Diplomacy & Crisis News

Washington’s prewar efforts were weak and inadequate.

At the national level, parties insist they won’t work or vote with the far-right AfD—but at the local level, it happens all the time.

Someday, soldiers hope to return home and topple Lukashenko.

America and China need to cooperate on relief.

What the war in Ukraine has revealed about geopolitical rivalry.

With his dramatic trip to Kyiv, President Joe Biden directly escalated his confrontation with Russian president Vladimir Putin—and with his Republican detractors at home. Biden, you could say, is all-in on standing by Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression. His visit not only to Kyiv but also to Warsaw, where he will deliver a speech about the conflict, marks a pivotal moment. More than ever, Biden is signaling that he is a war president.

Biden’s critics like to paint him as an old duffer who is out of touch with contemporary realities. Sen. Rick Scott (R-FL) recently referred to him as “confused.” But his audacious trip to Kyiv showed no confusion. It demonstrated real moxie. So much for “Basement Biden.”

Nor was this all. The trip also underscored Biden’s diplomatic savvy. As a product of the Cold War era, Biden knows that he, and he alone, can exercise the leadership to bolster the Western alliance, which buckled but never disintegrated during the standoff with the Soviet Union, no matter how much pressure the Kremlin exerted upon it. It’s back to the future. Once more, Moscow is attempting to fracture NATO in the hopes of creating its own, anti-Western new world order.

Biden isn’t budging. He campaigned on restoring American democracy but has ended up defending it even more abroad. The Ukraine crisis plays to his strengths, allowing him to exercise the atrophied diplomatic and military muscles of the Western alliance to promote American predominance once again.

As Adrian Kubicki, the Polish consul-general in New York, told me, “President Biden’s visit to Ukraine and his following visit to Poland reaffirms the US’s strong commitment to continue its support to Ukraine and Ukrainians in their defense against Russian aggression. It is also an important message to Poland and other allies from the eastern flank of NATO that the security of the region is our common top priority. Poland and other B9 countries [the Bucharest Nine] will have an opportunity to discuss directly with President Biden what measures NATO should take in order to enhance our defense capabilities and security. This historic visit is a significant step forward towards the end of Russia’s war of choice.”

Biden’s emergence as a vigorous leader is not sitting well with his critics on the political Right who are scrambling to depict his courageous visit as misguided or worse. For them, the idea that politics stops at the water’s edge is so yesterday. This morning, for example, Florida governor Ron DeSantis told Fox & Friends, “I and many Americans are thinking to ourselves, OK, he’s very concerned about those borders halfway around the world. He’s not done anything to secure our own borders here… we have a lot of problems accumulating here.” He added that Russia has been exposed as a “third-rate military power.” Maybe so, but he conveniently ignored that the exposure would never have occurred had Biden not supported Ukraine in the first place.

Then there was Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene. In a tweet, she stated, “This is incredibly insulting. Today on our President’s Day, Joe Biden, the President of the United States chose Ukraine over America, while forcing the American people to pay for Ukraine’s government and war. I can not express how much Americans hate Joe Biden.” It’s a false choice. Biden isn’t picking Ukraine over America. He’s carefully countering Vladimir Putin’s ambition to create a new Russian empire that will directly menace Europe. Anyway, the idea that the conflict is “Ukraine’s war,” as she puts it, is a canard. Conservatives used to recoil at what they called blaming the victim. But that’s precisely what she is doing—creating a fictional narrative that Ukraine is the bad guy, responsible for triggering the war through its obstreperous behavior.  Since when does mere existence constitute a casus belli for being attacked?

Make no mistake: the Ukraine war will create a searing rift in the GOP. The old guard represented by Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell will champion the war against Ukraine. Presidential candidates like Nikki Haley and (presumably) Mike Pompeo will attack Biden for being too soft on foreign policy. But others in the GOP are chicken about backing Kyiv. Take Donald Trump. He will promote a policy of cowardly truckling to the Kremlin—charging that Biden bungled matters by not seeking a diplomatic solution, namely, handing over Ukraine to Putin on a silver platter as part and parcel of Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence. 

Acceding to Putin’s megalomaniacal desire to rub Ukraine from the map would likely spell the end of NATO. Putin’s hold on power inside Russia would be impregnable. The Baltic states would be next on his hit list. Meanwhile, China would be fortified in its ambition to gobble up Taiwan and expel America, as far as possible, from the Asian theater.

Biden has it right. In visiting Kyiv on the eve of the anniversary of the Russian invasion, he’s showing that America isn’t going AWOL. Instead, it’s staying on the field of fight.

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters last year that he wanted his country to become a “‘big Israel’ with its own face” after the Russian invasion ends, stressing that security would likely be the main issue in Ukraine during the postwar period.

Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, was drawing supposedly some parallels between the future of Ukraine and contemporary Israel, where the images of soldiers and armed civilians are commonplace, and the government invokes security frequently.

The Ukrainian president stressed that his vision for his country’s post-conflict future included having armed forces in “all institutions, supermarkets, cinemas, there will be people with weapons.”

And he has on several occasions stressed the importance of maintaining close ties with Israel, which he hailed as a model for Ukraine.

“I am sure that our security issue will be number one in the next 10 years,” Zelenskyy said, dismissing the idea that postwar Ukraine would emulate a liberal European democracy such as Switzerland as a model. He said that the Ukrainian people “will be our great army.”

But at the same time, Zelenskyy insisted that notwithstanding its security challenges Ukraine would remain a functioning democracy like Israel. However, he said that, like the Jewish state, Ukraine would not be “absolutely liberal, European”; it would have to undertake a different modus operandi that reflects its unique geo-political situation.

“Ukraine will definitely not be what we wanted it to be from the beginning. It is impossible,” he told members of the Ukrainian media during a briefing. “Absolutely liberal, European – it will not be like that. It [Ukraine] will definitely come from the strength of every house, every building, every person.”

But the bottom line, he stressed, was that Ukraine would not slide into authoritarianism like Russia, adding: “An authoritarian state would lose to Russia. People know what they are fighting for,” he said. Ukraine, he stressed, represented Western democratic values as it faced a threat to its existence from an anti-Western authoritarian regime that dominated the neighborhood.

Indeed, Zelenskyy has been employing the Israeli model of a modern and progressive democratic nation, representing the values and interests of the West, fighting for its survival against a ruthless and corrupt dictatorship that seeks to destroy it.

Like Israeli prime minister Benjamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu, a former furniture salesman, Zelenskyy, a former comedian, has emerged an effective global marketing operator. He is telegenic and charismatic, fluent in American English, and familiar with the cultural codes of the Western elites’ political Zeitgeist.

And if Bibi, as some suggested, has tried to turn Israel into the fifty-first state of the United States, “Vlodko,” it seems at times, is hoping that his country was next in line to become the fifty-second state: A symbol of democratic values in a hostile region, with its educated population and an advanced economy, that could turn into another start-up nation, with a large and powerful diaspora, all translated into American congressional and public support.

Ironically, Israel, reflecting its complex ties with Russia—that for all practical purposes now maintains a protectorate in neighboring Syria—has resisted pleas from Kyiv for advanced weaponry. Air defense systems, in particular, have not been forthcoming and Israel has remained neutral in the war between Russia and Ukraine.

But the notion that Ukraine will try to be “like Israel” may not sound so farfetched. For instance, like the Jewish State, Ukraine enjoys wide public support among Americans and their representatives on Capitol Hill, who believe that the Ukrainians, like the Israelis, are “like them,” while the Russians, like the Arabs, are the detested “other.”

And, indeed, like in the case of Israel, Ukraine’s efforts to position itself as a natural ally of Washington, in both interests and values, has been accepted as a diplomatic axiom by powerful American foreign policy forces. Both Republican neoconservatives as well as many “conservative nationalists” on the political Right, and by liberal internationalists who dominate the thinking among Democrats, including the one currently occupying the White House, have come on board.

