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Hundreds of major companies, including Mars, Nike, Levi Strauss, Unilever and Starbucks, called on U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and world leaders on Wednesday to continue to support agreed curbs on global warming and to speed up efforts to move to a low-carbon economy.

In a statement addressed to Trump, U.S. President Barack Obama, members of the U.S. Congress and global leaders, the group, called 360+, reaffirmed its commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change.

The Paris Agreement, aiming to phase out net greenhouse gas emissions this century, came into force on Nov. 4 and now has backing from 110 nations including the United States.

The Nov. 7-18 meeting in Marrakesh is where U.N. officials and government representatives are trying to work out the details of the pact. However, Trump’s victory in the U.S. election last week has overshadowed the event.

Trump has threatened to tear up the U.S. commitment to the accord.

The 360+ group called on U.S. leaders to continue to participate in the Paris Agreement, support the continuation of U.S. commitments on climate change and continue to invest in low-carbon solutions at home and abroad.

“Failure to build a low-carbon economy puts American prosperity at risk. But the right action now will create jobs and boost U.S. competitiveness,” the group said, in the statement presented at U.N. climate talks being held this week in Marrakesh, Morocco.

“Implementing the Paris Climate Agreement will enable and encourage businesses and investors to turn the billions of dollars in existing low-carbon investments into the trillions of dollars the world needs to bring clean energy prosperity to all,” the group added.

The post Hundreds of major businesses urge Trump not to abandon the Paris climate deal appeared first on New Europe.

Plenary sessions : Wildlife trafficking is the world's fourth largest criminal activity with rhino horn now being worth more than gold. On Monday 21 November MEPs debate a report calling for common sanction at EU levels to help fight wildlife tracking and vote on it the following day. We talked to report author Catherine Bearder, a UK member of the ALDE group, about wildlife trafficking and what is fuelling demand for it.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : Wildlife trafficking is the world's fourth largest criminal activity with rhino horn now being worth more than gold. On Monday 21 November MEPs debate a report calling for common sanction at EU levels to help fight wildlife tracking and vote on it the following day. We talked to report author Catherine Bearder, a UK member of the ALDE group, about wildlife trafficking and what is fuelling demand for it.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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The ancient Assyrian capital of Kalhu was captured by the Iraqi army was found leveled. Today it is known as the village of Nimrud and is 32km south of Mosul.

Captured by the Islamic State jihadists in 2014, the 3,300-year-old city and its monuments have been wiped out because of hostility to so-called un-Islamic idols. IS published footage with the process of destruction, treating the destruction of the site as an accomplishment with religious significance.

The militants destroyed statues, murals, carvings, palaces, and the famous ziggurat. The site is still mined and booby-trapped, and archeologists cannot assess the full extent of the destruction.

UNESCO condemns Nimrud’s destruction as a “war crime.” IS has destroyed numerous ancient cities, including the 2000-year old Hatra in south Iraq and Palmyra in Syria.

The post Nimrud: the 3,300 y.o Assyrian capital is destroyed appeared first on New Europe.

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The European Union in partnership with the Government of the Central African Republic organise the Brussels Conference on the Central African Republic, which takes place in Brussels, on 17 November 2016.

Download this video here.

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Sweden’s central bank (Riksbank) announced it is examining the issue of an e-Krona on Wednesday.

Sweden is leaving cash behind. Card payments are taking over most transactions with coins and notes. But, an electronic currency is being considered for payment by those “who do not want to or have any access to commercial banks payment solutions, such as cards.”

Central Bank surveys suggest that less than 15% of Swedes make most payments in cash. And the cash only economy represents 2% of Sweden’s GDP, compared to 10% in 1990. There are now businesses in Sweden that do not accept cash payments; even Swedish homeless people sell their magazines with card terminals.

By 2014, four in five payments were made electronically; that compares with one in four transactions in Italy. Southern Europe tends to be more oriented towards cash payments.

It has been suggested that Sweden may become cashless by 2030, although two out of three Swedes see cash as a “human right.” For instance, what happens to people who are unbanked?

