loyalty over competence in the Russian military helps to explain Russia’s disappointing performance against Ukraine—a performance that necessitated the involvement of the Wagner Group in the first place. Given a freer hand and greater resources, Wagner quickly overshadowed the Russian military in effectiveness, forcing Ukraine out of Bakhmut after a months-long battle. Perhaps it is this gap in competency, coupled with frustration at how the Army is doing things, that drove Prigozhin to rebel.

But an effective mercenary is a double-edged sword. “The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not,” Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in The Prince, advising his sovereign against their employment: “if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness.” Putin would have been wise to listen.

Trevor Filseth is a former foreign affairs writer for The National Interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

En France, le bicentenaire de la naissance de Karl Marx revêt surtout une dimension éditoriale et universitaire. Une telle discrétion ne reflète guère la place occupée par ce pays, à la fois terre d'asile et champ de batailles politiques, dans la vie et l'œuvre du théoricien communiste. / Allemagne, (...) / Allemagne, France, Communisme, Histoire, Idées, Intellectuels, Socialisme, Marxisme - 2018/05

Ce mois de mai débutent les célébrations du 70e anniversaire de la création de l'État d'Israël. C'est l'occasion pour le peuple palestinien de rappeler la catastrophe vécue en 1948 et de revendiquer le droit au retour des réfugiés, prévu par les résolutions des Nations unies. / Israël, Palestine, (...) / Israël, Palestine, Proche-Orient, Histoire, Idéologie, Judaïsme, Mouvement de contestation, Nationalisme, Réfugiés, Palestine (Cisjordanie), Palestine (Gaza), Répression, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine mandataire 1922-1948 - 2018/05

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing this month for meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese leaders mostly met the low expectations for the event. Blinken’s journey helps to rejuvenate high-level Sino-U.S. dialogue at a time when the bilateral relationship is at a nadir and might even be drifting toward war in either the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The meeting seemingly offers hope for recovery and stabilization of relations. U.S. president Joe Biden said Blinken “did a hell of a job” in Beijing and that “We’re on the right trail here.” Of his meeting with Blinken, Xi said “This is very good.”

Alas, there is abundant reason to be skeptical.

The modest breakthrough has landed the relationship in front of a much bigger and thicker wall. Top-level communication is necessary but not yet sufficient for repairing a damaged relationship. The damage stems primarily from policies by each country that the other loathes. The problem is that neither country may be willing and able to change these policies that antagonize the other.

China’s List of Grievances

Prior to meeting with Xi, Blinken spoke with the PRC’s highest-ranking foreign affairs official, former Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang provided an efficient list of China’s top grievances with the United States. As paraphrased by the PRC media, “Wang asked the US to stop hyping the `China threat’ narrative, lift illegal unilateral sanctions on China, stop pressuring China’s technology and development and stop willfully interfering in China's internal affairs.”

“Hyping the China threat” refers to the U.S. concern that China aspires to displace America as the most strategically influential country in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing contends that the United States erroneously assumes China will naturally seek regional hegemony due to its newly-acquired relative economic and military strength. China, however, is an exceptional great power that will “never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence,” according to the CCP government.

The second major Chinese grievance is the United States making it harder for China to acquire key leading-edge technologies, alluded to in the reference to Washington suppressing China’s “technology and development.” Chinese officials and government-approved commentators have for years accused the United States of trying to “contain” China, and recently Xi himself has openly accused Washington of “comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” For Beijing, tech bans have become one of two spearpoints of containment. Already working to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, the Biden administration is also considering a ban on U.S. companies from investing in certain technology sectors in China. From Beijing’s standpoint, this is “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade and technological issues under the guise of national security” when “the real purpose of the US is to deprive China of its right to development.”

The third PRC grievance, “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” includes U.S. criticism of the mass incarceration of Uighurs in Xinjiang province and the dismantling of civil liberties in Hong Kong. It also includes what Beijing sees as the most pressing dispute in Sino-U.S. relations and the other spearpoint of containment: Washington’s support for the government of Taiwan. The new PRC foreign minister, Qin Gang, said in March that Taiwan is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Wang Yi reportedly told Blinken, “On the Taiwan question, China has no room for compromise or concession.”

The United States is unlikely to address these PRC grievances to anywhere near Beijing’s satisfaction.

