Diplomacy & Crisis News

Space capabilities are a vital aspect of modern security and defense architecture, but their deployment presents increasing challenges. The use of satellites for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, navigation, and communication has turned outer space into one of the most congested, contested, and consequential domains for military operations while simultaneously raising the likelihood of escalating tensions between space-faring nations.

In response to the rapid technological advancement and the proliferation of actors and interests in space, in 2019 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) promulgated space—along with air, land, maritime, and cyberspace—as its fifth domain of operations and warfare. The coverage of NATO’s relatively new space policy has been scarce, yet it offers an intriguing approach to the alliance’s evolving thinking on extraterrestrial security and collective defense while soberly assessing the alliance’s informational and technical gaps.

Many of NATO’s systems, such as the Ballistic Missile Defence program, the Airborne Warning and Control Systems, and the Ground Surveillance System, depend heavily on space-based assets which provide essential positioning and navigation information to allied states and enable precision strikes, combat, search and rescue mission support, missile launch attribution, environmental monitoring, surveillance, reconnaissance, and battlefield targeting data.

The alliance recognized that it must anticipate and identify threats, share intelligence, and coordinate policies and activities in the face of the growing militarization of outer space to minimize its vulnerabilities, maintain a competitive edge, and ensure optimal exploitation of its space assets vis-à-vis China and Russia. For this purpose, NATO’s defense ministers approved the creation of the Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, in 2020 and NATO’s Space Centre of Excellence in Toulouse, France, in 2021. The multinational teams from Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States currently manning the effort are to work with the allies’ national space agencies and organizations and the NATO Command Structure to detect missile launches; provide operational support; and ensure effective command, control, and decisionmaking capabilities.

NATO’s space policy promises to remain in line with existing international law while executing its defense and deterrence commitments outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO’s foray into space, however, raises the question of the applicability of treaty obligations in case of attacks to, from, or within space. The continued weaponization of space is beginning to generate considerable geopolitical tensions. Kinetic counter-space weapons, non-kinetic lasers, microwave weapons, electronic jamming or spoofing of signals or data transmission systems, and deployment of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons can significantly disrupt NATO operations and adversely affect civilian and commercial space architecture essential to the uninterrupted continuation of economic activity on Earth. In its June 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué, the heads of state and government of the thirty NATO allies recognized that the impact of such attacks “could threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack.” Yet they also emphasized that the decision to invoke Article V of NATO’s founding treaty would be taken on a case-by-case basis.

Whilst the communiqué itself is by design thin on conveying details about the legal regime which ought to apply to outer space attacks, it is nonetheless warranted to further inquire about the legal controversies which might arise from intentional and non-intentional acts of sabotage of discrete space assets. In case of an attack on a NATO member state’s vital satellite infrastructure, what ought to constitute a proportional response? Is it appropriate to extend the law of armed conflict to outer space conflicts? And finally, what are the international legal limits on the means and methods of waging war in space? To do due diligence on these and similar questions would require a considerable rethinking and expansion of the remit of existing institutional mechanisms for the adjudication of legal disputes between state and non-state actors and imposition of treaty commitments on states actively engaged in the space arms race. 

The alliance is mindful of the intensifying “scramble for space” among state and private actors and the potential for instability when military and civilian objectives intermingle or conflict. One of NATO’s key objectives is to enhance its space situational awareness and strategic communication capabilities. This includes monitoring the space environment and detecting, tracking, and identifying human-made objects in space. The alliance is working to improve its space surveillance capabilities by developing new technologies and resilient infrastructures that can enhance its ability to better monitor objects and events in space and enhance its orientation, response, and deterrence activities. To prevent a space arms race, the alliance must also assuage the fears of non-aligned members, whose perception of NATO’s investment in five core areas of its outer space strategy—namely (i) deterrence, defense, resilience; (ii) capability development and interoperability; (iii) training and exercises; (iv) science, technology, and innovation; and (v) industry partnerships—might be construed as having a dual-use application with offensive capabilities.

The proliferation of state and private actors and interests in space increases the risk of conflict in a rapidly evolving strategic frontier where jurisdictional claims and rights of ownership are explicitly prohibited by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The global community is threatened by inevitable regulatory fragmentation as distinct regimes attempt to define normative guardrails and vie for legal supremacy. 

NATO’s space policy is an essential first step in situating the alliance at the forefront of modern security and defense norm-setting and decisionmaking regarding the sustainable, secure, and stable use of outer space while mitigating the risks of conflict. By anticipating and mitigating critical security risks and working closely with its member states and international partners, the alliance can facilitate international consensus on a joint approach to the inevitable militarization of space and contribute to the creation of space standards that would benefit the security interests of all space-faring nations. 

Dr. Joanna Rozpedowski is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government. Twitter @JKRozpedowski

Image: Shutterstock.

The Chinese surveillance balloon shot down by the U.S. Air Force on February 4 traveled over a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) base and one bomber base, collecting information about U.S. nuclear facilities. Some commentary states that the United States took countermeasures to prevent the transmission of data back to China, meaning that the violation of U.S. airspace and sovereignty was “not a major breach” of U.S. security. Yet others, including Senators Steve Daines and John Tester and Representative Matt Rosendale, believe the Chinese balloon incursion was a serious problem and need to be prevented in the future. 

What information China was able to gather with a balloon that it could not obtain through satellite surveillance is unclear, but other important questions need to be answered. What is the Chinese purpose in the strategic realm? What does this mean for China’s modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal?

The collection of weather information about a U.S. Minuteman III missile field would tell the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) how its warheads might fare in seeking to destroy U.S. missiles, a point made by a very detailed assessment in 1984. 

An additional study eleven years ago discovered the Chinese build of tunnel-based mobile railroad launchers for their land-based ICBMs. The range of the DF-31 ICBM is estimated at 7,000-11,000 kilometers, meaning it can hit anywhere in the United States, including Malmstrom, F.E. Warren, and Minot Air Force Bases. 400 American ICBM missiles are deployed at these three American missile bases, and China’s nuclear buildup is allowing Beijing to hold the entire U.S. ICBM force at risk.

Especially with China’s construction of 360 additional ICBM launchers or silos in western China, the CCP’s objective is becoming clearer. These silos can contain DF-41 ICBMs that carry up to ten warheads each, with a 12,000-kilometer range. Despite doubts to the contrary, China’s expanded fissile material production capabilities are now confirmed by U.S. intelligence assessments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) can turn out nuclear warheads like sausages, building up to at least 1,500 warheads by 2030-35, according to recent U.S. intelligence reports. This “breathtaking” buildup, as described by the recently retired commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, is dramatically changing the security environment that the United States is operating in.

Indeed, on February 7, U.S. Strategic Command notified the U.S. Congress, as required by law, that China now has more ICBM launchers than the United States. This should concern Americans, especially given rising U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan and Beijing’s acknowledgement that its “no first use” policy does not apply to the island. Look no further than the statement from Chinese state media that threatened to use nuclear weapons against Japan, and “again demand their unconditional surrender” as occurred in World War II, if Tokyo decided to come to the defense of Taiwan. 

With no-first-use jettisoned, U.S. assessments of Chinese nuclear strategy might begin to include the idea that up to 360 DF-31 or DF-41 missiles in those 360 silos could very well unleash multiple thousands of warheads in a potential first strike against the United States. Such a threatened attack, in China’s mind, could ensure the United States stands down in the case of PRC aggression against Taiwan. 

The Chinese balloon entered U.S. airspace undeterred. If one is not concerned with multiple thousands of Chinese warheads holding at risk U.S. military capabilities and major American cities, one might contemplate Mike Pillsbury’s testimony before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission that warned China could use electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) against the United States electrical grid with catastrophic results. And what is a very efficient and surreptitious method of bringing an EMP weapon over America’s heartland? As the late EMP expert Dr. Peter Pry explained numerous times, a key means of delivering such a weapon would be a balloon.

Peter Huessy is Senior Defense Fellow at the Hudson Institute and President of Geo-Strategic Analysis. These views are his own.

Image: Shutterstock.

Editor’s note: This article originally stated in the first paragraph that the Chinese balloon traveled over two U.S. ICBM bases instead of one. We regret the error.

In the weeks following his return to power in Brazil on January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—best just known simply as Lula—has proven himself to be, as always, a canny politician who, despite his narrow victory over Jair Bolsonaro, has shown success both in forming a cabinet and obtaining a relatively friendly leadership in Congress. This initial period has been capped with a highly publicized meeting with President Joe Biden in Washington.

A Failed Seizure Gives Lula Space

In what direction will Lula take Brazil? At this early date, one must judge more from words than deeds. But there are signs that he will not be afraid to play political hardball. As politicians often do, he initially stressed that he wanted to unify the country after a raucous campaign in which Bolsonaro ran not only against him but against Brazil’s electoral system and courts, which he had insisted were conspiring to steal the election from him.