However, there are many arguments for the elimination of cash. Fewer bank robberies, lower transaction costs, and the elimination of tax evasion.

The e-Krona would, like a Bitcoin restore to the transaction some of its anonymity, rendering transactions more discreet and impersonal. That would both reduce and increase resistance to eliminating money in their physical form.

The post Sweden considers launch of e-Krona on its way to a “cashless society” appeared first on New Europe.

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Poland’s conservative government was celebrating a year in office on Tuesday. Prime Minister Beata Sydlo claimed the government achieved more in one year than the previous administration in eight.

State intervention and moral conservatism

The government boasts the introduction of a child allowance payment, the reduction of the retirement age on Wednesday, and the lifting of a burden for households that had issued Swiss-franc denominated mortgages. Meanwhile, a pace of 3-to-4% GDP growth is considered sustainable for 2017.

That was all achieved despite te first Polish sovereign debt downgrade in a generation, which in many respects was a statement of distrust in expansionary welfare spending and the introduction of measures that hurt the banking sector.

At the same time, the government had tested the limits of the Polish constitution. The government is heavy handed in its appointment of judges and has fired journalists from public media. Meanwhile, the PiS administration is advancing an ultra-conservative moral agenda, which includes the most strict abortion ban in Europe along with Ireland.

Portrait of protestor as he holds sign read in Czech ‘Black Friday’ during protest in support of free Polish media in central Prague, Czech Republic 09 January 2016.  EPA/FILIP SINGER

The victory of Trump in the US is seen as a vindication against liberalism. Beata Sydlo is the daughter of a miner and the PiS administration went to Paris to negotiate a deal for the coal industry, which is and will remain a “national resource.” That is short of calling climate change a lie, but it is clearly not a priority.

Defense and sovereignty

Hosting NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July, the Polish government has also spearheaded the bolstering of NATO’s eastern flank.

But, in defense too, Warsaw has followed controversial policies. Top-brass generals have been cleansed, paramilitary organizations have been integrated into NATO’s Anaconda exercise, and Warsaw speaks of rejuvenating the interwar intermarium security framework. Recently, Poland aggravated the Franco-German axis by opting for US made-in-Poland helicopters rather than Airbus.

Poland can identify with the “America first” slogan, although a “New Yalta” would be a nightmare.

Isolationism is feared by an administration that seeks to counterbalance the Franco-German axis rather than work for European defense identity. PiS has been the main ally to the British Conservatives in the European Parliament and have been the second pillar of opposition to a European Defense Community.

The hope is that a Trump administration will push for burden sharing – as the US picks up 70% of NATO expenditure – rather than reduce its commitment to the region. On that score, Poland has little to fear: it is among the six NATO member states spending more than 2% of its GDP on defense. And it prefers buying American if it’s “made in Poland.”

Final preparations for the upcoming NATO summit at the National Stadium in Warsaw, Poland, 07 July 2016. EPA/PAWEL SUPERNAK POLAND OUT

The post The PiS administration takes pride in leading a conservative revolt appeared first on New Europe.

The Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2015 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Dutch Srebrenica veterans keep joining a legal battle against their state.

The legal team making the case for soldiers said on Wednesday that another 80 troops of the Dutchbat III battalion have signed up; that brings the total to 180 plaintiffs.

Soldiers claim that the 1995 UN-mandated mission to protect the Muslim enclave of the city of Srebrenica was “impossible.” In June, Defence minister Jeanine Hennis admitted that Dutch soldiers sent to Srebrenica were indeed The battalion was unprepared, ill-informed, and ill-equipped.

Therefore, the veterans’ legal team has made the case that the massacre of 8,400 Muslim men and boys by the Serbian troops of General Ratko Mladic could not be stopped. Lawyers Michael Ruperti and Klaas Arjen Krikke argue that these young soldiers were held responsible for 20 years for a humanitarian disaster for which they had little responsibility. And they have suffered socially, emotionally, and financially.

