Agrégateur de flux

According to reports, the boat had suffered motor failure before drifting to the edge of the dam.

Rebecca West entreprit en 1937 un grand périple à travers la Yougoslavie. Elle en tira un livre au titre énigmatique qui allait la rendre mondialement célèbre. Les prémonitions de l'auteure, la force avec laquelle elle a su les exprimer font de son livre un chef-d'œuvre médiumnique à l'égal des Démons de Dostoïevski.
De Zagreb au Monténégro, en passant par la Dalmatie, l'Herzégovine, la Bosnie, la Macédoine et le Kosovo, Rebecca West a tracé une triple cartographie de cet État prophète et (…)

- Livres / Kosovo, Voyage, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Serbie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro

Rebecca West entreprit en 1937 un grand périple à travers la Yougoslavie. Elle en tira un livre au titre énigmatique qui allait la rendre mondialement célèbre. Les prémonitions de l'auteure, la force avec laquelle elle a su les exprimer font de son livre un chef-d'œuvre médiumnique à l'égal des Démons de Dostoïevski.
De Zagreb au Monténégro, en passant par la Dalmatie, l'Herzégovine, la Bosnie, la Macédoine et le Kosovo, Rebecca West a tracé une triple cartographie de cet État prophète et (…)

- Livres / Kosovo, Voyage, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Serbie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro

Je serai sans doute démenti par l'effet de mon post, plus que par les faits, mais voici quelques probables

Plus d'infos »

Sommaire

Actualité
Sud Kivu : l’emblématique prise d’Uvira par le M23
DossierL’année 2025 en Afrique : bilan et perspectives pour 2026
- Algérie : 2025, l’annus horribilis
- Du Sahel au Sahélistan ?
- Soudan : une guerre à la fois ethno-raciale et régionale
- Le Kivu face à l’expansionnisme du Rwanda
Dossier
Les changements climatiques et le peuplement de l’Afrique

Editorial de Bernard Lugan 
Le chaos démocratique

Si la France fait face aujourd’hui à un rejet massif et global en Afrique, le désamour remonte à la Conférence franco-africaine de La Baule, quand, en 1990, François Mitterrand déclara que c’était par déficit de démocratie que le continent ne parvenait pas à se « développer ». Il conditionna alors l’aide de la France à l’introduction du multipartisme. 
Le résultat de ce diktat démocratique fut que, dans toute l’Afrique francophone, la chute du système de parti unique provoqua une cascade de crises et de guerres, le multipartisme y exacerbant l’ethnisme et le tribalisme jusque-là contenus et canalisés dans le parti unique.Or, la démocratie du « one man, one vote » imposée à l’Afrique a mathématiquement donné le pouvoir aux peuples, aux ethnies ou aux tribus ayant le plus grand nombre d’électeurs. Ce que j’ai défini comme l’« ethno-mathématique électorale africaine », les peuples les plus prolifiques étant automatiquement détenteurs d’un pouvoir issu de l’addition des suffrages.
Or, encore, ce furent ces diktats électoraux vus localement comme des ingérences néocoloniales, qui ont peu-à-peu conduit à l’éviction de la France, notamment de la région sahélienne où, en dehors des officiels français et des vampires des ONG, personne n’a jamais cru à la comédie électorale, sondage ethnique grandeur nature et rite destiné à satisfaire les donateurs occidentaux… Plus de trois décennies après l’injonction faite à l’Afrique par François Mitterrand lors de son « discours de La Baule » le 20 juin 1990, la démocratie qu’il postulait être le remède aux maux du continent n’y a en effet apporté ni développement économique, ni stabilité politique et encore moins sécurité. Cet échec explique pourquoi des pays comme le Mali, le Burkina Faso, la Guinée, le Tchad et la Centrafrique, ont décidé de tourner le dos à l’impératif de la « bonne gouvernance » et de se donner ou de se redonner des régimes autoritaires. Nous assistons là, à la fois à la fin d’un cycle et à un changement de paradigme.
Or, si la démocratie électorale a échoué à régler les conflits africains, c’est en raison de l’inadéquation entre des réalités socio-politiques communautaires enracinées et un système politique importé à base individualiste. Comment le greffon démocratique européen aurait-il d’ailleurs pu prendre en Afrique sud-saharienne où, traditionnellement, l’autorité ne se partageait pas, où la séparation des pouvoirs était inconnue, et où les chefs détenaient à travers leur personne à la fois l’auctoritas et la potestas ?Comment a-t-on pu faire croire aux Africains que la transposition de la démocratie occidentale était possible sans qu’auparavant il ait été réfléchi à la création de contre-pouvoirs, au mode de représentation et d’association au gouvernement des peuples minoritaires condamnés par l’ethno-mathématique électorale à être pour l’éternité écartés du pouvoir ?

