Diplomacy & Crisis News

In addition to the Taiwanese government’s efforts to carry out reforms and increase the country’s defense budget, the growing threat from China has made Taiwanese society more mindful of its own security. Since last year, there have been several non-governmental endeavors to boost Taiwan’s civil defense. Among these initiatives, the Kuma Academy, or “Black Bear Academy,” has attracted the most attention. Co-founded by Puma Shen, a world-leading expert on misinformation, the academy is devoted to preparing 3 million Taiwanese citizens within three years in areas such as cognitive warfare, introductory modern warfare, wartime first aid, and evacuation drills. There are also several other NGOs running similar programs on various scales.

Since their inception, there have been heated debates within Taiwanese society about whether the academy and similar organizations will be able to increase public interest in self-defense. The Taiwan National Security Survey (TNSS) results from October 2020 and December 2022 reveal that local, civilian efforts like the Kuma Academy did indeed better prepare Taiwanese citizens for a conflict with China.

In the TNSS survey, citizens were often given an opportunity to specify the action they would take if Taiwan were to be invaded by China. In 2020, about 24 percent of respondents did not provide a response, while another 21 percent responded: “let it be.” When taken together, both accounted for nearly half of the population. However, things were very different in the most recent survey, conducted in December 2022. This time, when the same question was asked, the “no response” portion shrank considerably to around 15 percent, while the “let it be” group came in at 19 percent. Compared to the 2020 findings, around 10 percent of citizens moved away from these two categories. 　

Where did the 10 percent go? In short, it moved into categories that could be interpreted as displaying a willingness to resist a Chinese invasion. In the 2022 survey, the number of respondents that said they would “serve in the military” increased from 11 percent to 13 percent. Another 15 percent said they would “resist the invasion,” and another 15 percent said that they would “support the government.” In 2020, only 10 percent indicated so. These changes made up the 10 percent shift. There were other noteworthy responses in the 2022 survey. For instance, some citizens said they would “participate in local civil defense organizations” and “provide medical assistance.” If we combine them with those that expressed a willingness to support logistics in wartime, this group increased to 2 percent, compared to 0.4 percent in 2020.

All in all, the 2022 poll revealed a number of insights. First, the Taiwanese public’s willingness to defend itself is at an all-time high, jumping from 33 percent in September 2020 to 47 percent in December 2022. This reveals that nearly half of Taiwan’s citizens are willing to defend themselves. Second, in the nearly two years between the two surveys, there have not been any systematic, concrete changes in Taiwan’s defense policy, leading the authors to believe that it was efforts by organizations like the Kuma Academy that led to the outcome observed in the 2022 poll. Additionally, actions such as “helping with logistics” and “joining civil defense groups” closely resemble what the Kuma Academy and other civil defense groups have strived to teach since last year. Indeed, these efforts started to be reflected in public opinion polls in Taiwan.

Having said the above, in the same question, some citizens said that they would “hide away,” “surrender,” or “run away.” But taken together, they represented a minority in Taiwanese society. We believe that going forward, the Taiwanese public’s willingness to engage in self-defense will continue to increase. According to a recent publication, the actions a Taiwanese citizen will take in wartime are largely dependent on what they believe others will do. When more citizens express a willingness to fight, others will follow. The same is true for the contrary, however. This tendency is especially salient for those who consider themselves to hold both Taiwanese and Chinese identities. We believe this explains the ever-increasing support for self-defense in Taiwan; citizens took cues from their peers.

This survey has a number of critical policy implications for the United States. First, as the results show that Taiwanese citizens are willing to fight for themselves, it will help clear up doubts that the Taiwanese public only wants to free-ride or even entrap the United States in a conflict with China. Second, recognizing the growing threat from China, the United States will benefit from assisting local civil defense organizations, as such training raises Taiwan’s determination for self-defense and the country’s overall preparedness for war. Specifically, while recent discussions tend to focus on bilateral training between the American and Taiwanese coast guards, it would be wise to broaden the scope to include civil and other non-governmental organizations in Taiwan, such as the Kuma Academy. These exchanges could be vital for Taiwan’s ability to defend its homeland and further deter a Chinese assault. At any rate, it will be in the interests of the relevant agencies to take the lead on these efforts (if such conversations have not taken place already). Doing so will further strengthen and develop groups like the Kuma Academy, advancing U.S. security interests. Without strong U.S. and Taiwanese government support for these grassroots organizations, critical opportunities to prepare to win a conflict with China will be missed.      

