Agrégateur de flux

Trois temps forts cette année : les Compagnons de la Libération, l'armée du Mexique et les forces spéciales de l'Intérieur.

The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper series “Financing Global Development” analyses key financial and non-financial means of implementation for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses building blocks of a new framework for development finance.
The enormous deficiencies in Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) local and regional infrastructure in areas such as water, sanitation, transport and energy facilities, mean that long-term financial resources must be mobilised to ensure sustainable development. Local currency bond markets (LCBMs) are still generally underdeveloped in SSA in comparison with other regions of the developing world. Yet for all SSA countries, including the poorest economies, LCBMs could become an important means of long-term financing and reduce the financial vulnerability associated with foreign currency borrowing. LCBMs provide alternative sources of financing and reduce a country’s dependency on foreign debt. They allow for risk diversification and can mitigate the effects of external shocks. Local currency government bond markets are also important for benchmarking corporate bond markets – another way to finance companies for the long-term.
Policy recommendations for improving LCBM development in SSA
We recommend supporting LCBM development through national and regional initiatives that strengthen the institutional and regulatory environments, broaden the investor base and create more liquid secondary markets.     Authorities in SSA need to ensure favourable macroeconomic environments and develop suitable financial infrastructures.
To avoid financial turbulence, capital account liberalisation should be pursued very carefully, with LCBM development going hand-in-hand with solid financial and institutional development. SSA authorities should put into place appropriate strategies for managing debt and capital accounts in order to address capital in- and out-flows, and ensure trained personnel to implement them. Authorities should further ensure the safety of investments by guaranteeing profit repatriation. In this respect, law enforcement is crucial.
Bilateral and multilateral donors can support LCBM development by offering technical assistance to realise debt management strategies. The Debt Management Facility of the World Bank and the IMF and the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are good examples of donor support for developing countries that provide country-specific technical assistance at different levels. In SSA the African Development Bank has put in place the African Market Initiative (AFMI) which promotes LCBM development in SSA. Another fine example of donor support is the World Bank Group’s Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Program (Gemloc), which promotes LCBM development in emerging market economies.
Since LCBMs can supply long- or medium-term capital for both governments and companies they have a large potential for financing the infrastructure needed in SSA and for supporting the achievement of the SDGs.

From the beginning, the European Union has been polarising in Britain. The past four decades of membership have been marked by sustained debate on the extent and shape of British participation in the European project. Some have always rejected the notion that Britain can and should integrate with the rest of Europe. Others have supported Britain’s involvement in parts of the EU, particularly in the economic sphere. Few have wholeheartedly embraced European integration to the levels historically seen in the ‘core’ of Europe.

European Council 7-8.2.2013, European Council, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

In this respect, British reluctance to sign up to different aspects of the EU has been a function of internal prevarication on setting a foreign policy that reflects Britain’s place in the world. The question of ‘Europe’ has divided parties from within and without. Consequently, the UK’s ongoing renegotiation and eventual referendum on EU membership need to be filtered through the lens of national context. Both are the result of electoral politics in Britain rather than momentous change in the EU’s design.

The Prime Minister’s renegotiation will naturally derive its objectives from domestic political considerations. The outcome of the renegotiation, however, will depend greatly on the willingness of Britain’s European partners to work with the suggestions placed before them. This external dimension – the politics at European level – is fundamental to any deal which may be agreed.

By definition, a negotiation necessitates negotiating partners. In this case, the UK government’s main interlocutors are the governments of the other EU Member States (with a role for the EU institutions as well). These governments do not all share the same interests nor have they presented a united front against Britain in its desire to change how the EU works – far from it. A number of EU countries support some of the options for reform emanating from London. At the same time, three main points on which they broadly agree might make the renegotiation more challenging than hoped.

First, they have other pressing issues on the European agenda. The sovereign debt difficulties facing Greece, garnering great attention is recent weeks, is only one of a number of serious questions preoccupying European leaders. These pressing issues may take priority over discussing the details of the UK government’s demands to amend EU rules. Considering the tight timetable the Prime Minister has set himself, the postponing of solving the ‘British question’ to a later date could make securing a deal even more complicated.