For many Americans, the notion of an alliance with Israel is accepted today as a given, one more example of how history is seen sometimes as moving in a linear direction (“tides of history”). But much of what happens in international relations is less a reflection of the wisdom of history and more contingent on unexpected developments, or for that matter, cannot be explained by what political scientists refer to as a “rational actor model.” Instead, it is a product of clashes between personalities, bureaucratic rivalries, and Niccolo Machiavelli’s fortuna, those circumstances which human beings cannot control, and in particular, the character of the times.

From that perspective, the American relationship with Israel evolved not as part of an effort to protect or advance U.S. national interests in the Middle East. In fact, the members of the Washington foreign policy establishment, led by then-Secretary of State George Marshall, had opposed U.S. recognition of Israel in 1948 based on the consideration that Americans needed to win the support of the Arab states, in particular the Gulf oil-producing nations, to strategically protect Western interests at the onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (as well as out of fears that the United States could be drawn into an Arab-Israeli war).

Much has been said and written about the reasons that then-President Harry Truman rejected Marshall’s advice and established ties with the newly created Israel. Suffice to note that his decision was driven by the same reasons that large segments of the American public and elites supported Zionism at the time, which include Christian attachment to the Promised Land and the People of the Book, the impact of the European Holocaust and the plight of the Jewish refugees fleeing postwar Europe, and the existence of a politically active Jewish community.

Yet the United States had imposed an arms embargo on Israel until the early 1960s and clashed with Israel over numerous issues, including its decision to join France and Britain in attacking Egypt in 1956, forcing it to withdraw its troops from Sinai, as well as over its conflict with the pro-American Jordan, and later on, over its development of nuclear military power.

And when it came to values, Israel was ruled during its early years by a socialist government and elite that only reluctantly decided to support the American side during the Korean War.

Hence the notion of an “alliance” between the United States and Israel only started to make sense after the 1967 Six Day War, and the launching of a pre-emptive Israeli military strike against Egypt after receiving a “yellow” light from then President Lyndon Johnson to take action. Driven by U.S. support for Israel, anti-Americanism in the Arab World reached its peak during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing oil embargo against the United States.

Notwithstanding all the talk about Israel’s being America’s “strategic asset” in the Middle East during the Cold War, the military contribution of the Jewish state to America’s victory over the Soviet Union was marginal, mostly by protecting Jordan against outside threats and sharing critical intelligence.

If anything, in addition to igniting anti-American sentiments in the Arab and the Muslim World during the Cold War, American support for Israel brought the United States and USSR to the brink of nuclear conflict during the Yom Kippur War and forced the United States into costly military interventions in the Middle East, like in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

But if you were a Zionist who believed that Israel’s survival aligned with America’s sense of its own history and identity, like the majority of Congressional Democrats and Republicans and most Americans did, the suggestions that support for Israel failed to align with Realpolitik-based considerations or that Israel wasn’t a perfect democracy were beside the point. Those sentiments were demonstrated by the massive military and economic assistance Washington has provided Jerusalem through the years and its unyielding diplomatic backing for Israel.

Therefore, although Zelenskyy may recognize that Realpolitik may dictate limits on the U.S. support for Ukraine, a scenario exists in which the United States, like in the case of Israel, is gradually drawn into an alliance of sorts with Kyiv that goes beyond just trying to re-establish the status quo that existed before Russia’s invasion.

Like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the long-standing conflict between Ukraine and Russia over issues related to national rights, ethnic identity, borders, and sovereignty does not touch directly upon American interests or even values, involving issues like who should control the West Bank or for that matter, Crimea.

But then Israel and its American supporters have been successful in gaining U.S. support for its positions in the conflict with the Arabs, including its refusal to allow the 1947 Arab refugees to return to Israel proper, and most recently, in the decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital as well its annexation of the Golan Heights. Hence, perhaps Kyiv could win American backing for its demand that it, and not Russia, rightfully controls Crimea.

Indeed, Zelenskyy hopes that in the same way that the majority of Americans continue to instinctively side with Israel and lack sympathy for the Arab side, most Americans would feel the same about the conflict between the Ukrainians and the Russians.

But at a time when even Israel finds it difficult to continue holding to its support among the majority of Americans, Zelenskyy may discover that even being “like Israel” doesn’t do the trick.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz (Hebrew).

Image: Amit.pansuriya / Shutterstock.com

As the Chinese spy balloon hovered over Montana, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken made the decision to postpone his scheduled visit to China. The stakes of that visit were already high, with the two sides expected to discuss the ongoing semiconductor chip embargo, Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy’s visit to Taiwan, the war in Ukraine, and more. Now, neither side will have that opportunity. President Joe Biden promises that the balloon incident will not ultimately weaken U.S.-China relations, but there is little doubt that domestic pressure to get tougher on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has intensified.

By no stretch of the imagination does this look like what Xi Jinping would have wanted, especially at this juncture. Not long ago, the CCP had extended an olive branch to the United States and the West, hoping to improve relations in ways that would benefit Chinese trade with Europe and America and allow greater proximity to its greatest political rival. China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, had taken advantage of that emerging proximity, personally attending a Washington Wizards game and sending Chinese New Year greetings to the American audience before the game. Such efforts will now be put on hold following the balloon incident.

Given the negative fallout that was sure to come in the wake of flying a massive spy balloon in Western skies, why would the CCP have made such a move? One possible explanation is that this was part of China’s espionage routine, and that the CCP wanted to project a strong image ahead of Blinken’s visit. That explanation assumes, however, that China was unprepared for the strength of the American diplomatic response—something that seems unlikely from a country as sophisticated as China. What Xi Jinping needs right now is to de-escalate tensions with the United States, and serious provocations flown in American skies run counter to that goal. And if Xi truly wants to show his military might to Washington, a balloon is too light a weight.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the top Chinese leadership might not have even been aware of the balloon before it was informed by the U.S. State Department. How can it be that “U.S. officials are confident, however, that China directed the balloon” although “they don’t know if Beijing initially intended for the balloon to travel south over the U.S. heartland after it ventured over Alaska.”

If launching the balloon over the U.S. territory was not Xi Jinping’s idea, that leaves two distinct possibilities. One possibility is that certain Chinese bureaucrats were politically insensitive enough to release the balloon over the United States before Blinken’s visit without asking Beijing for permission. A second possibility is that this was done by internal opposition to Xi, with the intention of further straining U.S.-China relations and making an international mockery of Xi's leadership. The latter possibility is no less likely than the former.

In either case, who is the likeliest “candidate” that is out of step with Xi Jinping? Quite likely, it would be the Chinese military.

On February 4 the U.S. Department of Defense issued a statement refuting the Chinese claim that the balloon was a mere weather balloon. In the statement, a senior official stated that “This was a PRC surveillance balloon. This surveillance balloon purposefully traversed the United States and Canada. And we are confident it was seeking to monitor sensitive military sites. Its route over the United States, near many potential sensitive sites, contradicts the PRC government’s explanation that it was a weather balloon.”

This claim is bolstered by Chinese companies’ own claim that they produce such balloons for military use. For example, according to the website of China Zhuzhou Rubber Research & Design Institute Co Ltd., it is a government-owned military research institute with weapon production licenses. Its military supporting products were used in the “Shenzhou V” manned spacecraft, and have won the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Armament Department commendation. It is a designated research institution for the weather balloons of all military branches of the PLA.

Following the shooting down of the first balloon, the United States swiftly sanctioned six Chinese companies involved in the production of such balloons.

Chinese law also provides circumstantial evidence that this is a military balloon. According to Article 70 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China, the state shall exercise unified management of the airspace. This means that private individuals are prohibited from launching any flying objects without government permission. Thus, a massive surveillance balloon sent into the stratosphere and left hovering over the United States for multiple days could not be the act of a civilian company—this act must have been sanctioned by someone in the military or government, with the former being a likelier suspect given its direct responsibility over securing airspace.

It is possible the balloon could have been part of a military research project, and such projects are generally not reported to Xi Jinping. Approval from a military intelligence organization, such as the PLA’s Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department, would suffice. But the usage of this balloon was far from a routine experiment, given its sensitive timing and the balloon’s lengthy stay in the United States. This has given rise to speculation that it was meant primarily for Americans to see, causing a surge of negative opinions regarding the CCP.