Charles K. S. Wu is an assistant professor of political science at the University of South Alabama. Find him on Twitter @wupolisciusa.

Yao-Yuan Yeh is the Fayez Sarofim – Cullen Trust for Higher Education Endowed Chair in International Studies, chair of the International Studies & Modern Languages Department, and chair of the Political Science Department at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. Find him on Twitter @yeh2sctw.

Fang-Yu Chen is an assistant professor of political science at Soochow University, Taiwan. Find him on Twitter @FangYu_80168.

Austin Horng-En Wang is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Find him on Twitter @wearytolove.

Image: JENG BO YUAN/Shutterstock.com.

“I am in Ukraine today,” President Joe Biden declared in his dramatic trip to Kiev earlier this week, “to reaffirm our unwavering and unflagging commitment to Ukraine’s democracy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” For most of this first year of the Ukraine war, the American public remained strikingly supportive of Biden’s Ukraine policy. But soft spots have been showing—and risk becoming cracks in the support base Biden needs to sustain that commitment.

Late 2022 polls showed 75 percent support for Russia sanctions, 57 percent for Ukrainian military aid, and only 35 percent seeing the conflict as “none of our business and we should not interfere.”

Support for military deployments to Eastern European NATO allies reached as high as 69 percent when specified “as a deterrent to keep Russia from invading those countries.” As to direct military intervention into the war itself, the public has consistently stood behind the line drawn by the Biden administration against this: in March 68 percent opposed sending troops, in August 60 percent, and in October 66 percent.

On questions geared to the then-upcoming midterm congressional elections, 69 percent were supportive of a candidate favoring continued Ukrainian military aid, while only 25 percent for a candidate advocating lifting Russian sanctions. A post-election poll showed a similar margin of 64 percent wanting their Congressional members to support Ukraine aid, while only 36 percent oppose.

Within all that, though, party differences had begun to emerge. Whereas in May only 17 percent of Republicans said Ukrainian support was “too much” support, by September this was up to 32 percent; Democrats had only gone from 8 percent to 11 percent. By January 2023, Republicans were up to 47 percent taking the “doing too much” position, Democrats only 10 percent.

Even before becoming House Speaker, Kevin McCarthy issued his “no blank check” warning. Reducing Ukraine aid was among the pledges he made to hard-right caucus members in order to become Speaker. House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committee Chairmen Michael McCaul and Mike Turner are playing the waste-fraud-abuse card—that they do support Ukraine, but just want more oversight on how the money is spent. Others, such as Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, are more blatant and bombastic, posing questions like “Is Ukraine now the 51st state of the United States of America?,” even alleging an elaborate cryptocurrency conspiracy in which military aid for Ukraine actually funded Democrats’ campaigns.

And then there’s presidential politics. Questions explicitly identifying policies as Biden’s got much lower approval than those just about the policies themselves. The same poll that had only 26 percent saying reduce Ukraine aid got 53 percent disapproval when identifying America’s Ukraine policy as Biden’s. As the presidential race ramps up, this link will be made more and more. Florida governor Ron DeSantis, a leading Republican presidential aspirant, wasted no time in criticizing Biden for the trip and deriding the Russian threat as “third-rate.”

Some of the initial willingness to bear costs was a rally effect that took effect right after the Russian invasion. Over time though, cost-bearing willingness declined. In March 2022, 55 percent prioritized sanctioning Russia even if it damaged the American economy, and only 42 percent opted to limit damage to our own economy even if it made Russia’s sanctions less effective. By last month only 36 percent still supported making sanctions effective, with 59 percent prioritizing limiting our own economic costs. With the American economy still far from out of the woods and total aid to Ukraine going over $100 billion, cost-bearing willingness is understandably under added pressure.

