Diplomacy & Crisis News

Constituée en laboratoire du néolibéralisme à partir du milieu des années 1970, l'Amérique latine a changé de visage. Depuis une dizaine d'années, une grande partie de la région est « passée à gauche », un phénomène souvent décrit comme une vague. / Amérique latine, Bolivie, Brésil, Équateur, Pérou, (...) / Amérique latine, Bolivie, Brésil, Équateur, Pérou, Venezuela, Économie, Finance, Idéologie, Inégalités, Parti politique, Politique, Socialisme - 2011/11

After his record landslide victory on 18 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely knows he cannot rest on his laurels. With oil prices unlikely to rise anytime soon, national economic stagnation, a still heavily State-and-oligarch-controlled economy and an ever-growing shadow of confrontation with the West, Putin has his work cut out for the next six years.

The turmoil of the Skripal case and the flurry of tensions with the ‘common West’ did not break the spirit of Vladimir Putin’s supporters. Thousands gathered at Manezhnaya Square to celebrate their champion’s historic victory (76.7 %, an increase of 13.1 percentage points since 2012).

But for Russia, nothing has ever been as uncertain as it is today. The question is whether Putin is ready to implement important economic reforms, at the expense of a minority that has backed him since the beginning. In addition, Putin must consider the global ramifications of Russia’s more assertive foreign policy. Finally, with the constitutional limit of two non-renewable terms, the question of Putin’s succession is on everyone’s mind.

Stagnation versus Reform and the limits of ‘Putinomics’

However much of an election or, rather, a referendum of public confidence that this presidential ballot was, it will not hide Russia’s stark economic reality. In spite of impressive progress since the Cold War, Russia remains crippled by economic stagnation. The still substantial power of the State apparatus and its enfeoffed oligarchs has led to an undiversified economy, low wages and endemic corruption.

There is no doubt that Putin has achieved substantial success in restoring order over the Russian economy. He has pursued privatization in a much less opaque way than predecessor Dmitry Medvedev, while maintaining control over key industrial and financial sectors. Since 2000, Russia’s GDP per capita has grown by 13%, generating significant improvements in living conditions. Russia’s debt-to-GDP ratio was just 12.6% in 2017, down from a massive 92.1% in 1999. Since the chaotic immediate post-Cold War years in the 1990s, there have been significant improvements in crime rates and public health.

Despite these successes, investment risks remain high. Corruption is still prevalent (with the recent tragic fire in Siberia providing a stark reminder) and remains a serious hindrance to foreign investment. Foreign firms frequently face expropriation, and this lack of long-term legal visibility and security deters investors. The current crisis with the ‘common West’ – as the phrase goes in Moscow – from Ukraine to the Skripal affair, will not help improve the situation.

With low FDI on the one hand, and contained oil prices on the other, stagnation is here to last. In many ways it was precisely through this scheme of economic stagnation, coupled with macroeconomic and political stability, that Putin consolidated his power. For many Russians, no Putin would mean a return to the 1990s, when shops were empty and people queued miles to buy daily essentials.

However, this stagnation/stability dichotomy is increasingly irrelevant. With its worrisome demographic situation, Russian politicians likely understand the need for reforms: the limits of ‘Putinomics’ have been reached. Whomever is appointed Russia’s new Prime Minister, the most probable short-term scenario is an increase in corporate tax (currently just 20%, four points below the OECD average) and personal income tax. Should new economic sanctions be imposed on Russia, a further devaluation of the ruble, albeit softer than Russia’s last devaluation, cannot be excluded either.

A more assertive foreign policy

Putin’s re-election sparked a mixed international reaction. Unsurprisingly it was met with tepid response from the West, persistently vocal in its criticism of Moscow’s obstinate behavior on the world stage. But within Europe, the rift between pro-Russia and Kremlin-wary countries is still wide. Not all of Europe joined the UK in its diplomatic retaliation to the Salisbury attack: only fifteen EU member-states decided to expel Russian diplomats. Recent visits to Moscow from Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel likely influenced both countries to stay neutral. This shows how divided Western countries can be when dealing with Putin, an aspect he can continue to exploit.

Though Putin knows the age of the liberal order may not be over, it is solidly challenged in every corner of the world by authoritarianism and ‘democratorship’ (to quote Swiss academic Max-Liniger Goumaz). China and Turkey, two countries whose leaders have recently consolidated their power, were unsurprisingly the first two countries to congratulate Putin on his re-election. Both will hope for tightened relationships with Russia in the years to come. And with a recent comeback in Africa – an old Cold War battleground – that hasn’t gone unnoticed, Russia must believe that current winds blow in its favor.

