European Union

General : 16 MEPs from the GUE/NGL group withdrew their signature from a motion of censure on the Commission which was announced in plenary on Thursday 12 May.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

General : 16 MEPs from the GUE/NGL group withdrew their signature from a motion of censure on the Commission which was announced in plenary on Thursday 12 May.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/Afghanistan-nz-flag_thumb_169_1463669468_1463669468_129_97shar_c1.jpg

On 5 October, the EU and Afghanistan co-host the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. For the international community, it is the opportunity to signal sustained political and financial support to Afghan peace, state-building and development. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, High Representative Federica Mogherini and Neven Mimica, European Commissioner for Development Cooperation, represent the European Union. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah represent Afghanistan.

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General : The European Youth Event (EYE) taking place at the Parliament in Strasbourg this Friday and Saturday is not just for the 7,500 Europeans who will be in attendance. Regardless of where you are, you can make your views heard during the event where participants will exchange ideas and perspectives on the EU’s future. It will be opened by EP Vice-Presidents Sylvie Guillaume, Ulrike Lunacek, Mairead McGuinness, Rainer Wieland on Friday morning. Read on to see how you can play your part.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

General : The European Youth Event (EYE) taking place at the Parliament in Strasbourg this Friday and Saturday is not just for the 7,500 Europeans who will be in attendance. Regardless of where you are, you can make your views heard during the event where participants will exchange ideas and perspectives on the EU’s future. It will be opened by EP Vice-Presidents Sylvie Guillaume, Ulrike Lunacek, Mairead McGuinness, Rainer Wieland on Friday morning. Read on to see how you can play your part.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/72695ff0-16c6-11e6-a51e-bc764e093073_6.86_thumb_169_1463149685_1463149684_129_97shar_c1.jpg

On the 16 March 2015 the Council has launched the EU's military advisory mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA), which it established on 19 January 2015. It sets out to support the Central African authorities in preparing areform of the security sectorwith respect to the armed forces of the Central African Republic (FACA).

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General : More than one in four Europeans smoke. Half of them will die prematurely, shortening their life by 14 years on average. From 20 May new European legislation will be in place to make smoking and cigarettes less attractive, especially among young people. Read on to find out what will change and check out our infographic about smokers in the EU.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

General : More than one in four Europeans smoke. Half of them will die prematurely, shortening their life by 14 years on average. From 20 May new European legislation will be in place to make smoking and cigarettes less attractive, especially among young people. Read on to find out what will change and check out our infographic about smokers in the EU.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Have you ever noticed how you never see Cameron and Flynn in the same place at the same time?

After what feels like a lifetime, we move into the final weeks of this EU referendum campaign. A quick peek at the calendar only gives us five weeks until the vote and all the talk of long campaigns and attention deficits feels pushed to one side, as we flip into rushes for the line, tales of thousands of miles covered and last minute surprises.

I exaggerate. But only a bit.

So far, the real mark of the referendum has been how predictable it has been. Neither side has produced a killer argument, neither side has given any hostages to fortune that weren’t already out there. Even this week’s excursus into “EU as fourth Reich” by Boris was notable more for having taken so long to come out than for its content: I recall Nigel Lawson saying something similar back in February and no-one really noticed/cared.

It’s not that no one’s tiring to make the debate come to life. Remain, in particular, have thrown a lot at the debate, from Obama to the IMF, with a cavalcade of foreign leaders and experts bringing their gravitas and research to present a pretty robust economic case.

However, like the famous Crimean engagement, it’s magnificent, but it’s not effective, or at least as far as the polling goes. Admittedly, there’s obviously some issue around polling, which effectively places everyone in a state of profound uncertainty about who’s where. Given that uncertainty, fighting as if you still had everything to play for makes sense.

Leave appear to be taking the path of keeping back on the big guns, assuming they have them to produce. If public opinion is hard to measure because few people are really engaged, then it makes sense to wait until it’s more pressing and engaging. Of course, this might be as good as it gets, in which case the last-mover advantage is weaker. Our work on social media campaigning suggests that if there is an uptick of interest it has been small so far.

