Diplomacy & Crisis News

Jonathan Schanzer, Richard Goldberg

Environmental, Social, Governance Movement, United States

Ben & Jerry’s is now a cautionary tale on the dangers of the Environmental, Social, Governance movement run amok.

This month’s tweet from Ben & Jerry’s urging President Joe Biden not to send troops to eastern Europe to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine was roundly and deservedly jeered on Twitter by Russia experts, military hands, and foreign policy specialists.

“You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war,” the ice cream company stated. “We call on President Biden to de-escalate tensions and work for peace rather than prepare for war. Sending thousands more US troops to Europe in response to Russia’s threats against Ukraine only fans the flame of war.”

One critic of this naïve statement went so far as to suggest a new flavor for the occasion: Appease Mint.

But the tweet was more than an embarrassing gaffe. It was a clarifying moment. The Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) movement has lost its way. Corporate leaders with little to no experience in foreign affairs increasingly feel entitled to weigh in on complex policy challenges. If they are lucky, it only results in embarrassment. It’s time to provide ESG with some guardrails, if not all-out reform. 

Ben & Jerry’s is now a cautionary tale on the dangers of ESG run amok. Last year the company, which is owned by parent company Unilever, announced it would terminate its license to distribute in Israel. In doing so, the company picked sides in a century-old clash of nationalist aspirations that has vexed even the sharpest diplomatic minds. The 2021 decision was particularly odd, given that the company failed to take such strident positions on other disputed territories.

To be fair, Unilever isn’t alone. Many corporations that advertise their commitment to ESG are rather selective in their application. Take, for example, the major sponsors of the Beijing Olympics. Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, Visa, Toyota, and Panasonic all purport to adhere to ESG principles, with dedicated pages on their websites to all the good they do for the world. Yet, they have all chosen, for the sake of profit, to ignore the documented genocide destroying the lives of millions of Uighur Muslims in China.

The goal here is not merely to single out these companies for hypocrisy. In a sense, they are victims of a growing malady. Corporate boards increasingly feel the need to keep pace with politically charged causes to avoid “cancellation.” Companies often find themselves under duress for support of the wrong cause (or nonsupport of the right ones). This explains why they have sought out the counsel of ESG consultants and experts who purportedly know how to navigate this complicated space.

Here's the rub: these experts have no idea what they are doing. Even the most seasoned ESG consultants will quietly cede that there are no rules in this field. It’s entirely subjective. There is, in fact, no correct way to commit to ESG principles. The embrace of ESG is more about virtue signaling and branding than substantive change. Corporations often adopt the policies that impact their businesses the least. But they don’t want to risk running afoul of the latest corporate craze. So, they invest valuable time and resources to demonstrate their commitment to ESG.

Consultants who purport to be ESG gurus are paid top dollar to train corporations in how to get high ESG investment ratings and be included in ESG-based index funds. For a hefty fee, the C-suite can gain a coveted ESG stamp of approval. Yet, after doing so, they often continue with business as usual. Petroleum companies continue to have a heavy carbon footprint. Big pharma continues to produce drugs that can cause social upheaval. Multinationals continue to work in jurisdictions with poor human rights records. But they vow to be better global stakeholders, with occasional divestments or statements that reflect the latest political trends. In the era of ESG, this accounts for something.

One might argue that if corporations wish to project their softer side, ESG is a fairly innocuous way of doing so. However, this may not necessarily be the case. Morningstar, for example, acquired the ESG rating company Sustainalytics last year. This means that Sustainalytics’ ESG analysis will be used in twenty-nine countries by millions of investors. This also means that the subjective interpretation of Sustainalytics on political, social, and environmental issues will influence those millions of investors. Who is to say that this particular company’s perspective on a wide range of contentious issue is correct?

How are investment and divestment decisions being made? What data or analysis feeds into such recommendations? How does one company end up boycotting the pluralistic democracy of Israel while others enable a genocide in China? For a movement built on calls for transparency, these corporations are increasingly making decisions based on non-transparent, politicized information without regard to fiduciary responsibilities and shareholder value.

Deluged with complaints and concerns about the company’s ESG standards, Morningstar has hired a law firm to audit its process.

This is a welcome development. But Morningstar is not the only company that requires oversight. This was something that the SustainAbility Institute observed, which led to its sputtered effort to “rate the raters.” Absent such efforts from within the ESG community, it may be time for federal investment authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, to take a close look at the analytical practices wielded by financial firms providing ESG research and by corporations, themselves. This may be more urgent than ever given a Department of Labor proposal that would allow corporations to drag pension investments into the ESG abyss.

Last month, one top Unilever investor said the company had “lost the plot” due to its fixation on ESG. The same could be said for any number of corporations today. The commitment to being better corporate citizens is laudable. But when ice cream executives start weighing in on complex conflicts a half a world away, it just might be time to re-assess.

Jonathan Schanzer (@JSchanzer), a former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is senior vice president for the nonpartisan think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Richard Goldberg (@rich_goldberg), a former U.S. Senate aide and National Security Council official, is senior adviser.

Image: Reuters.

Yoav J. Tenembaum

U.S.-China Relations, Eurasia

Few events in modern diplomatic history have astounded the world as much as Nixon’s visit to China.

Fifty years ago this week, U.S. president Richard Nixon paid an official visit to China, thus ending an official diplomatic boycott that had lasted since the Communists took power in 1949.

The visit, which took place from February 21-28, 1972, was a diplomatic spectacle as few others have been. Few events in modern diplomatic history have astounded the world as much as Nixon’s visit to China. Only Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s official visit to Israel in November 1977, which ended the diplomatic boycott of Israel that existed since its foundation in 1948, can be compared to it. Nixon’s visit was the culmination of a major diplomatic breakthrough and the beginning of an emerging relationship between the two former foes.

Nixon’s visit came in the wake of a secret meeting between U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger and China’s Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, in July 1971.

Since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, the United States had no official diplomatic contacts with the government in Beijing as it recognized the nationalist government in Taipei, Taiwan, as the legitimate Chinese government.

The enmity between the United States and Communist China reached a peak during the Korean War (1950-1953), when the two countries fought each other.

But increasing hostility between the two Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, which then led to armed clashes between the two in the winter of 1969, offered an opportunity for the United States to attempt a rapprochement with its long-time rival.

To be sure, before he was even elected president, Nixon had written a Foreign Affairs article in 1967 arguing that Communist China was too important to be relegated on the sidelines of the international system.

After becoming president, Nixon and Kissinger set out to explore the possibility of a diplomatic thaw with Communist China. Following some unsuccessful attempts, the Pakistani government, which maintained close links with both countries, facilitated negotiations, finally leading to Kissinger’s secret mission to China and subsequently to Nixon’s official visit.

An official presidential visit of such a long duration would be difficult to countenance nowadays, particularly with a country with which the United States has no diplomatic relations. Nixon would describe his visit as “the week that changed the world,” which reflected the contemporary view that the visit was a singular turning point in the history of international relations. The same can be said fifty years later.

Following Nixon’s visit, the United States had to maneuver between its desire for an ever-closer dialogue with Communist China and its pledge to Taiwan’s security. The dilemma facing the United States was not simple. To achieve a rapprochement with Communist China was one thing; establishing full diplomatic relations was another. The United States had to strike a delicate balance between its moral commitment to Taiwan and its pragmatic interest in forging closer links with Communist China. That lead to diplomatic ambiguity, such as the Shanghai Communique published at the end of Nixon’s official visit to China, in which the United States stated that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China.”

This statement, in principle, was something both Communist China and Taiwan could agree on. After all, both believed that there was but one China; they just differed on which regime should rule over it.

Nixon’s visit changed the nature of the Cold War. Pursuing a policy of détente towards the Soviet Union, the United States was able to manoeuver between the two Communist powers. Détente created a situation, as Kissinger put it, in which the Soviet Union and Communist China were more distanced from each other than either was from the United States.

Arguably, the bipolar international system that existed until then turned into a tripolar one.

To be sure, Communist China under Chairman Mao Zedong was a totalitarian state. Mao and his regime were responsible for the deaths of millions of Chinese citizens and the persecution, humiliation, and torture of a large section of the population. The cult of personality in China reached Stalinist levels. The diplomatic opening to Communist China and the long-term effects were certainly not prompted by any ideological affinity.

Indeed, Nixon and Kissinger had already made clear that the principal motivating factor in their foreign policy was serving the U.S. national interest. There was a strong pragmatic streak behind their policy. Ideological reasoning was not completely absent from their decisionmaking process, but it was secondary. As Kissinger himself would argue many years subsequently, Nixon’s rhetoric was more idealistic than his actions; his objectives were defined in Wilsonian terms, while the tactics he employed were more pragmatic.