This is not the first time a blunder by the Chinese military, at a critical moment and in direct opposition to Xi Jinping’s wishes, has left him in an embarrassing diplomatic position. In September 2014, Xi Jinping visited India for the first time as general secretary of the CCP. This was a critical visit, involving twelve key agreements between the countries—including China’s commitment to invest $20 billion in India’s infrastructure over the next five years. But during the visit, border guards from both countries clashed along the India-China border. Indian media reported that, in the week prior, Chinese troops built a temporary road across the Line of Actual Control in the disputed border area of Ladaka and into Indian territory. India mobilized thousands of troops to the area to confront a significant number of Chinese soldiers. In a joint press conference after the talks, Modi called for a “clarification” of the Line of Actual Control on the border, putting Xi Jinping in an awkward position.

Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, faced a similar situation when he met U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on January 11, 2011. On the day of the meeting, China conducted a test flight of its newly developed J-20 fighter jet. Gates confronted Hu about the flight, asking if the move was directly related to his visit. Hu made clear that he had no prior awareness of the military maneuver, discovering the details only after he asked Chinese military personnel about it following his discussion with Gates.

Hu Jintao did not take control of the military during his tenure—it was essentially under the control of his predecessor and political rival, Jiang Zemin. This situation has continued into the Xi Jinping era: although Xi has made sweeping reforms to the military, promoting a large number of people he trusts to be senior generals (such as war zone commanders), the military is still not fully under his control. Chinese military sources have told me that many senior generals are estranged from the troops under their command.

By the time of the 20th National Congress, Xi Jinping had essentially crushed any opposition to him. At least on the surface, no one dares to oppose him. However, his tendency to place his own political allies in key positions has alienated large numbers of CCP cadres. But with his stronghold on control of the country, there is little they can do internally. In the minds of Xi’s opponents, the only one who can truly deal a heavy blow to Xi now is the United States.

Yet Xi and the CCP are now inextricably linked. Xi has tied the fate of the Communist Party to his own. And Xi’s—and thus, the CCP’s—fundamental view of the United States will not change. In light of this, the United States needs to remain acutely aware of a few things.

One is that the balloon incident, which has increased public pressure to get tougher on the CCP, has the potential to tighten the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and Russia. Since the incident reinforces Xi’s understanding that the overall trend in U.S.-China relations is towards rivalry and confrontation, he may cling ever more tightly to his relationship with Russia, currently China’s only ally with international military and political strength.Without Russia, China would stand alone in its confrontation with the West. And, if China were to attack Taiwan by force in the future, it would need a steady rearguard. Whether they have a friend or a foe on the other side of the 1,000-kilometer Russian-Chinese border will determine whether China dares to fight with confidence in the front.

To maintain the surety of that rearguard, China has continued to support Russia in its aggression against Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal recently revealed that import and export data from Russian customs obtained by C4ADS, a nonprofit organization, demonstrate that Chinese state-owned defense companies have been shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and jet fighter parts to sanctioned Russian state-owned defense companies since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, Russian imports of computer chips and chip components have now largely reached pre-war averages. Most of these shipments come from China.

The promise made to Vladimir Putin last year by Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, that China would support Russia, was not false—and the overall pattern of the CCP’s confrontation with the West, with Russia as an ally, will not change. The Russo-Ukrainian War, if ending in a Ukrainian victory and Putin’s ouster or Russia’s fall to the West, would be a heavy blow to Xi and the CCP. In that case, Europe and the United States would no longer face a security threat from Russia, leaving them free to focus their collective energies on dealing with the CCP. That situation is unwelcome enough in the eyes of Xi, incentivizing him to possibly offer his services as a mediator between the West and Russia in negotiations for an early end to the war while keeping Putin in power. This move though should not be seen as evidence of solidarity with Western values and intentions—rather, it is a self-serving means to preserve their military and economic strength to battle the West, including preparing for a larger war in the Taiwan Strait.

Simone Gao is a journalist and host of Zooming In With Simone Gao, an online current-affairs program.

Image: Shutterstock.

Trade relations between China and the U.S. have strained markedly in the past few years, beginning with the trade war in 2018 under the Trump administration. Tariffs and other measures were intended to rectify the growing reality that China disproportionately benefits from the globalized trade system, thus challenging the United States as the world’s economic powerhouse. This economic success, coupled with China’s reluctance to assimilate into the U.S.-led order and adopt liberal institutions and values, has fueled growing geopolitical competition. Various popular theories, such as the notion that liberal reforms would inevitably arise in China through its integration with global markets, were incorrect. Rather, China has pursued an industrial policy and gained politico-economic strength by leveraging free-trade policies. The U.S. response has been to resurrect and bolster an industrial policy of its own to adapt to the new geopolitical environment that China has wrought.

Contrasting Approaches to Industrial Policy

In an article for Foreign Affairs, John M. Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz describe how a bipartisan shift in the United States towards industrial policy has come about as a result of the “Made in China 2025” report, released in 2015, which detailed Beijing’s plans to advance its domestic high-tech industry. While possessing a strong manufacturing industry for low-value goods, China’s high-tech industry is comparatively underdeveloped and has been (and remains to an extent) dominated by Western companies. Through state-funded R&D projects, China hopes to become a world leader in advanced sectors such as AI, green energy, and semiconductors. China’s plans to annually scale up its R&D spending may see it become the world’s largest spender on such, up from its current position as the twelfth largest spender globally, with R&D accounting for 2.55 percent of its GDP.

But why is R&D so important? The work of economist Mariana Mazzucato points out that many of the United States’ most important technological developments were accomplished through publicly-funded, state-backed support. Mazzucato writes that between 1971 and 2006, 88 percent of the most important innovations have been fully dependent on federal research support. Publicly funded research via agencies such as the Department of Defense, DARPA, and the National Science Foundation enabled the development of touchscreen technology, the Internet, SIRI, GPS, and even Google’s algorithm. Likewise, Elon Musk’s Tesla and SpaceX have received billions in government support. The United States has a long history of state intervention with successful results, although publicly these days it praises free market capitalism and small government, downplaying the key role the state has played. The successes that U.S. state-backed R&D projects have enjoyed are what China hopes to replicate for itself.

However, if the United States has always been this state-driven hub of innovation, why is industrial policy now occupying the forefront again?

For starters, America still operates in a laissez-faire economy with a variety of powerful corporate actors, all of whom operate according to their own profit incentives. Mazzucato describes this phenomenon—the “socialization of risk and privatization of rewards”—as a pitfall of U.S. policy, wherein the state invests significantly in research while failing to reap any of the benefits that ought to accompany this, such as higher employment, increased tax revenues, and increased exports of goods and services. Instead, these rewards are privatized and commercialized by corporate venture capitalists. Such individuals and institutions are experts at tax avoidance and evasion, and will further seek to maximize their profits through outsourcing/offshoring manufacturing, and engaging in unproductive behavior such as stock buybacks. The deleterious effects of offshoring production to China have already been demonstrated through mass intellectual property theft, which has enabled China to avoid these costly investments in R&D and subsidize the domestic deployment of stolen technology.

What follows from this is the observation that the U.S. state is simply less centralized when compared to the Chinese state. While there is a high amount of government intervention in the United States, the accrual of significant profits to private conglomerates and individuals, together with the freedom with which they are allowed to operate, contrasts with China’s approach of ubiquitous Chinese Communist Party coordination and the persecution of capitalist elites with divergent interests. The CCP is the locus of power in China, while the United States has a more dispersed system of both private and public interests.

U.S. politics is the constant vying for power of these separate groups, and these interests often clash with one another: what is most financially profitable for a conglomerate may endanger the national security interest that the intelligence community is tasked with defending. What occurred during the preceding years was that there were low geopolitical and security risks associated with China, meaning that, as Steve Blank states, “private equity and venture capital were the de facto decision-makers of U.S. industrial policy.” This resulted in lucrative collaboration with China, which has subsequently led to a rise in national security risks. This heightened level of risk has injected a dose of realism into international relations once again, which means that security trumps economics.

Techno-Nationalism

This is what the emergent new industrial policy aims to achieve. Techno-nationalism, as it is known, “is a new strain of mercantilist thinking that links technological innovation and capabilities directly to a nation’s national security, economic prosperity, and social stability.” It calls for greater state intervention to “intervene and guard against opportunistic or hostile state and non-state actors” as a response to “the West’s increasingly short-sighted laissez-faire model and China’s state-centric capitalism.”