Most strikingly, Russia has been wearing down the global system of multilateralism that it has claimed to defend. Russia has long upheld the tradition of multilateralism, which has served its national interests well since 1945. But the 2008 Georgian war (later referred to as Europe’s first war of the 21st century), and later the intervention in Ukraine, reflected a significant departure in this regard. The most likely reason for this departure is nostalgia – not so much for the Soviet Union but for the two-player game.

In a world in which Russia’s ancestral enemy, the US, is still in the game, it is likely not bearable for the Russian elite to step aside, wearing the placard of historical loser. Therefrom, things that were unthinkable some years ago (like the so-called annexation of Crimea) became serious policy considerations. Putin is likely not done yet, having signaled his revived interest in solving Moldova’s Transnistria problem. But what is certain is that despite all of Putin’s flamboyant declarations on the modernisation of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the West’s concern will lie more in Russia’s serious hybrid and high-tech war capabilities, for which development will surely stand at the top of Putin’s priorities for the next 6 years.

Last term for the Czar, but no end of reign

However pressing the challenges ahead, with a constitutional amendment highly unlikely, this is almost certainly Putin’s last Presidential term. In 2024, after almost a quarter of a century in power, Putin may even be keen to step back – back, but not out. As a former top Russian diplomat and senior political analyst informed the author several weeks ago, the most plausible scenario would be that Putin’s successor will rule the country under his mentor’s close and sharp eye. The intelligence services will still report to Putin (like during Putin’s premiership under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency). Moreover, leaving the Kremlin may not mean leaving an official leadership position. The recent revival of the Russia-Belarus Union State represents a possible way out for Putin, enabling him to become President of an even larger entity.

As hinted at previously, it remains unclear where Putin’s heir will come from. One possibility is from the old guard of siloviki (former top officials or men of influence from the Soviet apparatus who accompanied Putin to the top and helped him reinforce his grip on power). Another possibility is from an emerging generation of young and ambitious protégés that Putin has been breeding for some time now, including his former bodyguard. Other uncertainties remain: will they come from Moscow, or from the rural provinces? Will they have a military/intelligence or civil background? Perhaps more than any other science, Kremlinology is an inexact and often surprising one.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Gregorie Roos.

The post Putin’s next 6 years: shadow of stagnation or light of reform? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Si nul n'ignore plus l'ampleur de la crise environnementale qu'affronte l'humanité, la crise de civilisation dont elle s'accompagne reste, elle, peu identifiée. On ne sortira pourtant de l'impuissance qu'à condition de la diagnostiquer clairement et d'en mesurer toute la gravité. / Capitalisme, (...) / Capitalisme, Écologie, Énergie, Finance, Idées, Idéologie, Inégalités, Mondialisation, Mouvement de contestation, Marxisme, Environnement, Crise financière - 2011/11

Amid the risks of the situation in Syria “spiraling out of control,” the United Nations chief has appealed to the five permanent members of the Security Council to break the current deadlock on reported use of chemical weapons in the war-torn country.

>> Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « Danser avec les États », écrit par Serge Sur dans le numéro de printemps 2018 de Politique étrangère. < <

Critics of overseas development assistance say it's a waste. The evidence shows that investments in public health enhance stability and security.

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The United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) on Wednesday said that it has received reports that an estimated 500 patients at Syrian health facilities have exhibited signs and symptoms consistent with exposure to toxic chemicals, after the shelling of a Damascus suburb over the weekend.

While Malians must ensure the successful holding of elections this year, their priority should be the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, a senior United Nations official said Wednesday.

Trump's nominee for secretary of state must answer for the false claims and recycled conspiracies he propagated.

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Rather than speaking out against Putin, the U.S. president is playing into Moscow’s hands.

Depuis 2006, Twitter propose aux internautes de propager des messages courts à travers Internet et vers les téléphones mobiles. Très simple et gratuit, ce service deviendra-t-il bientôt le « pouls informationnel de la planète » ? / Communication, Entreprise, Information, Internet, Médias, Presse, (...) / Communication, Entreprise, Information, Internet, Médias, Presse, Technologies de l'information - 2011/10

Le « printemps arabe » est venu heureusement rappeler que notre histoire est façonnée par les révolutions. Sans trancher la question, très débattue, de la définition de ce concept, cette carte recense les grands mouvements révolutionnaires, qu'il s'agisse de prises du pouvoir violentes, d'élections (...) / États-Unis, URSS, Colonialisme, Communisme, Conflit, Élections, État, Extrême droite, Histoire, Idéologie, Impérialisme, Mouvement de contestation, Nationalisme, Parti politique, Politique, Violence, Socialisme, Marxisme, Extrême gauche, Coup d'État, Maoïsme, Mouvement de libération, Révolution russe 1917, Indépendance, Réveil arabe 2011- - Politique

US and South Korean army soldiers pose on a floating bridge on the Hantan River during a joint military exercise in Yeoncheon, South Korea, in December 2015. (Photo by AP)

This year’s U.S.-ROK annual joint military drills kicked off on 1 April after a delay of two months caused by the astonishingly fast-forwarded bilateral thaws between the Koreas, U.S. and China. The first part of the drills, Foal Eagle, will involve a field training exercise of 11,500 U.S. and 290,000 ROK troops and the remaining part, Key Resolve, will involve a computer-based-simulation exercise of 12,200 U.S. and 10,000 ROK troops. Although both U.S. and ROK military press releases announced that the intensity of the drills will be similar to that of last year, the drills are expected to be low-key, cautiously reflecting the thaws. The duration of Foal Eagle has been shortened from two months to one, and Key Resolve from one month to two weeks. Plans for U.S. strategic asset deployment have also been altered as the deployment of large-scale nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines has been cancelled. Allegedly, however, such cancellation is offset by the deployment of other assets, including those crucial to the operation of ‘Decapitation Strike’, such as MC-130, as well as those that support marine landing in case of full-scale war, such as the amphibious assault ship group USS Wasp.

Contrary to last year, when he vociferously starred as President Trump’s evil counterpart, Kim Jong-un has remained silent since he expressed that he ‘understands South Korea’s stance’ on the drills during his meeting with President Moon’s convoys on 5 March. Once called ‘Crazy Fat Kid’, Kim Jong-un now appears on TV like any other ordinary global leader with complete disregard for the public’s willingness to accept such anomaly. The bizarre images of him awkwardly shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and IOC President Thomas Bach credit this fashion terrorist with the egregious hairstyle with rational characteristics and the capacity to run a ‘normal state’. Kim Jong-un’s gawky debut in the global diplomacy theater prior to the end of April meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, followed by the May meeting with President Trump, are, nonetheless, carefully planned attempts to play soft-powered preliminary warm-up.

Many experts agree that Kim Jong-un’s recent pro-diplomacy moves reveal his disguised intent to strengthen negotiation leverage for the May meeting. It is predicted that Kim Jong-un will ultimately demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces and strategic assets from the Korean peninsula through the orderly steps of earning recognition as a normal state, signing the peace treaty with the U.S., restoring diplomatic relations with the U.S., and damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance throughout the process. Backward induction of these future strategic aims, in conjunction with Kim Jong-un’s common ground interests with China and Russia’s emphasis on ‘double-freeze’, also explains the reclusive leader’s real intent, well-observable in his first foreign trip to China. China, vexed with its dwindling influence on the Korean peninsula since the startling U.S.-DPRK thaw, warmheartedly welcomed Kim Jong-un’s visit, which restored China’s seven-year decoupled diplomatic relations with North Korea. In response, Kim Jong-un shared with President Xi his refusal to accept the Libyan denuclearization model and alternatively proposed a procedural, step-by-step model to maximize his stakes. Kim Jong-un’s seemingly desperate yet innately strategic outreach now engages China in potentially alleviating sanctions and enlarging the pie on the negotiation table of the soon-to-be held six-party talks. Such guileful outreach will extend to other stakeholders as well. A number of experts anticipate that Kim Jong-un will soon meet with Russian President Putin to discuss the May meeting.

Can South Korea Save Itself?

The South Korean Moon administration’s subtle predilection for temporary peace over Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) calls into question whether recent temporary thaws can truly evolve into perpetual peace, given the fact that South Korea cannot defend itself (but such a leftist position is sympathetically understandable considering the doomsday nature of the war with Kim Jong-un). For some Korean conservatives, the emotional aspect of the currently deepening inter-Korean rapprochement seems to blind the Korean people into realizing the realpolitik beneath the thaws, a situation reminiscent of the geopolitical conditions that led to Nixon’s pursuit of Vietnamization during the U.S.-China détente era. Unless South Korea in the divided Korean peninsula has credible capacity to defend itself, the risks involving the incremental approach toward reunification should always be managed with a keen, vigilant reciprocity-oriented mentality.

