European Union

There needs to be a “comprehensive global approach” against secret tax structures, says the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who called for “zero tolerance”. Speaking to Parliament’s Panama Committee on Wednesday, the former advisor to the Panamanian government suggested that secrecy in tax affairs should be treated like a disease which needs to be isolated.
Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

There needs to be a “comprehensive global approach” against secret tax structures, says the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who called for “zero tolerance”. Speaking to Parliament’s Panama Committee on Wednesday, the former advisor to the Panamanian government suggested that secrecy in tax affairs should be treated like a disease which needs to be isolated.
Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Slovak Presidency of the European Council declared in the summer that the end of 2016 is still a feasible deadline for the finalisation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). But this deal – and several others – are under threat.

Despite all previous declarations, the Commission took the unprecedented political decision to subject the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) to approval by national parliaments in addition to the European Parliament. That’s at least 36 parliaments, both national and provincial, who need to approve the deal. It could mean four or five years before
the agreement takes effect.

The Commission is striving to react to criticism. It has come up with a new model of investment protection, the investor-state dispute settlement model (ISDS). It has substantially increased negotiation transparency. It publishes reports on the potential benefits of successfully-concluded trade deals. But this isn’t enough to reach out to those across the EU who are hostile to free trade. Member states remain under intense pressure from strong lobbies and civil society.

The EU is growing more protectionist, and has been since well before Britain voted to leave. It’s true that discontent with globalisation and suspicion of the EU’s trade – and other – policies were prominent in the debate leading up to the British EU referendum. But the EU itself reacted to the Brexit vote with a protectionist stance. Some EU capitals were keen to punish London for fear that other countries would follow Britain out of the EU but with favourable access to the single market. Pursuing this strategy would be damaging for both sides, so a more sensible and “depoliticised” approach needs to be found. Taking into account the significant trade deficit the UK has with the rest of Europe, currently at a record high level, one could even argue that the EU needs the British market more than Britain needs the EU single market.

Widespread public concern over free trade agreements is understandable. We are negotiating a new generation of trade deals that go beyond the elimination of tariff barriers and include discussions on food safety, international standards and consumer protection. In the case of TTIP, it even has geopolitical and strategic importance. Citizens want to know whether these deals will help growth to be restored and new jobs to be created. They want higher, not lower standards of health, labour and environmental protection. Opposition is often based on the perception that deals are negotiated in secret, for the benefit of multinational companies and at the expense of ordinary people.

If we are serious about fighting protectionism, we have to make a more convincing case about the benefits of trade liberalisation. Trade increases spending power, especially for those on low incomes, and enlarges the variety of goods and services people are able to buy. We must also be clear about the scope of trade agreements. The Commission has already made considerable
efforts in terms of transparency, but more has to be done. It’s clear that the benefits aren’t evenly shared across the EU or inside countries. We have to (re)define the responsibility institutions,
both at the EU and at national level, have towards those who may be affected. We must prevent crisis situations and be more pro-active.

Rejecting free trade means we are on the defensive. It’s an admission we aren’t competitive enough to progress on the global stage. Protectionism is very much a European and American problem; it’s not by any means a general global trend. We have to understand that the future of global trade doesn’t depend on our participation anymore. Canada, China, Australia and others are actively negotiating trade and investment agreements. We can either take the lead, conclude deals and set new models and standards, or we can stand by and let others set conditions for us. We face enormous challenges: chronically slow economic growth (especially in the eurozone), persistently high unemployment, and energy insecurity. We have to make clear to our citizens that open trade is a crucial instrument for growth and a way out of these difficult situations. Free trade was one of the engines of the prosperous decades following the Second World War in Europe, America and beyond. We should have the courage and political will to champion it.

IMAGE CREDIT: cylonphoto/Bigstock.com

The post Time for an end to EU protectionism appeared first on Europe’s World.

Place: Justus Lipsius building, Brussels
Chair: Robert Kaliňák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior 

All times are approximate and subject to change 

Home affairs issues 

+/- 08.00
Arrivals (live streaming) 

+/- 08.15
Doorstep by Minister Kaliňák 

+/- 10.00
Beginning of Mixed Committee meeting (roundtable)
Adoption of the agenda
European Travel Information and Authorisation System
Information Exchange and Interoperability (evolution of the Schengen Information System - SIS)  

+/- 11.10
Beginning of Home Affairs Council meeting
Adoption of the agenda
Adoption of non-legislative A Items
Information Exchange and Interoperability

+/- 12.50
Joint Action Days
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (public session)
Any other business 

+/- 13.15
Working lunch

+/- 15.00
Fight against Terrorism
EU Internet Forum
EU-Passenger Name Record
Any other business 

+/- 17.15
Press conference (live streaming) 

We politicians, our people, but also investors, bankers, live in uncertain times, ever since the outcome of the British referendum, the UK and the continent have regarded each other with some suspicion.