We also see “generational laddering” with younger generations—which are becoming the largest demographic voting bloc—less supportive than older generations. On approval of sanctions, Gen Z stands at 45 percent, Millennials at 55 percent, Gen X at 76 percent, and Baby Boomers at 86 percent. On Ukrainian financial aid, 53 percent/54 percent/60 percent/75 percent. On military aid, 44 percent/48 percent/61 percent/81 percent. On supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” 43 percent/52 percent/62 percent/66 percent.

The close collaboration of European allies has both satisfied the political preference for burden sharing and enhanced the strategic calculus for policy effectiveness. 86 percent of the American public stressed the importance of allies working with the United States against Russia. Support for sanctions has gone as high as 83 percent when posed as being imposed by both the United States and European allies. While Europe has done far better than anticipated in reducing its energy dependence on Russian oil and natural gas, the economic costs being borne from both sanctions and war still have been quite substantial. And as hard as NATO has been working on maintaining solidarity, issues like the German Leopard tanks and Ukrainian pressure on Britain for fighter jets are indicative of increasing differences over the optimal strategy for these next phases of the war. If European commitment wavers, the American public may question its own commitment.

Adding to these are signs of an emerging policy debate within the United States. While there were some dissenting views early on, these were even fewer than during the 2003 Iraq war. As long as the Russian strategy was proving flawed and Ukrainian military and society kept up their admirable will and extraordinary performance, U.S. and NATO policy generally seemed well-calibrated. But with the war becoming attritional and trench warfare-like, and Russia managing to contain economic sanctions and keep pouring troops in, concerns have been intensifying as to the sustainability of that strategy. The House Progressive Caucus’ October letter stressing the need to “avoid a prolonged conflict” was retracted for political reasons (coming on the eve of the midterms), but its policy argument lingers in the background. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley publicly questioned the prospects of a Ukrainian military victory and pushed for more diplomacy. Despite White House pressure, General Milley did some “clarifying” but only partially walked his views back. A recent RAND study was even blunter: it posed the dilemma of increased assistance emboldening Ukraine to hold out on any possible negotiated settlement on the one hand, and decreased assistance prompting Russia to ratchet up its destructiveness even further.

Relatedly, what if Ukraine starts losing as Russia mounts its next offensive? We know from other foreign policy cases that the sense a policy is working inclines the public to sustain support. That the Ukrainian resistance has held up so well has made Americans feel their money is being well spent. For example, comparing polls taken in August when Russia seemed to be gaining to October ones following Ukrainian forces re-taking Kharkiv and making other military gains, the none-of-our-business view went down from 40 percent to 35 percent, and support for providing weapons went up from 51 percent to 66 percent. But while a turn in the war towards Russia winning could strengthen the policy rationale for more support, the public may see this as throwing good money after bad, and be even less inclined to be supportive.

Alternatively, what if facing defeat Russia attacks a NATO ally or goes up the escalatory ladder toward the use of nuclear weapons? Recent polling by the Ronald Reagan Foundation found 69 percent of respondents are concerned about the threat of nuclear war—the highest indication of such fear since the Foundation first asked this question in 2018. That the threat was posed as “in the next five years” helps explain why 57 percent nevertheless still favored supporting Ukraine at the moment. It’s one thing for the public to affirm support for not giving in to nuclear threats when these are hypotheticals. It’d be quite another if the threat becomes more imminent, all the more if it’s coming from a beleaguered Vladimir Putin. Putin’s recent state of his union speech, suspending even any semblance of compliance with the New START treaty, threatening to resume nuclear tests, and announcing Russian strategic systems are now on combat duty only ratcheted up the nuclear threat higher than it’s been since the war started.

The Biden administration thus cannot count on the support that has been there for its Ukraine policy to still be there in the months to come. Soft spots in what otherwise is a consensus are more politically manageable than cracks in its base. As the war enters its second year, the political and policy challenges for maintaining Ukraine’s support, let alone increasing it, are even more formidable than they were in the first year.