Second, Europe’s leaders are generally happy with the EU’s architectural framework and not predisposed to making dramatic alterations. Desire to weaken the integrity of the internal market by altering the rules of the free movement of persons, for example, is minimal. Nor are other EU countries keen to see the multiplication of opt-outs or special rules just for Britain. While the will exists to work with the UK government to address its concerns, any EU changes agreed are likely to be relatively modest.

Third, the countries which share the single currency may well amend the governance of the Eurozone without changing the EU treaties. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Britain can simply tack on its demands to treaty reform certain to happen. The EU treaties could eventually be updated to incorporate the Fiscal Compact and related measures, but this prospect seems years down the line. In any case, securing treaty change in time for a referendum by 2017 would be a Herculean feat.

The obstacles to securing a substantive renegotiation within the set timetable are numerous. However, the actual renegotiation is but one part of the equation in (re)shaping Britain’s relationship with the EU. How the deal is presented at home and the arguments made in the campaign are likely to be much more influential to the referendum result. The external dimension may well determine the substance of the renegotiation, but the national context, as ever, will determine the outcome of the referendum.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

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Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20150626

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2015) ‘The External Dimension to Britain’s EU Membership’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 26 Jun 2015, britainseurope.uk/20150626

The post The External Dimension to Britain’s EU Renegotiation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Le 18 juin dernier des diplomates et des journalistes (Le Monde, Le Figaro) ont visité l’ancien site de missiles d’Albion. Retour sur cette visite

(lire la suite…)

A belső piaci szabályozásért felelős biztos szerint sehol nem ennyire feltűnő Európában, hogy csak olyanok árusíthatnak dohányterméket, akiknek jó a kapcsolatuk a kormánnyal. Hamarosan kötelezettségi eljárás jöhet piaci diszkrimináció miatt.

Kidobták a kötelező kvótákat a maratoni EU-csúcson. Önkéntes felajánlások alapján veszik majd át a menedékkérőket Olaszországtól és Görögországtól. Magyarország és Bulgária „különleges eset”, így valószínűleg kevesebb embert kell majd befogadnunk.

In the decades since Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan began working together to end the Cold War, much has changed. But one grim element of the old order war remains a constant: Mankind still possesses the knowledge and means to destroy itself with nuclear weapons, a capability increasingly outside the firm control of two alliances committed to maintaining their own versions of the status quo. How should today’s thinkers and policymakers deal with contemporary and future nuclear threats? By looking for guidance to one of the giants of the earlier age, Andrei Sakharov, write Sidney D. Drell, Jim Hoagland, and George P. Shultz.

Le débat nucléaire existe en France, malgré les jérémiades des anti-nucléaires qui ne cessent ce crier à la censure. Or, de nombreux colloques leur donnent la parole, ainsi qu'aux partisans de la dissuasion A preuve, le colloque organisé par Participation et Progrès, le club de réflexion stratégique animé par Pierre Pascallon, qui s'est déroulé à l'Assemblée nationale le 8 décembre dernier.

Les actes de ce colloque viennent de paraître chez L'Harmattan. Les anti (M. Rocard, B. Norlain, G. Le Guelte, P. Bouveret, J-M Colin, B. Pelopidas, Cl. Le Borgne) y on droit à une partie sur quatre, les pros (Th. d'Arbonneau, F. Dupont, Y. Queau, Ph. Wodka-Gallien, A. Vaitravers, B. Sitt, Ph. Cottier) aussi.

A cet échange d'argument succèdent deux autres parties qui portent sur les adaptations à envisager, avec les signatures, entre autres, de M Forget, F Géré,B Tertrais, V Desportes, E Copel, E. Valensi, A. Dumoulin, C. Grand, etc.... C'est probablement la plus stimulante car elle questionne la dynamique. Là encore, il y a des contradictions, plus intéressantes que ce qu'on a l'habitude de lire sur le sujet.

Alors que le débat sur le nucléaire resurgira certainement à l'occasion de la prochaine présidentielle, alors qu'il y a eu un discours récent de l'actuel président sur la question, cet ouvrage permet de faire le point de la question.