The View from Washington

China has amply proved itself an increasingly formidable potential U.S. adversary. It is undergoing a huge military modernization and expansion. It leverages its vast economic power to undermine U.S. global influence. It aspires to world leadership in emerging technologies. And it opposes important aspects of the U.S.-sponsored international order.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the PRC as “coercive and increasingly aggressive,” seeking to “refashion” the world to “suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” to the detriment of U.S. interests. Obviously, Washington does not accept Beijing’s Chinese exceptionalism or its “will never seek hegemony” rhetoric. Rather, Washington sees the United States and China as competitors for regional and global leadership. The diplomatic aspect of this competition requires America to continue calling out aggressive and expansionist PRC behavior before the international audience, just as Beijing asserts its own counternarrative. Nor is it reasonable to expect the United States to reverse its restrictions on helping its chief potential adversary achieve global technological—and consequent military—superiority.

For Washington to stop “interfering in China’s internal affairs” in the sense of not criticizing China is an impossible ask. Shaming illiberal states for infringing on civil liberties is now a part of America’s political culture, and the CCP leadership has infamously thin skin. Bashing China is now a bipartisan sport in U.S. domestic politics, with the politicians of both major parties scrambling to appear hawkish.

Only a day after the Blinken-Xi meeting, Biden seemingly unintentionally offended Beijing by casually referring to Xi as a “dictator” who was surprised and embarrassed by the spy balloon incident. A PRC government spokesperson immediately responded that Biden’s remark was “extremely absurd and irresponsible. . . . seriously infringing on China’s political dignity, which is an open political provocation.” The White House, in turn, indicated it will not retract the statement.

Beijing demands the United States must stop selling armaments to Taiwan and cease all contact between U.S. and Taiwan government officials. The U.S. position, however, is that arms sales are justified by Beijing’s permanent threat to use force against Taiwan. A U.S. law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires Washington to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Neither the PRC threat nor the U.S. law are going away anytime soon. Washington also maintains that the “one China policy” is satisfied by the lack of formal U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and does not preclude all contact between U.S. and Taiwan officials. In any case, members of Congress have repeatedly demonstrated that they will honor Taiwan leaders even against opposition from the U.S. executive branch.

American Frustrations

The U.S. side is similarly unlikely to get what it wants.

The most urgent American concern in the bilateral relationship is the need for crisis management. This appeared to be at the top of Blinken’s Beijing agenda.

Related U.S. concerns are perceived aggressive PRC activity toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea, which from the U.S. point of view increase the possibility of an accidental or unintended war.

Beijing could demonstrate goodwill to Washington by ceasing the hostile military signaling toward Taiwan and by quietly accepting the U.S. Navy’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea instead of threatening collisions with U.S. ships and aircraft. This, however, is almost unimaginable.

The Chinese government has framed both Taiwan and the South China Sea as do-or-die issues: the CCP either proves its legitimacy to rule China by establishing control over “Chinese” territory coveted by foreigners or fails on both accounts. Regime legitimacy, and thus security, is on the line. So is national security, as Taiwan outside of PRC control anchors the string of islands that form choke points between China’s east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Only by owning the South China Sea can Beijing keep unwanted foreign warships and warplanes away from China’s east coast. There are economic incentives as well: the South China Sea contains fish and hydrocarbons, and if captured, Taiwan would be the PRC’s richest and best-educated province.

Most importantly, the PRC seems to know no alternative way to attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea other than demonstrations of military bravado.

There is no hint of Chinese willingness to accommodate the U.S. desire for crisis management. China suspended contact between the two countries’ militaries after U.S. congresswoman Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. In May, PRC defense minister Li Shangfu refused to meet with U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of a conference in Singapore. Repeating a phrase PRC officials often use when discussing foreign relations, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained that the United States “must correct its mistaken actions” for military dialogue to resume.

This position resurfaced during the Biden visit to Beijing, during which China did not agree to the U.S. proposal to restart bilateral military engagement. PRC officials and commentators have elaborated that, in their view, the Americans want China to agree to allow the USA to challenge Chinese “core interests” with impunity. The PRC position is that if the USA wants to avoid crises, it should stop arming Taiwan and cease operating military units in Chinese-claimed waters and airspace.

Qin Gang said in March that the U.S. government’s “so-called `establishing guardrails’ for China-US relations and ‘not seeking conflict’ actually means that China should not respond in words or action when slandered or attacked. That is just impossible!”

