Agrégateur de flux

Le Premier ministre Edi Rama a fait fermer la chaîne de télévision News24 sans décision de justice. Un nouveau « caprice du prince » qui ravive toutes les inquiétudes pour la liberté de la presse et la survie de la démocratie en Albanie.

- Le fil de l'Info / Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Médias indépendants, PS Albanie, Politique, Médias

Donald Trump ist es gelungen, Indiens Vertrauen in die USA im Eiltempo zu zerstören. Ein Vasall Washingtons will Neu Delhi nicht werden, analysiert ein Südasienwissenschaftler.

Eine belgische NGO hat mit „Virtual Donors“ eine Kampagne gestartet, die in populäre Videospiele wie Minecraft, Fortnite und Baldur’s Gate 3 integriert ist – mit dem Ziel, die Registrierung von Organspendern zu fördern.

Le dirigeant français cite les figures emblématiques de l'indépendance qui ont été tuées lors d'opérations militaires menées par les forces françaises.

Der ungarische Ministerpräsident Viktor Orbán hat am Dienstag erklärt, Russland habe den Krieg in der Ukraine gewonnen – nur wenige Tage bevor US-Präsident Donald Trump am Freitag zu einem Treffen mit Wladimir Putin zusammenkommt.

596318 Željka Šulc

TRAVNIK, 13 August 2025 – The Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mission), Zahid Movlazada, visited Travnik and Busovača, where he met with Radoje Vidović, the President of HDZ BiH Central Bosnia Canton Board, Tahir Lendo, Prime Minister of Central Bosnia Canton, and Asim Mekić, Mayor of Busovača.

The discussions focused on political developments in the canton, institutional response to bias-motivated incidents, hate crimes and related preventive activities as well as efforts to advance education reform and the promotion of gender equality.

Movlazada reaffirmed the Mission’s commitment to supporting inclusive progress across communities, emphasizing the importance of collaboration among local authorities and all relevant stakeholders.

Deputy Head of Mission Movlazada visited the Mission’s Field Office in Travnik, where he met with staff to discuss implementation the OSCE mandate in Zenica-Doboj Canton and Central Bosnia Canton, aimed at strengthening support for institutions, civil society, and communities across the cantons.

The OSCE Mission to BiH remains committed to promote inclusive dialogue, protect fundamental rights, and strengthen democratic institutions.

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An OSCE pilot ‘train-the-trainers’ initiative is helping freshly trained Ukrainian border guards test their skills as trainers in document security at border crossing points. This initiative was part of a two-week training course in Lviv organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, from 11 to 12 August 2025.

The hands-on training, delivered by six of the newly qualified trainers who completed last week’s OSCE-led Training of Trainers course in Lviv, Ukraine, marked the first time this initiative has provided instruction directly at border crossing points. Two trainers, while mentored and observed by OSCE personnel, deployed to Rava-Ruska border crossing point (BCP) at the Ukrainian-Polish border to conduct training. Four additional trainers concurrently deployed to different BCPs in Odesa region, including Odesa and Izmail Sea Ports and Mohyliv-Podilsky and Palanca BCPs at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to train their peers.

The new trainers developed and delivered presentations on key topics from the basic training curriculum in document security and forgery detection. They also used OSCE-provided magnifiers to help their trainees deepen their hands-on experience with examining genuine, forged, and counterfeit travel documents.

The pilot initiative was developed in response to a request by the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service to trial run a train-the-trainers approach similar to the Dutch model they observed during an OSCE-supported study visit to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee’s Identity Fraud and Documents Centre of Expertise (ECID) in April 2025. The Dutch model involves a two-week training course where the second week is dedicated to the trainers-in-training applying their newly learned skills to lead five full days of basic training for their peers.  

Senior Administration officers highlighted the importance of this training program development. “Conducting a training session directly at the border crossing point serves as a logical continuation of the study visit to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee’s Identity Fraud and Document Centre of Expertise (ECID). This is an example of how the experience gained through the support of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department is being translated into practical skills applied directly during border control operations by Ukrainian border guards. Such trainings are important for enhancing the professional competence of the personnel of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and for integrating European border control standards into its daily operations.”