O. Kempf

Depuis jeudi dernier, le malade grec a mobilisé : jeudi, un Eurogroupe (les ministres des Finances de la zone euro, le Fonds monétaire international et la Banque centrale européenne) ; lundi, un Eurogroupe suivi d’un Conseil européen des chefs d’État et de gouvernement de la zone euro ; mercredi soir, un Eurogroupe ; aujourd’hui : un Eurogroupe suivi d’un Conseil européen et sans doute, demain ou lundi, d’un nouvel Eurogroupe. Sans compter les réunions techniques, les réunions à deux, à trois, à quatre. Alexis Tsipras, le Premier ministre grec, a quasiment planté sa tente au rond-point Schumann à Bruxelles, à mi-chemin de la Commission et du Conseil européen…

Les négociations entre la Grèce, d’une part, la zone euro et le FMI, d’autre part, ont largement battu les records de durée de l’histoire communautaire. Cela fait cinq mois que le gouvernement Syriza/Anel (gauche radicale/droite radicale) discute avec ses créanciers, sans guère de résultat. Or, l’horloge tourne inexorablement : il ne reste plus que cinq jours avant le 30 juin, date d’expiration du second programme d’aide financière et date à laquelle Athènes devra rembourser 1,6 milliard d’euros au FMI, une somme qu’elle ne pourra payer que si ses créanciers lui versent les 7,2 milliards promis. Les plus anciens comparent cet affrontement aux marathons agricoles des années 70 au cours desquels les Six de l’époque s’empaillaient sur la fixation des prix, encouragés à l’intransigeance par des manifestations de paysans souvent violentes. Jacques Chirac aimait raconter l’un de ses exploits : avoir réussi à tenir sept jours et sept nuits à Luxembourg, alors jeune ministre de l’Agriculture de Georges Pompidou…

• Pourquoi ça coince ?

Dimanche soir, Alexis Tsipras a envoyé à ses partenaires un projet de compromis signé de sa main, une première. Un geste apprécié, car en cinq mois la valeur de la parole grecque s’est effondrée, les négociateurs, tant au niveau technique qu’au niveau politique (celui de Yanis Varoufakis, le ministre des Finances), ayant souvent été contredit par Athènes quelques heures après avoir conclu un accord à Bruxelles. La méfiance a atteint un tel sommet que le négociateur en chef du FMI, le Danois Poul Thomsen, s’est contenté, ces derniers jours, d’envoyer un fonctionnaire junior ne disposant d’aucune autorité… Ambiance.

Lundi soir, après la réunion du Conseil européen de la zone euro convoquée en urgence vendredi dernier, tout le monde pariait sur un accord, la Grèce ayant fait un effort important pour non seulement équilibrer son budget, mais dégager un excédent budgétaire primaire (avant charge de la dette), certes sérieusement revu à la baisse par ses partenaires : les mesures proposées étaient censées rapporter 2,69 milliards d’euros en 2015 et 5,2 milliards en 2016 (2,87 % du PIB). Las : dès le lendemain, le FMI a passé le projet grec au karcher. Publié par le Wall Street Journalet le Financial Times, le document revu et corrigé ressemblait à une copie d’étudiant barrée de rouge par un professeur acrimonieux… Un rien humiliant pour la partie grecque.

Sur le fond, l’organisation dirigée par Christine Lagarde, soutenue depuis par la zone euro, reproche au compromis grec de miser essentiellement sur des hausses d’impôts frappant, notamment, les entreprises et d’oublier les coupes dans les dépenses, ce qui risque d’étouffer définitivement la reprise économique. Le compromis grec donne, de fait, l’impression de vouloir préserver à tout prix les retraites (le régime étant gravement déficitaire) et la fonction publique au détriment de l’économie réelle et de l’avenir de sa jeunesse.

