Diplomacy & Crisis News

Comment en est-on arrivé à ce niveau de tension, inédit depuis la fin de la guerre froide ? Pour le comprendre, ce numéro de « Manière de voir » propose d'examiner les causes et les dimensions du nouvel affrontement Est-Ouest, qui se déroule tant sur le terrain militaire que dans l'opinion. / Russie, (...) / Russie, URSS, États-Unis, Conflit, Histoire, Relations Est-Ouest, Géopolitique, Diplomatie - 2018/06

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In a turbulent year for both Israel and Lebanon, one would assume the two countries would work to avoid additional crises at all costs. Rather, Tel Aviv and Beirut are opting to escalate their long-running border dispute, raising concerns regarding a major conflict like the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. Yet, while neither side can realistically afford renewed fighting of such a magnitude, this round likely represents an attempted show of strength on the part of actors in both countries—one that centralizes so-called “deterrence through resilience” on the border while managing and minimizing potentially escalatory actions. Additionally, political elites in both countries likely see the value of the crisis in distracting their populaces from other pressing issues.

Current events are symptoms of long-running border disputes in the area where Lebanon, Syria, and Israel meet. This includes the city of Ghajar and the rural areas of Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Chouba Hills—all areas captured by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and originally part of Syria’s Golan Heights. Israel currently occupies Golan despite UN condemnation following its annexation in 1981. This worsened Tel Aviv’s border conflict with Beirut while further complicating a pre-existing dispute between Syria and Lebanon. Damascus and Beirut have long disagreed over the Golan borders demarcated during the former French Mandate and Ottoman eras.

As a result, the two countries have sparred over relatively minuscule bits of territory for decades, often with only the slightest movements along the “Blue Line”—the established border following the Israeli withdrawal and controlled by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL was established in 1978 to oversee an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the UN amended UNIFIL’s mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities and act as a neutral arbiter to keep the peace. Roughly 9,300 UN peacekeepers are deployed to the disputed area.

Yet UNIFIL struggles to contain aggression on either side of the border, as reflected by the last two months of aggressive actions by Israel and Hezbollah. The current crisis revolves around Hezbollah’s establishment of an “outpost” in the form of two tents in the Chebaa Farms and Kfar Chouba Hills area and claims it shot down an Israeli drone in June. Hezbollah and other Lebanese officials claim the move was in response to Israel’s construction of a border fence around the Lebanese side of Ghajar, a city spanning both Lebanon and the Golan split in half upon the Blue Line’s creation in 2000. The northern part of the city was re-occupied by Israel in 2006. Tel Aviv refuses to vacate the city and effectively prevents entry from the Lebanese side, violating the terms of the split.

A series of tit-for-tat incidents occurred before and after Israel asked UNIFIL to request the tents’ removal, which Beirut conditioned upon Tel Aviv’s pullout from Ghajar. This includes an incident between an Israeli bulldozer and soldiers of each country on July 5, Israeli shelling near Kfar Chouba in response to a missile fired near Ghajar into its territory on July 6, and an explosion near the Lebanese city of Bustan that wounded three Hezbollah members supposedly attempting to cross into Israel and sabotage the border fence on July 12—the seventeenth anniversary of the beginning of the 2006 war. Israel claims it used stun grenades, while Hezbollah accused Tel Aviv of excessive force. A similar construction incident occurred on July 20 that led Israeli forces to launch smoke grenades at Lebanese citizens attempting to build a road near the border.

This series of events is unique from other issues that regularly occur in these areas, not limited to Hezbollah-backed protests along the border or militant attempts to enter Israel. Typically, such problems are connected to violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), given Hezbollah’s strong support for the Palestinian resistance. Similarly, Israel violates the border with its occupation of the Golan and military flights over Lebanon to bomb Iranian targets in Syria, let alone aggressive actions that cross the border—often against the border protests in Lebanese territory.