The pilot initiative and training course were part of an ongoing extrabudgetary project supporting the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation in reducing illegal border crossings by using a fake or stolen identity. This project is funded by the United States.

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The OSCE Mission to Skopje marked International Youth Day by celebrating the power of youth civic engagement at the “Youth Civic Engagement Award” ceremony, held at Suli An in Skopje’s Old Bazaar.

Organized by the Ministry of Social Policy, Demography and Youth and the National Youth Council of Macedonia, with the Mission’s support, the event honoured young individuals, informal groups, and youth organizations whose initiatives are transforming communities across North Macedonia.

In her address, Enrica Vida, Head of the Mission’s Office of Political Affairs and Communications, praised the “creativity, passion, and leadership” of young people and announced a new Youth and Security Award, which the Mission will launch in 2026. The award will recognize young leaders and organizations contributing to safer and more resilient communities, reinforcing the Mission’s commitment to the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda.

“Youth participation is more than a right – it is a responsibility, and a unique opportunity to shape our shared future,” said Vida. “From financial literacy projects linking Skopje and Costa Rica, to grassroots campaigns on gender equality, safety, and intercultural dialogue, you are showing that civic engagement is democracy in action.”

The ceremony showcased inspiring examples of youth-led initiatives, from urban revitalization projects in Skopje to intercultural summer camps for children from crisis-affected areas. These stories, Vida noted, are “sparks” that grow into lasting change.

As part of its three-year strategy, the Mission will continue to support youth-informed policies, structured dialogue with institutions, and initiatives such as the forthcoming National Youth Violence Prevention Task Force, a joint effort with the Ministry to develop evidence-based solutions reflecting young people’s needs and perspectives.

By bringing together decision-makers, civil society, and young leaders, this year’s International Youth Day reaffirmed a shared commitment: empowering youth as essential partners in building democratic, inclusive, and peaceful societies.

CHIŞINĂU, 15 August 2025 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today opened an observation mission for the 28 September parliamentary elections in Moldova, following an invitation from the national authorities.

The mission is led by Jillian Stirk and consists of a core team of 15 experts based in Chişinău. ODIHR will be joined by 30 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country from 22 August. The Office also plans to request 200 short-term observers, due to arrive several days before election day.

The mission will assess the conduct of the elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards, as well as with national legislation. 

Observers will closely monitor all aspects of the electoral process, including the conduct of the campaign, also on social networks, the work of the election administration at all levels, election legislation and its implementation, campaign finance, media coverage, and the resolution of election disputes. Observers will also assess the implementation of previous ODIHR election recommendations.

Meetings with representatives of national authorities and political parties, the judiciary, civil society, the media and the international community form an integral part of the observation.

On election day, the ODIHR mission will be joined by delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to observe the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of votes and the tabulation of results.

ODIHR will publish an interim report some two weeks before the elections, and the observation mission’s preliminary findings and conclusions will be presented at a press conference the day after the elections. A final report assessing the entire election process and containing recommendations will be published by ODIHR some months after the end of the election process. 

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the OSCE Mission to Moldova operate independently under separate mandates.

Further information on ODIHR’s election observation activities in Moldova is available here: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova

For further information, please contact: 

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson: Katya.Andrusz@odihr.pl or +48 609 522 266

Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst with the Election Observation Mission: Egor.Tilpunov@odihr.md or +373 69 805 126

BBC Sport Africa analyse les troubles liés au surnombre, les graves manquements à la sécurité et les problèmes de billetterie rencontrés lors du Championnat d'Afrique des Nations au Kenya.

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (tur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) conducts an active and multidimensional foreign policy aimed at strengthening relations with all neighbouring regions. In the international sphere, the primary ambition of the authorities in Ankara is to transform Turkey into a regional power capable of influencing the political landscape in its immediate vicinity. The Western Balkans region, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, is a key area in the AKP’s political strategy, since Turkey has long maintained strong ties (both religious and cultural) with these countries. 

In accordance with principles of AKP foreign policy doctrine, the Turkish government seeks to promote multifaceted regional cooperation, thereby cultivating Turkey’s image as a country committed to ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans. In addition to conventional diplomatic apparatus, an extensive public diplomacy structure is also entrusted with implementation of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the Western Balkans. Drawing on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, these institutions are involved in a range of initiatives at various levels (from intergovernmental to municipal), with the aim of facilitating Turkey’s soft power projection in the region. 