Furthermore, Beijing likely sees the U.S. desire for crisis management as merely additional leverage for seeking concessions from Washington in bilateral disputes—an approach similar to Beijing canceling cooperation on climate change to express anger over particular unrelated U.S. policies.

Beijing has been emphasizing that Washington must keep the commitments Biden made during his talks in 2022 with Xi in Bali, the first face-to-face meeting between the two men since Biden’s election as president. Immediately before his meeting with Blinken, Xi said: “the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali.” Qin Gang and Wang Yi also mentioned the Bali commitments.

What does Beijing think Biden promised in Bali? A PRC media report offers a summary: “The US does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ does not support ‘two Chinas’ or `one China, one Taiwan,’ and has no intention to have a conflict with China, . . . the US side has no intention to seek "decoupling" from China, to halt China's economic development, or to contain China.”

Signposts of Failure

This is a signpost of impending failure. Each of these points suggests misunderstanding on Beijing’s part, to be followed by disappointment. From a U.S. perspective, Biden has kept his word. But as the Chinese should well know by now, Washington’s interpretation of what is allowable under a “one China policy” is far looser than Beijing’s. The U.S. government is clearly and openly committed to strengthening alliances to counter possible PRC military moves and is implementing an industrial policy to reduce vulnerability to China (as China is also doing in reverse). Americans would argue these are prudent defensive actions, not proof of “seeking a New Cold War.” And American officials say they are “de-risking” rather than “de-coupling,” even if the PRC insists on calling it containment.

The momentum gained through the Blinken visit to China will soon stall because the policies that drive the downturn in U.S.-China relations are likely to stay the same. Both sides think these policies are necessary to uphold fundamental national interests. The domestic politics in both countries support these policies. And unfortunately, these policies reflect a new era of great-power rivalry within the same region in which the adversarial aspects of bilateral relations are ascendant.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

With Russia’s waning momentum and influence in the wake of a slew of setbacks in the Ukraine war, concerns over an imminent Chinese attack on Taiwan have somewhat subsided. However, China’s recent charm offensives indicate its strategic calculations for an attrition war with Taiwan. To win such a war, China recognizes the necessity to accumulate as many bargaining chips as possible before entering into negotiations. One crucial aspect of this process is the restoration of its significantly damaged global reputation.

China has sought to claim the mantle of peacemaker since its reversal of the Zero Covid policy. Externally, it has actively presented itself as an unbiased alternative to the United States. After brokering an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China ventured into the highly sensitive Israel-Palestine conflict. Additionally, its unexpected vote in favor of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by the endorsement of French president Emmanuel Macron, highlights China’s potential mediating role in resolving the Ukraine conflict.

Internally, China is undergoing a diplomatic system overhaul. The removal of outspoken “Wolf Warrior” spokesman Zhao Lijian was followed by a carefully orchestrated visit to China by former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Furthermore, Beijing’s propaganda efforts are toning down the domestic fervor surrounding the idea of forcibly taking Taiwan. Despite its routine boilerplates against perceived “Western smear campaigns,” China appears to be adopting a more restrained and moderate diplomatic approach, aiming to convince the world that it still prioritizes peaceful means over force in its approach towards Taiwan.

However, China’s recent diplomatic shift belies its strategic adjustment towards the self-governing island. The lessons learned from the Ukraine war have led Xi Jinping to realize that if a military juggernaut like Russia can fail to annex Ukraine, the challenge of seizing a better-defended Taiwan would be even greater for China. This is especially true considering the island’s vital geopolitical and economic significance to the United States and the Western world. Consequently, China has recognized that a swift Blitzkrieg, as Russia had envisioned for Ukraine, is less feasible in the case of Taiwan. Instead, an attrition war, whose effect was validated during the Sino-Japanese War, would be a more practical strategy for China’s current status as an economic giant. Additionally, through salami tactics, China could chip away Taiwan’s outlying islands bit by bit.

An important giveaway of China’s plan for an attrition war with Taiwan can be gleaned from its recent contact with Ukraine. Following a long-awaited phone call between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, China dispatched a special envoy with a peace plan—built on its highly controversial twelve-point peaceful proposal on Ukraine—to the battle-scarred country. However, the mediation ended up with a public rejection from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba that Ukraine would not surrender territory to Russia in exchange for ending the war. While the specific details of the meeting were not disclosed, Kuleba’s remarks suggest that China’s proposal may have involved territorial concessions by Ukraine. If the land-for-peace approach proves successful in the Ukraine conflict, it is highly likely that China would employ a similar strategy in future negotiations during an attrition war with Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the assumption of China’s ability to outlast Taiwan and its Western allies in an attrition war hinges on its integration into the global economy and a robust self-sufficiency system.