But in the aftermath of the January 8 attempt by a mob of Bolsonaro supporters to occupy the Congress, Presidential Palace, and Supreme Court, Lula has used tough rhetoric, insisting (with some justification) that this was a failed coup attempt. Most egregiously, top military officials had used troops to prevent police from arresting protestors who had camped in front of the Army headquarters, instead letting many of them simply slip away. As a result, Lula dismissed the commander in chief of the Army, replacing him with another general who had earlier cast cold water on Bolsonaro’s allegations of electoral fraud.

He also removed the large number of soldiers who had been serving on the presidential security detail, saying he had “lost trust” in them. At the same time, prosecutors are starting to deal with the over 1,000 individuals arrested during the events in Brasilia. And a previously pro-Bolsonaro senator has asserted that in the interim between Lula’s election and inauguration, the former president at least tacitly approved a proposed effort to cook up an excuse to arrest the Supreme Court judge in charge of elections and nullify the results of the vote.

All of this has left Lula in a stronger position at the start of his administration than he might otherwise be, with Bolsonaro seemingly unsure whether to return to Brazil, where he could face legal jeopardy. Although Brazil’s political right has a mass base and its own well-oiled social media network, for now it is on the defensive, giving Lula some extra breathing space.

Building a Cabinet 

In forming his cabinet Lula has reached out to representatives of a range of parties beyond his own base, the leftist Workers’ Party, to include figures not only from other parties which had been aligned with him in his campaign, but also from ones that had opposed him. He had earlier picked as his running mate Geraldo Alckmin, former governor of populous São Paulo state and presidential candidate for the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party. Clearly chosen as a gesture to voters concerned about the Workers’ Party’s leftist orientation and Lula’s own free spending record, especially in his second term, Alckmin played a leading role in the transition and subsequently was named as minister of development, industry and foreign trade, in addition to holding the vice presidency.

However, the crucial position of finance minister has gone to Fernando Haddad, former mayor São Paulo city and a Workers’ Party heavyweight, moving the center of gravity on economic policymaking back towards the left. The position of planning and budget minister went to Simone Tebet from the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement. 

The Foreign Ministry was entrusted to veteran diplomat Mauro Viera. (In Brazil this ministry is usually headed by a senior career foreign service officer.) His record includes serving as ambassador to the United States, which may help in keeping relations with Washington on track. However, the former foreign and defense minister, Celso Amorim, remains a close advisor to Lula. His third-world-oriented viewpoint is likely to significantly influence the Lula administration’s approach to international affairs. 

Lula’s defense minister, Jose Múcio, comes from a small party currently aligned with Lula and has served in Lula’s cabinet before. His position has gained added importance as Lula grapples with civil-military relations after the January 8 events. Otherwise, the cabinet does not seem to have many stars, although it is noteworthy that Marina Silva, an environmental activist turned environment minister in Lula’s previous administration, is returning to her position.

Reaching Out to Congress

Lula’s approach to cabinet-making with its aim of coalition building seems to have served him well in his relations with Congress, despite the strong performance of pro-Bolsonaro forces in both houses on Election Day. A member of the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party gained the presidency of the Senate, with support from Lula’s Workers’ Party. It also successfully backed a conservative (if highly transactional) opposition figure for re-election to the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. 

During Bolsonaro’s presidency, Congress benefited from the practice of the “secret budget,” under which legislators got to determine individually where large amounts of public money was directed—a practice somewhat like the “earmarking” found in the U.S. Congress, but on a grander scale and more opaque. This in effect was the price Bolsonaro paid for gaining control over Congress (and beating back several impeachment attempts).

Lula campaigned against the secret budget, and a recent Supreme Court decision ruling it unconstitutional means he cannot be pressured to maintain it, which would have been politically difficult as his previous administration had been marked by a major scandal regarding the wholesale purchase of congressional votes. But finding other means to gain passage of legislation will be a challenge for Lula, given that in Brazil the path to good executive-legislature relations is seemingly paved with money.

Left Turn on Economics

With the personnel in place, Lula’s policies are beginning to emerge. On the economic side, his recent actions and statements have led some to believe that his moderate gestures during the campaign were a “bait and switch,” as he has ramped up his rhetoric against the rich who “don’t work.” Even before taking office, Lula attained congressional support to suspend a constitutional amendment passed in 2016 which had established an overall cap on spending increases at the rate of annual inflation for a twenty-year period. This will allow him to maintain trademark social programs. (Bolsonaro too had obtained a temporary suspension which allowed him to engage in a pre-election spending spree.)

Lula has publicly disparaged policies that privilege fiscal discipline over the needs of the poor. And he has also engaged in a vocal campaign against the independent central bank for keeping interest rates too high, calling them “an embarrassment,” and suggesting that the bank’s president will be replaced when his term expires. Finance Minister Haddad has echoed Lula, albeit in somewhat milder terms, urging the bank to be more “generous” in the interest of stimulating the economy while pledging to create a more realistic “fiscal anchor” than the spending cap.

Brazil’s huge state-owned Bank for National Economic and Social Development (BNDES) has also become an issue. In his previous administration, the bank, flush with the cash which had flooded into state coffers from the global commodity boom, had been an aggressive player on the international, and especially Latin American, stage, financing infrastructure projects undertaken by large Brazilian construction firms. This was an effort at supporting “national champions” as well as Brazil’s ambitions for global, and particularly regional, leadership.

During the presidential campaign, it had been suggested that BNDES, instead of venturing afield, would concentrate on supporting local enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized businesses. However, since taking office, Lula has asserted that BNDES would indeed be active in support of regional development and integration, and has named Aloizio Mercadante, a former Workers’ Party senator, as its head. This has raised eyebrows as Brazilian construction firms and politicians, including Lula himself, have been caught up in major foreign bribery scandals, though BNDES itself was never charged with misconduct.

Lula has criticized Bolsonaro’s partial privatization of the huge state power generator and transmitter Eletrobras as overly generous to investors (“almost banditry”), and said that this sale would be reviewed (though undoing it may be legally difficult). He has categorically ruled out the idea that Bolsonaro had floated of similarly privatizing state oil producer Petrobras.

Still, there are some who suggest that Lula’s bark may be worse than his bite regarding the economy. During his previous presidency, he showed fiscal restraint, at least during his first term, before money from the global commodity boom began to flow. It may be the case that he is setting up the wealthy and the central bank to take some of the blame when he is unable to make good on all his promises to low-income Brazilians.

Back to the Future on Foreign Policy

The themes of Lula’s previous administration are also reflected in his foreign policy. In his first international trip since taking office, he went to Buenos Aires for a meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States—a body of Western Hemisphere states which, unlike the Washington DC-based Organization of American States, excludes the United States and Canada while including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. While some Latin leaders, notably Chile’s Gabriel Boric and Uruguay’s Luis Lacalle, raised democracy issues, Lula, faithful to his longstanding approach, demurred, only urging in the case of Venezuela that these issues be resolved through “dialogue” while saying that Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro deserved “affection.”

Lula reiterated his commitment to Latin American integration, saying that Brazil would support Argentina in its current economic travails by providing financing for the Argentine purchase of Brazilian goods (presumably through BNDES). But despite his gestures toward regional unity, he has been willing to put Brazilian interests first. After initial hesitation, he supported the successful candidacy of orthodox Brazilian economist Ilan Goldfajn for the presidency of the Inter-American Development Bank, even though Goldfajn had been proposed by Bolsonaro. This chagrined Mexico, a traditional rival of Brazil’s for prominence in the hemisphere, which had promoted its own candidate.

He also used his visit to Argentina to deal with thorny issues regarding the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), where the draft text of a free trade agreement with the European Union had been earlier reached but which some EU members, notably France, had put on hold, citing Brazil’s poor environmental record under Bolsonaro. Lula, who seems genuinely committed to improving Brazil’s environmental performance, has urged progress on the agreement while suggesting that some further renegotiation may be in order. (Argentina, in weaker economic shape, is in no hurry to support an agreement with the EU, so its future remains in doubt.)

But there may be other motives behind Lula’s interest in reviving the agreement with the EU. Little Uruguay, which has an export-oriented economy based on its efficient agricultural sector, has chafed at Brazil’s sluggishness on trade expansion and has begun to negotiate its own free trade agreement with China, something to which Brazil and Argentina object to as inconsistent with Mercosur’s common external tariff. By showing new interest in the EU agreement and promising then to turn to China once it is completed, Lula may be hoping to persuade Uruguay to put its negotiations with China on the back burner for now, thus avoiding an internal Mercosur crisis.

Relations with the United States: The Feel Good Factor, for Now

Lula’s early meeting with Biden is a sign that he is viewed as a refreshing change from Bolsonaro, who had close ties with Donald Trump. And the parallels between the January 6, 2021 assault on the U.S. Capitol and the events of January 8, 2023 in Brasilia unsurprisingly were highlighted at the meeting. Likewise, Lula is definitely striking a tone on environmental issues that the Biden administration can appreciate.

But beyond these areas, the prospects for a shared agenda start to thin out quickly. Although the United States has shown some signs of wanting to modulate its confrontation with Venezuela, Lula’s bland assertions of the need for dialogue, which seem to put Venezuela’s embattled opposition on the same level as the Maduro regime, which uses all the elements of state power to throttle it, will ring hollow to many.