Nixon did not consider Communist China more politically enlightened than the Soviet Union. Most did not regard Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership as more open-minded than their Soviet counterparts. In this regard, the initiative behind U.S. policy was founded upon a strong belief that Communist China was too important an international actor to be left on the sidelines of U.S. foreign policy. In the context of the Cold War and the prevailing bipolar international system, Nixon believed that a rapprochement with Communist China, which was at loggerheads with the Soviet Union and thus more amenable to opening up a serious diplomatic dialogue with the United States, was needed. Such a policy would lead the Soviet Union to be more flexible towards the United States to prevent a further rapprochement with Communist China. The United States would conduct a policy of détente with the Soviet Union aimed at moderating the super-power conflict, which for its part would lead Communist China to welcome an ever-closer dialogue with the United States to prevent an anti-Chinese alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

With the benefit of hindsight, many regarded Nixon’s opening to China as his most astounding foreign policy success. It was not merely an ephemeral, tactical achievement, but rather a deeply influential, long-lasting crowning of a presidency marred by the Watergate scandal, which brought about Nixon’s downfall in August 1974. Although Watergate tarnished his reputation, Nixon managed to make a remarkable comeback into public acclaim as he became an elder statesman, whose opinions on foreign affairs leaders and policymakers frequently sought.

Dr. Yoav J. Tenembaum is a lecturer in International Relations at Tel Aviv University. He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University and a master’s degree in International Relations from Cambridge University.

Image: Reuters.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Inflation, United States

For much of the past year, sky-rocketing home prices and the cutthroat real estate market have grabbed countless headlines.

For much of the past year, sky-rocketing home prices and the cutthroat real estate market have grabbed countless headlines.

But beneath that inflation-driven rubble is another concerning trend affecting millions of Americans—the cost of renting an apartment or home is surging.

As reported by National Public Radio (NPR), rent costs in Orlando rose nearly 30 percent just last year alone, according to a survey by the real estate firm Redfin. Moreover, certain cities in Florida, New York, and New Jersey have witnessed particularly sharp jumps in rent.

And in Austin, Texas, rents came in at a whopping 40 percent higher year-over-year.

“That doesn’t literally mean that every person in Austin is going to see their rent go up 40 percent. But it means that if you are on the market right now looking for an apartment or home to rent, the prices will be 40 percent higher than they were the year before,” Redfin’s chief economist Daryl Fairweather told NPR.

“The root cause of the problem is a lack of supply. We have not built enough homes to meet demand,” she continued.

Fairweather also pointed out that more millennials are actively making the move toward home ownership, which is exacerbating the supply shortage.

“Millennials are the biggest generation,” she said. “We’re forming households, and we want a place of our own and that is causing an increase in demand.”

PPI Reaches New Highs

As rental and home prices continue their unrelenting march higher, another key inflation measure revealed that prices are rising more than expected last month.

The producer price index (PPI)—which tracks average price changes the country’s producers get paid for their goods and services over time—surged 9.7 percent in January year-over-year, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For January alone, prices climbed 1 percent, adjusted for seasonal swings. Forecasts had only been for a 0.5 percent increase.

“PPI offers a window to the price pressures that businesses are facing, and which will likely be passed on to consumers in the way of consumer price inflation in the months to come,” PNC economist Kurt Rankin told CNN.

Credibility on the Line

In response, a top Fed official said earlier this week that such high-inflationary pressures being witnessed across all sectors may force the Federal Reserve to step up its campaign to get rising prices back under control.

“This inflation we’re seeing is very bad for low and moderate-income households. Real wages are declining. People are unhappy. Consumer confidence is declining. This is not a good situation,” St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard told CNBC.

“We have been surprised (by) the upside on inflation. … Our credibility is on the line here. We have to react to data. … We have to reassure people we are going to defend our inflation target and we are going to get inflation back to 2 percent,” he added.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Roku TV,

Now, a new report says Roku is eying another move—one towards making its own TVs for the first time.

The Roku brand has become very successful in the last decade, first as a type of streaming media player and later as an operating system found on the TVs of manufacturers like TCL and Hisense. A report this week found that more than one-third of those who watched last Sunday’s Super Bowl did so through the Roku platform, the most of any in the survey. 

More recently, Roku has made a big move into original content, purchasing the library of the late streaming service Quibi and also making other new shows, driving viewers to its Roku Channel. The company also earns money when users subscribe to different services and rent movies and TV shows through the Roku Channel. 

Now, a new report says Roku is eying another move—one towards making its own TVs for the first time.  

According to Business Insider, Roku has been hosting focus groups in which they have asked customers how they would feel about the company making its own TVs, rather than licensing the Roku TV brand to other companies. 

The idea of doing so “has been discussed as part of Roku's roadmap,” a person familiar with the company’s strategy told the news outlet. "This is a manufacturing operation. They want to go into making their own TVs,” that source told the outlet. 

That focus group, Business Insider said, was shown “different models, feature sets and names, sizes, [and] price points.” 

A second executive told the site that Roku has been considering the plunge into manufacturing for some time. "The analysis has been done. They recognized that owning the last bit of branding made a lot of sense, particularly if you are going into content,” that executive said of the plans. 

The report arrived ahead of Roku’s quarterly earnings, set to arrive after the bell on Thursday. Roku is one of many companies, like Netflix and Peloton, that hit new heights during the pandemic, with millions more people than usual stuck at home and using their product, but have struggled more recently as such conditions have receded. The company fell short of estimates in the third quarter. 

“Roku's TV [original equipment manufacturers] struggled to get TVs to market due to component shortages and supply chain disruption,” analyst Michael Pachter, managing director at Wedbush Partners, said in a note, as reported by Business Insider. 

How exactly the manufacturing would work, and where it would take place, is unclear. 

Back in January, NPD’s tracking service found that Roku was the number one smart operating system for TVs sold in 2021. At the same time, during the Consumer Electronic Show, Roku announced a new deal to make Sharp its newest manufacturing partner. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters.

Caleb Larson

U.S. Navy, United States

The Navy argued that the Sailors leaked a piece of government property, declining to prosecute a sailor who only photographed the aftermath of the crash.

Four enlisted U.S. Navy sailors and one junior officer are being charged in connection with a leaked video showing a recent ramp strike during an attempted landing aboard an aircraft carrier.

The crash involved an F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, the navalized variant of the United States’ fifth-generation stealth fighter.

Off the Deck and Into the Ocean

An F-35C can be seen approaching the USS Carl Vinson’s flight deck during the video. However, the approach is too low, and a landing officer can be heard yelling at the pilot to “wave off,” which means the pilot should abort the landing to come around for another pass.

However, the F-35C does not gain enough altitude to wave off, and strikes the aircraft carrier’s front ramp. At least one of the airplane’s landing gear is shorn off, and the aircraft slides across the deck, leaking fuel and catching fire.

The airplane reaches the port side of the deck and falls into the sea. The harrowing video can be seen here and is worth a watch.

The video is actually a recording of a recording. It is a cell phone video of a monitor displaying the USS Carl Vinson’s PLAT system, a Pilot Landing Aid Television that records take-off and landing from the aircraft carrier flight deck.

An additional cell phone video of the incident exists, taken from the stern of the ship. That video shows the airplane's approach, but not the actual crash.

A photo also appeared on social media and showed the F-35C following the accident. The airplane can be seen floating on top of the ocean after the pilot ejected.

The Navy decided to charge only the sailors involved in recording the PLAT video, arguing that the PLAT video is government property and therefore subject to Navy approval before release. In contrast, the second video and the photo of the airplane were taken from personal cell phones.

Charged

“The sailors being charged under Article 92 are either being charged on a general orders violation theory or as a dereliction – as in they negligently failed to execute a duty not to record and leak onboard footage,” former military lawyer Rob Bracknell said to USNI News. “There are two reasons to charge this conduct: Leaking footage of a mishap might reveal platform or performance vulnerabilities to an adversary – maybe not in this case – but they want to deter the conduct in other cases and they want to deter sailors recording onboard systems with personal cell phones and broadcasting them.”

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. Follow him on Twitter @calebmlarson.

Image: Reuters.

Aaron Crimmins

Ukraine Crisis, Europe

As the Russian offense plays with new strategies and tools, Ukraine’s cyber defenders must always be vigilant.

Ukraine and Russia seemed to have a shared destiny. For decades the two nations have been entwined across myriad realms, while locked in constant struggle over identity. Once a primary Soviet Republic, Ukraine now feels the gravitational pull from two directions. In the East, their past comrades in Moscow, and in the West, their potential future compatriots in Western Europe. Ukraine is positioned on the front line in the ongoing contest of realities between the Russian Federation and NATO, and every day the friction between these societal tectonic plates grinds hotter.

As the military and diplomatic situation on Ukraine’s borders deteriorates before our eyes, we must watch these fields in collaboration with the unseen cyber field. Modern conflicts present many facets, and in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, cyber conflict features quite prominently.