China learned a crucial lesson from the Ukraine war: in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the best way to minimize or avoid economic sanctions from Western countries would not be through decoupling, but rather by further binding itself to the global value chains. Germany’s opposition to banning imports of Russian gas and oil, due to its high dependence on Moscow’s energy supplies, is a prime example. The European Union also demonstrated caution when imposing sanctions on Russia in order to minimize repercussions for EU citizens and businesses. To defend itself from potential surgical sanctions that may be imposed by Western countries, China is willingly accepting economic olive branches extended by EU powers such as France and Germany.

However, China’s endeavor to leverage its gargantuan economy does not make it bulletproof to Western sanctions. To counter China’s economic coercion, the U.S.-led Western bloc unveiled its “de-risking” strategy as a precautionary response during the G7 summit, aimed at minimizing the potential costs of a sudden escalation over Taiwan. This undoubtedly intensified China’s self-sufficiency movement, prompting it to expand its envisioned sanctions-proofing system to include its neighbors.

Exemplified by its Xi’an summit with Central Asian leaders, Beijing is accelerating the formation of a G7-like alliance. This alliance aims to strengthen economic ties as well as foster a collective security consensus. In response to G7’s planned diversification of supply chains to reduce their reliance on China, the country is also diversifying sources of its self-sufficiency system as it realizes it would largely be on its own if no preparation is made to sustain its potential war economy. Central Asian nations, seeking a reliable security partner in the absence of Russia, could play a practical role in aiding China, particularly given their limited relations with Taiwan. Assurances from Central Asian leaders that they would not interfere in China’s approach to the island have solidified the scaffolding of the regional-scale self-sufficiency system that China is establishing.

Speculations about the quick decline of U.S. combat power during a confrontation with China may bolster the latter’s confidence in taking Taiwan through an attrition war. Nonetheless, the resistance from Taiwan and the backlash from Western countries cannot be underestimated. Understanding these challenges, China is bound to unite all available forces and exploit any cleavage between the United States and its allies. One particularly workable and valuable target is certain EU countries that are actively seeking economic development through cooperation with China. Macron’s advocate for “strategic autonomy” to ensure the EU has more options beyond simply aligning with the United States on issues like Taiwan is one significant achievement that China has snatched.

As China is shifting towards an attrition war strategy, it is imperative for the U.S.-led Western bloc to adapt accordingly. The “de-risking” tactic cannot fundamentally resolve the underlying reliance on China within global supply chains. Instead, the United States should rev up the development of Taiwan’s self-sufficiency system. Rather than focusing solely on marginal improvements in the already tight economic ties between Taiwan and other democracies, the U.S.-led Western bloc ought to provide Taiwan with a stronger diplomatic endorsement to spur more “swing countries” in Asia, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, to participate in the island’s self-sufficiency system.

It is anticipated that China’s economic coercion would continue to be effective in the event of a war with Taiwan. When that day comes, the reluctance of major EU powers like France and Germany to provide sufficient assistance during the early stages of the Ukraine war is likely to re-emerge. The only feasible way that Taiwan could outlast China in an attrition war relies on its endurance until a turning point where its counter-offensive achieves success is reached. But before that, it must establish a self-sufficiency system that is at least on par with, if not stronger than, that of China.

Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. student in political science at Tulane University. He received his M.A. in international relations from the University of Liverpool. His articles have been featured in The Diplomat.

Image: Courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

A conversation with Stephen Kotkin.

Pour justifier leur défaite à la présidentielle de 2016, les démocrates américains ont avancé toutes sortes de raisons : l'iniquité du système électoral, les « fausses nouvelles », ou encore les Russes, accusés de collusion avec M. Donald Trump. Cette focalisation sur Moscou occulte les véritables causes (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Royaume-Uni, Russie, Armement, Élections, Géopolitique, Médias, Parti politique, Politique, Relations internationales, Stratégie, Diplomatie - 2018/05

On Friday evening Moscow time, the Kremlin—and the world—was stunned to witness what seemed like the beginnings of a coup against the government of President Vladimir Putin. The man leading the charge, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has a long history with the Kremlin. A former restauranteur, Prigozhin eventually, with the help of government contracts, built himself into an oligarch. But what he is most known for today is having founded the private military corporation Wagner Group. Since its inception in the early 2010s, it has seen action around the world, most notably in Africa and in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where it has played a large role in patching holes in sometimes weak Russian lines.