La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.

- Le fil de l'Info / Migrants Balkans, Albanie, Populations, minorités et migrations, Courrier des Balkans, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Turquie, Bulgarie, Croatie, Grèce, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Moldavie, Roumanie, Serbie, Slovénie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration

Cette année, nos héros sont souvent des collectifs, comme ceux des parents des victimes des tragédies de Kočani, en Macédoine du Nord, ou de Cetinje, au Monténégro, ou comme les féministes croates de fAktiv, mais il y a en a beaucoup d'autres et même, venu de Turquie, un Pikachu que l'on a vu brandir le drapeau de la révolte en Serbie et bien d'autres endroits...

- Articles / Personnalités, Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Moldavie, Monténégro, Roumanie, Grèce, Macédoine du Nord, Slovénie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Bulgarie, Croatie, Serbie, Kosovo, Turquie

I recently came across an excerpt of an interview that podcaster Theo Von did with Tucker Carlson. Oddly enough, the theme of the interview is revealed at the very end of the clip (begins at 7:12):

Theo Von: Oh, I think it's brave to be able to speak up; sometimes if you're right or wrong, it's brave to try.

Tucker Carlson: It's our obligation to try. I was quiet for 30 years. I shouldn't have been I didn't want to fight but I shouldn't have been

Theo Von: People say like you get information wrong, but if information is given out that's wrong, then how do you expect someone to know accurate information?

You would be hard-pressed to find a more heartfelt defense of spreading misinformation. The implicit argument is that error is excusable so long as it is delivered with confidence and moral self-regard. That is precisely the license Carlson gives himself as he proceeds to traffic in fake history, scientific illiteracy, and anti-Israel propaganda, all wrapped in a tone of faux humility.
Carlson advances his own peculiar version of supersessionism. Rather than claiming Christianity replaces Judaism, he suggests something even more radical: that Judaism itself no longer exists, and that modern Jews have no meaningful connection to the Jews of antiquity or to the land of Israel. In a neat rhetorical trick, Carlson simply denies Jewish continuity altogether (begins at 4:48):Theo Von: But because this Israel is not the Israel from the Bible, right? This is…

Tucker Carlson: I've tried to have this conversation. If it is, tell me how? What are you even talking about? And I'm not a theologian. I'm a freaking Episcopalian like I admit I know nothing but I do read the Bible every day, so I just don't see what you're talking about.

So you tell me what you're talking about. This is the Israel we read about. This is the inheritance of Abraham.

Theo Von: No way!

Tucker Carlson: How is it genetically the same? Are the people who live there now related to the people we read about in the Old Testament? If they are, we have DNA test. Tell me how that works? Oh, those are banned.

Okay. So then you tell me it's the same religion. How is it the same religion? There's no temple like, what are you even talking about? By the way, maybe there's a good answer that I just don't understand.
On at least one point, Carlson is refreshingly honest: he does not understand. Unfortunately, ignorance does not stop him from lecturing millions of listeners as though he does. His insistence that he “reads the Bible every day” is beside the point. This is not a theological question; it is a matter of history, archaeology, and population genetics—fields in which Carlson appears to have invested no effort at all.
Carlson reaches for a conspiracy theory. He claims that DNA testing is “banned” in Israel to hide the supposed lack of Jewish continuity. This is simply false. Snopes debunked the claim last year, noting that it is part of a broader attempt to accuse Israel of concealing evidence that undermines Jewish ancestral ties. More recently, an article in the Israel Institute of New Zealand was published, No, DNA Tests Are Not “Illegal in Israel': Debunking a Libel While Acknowledging the Real Policy Debate:Few modern anti-Israel talking points are as bizarre — or as revealing — as the persistent claim that “DNA tests are illegal in Israel.” As with many libels, the accusation begins with a thin thread of truth, wraps it in distortion, and emerges as another conspiracy theory designed to delegitimise Jewish identity and the State of Israel.