If there is a dog that has yet to bark very loudly, then it’s immigration. Vote Leave, in particular, has not been willing to go too far down that route, but there is both opportunity and incentive, given the persistently high levels of public interest in the issue. Seen in this light, Turkey might find itself been encouraged not to pull the plug on the refugee deal just yet.

Whether things will change gear in these last weeks remains unclear. Part of the problem is that the arguments are all very well-rehearsed, so finding lines that cut through and engage is very difficult. Even Cameron’s ‘security’ framing has fallen to the wayside somewhat, despite the potential it displayed.

In addition, the scope for external events to play in the debate looks to be limited. Should the Turkey deal fall apart, it will still take some time for volume of refugees and migrants crossing to Greece to reach last summer’s levels. The postponing of any major EU policy initiative, and of most of the British government’s work, also takes some of the potential for heat. The apparent resolution of the doctors’ strike is a symptom of this wind-down, and part of the reason others are looking to make advantage in the next month.

However, while this might play to Remain’s advantage, there is a sting in the tail. Turnout looks to be a crucial factor, as Leavers are much more enthused about the referendum. If the government and Remain draw too much of the life from the debate – to avoid annoying people – then they might find they still lose. Moreover, Leave have every incentive to help them make this happen. Difficult choices all round.

The post Charge of the Light Brigade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Welcome to Thursday’s edition of our daily Brussels Briefing. To receive it every morning in your email in-box, sign up here.

Gold prices down, sterling sharply up, bookies chalking Brexit at the longest odds since the campaign began (around 3/1). Has the Remain side in Britain’s EU referendum campaign made a decisive breakthrough?

Money is certainly moving against Brexit. A mini-trend of moderately better polls for the pro-EU side was buttressed on Wednesday by an ICM phone survey putting Leave 18 points behind. Referendum campaigns can break sharply as the public begin to seriously engage. Remain campaigners will be hoping this is that moment. Indeed after firing-off their big guns – the US president, macabre Treasury reports, Bank of England recession warnings – they may also be thinking: what took so long?

If a lead is sustained, two factors potentially play a role. ICM picked up a swing to Remain among Conservative voters, with around 60 per cent backing David Cameron’s position. They are still open to changing their minds, but for now the increasingly vicious Tory infighting seems to be encouraging a bit more loyalty to their prime minister. The second is that Remain are faring well on the economic argument – and that is where Mr Cameron thinks he will clinch the vote.

Now for the caveats. The Ipsos MORI poll on Wednesday could be an outlier. And even if it isn’t, why believe it? Pollsters called the last UK and Israeli elections dead wrong. Even pollsters are wary of polls these days. A debate over phone (better for Remain) versus online surveys (better for Leave) rages on in Britain. And in any event predicting behaviour in this vote is hard because there is no good quantifiable precedent.

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The case is made paper maintains that the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 covering industrial goods should be modernised and modified to take into account the various and growing criticisms of the original CU. Furthermore, economic integration between the EU and Turkey should be strengthened by signing a complementary deep integration regional trade agreement (RTA) between the EU and Turkey, covering agriculture, SPS measures, services, government procurement, investment, and dispute settlement. For Turkey, the objective would be to achieve comprehensive liberalisation, while for the EU this is an ideal opportunity to harness the economic and political potential of deeper integration with Turkey, in line with its wider trade and investment policy.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η Κύπρος έγινε το τέταρτο από τα πέντε Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν οικονομική βοήθεια από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο (ΔΝΤ). Ολοκλήρωσε το πρόγραμμα του με το ΔΝΤ την 7η Μαρτίου και με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης (ΕΜΣ) την 31η Μαρτίου. Αυτό παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως ‘έξοδος από τα Μνημόνια’. Είναι όμως πραγματικά έτσι; Τι σημαίνει η ολοκλήρωση ενός προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας με την ΕΕ και το ΔΝΤ, και πότε επέρχεται η πραγματική έξοδος από το Μνημόνιο;

Τα προγράμματα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ αποτελούνται από δύο μέρη: (1) την δανειακή σύμβαση ή σύμβαση διευκόλυνσης, και (2) τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις υπό τον όρο ικανοποίησης των οποίων απελευθερώνονται οι δόσεις της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις αυτές περιλαμβάνονται στα διαβόητα πλέον Μνημόνια (Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs), τα οποία συνάπτονται μεταξύ του Κράτους-Μέλους που επωφελείται της οικονομικής βοήθειας, του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής (εκπροσωπώντας τον ΕΜΣ, μέλη του οποίου είναι τα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης). Η αξιολόγηση τήρησης των όρων του  Μνημονίου διεξάγεται από την λεγόμενη ‘Τρόικα’: Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα (ΕΚΤ) και ΔΝΤ.