For Lebanon, and particularly Hezbollah, this round is at least partially connected to recent violence in the West Bank—namely, the brutal Israeli raid on Jenin on July 4 that killed twelve Palestinians and destroyed vast stretches of property. However, the Israeli fence around northern Ghajar also plays a role, given the long-running nature of disputes in this area and the northern Golan more broadly. Beirut feels strongly about its right to these areas—making this situation more than just a Hezbollah issue.

Of potentially equal importance to Lebanon’s political elites is the unifying nature of the situation and its ability to distract the public, as some Hezbollah affiliates have indirectly hinted. Indeed, a renewed border crisis offers a useful distraction for Lebanon’s political class, who wish to draw public attention away from the economic and political nightmare of the last few years. While hardly enough to resolve widespread frustrations, Lebanon’s powers that be likely view a manageable crisis as helpful at a time when their popularity is waning. One need only look at their rampant scapegoating of Syrian refugees to understand how Lebanon’s elites view and utilize a good distraction.

For Israel, any border dispute threatens deterrence against attacks from Iran-backed militants. Tel Aviv is home to a hawkish approach to national security that often rejects compromise—at least publicly—with such groups. Hezbollah is no exception, given it poses the greatest threat to Israel on its border. While the Israeli government likely views this situation as manageable as well, it will not show weakness in the face of one of its core rivals. Hezbollah will likely follow suit.

The fortunate reality is that neither actor desires a major escalation on their disputed border. Israel is struggling with domestic unrest stemming from a deeply polarizing judicial reform effort under the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and an increasingly difficult security situation in the West Bank that it appears to be ill-prepared to address without a full-scale military operation—one that will cause a full-blown war with Palestinian militants and further harm its international image. On the other hand, Hezbollah does not appear willing to take on Israel, as evidenced by its reaction to the Hamas rocket launch from southern Lebanon in early April. It should be noted that Tel Aviv also opted to avoid escalation at that time, assessing Hezbollah was not interested in a broader war.

For these reasons, while this round of border insecurity is notable and exceptional, neither major actor appears willing to escalate their actions beyond a point of no control. The time is not ripe for a repeat of 2006—a reality that hopefully sustains itself to prevent such bloodshed.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Shutterstock.

While President Joe Biden termed the idea of Saudi-Israel normalization “a long way off” in a CNN interview in early July, his administration is seriously discussing with the Saudis the set of U.S.-provided incentives which they want as sweeteners for a potential deal. The primary requests from Riyadh are formal security guarantees from the United States, a U.S.-Saudi partnership to develop civilian nuclear energy, and the ability to access arms sales without Congressional review, as press reports in March indicated. While Israel obviously would like to see normalization with one of the most important Arab states, the influential Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi has laid out a “sales pitch” to Washington in a recent article for the Hoover Institution, arguing that the United States also would see profound benefits from such a deal. Shihabi holds out the prospect for what is essentially a reset of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, restoring diminished U.S. influence. In return for a “formal structure or agreement” which would “be perceived by adversaries as obligating the United States to come to the defense of the [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] (in one form or another) if the latter is threatened,” Washington could “could expect a much closer and more influential relationship with Saudi Arabia, with all that such an alliance would entail.”

It is difficult to envision U.S. security guarantees taking the form of a Senate-ratified treaty, but there has been plenty of support in the U.S. Congress for the goal of promoting regional security integration between the United States, Israel, and Arab partner militaries, particularly on the development of joint regional air and missile defenses. While Shihabi does not explicitly make the argument that it would diminish Chinese influence in the kingdom in relative terms, that effect is clearly implied.

From a U.S. standpoint, though, Shihabi’s argument rings hollow. Offering security guarantees (even if less than a treaty) is a major concession that could tie our hands in a future crisis, and there are many reasons to doubt that it offers much incremental benefit to the United States. First, Saudi policymakers’ increasing shift to the East, and to China, is structural and economically driven. China is now by far the Saudis’ larger trading partner. While oil is still fungible, the United States’ need for imports from the Persian Gulf region has largely evaporated due to the increase in supply from domestic producers and other countries in the Western Hemisphere. It is, therefore, very difficult to see U.S. relative influence in the bilateral relationship going back to where it was during the “unipolar moment” of the 1990s, even if the Saudi side were no longer frustrated about what it considers a U.S. failure to use force against Iran after the September 2019 attacks against critical oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, as well as broader a perceived U.S. retreat from its regional security role. Second, the tradeoff articulated by Shihabi would involve very specific U.S. commitments on security in return for the relatively abstract and unenforceable notion of restored bilateral relations and relative influence. 