The United States is being forced to reevaluate its laissez-faire attitudes and adopt a like-minded attitude toward the state’s role in the market. This, however, is not so much a copying of China’s industrial policy as it is a bolstering of policies that the United States has always embraced.

While Washington has pioneered its own version of state-sponsored innovation of new technologies through DARPA, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense, it has not successfully safeguarded these technologies from being co-opted through intellectual property theft, nor has it developed a robust and necessary domestic manufacturing industry for implementing new technologies. When it comes to cheap consumer products—like the plastic toys and clothing produced in sweatshops—offshoring poses little security threat and IP theft hold little weight. Offshoring semiconductor chip production, on the other hand, poses an array of new problems. The emerging industrial policy of techno-nationalism therefore centers on the pivotal role of highly advanced technology and the national security threats posed to the country if this technology is mishandled.

In President Joe Biden’s recent State of the Union Address, he lamented the decline of the United States domestic manufacturing industry, declaring that America has “imported products and exported jobs.” He singles out the semiconductor industry in particular, stating that despite the that the United States invented chip technology, it now only produces 10 percent of the total global supply. Biden notes that supply chain disruptions have brought to the fore the disadvantages that overseas production entails. The president’s rhetoric notably echoes that of the 2016 Trump campaign, with this continuity demonstrating the necessity of such industrial policies. Biden’s comments also allude to the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides $52.7 billion in funding for domestic semiconductor manufacturing, workforce development, and R&D. The United States is also aiming to mobilize domestic competitors Nokia and Ericsson against Huawei. Moreover, just as China’s “Made in China 2025” policy document centers on developing advanced AI technology, so too does the U.S. aim to bolster its own while stifling China’s, leading to what may be described as a technological arms race.

This phenomenon is not limited to the United States, as we are also seeing Australia, a country that is very much embroiled in this emerging geopolitical rivalry, adopting a similar posture—evidenced by plans to develop an Australian DARPA, as well as an interest in cultivating its own semiconductor industry and rare earth mineral refineries.

What we may take away from this is that the era of free-reign globalization is gradually coming to a close. This new industrial policy is recentering this idea of “government putting a thumb on the scale, rather than just assuming that market outcomes are going to produce the maximum benefit.” The market is spurred by different incentives which have come to clash with those of national security and politics. Economists resented the trade tariffs first implemented under Donald Trump, yet they have remained in place following the end of his administration and expanded to even further restrictions and countermeasures. Wherever this leads, geopolitical necessities have cautioned many on the downsides of globalization and forced the state to once again pursue technologically-oriented industrial policies in order to correct course.

Jasper Hansen holds a Bachelor of Political Science from the Australian National University. His main interests include geopolitics, national security policy, and political theory.

Image: aslysun/Shutterstock.

In the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes which have struck southeastern Turkey, a major cover-up operation has been set in motion to save President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s reputation. Construction, rather than production, has long been the hallmark of Erdogan’s rule. And like in Jericho, the walls have come tumbling down. With an economy in freefall and a general election scheduled to happen later this year, Erdogan’s fate may now be in the hands of the United States.

A Fragile Economy

As far back as March 2014, economic analyst Jesse Colombo warned in Forbes that Turkey’s bubble economy, predicated on a combination of foreign “hot money” inflows and ultra-low interest rates, was heading for a bust. A government-driven infrastructure boom led not only to new roads, bridges, high-speed trains, airports, hospitals, and schools, but also to residential buildings, skyscrapers, malls, and hotels.

The Turkish lira has only been kept from collapse by swap deals—with countries like Qatar, China, South Korea, and the Emirates—but also backdoor interventions. At the same time, Turkey’s burgeoning current account deficit has been reduced by unaccountable capital inflows registered as “net errors and omissions.”

The Walls Come Down...

Two days after the earthquakes, the Istanbul stock market was closed after the benchmark index went into freefall. It has now been reopened to make up for the losses. The government has also instructed private pension funds to increase their holdings of Turkish stocks from 10 to 30 percent to prop up the stock market.

On his visit to the earthquake-stricken zone, Erdogan was already on the defensive. While admitting to “shortcomings” in the government’s response, he preempted criticism by stating, “I cannot stomach people conducting negative campaigns for political interest.”

The pattern of collapsed buildings in the earthquake zone reveals an underlying instability. This is supported by evidence that, before the 2018 general elections, which elected Erdogan as president, almost 295,000 buildings in the affected provinces were exempted from adherence to construction regulations. In all, this construction amnesty was extended to 3.1 million buildings throughout the country.

Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, noted that the state has granted an amnesty to 317,000 buildings in the megacity, so there are now 90,000 buildings that are at risk of collapsing in the event of a major earthquake. This is likely, as Istanbul is in the North Anatolian Fault Zone as opposed to the East Anatolian Fault Zone, where the recent earthquakes have taken place. 

Earthquake damage is not inevitable, nor must it be as destructive. Four hospitals in the earthquake areas escaped damage because seismic isolation devices were used during construction. These devices, costing around $4,000 each, would have made a significant difference had they been installed in other buildings before the earthquakes.

Taking Responsibility

There are two leading questions that are being asked. First, what has happened to the earthquake taxes, officially estimated at 88 billion lira ($4.6 billion), collected since the last major earthquake in 1999, to prevent the present devastation? Erdogan has proved evasive on this issue. And second, who bears the responsibility for the failure to adhere to building codes?

Here, the buck stops with Erdogan, as a video has surfaced where the president boasts about the construction amnesty granted for buildings in the earthquake’s epicenter, Karahmanmaras. In an attempt to shift the blame, the Earthquake Crimes Investigations Bureaus have been established, which so far have resulted in legal action against 134 suspects, mainly contractors.

As for Erdogan, he has claimed that 98 percent of the buildings that collapsed were built before 1999—i.e., before the previous earthquake, and therefore, the responsibility of the previous government. However, data shows that at least half of the collapsed buildings were built after 2001. Additionally, a video shows that buildings close to the epicenter were built in 2004, two years after the AKP government came to power.

America to the Rescue?

As well as sending two Urban Search and Rescue Teams and a Disaster Assistance Response Team, the United States has also instructed an aircraft carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush, to move toward Turkey in case there is a need for additional assistance. In nationalist circles, this has met with a negative response, which has been echoed by Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu.

On Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken plans to visit Turkey and will meet with his Turkish counterpart in Ankara. The issue of U.S. aid for the reconstruction of the earthquake zone could well arise, at which point, it will be a question of striking a balance between humanitarian aid and ensuring the survival of Erdogan’s regime.

Robert Ellis is an international advisor at the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens.

Image: Shutterstock.

The recent selection of Tsai Ming-yen as Taiwan’s new National Security Bureau (NSB) chief has surprised analysts in Taiwan. It represents the second consecutive surprising appointment for the island’s intelligence czar, both of which came under the tenure of Taiwan’s incumbent president, the independence-leaning Tsai Ing-wen. Like the previous appointment, Tsai Ming-yen’s ascension could reflect a shift in Taiwan’s approach to intelligence collection and sharing, which has responded to escalating and rapidly evolving threats to the island’s security.

Tsai Ming-yen’s accession came after the sudden resignation of former chief Chen Ming-tong. Chen’s appointment, as with Tsai’s, riled critics of the administration, given both were selected from outside Taiwan’s military and intelligence establishments. Perhaps shedding light on the reason for this, an official announcement stated that it was hoped Tsai would continue Chen’s efforts to “reform” the bureau.

Why Tsai?

But why was Tsai Ming-yen deemed the best candidate?

Firstly, while technically an outsider, Tsai was better qualified than Chen on the security/intelligence front. Tsai received his doctorate from King’s College’s Department of War. He was also a member of Taiwan’s National Defence Report advisory committee and an advisor for several Quadrennial Defence Reviews (2004-2016). Most importantly, he served for three years as Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC)—the inner circle responsible for directly advising the president on national security issues and whose members include the NSB’s director-general.