Coming from the Netherlands, I strongly regret the outcome of the referendum, but we have to respect and accept the choice of the British people. In my mind, it is a lose-lose situation, which we must manage as well as possible. It is now in the interest of both the UK and the rest of Europe to come to a fair and clear arrangement for our future relation. A new settlement with clarity on how the British government sees the role for itself in the Europe of the future, on how to proceed with our trade and international affairs and to limit the economic damage to the UK and the European Union.

Many things are uncertain, but we do know that whatever the future will look like, we'd better face it with a strong foundation. And that's what we are focusing on. Because the eurozone economy is now in a better shape and it needs to improve further. Since the crisis, we have taken important steps to secure our recovery. We are better prepared for possible shocks in the future. Thanks to the decisive steps we took, all European economies are growing again in the third quarter, unemployment is falling and deficits have been reduced. The average government deficit in the euro area in 2009 was over six percent, and will fall below two percent this year.

We have added safeguards to strengthen our shock absorption capacity so our economies can keep growing in the future, our people can find jobs again and investors are willing to invest in our countries and companies. But this doesn't mean we're there yet.

We've come a long way

First, look at how far we have come. In 2008 and 2009 our economies were hit by a huge financial crisis. In the US, the UK and all over continental Europe banks had to be saved by taxpayers' money in order to prevent chaotic defaults. But by preventing the collapse, government debt increased and investors became concerned about the prospects of repayment of government debt. This affected the banks' health, as they hold large amounts of sovereign debt. And so the vicious link between banks and sovereigns was born.

This is the reason we have taken unprecedented steps over the last couple of years. We have created a banking union, which aims to protect 340 million European taxpayers from future financial crises. The banking union was set up in only three years.

What are the results of the project so far? I see five key elements, which I will discuss in more detail in a minute: First, stricter and harmonized capital requirements. Second, enhanced supervision at European level. Third, making bail-in the new norm: if a bank gets into trouble, its investors must foot the bill. Fourth, resolution of failing banks at European level and setting up of a single resolution fund. Fifth and finally, we are determined to create a European deposit insurance scheme once remaining risks have been sufficiently reduced in the coming years.

These important steps will make banks and governments better prepared for possible shocks in the future.

Where are we now?

The European financial sector is in a much better shape than before. Thanks to the first two key elements of the banking union - stricter common rules and the single supervision mechanism - problems in bank balance sheets have become transparent in a uniform way. This is good news, because although this transparency shows that challenges remain, it also ensures that banks take their responsibility and take steps to become more resilient.

So banks can contribute to the recovery of the real economy and further reduce the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and banks.

As I said, we aren't there yet. A number of banks throughout the eurozone still suffer from a high stock of non-performing loans. These loans are putting pressure on bank's profitability and their ability to provide new credit. This is slowing down the economic recovery in a number of our countries. The gross carrying amount of these loans in the EU amounts to over a trillion euros. Insolvency laws in some countries have recently been modernized. But In practice there are also obstacles like the capacity of the courts. Therefore out-of-courts settlements are badly needed. The European Commission will propose legislation very soon.

But banks cannot afford to simply sit on their hands and wait. Without timely and adequate provisioning and write-offs of loans, their long term profitability and viability are at risk. While this might be painful in the short run, banks need to be ambitious, and raise additional capital if necessary, to survive in the long run.

Also, some banks still have a lot of scope for improving cost efficiency. Bold measures are needed to cut costs further. In addition, many banks have been hit by large fines due to unethical behavior. And I hope to say: unethical behavior in the past. These fines have been a drag on the recovery of some institutions. Here, prevention is better than cure. To survive in the long run, banks should always view things from the perspective of their clients and do what is right for them.

Earlier I mentioned five elements of the Banking Union. The third element, bail-in, is crucial. I am well aware, that some say bail-in is too painful, risky, and hard to apply. But it ensures that we won't have to save banks with taxpayers' money anymore. It is a sound economic principle and deals with losses in a fair way. Some may worry about stability, but I firmly believe that bail-in will ultimately safeguard stability and strengthen bank's resilience. And it gives markets an incentive to price risks as accurately as possible.

The effects are already becoming visible. Major rating agencies have downgraded their expectations about public support to much lower levels in eurozone countries. And several studies show that investors are responding accordingly. For example, we see an increase in the difference between banks' CDS spreads and the spreads of their sovereigns, which means that investors believe in the principle of bail-in.

The newly established Single Resolution Board, the fourth key element I mentioned, has not yet had to deal with a failing bank. This might sound a bit odd, but it makes sense, because bail-in also has a very strong  preventive effect. The threat of bail-in has caused banks to increase their buffers  by raising private capital, issuing shares or merging with other banks. In Greece, for example, the threat of bail-in late last year significantly increased private participation in the recapitalisation process of some Greek banks, thereby reducing the public burden. The same can now be seen in Italy. Private solutions are once again preferred.

What do we, the governments, do?

Let me reassure you: it's not all up to you.It's also up to governments. This brings me to the fifth element of the banking union: creating a European deposit insurance scheme once the remaining risks have been sufficiently addressed. I think we politicians should do two things in this respect:

First, we need to finish what we've started.