The truth is that such tests are not banned--they are regulated, nor is Israel the only country that does this. The fact that such tests exist—and are widely studied—fatally undermines Carlson’s argument. He also betrays a basic ignorance of Jewish diversity. Sweeping claims about “the Jews” ignore well-documented distinctions among Ashkenazic, Sephardic, and Mizrahi populations, all of which have been extensively studied.

According to a 2001 report on the website of the National Library of Medicine

although Ashkenazi Jews were found to differ slightly from Sephardic and Kurdish Jews, it is noteworthy that there is, overall, a high degree of genetic affinity among the three Jewish communities. Moreover, neither Ashkenazi nor Sephardic Jews cluster adjacent to their former host populations, a finding that argues against substantial admixture of males

The LA Times reported in 2010 on a study of Ashkenazic Jewish ancestry:

The study shows that there is "clearly a shared genetic common ancestry among geographically diverse populations consistent with oral tradition and culture …and that traces back to the Middle East," said geneticist Sarah A. Tishkoff of the University of Pennsylvania, who was not involved in the study. "Jews have assimilated to some extent, but they clearly retain their common ancestry."

Carlson’s final move—arguing that the destruction of the Temple somehow severed Judaism from its own past—is just as foolish. Judaism did not end in 70 CE. It adapted, as living civilizations do. Jewish law, liturgy, language, and communal identity evolved organically from Second Temple Judaism, preserving continuity across catastrophe and exile. To suggest otherwise is not scholarship; it is historical vandalism.

But Carlson is not trying to educate. As with his claim that Benjamin Netanyahu called him a Nazi or that American taxpayers somehow “pay Netanyahu’s salary,” this is pure provocation. He gives his audience what it wants: grievance dressed up as insight, ignorance masquerading as courage.

Tucker Carlson’s performance is not merely uninformed—it is reckless. By presenting his lack of knowledge as a form of bravery, he invites his audience to confuse curiosity with certainty and skepticism with denial. Jews, Judaism, and Israel are not abstractions to be waved away with rhetorical questions and conspiratorial shrugs. They are among the most thoroughly documented continuities in human history. Carlson’s failure to grasp that is not a moral stand. It is a choice—and one that trades truth for applause.

Az elmúlt évekhez hasonlóan 2025-öt is egy vegyes albummal zárom. Olyan válogatással az idei fotókból, amelyek a cikkekből, bejegyzésekből – egyelőre – kimaradtak.

Az Aeroparkban tett tavaszi látogatásom fókuszában a légimentők L-410-ese állt, de távolról a Malév Tu-134-eséről is készítettem fotót. Néhai nemzeti légitársaságunk 1987-ben az üvegorrú HA-LBElemérrel kezdte meg a típus kivonását, de a gépet szerencsére sikerült itthon tartani, ráadásul egy darabban

[...] Bővebben!

A kettővel ezelőtti podcastunkban a Hunyadi c. tévésorozatról úgy vélekedtünk, hogy a média már amúgy is csámcsogott rajta egy sort, az abban feldolgozott téma pedig nagy vonalakban történelmi alapismeret kellene, hogy legyen, ennek következtében pedig szokásunktól eltérően felesleges részletekbe menő kommentárt leközölnünk arról. Hasonló feltételezéssel élünk ma is, bár eltérő okokból. Abból a valószínű tényállásból következtetünk erre, hogy témánk, a das Boot a Magyarországon legismertebb háborús filmek közé sorolható, és ha ez nem is igaz a teljes közönségre, akkor is biztosan vonatkozik arra az idősebb nemzedékre, amely még másolt/kölcsönzött, és ugyebár sok esetben alámondásos kazettákra volt kénytelen fanyalodni az efféle szórakozás érdekében (persze a nosztalgia ezen a téren is sok mindent megszépít).

[...] Bővebben!

Az atlanti partok nagy múltú francia kikötőiről olvasva az ember hatalmas kikötővárosokat képzel el, és aztán meglepődik amikor kiderül, némelyik még magyar viszonylatban is csak kisváros minősítést kapna. Ilyen például Cherbourg, melynek hatalmas kikötője Napóleon egyik nagy presztízsberuházása volt, bár a négy kilométer hosszú hullámtörő gátak építését igazából már a forradalom előtti időkben elkezdték, és aztán majd csak XIX. század végén fejezték be. A kikötő, mely eredetileg Napóleon angliai inváziójának fő támaszpontja lett volna, a XIX. század második felében az Amerikába irányuló személyszállítás – vagyis a kivándorlás – egyik legforgalmasabb kiindulópontja volt, ez volt a Titanic utolsó kikötője is, mielőtt az elindult volna New York felé. Az első világháború alatt a város az országba érkező angol, majd az amerikai expedíciós csapatok egyik legfontosabb kikötője volt, majd a két háború között ismét a személyforgalom központja. A második világháborúban, a németektől való visszafoglalása után, az Európában harcoló amerikai csapatok utánpótlásának központja, a kikötő forgalma ezekben a hónapokban kétszer akkora volt, mint New York kikötőjének.