The Kim dynasty has always taken advantage of the uncertainties arising from frequent regime changes in competitive democracy between the U.S. and South Korea, while the U.S.-ROK alliance has ironically suffered from the certainty shown in the Kim dynasty’s consistent policy pursuit of WMD development. Rewarding the Kim dynasty for its temporary for-aid deception under such uncertainties has always generated more next-level costs than benefits, while the Kim dynasty has repeatedly breached the Agreed Framework by non-compliance. Thus, the Kim dynasty’s abominable past records of repeatedly withdrawing from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)’s failures to certify the Kim dynasty’s commitment to ‘freeze’ plutonium production and programs all lead to one very clear conclusion. Even if the Moon administration’s goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a procedurally long-term one and the leftist regime does not seek a regime change in North Korea, such aims must reciprocally maximize its negotiation leverage by strategically devising a step-by-step blueprint for consistently punishing and sanctioning Kim Jong-un whenever he displays detracting behaviors.

The post U.S.-ROK Annual Military Drills Again Signal Kim Jong-un Punishments for Deception appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La gauche française, quand elle n'occupe ni Matignon ni l'Elysée, analyse plus volontiers son exercice du pouvoir. La sempiternelle question de ses revirements, celle aussi de sa droitisation liée aux « contraintes européennes », au bouleversement de sa sociologie électorale, sont indissociables (...) / France, Politique - 2007/04

White House officials want Brian Hook to stay in his current role in Foggy Bottom, but a demoralized diplomatic corps would like to see him go.

The United States should be condemning Ilham Aliyev's corrupt regime rather than condoning it.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Delphine Alles propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Yandry Kurniawan, The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 240 pages).

Cet ouvrage aborde la construction du rapport de l’État indonésien à la sécurité nationale, avant de décrire les acteurs et débats impliqués dans les processus de sécuritisation (désignation d’une menace existentielle justifiant la mise en œuvre de mesures d’exception) et désécuritisation (retrait de certaines thématiques de l’agenda sécuritaire) de deux conflits internes. Yandry Kurniawan analyse l’évolution de la perception des menaces puis l’implication militaire face à la rébellion acehnaise (jusqu’à l’accord de 2005) et aux violences interconfessionnelles aux Moluques (1999-2005).

Un retour historique souligne combien la désignation de menaces existentielles fait figure de norme en Indonésie, dès l’époque coloniale. Une forme de loi martiale est institutionnalisée sous Sukarno puis consolidée par Suharto, avec développement d’une structure militaire territoriale parallèle à la bureaucratie civile. Le principal apport théorique de l’ouvrage apparaît dans les chapitres consacrés à la transition post-Suharto, de sa destitution (1998) au milieu du second mandat de Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2009). La période est marquée par l’embrasement de plusieurs conflits internes et la diffusion d’une violence de basse intensité (attentats, piraterie, criminalité). Dans ce contexte, les autorités cherchent à consolider simultanément la transition démocratique et l’appareil sécuritaire, débarrassant l’establishment militaire de ses habitudes répressives tout en recourant abondamment à une loi martiale désormais inscrite dans le droit. Les trois premiers présidents de la transition démocratique ont ainsi invoqué la loi martiale (Habibie au Timor oriental ; Wahid aux Moluques puis dans le contexte précédant sa destitution ; Megawati à Aceh). Les mandats de SBY n’ont pas non plus été exempts de mesures exceptionnelles, notamment en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme.

Les cas d’étude soulignent l’absence de linéarité de la transition entre sécuritisation et désécuritisation, alternativement mises en œuvre par les mêmes acteurs selon leur perception des menaces et du contexte, notamment de l’opinion. Ils soulignent aussi la complexité du rôle des militaires, susceptibles de devenir des partenaires nécessaires voire des amplificateurs de désécuritisation, loin de la représentation dominante qui les cantonne au rôle d’agents de sécuritisation.

Tourné vers l’étude d’acteurs nationaux et locaux, l’ouvrage aurait pu davantage souligner l’importance d’un contexte mondial susceptible d’enrayer ou de favoriser les processus de sécuritisation. C’est notamment le cas, pour des conflits à dimension religieuse, après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 (le gouvernement de Megawati assimilant alors les rebelles d’Aceh au terrorisme global). Dans la même ligne, l’intentionnalité des parties prenantes est parfois surestimée – choix assumé dont témoigne l’évocation de « politiques de sécuritisation » –, là où les autorités procèdent souvent à une sécuritisation ad hoc face à des situations semblant mettre en jeu leur crédibilité en l’absence de réponse vigoureuse. Enfin, les particularités inhérentes à la conception même de la sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est, au-delà de l’expérience coloniale, auraient mérité d’être soulignées : la sécuritisation prend une dimension différente dans un contexte où la sécurité nationale est d’emblée conçue de manière extensive et tournée vers l’intérieur, alors que l’appareil militaire se perçoit comme un vecteur de stabilité politique.

Delphine Allès

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