For the past few months, tensions between Prigozhin and the Kremlin—though Prigozhin has until recently been careful to critique the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and not Putin himself—have risen, with Prigozhin claiming that Shoigu was purposefully denying Wagner ammunition. On Friday, those tensions reached a boiling point as Prigozhin posted a video that he claimed showed the aftermath of a Russian missile attack on a Wagner camp (though analysts have found that, based on videos of the same camp from one day before, nothing had changed).

Within twenty-four hours, Prigozhin and his forces proceeded to leave Ukraine and reached within 200 kilometers of Moscow. As of the time of writing on Saturday evening, according to news reports and Prigozhin’s own Telegram messages Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko has apparently negotiated a ceasefire and potential resolution. Prigozhin claimed that his forces will return to Ukraine—though what Putin has promised in return is unclear.

What really caused Prigozhin to begin his self-proclaimed “March of Justice” is likewise unclear. While he originally claimed to be only hunting Shoigu and spoke repeatedly about not being against Putin, his drive toward the Kremlin seemed to belay that possibility. After all, any attempt to kill, usurp, or otherwise remove Putin’s minister of defense by force would clearly be seen as an attack on Putin himself.

Speculations that this was all some grand, 4D-chess-style play by Putin himself to eliminate Shoigu can be dismissed. Prigozhin’s spear penetrated deep into Russia, humiliating the Russian armed forces which were either unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to fire on his troops (with the exception of a few pilots). If Putin wished to eliminate Shoigu, firing him would have been far less of a hassle.

But where do things go from here, how does this latest incident affect both Russia’s and the West’s future? While nearly anything can happen, there are only four potential scenarios.

The Likeiest Scenarios

The first scenario can be called “the Truce Holds.” Here, Prigozhin returns to the front, possibly keeping some troops in Rostov, and resumes fighting. What happens to him in the medium and long term, however, is open to some speculation, pending further details. Likewise, the nature of the agreement between Putin and Prigozhin and what it entails has yet to be seen. Perhaps Putin agrees to fire Shoigu (which would be something of a political earthquake, as Shoigu is the only person to have served in the top levels of the Russian Federation’s government since its founding). Whatever the ultimate outcome, however, Prigozhin is unlikely to remain in Russia. He has at this point eliminated multiple Russian Air Force targets—possibly killing the pilots—and humiliated Putin’s government on the world stage. Exile of a sort seems like the likely outcome.

The second scenario, “Mop Up,” sees the truce break. Prigozhin either immediately or in the near future rebels yet again. This time, however, he is captured or killed. The Russian government then proceeds to mop up the rest of Wagner as a semi-independent force. Putin’s credibility would still take a hit—after all, a private military company he allowed to come into existence would have driven over 200 km into his own country in a coup attempt, pulled back, and attacked a second time—but he would remain in power, for now. Russia’s war in Ukraine would be hampered, however, as Wagner’s forces made up a not insignificant amount of troops there. Depending on the nature and scale of the mop-up, Russia would be forced into either a temporary or even permanent defensive posture for the remainder of the conflict. Moreover, even if Prigozhin was killed, Putin would likely not last much longer in office—having created the conditions for repeated potential coup attempts by private military forces is too great a stain on his record. He’d be quietly pushed to retire before the next presidential election.

The third and unlikeliest scenario, “President Prigozhin,” sees the truce break—but here, the Russian armed forces melt like butter as Wagner resumes its advance and storms the Kremlin. It is not an impossibility; on the open highway from Rostov to Voronezh, Prigozhin faced effectively no resistance. He also, on his now-paused march, seemingly altered his goals (or at least publicly moved closer to his private ones): in response to an address by Putin demanding that he stand down, Prigozhin said that those against Wagner “today are those who gathered around scumbags.” As it is unlikely that Prigozhin drove to Moscow for a stern talk and a handshake, in this scenario he takes the Kremlin and installs himself or a politically presentable chosen ally as the new president of Russia.