The banking union is a work in progress and we - the legislators - have to complete it so we have the right framework in place to deal with future crises.

One of the most important next steps is to start working on the Commission's legislative proposals that are expected before the end of the year. They should focus on reducing the risks that still exist. For example:

• They should clarify the quality and quantity of bail-in-able buffers for banks by ensuring that bail-in is possible without material risk of litigation. To achieve this, the creditor hierarchy in Europe needs to be further clarified and harmonised.
• The proposals should also create a level playing field by harmonizing further capital rules for banks by removing the remaining options and discretions.
• The final Basel 3 reforms should be put into practice, especially regarding the leverage ratio. 
• Insolvency laws and practices should be harmonised and strengthened to address banks' problems with non-performing loans, which I have already mentioned.

Another important element in reducing risks in bank balance sheets is the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures to banks. We're still waiting for the Basel Committee's findings, but we'll return to this issue in the future and consider the way forward in Europe, as this will also help to break the vicious circle.

The sooner we achieve these reforms, the sooner we'll be able to work on further steps to share risks. For example by creating a common backstop for the single resolution fund and introducing a European deposit insurance scheme.

The second thing we politicians need to do is stick to what we have agreed.

Over the last few years, we have all learned that saving a continent from financial ruin isn't easy and isn't always popular with voters. So I understand that my colleagues and myself  find it hard to keep doing what's necessary. I understand that it takes determination. But we have to stick to our plan. The road to populism is paved with paralyzed politicians.

European banking supervision and stricter prudential regulation will ensure we address the legacy problems in banks, and prevent the build-up of future risks. Bail-in limits the bank-sovereign nexus and helps set investors' incentives right. That's what we agreed to do. And it's important that we all remain committed. This brings clarity and stability. And that's how we contribute to further economic recovery throughout the eurozone.

Let me conclude. Brexit, globalisation, low interest rates, rising populism: we live in uncertain times. We have a strong common interest is to maintain financial stability and if possible political stability. In order to create opportunities and provide security. That's what people expect. That's what we should deliver.

Thank you.

In the wake of populist successes in the UK and the US, Viviane Gravey examines the prospects for a Front National victory in the upcoming 2017 French presidential election. She argues that, while the institutional structure of French politics would limit the room for manoeuvre of Marine Le Pen, it is ultimately the responsibility of other political actors to provide convincing alternative leadership, rather than solely rely on the checking power of institutions.

République française, lisecher, CC-BY-NC-2.0

After the double shocks of Brexit and Trump’s election, people are wondering when and where the next electoral shock will come. Will it be on 4 December, with the rerun of the Austrian presidential election and the Italian constitutional referendum? Will it come later, in early 2017 with the French presidential election, or in late 2017 with the German General Election? As we ponder where this populist wave will strike next, one key element is often left out of the discussion: the role of political institutions, of constitutional arrangements. Behind the catch-all label of ‘Western democracies’ lies a great diversity of institutional rules, which may limit the success of populist candidates.

This article investigates the role of institutions in stemming (or reinforcing) this populist wave by focusing on France and Marine Le Pen. The leader of the French Front National was propelled further in the media last week – first to discuss Trump’s election on France 2 on Wednesday, second by being invited on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show on Sunday. But is her election in May 2017 inevitable? And what power would she wield as French President?

French elections are run on a two-round system: the first round of 2017 Presidential election will be on 23 April, with the second round on 7 May (if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round, which is unlikely to happen). Only the two candidates with most votes advance to the second round. This system allows for a plurality of views to be aired in the first half of the campaign – in the 2002 Presidential election 16 candidates ran in the first round – and gives voters the opportunity to gather behind their favoured (or least worse of the two) candidate in the second round. There are thus two major differences compared to US presidential elections: a window of 14 days to reconsider; and small parties influencing not the vote share differences between the ‘big two’, but who qualifies for the second round.

The 2002 French election is a case in point. French PM Lionel Jospin’s failure to reach the second round in 2002 was in part explained by left-wing voters choosing to support smaller left-wing parties in the first round. But Jean Marie Le Pen’s failure in the subsequent second round against incumbent French President Jacques Chirac was born out of a mass demonstration against him, and a rise in voter turnout. In the UK and in the US, Brexit and Trump’s election have led to demonstrations – pro-EU, anti-Trump. The French electoral system allows for these demonstrations to take place before the final vote and to galvanise opposition to populist parties.

Let us imagine that these demonstrations are not enough, that tactical voting in the first and second round fails and that Marine Le Pen is elected President in May 2017. What then? The French semi-presidential political system has a strong president (1) as long as the president can work with a government of the same side and (2) under the limits on his/her power set out by the French Constitution and enforced by the French Constitutional Court, the Conseil constitutionnel.

A month after the presidential election, French voters will cast ballots in parliamentary elections for the Assemblée nationale. These are also run in two rounds, and this electoral system has not been kind to the Front National in the past. In 2012, the Front National received 13.6 per cent in the first round (a drop from 17.9 per cent for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the presidential election), but obtained only 2 MPs in the second round.