Secondly, Tsai, like his predecessor, is a well credentialled China expert. As with Chen, Tsai has been affiliated with the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), having served as an advisory committee member. He served a similar role in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s China Affairs Committee and has advised the Straits Exchange Foundation—a technical and operational arm of the MAC.

But perhaps Tsai’s most valued credential has been something different—his success in foreign affairs and diplomacy. Tsai was undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before his appointment in the NSB. Before then, he served as Taiwan’s representative to the European Union (2020-2022). His role in the latter was deemed highly successful, coinciding with the European Parliament passing legislation favorable to Taiwan, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu visiting European parliament members in Brussels, and Lithuania allowing Taiwan to set up a pseudo-consulate. Since then, the new president-elect of the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel, defied Beijing by talking on the phone with Taiwan’s president.

Diplomacy, Intelligence Sharing, and ‘Integrated Deterrence’

In welcoming his appointment, the administration’s spokesperson, Huang Chongyan, said Tsai would be tasked with handling “diplomacy,” in addition to “regional security… international strategy and security policy.” This broad purview—and in particular, the emphasis on diplomacy—may appear peculiar. But it reflects the shifting approach to security that is propelling the administration’s attempts to reform the bureau.

While serving as Taiwan’s European representative in early 2022, Tsai Ming-yen told the BBC that Taiwan was looking to implement the recently developed American concept of “integrated deterrence.” This involved, according to Tsai, coordinating with other democratic nations and exploiting political as well as traditional security tools. As highlighted by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, integrated deterrence involves reinforcing partners’ strengths in areas including economics, technology, and diplomacy. Actualizing this in the intelligence sphere would require shifting beyond narrower, conventional purviews of national security, bringing Tsai’s broader experiences and insights into geopolitics into play. As a recent article by the Center for a New American Security noted, this will require a diplomatic effort to strengthen international coordination and facilitate “sharing sensitive information with allies and partners.”  

Tsai reportedly has experience sitting in on intelligence exchanges with American and Japanese representatives. But Taipei may have seen particular value in Tsai’s connections and reputation in Europe. While Europe has been a target of intensifying Taiwanese diplomatic efforts over several years, the continent’s response to the Russia-Ukraine War is contributing to the view that Europe—incorporating both Western and CEE (Central and Eastern Europe)--is becoming a “new pillar” for Taiwan’s security.

One reason this is so is because of the intelligence and propaganda value of the Russia-Ukraine War, which Taiwan analysts see as a valuable tool for helping deter or fight back a potential Chinese invasion.

Shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began, Taiwan’s president directed the NSC—which includes the NSB’s director general—to form a “workgroup for responding to the situation in Ukraine.” On March 10, 2022, it presented a report titled “An analysis of the Russia-Ukraine War and the [security] situation in and around the Taiwan Strait.” In addition to further official updates, Taiwan has since seen an extraordinary number of symposiums, conferences, and publications focusing on the war and the parallels with its own security challenges.

Helping feed these events have been the fruits of diplomatic efforts to organize non-conventional pathways for information exchange. A surprising coup was the National Defence University’s “Nato Generals Class” in 2022, which hosted military officials from twelve countries, including Italy, Lithuania, Czech Republic, and was designed to encourage an exchange of views on the Russia-Ukraine War. This was also a key theme in the 2022 Taipei Security Dialogue, hosted by the INDRS in November, whose attendees included analysts from Germany, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Turkey. It was also recently revealed that a Taiwanese pilot attended a NATO training program aimed at providing “military and civilian officials with senior-leader education on NATO issues” and “networking opportunities.”

But much more was done with Ukraine itself. Taiwan’s administration embarked on a flurry of diplomatic activity/assistance after the invasion, including supplying Ukraine with Revolver 860 combat drones and other equipment, signing MOUs on energy assistance, providing humanitarian supplies, sending the digital minister to Ukraine to assess assistance needs, and having the foreign minister conduct videoconferences with Ukrainian mayors and even the primate of the Orthodox Church. New pathways for intelligence sharing were potentially opened when Ukraine’s parliament subsequently launched a bipartisan Taiwan Friendship Group, followed by a meeting between a Ukrainian parliamentarian and Taiwan’s president. Last year the INDRS hosted Yurii Poita, a visiting scholar from Ukraine’s Centre for Army Conversions and Disarmament Studies, who shared information on the organizational structure and efficacy of Ukraine’s Territorial Defence Forces. These developments are likely to be the tip of the iceberg.

But the Russia-Ukraine War has had a wider impact on Taiwan’s growing efforts to deepen its ties with Europe and emphasize Europe’s stake in Taiwan’s security challenges. The prominent Sinologist Linda Jakobson, in a recent event in Sydney, said anger in Europe is growing at Beijing’s refusal to condemn Russia’s actions. Resonating with Washington, Taiwanese officials have exploited this to publicly promote the notion of a “global democratic alliance” and a Russia-China axis, and have prosecuted the argument that an invasion of Taiwan will impact Europe. In line with this, in mid-2022, NATO, for the first time, identified China as a “security challenge,” and a recent NATO report on the Indo-Pacific mentioned Taiwan almost fifty times while noting that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” More recently, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggested that Taiwanese troops should join NATO exercises in Europe, adding that NATO should react “determinately if China were to attack Taiwan” through military intervention and “profound and comprehensive economic sanctions.”

On this front, Taiwan’s greatest gains have arguably been in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)—including the former Soviet Union states most directly threatened by Russian aggression. This region has traditionally been seen as a potential impediment to a coordinated NATO or EU response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan, such as participation in an American-led economic sanctions regime. A 2021 Carnegie report highlighted China’s attempts to exploit state fragility in that region to extend its influence at the expense of European unity and cohesion. Yet a 2022 report from the Centre for European Policy Analysis argued that some of those same states (in particular Lithuania and the Czech Republic) were already “ahead of the curve” in identifying and wanting to mitigate the threats China poses. Ties with Taiwan were at the front and center of the report’s explanation for this shift. China’s waning influence in the region, at times intertwined with disputes on CEE states' engagements with Taiwan, has seen the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European (C-CEE) agreement shrink from seventeen to fourteen members. At the same time, some narratives from CEE intelligence analysts are converging with those of Taipei and Washington. The Foreign Intelligence Service of one former C-CEE nation, Estonia, released a report in 2021 warning that Beijing was cooperating with Russia, seeking to divide Europe from the United States, and threatening to facilitate a “dismantling of the world order that has allowed Estonia to regain its independence.” Reflecting a connection between Taiwan’s predicament and its own vulnerabilities, as well as the tenets of the integrated deterrence doctrine, a recently released Estonian report directly addressed Taiwan’s existential challenges and acknowledged that “the unity and resilience of the West and like-minded countries against China,” along with sanctions, access to Western markets and Western technology, might be needed to deter an invasion of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Understated Value as an ‘Intelligence Sharing-Lite’ Partner

The growing purview of both the domains of intelligence and partners that Taiwan is reaching out to under the reforms of Chen and Tsai Ming-yen’s tenures speaks to the effectiveness of the new diplomacy-led approach. It also draws lessons from Taiwan’s frustrated attempts to strengthen intelligence sharing with its core partners, Japan and the United States, which continue to be mired by institutional resistance, legal/regulatory incompatibilities, and an unfortunate trust deficit due to historic issues of leaks, political conflicts, and concerted Chinese espionage campaigns targeting the NSB. The problems associated with committing to comprehensive agreements have been skirted around by an evolving “integrated-lite” approach that exploits diplomatic outreach and informal engagements, leverages executive discretion, acknowledges and explores the security value of intelligence in non-traditional domains, prefers ad hoc arrangements for micro-sharing intelligence on areas of mutual concern, and that retains state autonomy/discretion by keeping participation voluntary and on a case by case basis.

For like-minded nations that share Taiwan’s concerns about threats to regional or national security stemming from China, the potential benefits of Taiwan’s ongoing intelligence reforms cannot be understated. 