Η εκτενής δυνατότητα της Τρόικα να επηρεάζει σχεδόν άμεσα ένα μεγάλο εύρος πολιτικών των Κρατών-Μελών υπό οικονομική βοήθεια, πολλές από τις οποίες θεωρούνται καίριες για ένα κράτος (π.χ. προϋπολογισμός, φορολογία, κλπ), όπως και η σημαντικά μειωμένη συμμετοχή αντιπροσωπευτικών θεσμών (π.χ. εθνικό Κοινοβούλιο),  έχουν εγείρει  ανησυχίες σχετικά με την επίπτωση της διαδικασίας αυτής στις αρχές και σωστή λειτουργία της δημοκρατίας. Η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως η πολύ-αναμενόμενη λύση των ανωτέρω προβλημάτων και η επαναφορά της κανονικότητας και ορθής λειτουργίας των δημοκρατικών διαδικασιών. Στην πραγματικότητα, όμως, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος δεν συνεπάγεται και έξοδο από τα Μνημόνια.

Όσον αφορά στο ΔΝΤ, μετά την λήξη του προγράμματος και εάν το επωφελούμενο κράτος χρωστάει περισσότερο από το ποσό βοήθειας που αντιστοιχεί στο 100% της ποσόστωσης του στο ΔΝΤ (ή εάν κριθεί αναγκαίο από το ΔΝΤ ανεξαρτήτως του οφειλόμενου ποσού), άρχεται η διαδικασία παρακολούθησης μετά το πρόγραμμα – το λεγόμενο Post-Programme Monitoring (PPM). Η διαδικασία περιλαμβάνει την παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών του επωφελούμενου κράτους, ώστε να  εντοπιστούν αυτές που θα έθεταν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα και πρόοδο του κράτους και, κατ’ επέκταση, την αποπληρωμή του ΔΝΤ. Το PPM διεξάγεται δύο φορές το χρόνο.

Όσον αφορά στην ΕΕ, έχει δημιουργηθεί μία παρόμοια διαδικασία παρακολούθησης, με την ονομασία Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS), σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 14 του Κανονισμού 472/2013. Η διαδικασία εφαρμόζεται μετά την ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας ενός Κράτους-Μέλους της Ευρωζώνης και έως ότου εξοφληθεί το 75% της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας που έχει ληφθεί (είτε από τον τωρινό και μόνιμο ΕΜΣ, είτε από προηγούμενους μηχανισμούς οικονομικής βοήθειας που είχαν συσταθεί παλαιότερα). Σύμφωνα με την διαδικασία του PPS, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ διενεργούν τακτικές αποστολές και επιθεωρήσεις στο Κράτος-Μέλος, για να εκτιμήσουν την οικονομική κατάσταση του. Σε περίπτωση διαπίστωσης πολιτικών που θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα, και συνεπώς την δυνατότητα αποπληρωμής της βοήθειας που έχει χορηγηθεί, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ συντάσσουν έκθεση σχετικά με τα διορθωτικά μέτρα που το Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών της ΕΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να ζητήσει να θεσπιστούν απο το Κράτος-Μέλος προς διόρθωση των αποκλίσεων. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η διαδικασία ψηφοφορίας της ανωτέρω έκθεσης στο Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών είναι η αντίστροφη ειδική πλειοψηφία ή Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV). Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η έκθεση της Επιτροπής θεωρείται ότι έχει εγκριθεί, εκτός εάν σχηματιστεί πλειοψηφία καταψήφισης της – δηλαδή είναι εύκολο η έκθεση να υιοθετεί και πιο δύσκολο να απορριφθεί.