If he manages to do this smoothly—without serious opposition from the armed forces or the intelligence services, which is unlikely—it would be fairly bad for Ukraine. Prigozhin has critiqued the Ministry of Defense for a while now on their running of the war—from the refusal to transition to a war economy to a, in Prigozhin’s view, reluctance to truly fight aggressively. The Wagneritr is also significantly more ideological than Putin; whereas Putin mostly gave meandering addresses about how sinister the West is, Prigozhin would likely put in place a “positive” vision for Russia. A Prigozhin in charge, either directly or indirectly, would likely immediately put the country onto a serious war footing instead of adopting Putin’s strategy of keeping the war as far away from the population as possible.

The Worst Case Scenario

Yet what if Prigozhin makes it to Moscow but fails to secure power? Perhaps Putin escapes to St. Petersburg and vows to fight on, or perhaps the Wagnerites and the Russian armed forces begin to fight in earnest on the outskirts of the city? This development, the fourth scenario, could only be described as the “Second Russian Civil War.” It is likely that, similar to the first Russian Civil War, the combatants would not remain limited to a  two-sided conflict of government against rebels. Ramsam Kadyrov, the leader of Russian Chechnya who has until now been loyal to Putin, may sense an opportunity to truly make a kingdom for himself. Certain elements in Tartarstan or elsewhere, which have itched for their own ethnically-based states, may work for independence. China, which has had an eye on Siberian water for years, may—in the name of securing their border—move to take control of some strategic parts of Siberia.

The West, for its part, would need to consider how to proceed. A breakup of Russia into civil war would be disastrous, which is why realist thinkers like Henry Kissinger have urged the West to avoid such. A fracturing of Russia’s eleven time zones would open up a new chess board on the budding Cold War between the United States and China, exacerbating tensions and, ultimately, likely sucking Washington into conflicts there.

The United States would also likely have to reel in NATO and European allies. Questions that Washington has never had to confront will need to be answered. In the event of a Russian civil war, Ukraine would likely recapture all its territory. But what if it wants to go further: should Washington stop an angry Ukraine from performing its own “special military operation” in a shattered Russia’s frontiers? What happens if Poland, seeing Russian authority collapse, begins looking hungrily at the territories east of the Curzon line, which it lost under Josef Stalin?

Plus, there is the question of Russia’s nuclear stockpile. Russia, after all, possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country: what happens if they fall into the hands of any of the Tartar nationalists, Wagnerites, Islamic extremists, or other warlords who could emerge from the conflict?

Caution is Warranted

As of the time of writing, events appear to be defaulting toward the first scenario and least destabilizing scenario. Yet the situation on the ground is fluid—Prigozhin’s currently-declared exile to Belarus, among whatever other concessions have been promised, depends heavily on Putin keeping his word. Whether that is enough for Prigozhin is yet to be determined.

Ultimately, when coups get underway, the fog of war intensifies, making it difficult to see what will happen. In the event of “Mop Up,” the scenario otherwise most favorable for Putin, his authority may still be so weakened that someone else tries another coup in the months to come. “President Prigozhin” could see Prigozhin briefly control Russia, only to be challenged by yet someone else. And a full-scale “Second Russian Civil War” produces questions which been asked only in the nightmares of Western strategic planners. The last Russian Civil War produced the Soviet Union, after all. There is no reason to believe that this one would produce anything better.

Anthony J. Constantini is writing his Ph.D. on populism and early American democracy at the University of Vienna in Austria. Previously he received an M.A. in International Relations from St. Petersburg State University. In 2016 he was the War Room Director for the NRSC.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes his state visit to the United States, and after the historic conclave of the national security advisors of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines in Manila, the United States continues to develop its latticework (to use the turn of phrase adopted by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan) of “flexible partnerships, institutions, alliances and groups of countries” across the world to balance China. The challenge now facing the U.S. policy establishment, however, is how to prevent these partnerships from being derailed.

Twenty years ago, in these pages, David M. Lampton bemoaned an American tendency to conduct bilateral relations with other states on the basis of the “Christmas tree” approach: “hanging all sorts of conditions (oftentimes very minor or petty issues) as a price for other states to pay for the continuation of normal, bilateral relations.” To combine the two metaphors, a latticework approach cannot hold up if too many weights are placed on it.