The Abqaiq and Khurais attacks are often cited by Saudi observers as proof that the United States has abandoned its security role in the region, but while they demonstrated Iran’s new capabilities in a jarring manner, the attacks were calibrated to avoid a catastrophic oil market disruption—not to cause one. It is true that the facilities at Abqaiq in particular are uniquely important to Saudi export flows, and arguably a more important vulnerability than the Strait of Hormuz. However, the facility runs at well below its maximum capacity, and it was designed so that oil volumes can be routed around individual components of the facility which might be damaged in an attack. By targeting only a limited number of components at Abqaiq, Iran created a large outage—5.7 million barrels per day according to Saudi Aramco—but one which allowed for the kingdom’s full production level to be restored by the end of September 2019, about two weeks after the attack. This also was apparent to analysts, including me, looking at the commercial satellite photos available the day after the attack, limiting the impact on oil prices. It also was certainly clear to U.S. officials, and the intentionally limited impact on oil flows is likely a large part of the reason why President Donald Trump chose not to take military action against Iran as a result. Iran had shown that it could cause a catastrophic volume loss by hitting roughly triple the number of aim points at Abqaiq with accurate suicide drones, but it chose not to do so. 

The Abqaiq episode has not demonstrated to Iran that the United States has abandoned its interest in protecting the free flow of oil from the region or would be unwilling to take military action if Iran caused damage at a higher threshold. If Saudi Arabia had a U.S. security guarantee, that probably would have prevented a demonstration attack like this, but if it had not the United States could have been locked into taking military action over something below the threshold of major damage to U.S. interests. Trying to decide exactly how the threshold for such a guarantee should be defined would be difficult in a region known for the widespread use of gray-zone provocations, but an unambiguous guarantee with a low threshold could easily entangle the United States in an escalating conflict over a relatively minor trigger. Abqaiq is a perfect example of how U.S. and Saudi views about these thresholds can differ.

In addition, the use of support for proxies and gray-zone provocations by both Saudi Arabia and Iran raises the issue of potential “moral hazards” stemming from a security guarantee. Would Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman feel emboldened in his regional actions? The converse of that seems to have arguably been operative in the years since Abqaiq, in which a sense of vulnerability produced a dialogue with Iran and the recent agreement to normalize relations and mutually curtail actions that had caused friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia, including support for proxies. The fact that China stepped in to midwife the agreement toward the end of the process made it a bit uncomfortable for the United States, but it still promotes the U.S. interest in regional stability.

The Saudis and Emiratis’ frequent complaints in the years since Biden took office that the United States is “withdrawing” from the Middle East are belied by the facts. The United States still maintains a robust naval presence in the Persian Gulf and has substantial land-based air assets in the region, along with pre-positioned equipment for ground forces. This is clearly a major reduction from the levels seen in the post-9/11 era. However, it compares to the levels seen in the 1990s following the first Gulf War of 1991 and is well above levels of in-theater CENTCOM assets that prevailed in the 1980s. The United States is not withdrawing from regional security but rather returning to a more normal level. What is different, though, is the challenge the United States faces from a rising China outside the region, which is an argument for not allowing commitments in the Middle East to tie up more U.S. military resources.

Even without a security guarantee, there is plenty the United States can and should do to help Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states secure themselves against the primary threat they face, which is Iran’s growing arsenal of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—suicide drones and much more accurate ballistic missiles—which has sometimes been shared with proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen. Israel is a technology leader in this field, and the United States should facilitate cooperation to the extent possible. An integrated regional network would be ideal, but there are plenty of political obstacles unrelated to a U.S. security guarantee, especially the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as distrust among Gulf Arab states, including between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Regardless of any U.S. guarantees, it is difficult to envision sufficient trust between these states to do the sort of extensive integration of sensitive data and information technology systems, which is seen between the United States and Canada in NORAD or members of NATO in Europe. Even if not fully integrated or publicly acknowledged, though, such cooperation should be encouraged.