And on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a real gap between Washington and Brasilia. Lula maintains the view while Russia’s invasion was unacceptable, its causes are “unclear.” (In fairness, Bolsonaro, despite his professed pro-Americanism, took a similarly equivocal stance. He made pro-Russian statements immediately after the invasion, and while his government voted for the United Nations resolutions favoring Ukraine, it did not support the economic sanctions the United States and Europe imposed.)

Lula has offered Brazil as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine in a “club for peace,” together with China and other large states, just as during his previous administration he had suggested that Brazil undertake a similar role regarding efforts to check Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He is likely to get the same polite cold shoulder in this case as before.

We can expect Lula to keep Brazil on a democratic track, no small thing given the authoritarian adventurism of his predecessor. On his economic policies, the jury is still out as to whether he will turn the spending tap on to the point where inflation, devaluation, and a major loss of investor confidence become a real problem. And on foreign policy, Brazil may be occasionally helpful to the United States, but Lula’s fundamental orientation likely means that there will not be much common ground once the initial period of good feeling between the two governments passes.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Formerly a member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs from 2013 to 2016.

Image: Marcus Mendes/Shutterstock.

The right way to counter autocracy.

How Xi obscured a lethal viral wave—and what it means for the future of his regime.

Fear is mightier than the sword, and few things stoke fear like a dirty bomb. So, it should have come as no surprise when Russia accused Ukraine of building a radiological dispersal device (RDD), possibly setting the stage for a false-flag attack. By manipulating widespread fear of radioactivity, such a device is a potent weapon of terror, and Russia has transformed it into an instrument of “war by other means.” To manage this, relevant chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) doctrine must also shift to emphasize public information and crisis recovery.

The Dirty Deed

It is no secret that Russia’s military strategy includes targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, aiming to ensure this winter is taxing on the Ukrainian population. While such an effort is nothing new in warfare, the prevalence of nuclear power in Ukraine makes it unique—and dangerous. Heavy fighting has occurred near one of the country’s four operating nuclear power plants, with a missile reportedly landing close to another. This has raised the alarm among the international community; the effects of a nuclear meltdown could reach well beyond Ukraine’s borders, as was the case during the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Consequently, Russia has been forced to become creative in targeting nuclear facilities.

In late October 2022, Russia claimed Ukraine was building a dirty bomb. A tweet by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs named Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and research reactors as the sources of the necessary radionuclides, stating Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239—the fissile isotopes of nuclear power—were the most likely ingredients. Although they make lousy ingredients for a dirty bomb when compared to Cobalt-60 and Strontium-90, which were also mentioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the fear was palpable on both sides. Ukraine and the West immediately counterclaimed that Russia was the true perpetrator, accusing them of contemplating a false-flag event that risked nuclear escalation. Meanwhile, Russian state media played up the potential consequences, and the surrounding countries braced for a radiological incident. Although it is inconclusive from open-source intelligence if Russia truly intended to stage a false-flag attack, the threatened employment of an RDD to incite fear and achieve strategic military objectives was dastardly creative.

A Frightfully Effective Weapon

Unlike a nuclear weapon, an RDD does not unleash the power of nuclear fusion or fission. Rather, it simply disperses radioactive material via a conventional explosive, thereby adding the complexity of contamination to an otherwise common problem. A potential attacker does not have to overcome the proliferation challenges of obtaining special nuclear material, much less mastering nuclear physics, to build such a device. Theoretically, all they need are radioactive sources and a bomb.

Rather than mass destruction, a dirty bomb primarily deals in fear. As the explosion spreads its contaminants, the once-concentrated radioactive material is dispersed over a comparatively wide space. This lowers the radioactivity within a given area, thereby lowering the dose rate for the exposed. Consequently, the resulting contamination is generally more of a long-term health risk than an immediate problem, with a few exceptions, such as particulates suspended in air. However, it is likely that an uneducated public would mischaracterize the risk, as just mentioning radioactivity can incite panic. This radiophobia persists across societies, making the dirty bomb a potent instrument of terror.

(Radiological) War by Other Means

Because it lacks the power and complexity of a nuclear weapon, conventional wisdom says a dirty bomb is a poor man’s weapon of mass destruction. Strategic powers like Russia, so the story goes, are only interested in high-yield nuclear devices, which are important for deterring their enemies. Even terrorists would prefer to possess an improvised nuclear device (IND), as the destructive power is many orders of magnitude higher. Such a scenario is the plot of Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears, in which terrorists detonate an IND to attempt to draw the United States and Russia into a nuclear war.

However, such dogma fails to account for the geopolitical and military shifts that have pushed warfighting into the liminal space. As revisionist powers like Russia have questioned their ability to defeat the West in a conventional fight, they have watched Western armies struggle with counterinsurgency operations in the Global War on Terror. Noting the successes of nonstate actors in this conflict, they have adapted irregular strategies into their military doctrine, including the weaponization of fear. This phenomenon is described by David Kilcullen in The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, who argues, “The snakes have learned to fight like dragons, and the dragons now fight like snakes.” Therefore, as warfare has evolved into its fourth generation, it was only a matter of time before the threatened use of a dirty bomb was done in a strategic manner.

Of course, when it comes to radiological nightmares, Ukraine has history. Northern Ukraine was the site of the Chernobyl disaster, which resulted in approximately 30-50 prompt deaths (depending upon the source), hundreds of thousands of relocations, and lasting widespread contamination. This event has even been cited as a factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it left an indelible mark on the population’s memory. So, when it comes to radioactivity, the fear in Ukraine is visceral.

Managing the Mess

The evolution of the radiological dispersal device into a strategic weapon requires CBRN professionals around the world to reconceptualize this threat, particularly in terms of crisis management. While traditionally categorized as a weapon of mass destruction, a dirty bomb is really a weapon of fear. As such, the potential impacts are overwhelmingly psychological, economic, and political, as opposed to destructive, making them ideal for irregular warfare. Institutional knowledge should be amended to reflect this, particularly in the realms of public information and incident recovery.

On the matter of public information, strong messaging and education should be a priority, both left and right of boom. CBRN responders and security officials should develop robust messaging plans to combat radiophobia, which can paralyze a society. This requires intimate working relationships with public information experts, which should be fostered well ahead of an incident to ensure effective crisis communication. As information warfare grows in prevalence, this action will become increasingly important for all facets of CBRN consequence management.

As for recovery, it should be given significant attention as soon as possible during an RDD incident, as it will be vital to limiting the long-term social and economic effects. Out of fear, the public will be wary of any attempted cleanup, and they will demand it be complete. However, as those in the industry understand, completeness is generally a relative and elusive goal, and it can be very expensive. Therefore, in conjunction with public communication, recovery should be an early consideration.

Conclusion

Fear is a weapon that can be employed strategically. Noting this, revisionist powers like Russia have adopted irregular strategies to fight the West. Since a radiological dispersal device plays upon mass radiophobia, it is ideal for this purpose. As such, it is not shocking that Russia claimed Ukraine was developing one, potentially in furtherance of their own false-flag event. To address this evolution of the dirty bomb into a weapon of “war by other means,” the CBRN community must prioritize public information and disaster recovery.

Robert T. Wagner is a Senior Weapons of Mass Destruction Subject Matter Expert at Octant Associates, where he supports the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School and is a Nationally Registered Paramedic.

Image: A 3D rendering of a Russian nuclear warhead. Shutterstock.

In the wake of the formation of the new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Jordan has publicly voiced concerns and warnings. King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein of Jordan visited the White House on February 2, days after the United States voiced concerns of its own during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Jerusalem.

Netanyahu’s government took office after a few years in which Jordan-Israel relations were improving. Israel’s Bennett-Lapid government acknowledged the strategic importance of Jordan, managed to restore trust and good working relations with the king, and expanded the scope of cooperation between both countries.

This was in stark contrast to the previous lack of communication between Abdullah and Netanyahu, which led the king to declare in 2019 that Jordan’s relations with Israel were at an all-time low. Jordan’s lack of trust in Netanyahu derived from several negative experiences, ranging from the 1997 Israeli attempt to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Jordan (during Netanyahu’s first term) to Netanyahu’s 2017 public embrace of the Israeli security guard involved in a shooting incident at the Israeli embassy in Amman.

Jordan’s concern about the Netanyahu government is not only about the prime minister. It is also about the far-right composition of the government, and the fact that it includes key members who believe that "Jordan is Palestine” and seek to change the status quo in Jerusalem through provocative actions.

Jordan is also worried by the prospect of Israeli-Palestinian escalation, as it is the country that is impacted the most—for better or for worse—by developments in these relations. Just as the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 paved the way for Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel the following year, tensions between Israel and the Palestinians repeatedly stir public demonstrations and opposition in Jordan and are considered by the regime as a threat to stability.