Therefore, they demand compensation. Moreover, they make the point that a court should decide on the compensation rather than a government that is morally responsible for the massacre.

The post Dutch officers sue their government for blaming them for Srebrenica appeared first on New Europe.

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Emmanuel Macron will stand for the French Presidency, he announced on Wednesday.

No one was surprised and polls show he is popular. But, the question is whether he can win the forthcoming French Presidential elections, which are poised to become a third “battle of identity” following the British referendum and the US Presidential elections.

The man with a movement, not a party

The press was not surprised. Polls suggest that he is drawing from pools of voters on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. He was part of the Socialist government for years, but has insisted on not becoming a member of the party.

Macron, 38, presents himself as a renegade, although he does not look it. He began his career as an aid to François Hollande and was later promoted to a minister of the economy. He then founded his own political movement called “En Marche” (Forward).

A movement is not, of course, a party. But, there are advantages and disadvantages to not being part of a party.

The advantage of a movement is that Macron can dip both left and right, as he is not committed. He told journalists on Wednesday that the political system in France is “outdated” and that in transcending that he can unleash the country’s potential. What he is offering is a clearly pro-European platform and a liberal economic agenda.

French President Francois Hollande (L) escorts the former French Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron as he leaves the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, 31 July 2015. EPA/ETIENNE LAURENT

The battle of identity

There are also several disadvantages.

Traditionally, parties have funding, institutional support, and media attention. Macron believes he can compensate for that through managerial excellence.

Campaign funding will not be a problem, especially as he presents a traditional market-friendly agenda of deregulation and tax breaks. Some of his emblematic battles were taking on the totemic 35-hour week, calling for an end to job-for-life careers in the civil service, and the elimination of wealth tax. That is his brand.

Macron lacks a nationwide infrastructure “to get out the vote.” But, it is uncertain the Socialist Party still has that capacity, with the shedding of votes right and left of the political spectrum. And Macron says his movement boasts 90,000 members. To the extent he has this core of motivated support, a party could be superfluous. After all, parties are structures tend to question their leaders; movements simply rally behind them.

One thing Macron lacks is roots. The electoral discourse is polarized, with the far-right rising to unprecedented levels. Therefore, Macron needs to show with whom he stands and for what. That is what parties do.

In this respect, Mr. Macron’s greatest ally is Le Pen.

In making these elections about identity, the young liberal banker will have no problem rallying for the multicultural, young, dynamic, hopeful, and European France.

Marine Le Pen, leader of French extreme right Front National (FN) party,  09 September 2015. EPA/PATRICK SEEGER

One more bid for second place

The French Presidential elections of May 2017 will be a contest for second place in the first round. For over a year, the Front National candidate Marine Le Pen has come in first in the polls, although not with a margin big enough to secure a victory in the second round.

The assumption is that whoever is second will benefit from the mobilization of the centrist, liberal, socially-minded and pro-European vote.

That is what the polls say, if one can believe pollsters after their resounding failure in the Brexit and Trump campaigns.

Macron has a chance to dominate the center.

But, Alain Juppé appears to be more popular, even if he is limited by the appeal of his party. Juppé leads the race for second place and could even beat Le Pen in the first round. For the moment, these two are the most serious contenders for the center of the political spectrum and, theoretically, the presidency.

A right that can’t “ contain.”

Nicolas Sarkozy’s reputation is tarnished by numerous scandals. Days before the primaries, he is dealing with a case of illegal party financing from none other than Gaddafi. If allegations against him are true, then he received money from a dictator in 2007 to bomb him in the name of democracy in 2011.

Currently, Sarkozy appears to be competing with the Front National on anti-immigration and sovereigntist rhetoric. He is also competing with Marine Le Pen for who is more like Trump. With a “Le Pen light” image, Sarkozy has galvanized a strong backlash. He is facing “open primaries” in which left-wing voters will participate to ensure that Le Républicains opt for a palatable Juppé.

Sarkozy is too extreme to be a mainstream choice. But, at the end of this contest, Juppé will find a wall to his right. The center-right can no longer contain the nastier sovereigntist right of France. The votes for Sarkozy will not be easily transferable to the center and could end up with Le Pen.