In contrast to the presidential election, more than two parties can stand in the second round: you can stand as long as you gained more than 12.5 per cent of the popular vote. In many ‘triangular’ second rounds with the Left, Right and Extreme Right, either the Left or Right have stepped aside to allow a clear path to victory against the Extreme Right. In some ways, the Front National’s difficulties in parliamentary elections echoes UKIP’s woes in the 2015 UK General Election.

For the Front National to win a majority and be able to form a government, it would need to win an additional 287 MPs – a very unlikely outcome. No parties have ever agreed to enter into a coalition with the Front National to form a government. The most likely outcome of a Marine Le Pen win in the presidential election would be a cohabitation between a President from one party and a Government from another. This has happened three times since the foundation of the Fifth Republic: in 1986-1988, 1993-1995 and 1997-2002. In this situation, the president’s powers are limited to his/her constitutional prerogatives in the realms of defence and foreign affairs, with very limited influence on day-to-day politics.

Would Le Pen be powerless then, even if President? Not necessarily. As we see in the UK, you have MPs and ministers who voted for ‘Remain’ who are still working to deliver Brexit. With a Le Pen presidency, it may be tempting for a French Government to embrace some of her policies, or at least a watered-down version of them.

Even in this situation, only 60 members of the Assemblée nationale or of the Sénat are needed to refer a law, before it enters into force, to the Conseil constitutionnel. Its 12 members will have to judge whether it respects the constitution. This is key, as not only does the 1958 French Constitution have clear statements on the separation of powers, but the Conseil constitutionnel considers its preamble to have equal constitutional value.

This preamble refers to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the preamble to the 1946 French Constitution (which includes gender equality, asylum rights, rights to unionise…) and even the 2004 Environmental Charter (with the precautionary and polluter pays principle) – which will make it extremely difficult for a Le Pen presidency to contravene human rights; and, conversely, easy for opposition parliamentarians to seriously hamper the implementation of her policies.

In conclusion: institution matters! The global populist wave will impact different countries differently, in part due to their varying institutional and constitutional make-ups. France may well elect Marine Le Pen, but its two-round system makes it much more difficult. Its semi-presidential system, with a strong constitutional watchdog, would clip her wings once in power. But institutions cannot sustainably stem the rise of populism on their own: not only could Le Pen, if President, use her constitutional powers to increase her political power (eg by dissolving the assembly), but a popular party such as Front National repeatedly kept out of power could undermine people’s trust in their institutions. Thus, while institutions offer a safety valve, it is up to civil society, and to the other political parties, to offer compelling alternatives to citizens and make sure that populism does not override them.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2fWUSNb

Viviane Gravey | @VGravey
Queen’s University Belfast

Dr Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics at Queen’s University Belfast and co-author of Environmental Europe? She is Chair of the UACES Student Forum and Co-Editor of Crossroads Europe.

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The post Brexit, Trump, Le Pen? How France’s Institutions Will Make It Difficult for Le Pen to Win the Election and Govern appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/9_26_2013-95122---cohesion-policy-projects-16-9-preview_103.8_thumb_169_1478707958_1478707958_129_97shar_c1.jpg

EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 16 November 2016 to address cohesion policy by taking stock of the modifications on the common provision regulation and adopting conclusions on results and new elements of the cohesion policy and the European structural and investment funds.

Download this video here.

Hemming
Freedom of establishment
Under the Services Directive, applicants for a licence cannot be required to pay costs relating to the management and enforcement of the licencing regime when submitting their application

Soulier and Doke
The copyright directive precludes national legislation authorising the digital reproduction of out-of-print books in breach of the exclusive rights of authors

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

An agreement on the EU money market funds regulation has been struck by the European Parliament, Council and Commission, after lengthy negotiations, more than three years after the Commission published the original proposal.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

An agreement on the EU money market funds regulation has been struck by the European Parliament, Council and Commission, after lengthy negotiations, more than three years after the Commission published the original proposal.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 14 November 2016, the presidency reached provisional agreement with representatives of the European Parliament on a draft regulation on money market funds (MMFs), aimed at making such products more robust. 

The draft regulation is intended to ensure the smooth operation of the short-term funding market. It sets out to maintain the essential role that money market funds play in the financing of the real economy. It follows efforts by the G20 and the Financial Stability Board to strengthen the oversight and regulation of the 'shadow banking' system. 

With assets under management of around €1 trillion, MMFs are mainly used to invest excess cash within short timeframes. They represent an important tool for investors because they offer the possibility to diversify their excess cash holdings, whilst maintaining a high level of liquidity. 

While an overall agreement was reached at political level, a number of technical issues relating to the draft regulation are to be finalised in the coming days. The agreement will then be submitted to the Permanent Representatives Committee for endorsement on behalf of the Council. The Parliament and the Council will then be called on to adopt the regulation at first reading.