Russia has for years honed its cyber skills against its smaller neighbors, treating them as cyber-training grounds. To test their prowess against world-class adversaries from the jump would be foolish and likely lead to reprisals the Russian cyber and intelligence communities may not be ready for. Instead, while troops remain in the barracks, the Russian intelligence community engages on an invisible battleground without clear borders. As far back as 2005, malware such as Turla, or Ouroboros, has plagued Eastern Europe. From there, the infamous trojan has made its rounds through Western cyberspace as well. Ukraine saw cyber meddling—widely agreed to be Russian in origin—again come to a head in 2013, when, according to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) engaged in a “spearphishing” campaign against the Ukrainian government and law enforcement in retaliation for Ukraine participating in pro-EU talks. In 2014, for similar reasons, a multi-pronged attack hit Ukraine’s election infrastructure, reportedly due to potential pro-EU election outcomes. During the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea, the Russians jammed communications and even damaged the physical connections that carry information from location to location in physical space. The following year, cyber aggression from the east again ratcheted up, with the now infamous BlackEnergy helping to cause rolling blackouts across Ukraine and Poland. The very next year, once again, Ukraine’s power grid was struck, resulting in similar damage. Throughout 2017, Ukraine fell victim to various strains of Petya, and NotPetya, both widespread botnet attacks.

In the nearly two decades prior to the current upheaval in Ukraine, the embattled Eastern European country has endured a constant barrage in cyberspace. Ukrainian government cyber experts have had to mount a valiant defense on the front line, facing new and evolving Russian cyber campaigns. As the Russian offense plays with new strategies and tools, Ukraine’s cyber defenders must always be vigilant. In the Donbass region, contested since the incursions of 2014, Russian aligned separatists have created a malware playground, attracting cyber actors from all over the world to test their skills. From there, there is little stopping malware from wreaking havoc elsewhere in Ukraine and the globe.

All of this has created a perfect storm for Ukraine in 2022. Cyberspace actors from all over the world have converged in the Russian sandbox, raising the stakes and the threat level in the current conflict. Indeed, Ukraine has already begun to suffer renewed, albeit modest, attacks on its banking system, seemingly designed to encourage fear and financial instability. Although these attacks remain modest for now, the Russian cyberwar machine has many other tricks up its sleeve, many designed and tailored specifically for Ukraine, after decades of practice. Were this cold conflict to heat up, and Ukraine resist Russian demands, it seems overwhelmingly likely the Ukrainian cyber defenders will be once again put to the test.

The United States and NATO’s assistance to Ukraine may put these other countries in the crosshairs as well. The United States and other NATO countries have sent diplomatic entourages to Eastern Europe many times in previous weeks to sue for peace on behalf of Ukraine and greater Europe. Russian kinetic aggression may be limited to Ukraine and eastern Europe, but without clear borders and blockages to limit their scope, the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict may spill over, threatening further escalation with NATO and other powers.

Aaron Crimmins, Esq. is a cyber strategy and governance consultant and writer based in San Diego, California. He tweets @00crims.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Hoekstra

War in Yemen, Middle East

The Houthis as an organization have carried out terrorist attacks targeting civilians and U.S. personnel and they should be redesignated as such by the Biden administration.

Yemen is a country that many Americans would have difficulty finding on a map. Few would know that Yemen has been bitterly divided by warring factions for much of its existence. They probably would not know the Houthis or who other combatants in Yemen are and who the U.S. government supports. They might have heard that the conflict has created a dire humanitarian crisis where nearly 400,000 people have died and many more face a very difficult future.

Reviewing the statistics: Yemen is a country of almost thirty-one million people. It is estimated that roughly 21 million need humanitarian relief, of which eleven million are children. Almost three million Yemini’s are currently displaced. These numbers clearly paint a picture of a massive humanitarian crisis.

Further aggravating the current dire situation is the fact that United Nations relief aid is facing severe funding limitations that may result in eight million people possibly losing humanitarian assistance as soon as March 2022. Combined with an escalation of fighting between the warring factions, this is a bad situation that grows worse by the day.

The United States must exert leadership to help alleviate these awful conditions. There are multiple steps that can be taken. It begins with taking action and putting an end to deliberation. For far too many Yemenis, time already has run out or soon will. Our clear objective should be getting aid to those who need it and punishing those who are preventing aid from getting where it needs to go.

The Houthis, an Iranian terrorist proxy group in Yemen, are the primary obstacle to addressing this catastrophic humanitarian crisis. As the crisis worsens, it is the Houthis who have raised the war tempo in the country, and indications from Washington are the Biden administration is divided on how to respond. The National Security Council leans towards reimposing the terrorist organization designation on the Houthis while the State Department’s preference is to designate individual Houthi leaders and sanction them.

The facts on this issue are relatively clear. The Houthis as an organization have carried out terrorist attacks targeting civilians and U.S. personnel and they should be redesignated as such by the Biden administration. This would reimpose a designation put in place near the end of the Trump administration but lifted soon after President Joe Biden assumed office. Designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization should go hand-in-glove with continuing to designate individual Houthis as terrorists and sanctioning them appropriately. One does not exclude the other. With the stakes as high as they are, the Biden administration should pursue both avenues.

At the same time, the United States should continue supporting its allies, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, in the region. The Biden administration should encourage them to continue their efforts against the Houthis and also enlist their support in providing and delivering the assistance Yemen so desperately needs.

Some believe that Congress may try and exert pressure on the president to designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. While this would be a positive step forward, I am skeptical that a letter by a bipartisan group of lawmakers will have much of an impact. Yes, it would be helpful, but it will not be decisive. Even if Congress wanted to take stronger measures to compel the administration to act, the House does not even return for business until February 28. Besides this fact, the administration has all the information it needs to make a decision, and it should act sooner rather than later.

With the impending calamity that is facing Yemen, the United States working through the UN and humanitarian organizations should focus on getting relief supplies into the country for immediate distribution. Much of the relief has been going through a single port facility, Hodeidah. This port has the best facilities in the country but is also controlled by the Houthis. Given the real possibility for the Houthis to steal, manipulate, and profit from aid distribution, this single port is insufficient. The country is partitioned with the Houthis controlling parts of the country and the internationally recognized Yemeni government controlling other sections with other parts of the country under the influence of Al Qaeda. Humanitarian assistance must reach all these areas.

If the immediate effort is to limit the humanitarian crisis, the strategy should be to open multiple ports, land bridges, and air bridges into the country to get relief supplies in. That is how we save Yemeni lives instead of helping facilitate an Iranian-backed terrorist organization.

The United States should encourage countries to participate in an upcoming pledging conference in Sweden. The immediate shortfall in financial support for relief efforts needs to be addressed. The conference provides the best opportunity for the international community to help make that happen.

This will not be easy to accomplish. Major legitimate concerns about fraud within the assistance programs exist. There are additional concerns that the aid programs in some cases may be doing more harm than good by creating dependencies and weakening what little infrastructure still exists in Yemen.

While all of this is going on it is obvious that the United States and the international community need to attempt to reach a negotiated political settlement. But as long as the Houthis are unwilling to genuinely engage in constructive talks, U.S. policymakers will have to deal with the way things are rather than how they want them to be.

For the Biden administration, Yemen presents a very complicated challenge but domestically it is not a political issue. The Biden administration can take the steps outlined above and receive bipartisan congressional support for its efforts. It will receive support from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It will be denounced by Iran, the country that is supporting and, in many ways, directing the Houthis and stands to lose from a decline in the Houthis power. But in this case, by standing by U.S. friends in the region and the people of Yemen, the United States will be in a better position and help counter the evil influence Iran spreads in the region. Iran continues to use Yemen and the Houthis as a force to destabilize the region. It has no regard for the tremendous suffering it is imposing on the people of Yemen. It is who Iran is. It is this fact that the United States should never forget it as the Biden administration continues the dangerous and ill-advised effort to again enter a nuclear deal with Iran.

Peter Hoekstra is the former Ambassador to the Netherlands and U.S. Representative from Michigan.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Rubin

Colonialism, Africa

Just a decade ago, France held paramount influence in Africa. Today, its reach is in freefall and, with it, any pretension of being a global power.

Today, many Africans view the French as irrelevant if not persona non grata in many countries in which they once held sway. Earlier this month, for example, thousands of Malians celebrated the French ambassador’s expulsion in the capital city, Bamako. When French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian called the elected military junta “illegitimate” and “out-of-control,” Malian military leaders ordered Ambassador Joel Meyer to depart the country.

This is not to say that Paris does not have a point: frustration with Bamako has grown steadily. French troops deployed to the West African country in January 2013 to fight a Tuareg insurgency that an Al Qaeda-affiliated group exploited to seize territory in the country’s north. While Mali was once one of Africa’s most democratic nations, it has spiraled into a morass of poor governance and insurgency feeding off each other. Recently, the Malian junta contracted out security to Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group, an outlet known to commit human rights abuses and pillage local resources. French troops, meanwhile, are on their way out from the country.