Left without prospects

The ruling Socialist Party will hold its own primaries in January.

That is expected to be a ceremonial process. Prime Minister Manuel Valls will be virtually unchallenged. Polls suggest President Hollande does have a chance for either reelection or nomination.

Valls is popular – indeed more popular than Macron – with Socialist Party members. However, he has little appeal beyond. Macron will not be running against him for the nomination.

Alain Juppe will continue to accuse Mr Macron of a stab in the back of President Hollande. But, in keeping outside the Socialist Party, Macron can fend off this narrative. At the same time, while Socialists are going towards their worst electoral result in a generation, Mr. Macron will be an alibi. Many Socialist voters do not feel represented and have turned to the far-right.

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls following a meeting at the Matignon Palace in Paris, France, 18 April 2016. EPA/ETIENNE LAURENT

Can he win?

Coming from the left and with a liberal agenda, Mr. Macron will be better prepared to deal with an identify battle. He will reach further to the left than Juppé to the right.

None of the “second candidates” will have a strong narrative appealing to blue collar and white French men and women who feel left behind. That is the battle of France.

The post Macron throws his hat in the French identity battle appeared first on New Europe.

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Not so for Gunther Oettinger, the EU’s digital policy chief and soon-to-be budget boss.

Read more

MEPs have fought for and obtained better support for unemployed youngsters and additional funds to boost key initiatives supporting SMEs, transport infrastructure projects, research and Erasmus+ student mobility. The provisional deal on the EU Budget 2017 with the Council was reached in the early hours of Thursday. After Budget MEPs and Council have formally endorsed the agreement, the new EU budget will be voted in plenary in December.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

MEPs have fought for and obtained better support for unemployed youngsters and additional funds to boost key initiatives supporting SMEs, transport infrastructure projects, research and Erasmus+ student mobility. The provisional deal on the EU Budget 2017 with the Council was reached in the early hours of Thursday. After Budget MEPs and Council have formally endorsed the agreement, the new EU budget will be voted in plenary in December.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 17 November 2016, the Council and European Parliament reached agreement on a 2017 EU budget which strongly reflects the EU's main policy priorities. Total commitments are set at €157.88 billion and payments at €134.49 billion.  

"The strength of the 2017 EU budget lies in its focus on priority measures such as addressing migration, including by tackling its root causes, and encouraging investment as a way to help stimulate growth and create jobs. This maximises the budget's impact to the benefit of EU taxpayers, European citizens and companies. And it respects member states' continued efforts to consolidate their public finance", said Ivan Lesay, state secretary for finance of Slovakia and President of the Council.  

More money for migration and security 

Agreed commitments of almost €6 billion mean that around 11.3% more money will be available for tackling the migration crisis and reinforcing security than in 2016. The money will be used to help member states in the resettlement of refugees, the creation of reception centres, the support for integration measures and the returns of those who have no right to stay. It will also help to enhance border protection, crime prevention, counter terrorism activities and protect critical infrastructure. 

Investing in growth and jobs 

Commitments of €21.3 billion were agreed to boost economic growth and create new jobs under sub-heading 1a (competitiveness for growth and jobs). This is an increase of around 12% compared to 2016. This part of the budget covers instruments such as Erasmus + which increases by 19% to €2.1 billion and the European fund for strategic investments which raises by 25% to €2.7 billion. The 2017 EU budget also includes €500.00 million in commitments for the youth employment initiative to help young people to find a job. Further €500.00 million were agreed for supporting milk and other livestock farmers with additional support measures announced in July. 

With a view to matching member states' consolidation efforts at national level the Council and the Parliament reminded all EU institutions to complete the 5% staff reduction by 2017 as agreed in 2013.   