The potential benefits of intelligence sharing with Taiwan extend beyond assessing or deterring threats to peace across the Taiwan Strait. One particular area is cybersecurity. Taiwan has long been a testing and training ground for China’s offensive cyber efforts—many coming from the Fujian-based Strategic Support Force Unit 61716. As a result, Taiwan is not only a repository of enormous amounts of intelligence on Chinese cyber activities but has become a center of innovation on how these can be countered. In 2015, the NSB established a cutting-edge cyber security office. Since then, efforts have been made to strengthen coordination between this office and the Ministry of Digital Affairs’ Administration for Cyber Security, the National Security Council’s National Information Security Office, and the newly formed National Communications and Cyber Centre—Taiwan’s “iron triangle of cyber security.” These developments, directions to form new agencies by the Executive Yuan’s National Information and Communication Security Taskforce, the establishment of the Division of Cyber Security and Decision-Making Simulation in the INDSF, and the development of the Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command as a fourth branch of the military, reflect President Tsai’s commitment that “cybersecurity is national security.” Not only do Taiwan’s reforms provide lessons for other nations, but they could also position Taiwan to become a global leader on Chinese cyber threats and information warfare. On this front, it is worth noting that a 2022 Legislative Yuan report on Taiwan’s state cybersecurity development recommended strengthening international outreach and cooperation, as well as advancing “technological diplomacy” and international cooperation on talent development.

There are also wider benefits to be had. Taiwan has been the target of an extensive range of non-traditional threats to its security and sovereignty that manifest the full spectrum of pre-kinetic measures outlined in Beijing’s “Three Warfares” doctrine. Knowledge of these tactics brings into play the China expertise of Tsai Ming-yen, the China-focus of Taiwan’s intelligence community, and the island’s innate advantages in terms of its geographic, linguistic, and cultural proximity with the People’s Republic of China. While criticized for their scope and severity, Taiwan’s recently devised five national security laws, alongside specific legislation such as the Anti-Infiltration Act, reflect Taiwan’s comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted measures directed at the island by China, ranging from political interference, acquiring shares in media and other strategic assets, co-opting or infiltrating civic, industry and criminal groups, leveraging systemic/market power, up to the use of civilian intelligence gatherers and commercial surveillance drones. Given ongoing concerns in many countries about some of these issues, there is considerable value in tapping into Taiwan’s intelligence resources to understand, identify and forecast such non-conventional threats to national security.

Dr. Corey Lee Bell is a researcher at the University of Technology Sydney’s Australia-China Relations Institute. 

Image: glen photo/Shutterstock.com.

Ukraine, supported by Lithuania and Poland, recently doubled down on its campaign to sanction Russia’s nuclear sector in the same way as oil and gas, which have already been embargoed. With a high-profile lobbying campaign underway in Brussels to include nuclear in the next “sanctions package,” the tenth to date, Western officials are feeling pressure to choose sides.

Though the Biden administration has long been tempted to sanction Rosatom, a state-owned Russian nuclear energy corporation, along with Moscow’s other energy exporters, nuclear has been conspicuously absent from all sanctions lists. There is little agreement among the United States and its allies on the wisdom of the move and the risks associated with going nuclear in the sanctions war. Hungary and Bulgaria say that the consequences would be devastating and they would veto any proposed EU measure targeting Rosatom.

Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, when the Soviet army in Afghanistan was killing thousands daily, the United States and its allies visited sanctions on almost everything from gas pipelines and credit facilities to grain exports to the USSR, but civil nuclear cooperation was never affected. Westinghouse and Siemens continued to rub elbows with the Russians in Finland on the construction of the Loviisa nuclear power plant; France kept importing the bulk of its enriched uranium from Soviet Russia. Nuclear cooperation never stopped—and for good reason.

The imposition of sanctions in international politics must always be weighed against the implications of an adversary’s potential response. When it comes to the oil price cap plan, the downsides are few: The Kremlin has limited room to maneuver, and the expected countermeasure of a price floor for Russian oil is unlikely to change much for the global oil market.

But nuclear is a different kettle of fish altogether. The degree of interdependency is much higher, and so are the risks of interruptions in global supply chains. The consequences could extend well beyond the immediate economic impact and lead to catastrophic repercussions, including compromising nuclear safety. In addition, since Rosatom is a dominant global player accounting for about half of the world’s new nuclear build exports and about one-third of the nuclear fuel market, Moscow understands that its countersanctions would impose devastating impacts on the U.S. and European nuclear energy sector.

The Russian Federation still supplies 14 percent of  America’s enriched uranium consumption (down from 20 percent a decade ago, which translated into 10 percent of America’s electricity generation). Moreover, Russia has a de facto monopoly when it comes to providing the high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) that is critical for fueling 9 out of 10 advanced nuclear reactors currently under development in the United States and funded by the U.S. government. The American nuclear industry has secured bipartisan support and billions in public funds to cut uranium dependency on Russia, but it is likely to take years to have all the technology in place and enrichment facilities up and running. In Europe, Rosatom’s share is almost one-fourth in some countries, such as Belgium, which is dependent on Russia for as much as 40 percent of its uranium imports.

Exposure to Russia is even more significant when it comes to the nuclear fuel fabrication sector. Reactor fuel assemblies are sophisticated devices, full of proprietary technological features and an almost decade-long lead time in testing and licensing. While American and French vendors can, in theory, replace Russia in fuel fabrication for newer, Russian-designed VVER-1000 reactors, the French supplier will have to rely on its joint venture with Rosatom, a plant in Lingen, Germany, which is likely to be affected too should sanctions be imposed. Older Soviet-built VVER-440 reactors, which are commonplace throughout Eastern Europe and are scheduled to retire in the next 10 years, are entirely dependent on Russia’s fuel supply.

Should Rosatom cut nuclear fuel supplies for the VVER-440, it would, once the current stock of fuel was used up, bring power generation to a halt on all nuclear reactors in Slovakia and Hungary, half of the reactors in the Czech Republic, and 23 percent in Finland. Hungary and Slovakia would consequently face a drop in their electricity generation by about 25 percent, the Czech Republic by 15 percent, and Finland by 7 percent. Attempts to replace the Russian supplies with undertested alternatives could jeopardize the safety of the reactor core.

Worse still, beyond the nuclear fuel sector, only the Russians are currently supplying several vital isotopes to the world market, and it would take almost a decade to replace them. For instance, a deficit of Cobalt-60 (Co-60), which is used for radiation therapy as well as in medical sterilization, industrial x-ray welding seams, and food irradiation, would likely result in thousands of premature deaths across the world every year. Interruptions in the supply of Actinium-225 and Tungsten-188 would hamper the adoption of the most cutting-edge and efficient cancer treatment procedures, leaving tens of thousands of cancer patients untreated. The lack of Russian supplies of Californium-252 would cause further delays in the launching of the new French nuclear reactors designed to be used as initiators of chain reactions.

The Kremlin has so far refrained from using Russia’s leverage in the nuclear energy sector to respond to earlier Western energy sanctions, but direct sanctions on the nuclear front, even the most symbolic ones, could provoke President Vladimir Putin to fall back on his country’s civil “nuclear option.”

Unlike oil and gas, which are the main source of Russia’s tax receipts and, therefore, its main means of sustaining its military aggression in Ukraine, the drop in Rosatom’s export revenues from nuclear sanctions would be a paltry $1-3 billion, less than 0.5 percent of its energy exports. By contrast, the cost of a possible Russian uranium embargo and the severing of nuclear supplies in the United States and Europe could easily exceed $100 billion

The United States must recognize that the one-world model of civilian nuclear cooperation is coming to an end. America should adopt a comprehensive national program to ensure systemic self-sufficiency in the nuclear industry—from mining to fuel to isotopes—not just subsidies for the creation of our own uranium enrichment facilities, as is the case now, but in all areas over the next ten to twenty years.

Even if the Ukraine conflict were to be resolved by then, Russia’s unpredictability and hostility to the West, as well as peer competition with China, will persist or even exacerbate. As future conflicts unfold, the United States and Canada should address the vulnerabilities of themselves and their allies in the vital nuclear technology industry.

Prof. Ivan Sascha Sheehan is the associate dean of the College of Public Affairs and past executive director of the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. Opinions expressed are his own. Follow him on Twitter @ProfSheehan.

Image: Shutterstock/Shag 7799.