Στην ουσία λοιπόν, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος, η οποία παρουσιάζεται συχνά και ως το τέλος των Μνημονίων, αφορά ουσιαστικά μόνο στην ικανότητα του επωφελούμενου Κράτους-Μέλους να δανειστεί από τις αγορές. Το μέρος του προγράμματος που αφορά στην παρακολούθηση πολιτικών του Κράτους-Μέλους παραμένει για ένα σημαντικό χρονικό διάστημα μετά τη λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Το ίδιο παραμένει και η επιτήρηση της Τρόικα.

Ως εκ τούτου, είναι πολύ σαφές ότι η Κύπρος είναι μακριά από την πραγματική έξοδο της από το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, όπως και τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν σχετική βοήθεια. Η Κύπρος είναι σε θέση να εξασφαλίσει οικονομικούς πόρους από τις αγορές και δεν λαμβάνει πλέον οικονομική βοήθεια. Παρά ταύτα, η επιτήρηση και αξιολόγηση των πολιτικών, ήτοι, επί της ουσίας το Μνημόνιο, θα παραμείνουν τουλάχιστον μέχρι το 2029 για την ΕΕ, δηλαδή 13 χρόνια μετά την λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας και, για το ΔΝΤ, έως ότου εξοφλήσει περισσότερα από €820 εκατομμύρια.

Οι δημοκρατικές επιπτώσεις των ανωτέρω είναι σημαντικές. Μέσω της διαδικασίας οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, η Κύπρος θα είναι υπό στενή παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών της επί τη ουσίας για σχεδόν 20 έτη. Και αυτό, δεδομένης της περιορισμένης οικονομικής βοήθειας που έλαβε η Κύπρος σε σύγκριση με άλλα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης, όπως π.χ. η Ελλάδα. Για τα κράτη αυτά, η περίοδος επιτήρησης των πολιτικών, ήτοι του Μνημονίου, θα είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη.

The post Πότε μία χώρα “βγαίνει από το Μνημόνιο” ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Political myths are a particular kind of narrative used to shape the legitimacy of a political system, writes Jeremy F. G. Moulton. He argues that, despite the difference between the academic and common usages of ‘myth’, political myth theory can generate important insights for political authority, and that it may prove useful in understanding questions around the EU’s legitimacy.

Flag of the European Union – Berlin 2012, Thomas Quine, CC-BY-2.0

Last week, I presented a paper at the 2016 UACES Student Forum Conference at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. The paper focused on EU climate action and its interpretation as political myth; that is, a story that is used to explain and justify political authority.

Like most in academia, I like to flatter myself that my chosen field of study is both interesting and important – the reaction from the other attendees at the conference at least gave me reason to believe that the former may well be true. The discussion following my presentation revealed that political myth is a subject that has the potential to be of great interest and to promote spirited discussion, but it also showed that, as of yet, it has a limited readership.

This did not come as a great surprise. Within the academic writing on political myth theory, it has been recognised that sparse attention is paid to the matter. Yet, there is reason to argue that this should be (and is) changing. Since JCMS’s special issue on the subject in the EU in early 2010, more overt attention has been given to the European project’s political myths. But misconceptions about what political myth is remain prevalent.

What a Political Myth Is

Political myths are narratives that become central to a polity’s, or other political authority’s, raison d’être. They are used both by those in political authority and the wider population in order to legitimate that political authority. A political myth is a story that must be widely accepted as true, though its veracity is not the central issue. In fact, the truth behind a myth may well be questionable. What matters is the dominant belief and acceptance of the story.

I think political myths are best understood as developing in four stages (an approach I’ve adapted from the work of Della Sala 2010 and Bouchard 2013).

1. Initial framing – in this stage, a potential myth is framed as a narrative – one would imagine by those acting within or in favour of a given polity or political authority.
2. Diffusion – here the narrative is told and spread. Two distinct roles emerge: storytellers and listeners. For a potential myth to be successful, initial listeners must become storytellers and further diffuse the story. According to Della Sala, aside from political actors, initial storytellers are likely to be ‘cultural elites, public intellectuals and academics’.
3. Ritualisation – in this stage, a narrative becomes part of normal life, it is widely accepted as fact and becomes a basis of political, social, cultural and collective action.
4. Sacralisation – in this final stage, the narrative becomes a central part of a polity’s mode of being and the two become inextricably linked.

