Diplomacy & Crisis News

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A 2-ship of Israeli Air Force F-16s from Ramon Air Base, Israel head out to the Nevada Test and Training Range, July 17, 2009 during Red Flag 09-4. Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise involving the air forces of the United States and its allies. The exercise is conducted on the 15,000-square-mile Nevada Test and Training Range, north of Las Vegas. Red Flag is one of a series of advanced training programs administered by the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center and Nellis, through the 414th Combat Training Squadron. Flying for Red Flag 09-4 begins July 13 and ends July 24. U.S. aircraft will come from Nellis and Creech in Nevada, South Carolina, Idaho, the United Kingdom, Washington, Oklahoma and Ohio. Aircraft types will include F-15s, F-16s, E-3s and KC-135s. In addition to U.S. aircraft, the Israeli Air Force will be flying F-16C Falcons.
(U.S. Air Force photo/ Master Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald) released

Iran has been ratcheting up the rhetoric while Haaretz warns of the consequences of Iran’s ambitions in Syria. It all started back in February, when an Iranian drone and an Israeli F-16 were shot down at the Syria-Israel border. More incidents and additional quarrels over the Iran Nuclear Deal could lead to more grievous confrontations between the parties involved.

The drone and the F-16: the incident

On 10 February, the Israeli Air Force (IAF – Heyl Ha’Avir) intercepted and shot down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was flying within its borders. Soon after, the IAFdispatched its F-16I jetfighters in order to destroy the UAV control vehicle in Syrian territory. However, as the F-16Is engaged their targets, an intense barrage of anti-aircraft firewelcomed them. One F-16I was eventually shot down, while the two pilots managed to eject and landed on Israeli territory. In retaliation, Israel conducted surgical strikes against at least twelve Iranian targets within Syria.

A series of new developments

The events of 10 February represented a number of unprecedented developments. First, this was the first time that an Iranian drone penetrated Israeli airspace. Previously, Iran’s proxies – such as e.g. Hezbollah – usually carried out these tasks. This marks an upgrade in Tehran’s presence and involvement in operations against Israel. Also, the retaliation unleashed by the downing of the F-16 represented the first Israeli strike against manned Iranian bases. Hence, similarly to the Iranian counterpart, Israeli forces are not steering clear of a direct confrontation with their regional competitor.

Moreover, the IAF losing an aircraft is news in itself. Indeed, Israel had not lost a single jetfighter in a combat operation since the time of the Lebanon War at the beginning of the ‘80s. It is not clear what anti-aircraft weapon system brought the jetfighter down. IAF F-16Is are equipped with electronic countermeasures that give them an advantage against many anti-aircraft systems. There are, however, sophisticated systems in Syria – such as the Russian-made Buk-M1-2 or S-400 – that could successfully engage advanced jetfighters like the IAF F-16Is.

The loss of the jetfighter is noteworthy in another regard as well, as it could change Israel’s course of action. Indeed, Israel has been ceaselessly conducting airstrike in Syria throughout the Civil War, targeting Hezbollah’s supply chain as well as Syrian and Iranian strategic military facilities and bases. This line of conduct might be subject to change in light of these recent events; as an Iranian official commented, “the era of hit and run is over” and his words might ring partially or entirely true.

Leaders send warning from Munich

Displaying a piece of the UAV downed over the skies of Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Iran from the stage of the Munich Security Conference to not “test Israel’s resolve”. Netanyahu asserted that Israel would not let Tehran proceed with their plans against Tel Aviv, stating that his country is ready to wage war against Iran or its proxies to defend itself.

While Iran rejected all accusations brought forth by Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister might find additional reasons to reinforce his anti-Iranian foreign policies in recent domestic developments. The Israeli police recently claimed to have enough evidence to charge Netanyahu with corruption. Faced with this accusation, the Prime Minister might be strongly motivated to show resolve against Israel’s arch-enemy in order to deflect attention from himself – more so as if he can count on the Trump administration’s unconditional support and even on the assistance of countries equally worried about Iran’s rise, like Saudi Arabia.