Role and features of MMFs

 There are currently two kinds of MMFs that are used for short-term financing for companies and government entities: 

• those that offer a variable net asset value (VNAV) that mainly depends on market fluctuations;
• those that offer a constant net asset value (CNAV) and aim to offer share purchases and redemptions for a fixed price. 

When markets are stressed 

The financial crisis of 2007-08 showed that MMFs can be vulnerable to shocks and may even spread or amplify risks throughout the financial system. Investors are likely to redeem investments as soon as they perceive a risk, which can force funds to sell assets rapidly in order to meet redemption requests. This can fuel an investor 'run' and liquidity crisis for an MMF, potentially triggering further negative effects on other parts of the financial system. 

Common standards 

The draft regulation lays down rules for MMFs, in particular the composition of their portfolios and the valuation of their assets, to ensure the stability of their structure and to guarantee that they invest in well-diversified assets of the highestcredit quality.

It also introduces common standards to increase the liquidity of MMFs, to ensure that they can face sudden redemption requests when market conditions are stressed. In addition, the text provides for common rules to ensure that the fund manager has a good understanding of investors' behaviour, thus preparing for any future redemption requests. It provides investors and supervisors with adequate and transparent information. 

Issues resolved 

The agreement reached at the final meeting of 'political' negotiators covers, in particular, the core issues concerning regulation of MMFs, such as liquidity and diversification requirements, assets on which MMFs can invest including the role of government debt, transparency. It also provides fora report by the Commission on the functioning of the regulation, accompanied by a review clause.  

As the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) in Marrakech draws to a close, it is becoming increasingly clear that credible monitoring and transparency procedures are urgently needed. Otherwise national pledges to address climate change in the spirit of the 2015 Paris Agreement will not build sufficient global trust.

The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a shift towards countries making emission reduction pledges known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and a new Transparency Framework (Article 13). This framework requires regular progress reports on pledges to address climate change. While the quick ratification of the Paris Agreement is a sign that the international community is eager to make progress, setting up a strong and effective transparency framework will likely require hard and sustained work for years to come.

Our new research, published today in Climate Policy, shows that the long term success of the Agreement depends on the availability of well-designed and functioning monitoring and review mechanisms. The EU has one of the most advanced climate policy monitoring systems in the world – but it still encounters persistent challenges that, crucially, could jeopardize the implementation of the Paris Agreement if these challenges persist within the EU and potentially also in other countries and regions. We show that the EU’s current approach to monitoring climate policies – largely borrowed from monitoring greenhouse gases, which is a vastly different task – has not supported in depth learning and debate on the performance of individual policies. Other important obstacles include political concerns over the costs of reporting, control, and the perceived usefulness of the information produced. The international community should therefore draw on the EU’s valuable experiences and also difficulties in monitoring climate policies in order to develop the practice further.

A vital part of the implementation of the Paris Agreement will hinge on whether political actors can muster the leadership in order to successfully navigate these monitoring challenges at the international level. Monitoring is probably the most underestimated challenge in implementing the Paris Agreement. In the past, it has been seen as a technical, data gathering task. We show that it is anything but a mere reporting exercise. Implementing more advanced monitoring at the international level will require substantial political efforts, resources, and leadership. In order to justify investments in monitoring and evaluation to the public, care needs to be taken to ensure that monitoring information is used effectively to evaluate and improve policy, rather than as a weapon to lay blame when things slip.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement is that so many countries are part of it and are willing to engage. Disengagement or even withdrawal could therefore imperil the whole Agreement and have grave ramifications for the set-up of a strong monitoring system. The EU’s experience shows that recognising the role of public policies in the NDCs should thus be seen as one step in a long journey to deeper understanding of what climate policies achieve and how policies can be improved.

Image credit: CGIAR Research Programme (Creative Commons)

The post Lessons from European Climate Monitoring Crucial for Paris Agreement Success appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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First, Emmanuel Macron, the young economic adviser the French president promoted as economy minister in 2014, is to confirm his presidential bid, whether or not his mentor decides to seek re-election next year.

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 97 - Draft report containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Mongolia, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

1.           The forty-sixth meeting of the EEA Council took place in Brussels on 15 November 2016 under the Presidency of Ms Elisabeth Vik Aspaker, Minister of EEA and EU Affairs of Norway. The meeting was attended by Ms Aurelia Frick, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liechtenstein, Mr Stefán Haukur Jóhannesson, representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, and Mr Lukas Parizek, representing the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, as well as by members of the Council of the European Union and representatives of the European Commission and the European External Action Service. 

2.           The EEA Council noted that, within the framework of the political dialogue, the Ministers would discuss Western Balkans, Ukraine/Russia, Migration, and the EU global strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. An orientation debate was held on the digital single market, including the collaborative economy. 

3.           The EEA Council acknowledged the key role played by the EEA Agreement for more than 20 years in advancing economic relations and internal market integration between the EU and the EEA EFTA States. The EEA Council highlighted that the Agreement had been robust and capable of adapting to changes in EU treaties and EU enlargements. The EEA Council recognised that increased efforts towards enhancing competitiveness would be key for jobs and growth in Europe. 