The French divorce from Mali is increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception. Increasingly, France’s more-than-a-century-long diplomatic dominance in Africa is ending, and with it, France’s pretension of being a major player on the world stage.

Consider the Central African Republic: One year ago, rebels in the resource-rich, former French colony threatened to sack the capital Bangui. The United Nations, which has a robust peacekeeping force in the country, stood aside, as did France. Rwanda, with one-fifth the population of France and an army less than one-tenth the size of France’s, ultimately came to the rescue and stopped the rebel advance, pushing the Islamist rebels back into the hinterlands. From the locals’ perspective, French inaction compounded a betrayal marked by late President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s support for local dictatorship in exchange for a supply of Central African diamonds into French coffers. Although a generation of French policymakers have believed they could loot and run roughshod over the Central Africans, they have learned that Central Africans have long memories.

Then there is Rwanda itself. While Rwanda was originally a Belgian colonial possession, France treated it as its own following the country’s 1962 independence. French policy, however, was twisted. Declassified French archival documents and an assessment of newly-available sources now show beyond any reasonable doubt direct French complicity in the 1994 anti-Tutsi genocide. France’s motives? Distrust of Rwandans seeking greater ties to the Anglophone world as well as President Juvénal Habyarimana’s willingness (under whom Hutu militants planned the anti-Tutsi Genocide) to subordinate Rwandan interests and human rights to French requests. While Hollywood successfully depicted some of the horror of the 1994 genocide, the producers omitted French advisors training and even manning checkpoints with Hutu génocidaires. It is now clear there likely would have been no genocide in Rwanda had it not been for the cynicism of French president François Mitterrand.

Contemporarily, President Emmanuel Macron has said troops withdrawn from Mali will redeploy elsewhere in the Sahel. But it is unclear how long they will be welcome. Chadian president Idriss Déby’s death while fighting Islamist militants removed a stalwart French ally. However, Macron and the Quay d’Orsay’s support for Déby’s son Mahamat may backfire at the expense of future French influence. Burkina Faso, Niger, and other Sahelian countries watch their neighbors carefully. Momentum matters. They will not hesitate to kick France while it is down, especially if alternatives exist.

France’s unwillingness to recognize regional competition has also taken its toll. Djibouti, for example, was once France’s strategic backstop. Until a decade ago, Djibouti was home to the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion. It subsequently moved to the United Arab Emirates and then back to France. Meanwhile, China has become the dominant influence in the former French colony. Nor is China alone. Turkey is using anti-French, anti-colonialist rhetoric to cultivate former French colonies across Africa. In the most infamous example, Ahmet Kavas, the Turkish ambassador to Chad, lauded Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and accused French troops fighting them of being the real terrorists.

The hemorrhage in French influence is now obvious, but it has been in the works for years.

For Washington, two questions arise. The first is why France ignored warning signs, and whether something similar could happen to the United States’ influence. While the United States does not have a colonial legacy in Africa, it does have a history of supporting Cold War and Global War on Terror-era human rights abuses that Washington may have forgotten but locals in various countries have not. The second is the price of complacency. France should never have allowed China to out-compete it in Djibouti, nor should it have allowed Turkey to cultivate more influence in many Francophone countries than France itself.

Another question for American policymakers then becomes whether they are fine with China, Iran, and Turkey filling France’s leadership gap. Although the White House and the State Department may publicly deny something to that effect, both agencies appear unwilling to do anything to avoid a similar outcome.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Reuters.

It was always interesting speaking with those who escaped tyranny when I began my studies. My intention was not to educate myself on the nature of those regimes nor even challenge those ideas in my youth, but to understand the effect on individuals who survived the physical and mental struggle of a failed society. I was told that in my country, everyone believed everything they were told by the Government, where as in her country of Czechoslovakia, no one trusted anything they Government ever said. This view of the world is meant to not only keep one’s life from becoming suspect to the tyranny of their Government, but also to maintain one’s own sanity in a place that was a physical and mental prison, designed to enshrine corruption above and beyond a person’s natural rights.

While literature classes in an English speaking atmosphere often encourages students to follow novels based on British traditions and society, it was more useful to me to study places similar to where my family originated from. With a diverse background also came a diversity of places that were subject to different types of tyranny. While these places differed greatly, tyranny often crushes one’s humanity in a similar fashion. The works of Czech author Milan Kundera was notable, as a person who wrote about life under Communism post the Prague Spring. As described by my colleague at the time, their society was one where people only communicated in whispers, and were weary of neighbours, friends and family as the secret police loomed over every action of every citizens. The beginning of tyranny was as interesting as its end, with Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago showing how the makers and helpers of society will always be turned into criminals by a One Party State, and with the Polish filmmakers Kieslowski’s film Blanc/White showing an emergence from a gray and dead Communist Poland at the end of the Cold War, with the spirit of Solidarnosc giving light to freedom of the country and the individual.

I found out once studying comparative policy between the EU and Latin America that Milan Kundera was popular as well in the South America. While not under Communism, many countries in Latin America also suffered from military dictatorships well into the late 80s and beyond. Despite there being little in common between Czech and Latin American culture on the surface, the isolation and torment of living under a dictatorship in Latin America in those years can be clearly understood by those living under Communism in places like Prague in 1968, Budapest in 1956, Warsaw and Gdansk in the early 80s and East Berlin in the late 80s.

Lessons from this era of tyranny is not lost in modern times. Some tenants of free thinkers are sacrosanct, and movements like Solidarnosc in Poland has proven that persistent, peaceful and coordinated protest movements can heal a society. Latin American academic Guillermo O’Donnell studied the transition of military dictatorships into democratic nations during his studies, and he showed that there are different aspects of democracies that need to all function in order to produce a healthy and free society. Institutions and grassroots movements need to be married to clear and unwavering property rights and an open society built on free speech. The basic rules of laws should never be suspended, as those with unchecked power will corrupt them without fail. A free media should in a manner be part of the checks and balances on a society, as when a media is controlled or works for the Government, they tend to decay the checks and balances instead of functioning to challenge those in power to ensure a free society.

Democracies work in order to create methods and guarantee rights so that citizens never have to live in silence. If a society is crumbling, a Government will promote individuals operating on a level of subsistence just to maintain their food, shelter and basic needs so opposing views remain powerless. The checks and balances function to relieve pressures in society so that citizens can be confident that a small, elite group cannot choose to extinguish their rights, their property and their lives. Without these values to release pressures and tensions in a democracy, a country will vacillate violently between oligopolies, kleptocracies, military dictatorships, and one party states. Democracy is not just about voting ever few years, its about being able to be a human and have a free voice in a multidimensional and institutionally healthy community.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Student Loan Debt, United States

Biden is forgiving student loans for those who attended certain for-profit Universities. 

In the Biden administration’s latest concerted effort to cancel student loan debt, the Department of Education has announced that it will wipe out $415 million in federal loans owed by nearly 16,000 borrowers who attended certain for-profit schools.

“The Department remains committed to giving borrowers discharges when the evidence shows their college violated the law and standards,” Education Secretary Miguel Cardona said in a statement on Wednesday. “Students count on their colleges to be truthful. Unfortunately, today’s findings show too many instances in which students were misled into loans at institutions or programs that could not deliver what they’d promised,” he continued.

To date, under Cardona, the department has canceled a total of roughly $2 billion in borrower defense claims from more than 107,000 individuals. “When colleges and career schools put their own interests ahead of students, we will not look the other way,” Federal Student Aid Chief Operating Officer Richard Cordray said in a statement.

“We are grateful to have strong enforcement and oversight partners, such as the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general in Colorado, Illinois, and New Mexico. These offices provided key evidence that played a significant role in reaching the findings announced today. Moving forward, we intend to expand our collaboration with federal and state partners to serve students,” he added.

DeVry in Focus

One of those for-profit schools affected by the announcement is DeVry University, which was found to have misled prospective students from 2008 to 2015. The school falsely claimed that 90 percent of its graduates were able to land jobs in their particular fields of study within six months of graduation. However, in reality, the job placement rate was sitting at 58 percent, according to the Education Department.

Donna Shaults, a spokesperson for DeVry University, told CNBC that the school’s board and leadership have changed since the initial allegations. “Nonetheless, we do believe that the Department of Education mischaracterizes DeVry’s calculation and disclosure of graduate outcomes in certain advertising, and we do not agree with the conclusions they have reached,” she said.

Freezing Seizures

In recent weeks, the Education Department has also decided to freeze the seizures of tax refunds, Social Security, and other government payments involving federal student loans that are in default.

The department—in addition to other federal and state agencies—have the authority to collect on delinquent debt via the Treasury Offset Program, which was paused due to the coronavirus pandemic. That policy ends after May 1, but the Education Department will hold off on restarting collection for six months after the moratorium concludes.