Bruce W. Jentleson is a William Preston Few Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, a former State Department official, and the author of Sanctions: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

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A suspected Chinese spy balloon has exacerbated tensions between America and China. Is conflict inevitable? Or can it be headed off? Do the two sides have more incentives, particularly in the economic realm, to cooperate than is often assumed?

To address these critical questions, the Center for the National Interest invited two leading foreign affairs analysts for an expert discussion:

- Elbridge A. Colby is cofounder and principal of The Marathon Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial.

- Paul Heer is a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a former national intelligence officer for East Asia.

Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Climate activists and other advocates for lowering carbon emissions sometimes make it seem as if the only thing standing between humanity and a bright green future is a lack of political will. So when President Joseph Biden hailed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in his State of the Union address as “the most significant investment ever to tackle the climate crisis…leading the world to a clean energy future,” many were delighted. Not to be outdone, a week later the European Parliament approved a law that effectively bans the sale of new gas and diesel automobiles within the European Union (EU) from 2035, the deadline it set for carmakers to achieve a 100 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from new vehicles sold.

Alas, what holds back these green dreams is not want of moral imagination, but material shortages of critical minerals—without which there is no transition to clean energy systems.

First, overlooked in most political—to say nothing of politicized—discussions of the energy transition are the wildly different material requirements of renewable energy systems vis-à-vis their conventional fossil fuel-powered predecessors. For example, an electric vehicle (EV) like the Tesla Model Y, the top-selling car in the category in America last year according to the Kelley Blue Book, needs six times the amount of minerals that would go into a conventional automobile. It’s wiring alone requires about 130 pounds of copper—roughly three times the amount of the metal that goes into a gas-powered car. An efficient electrical conductor, copper is also needed for the switch to solar- and wind-powered generation for homes and businesses, which will necessitate massive rewiring. If, as expected, demand doubles to about 50 million metric tons a year by 2035, there will be an annual shortfall of nearly 10 million metric tons under the most optimistic scenario. And that is just copper: according to the International Energy Agency, achieving the goal of net-zero emissions by mid-century enshrined in the EU Climate Law as well as in President Biden’s December 2021 executive order will cause the cumulative demand for the most common minerals used in EVs and battery storage—lithium, graphite, cobalt, and nickel—to grow thirty-fold over the next two decades.

Second, compounding the shortage of material inputs is the concentration of sourcing and processing of the available critical minerals. For example, by itself, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), accounts for about 70 percent of global cobalt production. Moreover, almost all of the metal is then exported to China, which refines about 90 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements (REEs), two-thirds of the lithium and cobalt, and almost 40 percent of the nickel. As Biden’s Special Presidential Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security, Amos Hochstein, recently acknowledged at the African Mining Indaba in Cape Town, South Africa, “This is a major concern for the U.S. and I think for the rest of the world. As we are going into a cleaner, greener, and entirely new energy system, we have to make sure we have a diversified supply chain. … We can’t have a supply chain that is concentrated in any country, doesn’t matter which country that is.”

Overcoming these two challenges will require an “all-of-the-above” mindset.

Boosting domestic production, which the IRA tries to incentivize, despite this being at odds with the Biden administration’s restrictive approach to permitting in some areas, is one step. Geology, however, can limit how much of a dent this makes: as I previously pointed out elsewhere, the United States possesses less than 1 percent of the world’s reserves of cobalt and, even if it could possibly to mine it all, would still run through its entire supply in about six years given the current rate of consumption.