[...] Bővebben!

Mercredi 24 décembre 2025, l’Assemblée algérienne a voté à l’unanimité une proposition de loi insultante visant à obtenir « la reconnaissance et les excuses officielles de l’État français ». Or, si les godillots parlementaires algériens avaient un minimum de décence, ils auraient, tout au contraire, dû acclamer la France, tant leur pays lui doit tant. Jusqu’à son nom qui lui fut donné par elle en 1839…
Au moment de l’indépendance de juillet 1962, tout ce qui avait été bâti en Algérie y avait en effet été construit par la France à partir du néant, dans un pays qui n’avait jamais existé puisqu’il était directement passé de la colonisation turque à la colonisation française. Ce fut en effet la France qui créa l’Algérie en lui donnant ses frontières. Des frontières qui, à l’Ouest et à l’Est, furent tracées en amputant territorialement le Maroc, la Libye et la Tunisie. Une Algérie que la France ouvrit vers le Sud en lui offrant un Sahara qu’elle n’avait, et par définition, jamais possédé puisqu’elle n’avait jamais existé…

En 1962, la France légua à l’Algérie un héritage composé de 54 000 kilomètres de routes et pistes (80 000 avec les pistes sahariennes), de 31 routes nationales dont près de 9000 kilomètres étaient goudronnés, de 4300 km de voies ferrées, de 4 ports équipés aux normes internationales, de 23 ports aménagés (dont 10 accessibles aux grands cargos et dont 5 qui pouvaient être desservis par des paquebots),  de 34 phares maritimes, d’une douzaine d’aérodromes principaux, de centaines d’ouvrages d’art (ponts, tunnels, viaducs, barrages etc.), de milliers de bâtiments administratifs, de casernes, de bâtiments officiels, de 31 centrales hydroélectriques ou thermiques, d’une centaine d’industries importantes dans les secteurs de la construction, de la métallurgie, de la cimenterie etc., de milliers d’écoles, d’instituts de formations, de lycées, d’universités avec 800 000 enfants scolarisés dans 17 000 classes ( soit autant d’instituteurs, dont deux-tiers de Français), d’un hôpital universitaire de 2000 lits à Alger, de trois grands hôpitaux de chefs-lieux à Alger, Oran et Constantine, de 14 hôpitaux spécialisés et de 112 hôpitaux polyvalents, soit le chiffre exceptionnel d’un lit pour 300 habitants.

Sans parler du pétrole découvert et mis en exploitation par des ingénieurs français. Ni même d’une agriculture florissante laissée en jachère après l’indépendance. Or, tout ce qui existait en Algérie en 1962 avait été payé par les impôts des Français. En 1959, l’Algérie engloutissait ainsi 20% du budget de l’Etat français, soit davantage que les budgets additionnés de l’Education nationale, des Travaux publics, des Transports, de la Reconstruction et du Logement, de l’Industrie et du Commerce ! 

La France s’est ruinée en Algérie alors qu’elle n’y avait aucun intérêt économique réel. Qu’il s’agisse des minerais, du liège, de l’alpha, des vins, des agrumes etc., toutes les productions algériennes avaient en effet   des coûts supérieurs à ceux du marché international. Or, toujours généreuse, la France achetait à des cours largement supérieurs au marché des productions qu’elle avait déjà largement payées puisqu’elle n’avait jamais cessé de les subventionner !

Non seulement la France n’a pas pillé l’Algérie, mais, à défaut d’une réaction virile, elle serait fondée à « présenter la facture » aux gérontes qui gouvernent ce pays.

The Russian ruble has posted an unprecedented surge over the past twelve months, becoming the fastest-strengthening national currency since the mid-1990s. In 2025, it has outperformed major global currencies against the US dollar, according to Bloomberg. The ruble has ranked among the world’s five most profitable assets, trailing only precious metals—platinum, silver, palladium, and gold. Since the beginning of the year, the currency has appreciated by approximately 45 percent, with exchange rates stabilizing near 78 rubles per dollar. This strengthening reflects the combined impact of domestic macroeconomic factors rather than short-term speculative movements.