For Jordan, the Palestinian issue is not merely a diplomatic one—it is also a significant security issue. Throughout the years, this has led to multiple efforts by Jordan to push Israeli-Palestinian relations in a better direction. It was King Hussein who assisted U.S. mediation attempts between Netanyahu and Arafat in 1998 at the Wye Plantation summit, and it was King Abdullah who mobilized international opposition to Netanyahu’s annexation plan in 2020 and led efforts in 2022 to prevent escalation in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan.

Jordan is also part—together with Egypt, France, and Germany—of the Munich Group, a non-formal grouping that was formed in early 2020 to keep the idea of a two-state solution alive in response to then-President Donald Trump’s plan.

With Netanyahu back in office, and despite its deep concerns and past grievances with him, Jordan chose to engage. King Abdullah congratulated Netanyahu upon his election victory and hosted him in Amman in January (Netanyahu’s first visit abroad since taking office). On the practical level, Jordan has kept bilateral relations with Israel on track, including the implementation of the water and electricity deal that the two countries jointly signed with the United Arab Emirates. Even the tense incident that took place in January near the al-Aqsa Mosque between the Jordanian ambassador and an Israeli security guard did not change this trend.

Cooperation with Israel serves the central economic and security needs of Jordan, and it seeks to preserve this, as long as Israeli-Palestinian relations do not deteriorate to a level that leads Jordan to downgrade ties with Israel. It was in this context—preventing Israeli-Palestinian deterioration—that King Abdullah visited the White House in early February, his third visit of President Joe Biden’s presidency.

The visit took place amid a rise in violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. It reflected the important role that the U.S. administration attributes to Jordan in advancing regional stability and indicated an American interest in cooperation. The Abdullah-Biden meeting was also an opportunity for the United States to reiterate its commitment to maintaining the status quo in Jerusalem—an issue it should also press the Israeli government on—and Jordan’s custodianship of the Islamic holy places in the city.

The United States, the single-largest provider of aid to Jordan, also emphasized following the White House meeting that both countries are committed to advancing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In that regard, the visit will become even more important if it leads to concrete steps that advance stability, peace, and regional cooperation.

The United States and Jordan should prepare for the sensitive overlap between Ramadan and Passover this coming April by coordinating their efforts, dividing the labor, and utilizing their leverage over Israel and the Palestinian Authority, respectively, to lower the risk of escalation.

They should also work to create a new alliance of international actors that care about the Israeli-Palestinian issue and are committed to taking action to prevent escalation and advance peacemaking. The Middle East Quartet—composed of the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN)—has not been effective for years. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it does not even convene anymore. A new international mechanism is needed, even if informally at first.

Jordan can bring on board the other Munich Group members, while the United States can invite the EU and the UN, its allies in the Quartet. Switzerland and Norway, whose special envoys to the region recently visited Jerusalem, can also be incorporated, alongside Turkey, given its recent rapprochement with Israel and good relations with the Palestinians. Putting in place such a mechanism will require in-depth policy planning regarding its goals, composition, and conduct to ensure it will be more successful than previous initiatives.

On the regional level, the United States should stop trying to convince Jordan to join the Negev Forum, a regional grouping composed of the United States, Israel, and a number of Arab states. Instead, it should respect Jordan’s decision to stay out until there is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. In the meantime, Washington should make sure that the interests of Jordan and the Palestinians are considered during the upcoming Negev Summit in Morocco. Additionally, Washington should link Jordan and the Palestinians as much as possible to regional projects enabled by the Abraham Accords.

The United States can also encourage Jordan and Saudi Arabia to work together on updating the Arab Peace Initiative, bringing it in line with recent regional developments and making it a more effective incentive for peace. Conditions seem ripe for this. Amman played a key role in the drafting of the initiative over twenty years ago, and it may want to do so again. The Saudis repeatedly emphasize their commitment to the initiative, notably convening a multilateral gathering aimed at updating the initiative on the sidelines of the 2022 UN General Assembly.

Finally, the United States can help Israel and Jordan put in place a crisis-management mechanism that will enable the two neighbors to deal with the consequences of any Israeli-Palestinian escalation and prevent the collapse of bilateral ties. Such a model will also be needed between Israel and Turkey, and the United States can help it happen.

For these efforts to begin, and for the administration to be able to effectively follow up on last week’s meeting, the Senate must quickly confirm Yael Lempart, Biden’s recently-announced appointee, as ambassador to Jordan.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute, President of the Mitvim Institute, and Co-Founder of Diplomeds.

Image: Flickr/White House.

Before the supply chain woes suffered from COVID-19, now-National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and now-high-level White House official Jennifer M. Harris argued that the United States needed to implement an industrial policy to be more economically resilient for the coming global challenges in the twenty-first century. In addition, bipartisan calls in 2020 to strengthen the U.S. supply chain made it clear that national industrial policy legislation would be inevitably introduced. Immediately after taking office, the Biden administration signed an executive order aimed at improving the resilience of U.S. supply chains. The White House also hosted a global summit attended by leaders from fourteen countries and the European Union to discuss semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities. During the summit, the Biden administration urged European countries to work with the United States in developing resilient semiconductor supply chains that minimize dependencies on non-Western actors. Most notably, the Biden administration signed the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, providing $52 billion in federal subsidies to encourage domestic semiconductor manufacturing.

But though the Biden administration has recognized and made necessary changes to strengthen U.S. supply chains, there remain three pressing issues: the mapping of supply chains to determine existing vulnerabilities, persistent labor shortages, and the need for improved human capital. As long as the three problems persist, U.S. supply chains cannot be secure from geopolitical changes. 

If the United States wants to secure its supply chains, it must map its supply chains for manufacturing to determine existing vulnerabilities. Mapping these is difficult, involving numerous inputs, suppliers, and so forth. For context, a Japanese semiconductor firm took over a year to develop its supply chain. The Biden administration and multiple pieces of legislation have designated the need to identify such vulnerabilities. This is promising, but recent proposals have created more questions than answers. For instance, by their nature, corporations are always incentivized to focus on business efficiency rather than redundancy. How will the government hold companies accountable that they are properly identifying their supply chain networks? Additionally, globalization incentivizes multinational companies to source their resources and goods from various markets and locations with varying levels of transparency. Even if companies wanted to attain an accurate understanding of their supply chain, they might need help. Finally, the time needed to map these vulnerabilities meticulously is a problem with no proposed solution. 

Labor shortages of essential workers mean that supply chain bottlenecks will persist. These can have compounding effects—a labor shortage in the U.S. trucker market, for instance, has aggravated some supply chain issues. The trucker industry has a staggering 94 percent turnover rate, resulting in shortages continuing to plague supply chains because goods cannot be delivered in time and will often be stuck waiting on cargo docks. The Biden administration urged ports to stay open all day in southern California to decrease congestion. This did not improve the situation, as more truckers sought to enter the ports to transport cargo. Without taking steps to alleviate this issue, such as by raising wages and improving working conditions, instability in the trucking market will continue to have cascading impacts on the U.S. economy. Large and flashy investments into semiconductor manufacturing and other industries will be futile if consumers cannot receive the goods because there is a lack of truck drivers. 

While the U.S. government has provided substantial funding to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, it needs an influx of capable human capital to reach its full potential. Morris Chang, the founder of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), has stressed that the United States currently lacks a big enough talent pool capable of manufacturing semiconductors domestically. Moreover, America needs to do so with a labor pool that is talented and demands higher wages than its East Asian competitors. Even when Washington provides additional subsidies, it cannot speed up the time and energy required to train the number of workers needed to manufacture semiconductors instantaneously.

The Biden administration has correctly identified the critical role semiconductors play in U.S. national security. No one should doubt the sincerity and progress in addressing this vulnerability in the last few years. However, there is still much more work to be done. The U.S. government must tackle all three of these issues with urgency to unleash the capabilities of U.S. domestic semiconductor manufacturing.    

Richard Li is an undergraduate student at Cornell University. He can be contacted at rll246@cornell.edu.

Image: BiksuTong/Shutterstock.

Depuis le sociologue allemand Max Weber et son livre « L'Éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme », on se représente le capitalisme comme ascétique, rigoriste, autoritaire, puritain et patriarcal. Et, depuis près d'un siècle, on se trompe. Comme le montre la lecture et la redécouverte de (...) / Capitalisme, Histoire, Idées, Idéologie, Inégalités, Spiritualité - 2017/12

What the war in Ukraine has revealed about Putin’s regime.

Why America can’t afford to ignore India and China’s border dispute.

The liftoff of Artemis 1 last November launched a new era in space, as the United States prepares to send humans beyond low-Earth orbit and back to the Moon for the first time in half a century. The Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion capsule finally made their debut after $23 billion and eleven years of development.

Back on Earth, another element that will define this new era in human exploration of the cosmos has also begun taking shape. The Artemis Accords are a set of shared, non-binding principles that aim to govern “responsible, peaceful, and sustainable” exploration of space, taking the form of bilateral agreements between the United States and twenty-two signatory countries. This new international space club saw nine nations sign on last year.

As we finally enter the Artemis Era, the Accords must play a more prominent role in U.S. space geopolitics and public diplomacy.