Cultivating new partnerships is another approach to be pursued. The memorandum of understanding signed at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December, committing the United States to working with the DRC and Zambia to strengthen the EV value chain, has good potential. So does the Mineral Security Partnership, which includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission. With some focused effort, the new pact could evolve from a discussion forum into a “buyers’ club” for minerals needed for batteries that might both reduce dependence on China and contribute to industrialization in countries producing the critical minerals, especially in Africa. The establishment of such a group would also have the benefit of helping America and some of its closest allies get past the spat over the subsidies offered in the IRA.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that, as Hochstein’s comments correctly implied, the single most significant threat is that any one country or entity so dominates supply chains that it is able, at will, to block rivals’ access to critical minerals and thus the pathway to transitioning to new energy systems.  That is certainly what the Biden administration’s supply chain review found with respect to lithium-ion batteries, concluding that by “operating well outside globally accepted practices,” China has been able to “develop battery critical materials infrastructure well-ahead of market drivers,” resulting in the country producing 79 percent of all batteries in the world, with just one Chinese firm (CATL) by itself controlling 30 percent of the global EV battery market. To this end, diversification of supply is the overriding priority and the key to de-risking, even if it might entail having to do business at times with countries or firms that might otherwise not be viewed as “clubbable.”

The dream of a greener economy, powered by lower carbon or even carbon-neutral energy systems, may not be as fanciful as once thought, but achieving it will depend on securing access to and a steady (and copious) supply of the necessary strategic materials.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Advisor at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, is former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel and Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

Image: Shutterstock.

Given the threat to free-market democracies posed by authoritarian and revisionist China and Russia, the G7 (Group of Seven), a club of wealthy industrialized democracies, needs to be expanded and strengthened. South Korea is the logical new member of this forum. As a G8 member, South Korea would make a valuable contribution to strengthening free-market democracy in the Indo-Pacific and around the world.

Despite the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific in the global economy and the burgeoning challenge from China to the rules-based international order, the G7 at present has only one member located in Asia, namely Japan. This imbalance needs to be corrected. The Indo-Pacific economies already contribute the largest share to the global economy, more than North America or the European Union, and they constitute the fastest-growing region of the global economy. It is high time that the G7 welcomed another member from the Indo-Pacific to make itself more relevant to this changing reality.

South Korea is the logical new G8 member from the Indo-Pacific because, next to Japan, it is the largest and wealthiest free-market democracy in Asia. Under the present government of Yoon Suk-yeol, Seoul is pursuing a foreign policy that aligns South Korea more firmly with the democratic West vis-à-vis China. A logical culmination of this present trajectory is for Seoul to join the G7.

South Korea is now one of the largest advanced economies and one of the top military powers in the world. Its GDP is similar to those of Italy and Canada, two current G7 members. Its military is ranked as one of the six most powerful in the world, and Seoul has become a major arms exporter to nations including Poland, while its troops are stationed in nations including the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, South Korea is a technological powerhouse, with leadership in key strategic industries including semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries. If G7 were to effectively address economic and geopolitical challenges around the world, having South Korea as a member would be very helpful.

For Seoul, joining the G7 would help strengthen its national security vis-à-vis the rising challenge from Beijing and would solidify its stature as a leading power of the democratic West. For centuries, Korea was a vassal to China, with Beijing exercising hegemony over its foreign relations. As a G8 member, South Korea would be recognized, along with Japan, as a bulwark of free-market democracy in the Indo-Pacific against Beijing’s ambitions for regional dominance. 

The only potential hurdle to South Korean membership in the G7 may be possible opposition from Japan, given historical irritants in relations between Tokyo and Seoul. But Japan would do well to realize that it has more to gain than to lose from South Korean membership in the G7. Japan needs South Korea as an indispensable key ally in the face of growing challenges from China and North Korea. Having Seoul as a G8 member would help improve cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul on a wide range of shared issues and challenges. As a G8 member, Seoul would likely strengthen Tokyo’s efforts to effectively form a coalition of nations committed to the rules-based international order in spite of Beijing’s revisionist expansionism.

From Washington’s point of view, Seoul as a G8 member would offer an important contribution to the U.S.-effort to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, including its efforts to promote U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation against China and North Korea. Seoul’s admission would also enable better coordination among the world’s leading economic and technological powers to address burgeoning challenges posed by China’s technological and economic prowess.

As the Indo-Pacific has become more important than ever before, it is high time that the G7 adapted itself to this changing reality. Such adaptation begins by evolving the G7 from a club of mostly European and North American powers to a body more representative of the world’s economies and populations. Welcoming South Korea as a G8 member would be an effective and welcome first step, and should be supported by all current G7 members.

