Diplomacy & Crisis News

Russia and the United States hold about 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. What happens when they’re no longer talking?

The cutoff of the Matsu Islands may be a dry run for further aggression.

China can make friends or break legs. It can’t do both.

L'abondante littérature alpine, qui ne cesse d'interroger la finalité des conquêtes « inutiles », invite à déconstruire la métaphore du président Emmanuel Macron sur les premiers de cordée, visant à justifier un cadeau fiscal à la fraction la plus riche des grandes fortunes avec la suppression de l'impôt (...) / France, Népal, Environnement, Géographie, Sport, Société, Sous-continent indien, Loisirs - 2018/01

Beijing and Washington share an interest in rules for climate experimentation.

Sur une petite île du sud de la mer du Japon, plus de trois cents pêcheurs mènent une lutte pour endiguer le déclin des ressources de thon rouge dans le Pacifique. Ils mettent en cause la pêche intensive et dénoncent l'agence gouvernementale qui la défend. Dans le pays qui consomme le plus de thon (...) / Japon, Pacifique, Pêche, Mer, Écologie, Animal, Mouvement de contestation - 2018/01

The West’s historical anxieties have made it impossible to come to terms with the war’s reality.

Russian President Vladimir Putin made his own speech in a parallel political universe.

Historically, both countries formed their national identities in defiance of Russian imperialism, and together they can defeat it today.

Manila’s geopolitical shift is more than the Biden administration could have hoped for.

Will nationalism break Britain?

American financial power in the age of great-power competition.

A suspected Chinese spy balloon has exacerbated tensions between America and China. Is conflict inevitable? Or can it be headed off? Do the two sides have more incentives, particularly in the economic realm, to cooperate than is often assumed?

To address these critical questions, the Center for the National Interest invited two leading foreign affairs analysts for an expert discussion:

- Elbridge A. Colby is cofounder and principal of The Marathon Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial.

- Paul Heer is a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a former national intelligence officer for East Asia.

Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Climate activists and other advocates for lowering carbon emissions sometimes make it seem as if the only thing standing between humanity and a bright green future is a lack of political will. So when President Joseph Biden hailed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in his State of the Union address as “the most significant investment ever to tackle the climate crisis…leading the world to a clean energy future,” many were delighted. Not to be outdone, a week later the European Parliament approved a law that effectively bans the sale of new gas and diesel automobiles within the European Union (EU) from 2035, the deadline it set for carmakers to achieve a 100 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from new vehicles sold.

Alas, what holds back these green dreams is not want of moral imagination, but material shortages of critical minerals—without which there is no transition to clean energy systems.

First, overlooked in most political—to say nothing of politicized—discussions of the energy transition are the wildly different material requirements of renewable energy systems vis-à-vis their conventional fossil fuel-powered predecessors. For example, an electric vehicle (EV) like the Tesla Model Y, the top-selling car in the category in America last year according to the Kelley Blue Book, needs six times the amount of minerals that would go into a conventional automobile. It’s wiring alone requires about 130 pounds of copper—roughly three times the amount of the metal that goes into a gas-powered car. An efficient electrical conductor, copper is also needed for the switch to solar- and wind-powered generation for homes and businesses, which will necessitate massive rewiring. If, as expected, demand doubles to about 50 million metric tons a year by 2035, there will be an annual shortfall of nearly 10 million metric tons under the most optimistic scenario. And that is just copper: according to the International Energy Agency, achieving the goal of net-zero emissions by mid-century enshrined in the EU Climate Law as well as in President Biden’s December 2021 executive order will cause the cumulative demand for the most common minerals used in EVs and battery storage—lithium, graphite, cobalt, and nickel—to grow thirty-fold over the next two decades.

Second, compounding the shortage of material inputs is the concentration of sourcing and processing of the available critical minerals. For example, by itself, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), accounts for about 70 percent of global cobalt production. Moreover, almost all of the metal is then exported to China, which refines about 90 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements (REEs), two-thirds of the lithium and cobalt, and almost 40 percent of the nickel. As Biden’s Special Presidential Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security, Amos Hochstein, recently acknowledged at the African Mining Indaba in Cape Town, South Africa, “This is a major concern for the U.S. and I think for the rest of the world. As we are going into a cleaner, greener, and entirely new energy system, we have to make sure we have a diversified supply chain. … We can’t have a supply chain that is concentrated in any country, doesn’t matter which country that is.”

Overcoming these two challenges will require an “all-of-the-above” mindset.

Boosting domestic production, which the IRA tries to incentivize, despite this being at odds with the Biden administration’s restrictive approach to permitting in some areas, is one step. Geology, however, can limit how much of a dent this makes: as I previously pointed out elsewhere, the United States possesses less than 1 percent of the world’s reserves of cobalt and, even if it could possibly to mine it all, would still run through its entire supply in about six years given the current rate of consumption.