Also in Munich, Lebanon’s Defense Minister Yaacoub Sarraf reacted to Netanyahu’s words. Commenting on the Israeli Prime Minister’s promise to go after Iran’s proxies, Sarraf asserted that the government in Beirut is ready and willing to defend its territory against external aggression. Any Israeli operations taking place on Lebanese soil would, therefore, prompt an armed reaction against it. Sarraf’s pledge may well prove empty, as it is hard to imagine Beirut conducting military operations against Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, Israel will feel forced to gauge potential reactions from other neighbouring countries besides Syria. Meanwhile, there have been further revelations about Iran allegedly having up to 10 military bases in Syria, two of them near Israel’s border.

The Nuclear Deal as the final straw?

The year 2018 will see an increase in tension between Iran and Israel. This could potentially lead to a limited, regional conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran’s proxies. Yet, while the anti-Iranian front tightens, a more direct confrontation might arise from the Nuclear Deal. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of Israel and the USA grows, since they believe the Deal is incapable of preventing Iran from getting nuclear capabilities.

At the same time, Iran’s resentment towards the US is increasing. In particular, Iran accusesthe Trump administration of meddling in its business with other countries in order to counter the positive effects that the lifting of the sanctions ensued. Under such circumstances, the Nuclear Deal does not pay off and Iran would benefit from withdrawing. In this regard, Tehran warned its competitors that the world “would face another nuclear crisis, which would be very difficult to be resolved”, if the Nuclear Deal was to be scrapped.

If this is going to be the case, Iran will surely re-embark on its nuclear endeavour with renewed vigour. Simultaneously, Israel, the US, and the rest of the regional powers worried about Iran’s rise, might push for more aggressive solutions in order to deal with the prospects of a nuclear Iran once and for all. If diplomacy loses this round, the probability of a direct confrontation between these parties will increase dramatically.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Mauro Lubrano.

The post Israel and Iran on the path to escalation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Canada’s left is trying to tarnish Doug Ford’s image by branding him a racist. They’d be better off asking why so many minorities support him.

Blaming the Russians, or political opponents, only goes so far.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Alexander Thurston , Boko Haram: the History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton University Press, 2017, 352 pages).

Voici enfin une histoire de Boko Haram qui permet de comprendre en finesse une des insurrections djihadistes les plus énigmatiques d’Afrique. L’approche chronologique, en particulier, s’avère fort utile pour décrypter la complexité d’un mouvement qui, à partir de 2003, a connu plusieurs phases de profondes transformations, de la secte jusqu’au groupe terroriste, avec une faction affiliée à l’organisation État islamique depuis 2015. Arabophone, l’auteur a prêté beaucoup d’attention aux vidéos de propagande des insurgés, et il argue que l’on ne peut analyser Boko Haram en faisant abstraction de sa dimension religieuse, quoi qu’il en soit par ailleurs des facteurs politiques, sociaux et économiques pouvant, aussi, expliquer sa résilience face à une coalition antiterroriste qui réunit les quatre pays du pourtour du lac Tchad.

Une telle lecture permet de déconstruire les poncifs habituels à ce propos, ­notamment les représentations qui opposent un islam soufi, africain et tolérant face et un islam arabe, salafiste, « radical » et séditieux. Contrairement à la vision qu’en ont certains spécialistes du terrorisme, Thurston montre ainsi que Boko Haram n’est pas une importation saoudienne. Au contraire, le mouvement s’est développé en rupture avec les groupes wahhabites du Nigeria. Au début des années 2000, son fondateur Mohammed Youssouf a d’abord réussi à s’imposer comme le prêcheur le plus virulent de la région, en profitant de l’absence des principaux prédicateurs salafistes de la ville de Maiduguri, partis en Arabie Saoudite poursuivre leur cursus religieux à l’université islamique de Médine. Les relations entre les deux mouvances se sont ensuite dégradées très vite. À mesure que les groupes salafistes dénonçaient la déviance doctrinale de Mohammed Youssouf, celui-ci s’est radicalisé et a musclé son discours contre l’État nigérian. En 2009, il devait finalement appeler au djihad pour venger des membres de la secte abattus sans sommation par la police. L’exécution extrajudiciaire de Mohammed Youssouf précipita alors Boko Haram dans une autre dimension, celle de la clandestinité, du terrorisme et, bientôt, du massacre et de la guerre civile dans les régions riveraines du lac Tchad.

Pour autant, le mouvement a continué à revendiquer des positions religieuses. Rejeté en 2016 par l’organisation État islamique, le successeur de Mohammed Youssouf, Aboubakar Shekau, a par exemple accusé la faction de son rival d’avoir basculé dans le murjisme (murji’ah). Cette école théologique, qui date du Moyen Âge, considérait que seul Dieu pouvait juger des péchés des croyants. Elle est aujourd’hui déclarée impie, car elle va à l’encontre de la position des clercs qui attribuent aux imams et aux juges de la charia le soin de prononcer des anathèmes et, pour les salafistes les plus radicaux, d’excommunier (takfir) les déviants. Le débat n’est pas clos, mais il revêt toute son importance quand on sait que Boko Haram tue essentiellement des musulmans et non des chrétiens, minoritaires dans la région. À sa manière, le livre de Thurston nous renvoie ainsi à la question fondamentale des relations entre la religion et des États défaillants qui n’ont pas réussi à gérer leur héritage islamique et les demandes de justice sociale à travers la charia.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos

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/ Balkans, Macédoine, Serbie, Croatie, Slovénie, Yougoslavie 1946-1992, Frontières - Balkans / Balkans, Macédoine, Serbie, Croatie, Slovénie, Yougoslavie 1946-1992, Frontières - Balkans

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Today, some of Europe’s poorest countries are critical to China’s global economic development strategy. Under the 16+1 sub-regional framework, which includes eleven countries from central and eastern Europe and five from the Balkans (CEEC), China is pursuing investment opportunities in infrastructure in order to enhance its connectivity with the European region.

Thus far, Chinese interests have been universally welcomed by the sixteen nations with political elites keen to boost their fragile economies in post-recessionary times. However, as economic cooperation grows between China and its former socialist allies, the political implications are becoming more apparent. As the EU strives to sustain its ‘One-Europe’ policy with China, how some of its members and potentially future members embrace China’s global ambitions could undermine EU cohesion as it continues to endure instability.

The new Silk Road

The 16+1 framework is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to integrate the Asian country more deeply into the world economy. The initiative, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, underpins the Communist Party’s economic and geopolitical vision to connect China with the world. Considered as the biggest foreign investment by any one country since the US Marshall Plan, the BRI project spans 70 countries and aims to connect Central Asia with Europe, Africa, and Oceania through investment and trade in the areas of energy, infrastructure, and transformation.

Some of the projects include a railway line from Kazakhstan to Iran, a high-speed railway running from Southern China through South-East Asia, oil pipelines connecting Russia and China, a gas pipeline in Pakistan, highways in Hungary, and a railway connecting Budapest with Belgrade. Despite the estimated $4 trillion cost of the BRI, its objectives are not only economic. Enabled by positive economic relations, cultural exchanges between China and BRI participant states have increased with more opportunities for student-exchanges while foreign literature and cinema enters the Chinese market. Most significantly, the BRI is central to China’s political ambitions. Last October, it was enshrined into the Communist Party’s constitution, signalling the centrality of foreign policy to the ruling party and Xi Jinping’s desire to enhance China’s global image. As China’s global influence continues to grow, how will the West, grappling with its own challenges, react to the rising star of the East?

China sees Europe as pivotal to the revival of the old Silk Road, which launched China’s regional development over 2000 years ago. China’s strategic ambitions in Europe are underscored by its economic initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). According to the state-owned news agency, Xinuanet, Chinese investment in the CEE has surpassed $9 billion with $1.4 billion of investment going in the opposite direction. For some of Europe’s poorest countries, Chinese investment could be critical in building and upgrading energy plants, railways, motorways, and airports. Some of the big deals in the CEE involving Chinese investment include a €3 billion expressway connecting Montenegro and Albania; a €1.4 billion linking the Bosnian municipalities of Banja Luka and Mlinište; and a €1 billion project in the Czech Republic to create a Y-shaped canal connecting the waterways of the Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe. Moreover, in November Serbia began construction of the China-funded railway from Belgrade to Budapest worth around €3.2 billion.

The Balkans and Baltic regions are especially critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Two routes outline China’s historic project: The Silk Road Economic Belt, which enters Europe through the Baltic corridor, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which passes through the Southern Balkans. In 2016, the Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO bought a majority stake in Greece’s largest port, Piraeus. Through investment worth hundreds of millions of euros, COSCO aims to strengthen the port’s capacity and trade relations with the EU. In the Baltics, states are competing with one another for Chinese investment and exportsto China have more than doubled in recent years. Chinese tourism to the Baltic region has reached record levels, rising by 57.8% in Latvia in 2016. China sees the Baltics and Balkans as the gateway to the wider EU region and are critical to China’s new Silk Road.

Political consequences

China’s influence in the CEE transcends economic interests. On the political front, diplomatic relations have strengthened between China and several European countries. In November, China promised $3 billion in investment funds to the CEE at the fifth annual summit of the 16+1 framework in Budapest as Chinese leaders were joined by the heads of the sixteen countries. Hungary, in particular, has been very welcoming to Chinese interests. Its  right-wing Eurosceptic prime minister, Victor Orban, claimed that a new world order was forming and that ”the world economy’s centre of gravity is shifting from west to east”.

In the Czech Republic, President Milos Zeman has stressed the importance of relations with China over other actors such as the EU and NATO. In 2014, Zeman travelled to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and in 2016, the same meeting took place in Prague, with Jinping stating that both countries should see stronger relations ”from a strategic viewpoint and long-term perspective”.

Serbia represents another country to benefit from Chinese investment and strong political ties. Serbia, one of the Balkan countries applying for accession to the EU, has welcomed Chinese investment to improve its railways, roads, and energy plants. On his visit in June 2016, Xi Jinping said that Serbia was the point where civilisations of the west and east meet, suggesting the importance of the Balkan country to China’s BRI. In addition, China is one of the few countries to support the Serbian position of not recognising Kosovo.

Although China insists that the sub-regional 16+1 framework is central to the China-EU ”strategic partnership”, the EU is concerned that China is deploying ”divide and rule” tactics to damage European cohesion. The EU has called on all its members to respect the one-Europe policy and speak with one voice to the Chinese government. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Foreign Minister Sigmur Gabriel conveyed concern over Chinese influence in the EU’s periphery. Merkel stated that the 16+1 group should not contain political strings, while Gabriel warned that ”China will succeed in dividing Europe” if Europe fails to develop a single strategy towards China. China has rejected the notion of a one-Europe policy on political and economic grounds, given that ”the EU is a regional organization composed of sovereign states, not a sovereign country itself”.

There is evidence to suggest that China’s perceived strategy in Europe has caused division between Brussels and some of Europe’s sovereign nations. According to Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov, the Balkans has no alternative but to welcome Chinese investment given the EU’s neglect of the region. Moreover, in 2016, Greece and Hungary compromisedthe EU’s legal stance on China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, while an EUstatement criticising China’s human rights record was blocked by Greece last year.

As parts of Europe continue to suffer the consequences of the financial crisis, Chinese investment is a welcomed opportunity to create jobs, upgrade infrastructure, and enhance economic competitiveness. However, the political impact of China’s economic interests in Europe is creating the most tension, especially in Brussels. For the EU, strong relations between China and the 16+1’s eleven EU members threatens the Union’s one-Europe policyvis a vis Beijing. In addition, five non-EU countries are part of the Western Balkan enlargement strategy, which aims to integrate the region into the EU by 2025. Seeing that the EU views the Balkan’s relationship with China as gaining leverage on Brussels, growing Chinese influence in the region could undermine the future of EU enlargement.

 

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This article was first published on Global Risk Insights.

The post Chinese economic interests and the threat to EU cohesion appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Le CRIF jouit aujourd'hui d'une reconnaissance exceptionnelle et quasi unanime auprès de la classe politique française. Il n'en fut pas toujours ainsi. / France, Israël, Conflit israélo-arabe, Judaïsme, Parti politique, Racisme, Conflit israélo-palestinien - (...) / France, Israël, Conflit israélo-arabe, Judaïsme, Parti politique, Racisme, Conflit israélo-palestinien - 2011/07

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