  Headings2017 EU budget (in mln €)  CommitmentsPayments 1. Smart and inclusive growth74,89856,522 - 1a. Competitiveness for growth and jobs21,31219,321 - 1b. Economic, social and territorial cohesion53,58737,201 2. Sustainable growth58,58454,914 3. Security and citizenship4,2843,787 4. Global Europe10,1879,483 5. Administration9,3959,395 Special instruments534390 TOTAL157,883134,490Next steps 

The 2017 EU budget is expected to be formally adopted by the Council on 29 November and the Parliament on 1 December.

On 17 October 2016, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1839[1] amending Decision 2010/638/CFSP. 

The Council Decision renews existing measures until 27 October 2017. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this Council Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it. 

[1] Published on 18.10.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 280, p. 32. 

* - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/1694[1] implementing Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333. 

The Council Decision removes one person from the list of persons as set out in Section A of Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333. 

On 30 September 2016, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1755[2] amending Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333. 

The Council Decision renews the existing measures for three persons for a further period of six months and amends the statements of reasons relating to these persons. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Armenia align themselves with this Council Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 21.9.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 255, p. 33.
[2] Published on 1.10.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 268, p. 85. 

* - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Location : ASP A3G3Further information
Final programme
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 

(1)     RECALLS its conclusions of 19 November 2014 on the Sixth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion: investment for jobs and growth[1], of 23 June 2015 on the implementation challenges of the cohesion policy 2014-2020[2], of 18 November 2015 on Simplification: Priorities and expectations of Member States with respect to European Structural and Investment Funds[3], of 15 March 2016 "Investing in jobs and growth - maximising the contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds"[4] and of 24 June 2016 on "A more R&I friendly, smart and simple cohesion Policy and the European Structural and Investment Funds more generally"[5]; 

(2)     RECALLS that the EU shall develop and pursue actions to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union and that the specific mission of cohesion policy is to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various regions as set out in Article 174 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; 

(3)     RECOGNISES that cohesion policy is the main investment policy at the EU level to achieve the objectives as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy; and UNDERLINES the added value of cohesion policy and the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds), in particular:  

a)      in providing a stable long-term EU framework and financial means for investment in jobs and growth and the delivery of structural reforms, through integrated interventions tailored to Member States and the various regions of the EU; 

b)      in mobilising and coordinating national and subnational actors under the shared management mode by directly engaging them, based on the partnership principle, in delivering EU priorities through co-financed projects; 

c)           in pioneering an evidence-based and result-oriented approach to EU investments; 

d)      in providing positive incentives for many Member States and subnational actors to implement structural reforms, strengthen their strategic planning, administrative capacity, and cooperation. 

I.          Evaluation of the cohesion policy programmes 2007-2013

 (4)     WELCOMES the Commission Staff Working Document 'Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-2013'[6], which provides evidence that during the 2007-2013 programming period, cohesion policy has made a major contribution to growth, employment and social inclusion opportunities throughout the different types of EU regions, objectives defined in EU strategies, as well as to the reduction of regional disparities between Member States; 

(5)     HIGHLIGHTS that the results set out in the Ex-post evaluation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund were achieved in a context of economic and social challenges, including the deep global economic and financial crisis, the need to build up the economy, infrastructure and administrative capacity, in particular of 13 Member States joining the EU as from 2004, as well as shifting strategic political priorities and newly emerging challenges at EU level;  

(6)     UNDERLINES in particular the following findings of the Ex-post evaluation of the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund: 

a)      The economic modelling performed by the Commission estimates that EUR 270 bn invested from the ERDF and Cohesion Fund during the period 2007-2013, together with national co-financing, will have generated EUR 1 trillion in additional GDP across all Member States by 2023; 

b)      The data reported by managing authorities of the Member States shows that the ERDF and Cohesion Fund will have led to the creation of nearly 1 million jobs, which represents a significant contribution to the net total of 3 million jobs created in the EU economy over the period; 

c)      Financial support under the ERDF programmes helped 400 000 SMEs to withstand the effects of the economic and financial crisis and increase their competitiveness and exports through innovation; 

d)      Cohesion policy contributed to a closer integration of the EU internal market, in particular through improving transport links (in particular TEN-T corridors), to improving energy efficiency, water and waste water treatment as well as waste management, to modernising education and healthcare infrastructure, as well as to strengthening research and innovation; 

e)       Funding available under European Territorial Cooperation programmes (Interreg) enhanced cooperation between neighbouring regions of different Member States, between Member States across the EU, as well as between Member States and non-EU countries,  and also contributed to wider effects, notably in terms of alleviating specific barriers to cooperation across different sectors and of better economic, social and environmental integration, thus representing a prominent example of EU added value;  

(7)     Notwithstanding the positive results of cohesion policy in the 2007-2013 period, NOTES some shortfalls during this period, in particular: 

• Weaknesses in terms of relevance, monitoring, effectiveness and coherence of the actions undertaken, showing that the focus on result-orientation had not been strong enough; and
• The need to enhance administrative capacity at the management level of programmes and to decrease the administrative burden and costs;

 (8)     NOTES that the underlying evaluations of the Staff Working Document capture the situation at the end of 2014 when programmes could not yet have reported in full on the achievement of objectives and targets; 

(9)     NOTES that the Commission has also undertaken an ex-post evaluation for the European Social Fund (the ESF) and LOOKS FORWARD to the presentation of results in the related Staff Working Document; INVITES the Commission to present the outcomes of future evaluations for the ESI Funds in a coordinated manner to facilitate a complete assessment, while paying special attention, where appropriate, to the place-based approach; 

(10)   UNDERLINES that cohesion policy, being accompanied by a thorough set of rigorous evaluations, represents best practice of evidence-based policy-making, and can serve as an example for other EU policies financed from the EU budget; 

(11)   CALLS ON the Commission and Member States, in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, to widely disseminate to the public the results and benefits of cohesion policy which are supported by available evaluations.  

II.         Assessment of certain new elements of cohesion policy and the ESI Funds 2014-2020

(12)   HIGHLIGHTS that compared to the 2007-2013 programming period, a number of new elements were introduced into the legislative framework for the 2014-2020 period aimed at strengthening the effectiveness, result orientation and EU added value of the ESI Funds. First concrete experiences with certain new elements, in particular with the performance framework, thematic concentration, ex-ante conditionalities and the link to the EU economic governance, were made in Member States during the elaboration of their Partnership Agreements and programmes. The practical application of new elements required careful preparation in terms of time and resources to ensure that the necessary conditions for effective spending, including new management and control systems, are in place. At the same time, new instruments of the legal framework such as joint action plans, integrated territorial investments or community led local development strategies provide new opportunities for Member States; 

(13)   NOTES that the comprehensive programming exercise, in combination with the late adoption of the legal acts, parallel preparation for the closure of the 2007-2013 period, and longer than expected designation of authorities, has delayed the implementation phase in the 2014-2020 period; EXPECTS, however, that the efforts made by Member States and the Commission during the programming process will pay off in the years to come through a more effective implementation of high quality programmes, and the possibility to build in the future on the improvements made in the current period; CALLS on the Member States and the Commission to take the necessary steps to speed up the implementation and reporting on the progress of the current programmes;  

(14)   RECALLS that the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) provides a targeted support to tackle youth unemployment, accompanying the traditional actions supported by the ESF, and complementing national strategic frameworks including through the implementation of the Youth Guarantee; and TAKES NOTE of the recent Commission Communication[7] setting out the implementation results of the Youth Guarantee and YEI since 2013; 

(15)   CALLS on the Commission to submit the legislative proposals for the next programming period of the ESI Funds as soon as possible in 2018, with a view to allowing the co-legislators to reach a timely agreement, and providing a basis for early start of the programming process; 

(16)   CALLS on the Commission to consider using new elements of the ESI Funds as an example for other EU policies financed from the EU budget in the context of its "EU Budget focused on Results" initiative[8] launched in 2015; 

Performance framework

(17)   RECALLS that the ESI Funds were the first EU funding instruments to introduce a performance framework based on measurable indicators, and a review with a performance reserve to be allocated during 2019 to only those priorities of Member States programmes for which the milestones set out in the performance framework of the programmes have been achieved; 

(18)   RECOGNISES the efforts made and resources dedicated by Member States and the Commission to develop intervention logic and performance framework for the ESI Funds programmes (especially to define robust indicators, their baseline and target values); NOTES that this process has triggered useful reflections and discussions on the setting of objectives, monitoring of progress, and contributed to changing the mind-set towards an increased focus on results and performance within Member States and the Commission; 

Thematic concentration

(19)   RECALLS that the ESI Funds are subject to legal requirements for thematic concentration which leads to a higher concentration of financial support on fewer areas contributing the most to reaching the targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy, and is expected to produce better results; 

(20)   WELCOMES the fact that in the Member States' programmes under the ERDF and the ESF, thematic concentration has been achieved and, in many cases exceeded the minimal requirements; CONSIDERS, however, that a balance must be maintained between the predefined requirements for concentration on a limited number of thematic areas and the needs of Member States, including the flexibility to respond during the programming period to specific national and regional development challenges; 

Ex-ante conditionalities

(21)   RECALLS that ex-ante conditionalities were introduced in the 2014-2020 period to ensure that the conditions necessary for an effective use of funds were in place in Member States before the investment under the ESI Funds is made; 

(22)   CONSIDERS that while the fulfilment of ex-ante conditionalities sometimes requires significant time and resources to implement legislative changes or complex reforms, they have a positive effect on the overall investment environment, the strengthening of administrative capacity and good governance in many Member States; WELCOMES the facilitating role of ex-ante conditionalities in the preparation of project pipelines, strategic documents such as smart specialisation strategies, as well as in a faster implementation of the EU acquis; 

Link to EU economic governance

(23)   RECALLS that in the legislative framework for the 2014-2020 period, measures were introduced to ensure that multi-annual investments of the ESI Funds address relevant country-specific recommendations. As a result of the programming exercise, the current ESI Funds programmes are designed to support structural reforms in line with EU priorities defined through the European Semester process; 

(24)   CONSIDERS that investments that address relevant country-specific recommendations contribute to delivering structural reforms and improving the overall macro-economic situation of the Member State concerned; 

(25)   CONSIDERS that more consistency should be sought in the future between various measures linking the effectiveness of the ESI Funds to economic governance, building on the first positive experience with the introduction of ex-ante conditionalities, and taking into account the need to accommodate social, economic and territorial challenges, as well as the continuity and stability of multi-annual programmes; 

Simplification

(26)   REGRETS that the full potential of the efficiency and the result orientation of the ESI Funds legislative framework is hampered by over-regulation and the existence of too many layers of rules and controls (EU, national and regional level); RECALLS that trust between all actors is essential for an effective functioning of the shared management mode, and should be further strengthened by making the ESI Funds simpler, more accessible and more understandable to citizens, businesses and administrations; REITERATES in this regard the importance of early warning mechanisms and of reinforcing the preventive role of audit at EU and national level; 

(27)   WELCOMES the findings and recommendations issued to date by the High Level Group on monitoring simplification for beneficiaries of the ESI Funds established by the Commission and LOOKS FORWARD to its future work regarding the preparation of the post-2020 programming period; 

(28)   TAKES NOTE of the legislative proposal aimed at the simplification of the ESI Funds for the current programming period, submitted by the Commission to the Council in September 2016, and REMAINS COMMITTED to its rapid adoption; CALLS on the Commission and Member States to make best use of all options in the legal framework (including early preparation of delegated acts) which help to simplify the implementation of the current ESI Funds programmes; 

(29)   IS COMMITTED to a substantial simplification, balancing the need for stability and continuation with a significant reduction of the administrative burden and costs in the post-2020 period; CONSIDERS that the following directions and new avenues should be carefully explored without prejudice to future decisions: 

a)      A simple, clear and light set of rules for the ESI Funds with a stronger emphasis on an integrated approach (e.g. multi-fund programmes and common rules for all ESI Funds), while ensuring that each ESI Fund can deliver effectively and efficiently on its Fund-specific missions, and that preference is given to the simplest solution available; 

b)      The ESI Funds rules and the rules applicable to other EU funds, as well as other EU policies having an impact on the implementation of the ESI Funds (in particular state aid rules), should be further mutually aligned in order to simplify the implementation of EU funds for beneficiaries, facilitate synergies and complementarity between different programmes and blending of various sources, as well as to allow for comparability of effectiveness and efficiency across EU funding instruments; 

c)      Further facilitation of the take-up and efficient use of the full range of simplified cost options, accompanied by clear requirements for their control and audit; 

d)      A simpler and streamlined shared management model based on performance rather than compliance, in order to further enhance the result-orientation of the ESI Funds, while taking into account the importance of prevention, proportionality and value-for-money; 

e)      An assessment of whether lessons to be drawn from delivery mechanisms used in other EU policy areas could contribute to improving the effectiveness of cohesion policy and the ESI Funds; 

f)       Broader application of proportionality and the introduction of differentiation into the implementation of the ESI Funds programmes based on objective criteria and positive incentives for programmes; 

(30)   REMAINS COMMITTED that a regular political debate takes place among relevant ministers in the General Affairs Council to discuss the implementation and the results of cohesion policy and the ESI Funds, as well as to support the preparation of the policy framework for the post-2020 period. 

[1]            Doc. 15802/14.
[2]            Doc. 9622/1/15 REV 1.
[3]            Doc. 14266/1/15 REV 1.
[4]            Doc. 7075/16.
[5]           Doc. 10668/16.
[6]           Doc. 12371/16.
[7]            Doc. 12749/16 + ADD 1-3.
[8]            http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget4results/index_en.cfm

 

Monday 21 November 2016 - Youth and Education

Place:        Justus Lipsius building, Brussels
Chair:       Peter Plavčan, Slovak minister for Education, Science, Research and Sport

All times are approximate and subject to change

Youth

+/- 08.00
Arrivals

+/- 08.15
Doorstep by minister Plavčan

+/- 08.30
Breakfast: structured dialogue Youth

+/- 10.00
Beginning of Council meeting
Adoption of the agenda
Approval of legislative A items (public session tbc)
Approval of non-legislative A items

+/- 10.30
Promoting new approaches in youth work (conclusions)

+/- 10.45
Young Europeans at the centre of a modern Europe (public session)

+/- 12.30
Any other business

Education

+/- 15.00
Beginning of Council meeting

+/- 15.15
Resolution on a New Skills Agenda (adoption)

+/- 15.30
Recommendation on a Skills Guarantee (political agreement)

+/- 15.45
Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism (conclusions)

+/- 16.00
Fostering and developing talent: (public session)

+/- 17.45
Any other business

+/- 18.00
Press conference (live streaming)

Tuesday 22 November 2016 - Culture and Sport

Place:        Justus Lipsius building, Brussels
Chair:       Marek Maďarič, Slovak minister for Culture

All times are approximate and subject to change

Culture

+/- 08.00
Arrivals

+/- 08.45
Doorstep by Minister Maďarič

+/- 09.30
Beginning of Council meeting

+/- 09.45
Public deliberations (public session)
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (progress report)

+/-10.00
Decision on the European Year of Cultural Heritage (2018) (general approach

+/-10.15
Decision on the European Capitals of Culture 2020-2033 (general approach)

+/-10.30
Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations (debate)

+/- 12.15
Any other business

+/- 13.00
Lunch: structured dialogue Sport

+/- 14.30
Press conference (live streaming)

Sport

+/- 15.00
Beginning of Council meeting

+/- 15.15
Sport diplomacy (conclusions)

+/- 15.30
The impact of sport on personal development (public session)

+/- 17.20
Any other business

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_c96321.r21.cf3.rackcdn.com/450px-Flag_of_the_Central_African_Republic.svg_129_97shar_c1.png

The EU strategy is based on a flexible approach linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). The consolidation of peace, security and sustainable stabilisation are central to EU-CAR relations.

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