“This policy means you won’t lose money from certain government payments, such as the child tax credit, Social Security payments, and tax refunds for the 2022 tax season,” the agency’s website says.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters 

Stephen Silver

Child Tax Credit, United States

Does the expanded child tax credit reduce poverty?

The expanded child tax, which was sent to American families for the last seven months of 2021, was part of the American Rescue Plan Act, a bill signed into law by President Joe Biden in March 2021. The credit, which included direct payments to most American families between July and December, had an immediate effect in reducing childhood poverty and hunger. 

However, the credit expired at the end of last year, and when the Build Back Better spending package failed to pass the Senate, payments were paused indefinitely. But, last week, the White House held a “day of action” to encourage people to claim their benefits, while Senate Democrats continued to advocate for the credit’s revival. Yet, despite such measures, the credit’s future remains unclear.

CNBC looked at how families are being impacted by the loss of payments. 

ParentsTogether Action reported the result of a survey that found 57 percent of respondents said “it has been more difficult to meet their family’s basic needs” since the child tax credit payments stopped. A full 22 percent said they “have been unable to meet their family’s basic needs.” And more than 70 percent said it was “extremely important” for Congress to extend the credit. 

“Thanks to opposition from Senator Joe Manchin and all 50 Republicans, the Senate failed to pass the Build Back Better Act in December, effectively abandoning millions of American parents relying on the expanded Child Tax Credit to survive as the pandemic raged. Parents have used this money to pay for the basic necessities: food, housing, and childcare,” Justin Rubenn, co-director of ParentsTogether Action, said in the announcement. “Now, as the second missed payment approaches, millions of families are on the brink.” 

The Case For the Credit 

Also this week, Gary Cunningham, the CEO of Prosperity Now, penned an op-ed in The Hill,  calling for the expanded child tax credit to be restored because it reduced poverty in 2021. 

“Congress must now decide whether to leave American families and children with a broken promise of increased opportunity for financial well-being and equity or to act immediately by extending the CTC expansion,” Cunningham wrote. “We urge lawmakers to consider the negative impact the absence of the enhancement of this earned benefit would have on low-income and working families across the country and act accordingly.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Misinformation,

Federal stimulus checks were sent out twice in 2020 and again in 2021, as the government sought to deal with the continuing pandemic. However, no further rounds of stimulus checks followed after last spring’s American Rescue Plan Act. Now, a viral Facebook video is claiming another round is coming, but it’s been widely debunked.

Federal stimulus checks were sent out twice in 2020 and again in 2021, as the government sought to deal with the continuing pandemic. However, no further rounds of stimulus checks followed after last spring’s American Rescue Plan Act, and despite petitions from the general public and some support from members of Congress, it’s clear that neither the White House or the leadership in Congress has prioritized any other rounds of checks. 

Now, a viral Facebook video is claiming another round is coming, but it’s been widely and accurately debunked. One version of the video, from a Facebook account called Care First Homes, features an extremely crude video of President Joe Biden giving a speech over footage of him signing a bill. In a voice that sounds like that of an unskilled impersonator, Biden states that “some people in the country will start seeing those direct deposits in their bank accounts this weekend, and payments to eligible Americans will continue throughout the course of the next several weeks.” The words in the video don’t particularly match the way Biden’s lips are moving.

Alas, the video has been debunked, by Politifact, among other fact-checking outlets. “Americans expecting any such payment will be left disappointed, because the video is a fake and didn’t appear on any recent newscast,” Politifact said. The site also found that the video used in the Facebook post comes from a speech Biden delivered last November in Glasgow, Scotland, although it was about climate change, not stimulus checks. The clip of Biden signing something is from an executive order he signed in released to the chip shortage last February. 

It’s also clear from watching the videos that Biden is wearing neither the same color suit, nor the same tie. Politifact also found that the words attributed in the video to Biden were actually said by White House press secretary Jen Psaki in March 2021 after the passage of the American Rescue Plan Act.

Did Stimulus Lead to a Rise in Opioid Deaths? 

This week, Ohio’s attorney general, Dave Yost, touted a study finding a link between stimulus checks and opioid deaths. The peer-reviewed study will be published in the International Journal of Drug Policy in April. “Nobody knew that this correlation would exist. We know now. So as we think about emergency responses, it's important for us to ask how we design these programs, for example, what if it was spread out over time?” Yost said. That same attorney general, last spring, had sued the Biden Administration over the “tax mandate” in the American Rescue Plan Act. One local reporter, however, noted that the study’s conclusions are “much less definitive.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters 

Stephen Silver

Alabama CTC, United States

The bills, which would save families a total of $87 million, is now moving to the desk of Gov. Kay Ivey after passing nearly unanimously.

The expanded child tax credit, which expired at the end of 2021, was not renewed after the Build Back Better package supported by the Democrats failed to pass the Senate, thanks to opposition from Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) along with all fifty Senate Republicans.

Now, however, one state is moving towards passing a child tax credit of its own—and it's one of the reddest states in the country. 

According to WSFA, both houses of the state legislature in Alabama have passed what’s been described as “a tax break for families who received the federal child tax credit.” The bills, which would save families a total of $87 million, is now moving to the desk of Gov. Kay Ivey after passing nearly unanimously. 

“If you have two children, this is probably right around $200 that they will not pay,” Sen. Dan Roberts, sponsor of SB152 in the Senate, told WSFA. “They’ll get a tax credit on it and save them $200 in taxes.”

“One of the problems was that people were working, and their children were not in school. So they had to pay extra money to help somebody take care of their children while at work,” Rep. Jim Carns, the House sponsor, told the news outlet. 

According to AL.com, which cited the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), when the expanded child credit was passed at the federal level, 91 percent of Alabamians spent the money on “basic things such as food, clothing, rent, mortgage and utilities.” That percentage for most states was in the 1980s or 1990s, although in some parts of the country it was in the 1970s. 

“Extending the expanded credit and making the Child Tax Credit fully available on a permanent basis to families with low incomes would improve children’s lives in the near and long term and benefit society overall in important ways,” the CBPP report said. “Additional income is linked to better outcomes for children in families with low income, including better educational performance and attainment, higher earnings in adulthood, and better health, which can yield benefits for children and their communities over the course of their lives, studies show.”

Indeed, a report this week by the Center on Poverty & Social Policy at Columbia University found that while the enactment of the expanded child tax credit successfully reduced child poverty last year, the credit’s expiration caused it to rise again. 

“The monthly child poverty rate increased from 12.1 percent in December 2021 to 17 percent in January 2022, the highest rate since the end of 2020,” the Center’s report said, adding that the expiration put 3.7 million more children in poverty. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters
 

Ethen Kim Lieser

Inflation, United States

St. Louis Federal Reserve president James Bullard warned Thursday that without central bank action on interest rates, inflation could become an even more serious issue going forward.

Much to the dismay of already cash-strapped, pandemic-weary Americans, it was recently reported that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) surged 7.5 percent in January year-over-year—the fastest rate witnessed since way back in February 1982.

Then, not to be outdone, the Producer Price Index (PPI)—which tracks average price changes the country’s producers get paid for their goods and services over time—steadily climbed higher 9.7 percent over the same period.

Even with such data points in hand, though, there still appears to be disagreements over what exactly is driving these inflationary pressures. Is it the American Rescue Plan that approved another round of stimulus checks and the enhanced child tax credit? Or perhaps higher consumer demand amid the ongoing supply chain crisis?

"There’s a confluence of factors—it’s both,” David Wessel, the director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution, recently told NBC News.

"There’s a lot of things that pushed up demand and a lot that’s kept supply from responding accordingly, as a result we have inflation,” he continued.

Too Much Stimulus?

Wessel also noted that there is likely a link between surging demand and roughly $5 trillion worth of stimulus packages approved during the Trump and the Biden administrations.

Dean Baker, the co-founder of Center for Economic and Policy Research, said that the stimulus was necessary for the pandemic-hit economy, but it also propelled Americans to buy more products rather than services just as the supply chain was showing signs of fractures.

"I see it as secondary, but there’s no doubt it was a factor in driving inflation,” he told NBC.

Action Needed Now

Regardless of what’s exactly causing the higher prices, St. Louis Federal Reserve president James Bullard warned Thursday that without central bank action on interest rates, inflation could become an even more serious issue going forward.

"We’re at more risk now than we’ve been in a generation that this could get out of control,” he said during a panel talk at Columbia University, per CNBC.

"One scenario would be … a new surprise that hits us that we can’t anticipate right now, but we would have even more inflation. That’s the kind of situation that we want to … make sure it doesn’t occur,” he continued, adding that “there’s been too much emphasis and too much mindshare devoted to the idea that inflation will dissipate at some point in the future.”

Legendary investor Charlie Munger also recently weighed in on the high stakes that are at play amid the current high-inflationary environment.