While Russian president Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine nearly one year ago was undoubtedly motivated by his desire to leave a mark on history, the risk of a humiliating defeat has united Russian elites in support of the war, regardless of their ideological convictions. Russia’s hawks consider this war as part of a wider conflict against NATO and they fear that a military defeat would not only severely weaken Moscow’s influence around the world but could also risk destabilizing Russia. Although most members of the liberal bloc might not share these security concerns, they understand that in order to negotiate the removal of sanctions, Russia needs to be in a position of strength.

We’re often presented with the claim that if Putin were removed from power, either because of a coup or illness, the war in Ukraine would end. However, this represents a misunderstanding of the Russian power structure and ignores the key interests of the political factions that operate in Putin’s shadow. While there are two main ideological camps, the liberals and the hawks, there exist numerous clans vying for political influence and financial gains. Ties between members of the elite are formed through family relations, business interests, personal friendships, and shared rivalries.

We can divide the Russian elite into three categories based on their roles and responsibilities: siloviki, technocrats, and oligarchs. The siloviki represent law enforcement and security agencies. Although they tend to share similar world views and their collective influence has grown significantly under Putin’s rule, there is intense competition amongst them. The siloviki monitor, investigate, and prosecute members of rival clans while protecting their allies. Technocrats provide bureaucratic influence and can help secure state contracts and subsidies. In order for them to advance in their careers, they must be cleared by the security apparatus. Oligarchs ensure the financial interests of their allies by providing bribes or company shares. Many prominent oligarchs used to work in the security services, such as Igor Sechin, president of Rosneft, and Sergei Chemezov, CEO of defense conglomerate Rostec. 

Clans continuously engage in minor power struggles in an environment where surveillance and corruption are rampant. Putin exploits the competitive and ruthless nature of Russian politics to maintain a balance of power and prevent any faction from becoming too powerful. For example, in 2016, he created the National Guard (Rosgvardiya), headed by his former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov, as a counterweight to the Ministry of Interior. They have overlapping roles, but the Rosgvardiya reports directly to Putin, granting him greater control over how protests and dissent are suppressed. Since the start of the invasion, there have been similar maneuvers to keep factions in check. In the recent military reshuffle, Colonel-General Aleksandr Lapin was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, and General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, replaced General Sergei Surovikin as commander of the “special military operation.” This served to reassert the Ministry of Defence’s control over the war effort and curtail the growing influence of Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group, and Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader.

Members of Putin’s inner circle do not form a unified bloc but they have a shared interest in maintaining the status quo in order to safeguard their economic interests and political survival. The few members of the elite who spoke out against the war, such as Mikhail Fridman and Oleg Deripaska, have lost influence in Russia and are sanctioned by the West. Furthermore, the conditions for a coup to be successful are currently highly unfavorable. Rival factions, eager to prove their loyalty, monitor each other while also being monitored by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), a security agency tasked with protecting the Russian president. A coup would also trigger an intense power struggle between clans, which would lead to political instability that could weaken Russia’s war effort. Despite their petty rivalries, the siloviki view a military defeat in Ukraine as an existential threat and continue to support Putin. Even if Putin were removed, his successor would most likely be a technocrat with close ties to the siloviki, such as Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff, or Sergei Sobyanin, mayor of Moscow. While a change in leadership might facilitate peace negotiations, it will not fundamentally change how the Russian system operates, at least not in the short run, nor will it lead to a drastic change in strategy regarding Ukraine.

A military defeat would be a humiliation domestically and on the international stage. Russia would emerge as a regional player with diminished influence and the state would lose credibility given the high casualties and economic loss that it would incur. This could lead to increased protests and secessionist movements that would destabilize Russia, and perhaps even lead to territorial disintegration.

For Russia’s hawks, this conflict is part of a larger hybrid war against the U.S.-led West. Many of them started their careers in the KGB and view NATO expansion as a continuation of the Cold War and a direct threat to Russian security. They blame the United States for fueling anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine by supporting the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Maidan Uprising, which they consider to be a U.S.-backed coup. Although there was evidence of American interference, the U.S. role was greatly exaggerated in the minds of the siloviki, who remain paranoid of the prospect of a U.S.-instigated “color revolution” in Russia. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, arguably the second most powerful figure in Russia, has stated that the war in Ukraine is a military confrontation against NATO and that the United States wants to weaken and destroy Russia. 

Even though members of the liberal bloc might privately oppose the war, they have limited influence on foreign policy or national security as their role is to manage the economy. Prominent figures include Elvira Nabiullina (chairwoman of the Bank of Russia), Anton Siluanov (minister of finance), Herman Gref (chairman and CEO of Sberbank), and Andrey Kostin (chairman of VTB). They have successfully minimized the impact of sanctions: the International Monetary Fund announced that the economy contracted by 2.2 percent (instead of 8.5 percent projected in April) and is projected to grow by 0.3 percent in 2023 and 2.1 percent in 2024. The Russian economy has been damaged by sanctions, but it is far from imminent collapse. Moreover, the liberal bloc understands that relations with the West have reached a point of no return, and certain sanctions will likely remain even after the war. There simply is no economic incentive for Russia to withdraw its troops without a peace settlement that would guarantee a path to sanctions relief.

Capitulation is not an option for either Ukraine or Russia, which means this war will likely continue for several years. Moscow is slowly gaining ground in Donetsk and is preparing a large-scale offensive with 200,000 fresh troops. Even if the offensive fails, Russia still has enough resources to maintain control over certain pockets, which would prevent Ukraine from joining NATO or the European Union. With neither side capable of securing a complete military victory, this war will either end in a frozen conflict or through a political settlement after a prolonged stalemate. 

Kelly Alkhouli is a political consultant and director of international relations at the Center of Political and Foreign Affairs (CPFA). Follow her on Twitter @KellyAlkhouli.

Image: ID1974 / Shutterstock.com.

Now more than ever, America needs its allies, and its allies need America. As hostile actors continue their aggressive, increasingly militarized behaviors, the Biden administration must find ways to stabilize and strengthen its relations with its key strategic partners around the world.

Nowhere in the world does this hold truer than the Indo-Pacific. President Joe Biden has made this region as a key focus in his foreign policy agenda, as shown by the administration’s recent high-level visits to Asia. To meet the rising security challenges posed by regimes including Russia and China, America’s emphasis on the Indo-Pacific is crucial to its safety, as well as its allies.

As a retired lieutenant general of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), I welcome the Biden administration’s proactive posture towards our region. Key U.S. allies in East Asia including South Korea have historically partnered with America to contain threats to the region, and maintaining a robust military alliance between our two countries is essential to achieve our mutual interests of peace in this part of the world.

For reasons of interoperability and to maintain the highest quality armed forces, the South Korean military uses U.S. arms to conduct its mission to maintain peace. These include Apache attack helicopters, F-15 and F-16 fighters, and the F-35 stealth fighter. The South Korean Air force operates forty F-35s and is planning to acquire twenty more to supplement its capabilities.   

U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin recently visited Seoul and reassured the South Korean government that the United States will continue to deploy strategic assets including F-35 fighter jets as deterrence assets against North Korea. This was a much-needed move against an ever-growing nuclear threat from North Korea, and it reassured many Koreans as to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the region. Having said that, conflicting news from the United States on the F-35 program and its future is concerning, to say the least.

The main concern is the ongoing dispute in Washington about the F135 engine that powers the F-35. There are those in the Pentagon and Congress who have called for an upgrade to the propulsion system—and rightfully so, given the F-35’s need for better thrust and vertical lift—but there are also voices calling for a completely new engine system called the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP). Thus far, we have seen hundreds of millions of dollars earmarked for the development of this new engine and this year is a pivotal year for the future of the F-35 program. 

The proposed creation of an entirely new engine, compared to upgrading the existing F135, would greatly burden South Korea and other allies who operate the F-35. Not only would the U.S. military have to build out an entirely new infrastructure and supply chain to produce and install these new engines, but it would affect the procurement of F-35s, with the current engine, by allies like South Korea. If this year’s Congress authorizes this overhaul and leads to Korean F-35s being retrofitted at extra cost, this will be a huge strain on both American and global supply chains and would most likely force the South Koreans to cancel its purchase of additional F-35s, leaving Seoul with fewer deterrence assets when crises arise. 