There are a number of ways to classify and differentiate political myths, but one set, that of foundational and functional myths, is especially useful in relation to the EU.

Foundational myths are the stories that relate to the how and why of a polity’s formation. In the EU, foundational myths are of European peace, necessitated by two World Wars originating in Europe, and that of a united Europe being a prosperous Europe.

Functional myths are those that are used to justify a polity’s political authority and existence based on the functional benefits the polity provides. Of special interest to me is that of EU climate action, but other functional political myths in the EU include the EU as a sui generis international actor, as a protector of fundamental rights and as the Single Market and source of competitiveness.

What a Political Myth Isn’t

One of the queries that arose from the presentation of my paper was whether political myths were not simply narratives. In the political myth literature, one finds many references to narratives. Some who write on narratives also find it useful to conflate the two (e.g. Manners and Murray 2016).

However, there is an important analytical distinction between them. Political myths can be understood as extensions of narratives. One can state that a truly successful narrative is one that becomes a political myth – as Della Sala writes ‘political myths are sacred narratives’ – that is, narratives that have progressed through the stages of mythification to the point of become sacralised.

The central difficulty with political myth is the terminology. ‘Myth’ is a term that has such a clear definition in the vernacular that, without background reading on political myth theory, one naturally approaches the term thinking it denotes a fiction. This is something that Flood has written on, saying:

Studies of myth almost invariably open with the caveat that the reader should not confuse the popular, pejorative term myth as a synonym for falsehood, distortion, or delusion with the scholarly usage which stresses that myths have unquestioned validity within the belief systems of the social groups which cherish them.

I would temper Flood’s certainty that the scholarly term identifies narratives of ‘unquestioned validity’ with the addition of ‘largely’, as every story has its disbelievers. With that aside, the quote from Flood necessarily establishes the two separate uses of the term.

Whilst it might appear desirable to create a new, academic term for ‘myth’ that steers away from any confusion, I would maintain that this is not the best course. It would mean, at least, partial divorce from the rich body of political myth literature that exists to date and would represent something of a disruption to the field and its theoretical development.

Instead, in academic texts, the term should be defined clearly, with the alternative meaning addressed. In less academic, more public-facing discussions of the subject, I would suggest that alternatively terminology is used. Perhaps Della Sala’s ‘sacred narratives’ would be suitable.

Myths and the European Union

The future of the EU is dependent on the Union finding narratives that resonate with European citizens to the point of becoming sacralised. It should be remembered that political myths can be used to both bolster the legitimacy of a polity and undermine it. As Aning and Nsiah have written, if leaders fail to provide a new myth, then ‘any passionate fringe group will fashion a political myth – positive or negative – for the state’.

In the context of EU crisis and raised levels of Euroscepticism, I believe that political myth theory allows for EU scholars to ask important questions on European unity and can provide insight into possible pathways for the future of a unified Europe.

Academics have a role to play in the establishment, diffusion and interpretation of these potential myths. For example, scholarly investigations into the negative myths that have developed around the EU, such as the democratic deficit, would make fascinating additions to a field which has largely focused on positive myths to date. I certainly look forward to the development of the field in the coming years, and hope to see others sharing my enthusiasm for it.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Jeremy F. G. Moulton | @JFMoulton
University of Hull

Jeremy F. G. Moulton is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Hull. His research focuses on EU climate action, political myth and multi-level governance.

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The post Political Myths and How to Study Them appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On March 2016, Cyprus became the fourth out of the five Eurozone Member States under European Union (EU) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to end its program – a so called ‘exit’ (IMF on the 7th). Despite appearances and terminology, however, this is actually not a whole-out, true program exit. What does it really mean to end an EU-IMF program, and is it really an ‘exit’?