Cultivating new partnerships is another approach to be pursued. The memorandum of understanding signed at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December, committing the United States to working with the DRC and Zambia to strengthen the EV value chain, has good potential. So does the Mineral Security Partnership, which includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission. With some focused effort, the new pact could evolve from a discussion forum into a “buyers’ club” for minerals needed for batteries that might both reduce dependence on China and contribute to industrialization in countries producing the critical minerals, especially in Africa. The establishment of such a group would also have the benefit of helping America and some of its closest allies get past the spat over the subsidies offered in the IRA.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that, as Hochstein’s comments correctly implied, the single most significant threat is that any one country or entity so dominates supply chains that it is able, at will, to block rivals’ access to critical minerals and thus the pathway to transitioning to new energy systems.  That is certainly what the Biden administration’s supply chain review found with respect to lithium-ion batteries, concluding that by “operating well outside globally accepted practices,” China has been able to “develop battery critical materials infrastructure well-ahead of market drivers,” resulting in the country producing 79 percent of all batteries in the world, with just one Chinese firm (CATL) by itself controlling 30 percent of the global EV battery market. To this end, diversification of supply is the overriding priority and the key to de-risking, even if it might entail having to do business at times with countries or firms that might otherwise not be viewed as “clubbable.”

The dream of a greener economy, powered by lower carbon or even carbon-neutral energy systems, may not be as fanciful as once thought, but achieving it will depend on securing access to and a steady (and copious) supply of the necessary strategic materials.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Advisor at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, is former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel and Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

Image: Shutterstock.

Given the threat to free-market democracies posed by authoritarian and revisionist China and Russia, the G7 (Group of Seven), a club of wealthy industrialized democracies, needs to be expanded and strengthened. South Korea is the logical new member of this forum. As a G8 member, South Korea would make a valuable contribution to strengthening free-market democracy in the Indo-Pacific and around the world.

Despite the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific in the global economy and the burgeoning challenge from China to the rules-based international order, the G7 at present has only one member located in Asia, namely Japan. This imbalance needs to be corrected. The Indo-Pacific economies already contribute the largest share to the global economy, more than North America or the European Union, and they constitute the fastest-growing region of the global economy. It is high time that the G7 welcomed another member from the Indo-Pacific to make itself more relevant to this changing reality.

South Korea is the logical new G8 member from the Indo-Pacific because, next to Japan, it is the largest and wealthiest free-market democracy in Asia. Under the present government of Yoon Suk-yeol, Seoul is pursuing a foreign policy that aligns South Korea more firmly with the democratic West vis-à-vis China. A logical culmination of this present trajectory is for Seoul to join the G7.

South Korea is now one of the largest advanced economies and one of the top military powers in the world. Its GDP is similar to those of Italy and Canada, two current G7 members. Its military is ranked as one of the six most powerful in the world, and Seoul has become a major arms exporter to nations including Poland, while its troops are stationed in nations including the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, South Korea is a technological powerhouse, with leadership in key strategic industries including semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries. If G7 were to effectively address economic and geopolitical challenges around the world, having South Korea as a member would be very helpful.

For Seoul, joining the G7 would help strengthen its national security vis-à-vis the rising challenge from Beijing and would solidify its stature as a leading power of the democratic West. For centuries, Korea was a vassal to China, with Beijing exercising hegemony over its foreign relations. As a G8 member, South Korea would be recognized, along with Japan, as a bulwark of free-market democracy in the Indo-Pacific against Beijing’s ambitions for regional dominance. 

The only potential hurdle to South Korean membership in the G7 may be possible opposition from Japan, given historical irritants in relations between Tokyo and Seoul. But Japan would do well to realize that it has more to gain than to lose from South Korean membership in the G7. Japan needs South Korea as an indispensable key ally in the face of growing challenges from China and North Korea. Having Seoul as a G8 member would help improve cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul on a wide range of shared issues and challenges. As a G8 member, Seoul would likely strengthen Tokyo’s efforts to effectively form a coalition of nations committed to the rules-based international order in spite of Beijing’s revisionist expansionism.

From Washington’s point of view, Seoul as a G8 member would offer an important contribution to the U.S.-effort to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, including its efforts to promote U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation against China and North Korea. Seoul’s admission would also enable better coordination among the world’s leading economic and technological powers to address burgeoning challenges posed by China’s technological and economic prowess.

As the Indo-Pacific has become more important than ever before, it is high time that the G7 adapted itself to this changing reality. Such adaptation begins by evolving the G7 from a club of mostly European and North American powers to a body more representative of the world’s economies and populations. Welcoming South Korea as a G8 member would be an effective and welcome first step, and should be supported by all current G7 members.