"Inflation is a very serious subject, you could argue it is the way democracies die,” the ninety-eight-year-old vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway told Yahoo Finance on Wednesday.

He also noted that it was only after years of inflation when “eventually the whole damn Roman Empire collapsed, so [the current situation] is the biggest long-range danger we have, apart from nuclear war.”

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

 

 

Trevor Filseth

U.K. Visa Program, Europe

Russian influence looms large in the decision by the U.K. government to cancel its visa program that gives a direct pathway to legal residence within the country to foreign investors

The British government indicated on Thursday that it would end its “golden visa” program, which gives a direct pathway to legal residence within the United Kingdom to foreign investors, over concerns that the system was being taken advantage of by figures with connections to corruption and organized crime.

The Home Office made the announcement, claiming that the system had allowed for “corrupt elites to access the UK.” It added that the visas had, in some cases, led to security concerns, “including people acquiring their wealth illegitimately and being associated with wider corruption,” and indicated that the system was being shut down immediately and would not accept any further applicants.

Although the announcement did not single out any country for accusations of corruption, the decision is widely perceived to be aimed at Russia. Thousands of wealthy Russian emigres with connections to the country’s state-owned oil and gas companies live in London; many of them have ties to President Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, although some are political exiles opposed to the Kremlin.

The “golden visa” system, which was introduced in 2008, offered permanent residency to an investor and his or her family if he or she invested 2 million pounds, or $2.7 million, in the UK. Prior to the program’s shutdown, concerns had been raised that it made it easier for foreign investors to launder money, and Home Secretary Priti Patel framed the program as part of a broader crackdown on illicit finance, rather than as a political tool against Russia as part of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian crisis.

“I want to ensure the British people have confidence in the system, including stopping corrupt elites who threaten our national security and push dirty money around our cities,” Patel said, adding that the country’s immigration system would be reformed to prevent national security concerns but would maintain incentives for investment.

As Russian troops have built up along its border with Ukraine, fears of an invasion have led many European countries, including the UK, to craft sanctions policies for use against the Kremlin if Russia intervenes in Ukraine. To a large extent, prior sanctions policies have focused on blocking Russian oligarchs’ financial access to Europe rather than attempting to disrupt the livelihoods of ordinary Russian citizens.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson said on Thursday that the British government had decided to implement a variety of “tough sanctions against the Russian regime, against big Russian companies – organizations of strategic importance.”

“Also [by] making sure that we stop the raising of funds by Russian companies on London financial markets,” the prime minister added.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Prashanth Parameswaran

Pivot to Asia, Indo-Pacific

The weight of the U.S. commitment challenge now rests with the Biden administration as it embarks on implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia.

The Biden administration’s newly released Indo-Pacific strategy, which builds on the Trump administration’s work on the concept, directs the United States to strengthen its commitment to the Indo-Pacific and “firmly anchor” itself across the region. As Washington looks to do so in Southeast Asia, it should pay particular attention to sustaining its engagement, especially given its historical involvement in the region.

As I argue in my new book, Elusive Balances: Shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia Strategy, applying a “balance of commitment” approach to understanding U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia suggests that U.S. policymakers have found it challenging to calibrate between shifts in power, threats, and resources to increase American commitment in a sustained, calibrated way that reflects Southeast Asia’s growing importance over the past half-century. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, terrorism consumed the George W. Bush administration’s Southeast Asia approach. Subsequently, Barack Obama’s desire to broaden Washington’s focus led U.S. policy to fall short on resourcing in some areas.

The weight of the U.S. commitment challenge now rests with the Biden administration as it embarks on implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. While the combination of a tougher domestic consensus on China, deepening polarization, an ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, and a string of other foreign policy issues, including Russia’s military maneuvers in Ukraine, is no doubt a contested context, there are steps that the Biden team can take to better manage this challenge across the economic, diplomatic, and security realms.

First, the Biden administration must find sustainable ways to enter into economic commitments with key Southeast Asian states. Historically, this has proven difficult with respect to trade pacts across multiple administrations, be it Bush’s bilateral approach that faltered with countries like Malaysia and Thailand, or the multilateral approach with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with four Southeast Asian countries—Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam—that failed to gain approval domestically.

The Biden administration’s recently-proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) offers a starting point for cooperation, particularly in realms like the digital economy where agreements are proliferating and there is an opportunity for a broader regional pact. Even if such sectoral agreements may not require congressional approval under the lapsed trade promotion authority, legislative involvement will be key to reassure partners that the rules and principles being negotiated are binding and durable.

Second, the Biden team should look at creative ways to find a more dispersed approach with respect to U.S. security personnel and equipment in Southeast Asia that extends beyond current locations, as it has begun to do with its Global Posture Review released last November. Sustainable progress in this area has proven challenging to date in spite of the acknowledgement by both Democratic and Republican administrations following the Cold War that a diversified presence will help insulate Washington from political changes in Thailand or the Philippines, as we saw with the closure of U.S. bases in Subic and Clark.

To be sure, basing-like arrangements per se may not gain much traction in parts of Southeast Asia. Yet looser agreements or less ambitious starting points, such as the prepositioning of certain U.S. equipment ahead of natural disasters, port visits for U.S. vessels, or even stopover points for multilateral, U.S.-led exercises covering areas like military medicine, would at least begin normalizing the notion of a more distributed U.S. security presence in Southeast Asia across a larger group of countries. To manage sensitivities, this could even leverage existing work by Southeast Asian countries and U.S. allies and partners in certain spaces within the region, be it the Mekong subregion or the Sulu Sea. 

Third, the Biden team should elevate and expand institutionalized diplomatic dialogues with Southeast Asian countries to ensure that their strategic importance in U.S. policymaking endures despite ebbs, flows, and imbalances across administrations. While the administration’s flood of cabinet-level officials to Southeast Asia during its first year of office is no doubt impressive, institutionalizing engagements would at the very least help limit the fallout on relationships if countries see reduced interest under future administrations. This is certainly possible given the reality that these ties often do not receive the same prioritization of key countries in other subregions, be it South Korea or India.

A major priority in this regard is the U.S.-Indonesia strategic partnership, which was initially started under President Barack Obama has since been relaunched under President Joe Biden. In addition to Indonesia’s traditional leadership role within Southeast Asia, Jakarta is also undergoing a period where foreign policy will be an elevated priority by circumstance, with Indonesia hosting the G-20 in 2022 and then the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2023, while also occupying the position of U.S.-ASEAN dialogue partner coordinator out to 2024.

The United States should also pay attention to smaller countries in Southeast Asia that have outsized importance. For example, Laos is at the forefront of U.S.-China competition in Southeast Asia but typically finds it more difficult to attract sustained attention from U.S. policymakers. Looking further out, gains in U.S.-Laos ties, if sustained in the next one to two years, could pave the way for an elevation of the U.S.-Laos comprehensive partnership when Laos inherits the ASEAN chairmanship in 2024, which could see Biden himself visit Laos for the round of Asian summitry to be held there.

Of course, building a sustained U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia is not without its challenges. The Biden administration will need to juggle the twin realities that the United States is a domestically-consumed global power and also one that is looking to be more involved in the Indo-Pacific more generally. Engaging some Southeast Asian states could also prove challenging, either due to their own domestic circumstances or their wariness about being dragged into the throes of intensifying U.S.-China competition.

Nonetheless, the momentum generated by the Biden administration in Southeast Asia during its first year, coupled with the clear approach set out in the Indo-Pacific strategy, offers a firm foundation to build a sustainable regional policy. An easing of the Covid-19 pandemic could also pave the way for more face-to-face interactions beyond existing plans for the first-ever U.S.-ASEAN Summit to be held in Washington, DC.

In a letter to the Heritage Foundation in 1986, Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew remarked that “Southeast Asians are more accurately aware of the uncertainties of U.S. policies than other regions of the world.” While that comment was far from surprising given the history of U.S. commitment to the region, one hopes that the Biden administration and others after it will be able to add at least a bit more certainty for Southeast Asian policymakers in the years to come.

Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran is a Fellow at the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars based in Washington, DC. His new book is Elusive Balances: Shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia Strategy.

Image: U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris attends a roundtable at Gardens by the Bay in Singapore before departing for Vietnam on the second leg of her Asia trip, August, 24, 2021. Reuters.

Jeffrey Jeb Nadaner, Alexander B. Gray

Supply Chains, United States

It does America little good to win the innovation battle for the state-of-the-art if our military, ground transportation, and infrastructure grind to a halt for lack of the common essentials, including a reliable supply of semiconductors.

A recent Commerce Department survey found that U.S. manufacturers had only five days’ worth of the semiconductors needed to sustain production lines (compared to a roughly forty days-supply just three years ago). In 2021, many U.S. auto assembly lines nearly shut down from a global supply crunch on the semiconductors now ubiquitous in modern cars and much else in American life. All this following nearly two years of Covid-19-exacerbated shortages—first, medical equipment, then computer chips, and, more recently, consumer goods of all types.