Cyprus requested financial assistance on 25th of June 2012.  The request came amid growing problems within the Cypriot banking sector, primarily due to its exposure to Greek debt and Private Sector Involvement (PSI) Greek bond ‘haircut’ process. However, the program was entered into almost a year after (29th of April 2013), on account of differences that arose during the negotiations between the Troika and the Cypriot government. Because of the prolonged negotiating period and the consequent increasing flight of capital from Cypriot banks, a bank holiday was imposed for almost two weeks and ensuing capital controls continued for two years until April 2015. Cyprus borrowed a total of up to €10 bln from the EU-IMF financial assistance: €9 bln from ESM and €1 bln from IMF (equal to 563 per cent of Cyprus’ IMF quota).

What of the process of EU-IMF financial assistance? The financial assistance program consists of two parts: (1) the financial assistance or loan agreement, and (2) the policy adjustment that this assistance is conditional upon, outlined in the now infamous Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). This policy conditionality is monitored by the so-called Troika: The European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. The MoUs, as well as the intrusive monitoring capacity that the Troika has in the Member States under this policy conditionality framework that cover an extensive amount of policies that are key to a State (e.g. budget or taxation), have raised concerns in terms of the democratic process. The end of the program is often portrayed as the long awaited remedy and redemption of democratic process. But is this really the case?

The process of ending a financial assistance program is similar for the EU and the IMF. For the IMF, after the program concludes, and provided that the State concerned owes more than the amount of the assistance equivalent to 100 per cent of its IMF quota (or should it be deemed necessary by the IMF regardless of the amount owed), the process of Post-Program Monitoring (PPM) is initiated. The process was introduced in 2000 and is provisioned under the IMF’s operating principles. PPM aims at ensuring that the State concerned returns the amount owed to the IMF regularly and on time, by monitoring policies and circumstances of that State in order to identify and address risks that could jeopardize its progress to external viability and thus impair repayment of the IMF.  PPM is conducted normally twice a year.

For the EU, there has been a similar process instituted, termed Post-Program Surveillance (PPS), under Article 14 of Regulation 472/2013. PPS applies as long as the Eurozone Member State concerned has repaid less than 75% of the financial assistance under the ESM (or the previous EFSM and EFSF SA). Under PPS, the EC and ECB conduct regular review missions to the State concerned to assess its economic situation and, where applicable, report on corrective measures, which the Council can then request be adopted by that State. It is also worth noting that the voting procedure in the Council is reverse qualified majority (RQMV), i.e. the Commission’s report is deemed adopted unless a blocking majority is formed, making it easier to adopt the report and harder to reject it.

In essence, then, the ending of the program only refers to the ability of the State concerned to procure capital through the markets on its own. The policy monitoring and conditionality aspects remain very much in place for a substantial amount of time after financial assistance has ended, as does the Troika monitoring and supervision.

As such, it is clear that Cyprus is a long way from actually exiting its EU-IMF program, as are the rest of the Eurozone Member States that received assistance. While Cyprus is able to procure financial resources on its own, policy conditionality and monitoring is still in place, and will be for a substantial amount of time. The EU’s PPS will last at least until 2029, i.e. 13 years from now, while the IMF’s PPM will last until Cyprus has repaid more than €820 mln to the IMF.

The democratic repercussions of this in the political realm are considerable. Through the EU-IMF financial assistance process, Cyprus will have been under close policy monitoring and conditionality effectively for close to 20 years! And this is considering Cyprus’ limited financial assistance; consider, for example, the rest of the Eurozone Member States which have received considerably more assistance (e.g. Greece through the EU).

The post When does a Eurozone Member State actually exit its EU-IMF bailout? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Britain: 2016

Should an extraterrestrial land on Earth tomorrow and decide to base his decision on where to live solely on economic forecasts provided by the European Commission, there’s a fair chance they’d pick the UK.

In country-specific recommendations published yesterday for almost all EU countries, Britain comes out looking pretty good, with a “dynamic” economy, “strong” household balance sheets and a banking sector whose resilience “continues to improve.” Even the risks to the economic outlook are presented as being contained, or mitigated by the government’s “wide-ranging” reform agenda.

All well and good. The only perplexing thing is, how does this fit with the altogether less peppy assessment that the EU Commission made this time last year? What could be happening to change their view?

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