Artemis and its Predecessors

The Artemis Accords, launched by NASA in mid-2020, aim to enhance international cooperation around the return to the Moon and establish the prevailing norms and guardrails for space exploration and governance in the lunar system and beyond. The principles center around peaceful, cooperative, responsible, and transparent use of space, as well as pledges to address space debris, share data, and preserve historic places or objects like landing sites or defunct spacecraft. Many of these are common-sense and broadly acceptable principles. Another section permits the establishment of “safety zones,” which require notification and coordination procedures around the sites of activity in space to avoid conflict.

The Accords build on decades-old multilateral agreements called the “five United Nations treaties on outer space” and their celestial protocols. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the foundational document for international space law, establishing outer space as the “province of all mankind.” On the Moon and “other celestial bodies,” states commit to not claiming territory and to peaceful activity. States also agree to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in space. 

Subsequent treaties expanded on these issues. The Registration Convention, for example, requires states to inform the UN of objects launched into space and their orbits. The Liability Convention states that anything launched within the territory of a state is the liability of that state, no matter who is doing the launching. For instance, if your company’s smallsat hitches a ride on a Falcon 9 rocket and later ends up colliding with a French communications satellite, the United States is the responsible party. The Moon Agreement expands the “province of all mankind” principle to the Moon and its resources, requiring “equitable sharing by all State Parties.” Unsurprisingly, the United States, China, and Russia have not agreed to restrict commercial exploration and use of the Moon; Saudi Arabia’s recent withdrawal is more proof this view is fading.

This is also why there is the more geopolitically contentious line concerning “Space Resources” in the Artemis Accords, which states that “the signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation.” A chief OST principle established that no nation can lay claim to a celestial body in space—in other words, no space conquistadors. Taking resources from that body is another question. Could a nation take Moon rocks as souvenirs, or mine substantial amounts of helium-3? The United States had already attempted to answer this question: the 2015 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act formally legalized U.S. space mining. The Artemis Accords are an effort to establish de facto international agreement that space resource extraction is consistent with the OST’s provisions on sovereign claims.

The signatories of Artemis are geographically and culturally diverse. All have alliances or close relationships with the United States, and include NATO allies and important partners in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Latin America. Two African nations, Nigeria and Rwanda, signed at the end of last year.

Great Power Competition Goes to Space

China and Russia have rejected the premise of the Accords. Russia has slammed them as “too U.S.-centric,” and China state media claimed the Accords are redundant, given the existence of the OST, and are a U.S. effort to stunt Chinese space ambitions. 

Instead, China is forging ahead with the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a base on the Moon’s south pole, by the middle of the next decade. Unveiled in 2021, the ILRS will be a phased program with “reconnaissance” and “construction” stages through 2035 and crewed landings beginning in 2036, though China could achieve a crewed landing by 2030. China has opened the program to others, likely intending the ILRS as an alternative to the Artemis Program. This would be in line with its efforts to disrupt the liberal, U.S.-led global order and to develop its own.

China and Russia could silently abide by the Accords without signing or violating them, or create a set of alternative principles around ILRS that attracts signatories and emerges to compete with Artemis, similar to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which excludes the United States). There’s been no sign of this yet, but the UAE (an Artemis signatory) inked a Moon exploration partnership memorandum of understanding with China in September of last year. An Artemis head start doesn’t necessarily mean the Accords will prevail.

So as U.S.-China tensions reach the cosmos, defining a framework for space exploration in the twenty-first century will be crucial. China claims that its activities in space are for peaceful purposes, but U.S. intelligence has warned about China’s planned militarization and weaponization of space. Among our most vulnerable assets are satellites. China famously tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007 and has continued to build an ASAT weapons program that could threaten our critical satellites.

It is also not difficult to imagine a militarized ILRS base. A report last August predicted China would overtake the United States “as the dominant global space power economically, diplomatically and militarily by 2045, if not earlier,” and that America “may likely lose space superiority to China within the next decade.”

The Accords are also vital for economic reasons. There are potentially trillions of dollars of resources on celestial bodies, such as helium-3, iron, nickel, and gold, and nations that develop the capacity for space mining will want a slice of that pie. The Accords thread the needle between permitting resource extraction—by any nation—and reiterating that celestial bodies are not subject to sovereignty. The lack of internationally accepted rules of the road for space, or a situation with competing principles, will inhibit peaceful exploration of space, increase the likelihood that the domain becomes militarized, and reduce opportunities for commercial growth: if the playing field is unstable or unclear, companies won’t invest—and space is risky enough already.

Growing the Club: Prioritize Germany and India

Germany and France were not part of the initial signatory list, skeptical of the text and the coalition. France was apparently under the impression that the OST banned space mining. Many nations in Europe understandably want to maintain leverage and their own capacity to shape global policy independent of the United States. Europe has diverged from Washington on the regulation of Big Tech with the General Data Protection Regulation, for example. France and Germany also want to boost the role of the European Space Agency.

But it is in the broader European interest to join U.S.-led initiatives in a multipolar world, and the best bet to guarantee its own interests are represented in space. Infighting over defense spending had strained NATO to the point of “brain death.” But once a major threat to European security emerged from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the alliance quickly came back together with a robust response. Members of the alliance share overarching values, and European-American disputes are relative by nature. There shouldn’t need to be a cataclysmic event with China in space to galvanize U.S. allies. 

France ultimately signed last June after being convinced by U.S. officials that the Accords were the beginning of a discussion on space resources, not a finite end. Getting Germany onboard would send another important signal that key U.S. allies are united on Accords principles, and should be a priority.

India’s accession remains elusive. India-U.S. ties are warming, and the nation has no qualms about joining new U.S.-led groups and dialogues such as the Quad and the I2U2 Group. But the country’s thinking likely remains tied to its broader geopolitical positioning. India’s historical relationship with the Soviet Union and now Russia complicates Artemis talks. Much like India’s cautious approach to Ukraine, India may choose to play it safe for now with a wait-and-see approach on competing frameworks and groupings. India may simply not sign any set of multilateral principles in space that it sees favoring one international bloc over another.

India has a robust space program with big ambitions, not to mention immense geopolitical significance for U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific, and it is likely the biggest outstanding prize for the Accords. If India continues to seem reluctant, then the Accords should allow for some sort of partnership or secondary signatory category, at least at first. It is critical that the U.S. builds on a broad array of signatories beyond its traditional allies, and such an option might attract additional signatories.

Signing the Accords acts as a signaling device to other nations and builds consensus around principles that align with our values and interests. Every country makes a difference and can contribute in its own way. There’s a lot at stake for nations participating in the Artemis Program, whether it be future hardware or angling for astronaut slots. More signatories enlarge the pool of U.S. partners for missions to the Moon and beyond. 

Moving Forward with the Artemis Accords

NASA and U.S. policymakers should be utilizing the Accords more than they currently are. A recent NASA Office of the Inspector General report found that, despite high interest in Artemis, NASA “lacks an overarching strategy to coordinate Artemis contributions” from other countries. The agency can start with the Accords.

We should enlist current national signatories to help recruit others to enlarge the group. President Joe Biden has not yet taken advantage of the opportunity brought by Artemis 1 to outline the program’s success and gather further public support for its future. To that end, he could give a major address outlining U.S. plans for human space exploration and include a call for countries to sign the Accords. 

Second, the Accords should be part of a broader public communications and diplomacy campaign. NASA should be heavily promoting the Accords, both principles and signatories, on their media channels—securing captive audiences of millions is incredibly difficult to do, and we should be taking advantage of these rare events that draw massive public interest and excitement.

Finally, the Accords should be used as an intergovernmental forum to enhance dialogue and cooperation between signatory nations, which so far has not occurred. Thankfully, the United States just hosted the first gathering of Accords nations in Paris along with France and Brazil at the International Astronautical Congress in September 2022. However, this should just be the beginning of a transformation of the Accords from a list of national signatures to an operational and influential entity with regularly scheduled meetings and fora.

Space norms developed now have the potential to build a prevailing international framework that could last decades if not centuries, as principles aimed at the Moon could remain in place when we one day develop capabilities to reach Europa and Enceladus, orbiting Jupiter. As other actors with different values build their own competing programs, the stakes are high. The Accords will help build a new framework for international dialogue and cooperation that can increase economic opportunity for countries via space resources, inspire new generations of explorers, and increase intercultural exchange between peoples.

With twenty-three countries, the Artemis Accords are off to a great start, but expanding to other signatories and solidifying the principles as norms, more heavily promoting their existence and purpose, and reducing the chance of an alternative set of prevailing principles should be top priorities for U.S. space policy.

Alex Dubin is an Endless Frontier Fellow at the Lincoln Network focusing on space policy.

Image: SpaceX/Flickr.

On February 6, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake shook the southern cities of Turkey. Thousands of buildings, vital highways, and airports collapsed. According to the latest figures, more than 30,000 Turkish citizens were killed, while millions of people are directly impacted.

Although Turkey is highly prone to earthquakes, Erdogan’s government is facing severe criticism because of the insufficiency of the government’s response. Centralized bureaucracy has hampered the mobility of many NGOs and volunteer associations, indirectly increasing losses.