4.           The EEA Council emphasised the importance of a well-functioning Single Market as a driver in boosting economic growth and creating new jobs throughout Europe, and welcomed the steps already taken to implement the proposals contained in the strategies for a digital single market and for upgrading the Single Market, both launched in 2015, with a view to exploiting in full its untapped growth and productivity potential. The EEA Council agreed that a holistic approach is required to tackle some of the main challenges facing the Single Market, and stressed the importance of close involvement of the EEA EFTA States in the further design and development of single market policies and initiatives. 

5.           The EEA Council welcomed the adoption of the EEA Joint Committee decisions of the first package of legal acts related to the EU regulations on the European supervisory authorities in the area of financial services. The EEA Council also highlighted the high importance of promptly incorporating and applying the other outstanding legislation in the field of financial services as soon as possible in order to ensure a level playing field throughout the EEA in this important sector.

6.           Noting the progress report of the EEA Joint Committee, the EEA Council expressed its appreciation for the work of the Joint Committee in ensuring the continued successful operation and good functioning of the EEA Agreement. 

7.           The EEA Council emphasised the importance of solidarity among the countries of Europe to overcome social and economic challenges. In particular, the EEA Council expressed concern regarding the continued high level of youth unemployment in some EEA member states. 

8.           The EEA Council commended the positive contribution of the EEA and Norway financial mechanism 2009-2014 and of their predecessors in reducing economic and social disparities throughout the EEA and recognised the still existing need to alleviate social and economic disparities in the EEA. 

9.           The EEA Council welcomed the ratification of the agreement on an EEA financial mechanism 2014-2021 by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and of the agreement between Norway and the EU on a Norwegian financial mechanism for the 2014-2021 period by Norway. The EEA Council further welcomed the provisional application of the agreement on a Norwegian financial mechanism for the 2014-2021 period as of 1 July 2016 and of the agreement on an EEA financial mechanism 2014-2021 as of 1 August 2016. 

10.        The EEA Council also welcomed the provisional application of the Protocol on trade in fish and fisheries products between Iceland and the EU as of 1 August 2016 and of the Protocol on trade in fish and fisheries products between Norway and the EU as of 1 September 2016. 

11.        Emphasising the fact that greater knowledge of the EEA Agreement throughout the EEA is in the interest of all contracting parties, the EEA Council urged them to ensure that information on the EEA Agreement is made readily and easily available. 

12.        The EEA Council noted that free movement of capital is a fundamental internal market freedom and an integral part of the EEA acquis and acknowledged that restrictions can be implemented only temporarily on the basis of the provisions of article 43 of the EEA Agreement. The EEA Council welcomed the progress of the comprehensive plan of the Icelandic government for removal of capital controls without threatening economic and financial stability of the country. 

13.        The EEA Council placed great importance on continued close cooperation between the EU and the EEA EFTA States in environment, energy and climate change polices, particularly in light of the 2030 framework for climate and energy and the framework strategy for a resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy. The close cooperation should also continue in particular in the areas of internal energy market, energy security, emissions trading, promotion of competitive, climate resilient, safe and sustainable low carbon energy, energy efficiency, renewable energy resources, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), as well as other environmental issues such as waste, chemicals, water resource management and industrial pollution. 

14.        The EEA Council recalled the historic global and legally-binding climate agreement reached in Paris in December 2015 and welcomed its entry into force on 4 November 2016, triggered by the EU ratification. The EEA Council welcomed the efforts undertaken by both EU member states and EEA EFTA States to ensure speedy completion of their national ratification procedures and encouraged other countries to ratify as soon as possible. 

15.        The EEA Council welcomed the broad support the joint initiative on European standardisation had achieved and the efforts the EU side had initiated with this successful collaborative co-regulation modernising the European standardisation system. The EEA Council also acknowledged that the involvement and contribution from EFTA in this field is an illustration of efficient EU-EFTA cooperation supporting a homogenous EEA. 

16.        The EEA Council welcomed the ongoing efforts made to both reduce the number of EEA-relevant EU acts awaiting incorporation into the EEA Agreement and to accelerate the incorporation process. While commending all the steps undertaken in the course of the last years, the EEA Council noted that the number of acts awaiting incorporation was still too high. The EEA Council called for continued work in order to significantly and durably reduce the current backlog and thereby ensure legal certainty and homogeneity in the EEA. It urged all parties to engage constructively to find solutions to pending difficult issues. 

17.        With regard to the third package for the internal energy market, the EEA Council welcomed progress made in recent months with regard to removing the remaining obstacles towards its incorporation in the EEA Agreement, notably as concerns the EEA EFTA participation in the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and underlined the importance of swiftly finalising this work in order to establish a fully functional internal market for energy. 

18.        The EEA Council welcomed progress made in recent months with regard to the 2009 regulatory framework for electronic communications (including the regulation on the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications - BEREC), and the regulation on medicinal products for paediatric use.