Zord

Sovereignty is often spoken of as something that can be defended, negotiated or restored. Syria, however, forces a far more uncomfortable question: what happens when sovereignty itself collapses — not in theory, but in practice?   After more than a decade of war, sanctions and fragmentation, Syria stands as one of the starkest examples of what the erosion of sovereignty looks like in the twenty-first century. The Sovereignty Index developed by the International Burke Institute places Syria near the very bottom of the global ranking — not as a political judgement, but as a reflection of structural reality. Across nearly every domain that defines a functioning state, Syrian sovereignty has been hollowed out.   Politically, Syria remains internationally recognized, but recognition masks a far more fractured internal landscape. Authority is uneven, contested and often symbolic outside Damascus. Multiple foreign military forces operate on Syrian territory, decisions of international institutions are selectively ignored, and large parts of the country remain outside effective central control. Elections and constitutional reforms have been announced, yet public trust is fragile and consensus elusive. Sovereignty, in this context, exists more on paper than on the ground.   Economic sovereignty has fared even worse. Syria’s economy has been reduced to survival mode. GDP per capita is among the lowest globally, foreign reserves are minimal, and dependence on imports for food, fuel and basic goods is overwhelming. The national currency circulates alongside dollars, euros, liras and rials, reflecting the breakdown of monetary authority. Economic policy is constrained not only by sanctions, but by the destruction of infrastructure, capital flight and demographic collapse. A sovereign economy cannot function when production, trade and finance are structurally incapacitated.   Technological sovereignty is virtually absent. Research and development spending is negligible, digital infrastructure is fragile, and national platforms barely function beyond limited government portals. Internet access remains inconsistent, public digital services are fragmented, and nearly all advanced equipment and software is imported. In Syria, technology does not empower the state; it merely patches gaps in an environment shaped by scarcity and instability.   Information sovereignty follows a similar pattern. State media operate under heavy control, but rely on foreign platforms and infrastructure. Cybersecurity capacity is rudimentary, national data systems are weak, and digital dependence is near total. Control exists, but resilience does not. In such conditions, information sovereignty becomes a tool of containment rather than a foundation for national coherence.   And yet, Syria’s story is not one of total erasure. Cultural sovereignty remains one of the country’s last enduring pillars. Ancient cities, religious pluralism, architectural heritage and culinary traditions continue to anchor Syrian identity. Despite widespread destruction, UNESCO sites, museums, crafts and collective memory persist. Cultural survival has become a form of resistance — not against external powers alone, but against the disappearance of the state itself.   Cognitive sovereignty, though severely damaged, has not vanished. Literacy remains relatively high given the circumstances, and the tradition of education endures even as institutions struggle. Universities operate under extreme constraints, research capacity is limited, and talent continues to emigrate. But the human capital that once sustained Syria has not been fully extinguished — it has been displaced.   Militarily, Syria retains armed forces and mobilization capacity, but autonomy is sharply limited. Equipment is largely imported, strategic decisions are coordinated with allies, and foreign military presence remains decisive. The army exists, but sovereignty over force is shared, negotiated and constrained. In this sense, Syria illustrates a crucial distinction: having armed forces is not the same as possessing military sovereignty.   Taken together, Syria represents a condition that is rarely acknowledged in international discourse: post-sovereign fragility. The state exists, but cannot fully govern. Borders exist, but cannot be fully controlled. Institutions exist, but cannot deliver. Sovereignty has not been surrendered — it has been exhausted.   As the International Burke Institute prepares to release the full Sovereignty Index for all UN member states later this year, Syria’s position will serve as a warning rather than an anomaly. Sovereignty is not destroyed overnight. It erodes through war, fragmentation, institutional decay and prolonged external dependency. Once lost, it cannot be restored by declarations alone.   From my perspective as an expert affiliated with the International Burke Institute and an active participant in initiatives aimed at strengthening sovereignty worldwide, Syria demonstrates the ultimate cost of state collapse. Sovereignty is not merely about independence from others. It is about the capacity to act, to protect, to provide and to endure.   Syria reminds us that sovereignty, when stripped of institutions, resources and cohesion, becomes a memory rather than a mechanism. Rebuilding it will require not only reconstruction funds and diplomatic engagement, but something far harder to restore: trust between the state and its people, and unity within a society that has learned to survive without either.