Towards the end of last year, the Biden administration tapped the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in response to rising gas prices. Whatever the merits of that decision, the existence of the stockpile provides a measure of both market and geopolitical stability. The federal government also maintains, with decidedly mixed success, stockpiles for personal protective equipment (created after 9/11 and nearly empty when Covid-19 began), critical minerals, and even helium. Nonetheless, given the dependencies revealed and accentuated by the pandemic, it is past time to consider expanding the scope of products and materials kept under strategic reserve—starting with semiconductors.

Until recently, the merits of stockpiling any manufactured product were a largely academic discussion. Global supply chains generally delivered on time and at an agreeable cost. Commercial businesses were geared to avoid excess at all costs. Popular management techniques called for ruthless efficiency, or “just in time” delivery, leaving the private sector—and the country—vulnerable to even short interruptions.

But times are changing rapidly, both geopolitically and economically. Should escalating tensions with China lead to a rapid decrease in semiconductor imports, America’s critical infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and even the basic capacity of the U.S. military to operate effectively would be dangerously degraded.

Recognizing these vulnerabilities, the U.S. Congress has recently considered legislation—including the CHIPS Act passing the Senate and the America Competes Act just introduced in the House—that will invest tens of billions of dollars to support U.S. semiconductor research, development, and production. These are important steps but will take multiple years and yet more investment to establish new production and supply systems (a new chip foundry is a multi-billion-dollar capital investment, in addition to the maze of regulations and other costs associated with any new industrial project in the United States.)

In the meantime, a dangerously high percentage of microelectronics products consumed in the United States are produced either in China (packaging and lower-end chips) or Taiwan and South Korea (more advanced semiconductors), which are potentially subject to Chinese coercion and blockade. The vulnerabilities apply not just to the advanced semiconductors found in nearly every new commercial and military system, but lower-value components like the surrounding packaging (98 percent of which is produced in Asia).

There is a basic supply and demand disconnect that cannot be addressed through the usual market forces and government incentives. We are confronted with a significant microelectronics problem in the present day. This cannot wait to be solved in the indefinite future.

To ensure an adequate supply of semiconductors of all types—from obsolete to legacy to leading edge—in the near term requires a strategic stockpile for microelectronics. It would, among other purposes, add an element of uncertainty and even deterrence to Chinese strategic calculations. The Chinese government can exert significant leverage over the United States by forcing a slow-down or outright halt to semiconductors imported from Asia. The known presence of significant domestic reserves would complicate those plans.

A concerted U.S. government effort would—via bulk purchases, tax incentives, or other policies—acquire and set aside up to a month’s worth of the most commonly used microelectronics items from existing sources. The priority would go towards products not being generated in large quantities already by commercial markets. Unlike the Defense Department’s other reserves, the semiconductor stockpile should be available to alleviate supply shocks impacting civil and commercial sectors. Additionally, microelectronics supply levels should be maintained irrespective of market or budget considerations—meaning it cannot be a profit center for the government.

While there is understandable hesitation to “militarize” such tasks, the Defense Department is a natural home for such a stockpile. The Pentagon’s stewardship of the National Defense Stockpile of critical minerals and metals has left much to be desired, as documented by the Biden administration’s supply chain report last year. Still, there is no denying the U.S. military’s proficiency at large-scale logistics, especially compared to the rest of the federal government. For example, it was the Pentagon that stepped in to ensure sufficient supplies of ventilators and other life-saving equipment at the onset of Covid-19 and led the effort to develop a vaccine for the virus.

Ultimately, it does America little good to win the innovation battle for the state-of-the-art if our military, ground transportation, and infrastructure grind to a halt for lack of the common essentials, including a reliable supply of semiconductors. Congress and the administration have a viable model upon which to base the solution.

Jeffrey Jeb Nadaner is Executive Director of SAFE Commanding Heights a bipartisan initiative to secure critical industrial supply chains, and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy.

Alexander B. Gray is a former Chief of Staff of the National Security Council and a Senior Fellow with SAFE Commanding Heights.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Huessy

Arms Control, Eurasia

Unless China can be persuaded to change its attitude toward transparency in its nuclear forces and deterrent policies, and that Russia and China both agree to seriously put all strategic and regional nuclear forces on the table for verifiable limits, arms control may go away as a major construct of U.S. deterrent policy.

Nuclear arms control has been a fact of U.S. strategic deterrent efforts since at least 1972 when the Nixon administration and Congress ratified the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the SALT I or Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement with the USSR. While the Johnson administration had started arms negotiation with the Soviet Union, the Glassboro Summit Conference did not produce an agreement.

The new impetus for the agreement came from the Soviet side, which in turn had been spurred by the Johnson administration’s push in 1967 for a limited or “thin” missile defense shield aimed at deflecting China’s new nuclear forces.

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev called President-elect Richard Nixon and pushed for immediate discussions to ban all missile defenses. The Soviets were convinced that the “thin” missile defense was simply a clever means of masking America’s real intention: to build defenses against Soviet nuclear forces.

Nixon responded positively to Brezhnev’s outreach but offered a twist. He proposed the two countries negotiate an agreement on offensive nuclear forces as well, which the Soviets eventually accepted as they had been trailing the US in the scope of their nuclear forces.

The resulting ban on continental U.S. missile defenses (except for an allowed nominal deployment of 100 interceptors) and the SALT I Treaty started more than fifty years of arms control that has become an inextricable part of U.S. strategic deterrence.

While SALT was described as arms control, the treaty did allow a huge increase in deployed, in the field strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons, from roughly the 2,000 deployed at the time to around 10,000-12,000. What was limited were the total number of what were termed SNDVs, or strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which included ballistic missiles at sea, on land, and on strategic nuclear bombers. At the time, the United States was just beginning to add multiple warheads to its arsenal of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and Poseidon sea-launched missiles, which at the time both had only a single warhead each.

While the Poseidon had roughly the same range of the Polaris, it could carry upwards of fourteen warheads on each of the sixteen missiles on thirty-one submarines, with double the accuracy, giving the U.S. a hypothetical nuclear deterrent force of nearly 7,000 warheads, with somewhere around at least one-third on patrol at any time.

At the same time, 500 Minuteman III missiles were deployed between 1970 and 1975, with three rather than one warhead each, with improved accuracy and range. 450 Minuteman II missiles would remain in the force, having been first deployed in 1966. They were later taken off alert and removed from their silos in 1991 by then-President George H.W. Bush with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

Throughout the 1970s, U.S. total deployed warheads did markedly increase, but efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, including the MX missile, the Ohio-class submarine, the C-4 sea-launched ballistic missile, and the new B-1 and B-2 bombers and air-launched cruise missile, suffered from major funding delays and lack of support. The post-Vietnam era along with détente and peaceful coexistence narratives of U.S. foreign policy markedly reduced support for U.S. military spending, including nuclear modernization.

Like Sputnik in 1957, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stopped the downward spiral in U.S. defense spending. President Jimmy Carter proposed a defense increase of 6 percent in 1980 but it would not be until November 1981 that the United States announced a comprehensive nuclear modernization and arms control proposal designed to counter the worsening correlation of forces which the Soviets believed favored Moscow.

For example, the SALT II Treaty of 1979, pulled from Senate consideration by the Carter administration when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, allowed for a continued buildup in Soviet forces, even as SALT II supporters urged the United States to abide by its terms.

During much of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan warned about the growing imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union when he spoke about Moscow’s growing military power, a key concern of the 1976 recreated Committee on the Present Danger.

But Reagan was not just pushing for more offense. He also supported two elements of a deterrent strategy that were new. He first supported missile defenses and saw defenses not as a substitute for deterrence—a criticism his opponents got wrong—but as a bulwark adding to deterrence, as well as major reductions in nuclear weapons, as opposed to the joint agreed to build up characterized by the SALT process.

In addition, Reagan was very cognizant by the 1980 presidential campaign that the Soviets were not abiding by their treaty commitments. Thus, Reagan would eventually adopt the phrase, “Trust but verify.”

By the late 1980s, the Soviets were deploying over 10,000 long-range or strategic nuclear weapons. While the Soviets relied on multiple-warhead land-based missiles that were on nearly full alert, the United States relied primarily on sea-based systems, where roughly one-third were always in port, while another one-third were in transit and the final third on patrol.

So, while the SALT process allowed each nation to have an equal number of deployed countable warheads, on a day-to-day basis the Soviets had more fast flying missiles “ready to go” than the United States. This “window of vulnerability” was characterized by critics of détente and peaceful coexistence as a danger to U.S. security that could not be altered if not taken seriously.

There was also the added danger of the huge Soviet throw-weight advantage or ability to add thousands more missile warheads to its SALT accountable force that contributed to the strategic imbalance.  