The earthquake could not come at a worse time. The Turkish economy is already in a bad shape, and the current disaster further complicates the economic and political situation in the country. We cannot know at this time the expected costs of reconstruction efforts, but the Izmit Earthquake (1999), which was less destructive, cost approximately $17 billion, or approximately 1 percent of the GDP at that time.

When Turkish voters head to the polls in June—presuming elections are not postponed due to the earthquake—for the first national elections since 2018, they will be tasked with affirming or correcting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s sweeping economic policies over the last ten years.

Turkey’s economy is an anomaly, even against the backdrop of global economic turmoil. Since the country lifted its COVID-19 lockdowns in June 2020, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has instituted sweeping economic reforms to stimulate growth at all costs.

This has led to strong economic indicators, including 11 percent economic growth in 2021, growth for nine quarters during a global recession, surpassing many G-20 and OECD countries, and an expected 5 percent growth last year, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

Over that time, Turkey has also proven that economic growth does not necessarily lead to prosperity. Millions of Turkish citizens have been hurt by these policies, leading to a severely weakened Lira and runaway inflation, an impoverished middle class, and a steep decline in consumer confidence. These circumstances have bankrupted many small businesses and led to Turkish bonds reaching “junk” status among foreign investors.

Just two years ago, $1 was equal to approximately seven Turkish Liras. Today, with a strengthening dollar and a weakening Lira, that conversion rate is approaching 1:19, adversely affecting purchasing power.

Turkey’s economic “rising tide” has left the vast majority of the population underwater. These people will now decide if the current policies stick, or if a new path forward is needed.

Despite the recent economic hurdles, Turkey still possesses the potential to become a regional and global economic force. With a population of 84 million people and a strong manufacturing industry, Turkey is a global leader in consumer products, transportation equipment, electronics, and agricultural products.

To realize its full potential, Erdogan’s administration—or his successor’s—must embrace a broader definition of economic success.

Cooling Off the Overheated Economy

As of October 2022, Turkey’s runaway inflation reached 85.5 percent year-over-year, which ranked seventh-highest among any nation in the world, alongside low-income, underdeveloped countries like Zimbabwe, Lebanon, and Venezuela, and sanctioned economies such as Iran.

Though it fell to 64 percent in December, Turkey’s inflation rate is still nearly ten times that of leading Western economies.

Increasing interest rates is a commonly used tactic by central banks to cool down hot economies. However, Erdogan holds the unorthodox economic belief that high-interest rates generate high inflation, pushing for lower interest rates to keep economic activity high in exchange for popular support. To maintain his control over monetary policy, he has replaced the governor of the Turkish Central Bank four times over the last seven years.

Last fall, Erdogan called on the central bank to take interest rates into the single digits to close out 2022. This fourth-straight rate cut pushed Turkey into what Bloomberg described as “extreme outlier status” at a time when most central banks have been hawkish on interest.

In addition to driving inflation, Erdogan’s interventionist monetary policies jeopardize the independence of the Turkish Central Bank and lead to a dramatic decrease in confidence from domestic consumers and foreign investors.

Combine this with widespread industry strikes and civil unrest, a gutting of the country’s middle class, and a 55 percent raise in the minimum wage—which is expected to fuel inflation further and crush small businesses—and Turkey is nearing a hyperinflation spiral, despite its economic growth.

Turkey’s CDS premiums, the putative indicators of country risk, exceeded 900 in July 2022, the highest since 2003. This means the country is at high risk of default.

The Election Effect on an Interventionist Economy

Turkey has a strong democratic tradition, yet in recent years, there have been concerns raised regarding the transparency and accountability of the country's democratic institutions.

Turkey’s 2023 election is thus considered a watershed moment by many, a choice between institutionalizing competitive authoritarian rule or moving back to democratization.

Erdogan has signaled that he intends to stay the course on high growth at the expense of taming inflation. Poor management of the economy is the principal source of widespread dissatisfaction with Erdogan and the AKP. 

Stagflation can be tolerated by an electorate if other political issues outweigh the economy. In recent elections, voters have valued the AKP’s approach to national security and fighting terrorism over economic weakening. Prior to the recent earthquake, the weakness of the Turkish economy was the most important issue among likely voters. But now it seems that the earthquake will remain the main topic in the political agenda during the next year with irrefutable economic consequences.

Nevertheless, Erdogan cannot be underestimated, thanks to his firm control over the state.

The current presidential system—a shift from the parliamentary system before it—was endorsed in a national referendum in 2017. Since his re-election in 2018, Erdogan has consolidated power over all institutions, including the judiciary, removing democratic checks and balances.

According to many international watchdogs, Erdogan has embraced the telltale signs of authoritarianism, including nepotism, clientelism, and a lack of governmental accountability. Whoever has spoken out against Erdogan internally has been replaced by a loyal yes-man.

A win for the AKP in May, which seems probable, will serve as a ruling mandate for these policies, despite their unsustainable track. This will likely lead to increased interventionism and state management as the situation spins out of control. 

Drawing insights from Erdogan’s actions and rhetoric, Turkey could see a deterioration of economic ties with the European Union and the International Monetary fund, leading to decreased Western foreign direct investment (FDI) and borrowing capacity.

However, Erdogan has shown a pragmatic approach to replacing the influence of Western economic support, including by strengthening ties with erstwhile regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

It’s Not Too Late for a Turkish Turnaround

On the other side of the ballot, the opposition alliance has assembled some of the world’s top economic minds to provide an alternate vision for economic success. These include world-renowned economists like Daron Acemoglu, Wharton professor Bilge Yilmaz, and former AKP economic minister and ex-Erdogan ally Ali Babacan.

If these technocrats can reach a consensus, they could swing the election and help restore the trust of foreign investors and international donors.

It will be challenging for a new government to prioritize Turkey’s long-term economic health with short-term, necessary pain. There is no path forward without institutional revision that attains broad domestic and international support. 

Returning to conventional economic policies also means unraveling some of the artificial economic growth over the last few years.

Turkey’s economy would also benefit from a return to its democratization process. A more transparent and accountable government would create a more predictable and stable business environment, thereby encouraging entrepreneurship, investment, and growth in the country.

Embracing Stakeholder Capitalism to Defeat Income Inequality

In Turkey’s new economy, everyone needs to have a seat at the table—a model commonly referred to as stakeholder capitalism. Everyone, including investors, business owners, workers, customers, and the general public, should experience long-term economic gain from growth.

Poor policy-making and governance have led to the current paradigm, taking much of the economy down with it. However, certain sectors are showing resilience against economic headwinds.

Turkish tech startups Getir, Peak Games, and Insider each recently attracted investments from prominent venture capital firms. Technology-driven development is more important for Turkey’s future, providing major employment and wage growth.

If the winner of the next election embraces logical economic governance, Turkey can become a more predictable place for FDI and investment of all kinds. If existing policies change, startups will have greater access to capital, which they can leverage to grow in Turkey. If current trends stay the same, however, then these startups will leave and take the opportunity for economic prosperity with them. It’s really that simple.

The current government bears an enormous responsibility for the recent economic losses, including from the earthquake. After all, earthquake taxes are collected in Turkey and designated for disaster relief. However, in recent years, much of those funds have been redirected to infrastructure projects, such as highways and airports.

Likewise, it would be tough for any government to coordinate relief efforts after such a large disaster like the one that has befallen Turkey. However, the current government took a number of unwise and incorrect steps, including banning social media.

Dealing with the reconstruction just three months before an upcoming election will not be easy for the current government, since there is an already ongoing and entrenched economic crisis. The adverse effects of the earthquake will aggravate the poor state of the economy and impact the tide of the election.

Turkey needs a fresh start. That’s why the next election is the key to unlocking Turkey's vast economic potential and creating a bright, equitable future for its citizens. A robust economy in combination with a stable democratic system would make Turkey a pillar of stability in an uncertain region.

Cenk Sidar is the co-founder and CEO of Enquire AI, a business intelligence software company based in Washington, DC. He is also an expert on the Turkish economy and foreign policy. He previously ran as a candidate for Member of Parliament for the Republican People's Party (CHP) in Turkey's 2015 parliamentary elections.

Image: Thomas Koch/Shutterstock.com.

Delivered just three days after a U.S. fighter jet shot down a high-altitude reconnaissance balloon from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), President Joe Biden’s State of the Union Address sounded incredibly benign toward Beijing. To be sure, the president repeated the consistent themes of “competing with China” and “autocracies have grown weaker, not stronger.” Even at one point, he shouted out “name me a world leader who would change places with Xi Jinping, name me one!” But, he also reaffirmed that he wanted “no conflict,” and stated that “I am committed to work with China where it can advance American interests and benefit the world.” The president neither explicitly mentioned the balloon nor the U.S. military response. Instead, Biden ambiguously said, “[M]ake no mistake: as we made clear last week, if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country. And we did.” On a separate occasion, Biden told reporters that taking down the PRC spy vessel would not “weaken” U.S.-Chinese relations. “We’ve made it clear to China what we’re going to do. They understand our position. We’re not going to back off. We did the right thing. And there’s not a question of weakening or strengthening; it’s just the reality.”