19.        The EEA Council noted that progress was still needed on a number of important outstanding issues and looked forward to reaching a conclusion as soon as possible, in particular regarding the third postal directive, the EU legal acts in the area of organic production, as well as in the area of common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations. 

20.        The EEA Council noted that there was a number of Joint Committee decisions, for which the six-month deadline provided for in the EEA Agreement with regard to constitutional clearance had been exceeded. It encouraged the EEA EFTA States to strengthen their efforts to resolve the pending cases as soon as possible and to avoid such delays in the future. 

21.        The EEA Council acknowledged the significance of the negotiations on an ambitious, balanced and comprehensive free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. The EEA Council welcomed the continuous exchange of information between the European Commission and the EEA EFTA States, initiated in the EEA Joint Committee in December 2014. Bearing in mind inter alia Protocol 12 to the EEA Agreement, the EEA Council encouraged a continuation of this exchange of information. 

22.        The EEA Council acknowledged that the contracting parties, pursuant to article 19 of the EEA Agreement, had undertaken to continue their efforts with a view to achieving the progressive liberalisation of agricultural trade. The EEA Council looked forward to the signing of the agreements on the further liberalisation of agricultural trade and on the protection of geographical indications between the EU and Iceland, which were initialled on 17 September 2015, in the near future. The EEA Council noted the suspension of the negotiations between the EU and Norway on protection of geographical indications. 

23.        The EEA Council welcomed the progress made in the negotiations between the EU and Norway on further liberalisation of agricultural trade within the framework of article 19 launched in February 2015 and encouraged the parties to actively continue their efforts for further progress in the negotiations.

24.        The EEA Council looked forward to the adoption of the Joint Committee decision related to the agreement on the further liberalisation of trade in processed agricultural products within the framework of article 2(2) and article 6 of Protocol 3 to the EEA Agreement between Iceland and the EU, which was concluded on 17 September 2015, in the near future. 

25.        The EEA Council encouraged the contracting parties to continue the dialogue on the review of the trade regime for processed agricultural products within the framework of article 2(2) and article 6 of Protocol 3 to the EEA Agreement in order to further promote trade in this area. 

26.        Acknowledging the contribution made by EU programmes to building a more competitive, innovative and social Europe, the EEA Council welcomed the participation of the EEA EFTA States in EEA-relevant programmes to which they contribute financially. 

27.        The EEA Council recognised the active participation and full integration of the EEA EFTA States in the European research area and the successful association of Norway and Iceland in Horizon 2020, the EU's flagship programme for research and innovation. The EEA Council will continue to place high importance to the integration and policy alignment of EEA EFTA States with the EU in the area of research and innovation. 

28.        The EEA Council underlined the importance of continuing the practice of inviting officials from the EEA EFTA States to political dialogues held at the level of the relevant EU Council working parties.

29.        The EEA Council underlined the importance of inviting EEA EFTA Ministers to informal EU ministerial meetings and ministerial conferences relevant to EEA EFTA participation in the Internal Market, and expressed its appreciation to the current Slovak and incoming Maltese Presidencies for the continuation of this practice. 

30.        The EEA Council recognised the positive contributions made by the EEA EFTA States to the decision-shaping process of EEA-relevant EU legislation and programmes through their participation in the relevant committees, expert groups, studies and agencies, as well as through the submission of EEA EFTA comments. 

The EU and Lebanon adopted the partnership priorities for the coming four years, as well as a compact. The partnership priorities set up a renewed framework for political engagement and enhanced cooperation. They were agreed in the context of the revised European neighbourhood policy and the EU's global strategy for foreign and security policy.

The compact includes the mutual commitments through which the EU and Lebanon will fulfil the pledges they made at the London conference on supporting Syria and the region in February 2016. The objective is to improve the living conditions both of refugees temporarily staying in Lebanon and of vulnerable host communities.

The announcement was made jointly by Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Gebran Bassil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon in Brussels on Tuesday 15 November.

Partnership priorities in EU-Lebanon relations for the coming years include: security and countering terrorism, governance and the rule of law, fostering growth and job opportunities, and migration and mobility.

The EU-Lebanon compact foresees an EU allocation of a minimum of € 400 million in 2016-2017, in addition to the bilateral assistance of more than €80 million for those two years.  It outlines specific mutual commitments to address the impact of the Syrian crisis and aims to turn the situation into an opportunity to improve the socio-economic prospects, security, stability and resilience of the whole Lebanon. In turn Lebanon commits to ease the temporary stay of Syrian refugees, in particular regarding their residency status. The country currently hosts at least 1.1 million Syrians. It is the country hosting the highest number of displaced persons and refugees both per capita and per square kilometre.

Finding reliable figures on the budgets and finances of the United Nations (UN) system is not easy, unless you know where to look for them. I’ll try to present some of this below and also bring you up-to-date on my research on budgeting and resourcing in international organizations.

First, a lot of the older UN budget data has been gathered by the Global Policy Forum, especially thanks to the help of Klaus Hüfner.