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict presents a diplomatic challenge for Ukraine as it seeks to balance its interests with its foreign policy priorities. Ukraine views conflicts in the post-Soviet space as remnants of the Soviet era, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is no exception. However, the conflict also serves as a reminder of Ukraine’s ongoing war with Russia due to Russia’s repeated attempts to attack Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders. Therefore, Ukraine has been interested in supporting the preservation of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders since 1991.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as the Artsakh conflict, arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic Armenian-majority region located within the borders of Azerbaijan. Ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan in 1991, leading to a full-scale war between the two sides. A ceasefire was signed in 1994, but the conflict was never fully resolved, and tensions have remained high between the two sides.

The 2020 fighting saw Azerbaijan launch a military offensive to retake control of Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish support. Ethnic Armenian forces could not hold off the Azerbaijan military, and Azerbaijan made significant gains in the region. A Russia-brokered ceasefire was signed in November 2020, but Azerbaijan had already secured control of much of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in significant casualties on both sides and displaced thousands of ethnic Armenians from the region. The conflict has also had broader regional implications, with Turkey’s involvement raising tensions with Russia. The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains an ongoing issue, with ongoing negotiations and efforts to find a lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Ukraine’s ongoing war with Russia, and the annexation of Crimea, has made Kyiv’s position on preserving the territorial integrity of neighboring states even more crucial. For over two decades, Ukraine has firmly stood by Azerbaijan in support of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This unwavering stance, which has become more robust and consistent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, is a reflection of Ukraine’s understanding of the importance of preserving internationally recognized borders in the post-Soviet space.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s refusal to recognize self-proclaimed states, such as Kosovo, is a strategic move aimed at protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, given Russia’s repeated attempts to invade Ukraine’s borders.

Regarding any international conflict, Ukraine abides by the principle of territorial integrity. Most Ukrainian politicians and experts support this approach, which is reflected in Ukraine’s 2020 national security strategy, which declared Azerbaijan a strategic partner on par with Poland, Lithuania, and Georgia. Turkey, which is actively participating in the current conflict on Azerbaijan’s side, also has a strategic partnership with Ukraine.

In contrast, Armenia, a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has traditionally supported Russia in all votes on issues related to Crimea and Donbas. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has consistently voted in favor of Ukraine.

Given its foreign policy priorities and ongoing conflict with Russia, Ukraine has expressed support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia and highlighted the “privileged dialogue” between the two countries in recent years. Zelenskyy has emphasized the importance of preventing the crisis from turning into a “frozen” conflict and urged for a swift resolution to the problems back in 2020.

Since 2014, the UN General Assembly has adopted nine resolutions related to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the human rights situation in Crimea, and the region’s militarization. But, Armenia has voted against all nine resolutions on Crimea. Armenia has used this support for the concept of “self-determination” in Crimea as a justification for a similar process in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this approach has moved further away from a peaceful settlement and has drawn Armenia closer to its main ally, Russia. 

While Russia has long been Armenia’s main military and political ally, Armenia’s dependence on Moscow for defense and security deepened further following the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. Armenia is heavily reliant on Russia for military equipment and officer training. In addition, Russia is Armenia’s leading trading partner, and in 2019, nearly half of all money transfers to Armenia came from the two million Armenians living and working in Russia. As a result, Armenia is constrained in its foreign policy choices and is obligated to align its voting behavior with Russia in international organizations.

For over two decades, Ukraine has stood as a steadfast ally of Azerbaijan, consistently supporting its territorial integrity since the first ceasefire in 1994. This unwavering stance, which has become more robust and consistent in the face of Russia’s aggression, speaks to the strategic importance of preserving internationally recognized borders in the post-Soviet space. Armenia’s dependence on the Russian state as an ally has put it at odds with Ukraine, making it unlikely that relations between both countries improve until Armenia distances itself from Russia.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and an editor at Euromaidan Press. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Image: Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com

Durant les années 1930, dans un contexte de chômage grandissant, plusieurs lois sont votées en France pour limiter l'immigration et refouler les étrangers « indésirables ». Face à des partis politiques et une grande presse qui multiplient les campagnes xénophobes, des intellectuels prennent la plume. (...) / France, Conflit, Droits humains, État, Histoire, Mouvement de contestation, Réfugiés, Guerre d'Espagne 1936-1939, Droit d'asile - 2018/01

Side by side with Zelensky, the U.S. president declares: “We stand here together.”

/ Arabie saoudite, Golfe, Conflit, Islam, Pétrole, Religion, Santé, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Yémen, Coup d'État - Proche-Orient / Arabie saoudite, Golfe, Conflit, Islam, Pétrole, Religion, Santé, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Yémen, Coup d'État - Proche-Orient

Ironically, a defeat by Ukraine could trigger Russians to reexamine their national identity.