Is this an about-face on U.S. China policy? Hardly. Biden has not retreated from the key U.S.-Chinese battleground—securing cutting-edge technology and semiconductor supply chains. Building on the CHIPS Act passed last August to promote U.S.-based semiconductor production, free from Chinese interference, Biden asserted, “We're going to make sure the supply chain for America begins in America … I will make no apologies that we are investing to make America strong. Investing in American innovation, in industries that will define the future, and that China’s government is intent on dominating.” 

The downplaying of the PRC balloon flap seems to be a measured approach as Xi’s China is revealing signs of growing domestic instability and policy irrationality. As David Sanger observed in the New York Times, The Biden administration is debating which China will be harder to handle: “a confident, rising power or the one that, in recent months, seems to be stumbling, unable to manage the Covid-19 virus, and increasingly stressed as it tries to restore the spectacular economic growth that was the key to its power.” Apparently, an opaque authoritarian regime, marked by the lack of transparency and free policy deliberations, is always prone to reckless and nationalistic overseas undertakings. As Xi transforms the Chinese political system from the post-Mao collective leadership into a personalist or strongman regime, the echo-chamber effect may generate even more audacious, though aimless, foreign policy ventures that could easily escalate tensions into greater confrontations. 

Beijing’s motivation to fly a spy balloon to the United States, in such a presumptuous manner and on the eve of a crucial high-level official meeting aimed to steady U.S.-PRC relations, requires serious investigation. The Biden administration reproached the Chinese government for grossly violating America’s national sovereignty, prompting a last-minute cancellation of a trip to Beijing on February 3 by Secretary of State Antony Blinken—the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit China since 2018. Blinken’s trip was meant to follow up on Biden’s meeting with Xi at the G-20 last November as part of an effort to put a floor under the increasingly contentious relations between the United States and PRC. Did Xi intentionally approve the mission to test U.S. resolve despite the potential risks of being discovered and derailing Blinken’s trip? Or was it internal mismanagement and a deficiency of coordination and communication between the civilian and military bureaucracies? The notion is that the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. Biden officials believed that “both the senior leadership of the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese Communist Party, including Xi, were also unaware of the balloon mission over the United States, and that China is still trying to figure out how this happened.” Alternatively, if Xi was apprised of the balloon launch and approved its mission, he might have underestimated the strong domestic reactions within U.S. politics.

The intransigent attitude and poor handling by the Chinese government in its aftermath suggested the capriciousness of an autocrat that has grown drunk on his concentrated power, propaganda, and self-fulfilling narratives. It may be prudent for Biden to refrain from overly hyping up tensions with Beijing and avoid pushing a beleaguered Xi to the corner until more information and facts are received and assessed. However, Washington must be more vigilantly prepared to step up its guard in countering not only an aggressive PRC but, worse, an erratic one.

Dean P. Chen, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at Ramapo College of New Jersey.

Image: Midary / Shutterstock.com

De tous les ouvrages consacrés à la critique de l'Union européenne, et il n'en manque pas d'éruptifs, le plus dévastateur pourrait bien être l'un des plus discrets. L'un des plus décalés aussi. Travail méticuleux d'historien, « Les “Collabos” de l'Europe nouvelle », de Bernard Bruneteau, a de quoi faire (...) / Europe, France, Histoire, Idées, Intellectuels, Nazisme, Politique, Seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945 - 2017/12

« Qu'ils s'en aillent tous ! » Quinze ans après celui des Argentins confrontés au chaos économique, le cri parcourt un Brésil balayé par les scandales de corruption. Alors qu'aucune formation traditionnelle n'échappe au discrédit, une droite radicale parfois liée aux militaires émerge, qui promet de (...) / Amérique latine, Brésil, Communisme, Économie, Extrême droite, Libéralisme, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Politique, Religion, Extrême gauche, Corruption - 2017/12

What if the war had gone differently—or takes a sudden turn?

Even great powers aren’t safe from economic warfare—if the U.S.-led order sticks together.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spent two days visiting Israel and the West Bank. After meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Blinken said that normalization is “not a substitute for progress between Israelis and Palestinians.” In other words: Washington wants to tether Israel’s warming relations with the wider Arab world to the progress of negotiations with the Palestinians that have gone nowhere for the last fifteen years.

By linking these two efforts, Blinken is likely guaranteeing the failure of both.

The historic Abraham Accords agreements were signed with fanfare in 2020 on the south lawn of the White House, ushering in a new era of peace and cooperation between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Sudan and Morocco soon followed suit. A regional tectonic shift, the agreements opened the doors to new embassies, direct flights, a free trade agreement, and an influx of Israeli tourists—in particular to the UAE. The accords also seemed to signal a thawing of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which last year agreed to allow Israeli aircraft to use Saudi airspace.

When the Abraham Accords were announced, the Palestinian leadership expressed outrage, further complicating their already strained relations with the UAE. Palestinian rejectionism is nothing new—the Palestinian Authority (PA) wants to be the gatekeeper for Israeli access to the Arab world, blocking normalization unless it’s on Ramallah’s terms.

But waiting for the PA means waiting forever. Palestinians see the PA as both corrupt and incapable of preserving law and order. It has no mandate to make the difficult compromises necessary for peace with Israel. Israelis know they have no credible partner with whom to negotiate peace, so no prime minister has the mandate to make painful concessions. The parties of the “peace camp,” once a powerful force, barely garnered enough votes last year to sit in the Israeli Knesset.

Four Israeli prime ministers from different political parties offered compromises in the name of peace over the years, but Palestinian leaders rejected them all. Rather than laying the groundwork for peace, the PA’s education system is rife with incitement to violence: Palestinian schoolbooks have erased Israel from the map, and the PA continues rewarding terrorists and their families with handsome salaries for killing and maiming Jews.

PA President Mahmoud Abbas—who is now entering the eighteenth year of his four-year term—is eighty-seven years old and deeply unpopular. More than three-quarters of West Bank Palestinians want him to resign. But the PA’s troubles don’t end there. The West Bank is facing the deadliest increase in violence since the Second Intifada (2000–2005), with more Israelis killed in the West Bank in almost a decade and more Palestinian fatalities since 2007.

Against this backdrop, it makes no sense for Blinken to create a linkage between advancing regional normalization and the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Instead, the United States should be working furiously to decouple the two.

The normalization track has particular value for Washington because it is building a robust regional alliance to serve as a bulwark against Iran.

President Joe Biden has reiterated time and again that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, a recent analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security estimates that Iran is dangerously close to breakout capacity. A nuclear Iran threatens not only threatens Israel but also U.S. allies and assets in the Gulf and beyond. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, it will set off a nuclear arms race in the region and super-charge the many proxy militias that Iran has funded around the Middle East.

As Iran barrels towards nuclear capabilities, and with America’s attention and resources drawn to pressing global threats like the war in Ukraine and the threat from China, Blinken should focus on rallying a coalition to share the work of deterring and containing Iran. In that coalition, Israel is the only country that has credible options for the use of force to prevent a nuclear Iran.

By placing an unnecessary emphasis on Israel’s domestic issues and the elusive dream of Palestinian statehood, Blinken underscored an apparent fissure between the U.S. and its strongest and most capable Middle Eastern ally. But there is still time for the Biden administration to reevaluate its strategy and set its priorities straight: national security and regional stability before the national cause of a hapless Palestinian Authority.

Enia Krivine is the senior director of the Israel Program and the FDD National Security Network at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Enia on Twitter at @EKrivine.

Jonathan Conricus is an advisor to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on the Middle East, terrorism, media, and information warfare. Follow Jonathan on Twitter at @jconricus.

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For decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been honing its abilities in cyberspace, attacking any targets with strategic value to the regime, while increasingly integrating cyber as part of the nation’s broader intelligence and warfighting toolkit. Yet, despite the CCP’s widespread and relentless use of damaging and disruptive cyberattacks, little attention has been paid to the way China’s cyber strategy has been directly shaped and influenced by Xi Jinping since he came to power in November 2012. Indeed, over the last several years, as the CCP has become less about the collective and more about Xi, so too have the country’s cyberattacks. For Xi, cyberspace has become a reflection of his personal preferences, priorities, and insecurities, and a key domain he can and does routinely exploit to suppress his critics, disseminate his narratives, fulfill his visions, and maintain his cult of personality. For China, cyberspace is no longer just a means of leapfrogging its rivals and ascending the global power ladder—it has also become a key tool in the preservation of Xi Jinping.

Xi’s Digital Fortress

Most autocrats are deeply insecure and self-absorbed individuals, fixated on their own power and security. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Xi has emboldened and empowered China’s already extensive security system to become the most pervasive and illiberal surveillance state in the world—primarily as a means to safeguard himself as the most powerful leader in the country’s history. As many observers have noted, since taking charge of the country in 2012, and despite consistently pontificating about things like “common prosperity,” the fact he wants China to become a “fully developed, rich, and powerful” nation, or his vision for a “community of Chinese nationhood,” it has become increasingly clear Xi is most concerned about something else—himself. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao—China’s leader during the country’s initial foray into any sort of noteworthy cyber conflict—Xi’s visions of homogeneous national growth, identity, and unity revolve entirely around him and his divinity as China’s anointed savior. For Xi, a key piece of the enormous digital fortress he continues to shield himself with is cyberspace—a domain he uses unlike any other leader in world history to inflict harm on people or organizations who threaten him, or who question his vision and his “right to rule.”