The U.S.-China rivalry is driving the Saudi’s strategy of emphasizing their options and trying to use that to extract concessions from the United States. But while the United States cannot hope to pry Saudi Arabia away from China due to their economic interests, there is little indication that the Saudis genuinely have the option of junking the U.S. security relationship. China has long sought to be a supplier of military systems the West would not sell to the kingdom, going back all the way to China’s sale of medium-range ballistic missiles to Riyadh in the mid-1980s, but it has shown no interest in providing fourth- or fifth-generation fighter aircraft to regional powers—where U.S. and British systems currently provide the Saudis with overwhelming air superiority in any conflict with Iran. The financial cost of converting its forces to different equipment also would be prohibitive during a period when the kingdom is focused on diversifying its economy away from dependence on oil, not to mention the chronological gap in capabilities during the transition if the United States were ever to withdraw support for its weapons systems. China also is clearly not interested in abandoning its extensive relationship with Iran.

In sum, it simply does not make sense for the United States to make huge concessions to Saudi Arabia in the form of a formal security guarantee in response to concerns about China or the desire for Saudi-Israeli normalization. The United States should continue to play a leading role in regional security, but on its own terms, not theirs.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

La réglementation applicable aux données personnelles évolue, avec l'entrée en vigueur, le 25 mai 2018, du RGPD, adopté par le Parlement européen. C'est l'occasion pour « Le Monde diplomatique » de réaffirmer ses engagements en matière de confidentialité de vos données personnelles. / A propos du « Diplo (...) / A propos du « Diplo » - 2018/06

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Après un demi-siècle de lutte armée marqué par de nombreux attentats et par plusieurs tentatives de résolution pacifique du conflit, l'organisation basque ETA a annoncé début mai sa dissolution. Renversé par le Parlement le 1er juin, le gouvernement conservateur espagnol avait parié sur une défaite (...) / Espagne, Basques, Mouvement de libération, Terrorisme, Conflit, Politique, Diplomatie, Accord de paix, Parti politique, France - 2018/06

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Washington, Paris, and Doha are working to find a solution to Beirut’s nine-month presidential deadlock as well as to prevent another vacuum from plunging Lebanon into a deeper crisis.

A recent meeting held in Doha, Qatar, dubbed the “Quincy Committee,” sought to devise a strategy that can be delivered to the authorities in Lebanon. The countries that made up the committee were the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar. American ambassador Dorothy Shea attended the meeting alongside her French colleague, Jean-Yves Le Drian.

Le Drian, who is Paris’s special envoy to Lebanon, is expected to arrive on July 25 in Beirut after consulting with French president Emmanuel Macron and Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna about the conclusions reached in Doha. The French diplomat visited Lebanon in June to have a series of meetings with the different heads of the political parties. He also had spoken with caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, whom he left with a grave warning, “time does not work in favor of Lebanon.”

Yet it does seem to be working in favor of Lebanese politicians. One example is that the European Parliament had recently decided to extend a waiver for the imposition of targeted sanctions against Lebanese who are undermining the country’s democracy for another year. This is effectively a deadline: Lebanese leaders have one year to vote for a new president before sanctions will be imposed.

This European lifeline is a bit contradictory when compared to Le Drian’s words. Lebanese share the perception that the international community is failing them. Perpetual calls by global leaders like Macron for reform and accountability have fallen on deaf ears. Despite threats of sanctions and punishment for ignoring international standards for good governance, no serious actions have been taken to rectify the behavior of Lebanon’s ruling class. Karim Bitar, an associate professor of international relations at Saint Joseph University, talked to the National Interest about what likely will result from the Quincy Committee and its impact on the presidency and central bank governorship.