On the websites of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNSCEB), basically the body where the heads of all UN agencies and body coordinate, there are all kinds of UN system financial data, including in reusable (csv) formats for the years starting in 2010. Note that this data is annual although most UN budgets are biennial or, in some cases, even longer.

The UNSCEB (and its predecessor called ACC) have also been issuing reports on the financial situation of the UN system since the early 1990s, with the oldest reports including data going back to 1983. The latest report for the budget period 2014-15 has just been published at the end of October, and the figures above are from this report.*

My own research project in which we study UN budgeting and budget administration continues. We have just published a chapter titled “Changing Budgeting Administration in International Organizations” in the edited volume “International Bureaucracy” and are working on a special issue following our workshop on “Resourcing International Organizations” here in Munich. More is to come on the United Nations in the coming weeks and months.

If you also work on budgeting of international organizations or the questions related to resource matters in the UN system, in regional organizations or in other types of IOs, you can join our panel “Budget Formulation, Budget Administration and the Politics of Resourcing International Organizations” at the ICPP in Singapur in June 2017 (deadline of the CfP is in January).

* Note that this data does not represent budgets or expenditure but revenues that include government and private voluntary contributions made to the various UN organizations. In some of them, voluntary funds make up a large chunk of the money available (e.g. ~80% in WHO). I’ve added the figures for 2014 and 2015 for the chart.

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Did you know that 16 November is the ‘International Day for Tolerance’? This year, more than ever before, let’s take a moment to contemplate.

Talk of openness and inclusion may appear quaint in a world dominated by hate and harshness. Who wants to “respect and recognise the rights and beliefs of others” – as the United Nations would like us to do on Wednesday – when there is so much fear to spread, and so many angry ‘strong’ men and women to elect?

Life is just too short to be polite. People want tough leaders, not more soppy political correctness. Let’s leave softies like Canada’s Justin Trudeau to fight injustice, oppression, racism and unfair discrimination. The rest of us have better things to do.

Actually, we don’t.

Being mean and nasty can be exhilarating for a naughty moment. There is a thrill in breaking taboos, hurling insults and breaching red lines. Building walls and fences and deporting immigrants can sound like great fun.

But the excitement won’t last. And a permanent state of hate and anger is not a recipe for societal well-being. Living together – even without ‘them’, just among ‘us’ – requires a degree of courtesy and polite interaction.

“Being mean and nasty can be exhilarating for a naughty moment… but the excitement won’t last”

Taming the demons of racism, nativism and populism unleashed by America’s president-elect Donald Trump during his election campaign – which may be cultivated over the next four years – will not be easy. But here are six ways can be done.

First, let’s remember that millions of Americans did not buy into Trump’s toxic rhetoric. While the Electoral College certainly voted for Trump, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton secured a majority of the popular vote.

In other words, those who embrace pluralism, tolerance, inclusion – and who reject the nightmare version of a new Trumpian world order – cannot be easily shunted to the side lines. Their voice will continue to count. It may become even louder.

Second, it’s more important than ever to craft an inspirational narrative to counter and outsmart Trump’s European wannabes in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

As elections in these and other countries draw closer, instead of pandering to the ‘Populists International’, mainstream political parties in Europe must reach out with more conviction and passion to the majority of Europeans who believe in an open and tolerant Europe. Their voices are currently drowned out by extremists and ignored by others.

This is no time for old, wishy washy slogans and bland speeches. It’s time to fight fire with fire.

Third, underlining the principles of liberal democracy – as German Chancellor Angela Merkel did in her message of congratulations to Trump – is a good first step. But it will mean very little unless EU leaders take tougher action against those inside the EU – including Hungary’s Viktor Orban and the Polish government – who violate these very values.

Fourth, even as they lecture Trump, Russia’s Vladimir Putin or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on human rights, EU leaders should make sure that they practice what they preach at home and that their own treatment of minorities – as well as migrants and refugees – is above reproach. For the moment, it isn’t.

“Not so long ago racism and discrimination in Europe led to wide-spread devastation, death and destruction – history should not be allowed to repeat itself”

Fifth, even seemingly small things matter. Christmas traditions like ‘Black Pete’ in the Netherlands may seem harmless to white Dutch people but they send a harmful message of exclusion to the country’s many black citizens.

Offensive language, of the kind European Commissioner Gunter Oettinger used recently when speaking of his Chinese counterparts, sends the wrong message to European citizens and a watching world.

Last, let’s debate and discuss the reasons for Trump’s success, the rise of populists, the flaws of liberal democrats and the pros and cons of globalisation. As with Brexit, there are important topics to analyse and reflected upon.

For the moment, the killing fields of the 21st century happen to be far away, in Afghanistan, Africa and the Middle East. But not so long ago it was here in Europe that racism and discrimination led to wide-spread devastation, death and destruction.

History should not be allowed to repeat itself.

 

Related content

• Friends of Europe: Report – Islam and the challenge of Muslim democrats
• Europe’s World: Throwing money at failing states isn’t working
• Debating Europe: Changing the Politics of Fear – new series

 IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Alexandros Plakidas

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