AKP foreign policy doctrine and the Western Balkans 

The Justice and Development Party, which originated from a moderate Islamist milieu, won an absolute majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Immediately after taking power, the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continued negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the European Union, thus ensuring steady growth in public support. However, the religious foundations of the AKP political ideology soon became apparent, largely due to the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the strategic depth concept. In line with his vision, adopted by the AKP as the new doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s goal was to achieve a dominant position in the international system by expanding the scope of its diplomatic activities to neighbouring regions (i.e. the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus) . 

In AKP political discourse, Turkey has been depicted as a state whose historical and geographical identity is inextricably linked with the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, the Balkans became the region in which the Turks elected to initiate implementation of the strategic depth doctrine in the early 2000s. Several factors affected this choice, including efforts to strengthen Turkey’s image as a reliable partner of the European Union ahead of its expected accession to the EU. Another indication of Turkey’s constructive engagement in regional affairs was its endorsement of NATO expansion into the Western Balkans. Furthermore, comprehensive assistance (including financial support) provided by the Erdoğan government led to a rapid rapprochement between Turkey and most Balkan countries. However, soon it became evident that the AKP’s actions were driven by ideological motivations. For instance, a substantial proportion of Turkish funds, initially designated for infrastructure investments, was reallocated to renovation of Ottoman heritage sites. Local authorities widely viewed this as an attempt to preserve Turkey’s dominance in the Western Balkans. 

Having recognised limitations of foreign policy model based on historical sentiments,  in the mid-2010s the AKP government shifted its approach towards prioritising economic cooperation. This strategic realignment resulted in the establishment of free trade agreements with all Western Balkan countries. In order to maintain strong socio-cultural linkages between Turkey and the region, the Justice and Development Party has been increasingly relying on public diplomacy agencies tasked with promoting Turkish soft power in the Balkans. These organisations provide a wide range of services in the fields of education, administration, development and humanitarian aid, as well as renovation of historical heritage. Therefore, their activities are generally appreciated by local communities. However, the AKP’s frequent use of public diplomacy to achieve specific political goals raises legitimate concerns. 

Turkey’s public diplomacy activities in the region 

Among Turkish public diplomacy organisations currently operating in the Western Balkans, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) plays a key role. This institution has been present in the region since the late 1990s and has conducted a variety of initiatives there. In this regard, the Ottoman heritage restoration project has recently been identified as a high priority by the Turkish authorities. Each year, a substantial proportion of the agency’s total budget (approx. 30 million euro) is dedicated exclusively to the renovation of Ottoman monuments in the Western Balkans. As per published reports, from 2008 onwards TİKA undertook the restoration of more than hundred historical buildings in the region, approximately half of which were Ottoman mosques. Furthermore, numerous sites are currently undergoing reconstruction work, and some other renovation programmes are in the preparatory phase. According to official data, TİKA has completed over 4000 projects in the Western Balkans to date. In recent years, there has also been a significant increase in the organisation’s spending on improving economic relations with countries in the region, which is in line with the AKP’s updated foreign policy strategy. In addition to the pragmatic aspects of this particular engagement, trade and commercial initiatives allow Turkey to establish contacts on a larger scale with non-Muslim countries in the region (especially with Serbia). In this context, TİKA often acts as an intermediary, facilitating closer relations between Turks and their partners in the Western Balkans. 

Another Turkish governmental organisation involved in the Western Balkans is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). The institution was founded in 2010 and has since been directly affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In comparison to TİKA, the scope of its activities is much more narrow. The primary function of the YTB is to oversee various programmes dedicated to Turks residing abroad, as well as to representatives of so-called related communities (i.e. Turkic ethnic groups). The rationale behind establishment of the YTB was to unify all members of the Turkish diaspora around the AKP socio-political narrative. The government thus decided to create an institutional structure whose operation was to be predicated on shared historical memory and ethno-cultural affinities. The Western Balkans is one of the regions in which YTB operates most dynamically, organising cultural exchanges and educational programmes for students. According to data published by YTB, the institution’s involvement in the region has been steadily increasing year by year, especially in countries with a significant Turkish minority (Kosovo and North Macedonia). 

The Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) was created in 2009 under the auspices of the AKP government with the aim of promoting Turkish history, culture, art and language. YEE offers a comprehensive selection of activities, encompassing Turkish language courses, organisation of cultural events and art exhibitions, and provision of financial support for scientific research. Turkish cultural centres are currently located in 11 cities in all six Western Balkan countries, which demonstrates the crucial role of this region for the AKP. The activities of the Yunus Emre Institute in the Western Balkans can be categorised into two primary domains: education and culture. First of all, YEE is a leading institution for teaching Turkish as a foreign language. Serving as the main tool in promoting Turkish culture in the Western Balkans, the Yunus Emre Institute contributes to the steady growth in popularity of the Turkish language. As a result, in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, Turkish is often chosen by students as their preferred foreign language. According to data published at the end of 2020, since the inauguration of the first cultural centre in Sarajevo in 2009, more than 20,000 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have completed Turkish language courses.  

One of the newest organisations of Turkey’s public diplomacy is the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV). According to its founding charter, the institution’s mission is to enhance regional cooperation within the domain of education. As a transnational educational entity, the Turkish Maarif Foundation is responsible for organising thematic courses (from kindergarten to university level), awarding scholarships, managing educational institutions and dormitories, publishing scientific works, and performing various other tasks in accordance with the regulations of the host countries. The Turkish Maarif Foundation was established in 2016 to counter the influence of the Gülen Movement, which the AKP perceives as a threat to national interests. As demonstrated by official figures, currently TMV manages over twenty kindergartens, schools and universities across five Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Montenegro). It is important to note that the Turkish Maarif Foundation has recently become the subject of accusations for its propagation of AKP’s political agenda, whilst concurrently interfering in the domestic affairs of host countries. Therefore, the institution’s expansion in most countries in the region has been substantially restricted. 

Although the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB or Diyanet) is not a typical public diplomacy organisation, it nevertheless plays a pivotal role in promotion of Turkey’s soft power. The institution was founded in 1924 as a governmental body to oversee religious affairs on behalf of the republican state authorities. Following the AKP’s rise to power, Diyanet has become a central institution in the process of resurgence of Islam in Turkish public life. In addition to its primary religion-related duties, the institution collaborates with Turkish public diplomacy organisations and engages in a range of social and cultural projects. In this way, the Directorate’s activities are closely aligned with government policies. Consequently, the authorities in Ankara have gained another platform through which they can shape international public opinion. In recent years, the non-religious aspect of Diyanet’s operations has become a point of contention, particularly in the Western Balkans. Excessive involvement of DİB’s employees in promoting the AKP’s political narrative has been perceived as an attempt to subordinate the region by Turkey. For instance, some Bosnian members of Riyaset, the major Muslim organisation in the Balkans, publicly condemned the Directorate’s activities outside the religious sphere and accused it of promoting politicised Islam in the region. 

Conclusion 

Further growth of Turkey’s regional role, however, is contingent upon the advancement of the Western Balkan countries’ integration with the European Union. It is acknowledged that national governments perceive their potential accession to the EU as a primary objective. Nevertheless, they are not opposed to the prospect of cooperation with other external actors, especially in the absence of a comprehensive EU enlargement strategy. Turkey’s already established presence in the Western Balkans provides the country with a vital opportunity to leverage its influence. On the other hand, it is evident that perceptions of Turkey in the Western Balkans vary significantly between countries, largely attributable to the substantial differences in the historical experiences of individual nations. Generally speaking, Turks are viewed rather favourably in the Muslim-majority countries in the region, while in predominantly Christian countries, the views on Turkey are more mixed. Consequently, it is not possible to assert that the AKP foreign policy model has been wholly effective and successful, nor that the narrative disseminated by the AKP government and its institutions has been particularly appealing to any country in the Western Balkans. On reflection, it appears that the strategy of delivering a uniform message to neighbouring regions, as adopted by the AKP in the early 2000s, has considerably hampered the expansion potential of Turkish foreign policy. In promoting Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision, politicians of the ruling party frequently disregarded the interests and expectations of their partners. Hence, the ultimate failure of the strategic depth doctrine can be attributed to difficulties with correct understanding of local specifics and inconsistent actions in the international environment. 