While Chinese leaders and elites before Xi viewed cyberspace as a tool for advancing their political and ideological goals, China’s cyber strategy under Xi now unquestionably reflects his insecurities as well as his ambitions to consolidate power, protect his own image, and control the Chinese people inside and outside the mainland in ways his predecessors could not have imagined. To achieve these objectives and maintain what China expert Michael Schuman recently described as “the relentless promotion of his personality cult,” Xi has broadened the country’s cyber strategy far beyond espionage as a means of national growth and influence to now account for the protection and promotion of his greatness. Through three key steps—taking over control of China’s military, including its cyber units; bolstering the world’s most advanced domestic internet censorship system; and using cyberspace to attack and harass critics and dissidents abroad—Xi has completely reshaped the country’s cyber posture as a means of protecting himself, assuaging any insecurities and paranoia, and ensuring all facets of Chinese life at home and abroad reflect his personal beliefs. Xi Jinping wants to rebuild China in his image, and he is using cyberspace to do it.

The PLA’s New Commander-in-Chief 

Since his earliest days as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping has made it clear China’s military must be modernized. Tapping into visions of the country’s “century of humiliation” Xi has framed a strengthened People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as being crucial to restoring China’s greatness—greatness the country can only attain through his vision. In his own words, Xi has opined, “a nation’s backwardness in military affairs has a profound influence on a nation’s security. I often peruse the annals of modern Chinese history and feel heartbroken at the tragic scenes of us being beaten because of our ineptitude.” For Xi, ensuring China is never beaten or embarrassed again is critical. However, ensuring he himself is never beaten, challenged, or embarrassed is equally, if not more important. Luckily, for Xi, the country’s cyber soldiers—soldiers he controls—help to ensure these things are unlikely to ever happen. As China expert Tai Ming Cheung has said, “no other Chinese Communist Party leader, not even Mao Zedong, has controlled the military to the same extent as Xi does today.”

From a cyber perspective, Xi has been talking about making China a “cyber power” for the better part of a decade, and since at least 2015 when he announced a new Strategic Support Force, the PLA branch responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare, cyber has been a pillar of the country’s military modernization. Typically, works analyzing this latest chapter in the modernization of China’s military suggest this historic change is rooted in things like state security, regime survival, social cohesion, and the changing nature of warfare. Of course, all of these issues have contributed to Xi’s desire for China to have a “world-class military” by the middle of the century. However, it is now hard to ignore the fact that as Xi has come to control the PLA, including elements of the Chinese military responsible for carrying out cyber operations (e.g., Unit 61398), many of these aforementioned factors are now anchored to Xi and his own security and survival—not the Party’s. To echo William Lam, a political analyst at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, “Xi is paranoid about maintaining his personal security and of course, his power and his status as leader for life.” 

Control at Home

In the physical world, Xi has taken a number of steps to position himself as the unquestioned and unchallenged unitary leader of China. From integrating “Xi Jinping Thought” into the country’s constitution and national educational curricula to positioning himself as leader for life, to harassing, intimidating, and imprisoning dissidents, Xi has sought to ensure he is fully in control of China’s 1.4 billion people. Likewise, Xi has also worked to increasingly control online information and disseminate his messages throughout the mainland. For example, in 2014 the CCP created a new government department—the Cyberspace Administration of China—to regulate the internet, which Xi ultimately controls. In addition, Xi has long pushed the concept of “internet sovereignty”—or the idea that China (and presumably other countries) should be free to control the internet within its borders as it sees fit. Xi has also relied heavily on the country’s “Great Firewall”—the CCP’s legislative and technological toolkit—to limit outside information into the country as a means of shaping public thought and discourse in his personage. Some have suggested Xi’s control of cyberspace has been so pronounced that he has radicalized a generation. Writing for Human Rights Watch, Yaqiu Wang notes, “Now young online Chinese, once conduits for new ideas that challenge the power structure, are increasingly part of Beijing’s defense operation.” 

Early into Xi’s takeover, the government also introduced historic laws authorizing prison terms of up to three years for individuals caught posting defamatory comments online, or for people the government considered responsible for inciting protests or unrest. Control of online information on Xi’s terms has been so important, the government reportedly hired over two-million people as “microblog monitors” in 2013 to track and report unauthorized online information. Other online legal and institutional mechanisms the CCP have applied since Xi came to power include requiring government licenses for all online news sources, including messaging apps, blogs, and internet forums; mandating companies censor prohibited online content and requiring website registrants use their real names; restricting VPN usage; and increasingly ensuring internet providers obey state rules. 

An illustrative example of China’s ability to censor online information critical of Xi came in October 2022, when authorities purged the country’s internet of any evidence of a recent (and minor) protest calling for Xi’s removal. Some internet users who shared photos or videos of the protest have allegedly been cut off from accessing certain social media apps—apps which in China, are essential to daily life. Put bluntly, Xi’s obsession with securitizing himself and his image is paramount, and China’s state activities and repressive online behavior reflect this. As Susan Shirk recently wrote “…Xi takes the paranoia that has been endemic to Chinese politics since Mao Zedong’s rule to an extreme.”

Xi’s Global Insecurities  

Ensuring that his messaging, aura, and image are preserved abroad is equally important for Xi—a priority that has been reflected in the country’s use of cyberspace for years. In fact, Xi considers both internal and external threats as intertwined mutually reinforcing vulnerabilities. For starters, to combat and quell foreign threats, Xi has an entire army of cyber propagandists at his disposal who work around the clock to shape and influence public opinion abroad on social media sites. Xi’s “Fifty Cent Army”—the country’s state-backed internet militia—also regularly carries out harassment campaigns against individuals who pose a threat to Xi, and targets Chinese-language media outlets around the globe with messages and narratives important to him and his regime. China also routinely uses cyber as a means of harassing and coercing people with connections to dissidents the regime wants to return to China. For example, in July 2020, a Chinese student studying in Australia who manages a Twitter account critical of the general secretary said she had received video calls from a Chinese police officer, who, standing next to her father, warned her “remember that you are a citizen of China.” Speaking to this issue in October 2020, then-United States Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers, alongside FBI Director Chris Wray, delivered remarks announcing charges against eight agents of the CCP carrying out these types of acts against individuals living in the United States. Describing operation “Fox Hunt”—the CCP’s global anti-corruption campaign—Demers said, “…some of the individuals [targeted through this international CCP operation] may well be wanted on traditional criminal charges and they may even be guilty of what they are charged with. But in many instances, the hunted are opponents of CCP Chairman Xi – political rivals, dissidents, and critics.”

There has also been a well-documented surge of online disinformation targeting Chinese communities abroad, in places ranging from the United States to Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. Further, last year, the FBI also accused China of targeting Uyghurs based in the United States, through both physical and digital tactics. The FBI bulletin reads “Threatened consequences for non-compliance routinely include detainment of a U.S.-based person’s family or friends in China, seizure of China-based assets, sustained digital and in-person harassment, Chinese government attempts to force repatriation, computer hacking and digital attacks, and false representation online.” This nefarious online behavior that started under Xi, is a reflection of his paranoia and insecurities, as well as his desire to Sinicize China inside and out, while ensuring the world’s global Chinese population adheres to her personal vision for the country. 

The Xi Threat

While espionage is still China’s top priority in cyberspace and across the nation’s broader intelligence community (as illustrated by their recent spy-balloon fiasco) the country’s use of cyberspace under Xi has changed dramatically as he has progressively consolidated his power, and incrementally worked to shape Chinese society and thought in his image. In addition, China’s behavior in the digital domain now reflects the insecurities and paranoia of the most powerful leader in the country’s history. 

Going forward, more scholarly work is required to assess the degree China’s cyber strategy is shaped and influenced by Xi, and further, what that relationship might mean from a policy perspective. Perhaps if scholars and policymakers can develop a better understanding of what drives China’s behavior in cyberspace—as opposed to continuously focusing on how the country operates online—we will be better equipped to protect ourselves. In cyberspace, it might be time to start thinking about the “China threat” as the “Xi threat.” With Xi having secured another five-year term at the 2022 Communist Party congress, it is more important than ever that we develop a better understanding of the man who controls everything in China, and the extent to which his own beliefs and preferences shape the country’s strategy online and beyond.

Dr. Casey Babb is an International Fellow with the Glazer Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, England, and an instructor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, in Ottawa. His writing has appeared in Lawfare, The Globe and Mail, The National Post, The Jerusalem Post, and in scholarly peer-reviewed publications in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Casey is also a former advisor to two of Canada’s defense ministers, and a former Senior Analyst in Public Safety Canada’s National and Cyber Security Branch.

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