Parmi les points de désaccord : la trop forte hausse de l’impôt sur les sociétés, la taxe spéciale de 12 % sur les bénéfices des entreprises supérieurs à 500.000 euros ou encore la taxe sur les jeux. En revanche, les créanciers estiment qu’il faut que la réforme de la TVA permette de dégager un gain de 1 % du PIB (la Grèce propose 0,74 %). Dans le viseur, en particulier : le passage de 6 à 23 % de la TVA sur la restauration (Athènes a accepté que la TVA sur les hôtels passe de 6,5 % à 13 %). Au chapitre des coupes dans les dépenses, les créanciers exigent une accélération de la réforme des retraites, avec notamment un recul de l’âge de la retraite de 62 à 67 ans et à 40 annuités dès 2022 (et non 2025) et une augmentation des cotisations sociales dont les retraités étaient exonérés jusqu’à présent. Ils veulent aussi des économies plus conséquentes dans le budget de la défense (de 200 à 400 millions).

• Pourquoi la zone euro refuse-t-elle de restructurer la dette grecque ?

Pour ne rien arranger, la zone euro refuse de faire le geste qui permettrait à Tsipras d’avaler une pilule nettement plus amère qu’attendu : répéter leur engagement de novembre 2012 d’examiner la soutenabilité de la dette grecque, ce qui ouvrirait la porte à une restructuration (sous forme d’un allongement des remboursements de 30 à 50 ans). Même si la dette détenue par les États et le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (195 milliards d’euros sur 251,5 milliards d’euros) ne pèse pas sur les finances publiques grecques pour l’instant (moratoire sur les intérêts jusqu’en 2023 et maturités portées à 30 ans), elle explique pourquoi les créanciers exigent un excédent budgétaire primaire : il s’agit de dégager de l’argent pour un futur remboursement au détriment de la relance…

Mais affirmer trop clairement que la zone euro va encaisser une perte risque de compromettre l’approbation de l’éventuel compromis par plusieurs Parlements nationaux, en Allemagne, en Finlande (dont la nouvelle majorité est très remontée contre toute aide à la Grèce) ou aux Pays-Bas. D’autant qu’il va sans doute falloir remettre une vingtaine de milliards au pot pour éviter à Athènes un retour prématuré sur les marchés. Bref, si la restructuration de la dette est une urgence politique pour Tsipras, elle est un épouvantail politique pour la plupart de ses partenaires, même si ceux-ci ne se font pas d’illusions.

• Quelles sont les marges de manœuvre d’Alexis Tsipras ?

Le projet de compromis du gouvernement grec a mis en fureur l’aile gauche de Syriza, à tel point que Tsipras a dû retirer, mercredi soir, deux mesures qu’il proposait, dont l’augmentation des cotisations sociales sur les retraites (que les créanciers jugent déjà insuffisantes…). Il faut dire que la marge de manœuvre du Premier ministre grec est très étroite : entre 40 et 45 % de ce conglomérat de petits partis d’extrême gauche (maoïstes, trotskistes, communistes staliniens, eurocommunistes) et d’anciens cadres du PASOK (parti socialiste) sont clairement en faveur d’une rupture avec « Bruxelles » et le FMI, assimilés à des forces d’occupation dignes du nazisme, d’un retour à la drachme et à la constitution d’un nouveau front des « non-alignés » version 2015 qui irait de Caracas à Pékin en passant par La Havane, Moscou et Athènes. Ainsi, ce matin, Panagiotis Lafazanis, le ministre de l’Énergie, représentant du courant le plus dur de Syriza, a même affirmé que la Grèce devait tourner la page de l’euro et chercher ailleurs de nouvelles alliances…

La majorité du parti, elle, est réaliste, mais est loin d’être convaincu par les bénéfices de l’intégration communautaire : elle savait surtout que pour se faire élire, les Grecs étant massivement attachés à l’euro, Syriza ne devait pas attaquer directement la monnaie unique, mais l’austérité. Ces « Européens » espéraient que les créanciers, effrayés par les risques de contagion d’un éventuel « Grexit », accepteraient un compromis qui leur serait défavorable. Ils se sont rapidement rendu-compte qu’ils se trompaient lourdement : d’accord pour laisser les Grecs choisir les coupes budgétaires et les augmentations d’impôts nécessaires pour équilibrer le budget, d’accord pour redonner des marges de manoeuvre budgétaires à la Grèce en revoyant à la baisse l’exigence d’un excédent primaire (avant charge de la dette), mais pas question de courir le risque d’un nouveau déficit d’ici un an ou deux, ce qui impliquerait un nouveau plan de sauvetage... Tsipras n’a d’ailleurs trouvé aucun allié en Europe et s’est même mis à dos les pays de la zone euro les plus pauvres qui ont contribué au sauvetage de son pays et estiment que la Grèce n’a pas été jusqu’au bout de la purge nécessaire (Lettonie, Lituanie, Estonie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, Portugal). L’Allemagne, le bouc émissaire facile, est donc loin d’être isolée au sein de la zone euro…