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict presents a diplomatic challenge for Ukraine as it seeks to balance its interests with its foreign policy priorities. Ukraine views conflicts in the post-Soviet space as remnants of the Soviet era, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is no exception. However, the conflict also serves as a reminder of Ukraine’s ongoing war with Russia due to Russia’s repeated attempts to attack Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders. Therefore, Ukraine has been interested in supporting the preservation of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders since 1991.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as the Artsakh conflict, arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic Armenian-majority region located within the borders of Azerbaijan. Ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan in 1991, leading to a full-scale war between the two sides. A ceasefire was signed in 1994, but the conflict was never fully resolved, and tensions have remained high between the two sides.

The 2020 fighting saw Azerbaijan launch a military offensive to retake control of Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish support. Ethnic Armenian forces could not hold off the Azerbaijan military, and Azerbaijan made significant gains in the region. A Russia-brokered ceasefire was signed in November 2020, but Azerbaijan had already secured control of much of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in significant casualties on both sides and displaced thousands of ethnic Armenians from the region. The conflict has also had broader regional implications, with Turkey’s involvement raising tensions with Russia. The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains an ongoing issue, with ongoing negotiations and efforts to find a lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Ukraine’s ongoing war with Russia, and the annexation of Crimea, has made Kyiv’s position on preserving the territorial integrity of neighboring states even more crucial. For over two decades, Ukraine has firmly stood by Azerbaijan in support of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This unwavering stance, which has become more robust and consistent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, is a reflection of Ukraine’s understanding of the importance of preserving internationally recognized borders in the post-Soviet space.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s refusal to recognize self-proclaimed states, such as Kosovo, is a strategic move aimed at protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, given Russia’s repeated attempts to invade Ukraine’s borders.

Regarding any international conflict, Ukraine abides by the principle of territorial integrity. Most Ukrainian politicians and experts support this approach, which is reflected in Ukraine’s 2020 national security strategy, which declared Azerbaijan a strategic partner on par with Poland, Lithuania, and Georgia. Turkey, which is actively participating in the current conflict on Azerbaijan’s side, also has a strategic partnership with Ukraine.

In contrast, Armenia, a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has traditionally supported Russia in all votes on issues related to Crimea and Donbas. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has consistently voted in favor of Ukraine.

Given its foreign policy priorities and ongoing conflict with Russia, Ukraine has expressed support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia and highlighted the “privileged dialogue” between the two countries in recent years. Zelenskyy has emphasized the importance of preventing the crisis from turning into a “frozen” conflict and urged for a swift resolution to the problems back in 2020.

Since 2014, the UN General Assembly has adopted nine resolutions related to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the human rights situation in Crimea, and the region’s militarization. But, Armenia has voted against all nine resolutions on Crimea. Armenia has used this support for the concept of “self-determination” in Crimea as a justification for a similar process in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this approach has moved further away from a peaceful settlement and has drawn Armenia closer to its main ally, Russia. 

While Russia has long been Armenia’s main military and political ally, Armenia’s dependence on Moscow for defense and security deepened further following the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. Armenia is heavily reliant on Russia for military equipment and officer training. In addition, Russia is Armenia’s leading trading partner, and in 2019, nearly half of all money transfers to Armenia came from the two million Armenians living and working in Russia. As a result, Armenia is constrained in its foreign policy choices and is obligated to align its voting behavior with Russia in international organizations.

For over two decades, Ukraine has stood as a steadfast ally of Azerbaijan, consistently supporting its territorial integrity since the first ceasefire in 1994. This unwavering stance, which has become more robust and consistent in the face of Russia’s aggression, speaks to the strategic importance of preserving internationally recognized borders in the post-Soviet space. Armenia’s dependence on the Russian state as an ally has put it at odds with Ukraine, making it unlikely that relations between both countries improve until Armenia distances itself from Russia.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and an editor at Euromaidan Press. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Image: Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com

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Side by side with Zelensky, the U.S. president declares: “We stand here together.”