In more detail, the estimated cost of this replacement program is approximately $6 billion, whereas the upgrade to the existing F135 engine will save the program up to $40 billion. It is yet unclear as to how much of that $6 billion will fall on the shoulders of allies who have defense cost-sharing agreements with Washington, but this much is clear: South Korea cannot bear the burden coming from the increased defense costs for this program. 

South Korea and the United States are engaged in a delicate process of mending their bilateral alliance that was injured by President Donald Trump. In fact, the former administration strained the relationship by demanding that Seoul pay more for the U.S. military’s presence in the region. The last thing both governments need at this moment is another call for Seoul to take on higher defense costs as it would derail the sensitive process. 

The F-35 program is not just a matter of domestic politics in Washington. The national security interests of America’s most important allies also hinge on the viability of this program. Therefore, the Biden administration must settle this debate on the F135 engine by focusing on the impact of a replacement program or the benefits of updates to the existing components of the aircraft. It should also consider whether it would be viable to replace the engine in the later future—perhaps with the introduction of sixth-generation fighters. 

Allies like South Korea deserve timely and cost-effective deterrence measures from Washington, not politicized arrangements that are blind to the ever-changing threats from our common enemies. More importantly, it is in America’s best interests to avoid souring relations with its partners by force-feeding expensive and premature defense initiatives.

Before the global security environment takes a more dangerous turn, Washington would be wise to strengthen its alliances, instead of unsettling them with rushed political projects. 

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Chun In-bum currently serves in many advisory positions, including the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Korea Foundation, the Association of the United States Army, and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security & Development Policy. Chun served as the director of U.S. Affairs at the Korean Ministry of National Defense and all levels of command to include the ROK Special Warfare Command.

Image: DVIDS.

One year has passed since Russia crossed the border into Ukraine, and the Cold War, confined to the literature of the twentieth century, returned once again with the West bleeding Russia through a buffer state. The war has not been about preventing the cannibalization of Ukraine into Russia. Rather, the war is about maintaining U.S. dominance in the United States European Command (EUCOM).

The Wolfowitz Doctrine, named after then U.S. under-secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, was leaked to The New York Times in 1992. The crux of the policy underscored American supremacy at all costs in a post-Soviet world and “stamping out rivals wherever they may emerge.” In addition, U.S. leadership would place defense agreements as the cornerstone of its policy and inadvertently monopolize the global arms trade through treaties. Furthermore, it would prevent allies from developing their defense systems and increase reliance on American-manufactured hardware. Finally, interoperability formed the basis for amalgamating competing factions within NATO.

If this all sounds familiar, as it should, then it is essential to understand when this doctrine formed, how it came about, and why it still shapes many individuals’ views of the West—including Russian president Vladimir Putin’s.

The Fall of the USSR and the Broken Promise

The United States’ victory against the Soviets laid the foundations for the Wolfowitz Doctrine. First, the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan, due to Pakistan’s tactical use of guerrilla warfare, helped drained the Soviet economy and the USSR to its collapse in 1991. Secondly, the United States’ own victory over Saddam Hussein through a “tune-up” war in the same year, allowed Washington to showcase its supreme military might, regain some lost pride after the defeat in Vietnam, and rebuild the confidence of its allies.

In conjunction with this, the Wolfowitz Doctrine stipulated that the United States could silence and integrate two former major powers, Germany and Japan, “into a U.S-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic zone of peace.” Russia, on the other hand, was dealt with differently—the country fell off the radar. It became insignificant as a geopolitical competitor in the eyes of the West, as its gestures of peaceful offerings were rebuffed and guarantees given to it regarding NATO’s expansion forfeited.

A record of the minutes, declassified and released by the National Security Archives, recounts the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Moscow. Baker promised NATO would not expand under any circumstance. He further went on, and stated that “NATO is the mechanism for securing U.S. presence in Europe…We understand that only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries…. it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread; in an eastern direction… Germany's unification will not lead to NATO's military spreading to the East.”

In the same meeting, Gorbachev proposed to Baker that as the Soviet Union had dissolved, the need for NATO was no more, and a newly created Russia be allowed to join NATO. Baker dismissed this as a “dream.” However, when Boris Yeltsin came to power, he also proposed joining NATO, and took a step further by labeling membership to NATO as a “political aim for Russia.” In 1994, Russia signed the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which aimed to bridge the divide between the two entities and lead to a pathway to NATO membership.

As the United States realized its privileged position as an uncontested power, it went back on Baker’s word. After all, these “guarantees” were given to the Soviet Union—not to Russia. Taking advantage of this technicality, the United States pushed for former Warsaw Pact countries—such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—to join NATO at the Washington Summit in 1999. Russia opposed the inclusion, but besides a symbolic murmur, Moscow could do nothing to prevent such an endeavor. The successor state of the mighty Soviet Union was not its equal, and thus not considered important enough to be involved in global decisionmaking. Yet, despite its reduced size and sphere of influence, Russia persisted in being considered a key player in international affairs.

Putin’s Ascent and the End of Patience

In 2000, three weeks before his ascension to the presidency, a young and bold Vladimir Putin was interviewed by the BBC’s David Frost. He clarified his intention: “Russia is a part of European culture, and I do not consider my own country in isolation from Europe. Russia is part of the European culture. And I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world. So it is hard for me to visualize NATO as an enemy.”

When the 9/11 attacks occurred, it provided Putin with an opportunity to prove that Russia was willing to engage with the West in its fight against terrorism, as it saw similar security-related issues in Chechnya. Russian intelligence cooperated with the initial U.S. phase of the invasion of Afghanistan by providing crucial logistical, topographical, and urban data entry points into Afghanistan, especially the areas in and around Kabul. Putin also influenced former Central Asian states to open supply routes into Afghanistan for George W. Bush’s War on Terror. There was never any reciprocation or appreciation for this gesture by the United States, as it overreached and established bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. America had established itself in Russia's backyard, and did so as a “favor” to help its security problems and prevent any form of galvanization of groups venturing out of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, despite these amicable efforts and out-of-the-box thinking by Putin, NATO and the United States could not lose their Cold War mentality—the alliance pushed even more aggressively with its expansion. In 2004, seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—were granted NATO membership. The alliance had not only moved more than an “inch” from Germany, against what was promised by Baker, but was now standing firmly on Russia’s doorstep. George Kennan, the former American ambassador to the Soviet Union and the architect of containment, himself rejected the idea of expanding NATO and warned of its potential consequences. He professed that this “fatal error” could “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.”

The tipping point came in 2007, when Putin had lost patience with the arrogance shown by his Western counterparts. At the Munich Security Conference, Putin declared that he thought “it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them.”

Consequences

America’s position of not granting Russia a dignified parity status only further inflamed Putin. He, along with much of Russia’s political elite, could only come to the conclusion that the United States had no intention of working with Russia in a responsible and respectful manner. Washington was doing nothing more, the Kremlin realized, than carrying out a plan determined in 1992 to impose its will upon the world and “stamping out rivals wherever they may emerge.”

This would be further confirmed in Putin’s mind by American actions in Ukraine, meddling in the country’s political affairs and chalking out a path for the country towards eventually joining NATO and the European Union. The back and forth between both sides led to the Euromaidan Revolution, essentially setting up an everlasting division in Ukrainian politics that only deepened by the year.

From Putin’s perspective, invading Ukraine in 2022 was the only option to signal to the Transatlantic alliance that Russia is now in an economic and geostrategic position to counter any further expansion–that Moscow remembers how the broken promises Baker made to Gorbachev, that the line has been drawn in the sand, and the Wolfowitz Doctrine shall advance no further.

Sameed Basha is a defense and political analyst with a master’s degree in international relations from Deakin University, Australia. He specializes in Asia-Pacific regional dynamics and conflict & security studies. He tweets at @SameedBasha.

Image: Shutterstock.

/ Afrique, Israël, Géopolitique, Relations internationales, Diplomatie - Afrique / Afrique, Israël, Géopolitique, Relations internationales, Diplomatie - Afrique

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