Si le soutien de son parti est fragile, Tsipras peut compter sur celui de l’opinion qui lui est largement favorable, ce qui lui donne de l’air. Selon un sondage GPO-Mega Channel effectué la semaine dernière, plus de 56 % des Grecs sondés (contre 36,4 %) estiment que ce sont les créanciers qui sont responsables d’une absence d’accord, 54,3 % contre 43,8 % approuvent la façon dont les négociations ont été menées par le gouvernement et 47,3 % estiment que Syriza devra rester au pouvoir en cas d’échec. Et, cerise sur le gâteau, en cas d’élections anticipées, il obtiendrait le même score qu’en janvier dernier alors que Nouvelle Démocratie (conservateurs) ne recueillerait que 23 % des voix, soit un écart de treize points... De quoi faire rentrer dans le rang une partie des députés Syriza qui seraient tentés par une fronde à la Vouli, le parlement monocaméral grec.

• Reste-t-il encore du temps ?

Très peu : même si la Grèce parvient à rembourser le FMI le 30 juin, elle sera confrontée à une nouvelle échéance le 20 juillet, date à laquelle elle doit rembourser 3,5 milliards d’euros à la Banque centrale européenne (des obligations rachetées sur le marché secondaire et qui arrivent à échéance). Le pays sera donc en défaut de paiement soit le 30 juin, soit le 20 juillet… Sauf un éventuel compromis auquel tout le monde affirme encore croire.

To address the question of whether Federica Mogherini can shape a smarter foreign and security policy for the EU than Catherine Ashton did, the answer, assuming there is one, must come in several parts.

The first concerns the nature of the position itself. When Ashton was appointed EU High Representative (HR) in 2009, many commentators, reacting to the widespread feeling that several other higher-profile candidates would have been preferable, argued that the personality of the incumbent was irrelevant because all decision-making power lies in the hands of the member states. Whoever is in post, it was argued, will simply have to toe whatever line member states collectively think appropriate or desirable. This line of reasoning has also greeted the appointment of Mogherini, though it is at best a half-truth, as most member states are actually looking for guidance in defining and promoting their interests. Institutionally, the HR indeed has to work within clear political constraints. But she also enjoys a considerable margin of manoeuvre and, given creativity and imagination, can succeed in influencing, if not actually setting, the agenda to a meaningful extent. Commentators agree that Javier Solana, with far fewer resources than Ashton, succeeded far better in making a real difference.

As a result of Ashton’s tenure, there are those who suggest that the position of HR has been weakened or even undermined – precisely because of her relative failure to deliver on the undoubtedly exaggerated expectations of the security community. But that view overlooks the extent to which the new post-holder has succeeded in avoiding the many early mistakes for which Ashton was constantly pilloried. It also ignores the new geopolitical context in which Mogherini is operating, with the specific remit given to the HR by the December 2013 Council. That remit confers on the new HR a clear mandate to develop, not a new institution as in the case of Ashton (the EEAS), but a new strategy and new policy preferences for the EU as a whole.

“A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable”

The second issue is the respective candidates’ qualifications for the job. Here, Mogherini scores heavily, with her previous experience as Italian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Italian Parliament’s Defence Committee. Whereas Ashton had to start from scratch and learn on the job, Mogherini hit the road running. During her October 2014 audition hearings before the European Parliament, all observers were as impressed by her solid mastery of the issues as they had been disconcerted five years earlier by Ashton’s apparent amateurishness. Mogherini is also solidly advised and assisted by her chef de cabinet, Stefano Manservisi, one of Italy’s most distinguished European officials. Whereas Ashton appeared constrained by ambivalent signals from the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron, Mogherini benefits from the enthusiastic Euro-credentials of Matteo Renzi.