“It is quite unlikely that this meeting will solve the presidential deadlock. The last time the five countries met in France, they decided unanimously that there should be no extension to the term of the central bank governor Riad Salameh.”

Salameh, seventy-three, has been governor of the Lebanese central bank since 1993. Prior to the 2019 crisis, he was seen as a financial genius and the man credited for protecting the Lebanese pound (lira) by pegging it to the U.S. dollar. Now, he is regarded with contempt by most Lebanese people and is considered to be the gatekeeper of Lebanese corruption. Ordinary citizens have been unable to access their own bank accounts since late 2019. Salameh is facing investigations at home and abroad for financial crimes such as embezzlement and money laundering.

Salameh denies the charges made against him and has vowed to challenge them. Back in February, the long-time banking chief said he would not renew his term as governor. There is now a discussion among the Lebanese political elite and attendees from the Doha talks about how to proceed on the central bank succession. In Beirut, talk of offering an extension for a limited period was believed to be put on the table. Yet the group from Doha is said to have reached a near-consensus that if there is no extension, all responsibilities should be transferred to the first deputy governor, Wassim Mansouri. Everyone is now waiting to see the results of Le Drian’s visit and how he is gauging where the winds of Lebanese politics are blowing. If Salameh’s term is not extended to a caretaker capacity and the government cannot find a suitable replacement, it will mean that there will be a double vacancy for the first time in Lebanese history: one for the president and one for the central bank governor. The government and the five countries from the Quincy Committee have one week to find a solution. If they don’t, the politics of improvision will continue to rule Lebanon.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

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In recent months, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity, with American, European, and Chinese diplomats jetting from one capital city to another. For the Europeans, these trips are part of a long-term strategy to hedge their bets. For the United States, the overtures have been an attempt to thaw relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the meantime, President Xi Jinping and his Politburo have toned down their inner “wolf warrior” to capitalize on European equivocations and U.S. weakness to push the “rules-based international order” to their advantage. 

At its summit in June, the European Council reiterated its view that the PRC is “simultaneously a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival.” It and Europe have “shared interests … anchored in a respect for the rules-based international order,” and Europe will “continue to engage with China” to “tackle global challenges.” Yet many of the challenges that today menace the EU have their origins in the foreign policy ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party. The international order the CCP aspires to establish is opposed to the Westphalian nation-state system that emerged from Europe in the seventeenth century. Instead, Beijing envisions a Chinese civilization-state at the center of the political universe, upheld by a ruthlessly pragmatic Marxist-Leninist modus operandi.

European leaders appear little perturbed. Germany’s inaugural National Security Strategy acknowledged that “China is trying in various ways to remold the existing rules-based international order.” Still, it continues, the PRC is “a partner without whom many global challenges…cannot be solved.” Beyond the veneer of its more bellicose rhetoric, the new German China strategy asserts much the same. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Premier Li Qiang in June, he avoided any mention of Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or economic de-risking. At the request of Beijing, he also avoided the press.

French president Emmanuel Macron has been more overt. Macron has long held that any EU policy on China should not reflect Washington’s position. Between photo ops in Beijing in April, he implored Xi to “play a major role” in Ukraine by finding a “pathway to peace.” At the June summit of his pet project, the New Global Financing Initiative, he extended a coveted speaking slot to Li. “China will unequivocally reject trade protectionism and all forms of decoupling and severing of supply chains,” the premier warned. Macron has since suggested that he should attend the upcoming BRICS summit in August. It would come as little surprise if he advocates for China’s inclusion in the G7 in the future.

The French and German position appears to be a feature rather than a bug in Europe’s approach to China. EU leaders increasingly speak of a “multipolar world” where China plays a prominent role. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky—currently besieged by the man Xi once called his “best, most intimate friend”—has even suggested that his country could be a “bridge to Europe” for Chinese businesses. 