But with a new peace through strength strategy, three new arms deals were completed in 1987, 1991, and 1993, with Presidents Reagan and Bush markedly reducing Soviet and then Russian deployed nuclear forces. Gone was the entirety of the Soviet-era SS-20 INF range missiles. Under START I and II, deployed Russian and U.S. strategic warheads were projected to drop nearly 90 percent.

With the Moscow Treaty signed in 2002 and the New START Treaty ratified in 2010 and extended in 2021, it is often assumed the reduction to a nominal 1,550 deployed, accountable long-range nuclear warheads can simply be extended even lower towards the global zero level supported by the disarmament community and its political supporters.

Well, not so fast.

All arms control deals are not equal. The SALT process produced a massive buildup, while the initial START process produced reductions through unique, highly verifiable accounting rules. However, the current New START process assumes Russian compliance with treaty requirements that cannot be fully verified.

In addition, even though the START SNDV force the Russians maintain is assumed to be no more than slightly above 500 missiles and bombers, a great number of long-range or strategic Russian nuclear forces may not be contained within the New START framework, to say nothing of the Russian stockpile of 2,000-4,000 tactical nuclear weapons that are not counted under any arms control agreement.

Added to this imbalance is that Russia can upload many of its land-based missiles, to where additional thousands of warheads could be added to its strategic arsenal if Moscow breaks out from the current treaty limits.

But the dangers do not stop there. While the New START Treaty nominally limits Russian warheads to 1,550, with the allowed Russian bombers counting only as sixty warheads, (the same counting rules that also apply to the United States), China’s growing nuclear arsenal is not contained in any manner—by New START or any other agreement.

Although one could argue that China, as an exclusive member of the UN Security Council and signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is obligated by international law to engage in reasonable efforts to “end the arms race” and limit “nuclear proliferation,” Beijing has done none of these things.

In fact, China’s entire nuclear arsenal remains hidden from view, although minimal assessments see it growing to at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, a more than 300 percent growth from its current force level, which the head of United States Strategic Command recently described as “breathtaking.”

And as U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Fred Stoss told the Fourteenth Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit on February 7, 2022, China has constructed three new ICBM missile fields with at least 120 silos in each field, reportedly capable of holding DF-41 missiles with ten warheads each.

In addition, as former U.S. Air Force secretary Thomas Reed has detailed, has been the world’s biggest nuclear weapons technology proliferator, including to countries such as North Kora, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. Hardly a major power guilty of nothing but a “peaceful rise.”

Thus, the United States faces some serious challenges. Not only is it facing two conventionally armed peer adversaries in Russia and China, both are nuclear-armed, a marked change from the Cold War where Washington faced one conventionally armed peer force that was also heavily armed with nuclear weapons.

As top nuclear analysts like Hal Brands and Rob Soofer and Matt Costlow have recently outlined, when the New START Treaty and companion U.S. deterrent strategy were adopted in 2010 (as reflected in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review), it was assumed that the United States would only be facing one power with significant numbers of nuclear forces (Russia), and even then the narrative was that a more relaxed relationship with Russia—a “reset”—was in the offing.

Fast forward a decade: relations with Russia are now significantly more hostile. Major elements of Russia’s nuclear arsenal are completely modernized (over 88 percent according to Putin), while the entirety of China’s nuclear forces remains beyond any limits.

Thus, the United States is facing at least a two-to-one imbalance in strategic nuclear forces, and a ten or twenty-to-one imbalance in theater nuclear systems, while having to undertake deterrent policies both protecting the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies.  

The implications for nuclear deterrence and arms control could thus not be starker. Contrary to the assumption that arms control could continue a somewhat automatic slide of reductions toward zero, the United States is facing the prospects—for the first time in multiple decades—that projected modern force levels of twelve Columbia-class submarines, 400 Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ICBMs, and some sixty bombers will not provide an adequate future deterrent.

What then should we make of Congress’ assumption that nuclear modernization and arms control are two sides of the same nuclear deterrent coin, that one must go with the other? Unless China can be persuaded to change its attitude toward transparency in its nuclear forces and deterrent policies, and that Russia and China both agree to seriously put all strategic and regional nuclear forces on the table for verifiable limits, the United States is now entering an era where nuclear modernization is a task bigger than what it had previously planned, and arms control may go away as a major construct of U.S. deterrent policy.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and President of GeoStrategic Analysis. These views are his own.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Admiral Nakhimov, Europe

Even with this news, it could be well into next year before Admiral Nakhimov is back in service with the Russian Navy.

Last April, the Russian Navy announced that the refit and upgrades to the Project 11442M heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov were running behind schedule, and that the handover of the warship to the fleet would be delayed. While it was reported that the delays could stretch into 2023, it was announced on Thursday that the work had progressed and the ship is being prepared for handover.

"The Sevmash Shipyard has begun setting up and training the delivery team for the Project 11442M ship. The crew will comprise workers, builders, adjustment and test engineers, designers, technologists and specialists of other professions. Overall, the delivery team will comprise over 1,000 people," the press office of the Sevmash Shipyard said in a statement to TASS.

Even with this news, it could be well into next year before Admiral Nakhimov is back in service with the Russian Navy. The press office stated that after all the work on the missile cruiser is concluded, the warship will deploy to the sea where the delivery team and the crew will check the vessel prior to deployment.

Significant Upgrades

The Sevmash Shipyard has been modernizing and upgrading the Project 11442M cruiser since 2013, while the ship first entered the facilities nearly twenty-five years ago. By the time the cruiser returns to service, she will have spent more time undergoing repairs than the time it took on her initial construction and service with the Russian Navy combined.

In fact, the refit has been nearly a full rebuild of the ship. According to reports, large-scale internal work has been conducted, while specialists have been mounting equipment, systems and assemblies, painting and insulating the vessel. The press office also stated that specialists will load onto the cruiser and install over 5,000 items of equipment and more than a million of various items, and about 200 km of pipelines and 1,800 km of cables will be laid on the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet's future flagship. All of the electric installation work has been carried out by specialists of the Arktika enterprise.

The project designer, the Severnoye Design Bureau, created a 3D model of the warship that is being used in the upgrade and refit.

The Kirov-class heavy cruiser joined the Soviet Navy as the Kalinin in 1988. She was renamed in 1992 in honor of Pavel Nakhimov, the admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy who commanded the naval and land forces during the Siege of Sevastopol during the 1850s Crimean War.

Her actual service with the Russian Navy was short-lived. By the end of the Cold War, Admiral Nakhimov had rarely been deployed. She entered the Sevmash shipyard in 1997, and since 1999 has been permanently docked while waiting for the refit to be completed.

However, despite the time-consuming efforts, Moscow has repeatedly touted the capabilities Admiral Nakhimov will have after the upgrades are complete. The heavy cruiser will reportedly carry ten versatile shipborne launchers for eight Kalibr-NK or Oniks cruise missiles, and eventually will be armed with Tsirkon hypersonic missiles.

Of course, the ship has to actually be completed, and despite Russia's claims, it could be years before this warship heads out to sea again.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Wikipedia.

Kris Osborn

Russia-Ukraine Crisis, Russia

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he can’t speak “to the strength of (the Russia-China) alliance,” but said China's tacit approval of Russia's actions raises important questions.

While the world is focused on a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Pentagon is keeping a close eye on China as well. 

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he is concerned about what he called China’s support of Vladimir Putin’s recent actions. 

“We did note, with alarm, China's tactic approval of Putin’s activities here in the region,” Austin said during a press conference in Brussels on Thursday. 

Austin said he can’t speak “to the strength of (the Russia-China) alliance,” but said recent events raise important questions. He said the United States will continue to monitor the relationship between Russia and China moving forward.

The Russian and Chinese militaries have held meetings and joint exercises, but the interests of the two countries do not fully align. China’s primary interest, at least at the moment, looks eastward off its shores toward Taiwan. Russia’s near-term focus appears to face westward toward Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Russia and China share a long border region, but China places greater attention on its shared border with India.

However, China and Russia remain authoritarian regimes with shared hostility towards the United States and ambitions to expand outward. China may agree to stay silent, neutral, or even supportive of a Russian attack on Ukraine, if Russia agreed to endorse or offer approval to a Chinese annexation of Taiwan.

There are relatively few areas where Russian and Chinese interests might collide. Russia is unlikely to challenge the United States and China in the Pacific, given its smaller navy. Both countries, however, likely share a desire to expand influence and strategic advantages on the African continent and in Middle East.

There are certainly many unknowns, yet it is apparent that neither Russia nor China publicly airs out tension or disagreement with the other. By contrast, the two are publically demonstrating some measure of cooperation. However, it would be surprising if this cooperation would in any way lead China to any kind of military intervention in support of Russia in a conflict.

Kris Osborn is the Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters.