Estonia has long looked to the Nordic countries, mainly Sweden and Finland, for inspiration and belonging, rather than forging a common identity with its Baltic neighbours. Historically, Estonia has been shaped by the “good old Swedish times”, a national myth referring to the period from the 16th century to the early 18th century, when Estonia’s territory was under Swedish rule. Significant
reforms were introduced during this time, including the establishment of the University of Tartu. During the Second World War, many Estonians escaped as refugees across the Baltic Sea to neutral Sweden. Ties with Finland are even more profound. Estonians and Finns both speak a Finno-Ugric language and many Finns and Estonians were able to forge ties even during the Soviet days.
Estonia today shares generally secular-rational values with its Northern neighbours. Religion doesn’t play a large role in society; technological progress is viewed almost without scepticism. The success of Estonia’s e-government initiatives and start-up scene was preceded by the collective search for “Estonia’s Nokia”, when the Finnish company ruled the mobile phone market.
So why shouldn’t Estonia consider itself the sixth Nordic country? Parts of the progressive political elite already do. The Reform Party, which leads the government, titled its 2015 parliamentary election platform “Estonia: the New Nordic”. But in terms of attitudes towards other fundamental European values, such as social justice or human rights, Estonia couldn’t be further from the Nordic states.
The high taxation and well-functioning public services seen in Nordic countries are in stark contrast with the neo-liberal flat tax implemented in Estonia. The country is a fertile ground for e-government precisely because privacy has never been an important concern. Equal opportunities and gender equality measures are viewed by many Estonians as unnecessary meddling. And there are tough citizenship policies that negatively affect the Russian-speaking minority, which makes up a quarter of the population.
Estonians see immigration as their greatest concern, not re-starting stalling economic growth. They see Nordic attitudes to migration as misguided. Anti-immigration rhetoric and hate crime are rising, and the government has been reluctant to tackle it. There are also many differences on LGBT rights: although a civil union law that provides recognition and rights for same-sex couples came into force in 2016 in Estonia, its implementation has been halted by a political gridlock. In all five Nordic countries, marriage is – or soon will be – open to all couples equally (Finland’s
equal marriage law takes effect in 2017).
Having achieved its primary goal of escaping Russian influence in favour integration with the West – notably through membership of NATO and the EU – Estonia is now trying to focus on the construction of its national identity. But it is unclear yet whether the Nordic model will be the dream, or whether Estonia retreats to the nativism seen in Poland and Hungary.
IMAGE CREDIT: rudi1976/Bigstock.com
The post Estonia’s Nordic dream appeared first on Europe’s World.
The Hague, 25 November 2016
Mrs. Emily O'Reilly
European Ombudsman
Subject: Initiatives to improve Eurogroup transparency
Thank you again for your encouraging words and remarks, which will feed into our further reflection on the matter in due course.
Let me clarify a few of the points you mentioned in your letter:
First, access to documents held only by the national delegations participating in the Eurogroup, but not by its support structures in the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission. In the Eurogroup of 7 March 2016 it was decided that documents submitted to the Eurogroup will, as a rule, be published, unless there are well-founded objections such as i) documents which are still work in progress, and/or subject to further substantial changes; ii) documents containing confidential or market-sensitive information; and iii) documents for which the author institution objects to their publication.
The bulk of the Eurogroup documents is prepared by the European Commission and ESM. The agreement applies to all documents submitted to the Eurogroup. However - as mentioned in my previous letter- EU Regulation 1049/2001 does not apply to the Eurogroup, it not being an institution or body within the meaning of the Treaties, as recently judged by the European Court ofJustice in the Cypriot bail-in cases. Therefore documents held by national delegations will have to be handled in accordance with the national legislation on transparency. In case a request is made for public access to those documents I will redirect the request to the relevant national institution.
Second, the remarks concerning the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG). The role of the EWG is to prepare the meetings of the Eurogroup at a technical level. Its proceedings are hence closely aligned to the Eurogroup agenda, which is now published, in annotated form, prior to the Eurogroup meetings. Moreover, my Eurogroup summing-up letters are now also published shortly after the Eurogroup meetings and reflect the preparatory work of the EWG when relevant. In deciding on its transparency regime, the Eurogroup adhered to the existing legislation and upheld the confidential nature of the EWG proceedings.
Third, the publication of programme documentation. In the ESM Board of Governors (BoG) meeting in June it was indeed confirmed to publish programme documentation ahead of the ESM Board of Governors meetings. This arrangement is consistent with the decision to publish programme documents after the Eurogroup meetings. The ESM governing bodies typically convene once the relevant national procedures, which commence after the Eurogroup has reached a political understanding, have run their course. Publishing these documents prior to the Eurogroup meetings was not deemed appropriate by the Eurogroup since they can be subject to change and are part of a negotiation process.
Fourth, the overview of Eurogroup documentation. I am pleased to inform you that since the introduction of the transparency regime, the Eurogroup has not only published on its website the annotated agenda and summing-up letters of all its meetings, but also other documents, which mainly concern notes underlying our thematic discussions. Programme documentation is published on the website of the European Commission and the ESM.
Let me reassure you once again that we are committed to furthering the transparency of the political deliberations of the Eurogroup despite the fact that the EU provisions in this regard are not directly applicable.
I am confident that the initiatives which we have started to implement will indeed address the information needs of the European citizens and thereby contribute to an improved understanding of our work.
Kind regards,
Jeroen Dijsselbloem
President of the Eurogroup
As the nights have drawn in and the mercury has dropped, thoughts – in my neck of the woods at least – have turned to that important festivity of the six month-iversary of the referendum. Even though we’re little over five months on, we’re starting to see the wave of events asking us to reflect on the vote and on 2016 more generally.
From my perspective, the key paradox is the mix of radical rupture and apparent stasis in the British political scene. On the one hand, we have had a fundamental change of direction in the UK’s engagement with the international system and a shaking up of the party political system. On the other, we have many of the old hands still on deck and – most crucially – we still have little sense of how those old hands will pursue Brexit.
It is little exaggeration to say that we know about as much on this now as we did on the morning of 24 June, i.e. hardly anything. Whether it’s the totemic incantation of “Brexit means Brexit” or the “have cake and eat it” notes spotted this week, there is only the sense that the cunning plan gambit has failed to materialise. Of course, this is not surprising, because there is no cunning plan, no way out – in practical terms – of both limited free movement of people and not limiting free movement of goods, services and capital.
Earlier in the autumn I thought that there might be some flexibility on free movement of people from the EU27, who have other reasons to think about stepping back from a maximalist interpretation, but this has closed down of late. This is due to a more general hardening of the position that negotiations can only take place under Article 50 and mutual reassurance that the UK cannot be given a pick-and-mix deal as a reward for departure. That’s not unreasonable, especially given the growth of concern about populism post Trump (and pre-Le Pen), and the general air of messing about in London.
As David Allen Green rightly pointed out, the fight that May has to deal with is more about how she manages public opinion in the UK than it is about the EU27. It’s pretty clear that the UK can go low or high into Article 50, either retaining the four freedoms or binning them all (broadly speaking): the 27 might prefer the UK to keep them, but will cope either way. Thus it is the domestic audience that matters, because the UK government – and, to a less extent, the other member state governments – that have to get any deal approved, either formally (in parliament) or informally (in their party, the press and – eventually – elections).
If we assume that the deal side of things is broadly fixed into the high/low options, then we might usefully consider that what May is now doing is applying Lukes’ third face of power. Since she can’t impose her preferences on the public (first face) nor control the agenda (second face), she’s instead going to try and change what people want.
This really came home during this week’s exchange of letters with Donald Tusk, who rightly pointed out that the EU27 await the UK to get going with negotiations, so any uncertainty over the status of UK nationals in the EU rests firmly at the UK’s feet.
This has been part of a longer-running thread, of refusing to confirm rights for EU nationals in the UK without first getting confirmation of UK nationals’ rights in the EU. This is bar-room politics at its worst, since all sides have international treaty obligations to protect these individuals, while the alternative of forced removal is not credible, even in these febrile times: so reciprocal guarantees will be forthcoming. But May presents the situation as having an ace in her hand.
Language matter here. As the bots keep telling me on Twitter, ‘expats’ are just ‘our’ migrants. Much of the British public has a problem with immigrants, but hardly anyone has a problem with expats. Since I assume May is a well-informed and thoughtful individual, I also have to assume that she knows full well what she is doing here and the simplest explanation I can see is that she is seeking to kick up a mess about ‘expats’ so that there’s an outcry from the media and her party to act to save them. And the only way she can do that is by granting reciprocal rights to EU nationals, which might well include free movement (assuming the ‘expats’ want that too – which I’m guessing they do from my passage through Malaga airport last month).
In short, May is seeking to reframe the public debate, so that the weight of the ‘people discussion’ falls on ‘expats’ rather than ‘immigrants’. And if you couple that to the growing sense that people might be more open to the trade-off of market access in return for freedom of movement, then you have a basis for the high deal in Article 50.
Whether this will work, or can work, is a different issue. The fight over Parliamentary approval of Article 50 notification has distracted many in her party and the press, but at some point this effort will get noticed and attacked. Then it will be a question of how skillfully May can defend her position, which has not yet been seriously challenged. Someone did note to me the other day that the Tories won’t want to eject May because that would mean a second Prime Minister without an election: given how high temperatures have risen in the party, even that might not be enough to stop another regicide.
The post The third face of Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
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For much of the recent past, Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados offered little in the way of political entertainment.
Read morePlace: Justus Lipsius building, Brussels
Chairs: Peter Žiga, Minister for the Economy of Slovakia
All times are approximate and subject to change
+/- 09.20
Doorstep by Minister Peter Žiga
+/- 10.00
Beginning of Council meeting (roundtable)
+/- 10.05
Adoption of legislative A items (public session)
+/- 10.15
Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (public session)
+/- 11.55
The Energy Union package (public session)
Progress with the development of the external dimension of the EU energy policy
Any other business
+/- 16.00
a) Current legislative proposals (public session)
i) Framework for energy efficiency labelling
ii) Information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the field of energy
b) External energy relations
c) International Energy Agency: Long-term financial health
d) Work programme of the incoming Presidency
+/- 16.30
Press conference (live streaming)
The third meeting of the EU−Georgia Association Council will take place on 2 December 2016 in Brussels.
The meeting will be chaired by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, on behalf of the European Union. Georgia will be represented by its Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili.
A press conference will take place after the meeting, on Friday 2 December at 11.00 in the Justus Lipsius building (main press room).
The Association Council will discuss relations between the EU and Georgia, specifically on:
The EU High Representative and the Prime Minister of Georgia will also discuss more specifically the EU global strategy, the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy.
The President of the European Council Donald Tusk will meet Prime Minister Kvirikashvili on the eve of the Association Council, on 1 December (photo opportunity at +/- 13.30; press statements at +/- 14.00, Justus Lipsius VIP entrance).