Dear Colleagues,

As I reflect on my first full year as Chair, I am so proud of the work we have done and especially for the warm support I continue to enjoy. This supportive spirit was very much on display at our last annual conference in Liverpool, hosted by Liverpool John Moores University.

The programme, so expertly put together by our Events Working Group, track conveners and our UACES office staff highlighted different facets of Europe in interesting times. This conference facilitated conversations about the trajectories of European integration and transformation, governance, especially in the health and digital spheres, the importance of law and history to our understanding of the current moment and the utility of critical perspectives. Beyond the academic debates and discussions, the real world implications of our work and activities, especially how our field can respond to a rapidly changing global environment.

The local organising team went all out for us, and I want to extend heartfelt thanks to all of our Liverpool colleagues for their hard work and hospitality.

Aside from the main conference, the Graduate Forum Research Conference in Athens and the Doctoral Training Academy in Madrid were important reminders of how central PhD researchers and early-career colleagues are to the future of European Studies. I am pleased to note that this was yet another successful year and I am thankful to Sydney and the team for leading on our early career activities.

This has also been a year of change within UACES governance. We have said thank you and goodbye to colleagues whose terms on the Committee and in Officer roles have come to an end and welcomed new trustees who are already bringing fresh ideas and energy. I am grateful to everyone who gives their time and expertise to UACES governance, often quietly and on top of already heavy workloads.

Our journals, JCMS and Contemporary European Politics, continue to thrive, with strong rankings and a growing global readership that reflects the quality and breadth of scholarship produced by this community and of course the excellent work of the editors.

Looking ahead, there is much to be excited about. In 2026, we will build on the success of Liverpool as we prepare future Annual Conferences, including our 56th meeting in Prague hosted by Charles University. Prague promises to be a fantastic setting for conversations about how Europe is constructed, contested and reimagined in national discourses and I hope many of you will already be thinking about submitting those panel and paper proposals.

We continue to work on strengthen the infrastructure that underpins our scholarly community. In that spirit and with members of the committee, I undertook a review of how to continue support through Research Networks in a very constraining financial environment. In the new year, we will be relaunching this funding stream in a way that offers more flexible, sustainable backing for collaborative projects and better showcases the diversity of work across European Studies. Alongside this, we are looking at how to expand our awards programme to recognise the different ways in which colleagues at all career stages contribute to our field. Throughout, our priority remains to support research, teaching and impact that is intellectually ambitious, inclusive and outward facing.

None of this would be possible without you.

And to you a massive thank you.

As we approach the holiday season and the turn of the calendar year, I hope you are able to find some time for rest, joy and the people who matter to you.

I look forward to our many collaborations in the coming year.

With warm wishes,

Toni
Chair, UACES

The post End Of Year Letter From UACES Chair appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

***

Fotó: Szórád Tamás

Kritische Rohstoffe sind zu einem Schlüsselthema der Trump-Administration gewor­den. Mit einer Mischung aus Deregulierung, staatlicher Steuerung und Finanzierung will sie die amerikanische Rohstoffindustrie ausbauen. Denn die hohe Ab­hängigkeit der USA von chinesischen Rohstoffen zwingt Washington bei Verhandlungen mit Peking zu schmerzhaften Zugeständnissen. Trump nutzt die Roh­stofffrage nun selbst als geopolitischen Hebel, um seine handels- und sicherheits­politischen Interessen global geltend zu machen. Während multilaterale Foren wie die Minerals Secu­rity Partnership brachliegen, setzt Trump auch im Rohstoffsektor auf bilaterale Deals. Bei der Sicherung kritischer Rohstoffe konkurriert Europa mittlerweile nicht mehr nur mit China, sondern auch mit den USA. Daher sollte die Europäische Union (EU) ihre Rohstoff­souveränität entschlossener stärken, ohne sich bei Fragen der Nachhaltigkeit und regelbasierter Kooperation von Trump in die Defensive drängen zu lassen.

Kim Jong‑un looks so fat that if news broke tomorrow of his death from cardiac failure—amid cheese, cigars, and a stalled treadmill—the world would barely blink; many would simply shrug and say, “Well, that tracks.” Public appearances and open‑source estimates place the supreme leader at roughly 170 cm in height and around 130–140 kg in weight, a profile consistent with severe obesity. Add to that a long‑running pattern of heavy smoking, alcohol use, calorie‑dense diets, irregular sleep, chronic stress, and prolonged sedentary work, and the cardiovascular math becomes uncomfortably straightforward. In an ordinary political system these would remain private failings; in a hyper‑personalized autocracy where a single body doubles as the state’s command center, however, they become public risks—and the country itself ends up hostage to one man’s cholesterol.