The fact that a coalition of states might find extremely close alignment on a particular issue (or set of issues) and seek ways to facilitate common action does not, therefore, mean that there is complete harmony of interests or agreement on all questions. Yet over the last several decades, the United States has often operated from the premise that Washington can present partners with a laundry list of disparate preferences and demand compliance. Even two decades ago, it was clear that “a country may earnestly desire to be a partner of the United States, but this in no way means that it ceases to pursue its own national interests.” Today, when the rise of China and greater coordination among the states of the Global South offers greater hedging opportunities, other countries have options while the United States has diminished leverage.

A “latticework” approach to international affairs means that the mix of obligations and commitments to other partners will differ on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the Japan-Republic of the Philippines-United States security consultation, which Josh Rogin argues might herald the emergence of a JAROPUS coalition, is grounded firmly in the assessment of a shared threat arising out of China’s efforts to extend its maritime sphere of influence. It does not automatically follow that JAROPUS will move in lockstep with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, even though AUKUS also exists to respond to China’s improved maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific basin. AUKUS implies a level of defense technological-industrial integration, for instance, that is not a step the JA or ROP parts of the JAROPUS triad are prepared to take. Nor do these two coalitions (JAROPUS and AUKUS) assume the emergence of a common security alliance with India (via the QUAD (Japan, Australia, India, U.S.) format.

It can seem very tempting to take all these developments and conclude that the end result is the creation of an all-encompassing alliance, akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, a few years ago, my students at the Naval War College developed a timetable for the creation of an Indo-Pacific Area Treaty Organization, or IPATO. But even NATO is based on a series of limits: geographically confined to the North Atlantic area, and among states that share a vast, intertwined network of economic interests and general agreement on questions of values and governance. Yet NATO allies have often been very resistant to expanding their commitments to assisting the United States in other areas of the world.

The U.S.-India relationship shows the challenges of navigating a “latticework” relationship. When it comes to the rise of China as a regional and global challenger, the United States and India share common strategic assessments and concerns. For an America that seeks to reroute critical supply chains around a Chinese competitor, India is part and parcel of any robust Asian supply chain that bypasses China. Yet India’s strategic interests diverge from those of Washington when it comes to Russia and Iran. And on a whole host of issues related to understandings of human rights and what constitutes democratic governance, India is prepared to push back against U.S. efforts to argue that American (or Western) standards form the universal yardstick by which all others are measured. The challenge for the Biden administration, in the run-up to the Modi visit, has been whether it is possible to ringfence U.S.-India collaboration in the first two areas from the criticisms, particularly from members of Congress, about India’s divergence from U.S. preferences in the latter areas.

The “minilateralist” approach that Jada Fraser and others have discussed argues in favor of creating focused coalitions that are defined by a small set of issues. It also means that the United States has to become more comfortable with multitiered arrangements, where, beyond a small core group of allies (such as the UK, Germany, or Japan) that share an overlapping shared vision across an entire spectrum of security, political, and economic issues, the United States recognizes a larger group of associates who commit to some but not all of the obligations. For instance, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroening lay out a strategy for economic statecraft for a new democratic community of nations that brings together both a core group of U.S. allies but envisions a broader set of associated powers who partner with the U.S. on selected sets of issues. But a multilateralist, tiered level-of-association approach shifts the basis of engagement away from the broad parameters of alliance towards negotiating focused and specific agreements with other countries—laying out not only specific duties but also the benefits both parties expect to receive—and with the understanding that other issues not covered in those agreements will not alter the bargain.

Congress, in particular, never likes minilateralist, association approaches—members are loath to give up the power to insist on compliance with every possible demand or request. The Biden administration resisted those tendencies with the Modi visit, because of the strategic importance of India to the U.S. strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” basin. But in the context of the strategic competition with China, a black-or-white approach to partners can backfire, especially when Beijing is willing to deal in shades of gray.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College and director of the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Image Courtesy of the White House/Twitter.

En décidant d'intervenir militairement en Syrie, Moscou a sauvé le régime de M. Bachar Al-Assad et lui a permis de récupérer la plus grande partie du territoire perdu. Le Kremlin cherche désormais à imposer sa vision d'un règlement politique, tout en gardant un point d'équilibre dans ses relations avec (...) / Syrie, Proche-Orient, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Guérilla, Conflit, Islam, Fondamentalisme, Russie, Stratégie, Droit international - 2018/05