Outside of Europe, hedging has also become the path of least resistance. At a recent left-wing Sao Paulo Forum meeting, South American leaders applauded Macron’s push for European strategic autonomy and a China policy independent of Washington. Similar echoes can be heard from Africa to Southeast Asia, where China has been deploying its highest officials for the last two decades to solidify its influence.

China has aimed to portray itself as a more compatible partner, one that will not meddle in a country’s internal affairs while championing the interests of the Global South on the world stage—a convenient, if relativist, strategy that resonates in Egypt, South Africa, Myanmar, and Pakistan, among others. Despite the Biden administration’s assurances that American leadership is back and stronger than ever, policy failures in the Middle East and misguided agendas elsewhere have left the United States increasingly isolated, with key partners inching closer to Beijing. Exacerbating its loss of influence, Washington, like Europe, has been attempting to thread the Beijing needle—despite bipartisan hawkishness on Capitol Hill. 

During her trip to Beijing earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen repeated the administration’s new talking point: U.S.-China relations need to be “on a better track” that maintains “open and honest lines of communication.” “The world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive,” Yellen announced. What this means is unclear. But what is clear is that the PRC has little interest in honest dialogue or stabilization with the United States.

Consider what happened in June when Blinken traveled to Beijing. After it had refused a one-on-one with Xi until the last day of the visit, the CCP staged the encounter to depict the president as if he were holding court, with Blinken as a submissive petitioner. The trip's primary objective—to re-establish military-to-military communications—was, for the United States, a failure. Yet, for the CCP, it was a policy and public relations win. As long as Beijing delays the renewal of the bilateral military exchanges, it may draw more concessions from Washington. In the meantime, Xi’s feigned concern for fentanyl outflows into the United States and other policy issues came as wittingly crafted signs of “progress.”

Special Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, also supports engagement with China on environmental issues though this has not won him any goodwill in Beijing. Kerry returned from China last week without winning any further carbon reduction commitments from Xi. China is the world’s leading polluter, responsible for over a quarter of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and more than half of its coal production. Last year, it sanctioned domestic coal production equal to two new large coal power plants per week. Consequently, Xi and his central committee have little interest in genuine climate talks. What they are interested in, however, is exploiting Biden’s green agenda to weaken U.S. industry and undercut national security. 

No doubt, planting a de-escalation ladder between the superpowers is a worthy aim. Yet as the New York Times noted, Biden “is betting that high-level dialogue can itself act as a ballast in a relationship.” Yet, that bet and the administration’s detente has only emboldened the PRC. Xi has made it clear he has no desire to de-escalate—or even meet Biden halfway in establishing a viable, working relationship. In the last six months alone, China has violated U.S. airspace, increased patrols and unsafe maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, and placed export restrictions on minerals critical to the United States and allied defense production. While Washington continues to call for a “fair set of rules,” Beijing plays its own game, knowing that—beyond vacuous calls for more dialogue—it will be met with no meaningful response. Recent revelations that the CCP hacked multiple U.S. government agencies suggest that the provocations will not abate.

With Europe wavering, U.S. partners edging ever closer to Beijing, and a U.S. administration intent on engagement for engagement’s sake, China has carte blanche to do what it likes when it likes. Steadily, Xi is reshaping the rules-based international order with impunity. If neither Europe nor America resist, this diplomatic activity could herald China’s “new world order” sooner than expected.

Amy K. Mitchell is a founding partner at Kilo Alpha Strategies. She brings extensive national security and defense experience to the firm, having advised three Secretaries of Defense and several large defense contractors. Her unique understanding of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests provides companies with high-level insights and counsel. Ms. Mitchell is currently a Visiting Fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at New Lines Institute, serves on the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition and is a member of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition Foreign Policy Study Group.

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu is the founder of the geopolitical risk and strategic communications firm Magpie Advisory. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Visiting Fellow at the Independent Women's Forum, Contributing Editor with the New York Sun, and serves on the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition. She holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Oxford.