Authoritarian regimes often project an image of durability. Measured against the resilience that flows from democratic accountability, however, autocracies tend to be more brittle than they appear: they look solid until they suddenly are not. Rather than eroding gradually, they are prone to fracture once critical thresholds are crossed. History offers a consistent pattern. When a leader’s health deteriorates at the top of a highly personalized system, the effects propagate outward through the state—from Joseph Stalin’s strokes and paranoia distorting late‑stage governance, to Mao Zedong’s physical decline hollowing out decision‑making at the end of the Cultural Revolution, to Hugo Chávez’s prolonged illness paralyzing succession and policy in Venezuela, and to Egypt’s King Farouk, morbidly obese, dying young of heart failure after years of excess.

Taken together, these precedents underscore a sobering lesson for today’s axis of autocracies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea (often grouped as the so‑called “CRINK” states), and increasingly Venezuela all face succession risks that could generate abrupt discontinuity. Pyongyang, however, remains distinct. Extreme personalization of power, the absence of routinized succession mechanisms, and the centrality of nuclear weapons compress uncertainty rather than allowing it to unfold gradually. This makes any leadership shock uniquely costly: decisions that elsewhere play out over months could be forced into days, with nuclear security, alliance management, and great‑power signaling converging simultaneously.

Were Kim to die suddenly on an ordinary day, succession ambiguity, elevated military alert postures, and nuclear command questions would surface at the same time. The situation is further complicated by the lack of transparent health disclosure, delegated authority, or institutionalized handover—constraints that narrow elite bargaining space and push the system rapidly toward one of three familiar pathways. Two plausibly involve internal stabilization: the “Bloodline Restoration” Scenario, in which the Kim dynasty re‑consolidates power around a designated heir (possibly Kim Jong‑un’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae); or the “Collective Politburo Governance” Scenario, in which elites coalesce into a technocratic leadership coalition. Absent either, the remaining outcome is the “Warlordization” Scenario—factionalized military chaos and internal collapse, with no coherent authority able to negotiate with or control events.

If Kim’s obesity‑related health risks intensify yet sheer luck keeps him upright through 2026, and President Trump floats a tongue‑in‑cheek confidence‑building gesture—say, an effective weight‑loss drug to keep Kim Jong‑un literally alive, repurposed as diplomatic leverage (sigh)—it would merely confirm how thin the margin for error has become.

And if Kim’s uncontrollable waistline were to achieve what special operations could not, even the most optimistically stable outcome—where President Trump still maintains a hotline with a familiar counterpart, the Kim dynasty—would read like a strange footnote. Washington would not be negotiating with a general or a committee, but with the dynasty’s next custodian—perhaps facing Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae, across the table—where a Barbie doll slides forward as an icebreaker, along with talk of opening a Toys“R”Us in Pyongyang.

Democracies outlast autocracies thanks to fewer fragile bodies at the top

For policymakers in democracies—where sustainable, healthy lifestyles are not only possible but institutionally supported—the contrast with autocracy carries a dry irony. When power is dispersed and institutions absorb shocks, one leader’s cholesterol no longer qualifies as a strategic variable. After all the grand theory and high geopolitics, the conclusion is stubbornly mundane: democracy lasts not because it is wiser, but because its risks are distributed across many bodies. It is, in the end, dispersed biological durability—not ideology or strategy—that makes democracy more endurable than autocracy.

Thus, this structural advantage is worth taking seriously in 2026 for decision‑makers in democracies. If there is a New Year’s resolution worth making, it is this modest one. Cut back on alcohol, drink more water. Walk between meetings. Treat exercise not as lifestyle branding but as occupational hygiene. Metabolic discipline is not self‑help; it is risk management. Strategic discipline, in turn, begins with bodily discipline. And because power is not trapped in one body, democracies retain a merciful escape hatch: if the job becomes unbearable or the public turns hostile, leaders can step aside, retire, or lose an election, rather than allowing a failing body to linger as a national‑security variable.

The world has no shortage of contingency plans. What it lacks are authoritarian leaders secure enough in both their institutions and their health not to turn their own waistlines into a geopolitical variable.