In the context of exploring ways to improve the Turkish foreign policy strategy towards the Western Balkans, it is recommended that representatives of public diplomacy organisations devote more attention to inform the Western Balkan public about less controversial areas of Turkey’s involvement (e.g. labour activation, technology transfer, infrastructure development, support to the health sector). It is also of paramount importance to increase the level of transparency, for example by including comprehensive financial statements in annual reports. In addition, some experts have pointed to significant shortcomings in the public diplomacy model established by the AKP. These include inadequate coordination of activities, incompatibility between the scope of several programmes and the target groups, and subordination of some initiatives to the political interests of the ruling party. In light of the above mistakes, there is a high probability that the credibility of Turkish organisations involved in public diplomacy in the Western Balkans will be irreversibly damaged, which may have a detrimental effect on Turkey’s overall image in the region.

The post In the EU’s shadow: Turkish regional cooperation initiatives in the Western Balkans appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DIW-Studie untersucht Faktoren für Elektrolyse, bei der aus Wasser und Strom Wasserstoff entsteht – Wasserbedarf kann in der Regel gestillt werden – Zügiger Ausbau des Wasserstoffkernnetzes ermöglicht wasser- und stromsystemdienliche Elektrolysestandorte Trotz steigendem Wasserbedarf durch den ...

Magyarország első számú nemzetközi kutatási együttműködési programját bemutató országos rendezvénysorozat

CHIŞINĂU, 13 August 2025 – Observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) will hold a press conference on the opening of the observation mission to the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova on Friday 15 August.

What: 

• An introduction to the role of the ODIHR election observation mission and its planned activities

Who: 

• Ambassador Jillian Stirk, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission

When: 

• 11:00 local time (GMT +3) on 15 August 2025

Where:

• Summit Events & Conference Center, Red Room, 49/3 Tighina Street, Chişinău

Registration:

• No registration is necessary, but only questions from journalists will be taken

For more details, contact:

Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst with the Election Observation Mission: Egor.Tilpunov@odihr.md or +373 69 805 126

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson: Katya.Andrusz@odihr.pl or +48 609 522 266 

Dans God Will Not Help, Hana Jušić signe une chronique patiente et acérée du début du XXᵉ siècle, entre film d'époque et allégorie de la condition féminine. L'arrivée d'une veuve venue du Chili dans une communauté montagnarde croate bouscule un univers clos, régulé par les traditions, la foi et le patriarcat. La cinéaste explore les liens entre exil, superstition, sororité et paysages, tout en évitant les stéréotypes sur les Balkans.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Cinéma yougoslave, Croatie, Culture et éducation

BBC Sport visits Egypt to discover what Mohamed Salah means to the people of the football-mad country, and how a small boy from humble beginnings became a national icon.

Podgorica, Bar, Budva, Bijelo Polje... Du littoral jusqu'aux montagnes du nord en passant par le centre du pays, tout le Monténégro est en proie depuis dimanche à des incendies géants. Un soldat a été tué mardi dans la zone de Kuči, un autre blessé.

- Articles / Monténégro, Environnement, Courrier des Balkans, changement climatique

Emmanuel Macron aura donc coché toutes les cases de son bréviaire de la repentance. Il ne lui manquait que le Cameroun, mais voilà qui vient d’être fait… Dans un courrier daté du 30 juillet au président camerounais Paul Biya et rendu public mardi 12 août 2025, le président de la repentance a ainsi officiellement reconnu que la France avait mené « une guerre » au Cameroun, avant et après l’indépendance de 1960, marquée par des « violences répressives ».
 
Retour sur l’histoire qui fait une fois de plus litière de ce singulier ethno-masochisme présidentiel qui finit par ressembler à une fêlure psychologique. Voir à ce sujet mon livre Pour répondre aux décoloniaux, aux islamo-gauchistes et aux terroristes de la repentance.
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Alexander Isak is angling for a move away from Newcastle United but Eritreans in the city are keen for the man they see as an "ambassador" to stay with the Magpies.