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Despite another round of negotiations in Brussels on July 15, the situation in the long-contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh remains volatile as violence continues to rage between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In an attempt to stabilize boiling tensions, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has vowed to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory. Future U.S.-hosted peace talks between Baku are critical for deciding the region's fate. While peacekeeping proposals focus on the two direct combatants, the involvement of Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan, and Iran, which supports Armenia, will be necessary for potential talks to form an enduring settlement.

Given its shared cultural and ethnic heritage and desire to protect its sphere of influence, Turkey has long supported Azerbaijan’s territorial claims in Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey grew bolder in its support by providing infrastructure and weapons assistance, including Bayraktar TB2 armed drones, which helped secure Azerbaijan’s overwhelming victory. Ankara’s support has encouraged Baku’s assertiveness and reluctance to grant concessions. This attitude persisted throughout the September 2022 border clashes. Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu directly intervened, tweeting, “Armenia should cease its provocations and focus on peace negotiations and cooperation with Azerbaijan.”

Iran, meanwhile, played a pivotal role in perpetuating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Iranian army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have conducted large-scale military drills along its border with Azerbaijan. While Iran has a sizable Azerbaijani population, Tehran is concerned about Israeli influence in the Caucasus. Baku has received high-tech drones and other weapons from Jerusalem. Azerbaijan also supplies 40 percent of Israeli oil consumption. Iran is also concerned that Israel’s support for Azerbaijan is an opportunity for the former to conduct surveillance on Tehran via unmanned surveillance aircraft. Additionally, if Baku were to construct the Zangezur overland transport corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey via southern Armenian territory, Iran could be further isolated from the South Caucasus.

Excluding the regional powers from future Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations would be an unwise error. Upcoming Nagorno-Karabakh talks present the opportunity for Armenia and Turkey to make concrete steps in pursuing the normalization of ties discussed in 2022. Iran could also appease its Azerbaijani population by achieving peace with its neighbor.

Reconciling Turkey and Iran could also serve as an avenue for Washington to improve its own relations with Ankara and Tehran. U.S.-Turkey relations have deteriorated since the early 2000s. U.S.-Iran links have been in a deep freeze since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. As a result, the Iran nuclear crisis has worsened, with Iran now possessing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Through cooperation over Nagorno-Karabakh, Washington and Tehran could potentially revitalize peace talks in other areas, including nuclear nonproliferation.

While diplomatic cooperation between Iran and the West may appear unlikely, all parties have clear interests in furthering peace. Iran’s Azerbaijani population, which has staged protests in the past, poses problems for Iranian unity. The United States and France are also home to sizable Armenian diaspora communities. American and EU investors maintain commercial interests in Azerbaijan’s energy projects. Baku helped build 2,174 miles of natural gas pipelines to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. These projects will be critical for the success of the EU-Azerbaijan energy plan to double Brussels’ gas imports from Azerbaijan by 2027.

What conditions will ensure a durable peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh? First, Azerbaijan must cease its blockade of the Lachin corridor. This blockade has restricted the freedom of movement for the 120,000 Karabakh Armenians and threatened their access to food and medicine. Ending the blockade would be a suitable concession, allowing Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan’s territory.

Protection of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh will also be crucial for lasting peace and will put to rest Yerevan’s concerns about a potential ethnic cleansing. Persecution of Karabakh Armenians would surely lead to an increase in Iran and Turkey’s military involvement in the region. The United States should make clear that failure to assure the security of Karabakh Armenians would negatively impact Baku's reputation as a dependable trading partner.

If these objectives can be met, a commitment from Iran and Turkey to reduce escalatory practices will keep Karabakh tensions from spiraling into a more significant conflict. UN peacekeepers are ideal, neutral guarantors of preserving these conditions, as Russian peacekeepers have been ineffective in quelling violence in the region. Peacekeepers from the United States are out of the question, as there are no vital U.S. national interests in the South Caucasus that would warrant the risk of starting new wars.

The United States should recognize that it can reap considerable benefits from including Turkey and Iran in future Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks. Not only is it a chance for open dialogue on a myriad of important issues, but it could provide the greatest likelihood of lasting peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.

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Karl Schlögel recreates a lost world of long queues and shared spaces.