The third issue is the political content of the word “smart” as applied to European foreign policy. A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable. Ashton put more time and effort into the Middle East than any other geographical area. But it was not clear what she hoped to achieve, and her actual achievements were extremely modest. Her main diplomatic successes – Kosovo and Iran – stemmed from her personal human qualities rather than from diplomatic finesse. Whereas Ashton toed the British line of ambivalence towards the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and appeared to consider it with indifference, expressing a clear preference for NATO, Mogherini strongly believes in and attaches genuine importance to European defence and security co-operation, which she perceives as necessarily operating in harmony with NATO.

It is in the area of the respective post-holders’ main priority remits that the biggest difference can be detected. Ashton was charged with creating the EEAS and she is rightly credited with achieving this – and within a year of taking office. Yet the mid-term reviews of the EEAS were generally critical, and in her own observations of the service, she seemed far more concerned about its internal workings than about its diplomatic reach or objectives. Mogherini has been charged with developing an EU “grand strategy”. The Council remit specifically asked her to “assess the impact of changes in the global environment” and to report to the Council on “challenges and opportunities” for the EU arising from that shifting global context. The way she has gone about this offers considerable reason for optimism. The most important element is that she is asking the correct questions. Not, ‘how do we export our values to the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?’ But, ‘what can the EU realistically hope to achieve in these neighbourhoods given the massive changes they have recently undergone?’

The strategic review process will not be rushed. In the first phase, it has sought to understand shifts in the global environment, assess internal changes within the Union and their foreign policy implications, and review EU foreign policy instruments across the board (CSDP, cyber, energy, trade, development, counter-terrorism). In a second phase, starting immediately after the June Council, it will address the real questions required behind a genuine strategy: what are the EU’s interests, what are its realistic goals and how does it link these to appropriate means?

Mogherini has established a clear set of priorities, has developed a good working relationship with the policy community, with national and European officials and above all with the media. Whereas Ashton, for the overwhelming majority of commentators, got off to a decidedly rocky start, Mogherini’s performance to date has been virtually flawless. Whether this eventually delivers a “smarter” policy than that of her predecessor, of course, is largely in her own hands.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – european external action service

 

The post Is Federica Mogherini to make a real difference? appeared first on Europe’s World.

Only four years after the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) underwent its first major review at the time of what was over-enthusiastically being called the ‘Arab Spring’, the ENP is once again in flux. The adoption of a consultation paper in March earlier this year called ‘Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy’ so soon after the previous review was supposed to have made the ENP fit for purpose says much of the Barroso Commission’s shortcomings. Certainly, a genuine overhaul is now timely and much needed.

The EU’s eastern and southern neighbours have been going from crisis to crisis, with 12 out of 16 of them now directly exposed to unresolved conflicts, territorial occupation or even war. Bad governance, untransparent and ineffective state institutions, corruption and frequent violations of civil and political liberties are the rule rather than the exception in most of the partner countries in Europe’s neighbourhood. The European Union’s policymakers, whether in the Commission, the Parliament, the External Action Service or in EU member states’ capitals have all pointed to the ENP’s failure to respond adequately to these challenges.

Europe’s domestic problems are obviously an important factor. These times of austerity, rising nationalism and xenophobia, of growing concerns over illicit immigration, together with the looming threat of a Grexit and a disintegrating eurozone make costly and unpredictable foreign policy initiatives unattractive to public opinion. The latest ENP review is therefore faced with considerable constraints and seemingly bleak prospects. Yet meaningful reform of the ENP can be achieved, and it doesn’t necessarily have to come with a high price tag. For this to happen, though, decision-makers in the EU institutions and in member states’ capitals need to take five points into account.

In the first place, they must resist the ‘back to basics’ logic that some say should be put at the centre of the ENP review. Much as this sounds sensible, it is flawed. Not only did the basics of 2002 and early 2003, when the concept of a ‘wider Europe’ was agreed, relate to a neighbourhood very different to today’s, but also these basics were rooted in a false belief that the recipe for enlargement – conditionality and incentives for lasting reform – could be replicated without the carrot of EU membership.

“Playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’”

The second point to be emphasised is that although all concerned on the EU side underline the central importance to the ENP of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), they have all stayed tellingly silent as to whether full implementation of these stipulations is a means to an end or the end itself. The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic on the EU side in terms of foreign policy planning and the appropriation of targeted funds, and for EU neighbours it saps their efforts to generate domestic support for the approximation, implementation and enforcement of EU rules and norms.

Third, although the revised ENP of 2011 spoke of a ‘new response to a changing neighbourhood’, in practice its marked lack of innovation led to a gradual erosion of its credibility and therefore its effectiveness. This resulted from the de facto perversion of its ‘less-for-less’ principle into a ‘less-for-more’ practice which rewarded instead of sanctioning reform laggards in the neighbourhood. Also, it was the consequence of an overly-ambitious incorporation of issue-areas and policy fields the ‘new response’ was suddenly supposed to address, lacking, however, the means to do so.    

Fourth, ENP partners are shown by various EU Neighbourhood Barometers to have very different views of the EU. Last year, 56% of respondents in the eastern neighbourhood had a negative or neutral image of the EU, while in its southern neighbourhood only 38% held a positive view of the EU. This looks like being a major constraint on governments’ room for manoeuvre on ENP-related reforms.

Fifth, the original 2003 ENP and its 2011 successor fell victim to ill-informed and misleading interpretations of the underlying dynamics of the wider neighbourhood. The consequence has been that many in Brussels and in EU member states misinterpreted as signs of stability the stagnating politics of the countries in the neighbourhood and in some the re-emergence or even consolidation of authoritarianism.

Provided the consultation process now underway takes these points into account, a number of recommendations are in place.

The first is that further reform of the ENP will be bound to fail unless all 28 EU member states increase their involvement in both the review process and the implementation of a new policy framework. Developments like Russia’s unlawful actions in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s rivalry in the EU’s southern backyard compel all EU governments to incorporate the ENP into their foreign policy DNA. That also means the EU will need to abandon the ENP’s open-endedness because playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’. Europe’s neighbours need to be given a clear-cut roadmap; only an end-goal – not necessarily EU membership – will allow them to glimpse light at the end of a long reform tunnel and help justify costly and painful reforms.

Increased financial assistance and a wide-ranging liberalisation of trade, services and public procurement would undoubtedly benefit any neighbour implementing DCFTA stipulations. But because they remain confined by EU commercial policy, future ‘more-for-more’ formulae should envisage the more far-reaching integration of successful neighbours into some parts of the EU’s single market providing they approximate to EU rules and norms, and even adopt and enforce them.

To be taken seriously by reform-reluctant neighbours, the EU must start to use its leverage on trade. It should suspend trade preferences in the event of non-compliance with mutually agreed commitments. Other than Algeria, none of the 16 neighbours ranks among the EU’s top-20 trade partners. What the neighbours have in common is that they are more dependent on preferential EU market access than vice versa. This applies even to energy suppliers like Algeria and Azerbaijan, whose downstream networks are directed towards Europe and which desperately need the oil and gas sales if their governing regimes are to survive.

“The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic”

The EU is present in all 16 neighbours through its delegations and representative offices or through the embassies of member states. To benefit more from this presence and enhance the ENP’s visibility, greater coordination and cooperation, as well as a reduction of overlaps should be a priority. Hand-in-hand with this streamlining, the EU should engage more in political coordination, and perhaps joint programming, with external actors and donors particularly on economic, technical and infrastructure.

The EU’s search for harmony and security in its neighbourhood has forced it to rethink its policies vis-à-vis the near abroad once more. This offers a unique opportunity for stakeholders to show they have learned the lessons of past failures. But that demands the new ENP policy framework generates results so that the populations of the 16 neighbours feel that responding to EU-induced reforms pays off. Only then will the EU truly be able to help reform-minded neighbours to increase and sustain the legitimacy of their domestic reform efforts. However, this requires consistency on the part of the EU and greater coherence between the policies of the 28 EU member states and EU institutions.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Andrew Smith

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